

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

-9775A

[REDACTED]

-9775-13

COMBATTING
THE
GUERRILLA

4
Received 23 Jan 47

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

CGSC Ctl No. A61-705

[REDACTED]

ag-2389

head Lt 1

COMBATTING
THE
GUERRILLA

1 May 1945.

« Combatting the Guerrilla » is published for the information and guidance of all concerned. Since guerrilla activities can be conducted by civilians as well as by soldiers, this pamphlet should be read in conjunction with SHAEF, *Handbook for Unit commanders (Germany)*, Revised Edition, 15 February 1945, which provides information of assistance to commanders in their relations with the inhabitants during the period of the occupation of Germany.

CONTENTS

SUMMARY

	Pages.
1. Purpose	6
2. Types of activity.....	6
a. General	6
b. The inaccessible strongpoint.....	7
c. The irregulars	7
d. The underground.....	7
3. German experience with guerrillas.....	8
a. General	8
b. In France	9
c. In Poland	21
d. In Italy	22
e. In Yugoslavia	27
f. In Russia	28
4. Methods of countering guerrilla activities.....	34
a. General	34
b. Control of movement.....	35
c. Obtaining cooperation of local inhabitants.....	35
d. Eliminating guerrilla supplies.....	36
e. Importance of first countermeasures.....	36
f. Intelligence	37
g. Communications	37
h. Mobility	38
i. Offensive operations	39
j. Defensive precautions	40
Appendix.	
The Werewolf	41

COMBATting THE GUERRILLA

SUMMARY

Guerrilla warfare may have one or more of three aspects. These aspects are (1) the inaccessible strongpoint or *reduit*, (2) the irregular bands, or partisans, with or without a *reduit* and (3) the undercover or underground party which may operate alone or in conjunction with the other aspects.

Guerrillas disrupt lines of communications and military government by military and political action. They must attain surprise, mobility, and inaccessibility to be successful.

The most effective means of defeating guerrilla activity is to cut them off physically and morally from the local inhabitants. While stern measures, such as curfew, prohibition of assembly, limitations of movement, heavy fines, forced labor, and the taking of hostages, may be necessary in the face of a hostile population, these measures must be applied so as to induce the local inhabitants to work with the occupying forces.

Although the advantages of the guerrillas are mobility and surprise, his weaknesses are his dependence on others and his lack of resources, especially in equipment and resupply.

A knowledge of guerrilla activities is a prerequisite to being able to devise effective countermeasures.

COMBATting THE GUERRILLA

1. PURPOSE.

There are indications that German attempts at underground or guerrilla activity may increase as our forces complete the occupation of Germany. The Nazis, who have had considerable experience fighting guerrillas and who have had time to make preparations in advance, can be expected to produce German guerrillas who will be more experienced than any bands of guerrillas hitherto encountered either in this or in any other war. The solution of the problems presented to commanders by this type of activity can be assisted by a knowledge of the experience of resistance groups in those countries formerly occupied by the Germans.

In the preparation of this pamphlet, the main sources of information have been those interested in the conduct of guerrilla activities against the enemies of the United Nations. The descriptions given by these sources naturally tend to emphasize the success of guerrilla methods against the Germans. The Germans will, however, not have similar success in their guerrilla activities, for they will lack material and moral assistance from the outside world.

These notes have been gathered together quickly to be of such use as commanders may desire to make of them in connection with their operations among a hostile population.

2. TYPES OF ACTIVITY.

a. General.

Guerrilla warfare is characterized by relatively small, armed groups which harass and hamper the smooth functioning of both lines of communications

and military government. There are three roughly defined aspects of guerrilla warfare: (1) the inaccessible strongpoint or *reduit*, (2) irregular marauding bands of armed men, and (3) the undercover or underground party. All three aspects of guerrilla warfare can be present at the same time.

b. The inaccessible strongpoint.

The inaccessible strongpoint, defended by a strong garrison, and serving as a base for marauding guerrilla bands, could be the heart of any Nazi plan to prolong resistance for a considerable time. It would, however, put such a strain on manpower and available resources as seriously to diminish the effectiveness of other forms of guerrilla activity. The strongpoint method would have the further disadvantage of concentrating Nazi strength into a visible and definable target for Allied counteraction.

c. The irregulars.

Irregular bands of armed men, or partisans, may or may not have a strongpoint as a base. Their operations are based on surprise and a quick get-away. The get-away is accomplished usually by dispersion. The sizes of irregular bands vary from a handful to many thousands. Large bands of irregulars require good organization; usually an inaccessible strongpoint or outside aid is needed to accomplish it.

d. The underground.

The underground or undercover party is an organization composed of small units acting clandestinely in pursuit of definite ends. Its first aim is survival as an organized entity. This is what might be considered the «lowest common denominator» of guerrilla warfare, but its effectiveness can be great.

The Nazis themselves have had to combat underground activity, and there is evidence that Nazi Party

leaders have been deeply impressed by the effectiveness of the underground resistance which they have encountered. It is plausible that they may hope to do even better themselves, since they have had ample time and the advantage of their power to make their preparations.

3. GERMAN EXPERIENCE WITH GUERRILLAS.

a. General.

In every country which the Germans occupied, guerrilla warfare was prevalent in one or more of its aspects. The guerrilla activities were, however, not the same in every country. Therefore, in each occupied area the Germans developed particular countermeasures to suppress the guerrillas in the particular area.

Because detailed information concerning the activities of the various resistance movements and the German countermeasures must be closely guarded, the descriptions of guerrilla activities in France, Poland, Italy, Yugoslavia, and Russia are presented without giving names, dates, and locations. They illustrate the kinds of activity a security force may have to suppress, and being grouped by country, enable the reader to see that the Germans altered their methods, in some cases, to fit the country and the racial characteristics of its inhabitants. The German countermeasures which were not altered to take into account the characteristics of the country and its people were not uniformly successful. Thus in Russia severe measures in many instances caused resistance to stiffen while similar measures in Italy reduced the amount of guerrilla activity. The savage German reprisals against civilians in some occupied countries resulted in consolidating support for the guerrillas. Indiscriminate use of the death penalty against innocent individuals gave the inhabitants a feeling of having no alternative to death. This easily led to the determina-

tion to oppose the Germans and to aid the guerrillas.

The countermeasures described in this pamphlet are mainly those devised by the Germans. They may or may not be effective when used against the Germans. In any case, countermeasures are always susceptible of improvement, and an interchange of information on countermeasures between units fighting guerrilla tactics will assist us.

b. In France.

The following are specific instances of guerrilla activity in France, with the countermeasures employed by the Germans :

(1) *Ambush of a column.*

(a) *Guerrilla tactics.*

When ambushing a column the French resistance groups or Maquis would normally choose wooded country, and if possible, a stretch of road from which the German column would have difficulty in deploying. The tactics employed were as follows :

1. A road block was arranged just around a bend after a straight stretch of road. Various types of road blocks were used such as running a large truck across the road, felling trees on the road, or in mountainous country blowing down overhanging cliffs or rocks on to the road with explosives.

2. Having blocked the head of a column, the Maquis would then concentrate on immobilizing two or three vehicles at the rear of the column, or in the case of a very large column in the middle, thereby immobilizing either the entire column or a large section of it.

3. The effect of these tactics was normally a bunching of enemy vehicles head to tail which were then fired on with automatic weapons and rifles. On roads having steep banks at the sides small parties were

also placed at the top of the banks where they could throw hand grenades on to the Germans as soon as they dismounted from their vehicles.

4. The Maquis found it essential to operate in scrub country in order to have cover during withdrawal after the ambush, otherwise Maquis casualties became very heavy as soon as the Germans were able to bring their numerous machine guns into action.

(b) *Countermeasures.*

When the Germans had experienced a number of ambushes of the type described above, they developed the following types of countermeasures :

1. Armored vehicles, if available, were placed at the head and tail of columns.

2. Orders were given that on the move automatic weapons would be constantly manned and ready for instant action.

3. Motorcycles were frequently sent ahead of the columns to check for possible road blocks around blind corners, and these motorcycles normally had a machine gun mounted on the handle bar or in the side-car.

4. In particularly vulnerable areas the Germans sometimes cleared woods and scrub for a distance of 50 to 100 yards on either side of the road.

5. They also used the civilian population sometimes as protection against ambush. In the case of slow moving columns passing through particularly vulnerable country, the Germans at times made French civilians walk on either side of the column to protect it from Maquis fire. On other occasions one or two civilians were carried in each open truck with the same object in view. The Germans attempted to prevent further ambush by taking severe reprisals on the civilian population of the nearest village or other town where an ambush had taken place.

(2) *Damaging motor tires.*

(a) *Guerrilla tactics.*

The standard method of attacking German motor transport tires was by the use of the tire burster, a special article delivered from England. The tire bursters were simply laid in roads normally used by German motor transport. They were camouflaged as dead leaves, dung, old bricks or a piece of rock, and were placed in position at night or in the early hours of the morning. Farm laborers going to work were often employed for this purpose.

Considerable damage was also done by cutting or slashing the tires of stationary unattended vehicles. It should be noted that work of this type had to be done very quickly and cleanly, and it was found essential to use a strong and very heavy sharp knife for this purpose. A pocket penknife was normally not heavy enough to deal with large modern tires.

(b) *Countermeasures.*

Only the most elementary countermeasures were introduced, consisting of strict rules against leaving parked vehicles unattended, and the careful guarding of all motor transport parks. In addition, in areas where it was known that tire bursters were being used, the Germans on occasions fixed ordinary household brooms to the front bumper of vehicles in order to sweep a path clear of tire bursters immediately in front of the track of the vehicle. It is not known whether the broom countermeasure was effective or not.

(3) *Raid on isolated German headquarters.*

(a) *Guerrilla tactics.*

Raids on isolated German headquarters by French Resistance Groups were not very numerous. In most cases the armament of the French patriots was sufficient for only very small-scale surprise attacks.

Attacks were always made at night or in the morning at dawn, and surprise was always a very big factor.

When planning a raid it was found that it was essential first to locate and cut all telephone lines leading to the German headquarters. Otherwise the headquarters on being attacked would immediately warn other German units in the neighborhood who would themselves endeavor to cordon off the area and encircle the French raiding party. The most successful raid method entailed an approach right up to the German headquarters in absolute silence. Two or three patriots covered by hidden submachine guns or rifles would then make a dash right up to the building. French patriots found it essential to make raids as short as possible and withdraw as soon as the surprise element had worn out.

(b) Countermeasures.

The only effective way of countering these surprise attacks was by very alert and heavy patrolling. The Germans also found it necessary to change their sentries at irregular intervals. In the case of isolated headquarters, the Germans gave orders to their telephone operators to make frequent checks throughout the night in order to ascertain whether any headquarters telephone line had been put out of action.

(4) Raid on a gasoline dump or ammunition depot.

(a) Guerrilla tactics.

It was found essential that attacks be mounted in such a way as to take full advantage of the surprise factor, and plans were always made for a hasty withdrawal immediately before the German guard had had time to organize and take counteraction.

Attacks normally took place at night using very small coup-de-main parties, and on occasions a certain number of the French patriots were dressed in stolen German uniforms.

In the case of ammunition depots, it was found extremely hard to do any real damage to the ammunition unless a strongly armed raiding party could overcome the guard and spend some time in the ammunition depot forcibly damaging the stocks.

In the case of gasoline dumps, it was found that it was essential to know how the gasoline was stored, i.e., in tanks, cans, or tins. Rifle or machine-gun fire against gasoline containers allows a considerable quantity of gasoline to run out into the open air and only then can it be fired, using either weapons with tracer bullets or incendiary grenades. Saboteurs often use a small explosive charge linked with an incendiary grenade and initiated by a time-delay mechanism.

(b) Countermeasures.

The only effective measure which the Germans adopted consisted of considerably increasing the guards on such dumps.

They also used dogs to give the alarm, and this method was often effective in preventing the French patriots from making a totally undetected approach at night.

(5) Interfering with and damaging railroads.

(a) Guerrilla tactics.

Destruction of sections of tracks, demolition of bridges, ambushing railroad trains, and sabotage of railroad equipment are the principal means used to interfere with railroad operations.

(b) Countermeasures.

A special rail protection force was organized by the Germans to protect both equipment and the right of way. This force performed the following duties :

1. Constructed, organized, and manned strongpoints inside all installations and in places along the track.

2. Patrolled areas requiring constant surveillance.

3. Provided each military leave train and each troop train with a train commandant, and a train guard. The commandant was required to detail one «front commander» for each side of the entire train and for each coach. These commandants were responsible for continuous observation and defense during the journey. The train commandant allocated machine guns, assault, engineer, and mopping-up sections, reserves, and medical facilities for the whole train.

Every military train was kept in a constant state of alert with a higher degree of alertness on particularly dangerous sections of the line.

When surprise fire was opened against the train while in motion, a halt was ordered only if it was decided to engage the guerrillas. If the guerrillas were successful in halting the train, they were attacked and dispersed; the action was broken off when it was safe for the train to proceed.

The local population was required to obtain permission from the responsible commanders in order to use the railroad's right of way.

(6) *Cutting a railway line.*

(a) *Guerrilla tactics.*

When cutting a railway line the French Resistance Movement usually employed the following tactics :

1. Select and carefully reconnoiter a suitable stretch of railway line on a slight bend.

2. Check carefully whether the line was patrolled by German sentries.

3. Place an explosive charge of about 2 to 2½ lbs of plastic explosive which was set off by the passage of a train, by a fog signal, or by an automatic switch.

4. The charge, if correctly placed and set, would normally explode under the third or fourth wheel of

a locomotive, blowing away two or three meters of track and causing a derailment.

5. In suitable country and when the object of a derailment was a German troop train, the Maquis would endeavor to place a few automatic rifles and rifles in position so that the Germans could be shot down as they clambered out of the derailed train in confusion.

(b) *Countermeasures.*

When personnel was available, the railway lines were patrolled, but generally speaking the task of patrolling all important lines was quite beyond the German manpower resources.

Sentries and patrols were ordered to fire at the slightest movement in the vicinity of the railway lines and ask questions afterwards.

Sentries were placed at the entrances to almost all important tunnels.

As attacks usually took place at night, the lines were floodlighted in one or two exceptionally vulnerable points or railway junctions.

Germans would sometimes place a few empty flat cars in front of a locomotive so that the flat cars rather than the locomotive and tender would be damaged. In an endeavor to prevent the derailments, the Germans would even place civilians selected at random in these open flat cars in front of locomotives.

Another countermeasure adopted by the Germans consisted of selecting a number of local civilians. These civilians would be made responsible for guarding a particular stretch of railway line and were told that they would be shot if any sabotage took place on their portion of the line.

(7) *Sabotage of a locomotive.*

(a) *Guerrilla tactics.*

The French Resistance Movement developed many different methods of sabotaging locomotives besides

the derailling of trains. The most effective method, which normally required the assistance of the local railroad personnel, caused such damage to locomotives that repairs took an average of from one to two months. This method consisted of placing an explosive charge (about 2 lbs in weight) with a time fuze on the locomotive piston shaft where it enters the cylinder block. This method resulted in cracking both the piston and cylinder block and entailed a major repair.

Another form of sabotage, less serious, but which had serious long term effects, consisted of tampering in various ways with the locomotive lubrication system. One method was to remove the rag from the axle box thereby causing the splash lubrication to cease which would eventually result in a seized axle. A further method consisted of putting water into the cylinder lubrication box. A little oil would then be placed in the water and as the oil floated on top, a cursory inspection did not reveal this type of sabotage.

A further method practiced with considerable success consisted of putting specially prepared abrasive in all the normal greasing points of a locomotive instead of grease. This system had the disadvantage of producing results only at a considerably later date.

(b) Countermeasures.

This type of sabotage could only be countered by very detailed inspection of locomotive axle boxes, cylinders, greasing points, etc.

The Germans also carefully checked all railway personnel having access to locomotive repair cases including a body search for explosives, a careful checking of any suitcases, tool kits or packages of food carried by railway employees.

The Germans also attempted to prevent this type of sabotage by introducing German technical railway personnel into the French railways. This type of su-

pervision, however, did not prove particularly effective owing to the very high proportion of pro-Allied railway workers in the French state railways.

(8) *Interfering with messengers and isolated motorcyclists.*

(a) *Guerrilla tactics.*

The French Resistance Groups would make a careful study of the routes normally taken by German messengers, also the location of German headquarters where messenger activity was particularly heavy.

The best method which was developed consisted of placing a thin wire across the road just below head height. This method was particularly effective in deep wooded country or when used at dusk or by night.

It was found, however, that messengers were of course very much more numerous by day and the following system was therefore developed. A slack wire would be placed across the road and pulled taut by a concealed patriot when the messenger was almost on the wire and traveling too fast to avoid it. This method was particularly popular as it enabled a German victim to be selected without the risk of decapitating an unsuspecting French motorcyclist by mistake.

(b) *Countermeasures.*

Wire cutters on all vehicles.

German messengers found that a powerful headlight on the motorcycle with a well regulated beam would sometimes at night illuminate a shiny non-insulated wire in sufficient time to avoid running into it. It was noted that a wire was very rarely recognized in time by the German messenger if he was wearing goggles.

(9) *Disrupting telephone lines.*

(a) *Guerrilla tactics.*

Every alternate telegraph pole on a bend would be cut or brought down with high explosives. Even-

tually the strain on the remaining telegraph poles would be sufficient to pull down the remaining poles and lines over quite a large stretch.

In areas where the Germans were not numerous high explosive charges were placed on the head of a telegraph pole thereby blowing off the top of the pole, the insulators and all the wires in the group.

Telephone lines in many cases passed underground through major towns. Where this was so, normally the lines on telegraph poles dropped down into a small cabin outside the town where the junction was effected with the underground system. It was found that these small cabins could easily be forced and the telephone line connections inside destroyed with high explosives.

Telephone lines carried on poles were cut by hand. This proved a long process. In addition, some of the German military telephone lines which ran alongside the civil lines, consisted of wire of very hard steel, or wire with a hard steel covering which was not at all easy to cut by hand.

Hastily laid army field lines in the forward battle areas were difficult to attack owing to the density of German troops on the ground. Such attacks were not normally planned, but were carried out by local inhabitants using an ordinary pair of scissors or pliers.

In all cases of attacks on telephone lines, a much greater delay could be caused by cutting the lines in two places and removing a considerable stretch of wire.

(b) *Countermeasures.*

The most effective countermeasure was German propaganda which frequently announced that sabotage of this type did not effect the military in any way,

since they did not use the civil telephone system for military purposes. It was constantly stressed that attacks on telephone lines were extremely foolish since their only effect was to inconvenience the public and slow down the French administration, particularly in regard to distribution of food stuffs.

The German defensive patrols even using bicycles or motorcycles were quite ineffective owing to the magnitude of the task of guarding lines which could often be attacked well away from the road system.

Fines, arrests, and reprisals were imposed. In some cases a whole village would be fined when telephone sabotage took place in the vicinity.

(10) *Cutting long distance buried cables.*

(a) *Guerrilla tactics.*

A cutting team normally consisting of about six men was composed of telephone and telegraph technicians or men trained by them. The size of the team permitted guards to be posted while the cable was being cut and also provided enough personnel for the sawing of the cable to be done by two or three men taking turns.

The location at which a cable was to be cut required a careful choice. The exact route of the cable had to be known, including the precise distance from the edge of the road and the precise depth at which it was buried. The location for the proposed cut was normally chosen about twenty miles from a repeater station, and two cuts were usually organized simultaneously at either side of the repeater station. In selecting the exact spot for cutting the cable, an isolated part of the road was normally chosen, and as far as possible a point near a dump of sand or road mending material which could conveniently be used for hiding any traces of digging when the sabotage had been completed.

The most effective way of cutting the cable was found to be a clean cut made with a fine saw. When the cable had been cut right through, paraffin, grease, or some other insulating material was poured into the cut and the cable was then bound with heavy insulating tape. This procedure resulted in the cable being completely out without any possibility existing of even a small amount of current passing through the cut by means of frayed wires touching or through the medium of dampness in the surrounding earth. It was found if the cable cut was made absolute in this manner, the German device for locating the cut was rendered ineffective. When cables were cut by this saw method, it often took the Germans up to ten days to locate and repair the cut. Plans were therefore made for maintaining the cuts on the principal cable routes about once a week.

Another method used when time did not permit the very thorough cut, consisted of drilling a small hole in the cable and filling it with water. Cables were only blown up with high explosive when a very big attack was being mounted on a junction or a number of cables which would have taken too long to cut individually by the saw method. Cables cut by high explosives were always very easily traced by the Germans.

The resistance movements did not attack the cable repeater stations since it was hoped to preserve as many as possible of these for use by the Allies after the liberation.

(b) Countermeasures.

Owing to the length and complexity of the underground cable system, the Germans found it quite impossible to guard all these routes.

The most effective guarding done by the Germans was by means of very fast patrols on the main roads along which cables were laid. By the use of fast motorcyclists, there was always the possibility of

surprising a cable cutting party digging by the roadside. Where motorcycle patrols were not available, the Germans mounted their foot patrols on requisitioned bicycles, and these were sometimes assisted by police dogs.

Cut-detector instruments were made readily available to detect the exact location of a cut in the shortest possible time, with patrols ready to proceed at short notice to the presumed location of the cut.

A number of by-pass cables were laid around towns so that if a cable were sabotaged or damaged by air action in or near a town, the through line could be quickly reconnected via a by-pass cable.

Before D-Day the Germans had a fairly extensive knowledge of the French sabotage intentions as regards buried cables. The Germans planned to arrest a number of the telephone and telegraph specialists who were considered suspect, but as the latter knew of the German plans, many of them were able to join the Maquis at the critical moment and operate their cable cutting from the Maquis camps and under Maquis protection.

c. In Poland.

(1) Base of operations.

(a) Guerrilla tactics.

There were some cases of partisans billeted in villages inhabited for many years by the Germans, who, however, were afraid of betraying them to the German authorities. The latter not suspecting their presence in a German village were not looking for them there.

(b) Countermeasures.

1. Constant observations of offices and public places.

2. Prohibition of settling down in some localities.

(2) *Counterfeiting documents.*(a) *Guerrilla tactics.*

Members of the underground aspect of the Polish partisans used false documents.

(b) *Countermeasures.*

The Germans introduced into the identity documents a number of different secret markings such as the position of the seal, distortion of a letter, and almost invisible marks on the document forms, especially of the frontier passes («Durchlasschein»). Frequent controls of documents were made at railroad stations, on trains, in hotels, on the streets, in factories, and other likely places.

d. In Italy.

The following are specific countermeasures employed by the Germans:

(1) *General.*

Recent German undertakings against partisans in the Italian theater have been distinguished not only by their ruthlessness but also by a notable improvement in political and military tactics. From the very beginning the Germans have appreciated that the partisans represent a considerable threat to the security of their lines of communication, and a certain proportion of their forces in Italy has been continuously engaged in anti-partisan combat. In recent months, however, with the growth of partisan activity consequent to the Allied successes, the enemy has developed his countermeasures accordingly and not without a degree of success.

(2) *Small-Scale Attacks.*

In the early days the Germans attacked directly, aiming at principal communication routes. Although

the suppression of patriots was considered important, the Germans conducted their operations with surprisingly little planning, apparently underestimating the quality of Italian guerrilla fighters. Units employed were often small or inadequately armed. Hard-pressed at the front, the Germans had little time and few reserves to devote to the partisans.

(3) *Large-scale attacks.*

Towards the end of Summer, 1944, however, the Germans began to attack in full force, employing all the military and political means at their disposal. Their aims were:

1. To keep the partisans from active sabotage;
2. To force units to disband, to break up unified control, and to starve the remainder by ruthless blockade;
3. To scatter and frighten the partisans into the hills and finally to reduce small bands one by one.

In practice this entails the following method: Operations are opened with a strict blockade, followed by a series of sporadic nuisance attacks on the flanks as soon as the partisans appear to feel its effect; then the final assault is designed to break up the band. Strongpoints are established to garrison each «pacified» area. In their nuisance attacks and in the main assault the Germans are careful to employ guerrilla methods.

(4) *Blockade.*

The first step is blockade. The partisans are not directly attacked in their hide-outs, but slowly the Germans cut all their links with the outside world. They occupy highways and roads; they try to harass and kill partisan patrols and parties collecting sup-

plies. These measures are insufficient, however, unless the Germans obtain a firm grip on the civilian population, which is the main source of food and major channel for partisan supplies.

(5) Raids.

Raids, designed to cause the partisans to expend their ammunition and to give them the encumbrance of casualties follow in due course. Thereafter, the final assault on hungry and worn-out bands, cut off from main roads, sources of supply and contact with other groups, is not likely to be too difficult. The ground well prepared, the quarry's situation is often helpless before the final assault begins.

These tactics could not have been made effective without an increased commitment of men and material, although the troops the Germans use for their operation are apparently not so numerous as the partisans are led to believe. Nevertheless the investment is greater than formerly. A captured document, issued 25 July 1944 included the following directions :

«

Operations against partisans require thorough preparation. Reconnaissance patrols must have at least the strength of well-armed platoons (rifles, machine pistols, machine guns). Larger mopping-up operations must never be conducted with units weaker than well-armed companies (antitank guns, mortars, machine guns, machine pistols). Larger operations must be approved by competent SS and police authorities.

..... »

(6) Punishment.

For the purpose of effecting the most rigid control possible of all civilians, the Germans classified them

into two categories : 1. Those who bear arms against Germans, and 2. Those who do not bear arms against Germans, but assist the partisans or associate with them in some way.

Partisans helpers were arrested and delivered to the military police for interrogation and disposal. In « lenient » periods they were sent to Germany for forced labor. More often, as captured documents indicate, they were executed upon capture. An order issued 1 August 1944 by the Town Major of Bologna directed not only the immediate death of all captured partisans but of « anyone granting them food or shelter, or supplying them with information », thus providing the same treatment for those directly and indirectly engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Germans.

Some effort seems to have been made to direct these severe penalties at only those who had some dealings with the partisans. By thus discouraging all civilian assistance, the enemy gradually succeeded in his primary aim, which was to cut partisan supplies at their source. If one village which had given aid to the partisans was burned to the ground and all of its men either shot or taken to Germany for forced labor, the inhabitants of the next village thought more carefully before they lent their support. This went so far that in some regions partisans were reported to have been met with hostility, not because there was sentiment against them, but because contact with them brought savage punishment. Similar countermeasures when applied to whole populations have often been reported to defeat their purpose by making the population feel without any hope of improving their own personal security, and therefore unimpressed by threats of reprisals. The only explanation seems to rest in the circumstances under which the countermeasures are taken; they are successful no matter how severe provided there is some relation between the punishment and the assistance rendered the guerrillas.

(7) *Use of local militia.*

To meet the growing troop requirements without drawing upon frontline formations the enemy made liberal use of Italian Republic (Fascist) units. This indeed, was the principal employment of the Fascist Armed Forces; use was also made of irregular Black-shirt militia, and all German authorities were requested to lend these newly instituted militia units all necessary support.

Supplementing Italian troops, German units had been drawn from divisions, corps, and GHQ march and replacement battalions as well as from combat formations in reserve. Divisional anti-partisan platoons, mainly composed of spare personnel (cadres, replacements, etc.), were formed in several instances to take care of reconnaissance missions. Special schools were instituted by divisions and larger formations to train eligible units in the intricacies of guerrilla warfare. The curriculum provided for instruction in 1. existing partisan methods, and 2. tactics of detecting and effectively dealing with partisans on platoon level. Special combat commanders (*Kampfkommandanten*) generally local commanders of district centers, were appointed to direct anti-partisan operations within their jurisdictional areas. General control was, of course, exercised by higher tactical commands (Army, Corps, etc.).

(8) *Propaganda.*

Along with their improvement in purely military methods, the Germans did not neglect the weapon of psychology. Rumors were encouraged and the wildest stories were spread by enemy controlled sources.

(9) *Intelligence.*

Captured German documents, PW statements, and other reports show that the enemy was extremely ac-

tive in keeping up-to-date all available intelligence on partisan activities. Civilians in small villages were watched closely and interrogated on the locations of partisan bands and their future intentions. Without realizing it, these civilians often gave away valuable information.

A regular order of battle of partisan bands was kept by division G-2s. Information was passed on through channels. Ground intelligence was obtained from ordinary reconnaissance (anti-partisan platoons, etc., interrogation of civilians, contact men, and agents).

Espionage was one of the chief German sources of partisan information. Agents formerly approached the bands under the pretext of wishing to make up for their admittedly Fascist past by fighting on the partisan side. Some have been killed in their attempt to join, but many succeeded in gaining the confidence of partisan leaders and thereafter kept the Germans supplied with valuable intelligence. English-speaking Germans, posing as escaped Allied PWs have been known to join the partisans and operate as agents.

e. *In Yugoslavia.*(1) *General.*

Yugoslavian guerrilla warfare against the Germans was assisted by the inaccessible mountainous terrain, by stores and arms from the Allies, by the preoccupation of the Germans in other areas, by able leadership which coupled a political ideal — unity — with the fight against the Germans. The guerrillas were initially handicapped by being estranged from the inhabitants. This was overcome by intensive propaganda.

(2) *Withdrawing from an engagement.*(a) *Guerrilla tactics.*

After Tito's partisan forces were formed into military units, there still remained uncoordinated local

detachments, or «odreds», from which the partisan movement had started and which remained an essential part of the organization. These odreds operated in their own areas and would go underground when an Axis offensive had forced the larger partisan formations to withdraw. They would then continue resistance under cover of their normal rural occupation and maintain their organization in being until the area could be liberated again.

(b) Countermeasures.

The Germans devised no successful technique to deal with this problem. It probably didn't bother them as long as they could keep the more active partisans on the run by offensive operations.

(3) Mounting an offensive from a *reduit*.

(a) Guerrilla tactics.

During the latter part of 1943 and early 1944 the partisans increased their destruction against German lines of communication. Forays were made from strongholds in the mountains.

(b) Countermeasures.

The Germans made a large-scale attack using paratroops, gliders, and bombings against Tito's headquarters in Bosnia. The ultimate objective of this attack was to capture Tito and his staff. It was unsuccessful, probably in large part due to the Allied air support which drove the Germans from the sky after the first two days. Tito was, however, forced to evacuate his *reduit*.

f. In Russia.

(1) General.

While the rapidity of the German advance into Russia in 1941 and the undoubted widespread disor-

ganization which it caused, prevented any elaborate organization of the partisan movement by the Russians, there had been some supply dumps organized in the frontier areas; instructions for the contingency of enemy occupation had been issued to the extensive communist party organization in the frontier provinces. Immediately on German occupation the party organization endeavored to disappear underground and undoubtedly played a decisive part in recruiting, organizing, and often commanding partisan bands.

(2) First Phase

(a) Guerrilla tactics.

In the early months the Russians were, in the main, retreating, and coordination by the Red Army was as yet undeveloped. The topography of Russia played a vital part; the vast stretches of forest of Belorussia and Poland, the hollows and ravines of the Steppe country or the Ukraine, and the marshes of the Taman country were areas which offered every advantage to the native and none to the invader. Small bands were formed, usually not more than 25 or 50 strong, which set about to train and to establish contact with the surrounding villages and with each other. Major operations were at first studiously avoided, since this rendered the enemy countermeasures easier. The aim was to harass the enemy as systematically as possible by the destruction of field communications, telegraph lines, and permanent ways, the derailment of trains, and the blowing of bridges. Raids were also made on outlying enemy-occupied villages, railway stations, and depots.

This was the phase of small sabotage operations which were not coordinated.

(b) Countermeasures.

The Germans at no time in Russia disposed of anything like a sufficient number of troops to eradicate

the partisans. Nevertheless very considerable forces were employed against the movement. The system adopted was in general as follows: In partisan areas the Germans held the towns, the larger villages, railway junctions and stations, river traffic (NOT the river banks) and bridges. Blockhouses often as little as 200-300 yards apart fortified and garrisoned were spaced along lines of communications. Towns and villages were also guarded by fortified blockhouses, some of them capable of taking a garrison of some 300, and the towns and villages were also surrounded by deep aprons of barbed wire. Fortified lookout towers were erected in the center of a village. It is this part of the German defense system which probably caused the greatest drain of German troops. Everywhere else within the area the invader went at his peril, and normally did not venture at all.

(3) *Second Phase*

(a) *Guerrilla tactics.*

During this phase the Russians had been advancing, and contact between the regular army and the guerrillas developed steadily. Early in 1943 a Partisans Operations Branch was created at Operational GHQ, and a network of «G-2 and G-3» sections set up throughout all major formations of the army. By 1943 not only had the strength of most bands grown to 100-200 and their establishment become somewhat more regular, but a number of semi-permanent formations of bands up to 10,000 strong were coming into existence for the purpose of undertaking major operations coordinated with the advance of the army. Regular radio communication was established by the army with all bands. Contact by troop-carrying aircraft developed rapidly and became regular, both for the purpose of evacuating wounded and of dropping regular officers to act as commanders and instructors, and of taking off partisans for training

courses. Adequate and regular supplies were dropped by parachute.

There is little doubt that by 1943 the Russian General Staff had decided on its offensive plans and had realized that the partisan movement had proved its vigor in the eighteen months when it had operated virtually independently and that it would now be built up and exploited to the full. It is certainly the fact that in the campaigns of 1943 and 1944 large-scale operations by bands of partisans, often combined into masses of several tens of thousands, played a part in the operations without which success would have been impossible. Acting under direct orders of GHQ, they provided a regular flow of intelligence, tied down large numbers of enemy line of communications troops, interrupted vital enemy supply and reinforcement lines, and in the final stages captured and held down vital areas until the arrival of the regular army.

(b) *Countermeasures.*

About every six months a punitive expedition would be undertaken of considerable size. Thus we know that early in 1943 in the Pripet Marsh area a group of some 30,000 were engaged on such an expedition. If one can judge from the experience in Belorussia these punitive expeditions were costly and not very successful. In addition the Germans pursued a policy of savage reprisals against any civilians suspected of helping the partisans, but did not normally completely wipe out such villages.

It does not appear that the German measures were even temporarily successful. The punitive expeditions were virtually nullified by the terrain, which provided the partisans, who knew it, with vast areas in which to scatter or evade pursuit by moving camp. The system of countermeasures adopted by the Germans failed completely in its object; on the one

hand, their savage reprisals against the civilian population merely had the result of consolidating its support for the partisans; while, on the other, they never succeeded, for lack of troops and possibly for lack of ruthlessness, either in exterminating the partisans or in exterminating the villages which supported them with supplies and with information. As a result the Germans fell between two stools; they neither won the support of the villagers against the partisans, nor did they deprive the partisans of the inhabited areas on which their life in the forests depended.

(4) *Reasons for the partisan successes.*

The following are the main reasons for partisan successes :

(a) The exceptional capacity of the Russians for enduring privations, which far surpasses that of the Western European;

(b) The undoubted fury of patriotism aroused against the invader, in part fostered and certainly increased and kept alive by the activities of the party organizations which had succeeded in going underground in time;

(c) The wholehearted support given to the partisans by the civil population on whom the partisans largely depended. There is no doubt that the ruthless savagery of German reprisals against the population, so far from stamping out the partisan movement, served only to increase the solidarity of the villagers against the invader and to make the tasks of the partisans easier;

(d) The success of the movement was bound up with topography. Vast stretches of forest, steppe, and marshland, lying across enemy lines of communications, studded with numerous hamlets from

which to supply themselves, enabled the partisans to camp beyond the enemy's reach literally for years;

(e) The Russian peasant has for many centuries shown an innate capacity for local selfgovernment and improvised collective action. This capacity stood the partisan in good stead in promoting good discipline, cheerful acceptance of leadership and ready cooperation between bands.

(5) *Conclusion.*

The following are the main lessons on partisan warfare in Russia :

(a) Given adequate advance preparation of dumps, camps, contacts, skeleton organization, etc., partisan warfare can be expected to assume fairly serious proportions even without the support of the regular army;

(b) The two main conditions essential for its success are: large areas of suitably inaccessible forest, mountain, and marsh country, strategically placed across the invader's lines of communications; and the full cooperation of the civil population from the towns and villages which are adjacent to and within such areas;

(c) The best prospect of success for the occupying force lies in achieving what the Germans failed to do in Russia; isolating the partisans from the civilian population on whom they depend for vital supplies, information about the invader, and, not least, moral support. The Germans failed because their reprisal action only rallied the civil population round the partisans, but still left the villages and hamlets sufficiently intact and numerous to continue their support of the partisans.

4. METHODS OF COUNTERING GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES.

a. General.

A careful examination of guerrilla activities reveals that they are most successful when they can achieve the following :

1. Surprise;
2. Local superiority in numbers;
3. Mobility to retire quickly and to avoid presenting themselves as an accessible target.

To maintain an organization which can produce these good results the guerrillas require :

1. The support of the local inhabitants;
2. A secure and well organized base of operations;
3. A reliable intelligence system, including good communications;
4. A source of supply.

The above mentioned seven essentials apply to all three aspects of guerrilla warfare. The underground party is, however, sometimes limited to one or more of these essentials, and most frequently it emphasizes political rather than military action. Assassination, terror, sabotage, thefts of military supplies, and promotion of discomfort and disease among the occupying forces, are the main types of military action employed by underground parties.

The countermeasures against guerrilla activity must aim to deny the above mentioned essentials to the guerrillas. The essentials of surprise, local superiority, a secure and well organized base of operations, and a reliable intelligence system can be combated with the usual military tactics employed against regular troops. The special countermeasures

to guerrilla activity center around the tactics employed to deny guerrillas the essentials of mobility, the support of the local inhabitants, and a source of supply. These special countermeasures are principally the following : 1. Controlling all movement; 2. Indicating to the local inhabitants both the desirability of cooperating with the occupation forces against the guerrillas and the risk to themselves in lending any support to the guerrillas, and 3. Eliminating all guerrilla sources of supply.

b. Control of movement.

Censorship, identification cards, curfews, and road, rail and frontier controls, are the usual methods of controlling movements. These can be supplemented by patrolling all roads and railroads essential for supplies to forward and garrisoned areas.

c. Obtaining cooperation of local inhabitants.

Every effort, consistent with the policy of non-fraternization, should be used to make the local inhabitants desire to help the occupying forces, as the most effective means of defeating guerrilla activities is to cut them off physically and morally from the local inhabitants. The occupying forces by providing civil order and individual security will thereby assist the inhabitants and the community and will tend to identify the interests of the inhabitants with those of the occupying forces. A means of bringing home to the inhabitants the desirability of cooperating with the forces of occupation against the guerrillas is the imposition of restrictions on movement and assembly and instituting search operations within the area affected, as a counter to guerrilla activities.

To achieve success in relations with the inhabitants the occupying troops must be well disciplined. Instructions regulating the intercourse between troops and inhabitants should be designed to prevent inci-

dents from occurring which would cause the inhabitants to adopt a hostile attitude towards the occupying troops.

One of the most important forms of cooperation by local inhabitants is the revealing of their detailed knowledge of the locality, its topography, customs, etc. They can provide great assistance as guides, especially in heavily forested or mountainous terrain, where even good map reading is not an adequate substitute for local knowledge. A pool of interpreters can be especially helpful in this and other matters.

If the inhabitants are hostile, stern measures will be necessary. These may include curfew, limitations on assembly and movement, forced labor, and the taking of hostages. Care must be taken that these countermeasures are executed so as to induce the inhabitants to work with the occupying forces. Small but frequently recurring forms of sabotage may often be effectively stopped by always requiring that the local population and resources be taken to repair any damage done.

d. Eliminating guerrilla supplies.

Guerrilla supplies, especially arms and ammunition, can *in part* be eliminated by blockades, careful enforcement of movement controls, and other passive measures. To eliminate the sources of guerrilla supplies good intelligence plus offensive action is required.

e. Importance of first countermeasures.

Prompt, efficient, and effective countermeasures taken in the early stages to suppress guerrilla activity are necessary. Ineffective or half-hearted measures in the early stages will tend to be the greatest incentive and encouragement not only to the guerrillas, but also to all potential guerrillas and active sympathizers.

f. Intelligence.

It is the responsibility of the troops on the ground to know what is happening in their vicinity. The collation, sifting and distribution of all types of information will necessitate the staff to run efficient intelligence centers at headquarters of battalions and higher units.

Organized reconnaissance of the country and of the built-up areas within which troops may be required to operate is an essential preliminary to planning for any operation and for prevention of guerrilla activity. This reconnaissance must be carried out both by day and by night, and must cover movement on foot in vicinity of unit billets and movement in vehicles to more distant objectives. As much of the country will at one time or other have either been fought over or prepared for defense, the danger of mines will always be present and may even constitute a separate object for reconnaissance. Troops should be encouraged to observe and report on any unusual incidents and suspiciously acting persons.

g. Communications.

Although the greatest possible use will have to be made of existing civil means of communication, an alternative military system of communication will be necessary for operational purposes. A static military radio system will meet this demand. It must be realized that this may well be subject to interception by guerrilla intercept sets, and therefore the need for codes and ciphers will still exist. Radio communication will also have to be available between headquarters and any mobile columns based on any headquarters, and within the mobile columns themselves. This will usually involve certain additions and special types of radio sets within infantry battalions.

Messengers will have to be used with discretion. Motorcyclists should proceed in pairs. A more suit-

able vehicle for messengers will be a 1/4-ton or armored scout car, which will enable at least one armed man to be continuously on the alert as a protection for the driver.

Intercommunication aircraft will be of particular value for safe carriage of important persons and top secret correspondence.

Pigeons are best not used for military traffic as these may be a means of guerrilla communications, against which it may be necessary to wage a war of extermination, coupled with a closing down of all pigeon lofts.

Countermeasures against guerrilla communications should include :

1. Confiscation of civilian radio transmitters and receivers, or at least of the former and strict limitation and periodical inspection of the latter, as it is a comparatively simple matter to convert a receiver into a transmitter;

2. Continuous watch by direction finders for illegal radio stations;

3. A system of licences for civilian vehicles and permits for movement of civilians from place to place.

h. Mobility.

Guerrilla operations depend for their success on quick action followed by a rapid getaway to a hidden refuge. The counter to this type of operation must therefore include a high standard of mobility. Guerrillas also depend for their own security on frequent changes of their hideouts. This factor also calls for mobility if counter guerrilla forces are to make use in time of any information received.

Mobility demands not only the means of rapid movement but also a state of readiness and training to reduce to a minimum the time spent in preparing to move. Local reserves must therefore be prepared with their means of transport at instant readiness partic-

ularly during the hours of darkness, which are the most suitable for many guerrilla operations. Apart from tactical mobility, there is a need also for strategic mobility leading to surprise concentrations of troops in unexpected places. Air transport under these conditions affords exceptional opportunities of effecting this sort of surprise. In operations against guerrillas, parachute troops are particularly suitable for use to form a surprise stop line to prevent the escape of guerrillas, in cooperation with an organized drive to clean up a located center of guerrilla resistance. Parachutists may also be used to surprise an isolated hideout of a wanted man or a small band of guerrillas.

i. Offensive operations.

The types of offensive operations which an army of occupation may have to carry out include :

1. Organized drives on a large or small scale to clean up centers of guerrilla resistance;

2. Rapid pursuit and capture of sabotage bands of guerrillas often at night;

3. An operation to capture a wanted man or to search a suspected house or locality.

These operations may be conducted in a built-up area or in difficult terrain.

Although the scale of these operations will usually be on regiment, battalion, or company level, the essential elements of all these operations must be surprise and encirclement. To acquire these elements careful reconnaissance and planning, skill and concealment in the approach, deception plans, and coordinated assaults with all escape routes fully covered are needed.

To insure complete success with the minimum of casualties it will generally be wise to overestimate rather than underestimate the size of the force necessary to achieve a specific objective.

For these types of operations wheeled vehicles are usually preferred because they operate more quietly than tracked vehicles. Tracked vehicles and tanks should be used only with the main assaulting force when their noise as well as their weapons may help to drive the guerrillas in the direction of the troops located to intercept them.

j. **Defensive precautions.**

The first essential is that all troops must be impressed with the need of a war time state of readiness and alertness. As guerrilla activities may be spasmodic, special orders and frequent inspections will be necessary to insure that this standard is not relaxed in quiet intervals.

Guards will be necessary on camps and barracks, on military dumps and installations, on essential communication and general utility centers. To economize in manpower it is important to protect these with physical obstacles, such as wire, mines, searchlights, illumination, etc. The standard of guards and sentries must be of the highest, again a war time standard. Static guards should be supplemented by a patrol system, both on foot and in suitable vehicles. These patrols must also operate on a war not a peace basis. Dogs may be usefully employed both with static guards and with patrols in country districts.

Escorts may be required for important convoys, or alternatively roads may be required to be guarded during periods of heavy movement on them.

In the event of guerrillas adopting a reprisal attitude against the inhabitants, it will be necessary to provide guards and/or measures of protection for cooperating members of the population.

Sites for location of troops should be selected with an eye to their « security » value, and to economy in guards and sentries. Their efficiency in this respect will be improved by barricades and wire as necessary.

APPENDIX.

THE WEREWOLF.

The recent capture of a Werewolf headquarters and the interrogation of its staff provide a good picture of the working of this organization and give an indication of what may be expected from it in the future. The information which led to the capture of this particular headquarters by Allied troops came from a German soldier who, dressed in civilian clothes, gave himself up on 28 April 1945. After two searches, made necessary by the excellence of the camouflage, 6 officers, 22 enlisted men, and 3 women, most of them in civilian clothes, were captured. Among them was the unit commander, a colonel. Most of the following information is supplied by the latter.

On 16 September 1944, the colonel was Commandant of a German Army school at Turhenberg, Czechoslovakia, which taught various courses, including guerrilla tactics. In February, 1945, the school received an order from Himmler to add a course in « Werewolf » activities. On 1 April 1945, the school was closed and the training staff, numbering between 200-300 men, moved to Schonsee, Germany. It was contemplated that a school would be set up at Schonsee, but this was not done because of destroyed transit facilities and the approach of U.S. troops.

In the early part of April the training staff received the following orders from the German High Command :

« To stay behind, evade capture, and then harass and destroy supplies of the U.S. troops in the rear. Special emphasis will be put on gasoline and oil supplies. »

Upon receiving the above order, the colonel divided the group into four units — « A », « B », « C », and « Führungsstab » (operations staff or headquarters unit.). Units « A », « B », and « C » numbered between

60-100 men each, with approximately 40-50 in the headquarters unit. Units « A », « B », and « C » were located in a triangle around the headquarters unit and each operational unit had radio communication with the headquarters. The headquarters consisted of a captain and three first lieutenants, all of whom held high ranks in the Nazi party and were determined to fight to the last.

Operations were to begin three or four weeks after being overrun by U. S. troops. The plan was for each unit to receive designated targets from the headquarters. Bands of from 10 to 20 men were then to be sent out to destroy the target and to return immediately to their unit. No targets were to be located nearer than fifteen kilometers to the unit. Secrecy and camouflage were relied upon for security and all personnel had strict orders to conceal themselves if U. S. troops came into their area and under no circumstances to open fire in the bivouac area. No routes of escape had been planned. Members of the unit usually wore the Wehrmacht uniform, but a few members disguised themselves as foresters and were used as outposts to report any approaching danger.

The unit was equipped with regular Wehrmacht uniforms, camouflage suits, fur jackets, and other items of winter issue.

Their ordnance supplies consisted of mortars, machine guns, sub-machine guns, rifles, and various types of side arms. Each man was issued a very small pistol which could be easily concealed on the person. The ammunition supply for each type of weapon was ample for four months of ordinary operations. The unit had one civilian-type sedan and one Wehrmacht motorcycle which were well hidden in the woods, and 120 horses which were dispersed on farms throughout the vicinity. Food consisting of canned meat, biscuits, crackers, chocolate, and canned vegetables was sufficient for four months. Additional food supplies such as bread, potatoes, fresh vegetables, and smoked sausages were obtained from local sources. The unit

was supplied with water by a brook passing through the area.

The headquarters and billets of the captured Werewolf unit were concealed underground. The dugouts were constructed in such a manner as not to destroy the live trees around them. The dugouts were located on the slope of a hill which was densely covered with fir trees of the Christmas-tree variety. The entrance to the dugout was usually located in the midst of a clump of trees.

The entrance to each dugout was a hole approximately 24 inches in diameter and four to five feet deep. Approximately two feet down, this hole extended horizontally to a length of eight to ten feet. The dugouts had a capacity of three men and had a wooden floor and a drainage ditch. Walls and roof were reinforced with lumber, the entrance being covered with a strong lid on which turf was growing thus blending perfectly with the surrounding ground. The area was camouflaged solely with live vegetation. Great care was taken not to form any paths in the area. The dugouts were dispersed without pattern over a large territory. To give an example of the perfection of the camouflage of the dugout entrances, the following instance is mentioned. During the course of the Allied troops' second search of the area, an accidental shot was fired by a member of the searching party. Several members of the searching party threw themselves on the ground less than five feet from some of the dugout entrances without noticing their presence. The German soldiers in the dugouts could see the members of the searching party and later remarked on this incident.

An automobile was concealed in a dense section of the woods by carrying it on logs into a clump of trees. The larger trees were bent low enough to permit the passage of the car over them, and it was carried by the men over the bent trees and placed in the selected spot. The trees were then released and the car was camouflaged with additional branches.

The organization used members posing as forest workers to obtain and prepare certain food supplies for distribution at night to the personnel hiding in the woods. These members possessed recent discharge papers signed by the unit commander, and they were also the outposts and sentinels of the organization. Upon capture they were able to point out the exact location of the area but not the individual dugouts. Some of the members of the unit spoke English.

Local civilians were required to furnish bread and fresh foods for the organization and likewise to furnish food and shelter for the 120 horses in the organization's possession.

One important factor was the use of crippled officer personnel as key members. These officers were to be used as observation personnel to reconnoiter and to locate targets for the tactical bands to destroy. The executive officer, a captain, had one crippled leg in a heavy cast and one first lieutenant had a crippled leg and arm. They both possessed recent discharge papers signed by the colonel.

In future searches of suspected Werewolf bivouac areas, the following factors should be considered in determining the most probable location of the unit:

1. A very densely wooded area with small trees and shrubbery.
2. Presence of a stream as a source of water supply.
3. Signs of persons having recently inhabited the area (although the German soldiers were extremely careful to destroy such evidence.)
4. Signs of German military boot prints in the area.

In case any of the above factors prevail, a minute inspection should be made of areas where the shrubbery is most dense. It is recommended that in the inspection the same method be used as in probing for mines. Inasmuch as each dugout contains metal weapons, it might be practicable to employ mine detectors over the area.





#010876



H

COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS



3 1695 00536 0110