This book was produced in EPUB format by the Internet Archive.

The book pages were scanned and converted to EPUB format automatically. This process relies on optical character recognition, and is somewhat susceptible to errors. The book may not offer the correct reading sequence, and there may be weird characters, non-words, and incorrect guesses at structure. Some page numbers and headers or footers may remain from the scanned page. The process which identifies images might have found stray marks on the page which are not actually images from the book. The hidden page numbering which may be available to your ereader corresponds to the numbered pages in the print edition, but is not an exact match; page numbers will increment at the same rate as the corresponding print edition, but we may have started numbering before the print book's visible page numbers. The Internet Archive is working to improve the scanning process and resulting books, but in the meantime, we hope that this book will be useful to you.

The Internet Archive was founded in 1996 to build an Internet library and to promote universal access to all knowledge. The Archive's purposes include offering permanent access for researchers, historians, scholars, people with disabilities, and the general public to historical collections that exist in digital format. The Internet Archive includes texts, audio, moving images, and software as well as archived web pages, and provides specialized services for information access for the blind and other persons with disabilities.

Created with hocr-to-epub (v.1.0.0)

The text on this page is estimated to be only 3.00% accurate

(3x UBRIS

Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2020 with funding from University of Alberta Libraries https ://arch i ve . o rg/detai Is/Do Ian 1 97 1

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA CANADIAN LEGISLATIVE VOTING BEHAVIOUR 1867 - 1878 by Charles Edward Dolan A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOP THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE EDMONTON , ALBERTA FALL, 1971

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "CANADIAN LEGISLATIVE VOTING BEHAVIOUR 1867 - 1878," submitted by Charles Edward Dolan, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS. / 7/ Date

/ Alice for her contribution

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am indebted to members of my committee, professors Frederick C. Engelmann, J. Peter Meekison and Robert Hett; especially my supervisor, professor Engelmann, for his guidence, patience and understanding. This project grew out of a seminar on comparative party systems which professor Engelmann and his colleague, Robert Gilsdorf, conducted; credit for suggest ing the thesis topic goes to both of them. I am also indebted to G. N. Grobben of the computing centre for his invaluable assistance in the technical aspects of this study, and to Mrs. Mary Lou Everitt for her important contri bution in the production of the thesis.

ABSTRACT This study of Canadian Legislative voting behaviour for the first three parliaments was guided by several objectives. The first objective was to investigate aspects of political party development in Canada. In this, we sought to establish behavioural evidence of political party development. The second objective was to explore the behaviour of members of parliament in relation to certain issue categories. We wanted to determine the kinds of issues which call forth high degrees of cohesion, and those which produced divisive voting behaviour. A third objective was to examine several sociological variables with a view towards drawing out the underlying dimensions of legislative voting behaviour. Our final objective was to test several hypotheses concerning the special regional problems which confronted Confederation. The background, the scope of the study, the methodology employed and the data are discussed in Chapter 1. The analysis of the data is presented in Chapter 2, and the conclusions in Chapter 3 . Limitations imposed by the methodology and the data prevented us from drawing as concrete a conclusion as we would wish. However, the analysis did yield some support for our preconceptions of political party development, and provided some insights into the kinds of issues which both increased and diminished intraparty cohesion, the sociological dimensions of voting behaviour, and the special regional problems.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page 1 2 3 I INTRODUCTION II THE SETTING III SCOPE OF THE STUDY IV METHODOLOGY V THE DATA VI LIMITATIONS NOTES I INTRAPARTY COHESION II VOTING ON ISSUES III REGION AND RELIGION IV PARTY LIKENESS V REGIONAL PROBLEMS NOTES CONCLUSIONS 1 4 11 19 24 27 30 33 38 48 55 59 62 63 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 71

TABLES Number Page 1.1 Partisan Distribution of Seats in Parliament, 1867 - 1878 . 25 2.1 Average Cohesion Indexes, Liberals and Conservatives, 1867 - 1878. . 36 2.2 Significant Votes: High and Low Cohesion Indexes for Party, Religion and Region, 1867 - 1878 . 40 2.3 Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis of Issue Categories by Party, First, Second and Third Parliaments. ... 50 2.4 Significant Votes: Indexes of Party Likeness for Party, Religion and Region, 1867-1878 . 57

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION I Legislative roll call analysis has enjoyed a considerable popularity in the United States for several decades. As a method of describing and measuring variations in the voting behaviour of individual legislators, groups of legislators, and among roll calls, it offers several important advantages over other means of investigating political phenomena. First, roll call votes can be obtained easily. Most legislatures keep records of the issues on which roll call votes are taken and the positions taken by each legislator. Second, the nature of roll call voting makes empirical analysis comparatively easy. Third, as legislators are members of a political elite, to study their behaviour is to study behaviour that is politically relevant. And finally, as David Truman observes, like statistics on elections, roll call votes "... represent discrete acts the fact of whose occurrence is not subject to dispute. They do not depend for their validity as data upon verbal reports of action or upon the impressions of fallible observers. Despite the fairly widespread use of roll call analysis in the United States, and to a lesser extent, in Europe, no similar tradition has developed in Canada.

2 There may be a number of explanations for this. First, and perhaps most importantly, as the tenure of the government rests upon maintaining the confidence of a majority of members, Canadian political parties, especially the governing party, tend to be highly cohesive v/ithin the legislature. The tradition of strict party discipline has developed to the extent that most departures from voting along party lines (except v/hen a vote has been declared "free") generate comment from the media. It may be, then, that scholarly interest in legislative roll call analysis in Canada has not materialized because . 2 of the expected yield. Turner, for example, finds that average cohesion for the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties in 1953, 1959, and 1962, was either 100 or within two point of 100. Second, the initial studies, such as those of ReidJ and Underhill , of the origins and the development of political parties in Canada -- and theirs of periods when strict party discipline might not necessarily be assumed -- were undertaken during the late 1920's and early 1930 's -- v/hen the behavioural persuasion in politics was in its infancy. Third, interest in Canadian studies is a fairly recent phenomenon; previously, most Canadian students vzere attracted by the more esoteric fields, such as international relations, political philosophy . Whatever the reasons for its neglect, there are

3 several good reasons for examining early legislative voting behaviour. First, apart from academic interest -which in itself serves a legitimate purpose -- it should be valuable to have some idea of the underlying dimensions of voting behaviour in the legislature. Strict party discipline prevents us from drawing conclusions on the basis of roll call analysis today, and one could argue that an historical analysis might shed some light on the kinds of factors which influence the behaviour of legislators. Even though these factors may not manifest themselves in legislative voting behaviour, presumably they are expressed in caucus and do at some point influence public policy. Second, our understanding of the development of political parties is based upon the subjective evaluations of researchers. No effort has yet been made to relate political party development -- the establishment of durable, differentiated, visible and rationalized formations and stable operating structures to legislative voting behaviour. Surely one important measure of the extent to which parties in parliamentary systems may be characterized as "developed" or "developing is the cohesiveness they establish and maintain among elected members in the legislature. Third, an historical analysis of legislative voting behaviour might give us some insight into the special problems which confronted Confederation. These will be discussed later.

4 THE SETTING II The period during which our investigation of legislative voting behaviour takes place was one of the most challenging for Canada. John A. Macdonald and a few associates had rescued a disintegrating political system and created a nation out of a diverse collection of quasi-autonomous British colonies, each of which possessed at least the trappings of nationhood -- political institutions, a distinctive identity, and distinctive "national” interests. Canada, from 1867 to 1878, faced all the challenges of nation-building: what Chambers describes as establishing and maintaining a national authority, operating the political system, containing conflict to prevent disruption or immobilism, and meeting the crises of participation (involving citizens in the political process) and distribution (effecting a payoff) thereby convincing substantial segments of the population that their objectives could be accomplished within the new political framework.^ The bulk of Confederation Canada, the provinces of Ontario and Quebec, had a common political existence prior to Confederation. From 1841 to 1867, Ontario and Quebec were the United Province of Canada, a colony governed by an agent of the British Government, the

5 governor-general, initially without, but later on with the advice and consent of the legislature. Many of the challenges which faced Canada after Confederation also confronted the Union. The most important development during the Union was, of course, the achievement of responsible government. This came about gradually during the mid 1840's but the principle was established firmly by 1848. In practice, responsible government meant that the ministry performing the executive functions of government held office not at the pleasure of the governor-general but rather while it retained the support of a majority of the members of the legislature. During the struggle for responsible government and after its achievement, the members of the legislature, representing a variety of special interests and identifying themselves with a comparatively large number of political groups the precursors of political parties -aligned themselves either for or against the government. As Cornell suggests: . . . by 1844 one principal theme dominated the general election: support or opposition to "the late executive councillors." (sic) From this time forward, members of the Legislative Assembly were broadly grouped as Ministerialists and Opposition, as those "in" power or those "out" .7 Certain political groups established a tradition of align 

The text on this page is estimated to be only 8.00% accurate

■*

6 ing themselves together on issues. These alignments were not rigid; members of the legislative assembly felt free to, and frequently did, depart from their usual voting alignments. When we speak of Liberals and Conservatives from the beginning, therefore, we are identifying political groupings rather than distinct political parties, although as of 1878 political parties had clearly formed. The election of 1867 provides an indication of the extent to which these group alignments formed the basis for "party" competition. When political deadlock necessitated a realignment in 1864, George Brown, leader of the Canada West opposition forces, entered into a coalition with Macdonald's supporters, forming a Union alliance. Brown resigned from the coalition a year and a half later, but not before the legislature of the United Province of Canada had approved the Quebec Resolutions which laid g the groundwork for Confederation. Brown attempted to revive the Reform "party" and establish a Reform-Liberal alignment which could compete for office within Confederation. His efforts, however, were somewhat less than successful, for he was unable to persuade the Nova Scotia Liberals to join his movement (the Nova Scotia Liberals ran as anti-Confederates) and his preemptory departure from opposition forces in Canada East (the Rouges and English-speaking Liberals) prevented him

7 from broadening Reform support outside Ontario. As a result, Macdonald's Union forces, a loose alliance of Tories, moderate Reformers, Bleus, and Conservatives, fought the election of 1867 against fragmented opposition forces, including Nova Scotia Liberals, Reform supporters from Canada West, the Rouges and Liberals 9 from Canada East, and Liberals from New Brunswick. These immediate pre-Confederation alignments gradually became more firmly established and identifiable, if not overly distinct; political parties emerged, the Liberal-Conservatives comparatively early in Confederation, and the Liberals somewhat later. The Union alliance won 108 seats in the new parliament and the opposition forces 72.^ Within parliament, the ministry incorporated elements of the various groups which supported Macdonald, and formed the basis for establishing an on-going intraparliamentary organization of members. Evidence indicates Macdonald could count on the support of a majority of 20 to 30 members, but this majority could and did decrease substantially when parliament was confronted with particularly divisive issues. ^ Our investigation of legislative voting behaviour centres on the period when, for the Conservatives, and to a lesser extent, for the Liberals, party development

The text on this page is estimated to be only 29.50% accurate

' '

8 was taking place. We are concerned about the extent to which members of parliament who identified themselves with a particular party voted with that party, and how frequently they departed from voting along party lines. We also are concerned with the kinds of issues which caused party members to vote against their party, and whether their religious affiliation or the region from which they were elected has anything to do with the way they voted on certain issues. There were a number of important issues which commanded the attention of parliament between 1867 and 1878. One of the more important was the question of free trade or protection. The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 with the United States had been abrogated and the position Canada took in relation to tariffs on various kinds of trading goods was of considerable importance to the provinces and hence to members of parliament from the provinces affected. Prior to Confederation, of course, each colony had regulated both inter-colonial and international trade. After Confederation, when the federal parliament assumed responsibility for tariff and trade policy, therefore, the decisions taken by parliament affected the economic situation in the provinces, and thus became a divisive issue for members from the various regions.

9 Another important issue involved cultural affairs. The province of Quebec had obtained a measure of autonomy in relation to its local affairs. The protection of its cultural and linguistic heritage was crucial to Quebec, and any issue which involved religion, education or cultural matters that came before the federal parliament for resolution might be expected to cause a certain amount of divisiveness within Parliament. As the federal parliament retained jurisdiction over divorce in Quebec, a religious as well as cultural issue, parliament was frequently confronted with the possibility of ethnic friction. Still another issue which parliament was called upon to deal with involved privileges and elections. For the first decade of Confederation, the provincial electoral constituencies formed the basis for the national franchise. Furthermore, it was possible for a short time after Confederation for an individual to hold both provincial and federal seats. There were frequent disputes between the two parties regarding the validity of elections, electoral procedures, and the privileges of elected members. Finally, one part of the process of nation-building was linking the various communities together with a transportation system. The federal government, as part of the price for agreement to federate, promised transportation facilities to the Maritimes and the West. As a result, the government became heavily involved in a number of \

10 costly public works, either directly or by guaranteeing loans for developers. Regional cross-pressures frustrated the federal government's efforts to pursue these projects and imposed severe stresses on Confederation.

11 SCOPE OF THE STUDY III It is not our intention to attempt to come to grips with the broad question of Canadian political party development; such an inquiry would require a much more broadly-based study than our effort to identify trends and patterns in, and to draw meaning from, a collection of roll call votes. The scope of this study is much more limited: it is confined to describing the behaviour of two categoric groups and attempting to relate this behaviour to several sociological variables. It may be possible to draw tentative conclusions about political party development -- assuming a relationship between a party's voting behaviour within the legislature and its development (in Chambers' sense) but without supportive research and analysis, these tenta tive conclusions are unlikely to take us much beyond our present understanding. The legislative voting behaviour we are concerned with was to some extent structured prior to the point at which our analysis begins. A tradition of group voting cohesiveness in the legislature of the United Province of Canada was , according to Cornell, quite highly developed before Confederation. Cornell argues: If loyalty to a party is measured in terms of consistent support of major party policies and consistent support in divisions

12 having the force of votes of confidence, then the evidence points to a surprisingly large measure of stability on the part of the great majority of the members. It can be concluded then, in spite of the gradual evolution of political groups and the tendency to apply different names to the same group as it progressed from era to era, that there were per- * manent political parties during the whole Union period and that these parties were largely consistent in membership, viewpoint, and policy. ^ The first question we want to examine, then, is whether this tradition of cohesiveness which developed during / the union is evident during the immediate post-Confederation period. While we have doubts about the accuracy of Cornell's assessment, we should expect to find, making allowances for the fact that the post-Confederation circumstances in which voting took place differed in several important respects , that comparatively high levels of cohesion existed. Our assumptions for the Union period are necessarily impressionistic, for Cornell does not employ an index of cohesion, nor does he indicate quantitatively what "consistent support" means. The second aspect of legislative voting behaviour we want to explore is the relative levels of intraparty cohesion the Liberal and Conservative parties record during the period under investigation. Our analysis, on a year-by-year basis, and for the three parliaments, will attempt to discern any trends or patterns which might exist. As a working hypothesis, we might posit



13 that marginal increases in the cohesion indexes of both parties can be expected over the 11 years under review. Furthermore, we should expect to find that the Conservatives, as the governing party, score generally higher on the cohesion indexes than the Liberals, at least for the first seven years. Conversely, after the Liberals assume office in 1873, we should expect to find intraparty cohesion scores reversed. It may be possible to determine whether intraparty cohesion is principally a function of / incumbency, or whether it can be explained in terms of party development. It is anticipated that incumbency is the significant variable, but, assuming party development also is influential, it should be the case that cohesion within the Conservative party is generally higher than cohesion within the Liberal party was during its tenure in opposition. We expect to find distinctive differences between the government and opposition. The third part of our examination of legislative voting behaviour will focus on two sociological variables, region and religion, as alternative sources of voting cohesion. In this context, no attempt is made to control for party; region and religion, respectively, are substituted for party in the analysis, and the cohesion scores indicate the extent to which members from each region and adherents to each religion vote together. Methodological

14 difficulties and questions about the validity and limitations of this approach are discussed below. It is our contention that this analysis will indicate there are a number of regional and religious issues which call forth high degrees of intraregional and intrareligious cohesion and override traditional partisan political identifications. The fourth part of our analysis of legislative voting behaviour addresses voting behaviour in terms of categories of issues. It goes without saying that certain issues are more divisive than others, both generally and in relation to specific categoric groups. We want to determine which issues score low on the cohesion indexes, which issues score high and, in relation to the former, where this divisiveness stems from. The first part of this analysis involves the selection and comparison of votes on v/hich cohesion indexes score above and below certain limits; the second part involves the use of a multiple regression technique to determine -- controlling for party -- the explanatory value of the sociological variables. We shall treat each parliament separately and attempt to draw comparisons between parliaments. The methodology for these exercises is discussed below. The foregoing analysis should confirm our hypothesis that issues which have implications for a particular conception of federalism, issues which have implications

15 for a particular conception of the role of government, and issues which have implication for economic nationalism, will be more divisive than issues which do not have these implications. Concretely, this means that votes which score low cohesion indexes should involve at least one, and perhaps more, of the following: 1. Federalism. We might find questions here which raised the issue of provincial autonomy, such things as educational, ethnic, religious and cultural matters . 2. Role of Government. These issues might involve the government's regulatory activities in the industrial field, certain public works . 3. Economic Nationalism. The question of free trade or protection would be central here, but economic nationalism might also have implications for the British Connection, regional interests, and urban and rural interests. For the second part of our analysis, we should expect to find that religious and regional variables most adequately explain the voting behaviour of members in relation to categories of issues which involve the kinds of questions raised above. Where the categories of issues relate to provincial autonomy, the role of government, or economic nationalism, the religious and regional regression scores should be comparatively high; where the categories of issues do not relate to these questions, the regression scores for religion and region should be significantly lower .

16 The fifth part of our examination deals with the extent to which the behaviour of our categoric groups, alternatively, the Liberals and Conservatives, Protestants and Roman Catholics, and the regional divisions, the Maritimes, Quebec, Ontario and the West, is similar. We employ an index of party likeness to investigate this dimension of legislative voting behaviour. We expect to find that the indexes for the party variable are least similar, region somewhat more so, and religion the most similar . The final part of this study deals with three special problems. First, it is our suspicion that the Union ended in political deadlock because of the incompatability of French and English interests, and the impossibility of dealing fairly and equitably with both interests in a common political arena. Further, we argue that at least one of the reasons Confederation did not meet a similar fate is because the basic interests of French-Canadians -- for linguistic, cultural, educational and religious survival -- were, after Confederation, much more secure, much less open to assault. Provincial jurisdiction over these matters gave French Canadians a great deal more security in relation to la survivance. What we are arguing, then, is this: if the basic interests of French Canadians were secure in the provincial arena, French Canadian members would be

17 much less inclined to impose stresses in the national political arena. Moreover, it is our hypothesis that when French Canadian interests are subject to resolution in parliament, intraparty voting cohesion suffers. We expect to find that where there appears to be an objective ethnic, cultural, religious, or educational interest I in a particular vote, voting cohesion within both parties will decrease, while Roman Catholic and Quebec cohesion indexes increase. It is not our intention to draw conclusions about the reasons for the success of Confederation; we wish merely to comment on one aspect of voting behaviour which is relevant to an investigation of the sociological dimensions of that behaviour. The second and third special problems also involve regional influences upon voting behaviour, although in these cases not distinctively ethnic regional influences. The first hypothesis relates to the behaviour of members of parliament from the Maritimes . We know that the majority of Maritime members for the first parliament were either anti-Confederate, reform or Liberal. Nine out of fifteen New Brunswick members, and sixteen out of seventeen Nova Scotia members, fit into this category. 14 We also know that early in 1869, Nova Scotia's terms of entry into the union were revised; its subsidies from the federal government were revised after negotiation when it became obvious its revenues were not adequate

18 to meet its responsibilities.15 We should expect to find, then, that after 1869 voting cohesion among members from the Maritimes decreased; that the revised settlement with Nova Scotia w as sufficient to induce a notable percentage of Maritime members to vote more frequently with the government party. Finally, Escott Reid argues that members from the West were ’’ministerialist" during the 1870's.15 Election returns for the period suggest otherwise: in the election of 1874, when it was obvious that the Liberal or reform party would win office, British Columbia returned five Conservatives and one Liberal, and Manitoba returned two Conservatives and two Liberals.11 It is our hypothesis that voting cohesion among Western members does not support the ministerialist argument. We should expect to find that the cohesion scores for Western members during the Liberals tenure in office are much the same as during the Conservatives tenure in office, i.e., Western members are not highly cohesive at any time during the period under consideration.

19 METHODOLOGY IV The primary analytical tool employed in the examination of legislative voting behaviour is the Fortran ACCUM v program described in Anderson, Watts and Wilcox's Legislative Roll-Call Analysis ■ ^ The program is designed to facilitate the preliminary analysis and manipulation of legislative roll call votes that have been stored on punch cards by vote. The output of the program is: 19 1. The division of the vote by party (i.e. total "yeas" and "nays" for Liberals and Conservatives) . 2. A total division of the vote. 3. A Rice Index^O of Cohesion for each party on each vote. 4. An Index of Party Likeness for each roll call vote. 5. A coefficient of significance for each vote . The Rice Index provides a measure of party unity on a given roll call regardless of the position of the other parties. Rice defines cohesion as the extent to which the distribution of votes on a legislative roll call deviates from the distribution that would be expected to occur if all influences operated in a random fashion. The argument states that: . . . if one hundred votes were cast in a purely random manner, they would distribute themselves equally on both sides of the issue, i.e., fifty "yeas" to fifty "nays". This instance is defined as the case of

The text on this page is estimated to be only 19.50% accurate

. .

20 minimum cohesion and is assigned the index value of zero. The opposite extreme occurs when all members vote on the same side of an issue — that is considered complete cohesion and is assigned the index value of 100. The index is thus established as having a range from 0 to 100.2^ To take a specific example, if the party votes either 25 "yea" and 75 "nay" or 75 "yea" and 25 "nay", the majority within the party cast 75 votes, which are divided by 100, the total number of votes cast by the party. The percentage obtained is 75, which when converted to a 0 to 100 scale equals 50, the party's index of cohesion. The conversion is accomplished mathematically by subtracting 50 from the percentage obtained, and multiplying the 2 2 result by two. The Rice Index of Party Likeness is a device for measuring the difference between two groups in the degree of support given to a specific vote by each party. It is obtained by subtracting the percentage of "yea" votes cast by one group from the percentage of "nay" votes cast by the other, and subtracting the result from 100. Thus, if the Liberals favour a motion 80 to 20, and the Conservatives oppose it 20 "yea" to 80 "nay" the Liberal percentage of the "yea" votes is 80, and the Conservative 20. The differences between these percentages is 60, which when subtracted from 100 yields an index of likeness of 40. Like the cohesion index, the index of like 

The text on this page is estimated to be only 0.00% accurate

'

21 ness ranges from 0 to 100, with 0 representing complete dissimilarity of voting behaviour and 100 being perfect similarity. ^3 The coefficient of significance, the final ACCUM output, is a composite index of "participation" and "conflict"; it is derived mathematically from (a) the number of members present and voting on a particular measure and (b) the degree to which the outcome of the issue is contested. The most significant roll call is one in which all members of the legislature are present and voting and in which there is maximum possible division of response. The least significant roll call is one in which only a quorum is present and all vote together. ^ In our analysis of legislative voting behaviour, we use each of these methods to get at different aspects of voting behaviour. The Rice Cohesion Index is the basic tool for the analysis of intraparty unity, intrareligious and intraregional voting unity. The first stage of the analysis deals separately with each of these variables; cohesion indexes are computed for Liberals and Conservatives on each vote, Protestants and Roman Catholics on each vote, and for the four regions, the West, Ontario, Quebec, and the Maritimes. As the ACCUM program cannot deal with more than two variables at a time, to establish regional cohesion indexes it became necessary to single out each region and run it separately against the other

22 three regions. Thus we computed cohesion indexes for members from the Maritimes against members from Ontario and Quebec; members from Quebec against Ontario and the 'Maritimes , and members from Ontario against Quebec and the Maritimes. This technique was not without value in and of itself, for it enabled us to compare the voting behaviour of the Quebec members against the balance of Canada and provided a further indication of ethnic voting cohesion. For the second part of our analysis -- the examination of voting behaviour in terms of categories of issues -- the data were separated physically so that we could control for the party variable and calculate religious and regional cohesion, the latter without having to run each region against the others. The computer output from this exercise formed the basis for the next stage of analysis. For the final part of our analysis -- an evaluation of the sociological variables in relation to the issue categories -- we employed an SPSS Stepwise Multiple Regression program that provides a means of choosing variables which will provide as good a prediction as possible.25 The method constructs a prediction equation on one variable at a time, first choosing the single variable which is the best predictor. The second variable

23 brought in is the one which provides the best prediction in conjunction with the first variable. The program then proceeds stepwise, adding the best variable at each step until the desired number of variables is in the equation, or until additional variables no longer make a significant addition to the prediction equation. The program rank-orders each of the independent variables and provides regression coefficients. The output is then calibrated on a t-distribution table to determine statistical significance. As the number of cases in the various issue categories for our data is frequently small -- from six to 50 with an average of about 20 -- few of the variables are statistically significant at the 0.05 t-distribution level However, this does not negate our analysis, for we are more interested in determining the relative importance of each variable than we are in relating voting behaviour to statistical significance vis-a-vis a normal population 27 distribution .

24 THE DATA V The data upon which our analyses are based are composed of 446 roll call votes recorded in volumes I to XII of the Journals of the House of Commons.^ These votes are unevenly distributed over the 12-year period; there were nine and 11 votes for the two lowest years, 1874 and 1867 respectively, and 72 and 61 for the two highest years, 1870 and 1871 respectively, with an average of approximately 40 votes in the other years. Generally, there were between 120 and 140 members voting for each recorded division; in no case did the number of members voting fall below the quorum requirement of 20 members. During the 12-year period, there were 394 individual members of parliament sitting in the legislature. The size of the legislature in 1867 was 180; this was increased by four seats with the creation of Manitoba, six seats with the entry of British Columbia, and four seats with the entry of Prince Edward Island. Of the 394 members, 202 identified with the Liberal-Conservative party, while 192 v/ere either Liberal, reform, anti-union or independent. There were 145 who described themselves as Roman Catholics, and 249 who identified themselves as Protestants. A regional breakdown shows that the largest number of members were elected from Ontario, 175, followed by Quebec, with 127, the Maritimes with 74, and the West with 18.

25 A partisan breakdown for the three parliaments shows the following: Table 1.1 Partisan Distribution of Seats in Parliament, 1867 - 1878. First Parliament Government Opposition Initial Dissolution Initial Dissolution 108 120 72 70 Second Parliament Liberal-Conservative Liberal 104 103 96 102 Third Parliament Liberal-Conservative Liberal 67 77 138 128 Differences between the total number of members for the first and second parliaments are due to the addition of Manitoba, British Columbia, and Prince Edward Island.

26 For the second part of our analysis, the votes are divided into the following issue categories: I 1. Agriculture, urban affairs. 2. Cultural matters, including education, religion, i.e. divorce bills, and languages . 3. Foreign affairs, including trade and tariffs . 4. Internal administration. 5. Industry and commerce. 6. Justice and civil rights. 7. Military and veterans' affairs. 8. Privileges and elections. 9. Public Lands and mineral resources. 10. Public works. 11. Social services, including health and welfare . 12. Taxation and revenue. The categories, of my own design, are not rigid, and there is frequent overlapping, especially as between categories one and three, where many of the tariff votes dealt with agricultural products. The categories do give a reasonable indication of the subject matter of the votes, although the implications of a particular vote, which it is not always possible to discern, may relate to a different kind of issue. Each vote was committed to a category on the basis of a brief description in the journal outlining the substance of the vote. None of the votes appear in more than one category.

27 LIMITATIONS VI / Use of the cohesion index as the basic analytical tool for an examination of legislative voting behaviour is subject to a number of qualifications, perhaps the most important of which is the question of "What does cohesion mean?" We have defined cohesion empirically in terms of a mathematical formula which gives us a precise indication of the extent to which members of a particular categoric group vote together. But we have not answered the question of what cohesion means, for we have not identified its source. Our hypothesis is that party affiliation, religious identification, and the region from which a member comes, are important sources of cohesion. However, there are other explanations for cohesive voting behaviour, such as constituency pressures, the possibility of sanctions, the possibility of rewards, the socialization of members, the salience of issues, and other sociological variables, v/hich may influence the way members vote and thus their cohesiveness. We have no way of knowing whether these other factors play a large and important or small and insignificant role in determining the way an individual member votes, for we are not able to treat these factors empirically. A related question concerns the meaning of recorded divisions. Our data are based upon all the divisions recorded between 1867 and 1878. The question

28 is, do we give each of these divisions the same weight, I in terms of their importance, or do we conclude that some divisions are important and other are not? What criterion do we employ to determine the importance of a particular vote? Interparty conflict? High intraparty cohesion? The procedure for recording a division in the House of Commons is elaborate and time-consuming. After a voice vote has been taken, any five members may demand a recorded division. When a division is demanded, the division bells call members to the house; the bells continue to ring until the government and opposition whips are satisfied that all members available to answer the call are in their places. The doors to the chamber are then closed, excluding late members, and the Speaker reads the motion. Each member rises in turn and his vote 31 is recorded by the clerk. The answer is not obvious. Leaving aside the possibility that divisions are demanded to give members a break from debate, or to stimulate interest in the debate by attracting members who are not in the chamber, it seems reasonable to assume that recorded divisions tend to be more important than voice votes. Unfortunately, as there are no indications as to whether a vote is a confidence motion, though this is a convention in respect of votes on important government bills, we are left in the awkward position of having to treat each vote the same.

29 and relying upon the subject matter, and the conflict \ these votes generate to provide us with an indication of their importance. The point we are trying to make is that the explanations or conclusions we might offer are not based upon the full range of phenomena which it would be desirable to examine before making comments about legislative voting behaviour. Our conclusions, therefore, are only as reliable as the limited amount of information we have makes possible.

30 Chapter 1, notes Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., Allen R. Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p . 6 . 2 Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress, (Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 25. Originally published in 1951. 3 Escott Reid, "The Rise of National Parties in Canada" Proceedings, Canadian Political Science Association, 1932. 4 Frank H. Underhill, Canadian Political Parties, (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1957). 5 William N. Chambers, "Parties and Nation-Building in America," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds . Political Parties and Political Development, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966) pp . 82 - 95. 6 Ibid., P. 91 7 Paul G. Cornell, The Alignment of Political Groups in Canada, 1841 ~ 1867, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 82. The 'late executive councillors' is not a precise characterization of the members which formed the ministry; the executive councillors could not be termed 'late' until a new ministry had been formed. More importantly, the present state of historical scholarship on the Union period does not permit us to resolve a rather serious semantic problem. We need more information to be in a position to distinguish clearly between electoral organization, on the one hand, and support for the ministry in parliament, on the other. Even in regard to the former, we are not yet in a position to separate for the period after 1848 mere groupings of candidates from party-like electoral efforts designed to give more permanent support to the government during the ensuing legislative period.

31 Chapter 1', notes, cont'd 8 J.M. Beck, Pendulum of Power, (Scarborough: PrenticeHall, 1968), pp. 1 - 12. 9 Idem. 10 Idem. 11 Idem. 12 Cornell, loc . cit . , p. 82. 13 For example, the addition of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, deadlock, and so on. We believe the desire not to fail with Confederation militated for higher levels of cohesion. 14 J.K. Johnson, ed . The Canadian Directory of Parliament, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968), pp. 617 - 709. 15 The Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1954), Book I, p. 45. Originally published in 1940. 16 Reid, loc . cit . , p. 19. 17 Johnson, loc . cit ♦ , pp. 617 - 709. 18 Anderson et al , loc. cit., pp. 176 - 182. 19 The Program was designed to measure the voting behaviour of Democrats and Republicans and is readily adaptable to any legislature with two parties .

32 Chapter 1, notes, cont'd 20 The Index of Cohesion we employ was developed by Stuart A. Rice and first presented in, Quantitative Methods in Politics, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928). 21 Anderson et al, loc. cit. , p. 32. 22 Turner, loc . cit . , p. 26. 23 Ibid . , p . 42 . 24 Anderson et al , loc . cit . , p. 81. 25 G.N. Grobben, "CS101, Stepwise Multiple Regression,” an unpublished program prepared at the University of Alberta in 1970. 26 Norman H. Nie, Dale H. Bent, C. Hadlia Hull, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, edition, provisional user's manual. Section XV, p. 13. 27 The t-distribution is a statistical test which gives confidence levels for the occurrence of phenomena in a normal population. The confidence level of plus or minus 0.05 allows for a 10 per cent margin of error. 28 Canada, Journals of the House of Commons, Vol. I - XII, 1867 - 1878. 29 Johnson, loc . cit . , pp . 617 - 709. 30 This table was constructed on the basis of information from Beck, loc. cit. , and Johnson, loc. cit.

33 CHAPTER 2 INTRA PARTY COHESION I We have argued that the pre-Confederation cohesiveness within the government and opposition groupings as identified by Cornell should be evident in the immediate post-Confederation period. Even making allowances for the changed circumstances after Confederation, we said comparatively high levels of cohesion might be anticipated. We did not indicate the order of cohesion we expected to find, largely because Cornell's study gave an imprecise characterization of what "consistent support" meant, but we were thinking in terms of average cohesion indexes of 50 or better, i.e., 75 per cent or more of the members of a party voting with that party on a continuing and consistent basis. As the data in table 2.1 indicate, our initial assessment of post-Confederation voting cohesion was somewhat optimistic. Neither the Liberals nor the Conservatives obtained average cohesion indexes of 50 or more during the first two years of Confederation. The Conservatives obtained an average cohesion index of more than 50 in 1869, while the Liberals did not reach this level until 1871. Our hypothesis appears to be partly confirmed, for the Conservatives' average cohesion index for the first par 

34 liament was 51.4 but the Liberal average of 44.0 for the same period is below our expectations. The average cohesion indexes for the second parliament, which had only two sessions, are more in line with what we anticipated. The Conservatives, with an average cohesion index of 68.1, record their highest average cohesion for the three parliaments, while the Liberals, at 56.4, record approximately their average cohesion for the three parliaments. The cohesion averages for the third parliament, as we predicted, are reversed, with the Liberals, now the governing party, scoring high -- indeed, higher than might be anticipated -- while the Conservatives score relatively low. We posited that marginal increases in the cohesion indexes of both parties could be expected for the 11 years under review, except in relation to the Conservatives, whose cohesion indexes might be expected to decrease after 1873 when the Liberals assumed office. Again, our hypothesis is partly confirmed, for cohesion indexes, with with exception noted above, do as a rule increase from year to year. However, the increase is not constant from year to year, which suggests that the system was subject to greater stress, that the issues were more divisive, in certain years. The cohesion index increases are marginal -between 10 and 15 per cent at any one time — but they lack a distinctive pattern.

35 We hypothesized that the Conservatives would score higher cohesion indexes for the first seven years -- while they were in office -- and that the Liberals would score higher for the remaining five years. In terms of average cohesion indexes from parliament to parliament, the data confirm our hypothesis. The Conservatives average cohesion indexes of 51.4 and 68.1 for the first and second parliaments respectively, while the Liberals average 44.0 and 56.4, again respectively. For the third parliament, their positions are reversed; the Conservatives average 44.0 and the Liberals 71.9. However, on a year-by-year basis, there are two important exceptions : The Liberals , with an average of 35.4 in 1867 and 47.6 in 1868, score higher than the Conservatives, which average 34.9 and 41.1, respectively. There are a number of possible explanations for this: divisive issues, the absence of party discipline, uncertainty regarding the future of Confederation, and so on. It may be that parliamentary support for Confederation was not as highly developed as we anticipated. On the question of whether cohesion is principally a function of incumbency, or is more closely related to party development, our data are inconclusive. We anticipated that if party development was the significant factor. Conservative cohesion during its tenure in opposition should be higher than Liberal cohesion was while it was in opposition. In fact, the Liberals in opposition recorded an

36 Table 2.1 Average Cohesion Indexes Liberals and Conservatives, 1867 - 1878. Year Liberals Conservatives Year Liberals Conservatives 1867 35.6 34.9 1870 38.4 46.4 1868 47.6 41.1 1871 54.9 64.8 1869 42.7 53.7 1872 45.0 67.9 First Parliament : Liberals 44.0 Conservatives 51.4 1873 56 . 4 68.1 Second Parliament : Liberals - 56.4 Conservatives 68.1 1874 60.1 38.0 1877 77.8 47.7 1875 68.7 39.2 1878 73.8 44.9 1876 79.5 50.3 Third Parliament : Liberals 71.9 Conservatives 44.0

37 average cohesion index of 45.8, while the Conservatives in opposition recorded an average cohesion index of 44.0. The difference between the two is not significant. On the other hand, the effect of incumbency upon cohesion appears to be significant. The Conservatives recorded an average cohesion index of 53.9 while in office, and the Liberals recorded an average of 71.9. When we compare these averages with their average opposition indexes, 44.0 and 45.8, respectively, it becomes obvious that incumbency is largely responsible for cohesiveness. Conservative cohesion index averages after 1878, when the party reassumed office, would likely further substantiate this conclusion.

38 VOTING ON ISSUES II We argued earlier that an analysis of religious and regional cohesion indexes would indicate that there are a number of religious and regional issues which call forth high degrees of religious and regional cohesion and override traditional partisan political identifications. The data presented in table 2.2 support this hypothesis; there are close to 90 cases in which religious and regional cohesion indexes register 90 or above. Before we discuss these results, however, it might be useful to compare the behaviour of the two parties, the two religions, and the three regions, on the various issues. ^ If we know how these categoric groups differ on issues, it might help us to understand the circumstances in which religion and region function as sources of voting cohesion. The Liberals and Conservatives show distinctively different cohesion on three issue categories: culture, industry and commerce, and privileges and elections; moderately different cohesion on two issue categories: military and veterans' affairs and public works, and roughly similar cohesion on the remaining issues. The Liberals score high on cultural issues and public works, moderately high on foreign affairs and internal administration, and low on the other issue categories. The Conservatives score high on privileges and elections, and public works,

39 moderately high on foreign affairs and military and veterans' affairs, and less high on the other issue categories . The Liberals score moderately low cohesion indexes on foreign affairs, internal administration, industry and commerce, and low on the other issues categories. By contrast, the Conservatives record a large number of low cohesion indexes on cultural issues and industry and commerce, a moderate number on internal administration and public works, and few on the other issues categories . The significant cohesion differences between the Liberals and Conservatives, then, are on cultural issues, industry and commerce, and privileges and elections. With respect to religion, the Roman Catholics and Protestants show distinct cohesion differences on six issues, foreign affairs, industry and commerce, military and veterans' affairs, privileges and elections, public works, and taxation and revenue. The Roman Catholics and Protestants record fewer cohesion differences on cultural issues, and about the same number of high and low cohesion indexes on agriculture and urban issues, internal administration, justice and social services. The cohesion differences between the Roman Catholics and Protestants are not, of course, as distinctive as between the Liberals and Conservatives, but there are a sufficient number to merit comment.

Table 2.2 Significant Votes: High and Low Cohesion Indexes for Party, Religion and Region 1867 - 1878 40 0 a) £ e o •d t 4-1 •H r— 1 VO in in CO 1 — 1 d VO d 4^ fd tn m CM i — i CM CO in CO £ *H W ►> O 0 CM CO CTi d* CO CM VO r* CO r — i H 0 t i — 1 i — i i — i 43 a) d 4^ O’ tn CO CM CM CM CM CM d •H 0 £ •H 0 i — 1 d< d* d1 in CO •'si* CO i — I ri — i CM d t i — 1 i — i r-H rd i — 1 0 4-> d 4S o g> VO CM CM 1 — 1 i — 1 CM CO d •H £ 0 CM rr00 in CM CM VO ■ — i OO CM CO • LI i — i i — 1 Prot gh CO CO 1 — 1 i — 1 CM •H w £ 0 CM d CO co in i — i CM i — 1 • t O • rt ft tr. •d CO i — 1 CM i — i CM •H w • £ > 0 CO CM d CM i — 1 ■ — i d d it i — i i — 1 a) 0 d t 0 tn CO LO d i — i CO CM CM U *H i — i rd w 0 ^ iH 0 1-1 d< d in CM CM CM i — 1 i — 1 d t u 0 43 t •H tr> t -d o in vo CO CM 1 — 1 CO 0 CO K 1 — 1 03 0 d 0 0 i d ■ — i >i >1 ir> 0 t d i — 1 0 0 d 0 d 0 0 d 0 d o >1 d 43 d tr> d 4-1 O o 0 rd o o O i — 1 •d 0 d O d d •H d 0 d •d 4-> •H *H •d •d 0 0 4-> d 0 •H D 4-1 0 0 0 d 0 4-> •rH > 4-> i — 1 i — | •d 0 0 d 0 O'1 d i — 1 d d 4-> • 03 g 0 i — 1 •d o t! 43 o o X 0 d o tr> *> d 0 -d d d d t d •rH d 0 d d 0 0 -d 0 > 0 4-1 0 o It 0 H *H H 0 t> £ fd rH fd (d 4^ cn > Eh 0 0 0 d id e u W d d fd H O • d • • H-l • 03 • • • • • • o • 0 • i 1 4-1 CM co ctj d in i-a VO f" CO 05 CO o t id CO CN 05 i — ! i — i i — 1

The text on this page is estimated to be only 27.00% accurate



41 Both the Roman Catholics and Protestants record about the same number of high cohesion indexes on cultural issues and foreign affairs; the Roman Catholics, however, record about half as many low cohesion indexes on the same issues as the Protestants. Similarly, the Roman Catholics and Protestants record about the same number of high cohesion indexes on internal administration and public works, but the Protestants record almost twice as many low cohesion indexes for these issues. Finally, the Roman Catholics record no high or low cohesion indexes for industry and commerce while the Protestants record five low cohesion scores. Again, on taxation and revenue, the Roman Catholics record no cohesion indexes, and the Protestants record nine low cohesion scores. Regional cohesion differences are somewhat less distinctive than either religious or party differences. Indeed, we find only four cases where the cohesion differences between the regions are distinctive; for the Maritimes on cultural issues, for Quebec on public lands, and for Ontario on public works and taxation and revenue. Moderate cohesion differences are evident for Ontario on cultural issues and military and veterans' affairs, Quebec on foreign affairs and industry and commerce, and the Maritimes on military and veterans' affairs and privileges and elections. Ontario, Quebec and the Maritimes record about the

42 same high cohesion indexes for cultural issues, while Ontario records about half as many low cohesion indexes, and the Maritimes only one. For foreign affairs, the three regions record about the same high cohesion indexes, but Quebec records about one-third as many more low cohesion indexes as Ontario. For industry and commerce, Ontario and the Maritimes record the same number of low cohesion indexes, while Quebec records about 30 per cent more low indexes. For military and veterans' affairs, Quebec records two high and two low cohesion indexes, while Ontario records one high and four low indexes, and the Maritimes, three high and one low. For privileges and elections, Ontario and Quebec record the same number of high (two) and about the same number of low (18, 16) cohesion indexes, while the Maritimes record five high and four low indexes. For public lands, Quebec differs significantly from either Ontario or the Maritimes, with seven low indexes, as compared to one low index for Ontario and none for the Maritimes. For public works, Ontario records about twice as many low cohesion indexes as the Maritimes or Quebec. Finally, for taxation and revenue, Ontario records four high and 12 low cohesion indexes, v/hile Quebec records one low index, and the Maritimes no high or low indexes. When we examine religion and region as alternative sources of cohesion, we find that neither can be considered determining in the sense that region and religion

43 override party cohesion consistently and significantly for any of the issue categories. Nevertheless, as the data in table 2.2 suggest, region and religion are important sources of cohesion. Perhaps more strikingly, region and religion, in relation to certain issue categories, become insignificant as sources of cohesion. Let us look more closely at these findings. For category one, agriculture and urban issues, none of the variables accounts for significant high cohesion levels; yet in four cases, for the Roman Catholics, Protestants, Ontario and Quebec, agriculture and urban issues produce a fairly large number of low cohesion indexes recorded vis-a-vis religion and region. We do not assume a functional relationship between party cohesiveness, on the one hand, and religious and regional cohesion, on the other, though this may frequently be the case. What these figures suggest is that agriculture and urban issues have very little to do with religion and region -hence the abnormally low religious and regional cohesion indexes . For category two, cultural issues, all of the variables appear to be important in different circumstances. There are a sufficient number of high Liberal cohesion indexes, and low Conservative cohesion indexes, to indicate distinctive differences between the two parties on these issues. Religious cohesion differences are somewhat

44 less distinctive but cultural issues produced a larger number of low cohesion indexes for the Protestants. On a regional basis, cultural issues produced a fairly large number of high cohesion indexes for each region, and a large number of low indexes for Quebec. For category three, foreign affairs, including tariffs and trade, party clearly is the most important source of cohesion for both the Liberals and Conservatives. The Roman Catholics record a few low cohesion indexes for foreign affairs, while the Protestants, Ontario, Quebec and the Maritimes record a large number of low cohesion indexes. A similar pattern is evident for category four, internal administration, and for category 12, public works. Party in each case is the important source of cohesion, v/hile religion and region generally record low cohesion indexes. One fairly significant difference between intraregional cohesion in Ontario and Quebec should be noted; for public works, Ontario has more than twice as many low cohesion indexes as Quebec. For category five, industry and commerce, party is both an important source of cohesion (for the Liberals) and division (for the Conservatives) , while religion and region produce low intrareligious and intraregional cohesion indexes. Here again there are distinctive differences between the Liberals and Conservatives, between the Roman Catholics and Protestants, and less distinctive

45 differences between the three regions. Categories six, justice and civil rights, seven, military and veterans' affairs, nine, public lands, and 11, social services, are fairly similar. With the exception of differences between Ontario and Quebec in relation to regional cohesion for categories six and seven, and Quebec's unusually large number of low cohesion indexes for category nine, the party, religious and regional cohesion indexes are much the same. Liberal and Conservative cohesion for categories eight, privileges and elections, and 10, public works, is about the same for low cohesion indexes, but importantly different for high cohesion indexes. For the Conservatives, privileges and elections elicited 17 high cohesion indexes, as opposed to the Liberals three high indexes. Similarly, public works elicited 12 high cohesion indexes for the Conservative and eight for the Liberals . Privileges and elections issues produced a large number of low cohesion indexes for Protestants, and for Ontario and Quebec, while public works issues produced a large number of low cohesion indexes for Ontario, and a somewhat fewer number for Quebec and the Maritimes. Finally, for category 12, taxation and revenue, party is a relatively important source of cohesion for the Conservatives, apparently unimportant for the Liberals. Ontario shows a large number of high cohesion indexes.

46 At the same time, however, Protestants and Ontario recorded the largest number of low cohesion indexes for taxation and revenue, suggesting that the issues may be a source of cohesion in some circumstances and be incohesive in others. To draw the analysis together, only the most inchoate patterns emerge to delineate linkages between and among the variables. It is clear that the Liberals and Conservatives behaved quite differently towards cultural issues, industry and commerce, privileges and elections, and public works. It also is clear that Protestant intrareligious cohesion is similar to Ontario's intraregional cohesion, although the relationship is not constant. Similarly, there is a notable, although less distinct, relationship between Roman Catholics' cohesion and Quebec's intraregional cohesion. More strikingly, however, there are no distinctive cohesion differences between the Roman Catholics and Protestants on cultural issues, and only moderately distinct cohesion differences between Ontario and Quebec on cultural issues. We argued earlier that issues which have implications for a particular concept of federalism, the role of government, or economic nationalism, would be more divisive than issues which did not have these implications. The foregoing analysis tends to confirm this hypothesis: we have

47 found that issues which have implications for federalism, such as cultural issues, privileges and elections and taxation and revenue issues, produced more divisive voting behaviour than issues which did not have these implications. Similarly, we found that foreign affairs, and industry and commerce issues, which have implications for economic nationalism, and industry and commerce, and privileges and elections issues, which have implications for the role of government, also produced more divisiveness. At the same time, of course, these issues have produced high voting cohesion among both parties; cultural issues are cohesion-building for the Liberals and divisive for the Conservatives. It seems clear that cultural issues are the focal point for party competition; they define the differences between the two parties, and bring out the underlying religious and regional dimensions of voting behaviour. Finally, the number of low and high cohesion indexes indicate that there was not during the period a clear division on cultural issues between either the Roman Catholics and Protestants or Quebec and Ontario.

.

48 REGION AND RELIGION III It was suggested earlier that religious and regional variables would most adequately explain the voting behaviour of members in relation to the categories of issues which have implications for federalism, role of government, and economic nationalism. Where the categories of issues relate to these kinds of questions, we argued, the regression coefficients should be comparatively high. Where the categories of issues do not relate to these kinds of questions, we said, the regression coefficients should be significantly lower. As the data in table 2.3 indicate, our hypothesis is only partly correct; several categories of issues which do not relate to federalism, the role of government and economic nationalism yielded high regression coefficients, while several categories of issues which do relate to these questions yielded comparatively low regression coefficients. We believe that the explanation lies in the methodology; regression coefficients, like the coefficient of significance for the Rice cohesion index, are based upon participation and conflict. The regression coefficients are calculated on the basis of the number of cases, as well as the individual cohesion indexes: the greater the number of cases, the higher the regression coefficient, and, the greater the number of similar cohesion indexes, the higher the regression coefficient.

49 While this produces variations in the strength of the regression coefficient -- for example, instead of a 0.76543 we obtain a coefficient of 0.54321 with fewer cases and a smaller number of similar cohesion indexes -it does not, except where the distribution of cohesion indexes is extremely lopsided, alter the order of the variables . At the outset, the data reveal that religion is the single most important variable for the Liberals on the full range of issues. Protestantism best explains Liberal voting behaviour in relation to foreign affairs, internal administration (for the first and third parliaments) , industry and commerce, military and veterans' affairs, privileges and elections and public works, while Catholicism best explains Liberal voting behaviour in relation to cultural issues (for the first and third parliaments) , and taxation and revenue. Regional variables, Ontario and the Maritimes, respectively, best explain Liberal voting behaviour in relation to public works for the second parliament and foreign affairs and industry and commerce for the third parliament, and, public works for the third parliament. In contrast, for the Conservatives, region is a significantly more important variable. The regional variable, Ontario, best explains Conservative voting behaviour in relation to industry and commerce (for the first and third parliaments) , military and veterans' affairs, privileges and

50 Regression Coefficient Variable Regression Coefficient 0 0 03 43 •H 0 -P 0 0 O >1 •H 44 ■ — i 03 i — 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 4-> 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 • C/3 U -P 0 0 a 0 0 O • 0 V 0 0 0 £ •H 1 - 1 •H 4-) 0 4-1 0 •H •H M-l 0 0 0 £ 0 0 0 4-> •H > 0 0 0 0 43 0 •H 0 0 0 •H CM CM 0 43 0 tn 1 — i 0 Cm 0 0 0 •H tn V a o £ 0 0 0 0 0 0 P3 >i 0 0 V i — 1 •H -P •H •H 0 0 0 0 44 03 0 tn tn 0 0 o 0 0 1 — 1 0 •H *H •H •H -H •H 43 ft Cm i — I • — 1 tn tn tn 44 •H •H 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 CM CM CM CM CM •H 44 rH 43 44 0 g 1 1 1 1 I 0 •H s 0 44 T3 0 • CM CO •^r in MO 0 i 0 ■H 44 0 -P • 1 0 •H 0 0 03 0 U0 £ tn 0 0 44 O a 0 0 0 0 t 0 4-1 0 tn 0 O +j 0 •H 0 0 U3 O rH 0| 43 0 ro 0 0 0 • 0 CM i — 1 0 CM 0 43 •H 0 03 0 0 0 H 0 •H 0 1 — 1 *H 0 44 43 4-4 43 0 0 0 0 Eh > < Variable Regression Coefficient Variable Regression Coefficient Variable Regression Coefficient Variable Regression Coefficient 0 R *H * 4c * * 44 44 o m> I — 1 "cr CO CTi rMO CO CM CO MO CM o 0 0 CM ao o CO CO r» MO Co 00 CM MO U0 1 — 1 0 > -sT r» UO in MO rMO r" CM CM O UO CM O E 0 O 00 M0 m o CO CO CM O r-'1 — 1 0 0 CO CO l — 1 1 — 1 co U0 CM 1 - 1 o t" CM CM •H 0 i — 1 0 1 - 1 1 — 1 O o o o o O o o o O o o O 0 O 0 u CM CO MO CM UO in co CM MO co in CM MO 43 0 4C * * * * * 4c •H 1 — 1 00 CO co ruo o o o uo o o rl — 1 00 43 0 rI — 1 CO in CM CM 00 CM o 00 in CO MO UO Eh 0 O' 1 — 1 1 — 1 co in uo CO t"1 — 1 1 — 1 uo CO 1 — 1 0 o 1 — 1 o rMO cCM 1 - 1 CJO 1 — 1 00 CM 1 - 1 43 CM o MO CM in U0 UO ■vT1 1 — 1 00 CM o O o •H 0| 1 - 1 1 — 1 O o o o O o o o o o o O o CM CO in MO UO MO CM CO ■C4< CO CM MO UO 0 > •H 0 0 0 44 0 0 0 44 0 0 0 0 0 > •H •H *H 0 0 44 44 44 E 0 0 0 0 0 0 > > > •H 0 0 0 0 i — 1 O 0 0 0 0 u 0 0 0 0 43 43 43 Cm O C O 43 £ > £ 0 1 — 1 0 0 0 0 0 CM IM (0 O 0 0 0 O 0 0 03 43 0 0 0 •H Eh Eh Eh pi 0 > •H 4C 4c * * * 4c 4c 44 CO 1 — 1 M0 1 — 1 ■xT in MO CM rco r44 0 in co cin CO o CO rCO I — 1 UO MO CO uo 0 > rMO 00 CO co rH CO r" CM MO uo CO CO M1 00 0 0 i — 1 ao CO ■c? o (T\ o CM ruo uo MO CO CM CM E 0 r" uo CM CM 00 CO 1 - 1 l — 1 o 00 CO CO CM o 0 0 *H 0 o o o O o O o O o o o o O O o i — 1 O 0 o 0 CM co M0 UO CM CO uo MO CM CO UO MO CM 44 4C * 4c 4c 4c 0 H ro CM CO CO l — 1 O co f" CO CO MO in 0 0 CM CO •^r CM CCO rH in MO r1 — 1 CO MO 00 •H 0 CO m co rMO 1 - 1 MO UO CM nMO 00 r" CM [M 0 M0 in o o CP CM rH 1 - 1 1 - 1 CM CM UO i — 1 CM 43 in 'vF CM o 00 CM o O MO CO 1 - 1 o O •H 01 o o o O o o o O o o O O o o o cm oo "c? mo uo co cm uo mo n c in vo ^ 10 0 0 0 O •H tn 44 0 0 0 0 i — i 0 44 0 tn 0 0 0 0 0 ■H •H 0 44 V 44 0 0 0 0 i — 1 0 m 0 -H 0 0 0 44 44 0 0 CJ 0 < 0 •H 0 H 0 • • • 'U Variable

Table 2.3 Stepwise Multiple Regression, Cont 51 fa 0 > -H +» X fd in o i — ! CM CO 1 - 1 'M1 CO 00 > VO 5? CM 1 — 1 g in CO LO CO vo -P g in co CM rI-~ 0 o co co g 0 o 'vf 1 - 1 o CO -H CO CO CO co l — 1 CM 0 CO rCM rH o 4-> g rCM 1 — 1 o e G fd 0 • • • • • 0 o o O o o > •H o o o c o •H U g 4-> i — 1 0 fd g CO > cd in vo •m1 CO CM fa g in CO vo CM fa o CL) ■X X * CO ■X fa 1 — I CM rCM CO CM £ fa vo CO in in H1 g fd CO in CM CO 0 O CM o co co •H U VO o i — 1 CO o fa LO CO in o 00 fa o o o m o £ CO co co CO CO Eh fa vo vo CO 1 — 1 0 d) vo in rH o O •H 0 fa fa o o o o o Eh o o o o o 0 G O -p fd > 0 co fa O £ 0 fa O O Eh o o in cm vo co Eh vo CM in ^ CO co 0 0 •X •X •X -X 0 g g g o CO CO rH CO 0 > o 0 0 in CO CO CO CM g •H •H •H •H o •vr CO CM in o fa fa 4-> 4-> co o r" in •H 4J fd 0 0 0 co vo sr h1 o 4-) g > > > > 0 0) g g g g o o o o o > S 0 0 0 0 g 03 0 0 0 0 0 •H g fa fa fa CO in H VO CM 0 1 — 1 0 o o o fa g u o fd £ £ £ •X ■X fa 0 0 0 rCO co rvo £ fa fa fa CO 1 — 1 rH (N CO 0 fa rH 1 — 1 "nT o rr" fa g 0 o 0 0 CO CO H 0 g 0 o 0 CO vo I — 1 I — 1 o 0 o 0 Eh Eh Eh 0 0 fa o o o o o EH fa •H pi 0 > •H 4-1 0 4-1 > g g 0 0 £ 0 0 g •H 0 1 — 1 u g 0 fa t — i 4-1 0 0 g g 0 *H fa fa •H fa in ro (N co ■X ■X 4c •X X X X X X X l — 1 1 - 1 vo CO in CO rO' in o 1 — 1 a i ro CM I — 1 CO CO CO ri — 1 l"' m I — 1 VO 1 — 1 CM o vo l"' ro CO CO vo o o r00 CO o r" o vo rH CM co 'M1 vo CO vo CO CM I — 1 co co rH co vo CM vo 1 — 1 CM vo I — 1 00 vo CO VO o 1 - 1 vo VO o CO o CM I — 1 1 — 1 CM rl — 1 o 1 — 1 in CO rH o 'M1 o 00 vo 1 — 1 rH 1 — 1 vo in CM 1 - 1 o r'Vf CM o o vo in o O o IH vo rH 1 — 1 o o O o O o o o O O o o o C o o o o o O o O o o O o in vo CO CM in H1 VO co CM in H< VO co CM LO CM VO CO in M1 vo CO CM X X X X X X X X X r" CO CM CO in CM 1 - 1 CO o in CO 1 — 1 00 rin rin vo CM o CO t"(O in o CO CO in co CO CM rCO CO ro in H1 co CO t"' 00 uo vo 1 — 1 o rH H1 M1 o rm CM CM vo CM o r-' CM CM CO CO co i — 1 CO in CO fa CM m CO vo r-' rH o co CO CO in co o rco co vo CO CM vo CO in cm CM o vo rH 1 - 1 o in 1 — 1 o o 00 vo CM CM CM co CO 1 — 1 1 - 1 o O o o o o o O o O o o O o o o o o o O O o o o o o co vo CM in M1 CO CM in VO co M1 in CM vo CO CM in VO H1 CM vo CO in co fa g 0 0 g 0 0 0 0 g o to >i o >i g to 0 £ g 0 g g g 0 0 -H 0 0 4-> 4-1 0 0 g fa fa o •g g 0 0 £ fa 0 •H O •H fa g u g £ •H fa > 0 i — 1 0 0 fa 0 fa 0 •H i — 1 X > 0 g o *H £> g w g 0 0 g H £ fa fa Eh w fa fa fa 0 • g • g • g • • fa 1 — i in 0 fa 0 00 0 O cm g i — 1 i — 1 n3

The text on this page is estimated to be only 20.50% accurate

. *

52 elections, public works, (for the first and third parliaments), taxation and revenue, and foreign affairs for the third parliament. Protestantism best explains Conservative voting behaviour in relation to cultural issues (for the first and third parliaments), foreign affairs, internal administration (for the first and third parliaments) , and public works for the second parliament. The pattern we discerned in relation to the first order variables -- the dominance of religious variables vis-a-vis Liberal voting behaviour, and the dominance of regional variables vis-a-vis Conservative voting behaviour -- is to a considerable extent duplicated in relation to second order 5 variables. If the variable which best explained Liberal voting behaviour for the first order was a religious variable, the second order variable is likely to be a religious variable. Similarly, if a regional variable best explained Conservative voting behaviour for the first order, the second order also is likely to be a regional variable. For the Liberals, Catholicism replaces Protestantism in relation to foreign affairs, internal administration, for the first and third parliaments, military and veterans' affairs and public works. Similarly, Protestantism replaces Catholicism for the Liberals in relation to cultural issues for the first and third parliaments as a second order variable. Catholicism also replaces one Liberal regional variable,

The text on this page is estimated to be only 6.00% accurate

f

53 Ontario, for military and veterans' affairs. Finally, three regional variables replace religious variables for the Liberals in relation to industry and commerce, privileges and elections and taxation and revenue. For the Conservatives, second order regional variables replace both first order religious and regional variables in 12 cases. Regional variables replace religious variables in relation to cultural issues, foreign affairs and internal administration, and regional variables replace other regional variables in relation to cultural issues (third parliament) , industry and commerce (first and third parliaments), military and veterans' affairs, privileges and elections, public works (first, second and third parliaments) , and taxation and revenue. The data reveal two striking differences between the Liberals and Conservatives. First, religious variables generally have low influence on Conservative voting behaviour. Of the 14 regression runs, regional variables accounted for the first three variables five times, and two out of the first three nine other times. Even more significantly, Conservative Roman Catholics placed fifth in the list of variables 10 out of 14 times, and fourth on three additional occasions . For the Liberals, the variables are largely reversed. Regional variables display low influence, while religious variables are significantly more important. For the Liberals,

- 54 regional variables place fourth, fifth and sixth on the list of variables in seven regression runs, and fourth, fifth or sixth for two-thirds of the remaining seven regression runs. Quebec fares especially poorly in relation to the regional variables; Quebec ranks fifth on eight occasions, fourth once, and third four times.

55 PARTY LIKENESS IV For our analysis of indexes of party likeness, we hypothesized that indexes for the party variable would be the least similar, for region somewhat more similar, and for religion the most similar. The data in table 2.4 confirm the hypoethesis: there are 209 indexes where the two parties voted dissimilarly (an index of party likeness below 50); for the regional variable, there are 161 dissimilar votes (adjusted); and for the religion variable, there are 47 dissimilar votes (also adjusted) . 6 The data reveal two significant and slightly more than a dozen small differences between the Roman Catholics and Protestants and two of the regions, Ontario and Quebec. The significant differences are between Ontario and Quebec on public works and taxation and revenue issues; Liberals and Conservatives in Ontario voted dissimilarly 44 times while the Liberals and Conservatives in Quebec voted dissimilarly only two times on public works issues. Moreover, on taxation and revenue issues, the Liberals and Conservatives in Ontario voted dissimilarly 15 times while their Quebec counterparts voted dissimilarly only four times. Less significantly, the Liberals and Conservatives in Ontario voted dissimilarly six times on military and veterans' affairs issues, while their Quebec counterparts voted dissimilarly 10 times. The Liberals and Conservatives

56 in Ontario voted dissimilarly 15 times on industry and commerce issues, and 25 times on cultural issues, while the Liberals and Conservatives in Quebec voted dissimilarly 11 times on industry and commerce issues and 22 times on cultural issues. The differences between Liberal and Conservative Roman Catholics and Protestants also are less significant but distinctive enough to merit comment. The pattern, to the extent to which one exists, shows the Liberal Roman Catholics and Protestants voting dissimilarly slightly more frequently than Conservative Roman Catholics and Protestants on a half a dozen issues. Furthermore, there seems to be a fairly constant ratio between the two; Liberal Roman Catholics and Protestants vote dissimilarly about one-third more frequently than Conservative Roman Catholics and Protestants . On cultural issues, Liberal Roman Catholics and Protestants voted dissimilarly 21 times against the Conservative Roman Catholics and Protestants 18; on foreign affairs, the figures are six and three, respectively; on industry and commerce, nine and five, respectively; on public lands, five and one, respectively; on public works, six and three, respectively; and on taxation and revenue, three and none, respectively. Finally, the pattern is reversed for internal administration; the Liberal Roman Catholics and Protestants voted dissimilarly one time, while the Conservative Roman

Table 2.4 Significant Votes: Indexes of Party Likeness for Party, Religion and Region 1867 - 1878 57 0 0 g * * •h in co •p ti g •H -H o P PI u cd £ CO CO co in r0 • • •H CO P A g -H CO g 0 i — 1 LO CO 1 — 1 LO r" CO 1 — 1 CO 'sT -p PI g o u CO 1 — 1 LO ■O’ ebec Libs Cons CO CO i — 1 LO I — 1 o 1 — 1 P a co I — I 1 — 1 LD 0 0 > •H • P> • 4-> POO > • P P CL Ph CU 0 g o o LO LD ro co 0 * i cd • -P g o 0 CL) • P rQ (L CL •H pi iH CO CO O'. 'O’ LO CO CO CO rH cd g 0 rQ -H lb CO a) > •H -p g > g a) CO g o u CTi cn co cn co o in in co H1 o co H1 rH g O ** •H P 0 -p g P g g P p -P i — 1 -P >i 0 1 — 1 0 g 0 g 0 g o P P C7> p g -h -p p o g P •H -H p g 0 0 g •H (d -P 0 g 0 -H p g o P P 1 — 1 P MH ■p e p g 0 tn tr> P P O 4h g p g o P O < P u P C H H o 0 P> 0 g H u 1 — 1 CO CO 'H1 LO co P 0 g o g 0 0 •H p P Pi > g 0 g p p g 0 0 g o 0 £>1 tn g PI P CO g 0 P 0 o o 0 O g i — 1 *H o o rH p •H -p •H P> •H •H g +j g p> •H > O rH i — 1 •H g 0 0 rH ■H 0 n rQ o X > P •H P rH p P o g 0 P s CL W CL CL CO CL CD r00 cn o • 1 — 1 • CO I — 1 1 — 1 1 — I

58 Catholics and Protestants voted dissimilarly five times. The Maritimes, which is treated separately because of the comparatively few number of dissimilar votes between the Liberals and Conservatives, is notable for the absence of dissimilarity on cultural issues, internal administration, industry and commerce, privileges and elections and public works. Where these issues elicited a substantial measure of dissimilar voting among Liberals and Conservatives in Ontario and Quebec, the Maritimes were not touched significantly by the divisiveness. The single exception, foreign affairs, where the Maritimes do yield a respectable number of dissimilar votes, is not unexpected, for many of the votes in this category deal with tariffs and trade, a matter which was of some importance to the Maritimes.

59 REGIONAL PROBLEMS V We hypothesized that where there appears to be an objective ethnic, cultural, religious or educational interest in a particular vote, voting cohesion within both parties would decrease, while the Roman Catholic and Quebec cohesion indexes increased. It was our contention that where the interests of French-Canadians were subject to resolution in parliament (and not the provincial political arena) , the French-Canadian members of parliament would likely vote more along religious and regional lines than along traditional party lines. The data in table 2.2 on this question are inconclusive. For category two, cultural issues, where these kinds of interests would show up. Conservative cohesion suffers badly, but Liberal cohesion is increased substantially. Moreover, as the Roman Catholics are divided evenly on cultural issues (four high and four low indexes) we are unable to say whether the religious variable influenced party cohesion. Essentially the same conclusion is reached in regard to cohesion within Quebec; with seven high and eight low cohesion indexes, the difference is not distinct enough to enable us to draw any conclusions. We do, however, get enough information to conclude that cultural issues were perhaps the most divisive kinds of issues parliament was called upon to deal with.

*

60 The second hypotehsis which dealt with special regional problems concerned the behavior of the Maritime members before and after new terms were negotiated between Canada and Nova Scotia. We hypothesized that Maritime regional cohesion decreased after 1869 as the revised settlement with Nova Scotia was sufficient to induce a notable percentage of Maritime members to vote more frequently with the government party. An examination of the cohesion index averages for the Maritimes between 1867 and 1871 indicates that rather than decreasing after 1869, the cohesion indexes continue an upward trend that began in 1869. Maritime regional cohesion averages for the five years were : 1867-38.0 1868-29.2 1869-37.9 1870-39.0 1871-44.2 The only conclusion we can reach is that if the revised settlement with Nova Scotia had any effect at all upon the voting behaviour of Maritime members, the effect was negative; Maritime members voted less frequently with the government and more frequently along regional lines. The final regional problem we want to consider is the question of whether Western members were "ministerialist" in their support of the two parties, voting with the government, whichever party that might be. We found earlier that on the basis of election returns after the Liberals assumed office, the West did not shift its support from the Conservatives to the Liberals. We hypothesized that the voting

The text on this page is estimated to be only 18.00% accurate

» 

61 behaviour of Western members would not support the ministerialist argument; we suggested that the cohesion indexes for Western members were the same during the Liberals' tenure in office as they were during the Conservative administration. We argued that Western members were not highly cohesive at any time during the period under consideration. Again, an examination of the cohesion index averages for the Western members indicates that our hypothesis was only partly correct: Western members record only 50 cohesion indexes (out of 322) in which cohesion fell below 100 during the Conservative administration, but 89 cohesion indexes (out of 124) in which cohesion fell below 100 during the Liberals' tenure in office. While this evidence does not solidify the case for the ministerialist argument, it does suggest the ministerialist tradition was part of the Western members' voting behaviour.

The text on this page is estimated to be only 6.00% accurate

.

62 Chapter 2, Notes. 1 Cohesion index averages are based upon uneven samples, as noted earlier, and may therefore be partially distorted. 2 The West has been left out of this analysis because there was an insufficient number of members to make the comparisons meaningful . 3 The criterion for selection these votes was: high - a cohesion index of 90 or more, and low - a cohesion index of 10 or less. The West was left out because the sample was too small. 4 Again, the West w as left out of this analysis because the sample was too small. Furthermore, no regression coefficients are available for categories one, six, nine and 11, because there were too few observations to make use of all the variables. First order variables are those which best explain the voting behaviour observed these are found at the top of each column -- and second, third, fourth, and fifth order variables are ranked according to their explanatory value. 6 Since there were one column of party likeness indexes, two columns of religion likeness indexes, and three columns of region likeness indexes, we divided the total number of high and low religion and region indexes by two and three respectively to standardize for comparative purposes. The criterion for selecting these votes was a cohesion index of 50 or below. Also, the West was left out of the analysis for the same reason.

63 CHAPTER 3 CONCLUSIONS Within the limitations imposed by our data and the methodology employed, we have accomplished the objective set out at the beginning of our investigation: to describe , measure and evaluate Canadian legislative voting behaviour between 1867 and 1878. We have examined intraparty voting cohesion and established differences between the parties; we have explored the sociological dimensions of legislative voting behaviour and drawn linkages between the sociological variables and voting patterns; and, we have analysed voting behaviour in terms of a number of categories of issues and discovered relationships between party cohesion, the sociological variables and the issue categories. Our analysis has yielded mixed results: some of our findings are meaningful, others are not particularly significant. There have been a few surprises, and a few disappointments, a few promising directions, and a few sterile avenues . Our first conclusion is that we cannot, on the basis of our analysis, add greatly to our understanding of political party development in Canada. We found that incumbency appeared to be a far more important factor in determining intraparty cohesion than anything we might want to characterize as party development. Conservative cohesion dropped sharply when the party assumed the role of opposition, while

64 Liberal cohesion rose significantly, even spectacularly, during the party's first three years in office. Although we observe one notable indication of party development -- consistently high levels of cohesion for the government after 1870 -- we believe it will be necessary to look beyond 1878 for strong behavioural evidence of political party development. Our interpretation of the poor showing of the Conservatives during the first several years of Confederation does not rest upon solid empirical evidence. Indeed, at this point it is nothing more than a suspicion, an attempt to rationalize unexpected findings. Our interpretation is: We know that much of the support for Confederation was probably not much more than lukewarm to the prospect of having the important business of state dealt with in the new national political arena. It is likely that many members of parliament were not as commited to the broader political arena as Macdonald and his confederates; for those not caught up with grandiose visions of a national stage. Confederation probably meant a larger pie, but one which had to be divided among so many more competitors. On the other hand, the opponents of Confederation, especially from the Maritimes, but also from the central provinces, had no illusions about their role -- hence they could, and as our analysis shows, did vote together consistently. We suspect the relatively low cohesion averages for the Conservatives during the first several years of Confederation, then, are the product of

65 uncertainty and a lack of commitment on the part of Confederation's ostensible supporters. These members of parliament, one could argue, voted according to their personal preferences, constituency pressures, etc., in the absence of an overriding commitment to support the government . The remaining cohesion index averages, both for the Liberals and Conservatives, are close to what we anticipated and, as we indicated earlier, appear to be principally a function of incumbency. Assuming our explanation for the Conservatives' poor showing during the first several years of Confederation is valid, we would expect the uncertainty and lack of commitment on the part of Conservative members to resolve itself one way or the other as the new national political arena became more firmly established. Moreover, we should expect support for Confederation to grow as it became obvious the broader union had the capacity to survive the stresses the operation of the system imposed upon it. For the second part of our analysis, we found distinctive differences between the Liberals and Conservatives on cultural issues, industry and commerce, privileges and elections, and public works, as well as moderate differences on several other issues. These differences are not unexpected, and certainly not unexplainable, although there may be cause to question the adequacy of our explanations. With respect

- 66 to cultural issues, we know that the Liberals, at least while they were in opposition, took a strong position on provincial autonomy -- the Liberals were the parliamentary watchdogs of provincial rights . When questions involving cultural issues came before parliament, therefore, the Liberals could be expected to see them as threats to provincial autonomy, for cultural matters were among the few important (to some) governmental functions over which the national government did not assume jurisdiction. Furthermore, as political developments since Confederation have demonstrated, it is rewarding to take a strong provincial autonomist position while in opposition; both parties have done so with a large measure of consistency. The differences between Liberals and Conservatives on industry and commerce issues also are in keeping with our understanding of the role each party played during the formative years of Confederation. Many of the votes in this category of issues involved bankruptcy and insolvency legislation. The comparatively substantial measure of divisiveness within the Conservative party, we suspect, stemmed from different regional outlooks towards the role of government vis-a-vis commercial activities. Industrial Ontario, and the business community in Quebec, would have quite different ideas on the question than, for example, many FrenchCanadian members of parliament. Unfortunately, the regional differences on these issues our data reveal are insufficiently

■

67 distinct to enable us to establish a strong case either way. However, we suspect that the divisiveness which plagued the Conservatives on industry and commerce issues was not paralleled with the Liberals because of their role as opposition. For privileges and elections, it is our conclusion that the large measure of Conservative cohesion may be attributed to their role as the government during most of the period under consideration. To raise questions about the right of a member to hold a seat in the House of Commons, to attack the government's right to decide member's privileges, is to impugn the institution itself, and can be expected to produce a closed-ranks reaction on the part of government members. Not only were there fewer privileges and elections issues during the Liberal administration -- chiefly because the provincial franchise was replaced by a federal franchise -- but by the time the Liberals assumed office, electoral procedures had been operational for seven years, and no doubt many of the initial doubts and uncertainties had been removed as a result of early disputes. The differences between the Liberals and Conservatives on public works issues may be attributed to the Conservatives' committment to, and the Liberals' lack of committment to, Macdonald's view of Confederation. Macdonald pursued a policy of nation-building and an important part

The text on this page is estimated to be only 0.00% accurate

'

68 of this policy was his commitment to link the diverse regions of Canada together with a national transportation system. This required an ambitious public works program and direct or indirect government participation in a number of costly transportation schemes. The Liberals did not share Macdonald's dream, and consequently did not support his developmental policies, at least until they assumed office and were faced with the same kinds of challenges. The linkages between party, region and religion are comparatively close to what we expected to find, although not always as direct or distinct as we might expect. We found that the regional variables best explained Conservative voting behaviour in relation to our issue categories, while religious variables best explained Liberal voting behaviour. We found a close association between Liberal voting and Protestantism on the kinds of issues that would have significance to English-Canadians , and between Liberal voting and Roman Catholics on the kinds of issues which would have import for French-Canadians . Furthermore, we found Conservative voting behaviour and Ontario closely linked on the same kinds of issues which the Liberals and Protestants voted similarly, and somewhat less distinctly, we found Quebec related to the kinds of issues which the Liberals and Roman Catholics voted together on.

. •

69 When we analysed party voting patterns, we found a striking measure of similarity between the Liberals and Conservatives, except in relation to privileges and elections and public works issues. We anticipated these differences, and our earlier explanation for these differences stands. For the final part of our analysis, we tested several hypotheses concerning the special regional problems which confronted Confederation and, for the most part, found weaknesses either in our hypotheses, the data, or our methodology. We were not able to draw conclusions in relation to the question of French-Canadian interests because the differences between the party, religious and regional voting behaviour were not sufficiently distinct. With respect to the voting behaviour of members of parlia ment from the Maritimes before and after the revised settlement with Nova Scotia in 1869, the cohesion index averages not only failed to support our hypothesis but effectively refuted it. Finally, although we found some evidence of ministerialist voting behaviour among Western members, our analysis did not enable us to decide the question categorically one way or the other. In conclusion, our analysis provides some evidence of political party development. However, it would be nec essary to look at external evidence, such as the party

70 labels, electoral organization, the party's organizational presence in parliament, to obtain a full picture of political party development. There is, however, one thing which is clearly shown by the analysis of cohesion indexes: the cohesion index averages for the governing party — whether Liberal or Conservative — never fell below 60 after 1870. This is important in two ways: the governing party does establish some measure of cohesive voting, and since both parties had governmental experience during the period under investigation, this presages a trend towards the development of cohesive political parties.

'

71 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Anderson, Lee F., Watts, Meredith W. , Jr., Wilcox, Allen R. Legislative Roll-Call Analysis. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966. Beck, J. M. Pendulum of Power. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1968. Canada. Journals of the House of Commons, 1867 - 1878. Vol . I - XII. Ottawa: King's Printer. Canada. Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations . Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1954. Originally published in 1940. Careless, J. M. S. The Union of the Canadas. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1867. Carrigan, D. Owen Canadian Party Platforms 1867 - 1968. Toronto: Copp Clark, 1968. Chambers, William N. "Parties and Nation-Building in America," in Lapalombara, Joseph and Weiner, Myron Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. Cornell, Paul G. The Alignment of Political Groups in Canada 1841 - 1867. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962. Creighton, Donald John A. Macdonald: The Old Chieftain. Toronto: MacMillan Company, 1955. Dawson, R. M. The Government of Canada. 4th ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967. Engelmann, F. C. and Schwartz, M. A. Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1967. Epstein, Leon D. Political Parties in Western Democracies. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Golembiewski , Robert T., Welsh, William A., Crotty, William J. A Methodological Primer for Political Scientists. Chicago Rand McNally, 1969. Grobben, G. N. "Stepwise Multiple Regression CS101," Unpublished Computer Program, University of Alberta, 1970 Johnson, J. K. ed. The Canadian Directory of Parliament. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968.

72 Select Bibliography, Cont'd. Hougham, George M. "Minor Parties in Canadian National Politics 1867 - 1940," Unpublished Ph . D . Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1954. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms. Macquarrie, Heath The Conservative Party. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965. MacRae , Duncan Jr. Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting. New York: Harper and Row, 1970. _ . Parliament, Parties and Society in France 1946 - 1958 . New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967. Morton, W. L. The Kingdom of Canada. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963. Nie, Norman H., Bent, Dale H., Hull, C. Hadlai Statistical Package for the Social Sciences. Stanford University, 1968. Looseleaf Provisional Users Manual. Pickersgill, J. W. The Liberal Party. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1962. Thorburn, Hugh C. ed. Party Politics in Canada . Toronto : Prentice-Hall, 1963. Ross, G. W. Getting Into Parliament and After. Toronto: William Briggs, 1913. Rice, Stuart A. Quantitative Methods in Politics. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928. Turner, Julius Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1951. Underhill, Frank H. Canadian Political Parties. Canadian Historical Association Booklet No. 8, Ottawa, 1957. Ward, Norman The Canadian House of Commons. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950.

w 0 e LO 00 ro 00 00 r-" o 00 LO o 00 On] O' •H • • • +j o o oo CO 1 — 1 rH VO OO ro vo VO LO •H sr 1 — 1 00 VO 00 00 1 — 1 00 LO co *3* OO u 0 S o 0 00 av 00 VO CM 00 (Tv 00 CO 00 vo X! • • • 0 vo 00 vo 1 cr\ I — 1 O'' VO LO rvo 00 C?v rH LO LO CO 1 - 1 LO vo 00 44 co o i — 1 u l — 1 00 vo vo 00 OO 1 - 1 00 CM 00 CM 0 fd rH ^f CM 1 — 1 *=F LO l — 1 l — 1 CM 1 - 1 a i > • LO 1 - 1 O LO CM C' CO LO o 00 00 oo o 1 - 1 13 vo d U d co 0 • 00 00 00 00 CO 1 — 1 'vF 00 vo LO LO LO o o H .H £ CM ps CM LO 1 - 1 rH oo 1 - 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 0 O' d •H 00 o d 1 - 1 1 - 1 44 •H 0 d 0 0 0 -H 0 1 O 0 tr> CH -p d ,d 0 r" d 0 vo LO l> 04 VO (Tv OO VO vo LO o 1 — 1 (Tv 00 0 C4 -P vo 0 o CM OO 00 O' LO LO LO CM CM o (Tv rr-' o 0 co •H -H LO 00 00 CM ■M1 LO CO (Tv O O o o O O O O o o O o O o x d 0 -H H o 0 co Q -H X tn W -H o P-. rH • CH 0 0 CO LO s u 0 0) X r-' vo co co vo co ■ — I

*

0 0 £ r-' 03 03 00 o CM i — 1 o o o CM CO < — 1 00 •H • -p VO rCM in ro CM VO I — 1 ro o o VO r-' o •H p 0 s VO ro 1 — 1 m 1 - 1 I — 1 VO 00 00 ro o 0 CM CM VO m i — 1 m M< r03 CO o un vo ro 02 • • 0 00 CM ro 00 CM i — 1 in VO VO ro vo o M1 in ST 0 a ro CM CM 00 ro i — I l — 1 in ro vo ro l — 1 -P o 0 •H ro CM O 03 M1 ro ro M1 CO ro CM in vo 0 P • U 0 03 ro 1 - 1 O CM 03 ro ro o i — 1 vo 03 i — 1 CO -P CM ro O M1 ro CO I — 1 1 — 1 ro ro 1 - 1 ro 00 0 1 - 1 >i O -P P 0 • 0 ■P o vo CM M1 O m 03 vo 00 o 03 CM in ro 0 • • P P vo CM O 1 - 1 VO rvo rH o ro rrvo CM 0 0 ro ro i— 1 00 1 — 1 CM 1 — 1 l — 1 in 1 — 1 r4-1 X • rm rH 00 O in 00 CO m r-' M* CM rM1 M1 0 u • • 43 • l — 1 CO M1 1 — 1 O in 00 03 in vo 03 00 ro 03 0 0 m CM 00 ro M1 ro in ro 1 — 1 CM H 0 4H O 0 0 •H O 0 -PC 0 0 0 in ro CM o CM 03 M1 O m ro 00 1 - 1 CO 1 - 1 .0 0 O o o o M1 i — ! O in o ro CM CM r-' O 0 •H *H VO 03 O CO rrVO ro ro 1 — 1 vo M1 03 ro 03 U O 4-1 CM CM ro 1 — 1 CM CM CM CM CM ro CM CM CM ro CM •H -H • 4-1 0 o O O o o o O o o o O O O o O • 4-1 tn i — I 0 -H 0 01 X CJ H P 3 W 0 1 — 1 i— l m CM CO CO CO CO 1 — 1 03 1 - 1 m VO O CM 0 0 01 0 m o i — 1 CM ro o r" in CM 03 o CM 03 in < u CM m 03 in 1 — 1 1 — 1 I — 1 CO « - 1 CO VO i — 1 • ro 03 in CM CO m 03 M1 in O CM m ro vo 02 • •H r-' 1 - 1 vo r-' l — 1 00 CM m I — 1 r-* 03 i — 1 rH m 00 p ro rro vo M1 ro in vo I — 1 r03 M1 ro M1 0 • -p p in vo r" CO 03 o 1 — 1 CM CO M1 m VO 00 03 0 P i — l 1 — 1 H 1 — 1 i — 1 CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM > S P 0 0 >4 03 vo 00 I — I

CO 0 £ i — 1 CO co o CO o o 1 — 1 o co CO o CM 1 — 1 1 — 1 •H • -p

1 o -p p fd CM -p O' CM 00 o 00 CO LO O' CP o rH O' CP O' CP 00 0 P p LO 1 - 1 CO O' CP CO CM o CM CO LO o CM LO 0 CM 1 — 1 CM CM CM •'F o LO LO rH 1 — 1 CO 4M i — ! * • CO CM 1 - 1 CO CP o LO O' 00 CO 1 — 1 LO CO (D U • • • LO CO CP CO 00 LO CO o CO LO CO 1 — 1 a CO CO H CO CO CP 00 00 LO rH H £ 4-1 O O S p cd CD X co co co cp co co

APPENDIX 1. Cohesion Index for Party, Cont 1 d 0 0 £ 1 — 1 CM LO CM o o ai CO o CM CO 00 CO O' o o •H • • 4-> 00 LO CO o LO 1 — 1 CO o CO O' CO O' CO o CO •H u d CM r — 1 ■nF CM O' co CO CM 1 — 1 CM LO CM CM CM a ql 0 CO o CO CO O' CO < Ti CM CO 1 — I o O' LO 1 — 1 o n • • 0 o CO LO co CO CM CO CO 1 — 1 CO CTl o O' O' I — 1 00 d CM *cr LO ^f CM O' CO ^F LO 1 — 1 LO CO LO a o •H CM LO O' co CO CM CO G1 CM CO CM CO O'l O'l d • • cti 1 - 1 CO CM LO ^f CO 00 O'l 1 — I G\ CF\ O'l CO O' CM ^F 4-> CO co co 1 — 1 1 — 1 O' CO 00 CM 1 — 1 CO CO d o • 4-> CTl i — 1 o LO CO LO o LO 1 — 1 o co rH CO o o • u l - 1 O' CO CO CO CM CO o 2 U ac d CO 0 CO >4 1 — 1

in CO in m ID rr1 +j u cd CM U O m o o lO CN LO rLO r« — 1 s u id h co

APPENDIX 1. Cohesion Index for Party, Cont'd CO U nj S O CD CM CO O 00 00 r-' o CO r* • Q) O 00 O CO CM LO CO CM £ 00 CO CM CO 00 CM a 0 •H co r-' co rH r" o co CO u • • nj ri — 1 CO 00 CO o co 00 -P i — 1 CM 00 CO CM £ O 00 CTi 00 CO CO rLO rCM CM CO O o •M* CM i — 1 CM M4 00 00 00 CO CO 00 co co o rrrco CO 00 CM o 00 LO 1 — 1 o I — 1 00 • 4-> CO o o CO O o O O'* CO CO o CO 1 — I 00 00 o 0 • U 1 — 1 o 04 00 1 - 1 CD CO CO o CO 00 CO rH r-l 00 1 — 1 CM 00 LO CM 1 — 1 rH 00 00 LO • O' o 00 LO 00 00 LO LO 00 LO r-' CO rCO LO M4 o • 1 — 1 o CO o 00 00 CO CTi LO t of nee R m4 LO CO 1 — 1 CO 00 rH 1 — 1 1 — 1 00 00 CM 00 r" CO £ rd LO ["• CM o M4 CM LO rH LO o r1 — 1 CO co 00 (D O o CO O 1 — 1 1 — 1 M4 CO 'd4 CO LO 1 — 1 CM r" LO •H *H o r-' LO CM o 04 rCM CO r1 — 1 CO o 00 O MH CM l — 1 CM CO 00 CM 00 00 CM 00 04 i — 1 oo 04 CM CM •H *H M-l £ M-4 ij> h; 1 — 1 1 - 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 U (tf (D CO VO 00 o r" co i — l

CO d) e VO co co in i — 1 00 o •H • 4J m o co co •H LO i — 1 co co in m u fd S ro 00 00 c* CO • — ! in co in i — 1 m CO rrCN m CM CO CO o 0) 00 m 00 t-" cr> cn 00 C?i i — 1 ( Ti XI • Q) a> o 00 CTv uo l — 1 l — 1 VO CO VO m CO 00 CO VO P a CO m VO VO VO in CO CO I — 1 1 — 1 43 P 0 p •H CO in 00 VO in o CO CO in vo o CO r0 p • • • u td I — 1 VO rr' VO 00 m I — 1 o CO VO uo o -P m in CO rCO 1 — 1 i — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 m 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 a >1 o +» u fd P-. -p VO CO VO in CO m CO VO in o CO o o 1 — 1 0 • P p CO 1 — 1 CO in C0 1 — 1 o uo CO C'i o rCO 0 VO CO CO r-' CO CO i — l I — 1 1 - 1 1 — 1 CO 1 — 1 1 — 1 40 X • o VO in o cr> CO CO CO CO CO uo CO o CO o 0 a 43 • o rCO o o CO i — i C^I rvo CO CO CO cr> a tf i — 1 in VO o VO r-" CO 1 — 1 CO CO ■O1 H £ 4-1 O O P 0) £ fd i — ! o vo rCO ai vo rCO m m CO o 'sf XI a) u 1 - 1 1 — 1 CO t"* CO i — 1 (T\ cr> CO i — 1 CO vo o in o 0 •H -H CO CO rr-' vo vo vo CO UO m CA CO vo U O 40 1 — 1 CO CO i — 1 CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO •H *H 40 £ o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o • m tr> i — I d) -H O CO X CJ H Q X w x I — 1 i — 1 1 — 1 I — I 1 — 1 l — 1 rO I — 1 1 - 1 1 — | 1 — 1 1 — 1 i — 1 1 — 1 I — 1 l — 1 p o (d t"' 0 CO X rH

APPENDIX 1. Cohesion Index for Party, Cont 0 0 S o O 00 CTi CO UO N4 n4 o OO ro oo 1 — 1 •H • • -P o CN N4 00 oo 1 — 1 UO uo LD UO i — 1 rco o 1 — 1 oo •H u 0 ft CM 1 - 1 rn4 CO n4 H * — 1 CN CM CM l — 1 CO tJ o a ) CM ao o oo oo CN CN N4 -Q • 0 OO co rH o n4 CO OO 1 - 1 P a CO uo uo l — 1 00 CN CN 0 00 OO OO 00 CN OO I"' co u • 00 00 OO 0" OO UO co uo -p CN CN 1 - 1 CN CN co CN p o oo N4 N4 CN uo UO 00 CO 1 — 1 OO OO 00 1 — 1 o o CN 1 - 1 « — 1 1 — 1 OO 1 — 1 CN CO O CO uo N4 UO N4 00 UO O UO rH rH UO CN CN CN rH CN 00 CN -P O UO CO P' 00 uo rOO 00 1 — 1 t"co N4 uo 00 OO 0 • u N4 oo o 00 OO N4 CN CO oo r-' uo CO 0" 1 — 1 ft 00 H 1 — 1 N4 00 1 — 1 CO CO • UO N4 0" OO N4 CO 1 - 1 UO oo oo CO CO N4 UO ru • • • • uo CN rCN CN 1 — 1 ON CO i — ! CN oo oo 00 co 00 00 ft CO uo N4 O I — 1 O rQ ON CN CN CN 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 oo N4 N4 > ft 1 — 1 H 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 i — 1 1 — 1 1 — I 1 - 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 rH 1 - 1 1 - 1 U 0 0 >H o r" oo ■ — i

w a) £ o o 00 o o O oo LO O p* VO N1 CO CN ro •H • • • -p o o o o O N1 UO O VO UO p~ O' CN CO 00 •H p rd vo 1 — 1 CN CN 00 N1 CN LO N1 UO CN CN 00 o 1 -P £ O 1 — 1 vo 00 CN l — 1 1 — 1 CN OO UO r"sf 00 N1 p u rd Cli • -P UO p~ VO f" CN UO 00 00 pO O oo vo 00 o LO 0 U u CN o 00 CO OO CO VO CN pCN 1 - 1 Pa) U • • • • o vo oo CN vo p~ CN o CO O CO p00 N1 N1 £ Pd CN ( — 1 I — 1 CN i — 1 00 N1 CN vo N1 00 VO VO VO H a p O O S 1 - 1 « - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 — 1 rH 1 — 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 — 1 • - 1 P rti 0) >H O roo

The text on this page is estimated to be only 25.00% accurate

•

APPENDIX 1. Cohesion Index for Party, Cont'd w 0) e CN CN 03 C 33 VO CN N1 ro o o CN ro (N o N1 r•H • • +j 1 - 1 1 - 1 CN CN LO 1 - 1 ro o o 03 ro 03 LO 1 - 1 vo •H n1 N1 LO ■N1 N1 N1 LO N1 VO vo r03 p ctf S o a) o l — 1 o rro 00 00 o LO LO 03 LO o o CO n CD o VO i — 1 i — 1 (N 1 1 1 — 1 o 03 N1 CN vo CN 00 d vo 00 03 00 r-' r03 00 ro ro N1 ro ro 03 ro a 0 o vo 03 (N o ro l — 1 LO LO o 00 vo 00 • 03 1 — 1 N1 00 vo N1 ro o CO 00 ro o ro ro N1 o A • •H rP vo 1 — 1 ro o 1 — 1 00 o LO ro ro LO ro CN CN id ro 1 — 1 CN CN CN 1 — 1 1 — 1 CN rN1 ro ro 1 — 1 CN a ) • -p p 00 03 o 1 — 1 CN ro N1 LO vo r-' 00 03 o 1 — 1 CN ro P1 0 d LO LO vo vo vo vo vo vo vo vo vo vo r-' I"' rrr-' > !3 1 — 1 1 — 1 I — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 < — 1 I — 1 I — 1 I — 1 rp H 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 u h o 03

0 a) £ LO O O o CTi o co o CM I — 1 O' o o O' •H • • ■P CM "vT 00 1 - 1 m 00 CO o CO OL O' CM LO o O' •H p rd CO 00 CM O' CM CM CO o 1 — 1 •nI* l — 1 rH o 0 o 00 CO CM CT\ o CO O o O' r-~ CO O' CO o & • • • 0 o o O' CO O' O CO O CM 1 — 1 co CO CO CO o P CO O' O' CO CM CO o cr> CM CM CM CM CM co a rH o -p •H CM CO LO o CO CO CM LO o O' co LO CO CO 00 O' p p • • 0 cd CO LO o CO co 1 - 1 o CTv o LO LO CO CO O' u -P CO O' LO CO 1 — 1 o co 1 - 1 P 1 — 1 O >1 -p p • (d -P co rLO CO CM O' o CO o CM co 00 CO CTv O' LO P 0 • • • p I — 1 CM CO 1 — I 00 LO o o o O' CM l o CA P Pm CO CM co CO LO CM 1 — 1 o CO CM 1 — 1 0 1 — 1 <4H • 00 CM CO CO CO o •xT LO CO CM CO CM CO X V 0 • o 00 1 — 1 CM CM 1 — I CO o LO O' CM cr> CM CO 00 1 - 1 ■nT ro CM G\ 0) 0 o CM 00 CO CM CO CO LO O'! o rH CO (j\ CO o ,p •H *H o CM LO O CO LO 00 LO CM •M1 CO LO LO CM 0 o mm CM CM H CM 1 — 1 CM CM CM 1 - J CM CM CO CO CO CO CO u •H *H MM P O O O O o O O O o O O O O o o O • MM tn 1 — 1 0 -H o c n X o H Q P • W 0 1 - 1 CO O CM CO LO o CO O' O' CM o o O a. p • pp 0 rH CO O CO CO CO CO o O' LO 1 - 1 O'! o CO CO c u O' O' O' O' t — 1 LO O' o 00 O' LO O' LO O' 1 — 1 • LO CO O' CN 1 - 1 O' 00 o cr> LO CO CO o 1 — 1 SI • • o\ o CM o CO LO LO O o CO o o CO p CO CO CO 1 — 1 CO O' LO LO o O' LO 00 O' CO LO 1 — 1 0 • ■p p lO LO O' CO CO o rH CM CO LO LO O' 00 CT\ o O X! r-' I"' O' O' O' 00 00 00 CO co CO CO 00 CO CO P I — 1 1 — 1 1 - 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 • - 1 1 — 1 rH 1 - 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 I — 1 P I — 1 0 O' 0 co >H • — 1

0 0 e o LO o CM 00 1 - 1 CO C 33 \ •H • -p o O' o 00 O' 1 - 1 LO LO *H p 0 s 00 CM 1 — 1 CM 1 - 1 LO 00 H o LO 00 o 00 O 00 o LO 00 o LO 00 CO CO 'M1 CO LO 1 — 1 00 T3 -P 0 O U >1 ■P u 03 £4 U o 4-1 X 0 03 C H O 0 00 LO CM CO CO 00 LO o CO CM CO 00 00 CO CO CO A • • 0 CO 03 CO 03 CM • - 1 03 1 — 1 co O CM 00 o 03 0 CM 00 CM CM CM 00 1 — 1 CM 00 00 oo 03 00 CM OO a 0 •H CO CO LO 1 — 1 00 CO O' CO 03 03 O' CM 00 u • • 0 CO CM o O' CM CM o CO O' LO CM LO LO CO CM o -P 00 co CO 03 CM 1 - 1 1 — 1 CM rH 0 O • -P CM 1 - 1 I — 1 00 CM CO LO CM o LO CM CM O' CO 0 u 04 o r1 — 1 O' 00 1 - 1 CM 03 CM 1 - 1 co O P4 1 - 1 r« — 1 1 - 1 CO CM CM CM 00 1 — 1 1 - 1 • o 00 i — 1 ''F 'M1 00 O' CM O O O CO 00 00 O u • • • LO CO O 1 - 1 CO 00 O' •sF CO CO CM 03 o pp CM 03 LO CO 'cr 00 CO 1 — 1 rH CM CO CO O' 00 rH 00 S3 4-1 0 0 0 •H O 0 4-> S3 0 0 0 O LO O CM 00 -0 0 U 1 - 1 m O' 03 CM O' LO 0 •H -H O' CO 03 CM O' U O 4-1 00 i— i CM CM CM 00 1 - 1 •H *H 4-1 0 O o O O O O o • 4-i tr> i — I 0 *H O 03 X U H CO in 00 LO o LO O 00 03 co 1 — 1 o CM O' LO rH 1 - 1 1 - 1 O' o OO ■M1 OO CO co O CM CM 00 CM CM CM CM co 00 O o o o O O O o o Q !3 W P4 C4 < 0 o CO CO CO O CO LO CO LO LO 00 CM 00 03 O' l - 1 0 • o o ■M1 03 LO CO CO CO co ^F O' 00 co ^F 00 u CO 00 CO CO O' CO O' CO 00 CM I — 1 00 00 CO • 1 — 1 03 CM CO CO 00 co o O' CO 1 - 1 00 o X! • -H 03 O LO CO 03 LO LO 1 — 1 1 — 1 o CO 00 OO 00 o PI O' O' *cF O' CO O' O' 00 1 — 1 CO CO CO O' CO O' 0 • -P 0 1 — 1 CM CO LO CO O' 00 03 o 1 - 1 CM 00 ^F LO CO O P3 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 o o o o O o o > £ 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 — 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 CM CM CM CM CM CM CM U 0 0 >H I - 1 co i — I

APPENDIX I. Cohesion Index for Party, Cont'd CO (D & LO rCN 00 CO CO ONI •H • • -P 'Ll* LO LO o ro •H LO 1 - 1 LO CN ro *li* 00 LO u rd S 00 00 00 o o 00 LO o 00 LO 'Ll* 00 o t-* LO o 00 1 — 1 LO r' 'Ll* o 1 — 1 o (D 'Ll* 'Ll* LO rco CO r-' C7> 00 co LO <7\ 00 LO rH 'Ll* p • (L) LO o 'Ll* CO o LO LO CO 00 rH 00 LO 00 2 o 00 00 CO CO 00 CO CO l — 1 CO CO 00 LO CO 'Ll* 0 •H I — 1 o 00 L0 LO rco 1 - 1 r-» C7i LO LO 00 00 o o p • rd » — 1 o LO 00 OO LO LO OO o 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 — 1 'Ll* LO LO LO P 00 LO 00 CO •N* 1 - 1 1 — 1 CO OO 'Ll* h o t p 00 LO (7* o LO N* co LO CO o 00 LO 1 — 1 CO O 0 • u 'Ll* 00 00 o CO LO r<7* LO CO o 00 LO LO LO o Ph 00 'Ll* 1 — 1 rH » — 1 oo I — 1 rH CO LO • CO 00 00 oo 00 C7i o oo LO LO 'Ll* 'Ll* 'Ll* o u • 1 — 1 CO oo 'Ll* 'Ll* 00 i — 1 CO 'l* 'Ll* oo 00 00 LO 1 - 1 (7> & 'Ll* CO 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 OO CO 1 — 1 CO CO 'Ll* LO rLO 4-1 o 0 0 p C G rd 0 O •H •H O 4H •H •H 4H fd 4H to 0 •H o CO u r-' 00 1 — 1 1 - 1 'Ll* O' CN o CO 'Ll* 'Ll* LO O'* r-' 1 — 1 C' LO 1 - 1 1 — 1 1 - 1 00 C*I l - 1 CN CO o oo <7> CO o LO O l — 1 O-l LO LO LO OO LO 'Ll* 1 - 1 00 LO LO 1 — 1 'Ll* o 1 - 1 CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN i — 1 CN 1 - 1 O o O O O O o O O o O O O o O o w LO CN CN 'Ll* 00 00 CN 00 CO LO 'Ll* OO LO 00 CO 1 - 1 £ • 0 CN LO LO 00 LO O' O CN CO O'* LO LO (7l ■Ll* CN 00 o CO CO 1 - 1 LO LO 00 00 LO rH CN LO LO CO LO CO • rH LO 'Ll* CO o O' LO 1 - 1 CN LO 00 CN CO CO LO o p • •H LO CO CO 1 - 1 CO LO 00 CO CN LO 00 CO o CN LO LO p LO CO 1 — 1 CO 00 LO 0^ 00 P00 00 LO 'Ll* 1 - 1 OO a • P !h r00 O'* o 1 — 1 CN oo 'Ll* LO LO O' CO CO O rH CN 0 P o o o 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 - 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 ON CN CN > S CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN (N CN CN CN CN CN CN CN rd

APPENDIX 1. Cohesion Index for Party, Cont ' 0 0 £ o rCM in CO CO I — 1 1 — 1 CO CO CO 00 CO •H p o P o crc l — 1 co in rCO in CM CO ro CM •H o CO co CO CM CO 1 — 1 m KP in r00 U 0 S 1 — 1 o 0 ^p o 1 — 1 rCM co 00 CO o co o CM rCM o P 0 00 o co o 1 - 1 co m C0 CM in o CO ^p CO CM 3 o 1 — 1 CO *=P CO CO CO CO m in <=P CO CM CO O 1 — 1 0 •H CO CO CO CO CO o co o CO m in o co ^p CO u 0 co CO CM rCM 1 — 1 r-' 00 o co co CM CO 00 CO m p CO uo CM CO CM l — 1 l — 1 CM 1 — 1 l — 1 < — 1 CO £ O -P CM CO H CM O CO 1 — 1 co o 1 — 1 C" r~' CD SP CM 0 u CM 00 O co CM CO r-' o 1 — 1 in CD p 1 — 1 o ro di in 1 - 1 I - 1 1 — 1 CM H CO CM CD 1 — 1 1 — 1 • o r" CM CO O 00 co 00 CD o CO •sP ^p CD p co o • co co O'! CO CO cr> co D' o CD CM CM ID 00 co Ph in CO 1 — 1 CO CO CM CO CO CM CO ID ^P CM 1 — 1 CM 4-1 0 0 O P 3 3 0 o r-~ CM 'CP co o r^p CO r" ^p CD CM CO CO 0 O CO co ^P CO l — l CO P CM CD CM oc KP o M1 •H *H i — 1 CM r-« co r'' o CD CD 1 — 1 CM CO S CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM U 1 - 1 CM 0 r0 00 CO >H I — 1 1 — 1

to 0 £ oo *=3* in oo o i — 1 in oo m oo CN o OO 1 — 1 00 •H • • +> r-' rro in o oo in ro i — 1 CN m rH 00 OO r•H u fd S IT) oo i — 1 in •3* in OO N1 00 CO 00 ro 0 in 00 in oo in CN in i — 1 ro l — 1 o CN OO o o rQ • • 0 o m CN CN o OO in i — 1 1 — 1 00 o in in CM o o 3 N1 in N1 oo CN 00 CN ro N* o i — 1 a\ m a i — 1 rd +J 0 0 •H oo O O 00 oo CO in m I — 1 in m i — 1 CM 00 0 u • • • • u 0 l — 1 o i — 1 O m 00 00 o CO ri — 1 "st1 r00 +J l — 1 CN l — 1 l — 1 m OO OO m co 00 ** 0 >1 o -p u 0 • Cm -p 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 o m O oo rM CN 1 — 1 CM N1 H1 1 — 1 in O 0 • • • U u O 1 - 1 CN oo CO CO 00 uo CO 00 in 00 00 00 LO m 0 iM CM 00 CN i — 1 i — 1 1 - 1 i — 1 i — I 1 — 1 in oo oo l — 1 X • 1 — 1 00 co 00 i — 1 m N’ GO 00 o in OO rH CO in 0 o Td • 00 CN 00 ro CM m CM O in o 00 1 — 1 CO in 00 0 H 0 0 •H 0) t of nee R 00 00 CO CM CM CM CN in o 1 — 1 r" N1 m 0 0 0 o 1 - 1 00 pCO in in 00 r" r-' O 00 00 0 o CM m m CO OO 1 - 1 in m oo i — 1 in o OO l> oo 0 •H *H 1 — 1 o 00 m ro 00 I — 1 00 00 in N1 in rin o u 0 4M CM CM 1 - 1 CN CM CM CM CM I — 1 CM ?— l CM CM rH CM CM •H -H • 1 — 1 X MM 0 MM to 0 -rM o to O O O o o O o O O o o o o o o O O H Q W o CM UO OO 00 H1 OO 00 m 00 00 1 - 1 O m OO in 0 0 oo CO m H1 CM uo o CN l> in O r-' UO r-' O 00 00 OO rCO r00 r" rm oo uo UO oo CO oo • CM o 00 00 O rrH o 00 in CM o rCO o 00 & •H in CM CO 00 r" CM o 00 i — 1 l> CM in uo o o ip in CO •N* in in in in H1 in oo H1 UO 00 0 • 4-> SM oo o 1 - 1 CN 00 N1 in in f" CO oo O 1 — 1 CM ro N1 0 X! 00 H1 ■N1 N1 N1 N1 H1 uo UO U0 uo U0 > X CM CM CM CM CN CN CM CN CN CM CN CM CM CN CN CN U 0 0 X CM roo

w 0 S CD CO 1 - 1 1 — 1 o cd 00 ■nT o r-' o CM CO o P1 m ■H -P CO CO CT\ O') o pCO CO o i — 1 o LO o • - 1 CM •H CM CO CO CM IT) CO CO CO co 1 — 1 in pco u 0 S O 0 CM po pp I — 1 o 00 CO CO CO CM o 00 co CM X! • • 0 CM CO CO m o CM m CO P o 00 CO p CO CO 3 m p 00 00 p i — 1 CM i — I CO CO CO 1 - 1 CO CO CO CO a T) -p p o •H co cd p in CO o CM CD CO P 1 -P P o CM l — 1 in P I — 1 CM CM p l — 1 00 CO i — 1 CM CM -P P 0 (X -P o CO CO CM CD pCO CO o CM m 1 - 1 O CO ! - 1 CO 0 p P m co CO CO p o m o CD CD CM 1 - 1 m CO O CO 0 ip (X p CM p p I — 1 CO CM P P CM 1 — 1 00 CM CM CO CO X • CD co o CM in o p o P 1 - 1 1 — 1 o CO CM CO m 0 u n0 • O CD CO in 00 in o CM CD CM CM 00 CO 1 - 1 p" co P H m CO CO co CO CM CO CM CM CO CO CM CO P CO CO P m O O 0 •H O w -P p 0 P 0 CM CD 1 - 1 CD co CO O CO 1 — 1 P1 - 1 P' P^ pin 1 — 1 & 0 o m CO 1 - 1 1 - 1 CD P CM CD CM CM rP O in CD o m 0 •H *H o l - 1 00 P" CO 1 — 1 1 - 1 P" P CO 00 o m co CO CO u o m CM CM CM CM CM CM CM 1 - 1 CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM •H -H • •P P O O O O o O O o O O O O o o o O • M-) tD i — I 0 -H o cn X o H Q 3 W fX, (X tn CM P CO CO Pp P P" P CO CO co pp" o CM P • • • • 0 CM P 1 — 1 CM in i — 1 1 - 1 CD 00 in 1 - 1 P' Ip p o in U CD 00 00 CD CD CO CO CD CO p » — 1 CD CD CD • CO 1 — 1 CO CM CO r00 co CO CO pCO 00 CO CD CO A • •H p m CM p1 — 1 p o CO o co pCO CO o 1 — 1 PI ip 1 — 1 in CM l — 1 CO m CO CM CM in CO 00 m in m 0 • -P P in co P' co CD o i — 1 CM CO P in CO 00 CD O 0 P in m in m in CO CO CO CO CO co CO CO CO co P^ > £ CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM p 0 0 >H CM pCO

APPENDIX 1. Cohesion Index for Party, Cont'd w 0 £ co CNJ i — 1 m o o ro l — 1 r— 1 o •H • • -P LO 1 - 1 ^p r-« eg o 00 o o CO 00 co o •H u CN oo LO CN ■cP 1 — 1 o CC CN co o r00 U •H • • • 00 1 - 1 00 C" i 1 *cP 00 o m 1 - 1 ^p o i — 1 CN 00 Pi «nP ^P oo 00 ^P ON in ^p ^p ^P P CO rH 00 CN CN o m 0 o in cn ro rm ^p a\ m 00 O O 0 CD *H -H cgi l — 1 00 o o o m m o m m tn o O 4-1 » — I ON ON ON ON ON I — 1 i — 1 rH rH 00 oo 00 •H -H • 4-1 £ 4-4 tr> o O o o o o o o o o o o o 0 -H 0 cn u 9 M CN I — 1 i — 1 ON in rH I — 1 r» 00 ^p in £ • 0 CN i — 1 rr.H GC co 0o 00 00 r" o CPi cn 00 cn CPi oo 00 ^p 00 00 co • m co cn o o CO in CO CO in CO 1 — I CN rQ • • •H i> oo o ON o 00 0" OO cr> -5P oo CO pi OO in in m in CO 00 1 — 1 CO in rCD 0 • P u i — 1 ON 00 'CP uo CO CO CPi o i — 1 ON 00 0 43 i> rrr0" 00 00 00 00 > s CN ON CN ON CN ON ON CN ON ON CN CN ON U rd 0 CN oo i — i 00 co i — l 284 76.6 77.5 0.3087

APPENDIX 1. Cohesion Index for Party, Cont'd 0 0 £ p^ m o o o o o in h h l — 1 o o •H • • 4-> o 00 o CO o o o o o CM CM O o p^ o in •H CO cd i — 1 00 o o cn p" rrp" rm r-> u rd s H 1 — 1 O a) 1 — 1 LO CO H1 CO 00 o in m m in ■vt* CO CO h • • 0 m ID in ID 00 CO CO CO in m i — 1 i — 1 in ID P <7\ 1 — 1 00 CO CO 00 00 ai cr> « — 1 1 - 1 rH a 0 -H in cd in o rH o o 00 G\ cn o CO i — 1 CO CO u • • fd 00 CM ID in CO CO CM o CP> Cl 1 — 1 00 4-> 00 1 — 1 1 — 1 00 m m m m in in CM fd O • -P VO rH rH CO 1 — 1 o 1 — I CO ID ro r00 1 - 1 o o CO CO fX, CO CO CM CM 00 CM rH CP> m m m m ID CD rH CM 1 — 1 • m o rH o CO CO in 1 — 1 ID i — 1 CTv CO P" p-' O u • • « — 1 o o o pCM 1 — 1 in m i — 1 rH ID ID o 00 cn Pd o -p a cd fd CT\ in CM cn CM m 00 CO CO o H CD CO CO CO D 0 o 00 CD CO U-) CD o o o 1 — 1 CO cn •H *H Ppm pO O CM CM rH I — 1 CD CD CM CO cn o m •H *H CM CM CO CM 1 — 1 CO CO rH CO CO CO CO CM cm CO CM CM 4-1 p O o o o o o O o O o o o o o o o o m tr> 0) -H O cn u 0 in CM CO CO O 1 — 1 1 — 1 CPi CO o CO o CD CD p^ 00 O fd 0 CM CO 1 - 1 CD m o o CD 1 - 1 o rH o in m m 00 o U cn cr> cn 00 00 CP» • H CD CM CD cn rjr o CD in l — 1 cr> cp> CPi CO o CD o\ • •H O CP> 00 CO 00 l — 1 00 00 pCO cd CD ■M1 CM P" Hd CPi 00 in CO in CD 00 I — 1 H 1 — 1 H < - 1 1 - 1 CD CM CD 0 ■ P P in CD p' 00 cr> o 1 - 1 CM CO in CD 00 CPi O 1 - 1 o n CO 00 CO 00 00 CPi CPi CPi cn CPi cn ac CT> CP> O o > £ CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CO CO p rd (D >H co co i — I

0) 0 e 02 CM CN LO CN o CN p p CN m in 00 O o 02 •H • • +> VO P p VO VO 00 VO LD in 00 p p 00 O 1 — 1 CO •H p p p p CO VO P 00 00 00 00 00 CN o CO p u s 1 — 1 o 0 00 00 CO o o O in o o VO 00 m O 00 o P p • • 0 P 00 p o o o m o o 00 00 m o o o 00 0 « - 1 I — 1 1 — 1 04 ON CN vo CN CN P 00 00 CN o 1 - 1 a 1 — 1 43 -P 0 ■H OO LO in <72 CN 00 vo 1 - 1 1 - 1 02 CN CN p in 1 — 1 00 0 u • • • u 0 00 02 02 O CN 00 o 02 02 P 00 CO 02 CN VO p P CN 1 - 1 1 - 1 CN P 1 - 1 p 1 - 1 i — 1 V 0 >1 O p p 0 • P o 00 00 CN 02 p p P CN CN in 02 02 i — 1 p in 0 • • u u P LO m 00 P CO CO 00 02 00 « — 1 CN LO p 02 CO 0 P4 P 1 — 1 I — 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 P i — 1 1 - 1 i — 1 CN 1 — 1 4-1 X • P VO 00 p 00 vo CN o 00 CN P CN « - 1 P m p 0 O 43 • 02 P 00 p I - 1 00 P LO 00 P 02 1 - 1 02 1 - 1 02 1 — 1 0 H (X P 1 - 1 1 — 1 CN CN CN vo CN CN P 00 P CN 00 CN 0 4-1 o o a) •H O 0 4-> 0 0 0 0 VO CN CN p 00 r00 P p r02 CN 02 P 1 - 1 00 P 0 O 02 P p o 1 — 1 LO rin in vo in 00 P O CN in O •H P 02 in in o 00 CO 02 i — 1 I — 1 CO vo vo 02 VO 1 - 1 in u o m •H *H 04 00 00 CN 00 CN CN 00 oo 1 — 1 1 — 1 p CN CN CN 04 44 0 O o o o o O O o o o o o O O O o • 4-1 tX> i — I 0 *H O 02 X O H m 1 — 1 1 - 1 oo i — ! o o O 02 02 o o o p 02 1 — 1 02 0 0 o 1 - 1 i — 1 02 00 CN O CN 04 o o o 1 — 1 00 r-~ CO u 02 02 02 CO 02 02 1 - 1 02 02 o o o p CO 02 00 1 — 1 p 1 — 1 • 02 m 04 P o VO P 00 00 p p p p VO 1 — 1 02 p t • •H P VO 00 in p P P 1 - 1 1 - 1 p p p 1 — 1 p 1 — 1 vo p VO in LO vo m VO m in m p vo vo p in 1 — 1 in 0 • 4-1 U CN 00 P uo vo P 00 02 o 1 — 1 04 oo p m vo r0 P O o O o o O o o I — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 > 3 00 oo OO oo 00 00 00 00 00 CO 00 00 00 OO 00 00 u fd CD >* oo p oo

0 0 e o o in •H • • • • p LO in o <7* •H [•" CO o c£ 1 — 1 a o 0 1 — 1 p o 1 — 1 p • • • • 0 O'* C7l o rH ps CM o CO o 1 — 1 +J 0 £ •H o r" o o 0 Vi • • • • o 0 o CM o o P o o 0 p 1 — 1 >1 O -p 0 • PU P o P o in 0 • • • • Vi o CO o VO 0 P CM CM o <7* P P 1 — 1 £ 0 X • CO P o P S co 0 U • • • • 0 r• co CM o CM •H co cm ■ — 1 in o CO 1 — 1 i — 1 H p Vl 0 1 £ p cm 0 O 0 p •H o p r" CO p £ Vl 00 0 £ 0 VO <7* p in •H P JZ 0 O VO CM <7* i i P 0 •H *H CO rH p m Eh U 0 P 1 — 1 i — I CM CM •H P • • • • P £ o o o o • p tr* 1 — 1 0 -H O CQ X u H Q £ • W U) <7* o o CO Pc £ • • • • P-l 0 CM U0 o p c U <7* <7* o CO 1 — 1 • CM IT) o o P • • • • •H O in o CM P t"' p o <7* 1 — 1 0 • P Vl CO <71 o i — 1 0 P 1 — 1 i — I CM CM > X CO CO CO CO £ CO 0 0 00 X 1 — 1 VO VO o 1 — 1 VO CM o CO o CO CM in C' o 00 o vo o p in CM 00 00 1 — 1 o I — 1 CM o 1 — 1 1 — 1 CO 00 CM vo o p CO CO p oo o VO m in o o CO CO 00 VO CM P in o i — 1 CO CO CO p p o o 00 C' (7* CM o o 00 <7* vo p vo CO P CO cr* <7* p vo in vo 00 <7* P in in m in o 00 o VO CM 1 — 1 O'* p cr* o CO 00 vo CM VO <7* r~ 00 l — 1 i"' in p CO (7* P p CO p m <7* 00 o P o CO co in vo C' I — 1 o CM P o P vo m p i — 1 CM VO <7* CO p CO CO 1 — 1 o p <7* m <7* i — 1 m 00 o 00 CM r-' CM 00 * — 1 VO o vo in in p VO O i"' P CM C7\ CO CO CM CM CM CM o CM CM CM oooooooooo <7* 00 p vo co rp 1 - 1 CO CO CM 1 — 1 o <7* <7* in co CO vo CO 1 — 1 p CM CO 00 vo CO CM p CM r-' or* CM o <7* t-' CO vo rH 1 - 1 co co cr* r-' 00 CO vo 00 CO CO p vo 00 CO C7* CO CT* CO CM CO P in vo r00 <7* o 1 — 1 CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO 1874 1875

APPENDIX 1. Cohesion Index for Party, Cont'd w s CO CO CO ro ro ro CO CO ro ro CO CO ro CO ro CO p nj a) LO oo r— I

APPENDIX 1. Cohesion Index for Party, Cont 1 d w Q) e LD VO LO O' o o LO LO CO CM o CM o\ O' O LO •H • • • 4-> LO CO VO CO o 00 LO LO CM LO sP 00 CO LO 00 •H vo vo LO vo o vo 'vr CO CO 00 O' 00 VO LO p rH rtf s 0 CD LO o rH o LO LO LO >vP O' C0 CO o VO 00 ^p n . • • (D LO LO 1 - 1 CM CM 00 CO CO CM CO LO 1 1 ^P LO CO CO P 1 — 1 LO CO CM i — 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 CM 1 — 1 1 — 1 (T> LO CM CT\ G\ rH a 0 •H CO LO o 00 CO O' o o VO CO CTr 1 - 1 rH CO VP O 00 1 — 1 Pm CO CM CO LO r-' CM CM CM VO vo *VP O' ■'P av CO LO • o CO CO CO O' CM 1 - 1 I - 1 CO vo CO CM CM i — 1 CM LO 00 o • co CO ao CO vo LO 1 - 1 1 - 1 CO CM CO vo av CM LO o LO p: CO CO 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 CO CM CM O' 1 ^p CO 00 00 rH O Q) -H 0 CO U CO LO CT> co o CT> CO ^p O' LO 1 - 1 CO CO CO I — 1 1 — 1 c • • 0 LO o ■vP o H1 O' O' O' CM rH CM O' O' co O' 00 U "VP 1 - 1 1 - 1 £ CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO co co co CO CO P rtf 0) ID O' 00

cn 0 e o O' CM VO CP> o VO VO VO CTi VO o CO VO O' i 00 •H • • • •p o o CM r1 — 1 CM o 00 o 00 CM CM o rCM LO O' o m1 O' VO O' 00 o VO rVO CO CM 00 o LO LO O' rP • • 0 CM O' VO VO CT\ LO l — 1 CO O' VO VO LO VO VO VO O'! P a^ CM 00 o\ i — 1 1 — 1 I — 1 cr> CM i — 1 VO a dS -P a 0 •H o LO VO CO VO O' o O' 1 - 1 co oo LO 1 - 1 o LO CM 0 u • • CJ 0 O' LO r-' 1 — 1 1 — 1 CM M* o O' 1 - 1 CM 00 O' OO o O' CO -p COi CM CM oo 1 — 1 O' CO LO 00 00 00 00 00 vo CM CM CO -p u 0 fit a o • -p VO CO cr> CO O' CO O' o u u VO O' CM O' O' 00 CM 00 CO LO 1 — 1 O' O CM LO LO 0 CM GV CM 00 00 CM O' CO LO ■M* CM 00 LO M1 VO CM CM O' vp X • O' G\ CM 1 — 1 o CO 1 — 1 LO o O' CM VO 1 - 1 LO O' M1 VO 0 CJ • VO 1 - 1 LO o CM O' VO 1 — 1 o vo o LO 00 1 - 1 LO 1 - 1 LO a pH CTi 1 - 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 CM 00 CO CM CO CM CM 1 - 1 1 - 1 LO 0 P o 00 •h u w -PC 0 a 0 M1 CM vo O' a^ O CO CO 00 1 — 1 O' CM CM LO CM JZ 0 o . CM GV LO rH OO o LO I — 1 O' CO CO o VO M1 0 •r-j -H 00 O CM M1 00 O' 1 — 1 o CO O' cr> CTi oo VO LO CO u 0 <4-1 i — ! OO 00 00 CM CM » — 1 OO 00 i — I (D -H O CO >C U H Q 0 o CM CO M1 00 o M1 oo O 00 M1 CM LO a • • 0 O' CT> 00 00 o 1 — 1 vo GO VO O' LO VO LO OV 00 OV u GV vo LO vo 00 OO 00 OO M1 M* O' • - 1 VO VO • 1 — 1 1 — 1 Ov 00 1 — 1 CM O O CO M1 O' CO CO CO 00 • • •H VO rH vo 00 LO LO 1 - 1 1 - 1 00 O' cp> LO O' 1 - 1 CO p CO O' O' 00 oo CT\ O' GV VO CT> G\ CO O' CO LO 0 • -P u LO VO O' 00 GV o I — 1 CM 00 LO VO O' CO Ov o rH 0 rQ vo vo vo vo vo O' O' O' O' O' O' O' O' CO 00 > !3 00 oo oo oo 00 00 00 OO OO 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 P 0 0 >h LO oo H VO o~ oo ■ — l O' oo

The text on this page is estimated to be only 0.00% accurate

'

0 0 S CO 1 — 1 o VO 00 O o o CO 0" o CO 00 •H • +» 00 o LT) CO m m in i — 1 VO in m o CN r-' CO •H £ £ LO rVO LO LO in in m m VO vo VO VO CO rm O 0 o CTi o CN CN OO m 00 o O £ •H 00 m m o rin m in 00 00 o CO in m cn o rH 0 £ • • U 0 CN m rCN rCO i"' ro o o m CO 00 in r-' N* s» >i 4-> £ O 00 CO CTv 00 i — 1 CN CN 00 00 00 oo 00 OO 00 00 +> £ 0 Ph -M in o 1 - 1 CN VO rrO rG\ 00 H1 00 N1 m CO 0 • • £ £ N1 o m CN « - 1 m I — I i — 1 O in C-i o\ VO CO ro'* VO 0 Ph rin rCO 00 (N oo 00 CO CO CO CO 00 00 r' 00 x • i — ! CN o CO H1 LO o OO a\ CO £ 0 £ 0 ro CN CN m CN m r£ 0 O o\ LO CO 1 - 1 r00 OO CN o rm p' l — 1 I — 1 1 - 1 vo 0 •H *H 00 i> vo O'* in in N1 N1 N1 ro CN cr* i — 1 o rH "N* CN o rm CO o OO m oo vo oo < U 1 - 1 i — 1 I — 1 1 - 1 VO vo VO i — 1 1 - 1 vo m m CO 00 vo • 00 m er* 00 00 CO 00 00 CO CO 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 oo oo OO £ 0 0 >H r^roo ■ — l

0 0 e 00 00 CO rCO CO I"CO •H • • -p 00 H 00 co 00 CO CO CO •H CO 00 ^f CO CO CO CO uo u 0 r-' 04 1 — 1 ON 04 04 CO 1 — 1 l — 1 00 uo 00 r' 00 1 — 1 uo uo uo 00 uo UO f" co 03 O 0 04 o o 00 UO X • 0 CO 'si' o o uo 0 CO rH a o t'* 1 - 1 o 00 'sj* UO o uo 04 I — 1 ^f 04 uo co 04 CN ON CO CN 1 O 4-> U 0 Pd • -P rH 04 o 00 co o 0" O 1 — 1 CO O CN CO CO 0 • P P uo i — ! •vF oo i — 1 00 uo coo rH ^F uo O *=F UO CN 0 PH OO O' CN 00 -=F 00 *=F 00 CN OO 00 UO UO UO N1 00 <4-1 X • co 04 O o CN 1 — 1 CN CN O UO oo oo O O O 0 O • o uo O o OO r00 LO ^F rH o CN O O UO • - 1 £ Pi i — 1 1 - 1 1 — 1 I — 1 1 — 1 CN *cF CN H £ 0 ■H 0 0 nt of ance o 04 04 o CO o CO LO CN 04 O CO ^F 04 UO LO .£ 0 o lO 04 KF CO 04 LO 04 CO o 04 ^F OO 00 00 LO U O <4-4 00 CN 00 oo CN CN CN 00 ON 00 ON CN 1 — 1 O CN 00 •H *H

S oo *=F ”nF ■nF KF 'CF <=F 'cF

m 0 e •H -P ■H U 0 S ^f • o oo o LO co CJ\ LO co o o o in VO o VO 00 o LO pLO co o CO CO VO 00 o CO 00 VO o in in VO CO LO LO i — 1 m 00 m m rco o 1 — 1 d o 0 o 00 vo o 00 00 •p ^F r0 >1 O -p u 0 • Pa -P in vf i — 1 vo 0 • • U p VO ri — 1 00 0 Pa 1 — 1 in ppha • •o1 rco m 0 U • • d • CO vo co in 0 & 0rH 00 in ^f i — 1 vo pco m 00 CO CO vo 00 o m ^f o CO po pm 00 CO [•" CO CO CO CO 00 00 cr> O'l m co in (X> i — 1 vo vo 1 — 1 'VP in in o VO vo CT\ 1 - 1 O' r-' 00 m VO m vo r-' 00 i — 1 m CO CO ^F VO 00 CO o O' o l — 1 o 00 cn 00 00 i — 1 00 cn o 00 cr> m 00 co ^F CO ^F CO I — 1 i — 1 VO l — 1 vo 1 — 1 1 — 1 O' 0 ‘h o 00 •H O to -P 0 0 0 0 «=F co O' CO in r-> 00 VO 00 d 0 O O m 00 LO <=F oo 1 — 1 t — 1 vo 0 •p "H VO oo CO CO 000 m pCO co o ( — 1 co vo co u U HA OO 00 CO CO CO oo co 00 co 00 00 co CO co co i — 1 •H -H • • HA 0 O o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o • mo d> I — I 0 tH 0 CO X u H Q X w C4 PA • m o CO o vo 00 O co o l — 1 00 vo 'VP m co 00 0 0 m co vo ^f CO cn o CO cr» o cn VO co p~ U 00 00 co CO ^F LO 00 vo m 00 VO in CO 1 — 1 ^F • o O VO CO CO CO CTi pvo po "=F VO in 00 d • •H 1 — 1 co O CO in O •=F O VO 00 o 00 CO O 00 CO pi CO 00 m *=F O' *cF 00 ^F vo in cn 00 CO 00 00 00 • p in vo CO cn O 1 - 1 CO co ^F in vo p00 CT> o d i — 1 « — ! I — 1 1 - 1 l — 1 CO CO 00 00 CO co co CO 00 oo 00 13 'VF ^F <=F ^F ^F =F ^F ^F ■vF ^F P 0 0 X 00 CO I — I

APPENDIX 1. Cohesion Index for Party, Cont 1 CO CD s LO co o co o o o LO 1 — 1 00 o o LO O o •H • • • • +> rCO 1 - 1 o i — 1 o CO CO CO O'! LO o 1 — 1 00 00 •H n 0 s CO LO rLO LO LO 1 — 1 LO 00 LO CO LO LO LO LO o a) l — 1 CTi LO 1 — 1 co LO in LO CO co r-' co o n • 0 co LO o 00 LO LO 00 rCO LO co CO 00 CM LO 2 00 co i — 1 1 — 1 CO CO ra o •H ri — 1 r1 — 1 LO I — 1 CO CO o CO C0 CO LO u • 0 00 CO 00 in co in LO LO 1 — 1 CO cr> 00 o CJ\ 4-> a o rCO CO co LO CO 1 — 1 CO co CO co CO CO CO 4-> CO cr> in LO o CO CO CJ\ CO CO 00 LO LO LO CO 0 • • 34 CO LO co r-' cr> LO LO CO CO LO CO LO r" r-' LO 00 P4 co co CO LO CO 1 — 1 CO 1 — 1 CO LO co CO LO CO • o LO co i — 1 CO in r1 — 1 CO 00 "nT CO CO o U • t LO CO co co CO rCO CO CO 1 — 1 o C' CO (J\ CO LO LO 00 CO 1 — 1 1 — 1 CO 1 — 1 1 — 1 CO 1 — 1 LO 40 O 0 O 4-> a 0 r-' rLO LO CO LO CO r-' LO C' o CO LO 0 o co LO C0 co LO CO 1 — 1 00 CO o LO CO LO CO LO •H •H o 1 - 1 LO LO 1 - 1 LO CO 1 — 1 o co CO CO LO LO 1 — 1 0 4-1 co CO 1 — 1 CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO 1 — 1 CO CO CO CO •H •H • 40 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 4-1 tn d) *H o cn u tn LO O'! 1 — 1 CO rrO CO rro CTi o\ vp cr> 0 0 o LO 1 — 1 CO LO LO CTi o i — 1 co C?\ rCO CO co f" u t— 1 LO 1 — 1 LO CO LO LO rLO LO kP LO LO LO • o 1 — 1 rLO o KT co Cl OL CO C7! CO co CO o rP • • •H o CO C' CTl CO 1 — 1 'sP cCO LO CO CO co CO o VA co LO rcr> Cl LO co O'! 00 CT! O'! co O'! CO 0 • 4-1 U 1 — 1 CO CO LO LO cco O'! o 1 — 1 CO CO vp LO LO 0 43 CO CO co CO co CO CO co co £ O1 O1 VP •O’ vp vp vP Jo a3 0 CO rco

UJ- • 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 APPENDIX II. Indexes of Party Likeness Party, Religion and Region, 1867 - 1878 Libs . Cons . Libs . R.C. Prot . Cons . R.C. Prot . Quebec Libs . Cons . Ontario Libs . Cons . 100. 62. 94. 85. 92. 63. 72. 98. 43. 64. 67. 57. 93. 28 . 84. 60. 67. 99. 41. 73. 50. 75. 99. 39. 52. 88 . 99. 95. 98. 90. 88 . 47. 78. 60. 94. 43. 94. 96. 32 . 21. 88 . 55. 83. 71. 96. 53. 93. 98. 48. 39. 52. 98. 99. 48. 42. 37 . 95. 93. 35. 19. 81. 80. 95. 81. 70. 38. 96. 98 . 30. 31. 96. 98. 89. 97. 94. 52. 98. 81. 43. 45. 56. 79. 87. 33. 53 . 88 . 80. 92. 75. 100. 53. 96. 87. 51. 50. 74. 98. 97. 69. 65. 68 . 89. 93. 42. 53 . 58. 99. 97. 32 . 49. Maritimes Libs . Cons . 94. 95. 92. 74. 77. 81. 89. 98. 76. 88 . 75. 90. 96 . 69. 88 . 91. 96. 90. 77. 90. 99. 95.

APPENDIX II. Indexes of Party Likeness, Cont'd Year 1868 Vote Nbr . Libs . Cons . Libs . R.C. Prot . Cons . R.C. Prot . Quebec Libs . Cons . Ontario Libs . Cons . Mariti Libs Cons 23 88. 83. 84. 90. 80. 99. 24 40. 96. 95. 36. 24. 71. 25 70. 99. 99. 72. 58. 90. 26 70. 94. 92. 72. 52. 98. 27 48. 92. 93. 46. 31. 94. 28 58. 81. 99. 43. 53. 87. 29 83. 44. 55. 100. 89. 91. 30 40. 90. 93. 30. 32 . 70. 31 94 . 80. 99. 96. 78. 75. 32 43. 86. 89. 23. 37. 86. 33 80. 41. 48. 92. 83 . 78. 34 9 0 . 68. 93. 79. 99. 89. 35 96. 83. 98. 90. 96. 92. 36 44. 98 . 90. 39. 32. 85. 37 34. 99. 93. 27. 25. 53. 38 83. 87. 82 . 93. 69. 88 . 39 65. 89. 92. 41. 74. 87. 40 62. 96. 98. 43. 65. 92. 41 60. 95. 98. 38 . 63. 86 . 42 98. 95. 99. 100. 94. 100. 43 84. 78. 79. 57. 87. 73. 44 64 . 98. 84. 53. 54. 89. 45 59. 98. 99. 42. 41. 92.

Year 1868 1869 APPENDIX II. Indexes of Party Vote Nbr . Libs . Cons . Libs . R.C. Prot . Cons . R.C. Prot . 46 52. 95. 92. 47 54. 86. 86. 48 93. 82. 91. 49 48. 84. 85. 50 79. 52. 99. 51 83. 67. 93. 52 66. 89. 84. 53 33. 92. 100. 54 88 . 72. 86. 55 98. 95. 100. 56 63. 75. 96. 57 64. 76. 96. 58 71. 88 . 89. 59 62. 70. 96. 60 63. 68. 97. 61 61. 71. 93. 62 54. 90. 94. 63 51. 79. 85. 64 80. 45. 61. 65 81. 57. 89. 66 48. 91. 90. 67 64 . 52. 79. 68 61. 57. 79. Likeness, Cont'd Quebec Libs . Cons . Ontario Libs . Cons . Maritimes Libs . Cons . 37. 51. 73. 49. 34. 100. 99. 97. 93. 37. 50. 44. 46. 92 . 80. 63. 80. 72. 51. 69. 80. 27. 29. 50. 63. 95. 91. 100. 96. 100. 88. 37. 81. 88. 38. 81. 45. 99 . 66. 47. 54 . 95. 48. 54. 92. 44. 51. 92. 41. 60. 71. 51. 48. 66. 97. 76. 77. 42. 99. 85. 33. 29. 90. 98 . 36. 97. 82 . 52. 79.

APPENDIX II. Indexes of Party Likeness, Cont'd Libs . Cons . Quebec Ontario Maritimes Vote Libs . R.C. R.C. Libs . Libs . Libs . Year Nbr. Cons . Prot . Prot . Cons . Cons . Cons . 1869 69 65. 91. 80. 63. 47. 99 70 70. 74. 42. 74. 88. 68 71 81. 78. 80. 58. 98. 75 72 52. 91. 80. 55. 41. 68 73 92. 93. 82. 95. 87. 92 74 49 . 79. 98. 31. 42. 88 75 54 . 99. 86 . 44. 46. 88 76 78. 65. 52. 96. 78. 100 77 80. 55. 57. 96. 78. 99 78 47. 91. 73. 25. 35. 98 79 49. 97. 79. 27. 32. 90 80 43. 97. 90. 23. 27. 94 81 94 . 96. 99. 100. 100. 80 82 87. 86. 86. 71. 62. 80 83 36. 96. 81. 30. 28 . 68 84 71. 94. 75. 55. 86. 68 85 75. 89. 97. 65 . 72. 90 86 38 . 94. 85. 29. 31. 73 87 41. 91. 76. 24. 28 . 82 88 44 . 97. 88 . 26. 27 . 97 89 95. 98. 85. 99. 98. 81 90 33. 95. 83 . 22 . 29. 60 91 35 . 95. 78. 29. 19 . 88

APPENDIX II Indexes of Party Likeness, Cont'd Year Vote Nbr . Libs . Cons . Libs . R.C. Prot . Cons . R.C. Prot . Quebec Libs . Cons . Ontario Libs . Cons . Maritimes Libs . Cons . 1869 92 62. 90. 76. 90. 41. 40. 93 75. 45. 72. 98. 70. 83. 94 37. 92. 76. 25. 29. 85. 95 39. 83. 76. 12. 37. 83. 1870 96 62. 93. 84. 71. 48. 81. 97 55. 94. 93. 45. 54 . 69. 98 51. 94 . 90. 35. 56 . 63. 99 92. 93. 83. 98. 80. 98. 100 34. 96. 96. 21. 28. 56. 101 48. 94. 92. 21. 42. 84. 102 37. 90. 85. 18. 40. 55. 103 48. 94 . 92. 21. 42. 84. 104 46. 95. 87. 32 . 34. 81. 105 96. 93. 98. 100. 100. 85. 106 47. 100. 82 . 40. 33. 76. 107 49. 82 . 90. 38. 41. 73. 108 80. 97. 89. 71. 84 . 75. 109 59. 60. 81. 81. 41. 87. 110 92. 52 . 79. 77. 76. 71. 111 99. 62 . 85. 88 . 89 . 68 . 112 58 . 87. 89. 58 . 50. 71. 113 79. 97. 95. 78. 82 . 60. 114 74 . 49. 61. 95. 64. 50.

APPENDIX II. Indexes of Party Likeness, Cont'd Year 1870 Vote Nbr . Libs . Cons . Libs . R.C. Prot . Cons R.C. Prot 115 58. 58. 85. 116 66. 45. 68. 117 52. 84. 94. 118 51. 85. 90. 119 97. 86. 95. 120 99. 85. 86. 121 72. 75. 97. 122 59. 95. 89. 123 43. 91. 97. 124 41. 96. 90. 125 40. 99. 89. 126 73. 26. 69. 127 70. 33. 74. 128 69. 44. 78. 129 57. 36. 82. 130 76. 93. 94 . 131 84. 89. 89. 132 73. 95. 85. 133 48. 96. 83 . 134 44. 95. 94. 135 47. 97. 92. 136 46. 92. 89. 137 44. 93. 92. Quebec Libs . Cons . Ontario Libs . Cons . Maritime Libs . Cons . 82. 42. 63. 95. 52 . 88. 59. 37. 70. 35. 40. 84. 90. 91. 97. 98. 96. 95. 53. 68. 99. 68. 53. 6 6 . 37. 40. 55 . 33. 31. 68. 31. 30. 71. 96. 59. 90. 99. 54 . 97. 97. 47. 94. 99. 33. 85. 62. 88. 77. 78 . 85. 83 . 68. 76. 71. 60. 28 . 63. 45. 31. 63. 50. 31. 64. 34. 44. 48. 35. 38 . 52.

APPENDIX II Indexes of Party Likeness, Cont'd Year Vote Nbr . Libs . Cons . Libs . R.C. Prot . Cons . R.C . Prot . Quebec Libs . Cons . Ontario Libs . Cons . Maritimes Libs . Cons . 1870 138 54. 91. 88. 55. 34. 63. 139 44. 98. 98. 36. 37. 53. 140 99. 46. 65. 74. 98. 86. 141 43. 99. 92. 37. 36. 45. 142 46. 89. 93. 32. 52. 49. 143 89. 46. 81. 60. 92. 63. 144 84 . 81. 94. 63. 86. 95. 145 43. 97. 100. 36 . 30. 75. 146 52. 93. 84. 60. 32. 68. 147 68. 91. 83. 45. 75. 88 . 148 63. 97. 89. 41. 69. 78. 149 55. 86. 87. 51. 42. 87. 150. 72. 86. 98. 49. 78 . 96. 151 82. 36. 49. 93. 85. 93. 152 70. 43. 53. 92. 69. 95. 153 65. 36. 87. 99. 37. 92. 154 92. 79. 90. 94. 88 . 81. 155 75. 17. 77. 93. 56. 89. 156 73. 20. 84. 93. 54 . 81. 157 72. 17. 82. 93. 56 . 78 . 158 64. 52. 79. 70. 51. 85. 159 79. 22. 90. 90. 60. 85. 160 75. 19. 79. 94 . 56 . 92.

The text on this page is estimated to be only 10.00% accurate

,

APPENDIX II. Indexes of Party Likeness, Cont'd Vote Libs . Year Nbr . Cons . 1870 161 70. 162 59. 163 66. 164 66. 165 66. 166 79. 167 41. 1871 168 42. 169 44. 170 35. 171 44. 172 66. 173 67. 174 70. 175 45. 176 48. 177 89. 178 58. 179 80. 180 56. 181 35. 182 38. 183 100. Libs . R.C. Prot . Cons . R.C. Prot. Quebec Libs . Cons . 25. 79. 94. 54. 92. 78. 53. 80. 85. 45. 82. 92. 49. 79. 92. 47. 99. 52. 95. 91. 19. 94. 90. 25. 92. 84. 20. 97. 100. 19. 92. 84. 20. 44. 88. 15. 29. 76. 96. 41. 88 . 16. 86. 95. 19. 75. 76. 12. 90. 98. 93. 100. 87. 48. 94 . 84. 92. 98. 95. 59. 95. 77. 15. 90. '85. 18 . 100. 100. 100. Ontario Maritimes Libs . Libs . Cons . Cons . 53. 92 39. 83 54. 73 46. 85 46. 85 97. 71 43. 50 30. 98 22 . 91 20. 94 22 . 91 98. 75 35. 96 98. 88 43. 88 54. 74 79. 97 67. 57 65. 79 45. 48 25. 79 29. 80 100. 100

APPENDIX II Indexes of Party Likeness, Cont'd Year Vote Nbr . Libs . Cons . Libs . R.C. Prot . Cons . R.C. Prot . Quebec Libs . Cons . Ontario Libs . Cons . Mari times Libs . Cons . 1871 184 54. 62. 98. 96. 16. 89. 185 40. 95. 79. 16. 41. 72. 186 32. 92. 84. 15. 29. 61. 187 30. 95. 77. 17. 29. 49. 188 28 . 100. 82. 15. 20. 62. 189 26. 95. 85. 17. 20. 46. 190 27. 98. • 93. 20. 18. 54. 191 30. 96. 82. 17. 27. 58 . 192 93. 85. 91. 100. 92. 80. 193 35. 91. 86. 29. 33. 42. 194 29. 100. 78. 13. 27. 56. 195 28. 92. 83. 14. 20. 57. 196 29. 92. 83 . 18. 22 . 52. 197 99. 94. 89. 97. 98. 95. 198 27. 96 . 92. 14. 18. 59. 199 83. 70. 83 . 62. 89. 92. 200 97. 80. 91. 73. 93. 76. 201 80 . 85 . 78. 99. 50. 98 . 202 75. 85. 71. 95. 47. 87. 203 86. 73. 80. 95. 69. 99. 204 20. 94 . 96. 6. 10. 85. 205 44. 95. 91. 22 . 40. 90. 206 31. 93. 85. 9. 31. 72.

APPENDIX II Indexes of Party Likeness, Cont'd Year Vote Nbr . Libs . Cons . Libs . R.C. Prot . Cons . R.C. Prot . Quebec Libs . Cons . Ontario Libs . Cons . Maritimes Libs . Cons . 1871 207 26. 93. 99. 6. 19. 58. 208 38. 70. 98. 17. 44. 57. 209 83. 74. 90. 76. 100. 78. 210 20. 94. 97. 16. 14. 45. 211 23. 100. 98. 16. 14. 62. 212 23 . 92. 93. 3. 13. 72. 213 23 . 80. 99. 9. 16. 51. 214 78. 36. 89. 93. 62. 100. 215 49. 97. 81. 31. 56. 58. 216 47. 100. 87. 41. 30. 83. 217 26. 94. 99. 13. 23. 57. 218 23. 99. 97. 12. 23 . 44. 219 30. 99. 91. 9. 18. 90. 220 74. 55 . 95. 28 . 97. 78. 221 66. 39. 79. 92. 47. 87. 222 35. 67. 93. 4. 20. 100. 223 40. 61. 93. 4. 27. 100. 224 65. 69. 78. 100. 54 . 83. 1872 225 79. 85. 98. 63. 67. 94 . 226 93. 75. 82. 82. 77. 92. 227 97. 86 . 80. 95. 86. 99. 228 95. 85. 73. 89. 67. 99. 229 24. 93. 95. 5. 16. 53.

APPENDIX Ii. Indexes of Party Likeness, Cont'd Vote Libs . Year Nbr . Cons . 1872 230 36. 231 27. 232 31. 233 43. 234 33. 235 46. 236 95. 237 93. 238 78. 239 32. 240 30. 241 35. 242 38. 243 26 . 244 34. 245 28 . 246 32. 247 40. 248 96. 249 100. 250 93. 251 72 . 252 74. Libs . R.C. Prot . Cons . R.C. Prot . Quebec Libs . Cons . 99. 100. 21. 94. 97. 9. 91. 88 . 9. 93. 96. 36. 88 . 94. 26. 95. 99. 41. 85. 79. 95. 84. 85. 87. 92. 85. 75. 90. 97. 4. 89. 97. 22. 91. 96. 18. 91. 93. 10. 94 . 96. 6. 83. 89. 6 . 87. 97. 3. 89. 98. 18. 96. 97. 24. 84. 85. 69. 98. 98. 100. 42. 72. 61. 37. 83. 97. 35. 98. 12. Ontario Maritimes Libs. Libs. Cons. Cons. 25. 68 • 00 1 — 1 54 30. 56 28 . 87 14. 79 25. 90 73. 88 70. 79 51. 80 17. 85 • • — 1 i — 1 71 23. 78 27. 82 15 . 63 17. 100 17. 61 7. 73 25. 90 89. 90 97. 94 95. 93 59 . 97 100. 89

APPENDIX II Indexes of Party Likeness, Cont'd Year Vote Nbr . Libs . Cons . Libs . R.C. Prot . Cons . R.C. Prot . Quebec Libs . Cons . Ontario Libs . Cons . Maritimes Libs . Cons . 1872 253 32. 90. 92. 15. 17. 87. 254 36. 95. 98. 20. 23. 80. 255 47. 97. 93. 41. 23. 80. 256 30. 98. 91. 19. 19. 47. 257 88. 40. 47. 100. 100. 89. 258 90. 42. 49. 100. 98. 89. 259 26. 98. 93. 10. 14. 55. 260 27. 88 . 99. 8. 11. 64. 261 24. 88. 99. 7. 12. 45. 262 53. 70. 90. 31. 41. 73. 263 45. 71. 99. 28 . 38 . 71. 264 24. 83. 96. 9. 13. 53. 265 25. 92. 90. 3. 18. 63. 266 82 . 96. 56. 58. 94 . 92. 267 96. 60. 53. 94. 95 . 100. 268 27. 95. 95. 16. 13. 62 . 269 29. 82 . 96. 13. 16. 78. 270 26. 89. 96. 10. 13 . 67. 271 34 . 91. 96. 23. 19. 67. 272 27. 97. 93. 16. 14 . 50. 273 34 . 99. 95. 16. 25. 73. 274 25 . 95. 98 . 13. 11. 63. 275 26. 94 . 98 . 7. 11. 70.

APPENDIX II. Indexes of Party Likeness, Cont'd Year 1872 1873 Vote Nbr . Libs . Cons . Libs . R.C. Prot . Cons R.C. Prot 276 65. 86. 44. 277 79. 78. 94 . 278 50. 75. 95. 279 22 . 98. 89. 280 93. 88 . 93. 281 19. 80. 96. 282 19. 80. 95. 283 25. 80. 95. 284 23. 95. 89. 285 34. 98. 86. 286 34. 98. 87. 287 25. 82 . 98. 288 35. 89 . 86. 289 92. 100. 99. 290 26. 79. 99. 291 24 . 81. 99. 292 99. 96. 93. 293 90. 43. 33. 294 91. 44. 33. 295 92 . 47. 34 . 296 92. 47. 38 . 297 94. 44. 28 . 298 96. 46. 28 . Quebec Libs . Cons . Ontario Libs . Cons . Maritimes Libs . Cons . 30. 84. 100. 36. 97. 75. 18. 50. 70. 0. 22 . 33. 95. 96. 83. 11. 5. 53. 11. 5. 53. 12. 8. 67. 20. 5. 52. 19. 35. 63. 19. 33. 64. 12. 7. 65. 17. 37. 52. 96. 92. 98. 13. 3. 100. 9. 3. 100. 97. 95. 93. 95. 100. 97. 95. 100. 97. 89 . 84. 97. 89. 87. 97. 89 . 84 . 99. 89. 83. 99.

APPENDIX II. Indexes of Party Likeness, Cont'd Year 1873 Vote Nbr . Libs . Cons . Libs . R.C. Prot . Cons R.C. Prot 299 26. 80. 97. 300 91. 82 . 99. 301 23. 86. 99. 302 23 . 86. 99. 303 26. 83. 99. 304 25. 85. 99. 305 23. 82. 96. 306 26 . 79. 99. 307 23 . 86 . 93. 308 68. 80. 40. 309 28 . 87. 97. 310 28. 87. 97. 311 28 . 96. 100. 312 18. 77. 100. 313 18. 77. 100. 314 29. 87. 94. 315 27. 70. 100. 316 57. 47. 97. 317 27. 75. 100. 318 18 . 77. 99. 319 30 . 68 . 96. 320 10 0. 100. 100. 321 70. 95. 33. Quebec Libs . Cons . Ontario Libs . Cons . Maritimes Libs . Cons . 9. 8. 77. 93. 86. 90. 14. 6. 79. 14. 6. 79. 13. 7. 78. 12. 5. 78. 13. 6. 78. 6. 7. 88 . 12. 3. 79. 84. 30. 95. 15. 5. 88 . 15. 5. 88 . ■21 . 4. 89. 0. 0 . 88 . 0. 0. 88 . 22 . 10. 59. 6 . 7. 100. 100. 18 . 86 . 12. 6 . 97. 10. 0. 75. 8. 0. 88 . 100 . 100. 100. 32. 100. 87.

APPENDIX II Indexes of Party Likeness, Cont'd Year Vote Nbr . Libs . Cons . Libs . R.C. Prot . Cons . R.C. Prot . Quebec Libs . Cons . Ontario Libs . Cons . Maritimes Libs . Cons . 1874 322 86. 31. 17. 96. 95. 99. 323 87. 36. 20. 98. 95. 92. 324 55. 94. 99. 42. 50. 74. 325 51. 58. 83. 73. 51. 75. 326 37. 92. 96. 44. 23. 63. 327 77. 99. 97. 72. 77 . 89. 328 87. 96. 73. 100. 73. 100. 329 62. 68. 92. 38. 69. 89. 330 65. 99. 37. 38. 91. 100. 1875 331 32. 99. 91. 31. 12. 97. 332 66 . 96. 43. 96. 12. 96. 333 55. 98. 60. 26. 65. 86. 334 68. 100. 33. 30. 100. 100. 335 55. 82 . 88 . 40. 40. 99 . 336 34. 84. 91. 47. 14. 74. 337 38. 92. 97. 33. 12 . 86. 338 37. 98. 89. 32. 21. 82. 339 37. 98 . 86. 33. 23. 75. 340 61. 33 . 48 . 98. 67. 66. 341 36. 97. 95. 29. 22. 77. 342 38 . 97. 95. 29. 30. 72. 343 76. 39. 52. 99. 71. 87 . 344 71. 38. 54 . 98 . 66. 78.

Year 1875 APPENDIX II . Indexes of Party Vote Nbr . Libs . Cons . Libs . R.C. Prot . Cons . R.C. Prot . 345 74. 36. 94. 346 99. 100. 90. 347 81. 93. 75. 348 48. 98. 77. 349 61. 95. 86. 350 84. 83. 85. 351 64. 97. 100. 352 66. 90. 78. 353 47. 95. 93. 354 49. 99. 96. 355 49. 99. 96. 356 55. 91. 92. 357 53. 87. 80. 358 65. 97. 89. 359 90. 93. 81. 360 42. 92. 89. 361 69. 87. 49. 362 78. 57. 65. 363 72. 93. 49. 364 32. 94 . 98. 365 100. 98. 97. 366 25. 92. 87. 367 35. 100. 96. Likeness, Cont'd Quebec Libs . Cons . Ontario Libs . Cons . Maritimes Libs . Cons . 96. 31. 56. 100. 96. 100. 86. 51. 91. 40. 44. 73. 65. 51. 85. 65. 95. 90. 58. 57. 91. 62. 6 6 . 100. 38. 49. 56. 48. 44. 33. 48. 44. 32. 62. 40. 86. 56. 49. 71. 65. 58. 72. 95. 79. 83. 50. 12. 78 . 58 . 87. 80 . 95. 78. 88. 94. 40. 100. 31. 12. 87. 99. 98. 100. 23. 12. 44. 32. 21. 82 .

APPENDIX II. Indexes of Party Likeness, Cont'd Year 1875 1877 Vote Nbr . Libs . Cons . Libs . R.C. Prot . Cons R.C. Prot 368 29. 98. 92. 369 67. 83. 80. 370 73. 82 . 87. 371 96. 99. 87. 372 43. 79. 90. 373 30. 98. 93. 374 46. 92. 90. 375 92. 99. 89. 376 28. 98. 94. 377 32. 99. 88. 378 54. 79. 92. 379 26. 99. 88. 380 25. 100. 88. 381 66. 41. 37. 382 68. 41. 31. 383 43. 96. 99. 384 68 . 40. 29. 385 71. 33. 22. 386 68. 42. 21. 387 29. 97. 93. 388 27. 99. 91. 389 27. 98. 88 . 390 69. 40 . 23. Quebec Libs . Cons . Ontario Libs . Cons . Maritimes Libs . Cons . 29. 17. 57. 71. 59. 90. 85. 63. 95. 96. 91. 100. 52. 34. 69. 29. 12. 65. 50. 36. 97. 97. 80. 95. 33 . 9. 72. 40. 12. 100. 55. 52. 77. 29. 15. 51. 28 . 16. 33. 81. 82. 46. 81. 88 . 79. 33. 36. 74. 78. 94. 82 . 83 . 97. 67. 82 . 95. 76. 27. 18. 50. 29. 11. 50. 29. 11. 50. 84 . 84 . 70.

APPENDIX II Indexes of Party Likeness, Cont'd Year Vote Nbr . Libs . Cons . Libs . R.C. Prot . Cons . R.C. Prot . Quebec Libs . Cons . Ontario Libs . Cons . Maritimes Libs . Cons . 1877 391 69. 25. 26. 92. 87. 67. 392 65. 19. 29. 92. 85. 50. 393 25. 99. 92. 26. 11. 72. 394 30. 95. 84. 30. 19. 58. 395 28 . 96. 90. 29. 19. 45. 396 76. 91. 99. 83. 70. 91. 397 46. 91. 74. 43. 44. 77. 398 22 . 100. 96. 20. 14. 46. 399 24 . 99. 91. 27. 18. 37. 400 82 . 100. 90. 81. 77. 88 . 401 37. 95. 99. 41. 35. 37. 402 23. 90. 96. 28. 10. 48. 403 26. 99. 93. 31. 16. 42. 404 31. 96. 99. 37. 15. 79. 405 29. 92. 97. 34. 20. 48. 406 24. 94 . 95. 24. 15. 25. 407 22 . 89 . 100. 18. 15. 38. 408 22 . 98. 96. 24. 12. 33. 409 22 . 97. 94 . 26. 15. 21. 410 37. 92. 91. 40. 24. 85. 411 18. 98. 86. 14. 5. 71. 412 21. 95. 81. 33. 0. 7.

APPENDIX II Indexes of Party Likeness, Cont'd Year Vote Nbr . Libs . Cons . Libs . R.C. Prot . Cons . R.C. Prot . Quebec Libs . Cons . Ontario Libs . Cons . Maritimes Libs . Cons . 1877 413 28. 100. 88 . 30. 19. 50. 1878 414 24. 94. 95. 24. 10. 61. 415 72. 94. 84. 49. 85. 78. 416 44. 91. 85. 36. 47. 55. 417 57. 25. 40. 86. 80. 77. 418 58. 27. 38. 87. 75. 75. 419 40. 79. 70. 43. 52 . 38. 420 76. 46. 31. 80. 92. 93. 421 28 . 94. 95. 19. 24 . 57. 422 70. 36. 23. 86. 93. 75. 423 34. 98. 97. 36. 16. 71. 424 45. 98. 80. 40. 43. 63. 425 69. 98. 34. 100. 24. 89. 426 29. 98. 97. 25. 21. 60. 427 29. 97. 99. 27. 20. 59. 428 41. 90. 95. 50. 25. 59. 429 77. 35. 30. 89. 93. 100. 430 82. 81. 80. 95. 77 . 100. 431 80. 40. 21. 87. 94. 72 . 432 38. 92. 96. 39. 24. 87. 433 82 . 32. 23. 93. 98. 80. 434 29. 80 . 92. 49. 18. 39. 435 67. 99. 58. 96. 44. 52 .

The text on this page is estimated to be only 6.00% accurate

'

Year 1878 APPENDIX II . Indexes of Party Likeness , Cont'd Vote Nbr . Libs Cons Libs . R.C. . Prot. Cons . R.C. Prot . Quebec Libs . Cons . Ontario Libs . Cons . Mari times Libs . Cons . 436 21. 95. 81. 24. 13. 39. 437 43. 99. 91. 45. 35. 58 . 438 21. 93. 92. 30. 12. 44. 439 22 . 97. 92. 22. 11. 72. 440 54. 78. 86. 26. 68. 44. 441 23. 98. 100. 17. 16. 56. 442 30. 100. 89. 24. 23. 80. 443 22 . 99. 90. 12. 17. 49. 444 21. 99. 90. 12. 19. 48. 445 55. 99. 76. 73. 38 . 56 . 446 21. 95. 96. 15. 17. 56 .