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
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BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1846.



ART. I. — *The Episcopal Observer.* Boston and Baltimore.
August, 1845.

THE *Episcopal Observer* does not appear to comprehend what it is it must do, in order to refute the argument urged against Protestants in the article headed *The Church against No-Church*, in our Review for April last. That argument, formally stated, is, — According to the admissions of Protestants themselves, it is not possible to be saved without eliciting an act of faith.* But it is not possible to elicit an act of faith without the Roman Catholic Church. Therefore, without the Roman Catholic Church, it is not possible to be saved. As Protestants concede the major, it is evident they can set aside the conclusion only by denying the minor, and proving affirmatively that an act of faith *can* be elicited without the Roman Catholic Church.

* The impossibility of being saved without *eliciting* faith, that is, without the *act* of faith, assumed here and throughout the whole argument, is, of course, to be restricted to adults, or persons in whom reason is so far developed as to render them morally responsible for their acts. It is true, universally, that it is impossible to be saved without faith, "for without faith it is impossible to please God," Heb. xi. 6, and "he that believeth not shall be condemned," St. Mark, xvi. 16; but it is not universally true that it is impossible to be saved without *eliciting* faith; for infants are saved by the infused *habit* of faith received in the Sacrament of Baptism, without the *act* of faith, of which they are not capable. Nevertheless, restricted to those who have attained to that age in which they become morally responsible for their acts, the assertion in the text is strictly true; and it is only as so restricted we understand it, or wish to have it understood.

The *Episcopal Observer*, however, contends that it will refute us, if it succeed in proving that an act of faith cannot be elicited *with* the Roman Catholic Church. It supposes the argument may be retorted, and the question made to turn on the merits of Catholicity, instead of the merits of Protestantism. But in this the editor labors under a mistake; for the point at issue is not what is possible *with* Catholicity, but what is possible *without* it. The argument puts Protestantism on the defensive, and requires her to vindicate herself. She cannot retort upon her accuser; because, even were she to prove her accuser guilty, she would not establish her own innocence.

The Protestant denies the Catholic Church, and does all in his power to destroy her. Be it so. We do not, in our argument, undertake the defence of the Church against him; but call upon him to establish the sufficiency of Protestantism for salvation. He dare not affirm that salvation is possible without faith. But faith, we tell him, out of the Catholic Church, is not possible. He must deny this, and prove that it is possible out of the Catholic Church, or else admit that in denying the Catholic Church he denies the possibility of faith, and, therefore, of salvation. It avails him nothing, even if he prove that faith is not possible with the Roman Catholic Church; for, until he proves its possibility without it, he can conclude from the fact that it is not possible with it only that it is not possible at all.

The *Observer* cannot deny this, but it imagines that in an argument with us it can relieve itself of the necessity of proving affirmatively that faith is elicitable without the Church, by adopting the *argumentum ad hominem*. "Mr. Brownson," it says, p. 325, "assumes in the outset, as well as we, that an act of faith can be elicited in *some way*. . . . If we shut the mouth of his witness, he must fall back on Protestant ground, or become a faithless infidel." If we were so disposed, we could concede the *Observer's* premises and deny its conclusion. If faith be possible in *some way*, and not possible on Catholic ground, it must be possible on Protestant ground or on *some other*, we admit. But, for aught the *Observer* shows to the contrary, there may be some other than the Protestant ground on which it is elicitable. Therefore, it does not follow, that, even were it to shut the mouth of our witness, we must either become Protestants or infidels.

But the *Observer* has no right to say that we assume in the

outset that an act of faith can be elicited in some way, and therefore must admit, that, if not elicitable in the way we allege, it must be in some other way ; for we assume no such thing. We assert in the outset, and we labor throughout the argument to prove, that an act of faith is elicitable in *no* way, but by the authority of the Roman Catholic Church ; and, if in any part of the argument we reason on the assumption of its possibility, it is only on the ground that its possibility is conceded by Protestants in their assumption of the possibility of salvation.

An analysis of the whole argument of the article in question, so far as it bears directly against Protestants, will give us the following :

1. According to the admissions of Protestants, it is not possible to be saved without eliciting an act of faith.

But it is not possible to elicit an act of faith without the Roman Catholic Church. Therefore, without the Roman Catholic Church, it is not possible to be saved.

2. According to the admissions of Protestants themselves, it is possible to elicit an act of faith, since they admit the possibility of salvation, and that salvation is not possible without faith.

But it is not possible to elicit an act of faith without the Roman Catholic Church. Therefore, it must be possible to elicit an act of faith with the Roman Catholic Church.

The major, in both instances, is assumed to be conceded by Protestants. The dispute, then, must turn on the minor ; for, admitting both premises, no one will dream of denying the conclusion. The *Observer*, then, evidently cannot refute us in the way it imagines. The argument with which it proposes to refute us, if we may be allowed to reduce it to form, is, — It is impossible to be saved without eliciting an act of faith, *transeat*, or we concede it. But it is not possible to elicit an act of faith *with* the Roman Catholic Church. Therefore, it is possible to elicit an act of faith, or to be saved, without the Roman Catholic Church.

But this argument is faulty, for the conclusion does not follow from the premises ; because faith, if not elicitable with the Roman Catholic Church, may not be elicitable at all. The *Observer*, in order to refute us, must go a step further, and maintain this argument, namely : — It is impossible to be saved without eliciting an act of faith, *transeat*, or we concede it. But an act of faith *is* elicitable without the Roman Catholic Church. Therefore, it is possible to be saved without the Roman Catholic Church.

This argument, if sustained, would be good against the argument we adduced, because it is its direct negative; but it would not, after all, be conclusive against Catholicity. The conclusion follows *ad hominem*, not necessarily; for there may be something besides faith necessary to salvation, and which is attainable only through the Roman Catholic Church. Yet, if sustained, it would unquestionably refute the argument on which we in our essay relied to establish the insufficiency of Protestantism. But the *Observer* does not sustain it; does not even seriously attempt to sustain it. It merely attempts to retort upon us, and show that it is as difficult to elicit an act of faith on Catholic ground as we allege it is on Protestant ground. We tell it, therefore, again, since what it attempts to prove is not the negative of our proposition, even assuming that it has done all it has attempted, which it of course has not, it has not refuted us, or relieved Protestantism in the least of the very grave objections we urged against it.

We are rather surprised that even the editor of the *Observer*, who, though by no means a theologian or a disciplined reasoner, is yet a man of at least ordinary natural ability, should think of controverting this. He must know that the whole question, as we presented it, turns on the sufficiency or insufficiency of Protestantism to the eliciting of an act of faith, and that, till he has proved its sufficiency, he has proved nothing to his purpose. Protestantism, if good for any thing, must be able to stand on its own merits, and be capable of being sustained, not by the assumed error of some other system, but by its own positive truth. Its advocates show but little confidence in its intrinsic strength, when they refuse to bring forward positive arguments in its defence, and seek to sustain it solely by abusing the Church, calumniating her sovereign Pontiffs, misstating her history, and misrepresenting her teachings. They themselves admit that faith is a condition *sine qua non* of salvation, and therefore must admit, that, if faith be not elicitable on Protestant ground, no man living and dying a Protestant can be saved. Why, then, do they not see the necessity, before all, of establishing the fact that faith is elicitable on their ground? Why do they so studiously evade the question? The question is for them a question of the gravest magnitude. Their eternal all is at stake. If they are wrong in assuming that they can have faith as Protestants, as we think we have proved they are, they have and can have no well grounded hopes of salvation. How, then, can they treat

this question with indifference? Can a reasonable being rest satisfied with his condition, so long as he has room to fear that he is out of the way of salvation? Is the eternal destiny of the soul a matter to be trifled with? "What doth it profit, if a man gain the whole world and lose his own soul? or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" St. Matt. xvi. 26. It may be humiliating to the Protestant to descend from that pinnacle of human pride and self-sufficiency on which his assumptions place him, and consent to receive instructions, as a little child, from the Church against which he has for so long a time protested, — to prostrate himself at the foot of the cross which he has despised, and to be called by a name he has done his best to make a name of reproach; but it is better even to submit, it is better to own that he has been wrong, that he has deceived and been deceived, that he has sinned before God, blasphemed his holy name, and become unworthy to be called a son in his Father's house, than to eat husks with the swine and to lose his own soul for ever. Let the prodigal son come to himself, and ask if he can have life in the "far country" where he has wasted his substance and is perishing with hunger, and he will not refuse to say, "I will arise and return to my Father's house, where there is bread enough and to spare." Would that our Protestant brethren would once seriously reflect on their own position, once seriously ask themselves, in the solitude of their own self-communings, if they have faith, if they can have faith without returning to the bosom of the Church; they would then soon find that where they are they have and can have no foundation on which to build, no ground of hope in God's mercy, or of a share in the heritage of the saints.

In our July number we charged the *Observer* with *ignoring* the position, which we had assumed in the article he was laboring to refute, that what one is required to believe in order to be saved is truth, not falsehood; that is, truth without mixture of error. The editor, in his reply, appears to admit the charge, but labors to justify his neglecting the position, on the ground that it was of no consequence to him. "It was," he says, "of no consequence to us that he (Mr. Brownson) labored long to prove that the 'somewhat' the Christian must believe, in order to be saved, is truth without any mixture of falsehood; for his only object, in getting up his 'exact' theory, was to create a necessity for an 'infallible witness'; and if it

turned out in the end that he could not legitimately authenticate the authority of the witness, it would follow of necessity that there is no such thing as faith, or that illicit processes of reasoning had betrayed Mr. Brownson into a false presentation of its claims." — p. 325. *Therefore*, the position and reasoning were of no consequence in the refutation of our argument!

The *Observer*, in the first place, labors under a mistake in saying, our "only object in getting up the exact theory was to create a necessity for an infallible witness." We merely attempted to show, from the nature of faith itself, and of its object, that without an infallible witness there can be no such thing as faith. The necessity, if we were right in our reasoning, was not of our creating, but in the nature of the case. It was the *Observer's* business, not to *assume* we created or imagined a necessity where none exists, but to *prove* that the necessity we alleged does not exist in fact. We cannot understand how otherwise he was to refute us.

In the second place, the *Observer* distinctly admits, that, if our position and the processes of reasoning we adopted be admitted, it follows of necessity, either that there can be no such thing as faith, or that the infallible witness we contended for, that is, the Roman Catholic Church, must be accepted, — precisely what throughout the whole argument we were laboring to prove. And this is assigned as a reason why, when avowedly attempting to refute us, it was of no consequence to controvert our position, or show the fallacy of our reasoning! You flatter yourself with having "the pleasure" of refuting an opponent. If you grant his position and reasoning, you own you must accept his conclusions; *therefore*, in order to refute him, it is of no consequence to overthrow his position or set aside his reasoning. This would be a novel way, and, by the by, rather an easy way, of refuting an opponent, and no doubt has many attractions for our friend of the *Observer*; yet we would thank him to tell us, *ex professo*, what in an opponent's argument he regards it as necessary to refute in order to refute the argument.

Nevertheless, the editor says he did not entirely overlook the matter; but, all unimportant as it was, had special reference to it in stating one of the points we maintained, which needed looking after, to be, "That, unless the nice *theological* shades of meaning in God's word are appreciated, one cannot be saved." — p. 326. But we complained of him, first,

for omitting, when giving professedly a synopsis of our argument, an important position which we had assumed, and without which the argument would be incomplete and without force ; and, secondly, for ascribing to us a proposition we neither adopted nor implied, and reasoning against it as if it were ours, and giving his readers no means of discovering it to be not ours. These two just causes of complaint, we are sorry to say, he suffers to remain. He has grossly mutilated and misrepresented our argument, and will neither acknowledge his injustice nor afford his readers the means of detecting it.

Our proposition was, simply, that what one is required to believe in order to be a Christian believer, in order to be saved, is truth, not falsehood, truth without any mixture of falsehood ; or, in other terms, — as we elsewhere expressed ourselves, — the word of God in its purity and integrity. The editor of the *Observer* tells his readers that we maintain, “ that, unless the nice *theological* shades of meaning in God’s word are *appreciated*, one cannot be saved.” We submit to the candid, nay, even to the uncandid reader, if these two propositions are identical ; if, indeed, there is not a wide difference between them. The first proposition the editor omitted, and substituted for it the second. This was grossly unjust. All his reasoning, professedly against our proposition, was directed solely against the one falsely ascribed to us ; and he seemed to his readers to be refuting us, when he was really only refuting a proposition which he had himself fabricated, and without any authority asserted to be ours. Here was both falsehood and deception, from the guilt of which the editor hardly attempts to clear himself, — whether through simplicity or malice it is not for us to decide.

But let us examine these two propositions. The one the *Observer* ascribes to us evidently makes theology a condition *sine qua non* of salvation. This must be admitted. 1. Because it speaks of the “ nice *theological* shades of meaning in God’s word.” The adjective *theological* is necessarily used here to designate the subject of the shades of meaning, and by its proper force determines that subject to be theology. If this had not been the intention of the framer of the proposition, assuming him to have attached some meaning to the words he adopted, he would have omitted the word *theological*, and have written simply, “ Unless the nice shades of meaning in God’s,” &c. 2. Because the proposition affirms unless the nice

theological shades of meaning be *appreciated*, &c. Now, faith does not appreciate distinctions or shades of meaning. That which appreciates distinctions or shades of meaning in God's word is science, and that particular science which is called *theology*. To appreciate is to comprehend, and nothing is appreciated that is not comprehended. But faith does not comprehend. Its peculiarity is in believing without comprehending, without appreciating, — in believing the incomprehensible and the inappreciable. Consequently, to affirm that it is necessary to salvation to appreciate all the nice shades of meaning in God's word is to affirm the necessity of theology to salvation. And there can be no doubt that this is what the editor of the *Observer* intended to make his readers believe we did affirm. Whoever looks through his two articles will be perfectly convinced that he means to assert we maintain, that, unless all the nice shades of *theology* are appreciated, unless we have a theology which embraces all the truth there is in God's word, and appreciates all its shades of meaning, and which includes no error in any respect whatever, but is in every conceivable respect the exact truth as it lies in the mind of the Holy Ghost, we cannot be saved. He will not, and dares not, deny that he has represented, and intentionally represented, us as so maintaining.

Now, we deny that our proposition warrants this. What is it we say? That, in order to be saved, one must *believe* truth, not falsehood, truth without any mixture of error, or the word of God in its purity and integrity; and we define faith to be "a theological virtue which consists in believing without doubting, explicitly or *implicitly*, all the truths which Almighty God has revealed, on the veracity of God alone." Is there here one word said about theology? Is there any thing which indicates that we hold it necessary to appreciate the meaning, much more, the nice shades of meaning, there may be in God's word? Yes, one word, says the *Observer*, one word which proves, that, if it spoke of theology, we also spoke of it. — p. 327. We define faith to be a *theological* virtue. We therefore use the word *theological* as well as the editor of the *Observer*, and speak of theology as much as he did. In reply, we add that we have proved conclusively that he did speak of theology, and not only because he used the term *theological*, but because he spoke of shades of meaning to be *appreciated*. The same word, we are sorry to be obliged to inform him, may have more than one meaning, and be used sometimes in

one sense, and sometimes in another, to be determined by the connection in which it is used. We defined faith to be a *theological* virtue, to designate its immediate object, which is God, and to distinguish it from the moral virtues. This is a strictly proper use of the word, and has not the remotest reference to the science of theology. The *Observer* did not and could not use the word in this sense, for the reasons already assigned, and because it did not wish to distinguish theological shades of meaning from *moral* shades, and could not have so done if it had wished, since shades of meaning have no *moral* character.

We could not have intended to mean by faith the *science* of theology, for we said faith consists in *believing*, and we were careful through our whole article to draw the distinction between *belief* and science. If we had meant theology, instead of faith, we should have been compelled by the principles we laid down to have written, "Faith is a theological virtue which consists in *comprehending* all the *truths*," &c. But as we used the word *believing*, instead of *comprehending*, it is but reasonable to give us credit for meaning what we said, and to conclude that we meant faith when we said so, and not theological science.

And again; we speak of faith as consisting in believing explicitly or *implicitly*. We did not contend that even an explicit faith in all the truths revealed is necessary to salvation, but admitted that an *implicit* faith might, at least as to some portion of the revealed word, suffice. But in theology, inasmuch as it is a science, all is necessarily explicit, and nothing implicit. It would be absurd to speak of *implicit* science or *implicit* knowledge. But we may speak of implicit faith, since he who believes a proposition believes by implication all it necessarily involves, though he may be far from mentally apprehending it all. He who believes the Church to be an infallible teacher believes *implicitly* all she teaches, though as a matter of fact he actually know but a small portion of what she teaches; because her infallibility necessarily implies that all she teaches is true. Consequently, since we spoke of believing explicitly or *implicitly*, our words must be understood of faith, and not of theological science.

The *Observer* says that we "define faith as a theological virtue which embraces all the meaning there is in truth, including, of course, its shades of meaning." — p. 327. This is not strictly correct; for we define it as embracing only the

truths which Almighty God has *revealed*, and there may, for aught we know, be truths he has not revealed. But admitting that we make faith embrace all the meaning and even the shades of meaning in the word of God, what is this to the *Observer's* purpose? To believe explicitly or implicitly all the truths Almighty God has revealed is something very different from *appreciating* them, from noting and appreciating all their nice shades of meaning. To do this last, one must comprehend these truths, know their full significance, which transcends all mortal ability. They have depths of meaning which will excite the wonder and admiration of the saints through eternity. Even the saints in their beatified state will never be able fully to appreciate the meaning of God's word; for it is infinite, even infinitely infinite. Yet it all may be, and is, embraced explicitly or implicitly in the simple faith of the simplest Christian believer. It is evident, therefore, from all these considerations, that we meant by faith, faith as distinguished from theology, and that we did not contend and could not have contended for such a proposition as the editor of the *Observer* has presented to his readers as ours. Will he candidly acknowledge that he has done us injustice, that he has deceived his readers, and claimed to have refuted us, when all he has done is to *ignore* our arguments, and refute a proposition which he himself has invented, and which we should be as ready to reject as he is, and perhaps even more so?

After telling the editor in our July number that we did not expressly or by implication maintain, that, unless all the nice theological shades of meaning in God's word are appreciated, one cannot be saved, and charitably ascribing his misrepresentation to his ignorance of the distinction between faith and theology, we proceeded on the supposition that he probably intended to deny our position, that what one must believe in order to be a Christian believer, in order to be saved, is truth, not falsehood, truth without mixture of error, or the word of God in its purity and integrity, and to maintain as his own thesis the contrary doctrine, namely, in order to be a Christian believer, in order to be saved, it suffices to believe truth *and* falsehood, truth mixed with error, or the mutilated and impure word of God. Assuming this to be his thesis, we proceeded to combat it. In his reply to us he brings it forward again, insists on it, but studiously avoids noticing even one of the very grave objections we urged against it, and does not even

attempt to show us, on divine authority, that in matters of Christian faith it is lawful to believe falsehood, nor deign to inform us how much or how little falsehood it is allowable to mix up with the truth. Why is this? Does the editor still remain of the opinion, that the proper way to refute an argument is to ignore it, or that his word is sufficient authority for believing whatever he may take it into his head to assert?

The editor alleges nothing new in support of the sufficiency of his "mixed" theory. He simply refers to his former argument from the alleged inadequacy of language to serve as the medium of communicating the exact truth. "We showed," he says, "that language being a fallible representative of thought, it must in some instances and to some extent fail to fulfil the end of its use." — p. 326. That the language of the *Observer* fails frequently to serve as the medium of communicating the exact truth, or even the truth at all, we have but too ample evidence; but that this is the fault of language itself, rather than of him who uses it, we are not quite so ready to concede. "Mr. Brownson," it says, "would have convinced a larger circle of intelligent readers, if he could have seriously set himself to work, and have shown why, and how, and when, human language was divested of its garments of fallibility, and clothed with the attributes of *unerring* divinity." — *ib.* It will be time enough for us to show this, when we assert, or when we maintain doctrines which imply, the absolute infallibility of language. The *Observer* must excuse us, if we do not in all cases show a willingness to undertake to maintain the propositions he fabricates for us. We hold ourselves bound to accept every consequence fairly deducible from principles which we acknowledge; but not every consequence the fertile fancy of the editor of the *Observer*, without any authority in any thing we say, chooses to tell his readers is a proposition we are bound to maintain. When he shall have proved from any thing we say or imply, that we hold language is clothed with "the *unerring* attributes of divinity," we will tell him why, how, and when it became clothed with them.

Whether language is adequate to the expression of all the distinctions, all the nice shades of meaning, involved in the revelation Almighty God has made us, we do not inquire; because we have nothing to do, in matters of faith, with distinctions and shades of meaning, and because, when we believe the revelation on competent authority, we necessarily believe all that it involves, whether we recognize or mentally appre-

hend all the distinctions or shades of meaning it involves, or not. Moreover, though we have heard much of the imperfection of language, we have never yet found it so very imperfect as some people pretend. The imperfection, for the most part, we have found to be not so much in language as the representative of thought as in the head of him who uses it. As a general rule, he who thinks with clearness, exactness, and precision may always find language a perfect medium of his thought. But be this as it may, the *Observer* will not deny that language has some capabilities, that in some instances and to some extent it may serve as a perfect representative of thought. If not, we had better shut our mouths, and stop writing, for there are errors, falsehoods, and deceptions enough already in the world, without adding to the number. The simple question is not, whether language be in all cases absolutely infallible, but whether it is adequate to the exact expression of the word of God, so far forth as that word is the object of faith. When I say two and two are four, language is a perfect representative of my thought, because I assert a simple proposition, with one simple sense, in which there are and can be no distinctions, no nice shades of meaning, to be noted or expressed. So is it with the articles of faith, as propounded for our belief. They are, as formal propositions,—the only sense in which we are required to believe them, since their matter is intrinsically incomprehensible and inappreciable, as all admit,—all simple propositions, each having one simple sense, neither more nor less, which he who believes affirms, and he who disbelieves denies. If language, as it unquestionably is, be adequate to express a simple proposition with clearness, exactness, and precision, it is adequate to the clear, exact, and precise expression of the articles of faith, and therefore the necessity of believing the exact truth, or the word of God, in its purity and integrity, cannot be denied on the ground of the imperfection of language.

We have seen, lately, this argument against the necessity of believing the exact truth, drawn from the assumed imperfection of language, insisted on from several quarters, and it appears to be resorted to as the last refuge of those who are determined not to admit the authority of the Catholic Church. But are they aware of the consequences which necessarily follow from their doctrine? The *Observer* expressly teaches that Almighty God himself cannot make us a revelation which shall reach us exempt from error. Then, since Almighty God

chooses to make the revelation, chooses the medium through which he makes it, he must be said to teach the error which necessarily accompanies his word, or is necessarily mingled with it. But God can teach error in no sense and in no degree whatever, for he is *prima veritas in essendo, in cognoscendo, et in dicendo*. Then, if he cannot make a revelation without necessarily communicating a certain portion of error along with it, be it more or less, he can make us no revelation at all. Hence, the first consequence of the doctrine is **THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DIVINE REVELATION.**

If we assume — as we must, if we assume that God does make us a revelation, and cannot make it exempt from error — that he makes a revelation in which he necessarily mingles error with the truth, we deny his veracity, at least his veracity *in speaking*, — *in dicendo*, — or in making the revelation. Then his veracity cannot be alleged as the sufficient ground for faith. But the veracity of God is the only ground for faith possible, and if it be not sufficient, there is no sufficient ground for faith. Then there is and can be no faith. Hence, the second consequence of the doctrine is **THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF FAITH.**

But, if God makes us a revelation, and does not make it exempt from error, so far forth as the error necessarily mingled with the truth extends, he in making the revelation deceives us, leads us necessarily into error. But to charge God with deception, or to accuse him of leading men into error or falsehood, in any degree whatever, is blasphemy; for it makes him a liar. Hence, the third consequence of the doctrine is **BLASPHEMY**, and they who defend it are material, if not formal, blasphemers. We beg the editor of the *Observer* to attend to this point, and, if not prepared to accept these consequences, as we presume he is not, to show us — not merely *assert*, but *prove* — that they do not necessarily follow from his doctrine. We beg him to answer fairly, logically, candidly, without evasion, subterfuge, declamation, or abuse.

Furthermore, the Holy Ghost probably knows the capabilities of language as well as our friend of the *Observer*, and, since it is repugnant to his veracity to communicate any thing but the exact truth, we may reasonably conclude, that, if there are truths, though we can conceive of none, which he knows language is inadequate to express with exactness, he does not reveal them, or make them a part of the word he propounds for our assent. This, it strikes us, would be more reasonable

than to conclude with the *Observer* that God makes us a revelation mingled with more or less of error.

The editor of the *Observer* would be relieved of many of his embarrassments, if he would take the pains to make himself acquainted with a few of the more ordinary terms and distinctions of theological science. A slight acquaintance with a brief course of systematic theology would save him from many of the grave errors, as well as laughable blunders, which his writings everywhere indicate to the theologian. To write confidently, even flippantly, is not always to write wisely or profoundly. We suspect, after all, that our friend of the *Observer* really supposes that we assert and maintain, consciously or unconsciously, that no one who entertains the least *theological* error, however trifling or insignificant, and whatever his love and earnest strivings for the truth, can be saved; but we assure him that we had hoped, that, in a community where we have been known for years, and where we are not regarded as an absolute dunce, it could never be necessary for us to deny that we maintain any proposition so obviously and so grossly absurd. We are not among those who claim infallibility for the human understanding, nor has our own past experience tended to give us any very lofty notions of its ability, when left to itself, to avoid even great and dangerous errors. Unquestionably, we assert that faith must be infallible, that in matters of faith we must believe the word of God, the whole word of God, and nothing but the word of God; but to our mind there is a wide difference between asserting this and asserting that every or any purely theological error excludes from salvation. Whoever would be saved must believe the true doctrine of the Trinity; but it does not follow from this that he cannot be saved, if he honestly err in the account he renders of the doctrine to philosophy, in the applications he may make of it in the general explanations of science, in the conclusions he may draw from it, or the arguments by which he may attempt to render it less difficult for reason to grasp, — providing that he advance nothing which impugns the doctrine itself as a simple article of faith. The same may be said in regard to all the articles of faith. No error excludes from salvation, unless it be an error in matters strictly of faith. In matters strictly of faith, we of course contend that it is necessary to believe the exact truth; because, *if error be mingled with the word, we cannot believe it at all.* If we believe the word at all, we believe it because it is God's word, on the divine veracity alone.

We have and can have no other ground of belief ; and if we do not believe it on this ground alone, our belief is not faith. But we have not, and cannot have, the divine veracity for error ; because God does not reveal error, and cannot speak what is not strictly true. If, then, we receive the word only as mingled with error, we do not receive it on the divine veracity ; but on some other authority, and therefore on an authority insufficient for faith.

The editor of the *Observer*, strange as it may seem, actually appears to be unaware of the fact that *falsehood is not susceptible of the degree of evidence requisite for faith* ; and he evidently reasons as if men might have faith in falsehood as well as in truth. But faith in error or falsehood is impossible. If we mingle error with the word, it must be because the evidence on which we receive the word is indistinguishable from that on which we receive the error we mingle with it. The evidence for the truth is then no higher than the evidence we have for the error. Then the truth is no better evidenced to us than it is possible to evidence falsehood. *But when the truth is no better evidenced than it is possible to evidence falsehood, it is not sufficiently evidenced for faith.* Consequently, when we mingle error with the word, we have no faith in the word itself. We must, then, believe the exact truth, or not have faith.

We told the *Observer* that it must be aware that on the definition which we gave of faith rests nearly the whole of our argument for the necessity of an infallible witness ; for, if faith consist in believing without doubting, it is obvious that it is impossible to elicit an act of faith on the authority of a fallible witness. To this the *Observer* replies : — “ Is God speaking audibly by his word to the ear, or silently by his spirit in the heart, a fallible witness ? Did we not say in our former article that we have in the person of the Holy Ghost what answers Mr. Brownson’s theory, a witness and interpreter that cannot err, therefore infallible ? ” — p. 327.

1. It is fair to infer from this that the editor of the *Observer* means to concede our definition of faith, and that faith is not elicitable without an infallible witness, — two points of some importance in the controversy. He must now prove that he has or can have an infallible witness without the Roman Catholic Church, or admit that without the Roman Catholic Church faith is not elicitable.

2. The witness he alleges is in one sense the very witness we contend for, since we hold the Church to be the witness to the fact of revelation only on the ground that it is the Holy Ghost that witnesses in her testimony. If by the Holy Ghost in person the *Observer* means the Holy Ghost bearing witness through the Church as his organ, we are agreed, and there is no controversy between us ; but if, as is the case, it means the Holy Ghost bearing witness immediately to the individual, we deny the assumption, and put the editor upon his proofs.

3. We cannot entertain the *Observer's* appeal to the personal testimony suggested, for its pages bear unequivocal evidence that its editor does not write under the immediate dictation of the Holy Ghost. The editor is a bold man, but we do not believe that even he dare lay his hand on his heart and solemnly assert that he truly and sincerely believes that he is specially inspired by the Holy Ghost to say what is or is not the word of God.

4. The *Observer* cannot claim, on its own principles, to have an infallible witness, even in case it has the private testimony of the Holy Ghost. The Holy Ghost can be an infallible witness only on condition that he speak to the mind and heart the *exact* truth ; which the *Observer* contends, owing to the fallibility of language, is not possible.

5. Though the *Observer* may have *said* in its former article that it has the infallible testimony of the Holy Ghost to the fact of revelation, we do not recollect that it *proved* that it has or even may have it ; and since it denies to Almighty God the ability to tell the exact truth, it must excuse us if we cannot take its unsupported assertions as conclusive for whatever it may allege. We cannot consent to award it an infallibility which it denies to Almighty God.

6. The editor of the *Observer* has no right to allege the private testimony of the Holy Ghost as the basis of an argument he is publicly urging ; for, according to his own admission, it is a secret of his own bosom, not recognizable by or provable to another. The validity of an argument that rests upon it cannot, therefore, be publicly established ; and we trust it cannot be necessary to prove that an argument, the validity of which cannot be publicly established, is an argument which it is not lawful publicly to urge.

The resort to the private testimony of the Holy Ghost, or what we called *private illumination*, is always exceedingly suspicious, — may, in fact, be always regarded as a mere eva-

sion of a difficulty felt to be unanswerable. It is always a virtual acknowledgment of defeat. The man finds himself condemned by reason, and appeals to unreason, — flattering himself that he will henceforth be secure, because, if he cannot prove that he has the private illumination alleged, you may find it equally difficult to prove that he has it not.

But this miserable subterfuge shall not avail the editor of the *Observer*. He promised himself the “pleasure” of refuting us, and we hold him to his promise. We deny in our argument that faith can be elicited without the Roman Catholic Church. He says it can be, and alleges private inspiration, what he calls the “internal monitor,” as the means by which it is elicitable. His thesis, then, is, Faith is elicitable by the internal monitor, or private testimony of the Holy Ghost, without the Roman Catholic Church. This thesis he must maintain by positive proofs, or yield to his opponent. But he cannot maintain this thesis without proving, 1. That faith is morally as well as metaphysically possible by this private testimony; and 2. That it is possible in the ordinary course of God’s gracious providence.

1. We did not deny that faith is elicitable without the Roman Catholic Church, because it could not have been made elicitable in some other way; but because it has not been. We say expressly, “We do not deny the possibility, on the part of God, of adopting some other method.” — p. 173. The question, then, is not a question of *a priori* reasoning; but a simple question of fact. Before the editor can refute our thesis or maintain his own, he must prove, as a matter of fact, that faith is actually made elicitable without the Roman Catholic Church, and by the private testimony of the Holy Ghost. It is not elicitable by this private testimony, unless we have it. He must, then, in order to prove faith possible by it, prove that we have it, or at least may have it, if we will.

2. The editor must not only prove that we have or may have the private testimony, but that we have or may have it as standing in the ordinary course of God’s gracious providence. For, if it does not stand in the ordinary course of God’s gracious providence, it is a miracle. But we were not discussing what is or is not possible by means of miracles, but what is or is not possible without miracles, — as is evident from the fact, that we were not seeking what is possible on the part of God, but what he has made possible on the part of man. The Church is, indeed, a miracle in relation to the order of nature, inas-

much as it is supernatural ; but standing in the ordinary course of God's gracious providence, we do not call it a miracle, any more than we call that a miracle which stands in the order of God's natural providence, or providence as manifested in the order of nature. If the private testimony stands in the order of grace, as the ordinary method of eliciting faith, it is not to be regarded as a miracle ; but if it do not stand in the order of grace as the ordinary method of eliciting faith, it is a miracle. Hence, the editor of the *Observer* must prove that private illumination is the method Almighty God in the ordinary course of his gracious providence has actually adopted for eliciting faith, or fail to refute our thesis or to sustain his own.

That private illumination is the method actually adopted as the ordinary method of eliciting faith, we deny, 1. Because the faith we are required to have cannot be elicited by it ; 2. Because the method actually adopted is a different method ; and 3. Because faith must be elicited by this different method, or not be the faith on which the question turns.

I. The faith which would be elicitable by means of the private testimony of the Holy Ghost, even assuming that we have or may have it, would be simply faith in a new revelation made specially to the individual. This private testimony must be sufficient, in order to meet the demand, to enable us to say, in all cases, what is and what is not the word of God. But the word must be propounded to the mind, before testimony to the fact that it is God's word can be received. It must be propounded by the Spirit privately illuminating, or by some other authority. If by some other authority, then the sufficiency of private illumination for eliciting faith is denied, and the question comes up as to what this other authority is, and as to what may be its competency. If by the Spirit privately illuminating, then the private illumination propounds as well as evidences the word ; which is the same thing as its revelation. Then whatever the word believed on the authority of the private illumination, it is a new revelation, and, as a formal revelation, independent of every other revelation, and has no connection with any other revelation, either express or implied.

But a new revelation made specially to the individual is not the revelation faith in which we have assumed, on the strength of Protestant admissions, to be essential to salvation, and which we have denied to be elicitable without the Roman Catholic Church ; for we say expressly, in our article on *The*

Church against No-Church, — “ But the revelation to which we are seeking a witness is not a new revelation, not a private revelation which Almighty God may see proper to make to individuals, but a revelation already made and propounded for the belief of all men.” — p. 173. Throughout our whole argument we presuppose that a revelation has been made, a historical revelation, a public or catholic revelation, which we call briefly “ the Christian revelation,” and which must be believed, as the condition *sine qua non* of salvation. It is always on the means and conditions of eliciting faith in this, to us, historical revelation that the question turns. Faith in any other revelation, then, although it should embrace materially the same truths as this, would not be the faith in question. Even were it proved that faith in some other revelation is elicitable without the Roman Catholic Church, it would be nothing to the purpose, for it might still be true that faith in this is not possible without it. The faith involved in the controversy is a faith in this formal revelation, already made and completed. But private illumination can give us faith only in a new revelation, a private revelation, made specially to the individual. Therefore, the faith we are required to have, the faith on which the whole question turns, is not elicitable by private illumination, even in case private illumination be assumed as a fact.

II. But the method of private illumination is not the method of eliciting faith actually adopted ; because it is evident from the Holy Scriptures that another method has been adopted. The Holy Scriptures are admissible testimony in the case ; for, in the first place, we adduce them only as simple *historical documents*, and, in the second place, they are held by Protestants, against whom we are reasoning, to be of divine authority. According to these, the method of eliciting faith actually adopted is not by private inspiration, but through the ministry of teachers to whom Jesus Christ committed his revelation, and whom he authorized to teach or propound it. St. Matt. xxviii. 19, 20.

1. The revelation to be believed must be propounded, and with authority. This is evident from the express assertion of St. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans. “ How can they believe him of whom they have not heard ? And how shall they hear without a preacher ? And how can they preach, unless they be sent ? ” — x. 14, 15. The obvious sense of this is that faith comes by hearing (verse 17), — the word must be propound-

ed ; that hearing comes by the preacher, — there must be some one to propound the word ; and that the preacher preaches because sent, — he who propounds the word must propound it with authority, or because authorized to propound it ;— for this, in this connection, is unquestionably the meaning of the word *sent*. Therefore, faith is elicitable only on condition that the word is propounded, and propounded with authority, and therefore only on condition that there be pastors and teachers authorized to propound it.

But, on the assumption of private illumination as the authority for saying what is or is not the word of God, the word cannot be authoritatively propounded. To propound is to propound to others, and to propound authoritatively to others is to propound with an authority which is equally an authority for him who propounds and for them to whom he propounds, — an authority which he may adduce, and which they must admit. But private illumination is not such authority. It is not an authority common to both parties, — is not public or catholic ; but private, confined to the bosom of the individual. In the preacher, it is no authority for the hearers ; in the hearers, it is no authority for the preacher. Confined to himself, he cannot adduce it as the reason why they should believe him ; confined to them, he cannot appeal to it, for he cannot know that they have it, and has no right to presume on their having it. Moreover, to assume it in them as the authority would be to transfer the authority from him to them ; and then, if they might be said to *hear* with authority, he could not be said to *propound* with authority. Besides, this would place the one assumed to be the learner above the teacher, and subject him who is assumed to teach to them who, it is assumed, need to be taught, — an absurdity which can find place only in Congregationalism. It would compel the teacher to rely on those he teaches for the authority with which to teach, and to preach not because *sent*, but because *called* ; which would be as if the Son of God came not because sent by the Father, but because called by the sinners for whom he died.

On this ground, it is evident the preacher could not propound the word with authority. But it must be propounded with authority, or faith is not elicitable, as before proved. Therefore, either faith is not elicitable, or there is some other method than that of private illumination by which it is elicitable.

2. Another method than that of private illumination is evidently the method of eliciting faith actually adopted ; because,

on the method actually adopted, it is possible for the preacher to vindicate the word and convince gainsayers. "A bishop must," the holy Apostle tells us, "embracing that faithful word which is according to doctrine, be able to exhort in sound doctrine and convince the gainsayers. For there are many disobedient, vain talkers, seducers, especially they of the circumcision, who must be reprov'd, who subvert whole houses, teaching things which they ought not for filthy lucre's sake. Wherefore rebuke them sharply, that they may be sound in the faith."—Tit. i. 7–13. But this is impossible, if he have no authority on which to declare what is or is not sound doctrine, but the private illumination of the Holy Ghost. He can convict gainsayers, vain talkers, seducers, only on condition that he has a public or catholic authority for the word, to which they can be compelled to answer, and by which he can vindicate the truth, and refute the error. But private illumination is not a public or catholic authority. It is authority only for the individual who has it. Since, then, the preacher of the word is required to do that which he cannot do without a different authority, it is evident that some other method than private illumination for saying what is or is not the word of God, and therefore for eliciting faith, is the method actually adopted.

There is here a question of no small magnitude, and of the greatest practical importance. The whole land is evidently overrun with infidels and misbelievers. The editor of the *Observer* is as ready to admit this as we are. He finds men, as well as we, denying or perverting the faith. He is at war on all hands with what he regards as error. He is at war with his Puseyite brethren, who he thinks are making shipwreck of the faith; he is virtually, whether he knows it or not, at war with the episcopal constitution of his own church, and contending, substantially, for the Congregationalism in which he was brought up, and which he has never really renounced; nay, he enters the lists against us, and labors with might and main, though without any flattering success, to convict us of error,—to prove the Catholic Church corrupt, as good as no church at all, and that on her authority faith is not possible. But does he not see that all this is pitifully absurd, if he have no authority but private illumination for saying what is or is not the word of God? If we demand of him evidence that he, instead of those he opposes, has the word, what answer has he to return? He cannot appeal to private illumination, for that is a secret of

his own bosom, as he himself admits, and therefore is no authority by which to prove that he is right or others wrong. He must either admit another authority, a catholic or public authority, or close his pages, and shut his mouth. His very attempt to convict us and others of error is a proof that he himself, unless he is capable of grosser inconsistency than even we can believe him, does not rely on private illumination alone, but really believes that he has an authority for faith which is common to him and us.

3. The method of eliciting faith, or the rule of faith, actually adopted, cannot be private illumination, because the method or rule actually adopted presupposes the possibility of **HERESY**. "The man that is a heretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid."—Tit. iii. 15. There must be, according to what we have just said, a public or catholic authority for faith, or no one can have the right or the ability to admonish another for heresy; for he must be convicted of heresy before he can be admonished, and he cannot be convicted of heresy on a private authority. Where there is only a private authority for faith, there can be only a private faith. But where there is only a private faith, and no authority to propound a catholic or public faith, there is and can be no heresy; for heresy is not the wilful rejection of the private faith of individuals, but of a public or catholic faith. But there can be heresy. Therefore, there must be a public or catholic faith. Therefore, a public or catholic authority for faith. But private illumination is not such authority. Therefore, there is and must be another authority than that of private illumination.

III. These considerations suffice to establish the fact, that there is another method than that of private illumination actually adopted. We proceed now to prove the third proposition, namely, that faith must be elicited by this other method, or not be the faith on which the question turns.

1. It can be elicited only by this other method. This is evident from the words of the holy Apostle already quoted. Rom. x. 14, 15. Faith comes by hearing, hearing by the preacher, and the preacher preaches because sent. But the text goes further, and asserts not only that faith does come by hearing, but that it can come in no other way; not only that hearing does come by the preacher, but that it cannot come without him; not only that the preacher does preach because

sent, but that he cannot preach unless sent. The preacher evidently cannot be sent, without an authority competent to send him. No authority, not public or catholic, is competent to send him ; for the mission, as we have seen, is public or catholic. Therefore, without a public or catholic authority, faith is impossible. Therefore, faith must be elicited by means of a public or catholic authority, or not be the faith in question. Hence St. Augustine says, *Evangelio non crederem, nisi me Ecclesiæ Catholicæ commoveret auctoritas.*

2. This is of itself conclusive ; but we add, secondly, that faith must be elicited by this other authority, as is evident from the nature of faith as a theological virtue. According to the definition of faith already given and accepted, at least accepted so far as we have occasion now to insist on it, "faith is a *theological virtue* which consists in believing without doubting, explicitly or implicitly, all the truths God has revealed, *on the veracity of God alone.*" Theological virtues are those whose immediate object is God, and God as transcending the order of nature, and apprehensible only through supernatural revelation ; for those virtues which refer to God as their object only mediately, as revealed in the order of nature, and as he is known or may be known by the natural light of reason, are not termed theological virtues, but are simply intellectual and moral. Faith, then, as a theological virtue, is a virtue whose immediate object is God ; that is, what in faith we immediately believe is God himself. The matters beside God included in faith are not that which is immediately believed ; we believe them only mediately, by God, on his authority, — because we believe him. Thus, charity is a theological virtue, whose immediate object is God ; for though it include the love of God *and* of our neighbour, yet the immediate object of our love is God ; because we are to love our neighbour not for his own sake, but in and for the sake of God. Thus in hope, as a theological virtue, what we immediately hope is God ; and the other things we hope for, such as pardon of our sins, assistance of divine grace, and final perseverance, are hoped only mediately, as pertaining to God, and for the sake of God. In like manner, in faith God is what we immediately believe, and the other truths revealed we believe by him, on his authority.

But faith pertains to the intellect as its subject, and the intellect stands related to its object in the order of truth. Hence the immediate object of faith is God as truth, or as essentially true ; as the immediate object of charity is God as good-

ness, or essentially good. God, as truth or as essentially true, is the infinite veracity in being, or, as the theologians say, *prima veritas in essendo*. The immediate object of faith, then, in the last analysis, is God as essentially true, or, in other words, the infinite veracity of God. We must, then, in faith believe *on* the veracity of God ; for if not, we do not believe the veracity of God itself ; and if we do not believe this, our faith, though it may be *intellectual*, is not *theological*.

Hence, were it possible to believe the matters revealed in the word of God on any other authority than the veracity of God revealing them, — say, as our Unitarian friends contend, because they appear reasonable to us, satisfy the wants of the intellect and heart, warm our sensibilities, exalt our imagination, and give us lofty and ennobling views of the worth, capacities, and destiny of the human soul, — our belief would not be theological faith, for it would not necessarily imply belief in the veracity of God. We should not, in such case, necessarily believe God, either as the ultimate truth in being, in knowing, or in speaking, and therefore God would in no sense be the immediate object believed. At best, we should believe God only mediately ; as if in charity we loved our neighbour immediately, for his own sake, we could love God only mediately, that is, for the sake of our neighbour. We must, then, believe solely on the veracity of God ; for it is only by believing *on* the veracity of God, that, in believing, we believe it ; and it is only by believing it, that in believing we believe God as the immediate object of our belief ; and it is only by believing him as the immediate object of our belief, that our faith is *theological*.

But we cannot believe on the veracity of God, unless the authority that propounds the word be his authority ; for it is only on this condition that his veracity can be presented to the mind as the immediate object to be believed. Hence, theological faith is not elicitable, unless God himself propounds the word, and is not elicited unless elicited *because* it is his authority that propounds.

But faith is not only *theological* ; it is a theological *virtue*. As a virtue, it implies an act of the will in obedience to a command. Faith depends on two faculties of the soul, the will and the understanding. It cannot be elicited, unless the will command the intellect to assent to the truth revealed ; because the matter of faith is obscure, intrinsically invident, and does not of itself *compel* the intellectual assent.

But this act of the will, in order to be a *virtue*, must be not only a command to the intellect to believe, but also itself an act of obedience to the command of God ; and in order to be a *theological* virtue, it must be an act of obedience to the *supernatural* command of God. Consequently, to the integrity of faith it is essential that it be elicited not only by the veracity of God as the ground of assent, but also *in obedience to the authority of God commanding us to believe*. We must believe the word not simply for the sake of believing the truth, but also for the sake of obeying God.

But we cannot obey God, when and where his authority is not present to command ; and we do not elicit faith, when we do not believe in obedience to his authority ; for to believe on any other authority would not be to believe because God commands us to believe. Then faith is not elicitable, unless God himself propound the word by his own authority ; and is not elicited, in fact, unless elicited *in obedience* to his authority. Therefore, faith must be elicited on, and in obedience to, the authority of God propounding the word, or it is not faith.

But faith is a *theological* virtue, and therefore can be elicited only in obedience to the *supernatural* authority of God. Therefore, God must propound the word in a supernatural manner. But the faith to be elicited is not a private faith, but a public or catholic faith, as we have already proved. The authority of God which propounds it must, then, be not only supernatural, but also public or catholic. Faith, as a theological virtue, may be elicited by means of private revelation, and no doubt often was so elicited under the old dispensation, and, for aught we know, is so elicited by individuals under the new. But this, though *theological*, is not at the same time *theological* and *catholic*, and, moreover, it is miraculous, not in the ordinary course of God's gracious providence, and therefore is not the faith with which we are concerned. But God cannot propound his word with authority in a public or catholic manner, unless he express his authority in a public or catholic manner. Then he must express his authority through some publicly recognizable organ. The authority is not the authority of God as revealed in the natural order, and cognoscible by the natural light of reason ; but supernatural, and therefore can itself be known only as supernaturally revealed. If not revealed, or in some way made intellectually apprehensible as the authority of God, it cannot be obeyed as such. It can be revealed or made intellectually apprehensible only in two ways,

visibly or invisibly. If invisibly, it is not expressed in a public or catholic manner. Then it must be visibly. If visibly, then through the inspiration of private individuals, publicly accredited by miracles and appropriate seals of the divine commission, as under the old law, or by a body of pastors and teachers, that is, the Church, or *Ecclesia docens*, as Catholics hold to be the fact under the new law, or Christian dispensation. For the first mode of visibly expressing the authority of God the *Observer* and its friends will not contend; they must then admit the second, or deny the elicibility of the faith in question. Therefore, if faith be elicitable at all, it must be elicited in obedience to the authority of God propounding it through a body of pastors and teachers, or, briefly, in obedience to the authority of God expressed through the visible Church teaching. The visible Church teaching is the Roman Catholic Church, as proved in our former article. Therefore, faith is not elicitable without the Roman Catholic Church. Therefore, faith cannot be elicited by private illumination, but must be elicited in obedience to the Roman Catholic Church teaching, or not be the faith required.

But this conclusion does not rest solely on *a priori* reasoning. We establish it as a fact by the testimony of the Holy Scriptures.

1. In our article on *The Church against No-Church*, we proved that our blessed Saviour did institute the Church teaching, and commanded it to teach all nations even unto the consummation of the world. St. Matt. xxviii. 19, 20. But if he commands her to teach all nations, he commands all nations to believe what she teaches; for the authority to teach necessarily implies the corresponding duty to believe. Then we must believe what the Church teaches, or we do not believe what God commands us to believe; and *because* she teaches, or else in believing we do not obey God, since her authority is his. Also we must believe what she teaches because she teaches it; for, as a matter of fact, this is one of the things which she teaches, and therefore not to believe because she teaches would be to disobey the command of God to believe what she teaches. Therefore, we must believe the word as propounded and *because* propounded by the Church, or body of teachers Almighty God has commissioned as the visible organ of his authority, or not have faith.

2. Our blessed Lord says to those he authorizes to teach,

“He that heareth you heareth me ; and he that despiseth you despiseth me ; and he that despiseth me despiseth him that sent me.” St. Luke, x. 16. This proves that the authority of the teachers is the authority of God, or, in other words, that God does express his authority through a visible organ ; for, otherwise, to hear the teachers would not be to hear him. Then, 1. to believe in obedience to the teachers is to believe in obedience to God, — “he that heareth you heareth me.” Then, 2. not to believe in obedience to them is not to believe in obedience to God, — “he that despiseth you despiseth me ; and he that despiseth me despiseth him that sent me.” Therefore, we must believe in obedience to the teachers Almighty God has commissioned, or not believe because God commands us to believe ; and if we do not believe because he commands us to believe, we have not faith, that is, the public or catholic faith on which the question turns. We might easily multiply our proofs from the Holy Scriptures, but these are conclusive.

We have now proved that the method of eliciting faith in the word, actually adopted, is another than private illumination, that it is by a body of teachers, or the Church teaching ; and that faith must be elicited by means of, and in obedience to, the Church teaching, or not be faith. Therefore, private illumination is not and could not have been the method adopted. Appeal may be made to it, but it will not avail ; for such is the nature of the faith which we are commanded to have, that it cannot be elicited unless in obedience to a public or catholic authority propounding the word. We said all this in substance in our article on *The Church against No-Church* ; for we say, —

“But the revelation to which we are seeking a witness is not a new revelation, not a private revelation which Almighty God may see proper to make to individuals, but a revelation already made and propounded for the belief of all men. This is the revelation to be established ; and since your private revelation does not establish this, or if so, only by superseding it and rendering it of no value (for it can prove it even to the individual only by its being seen to be identical with what the individual receives without it), it evidently cannot be the witness we are in pursuit of. And this is the common answer to the alleged private illumination, whatever its form. It is valid only within the bosom of the individual, and can be alleged in support of no common or public faith ; therefore can be no witness in any disputed case. It may be a private benefit, or it may not be. It is a matter not to be spoken of, and a fact never to be used,

when the question concerns any thing but the individual himself. *But the faith we are required to have is a faith propounded to all men, a public faith, which must be sustained by public evidence.*" — Vol. II., p. 173.

The *Observer* should have denied in the outset our assumption, that the faith we are required to have is a public or catholic faith ; or, if not prepared to do this, which, of course, it was not, it should have shown that a private witness may be competent authority for a public or catholic faith. For, till the editor had shown this, and relieved the private witness of the charge we brought against it, private illumination stood convicted of incompetency, and he had no right to introduce it.

But, though what we have said is conclusive against the theory of private inspiration, a theory which a professed Churchman should both fear and be ashamed to urge, — there is still one other consideration, of a more practical character, to which we beg leave to call the attention of the *Observer*. We called its attention to it in our former reply ; but, as it has the happy faculty of overlooking the points in an opponent's argument which are somewhat difficult to refute, we must take the liberty of calling its attention to it again. The editor must be aware that he is not the only one who appeals to private inspiration. Almost every sectary, from Montanus down to the Mormon impostor, not overlooking Luther, Zwingle, Calvin, the Anabaptists, Quakers, Puritans, and Methodists, makes precisely the same appeal. Now, it is certain that some of the sectaries who make this appeal are mistaken, for some of them teach and have taught doctrines contradictory to those taught by others, and doctrines rash, scandalous, and pernicious, — at war with common decency, social order, and domestic peace and virtue. It is necessary, then, to observe the admonition of the holy Apostle : — "Dearly beloved, believe not every spirit, but try the spirits, whether they be of God ; because many false prophets are gone out into the world." — 1 St. John, iv. 1.

But we cannot try the spirits, unless we have some criterion by which to try them. This criterion cannot be the private inspiration, the "internal monitor," as the *Observer* calls it ; because that is what is to be tried, and it would be absurd to talk of trying a spirit by itself. The criterion must be independent of the inward witness, and distinct from it, — a standard or measure by which it may itself be tested or measured. What, then, is this criterion by which we may try the spirits,

and know whether they are of God, or whether they are spirits of error? The answer is at hand. "We are of God. He that knoweth God *heareth us*; and he that is not of God heareth not us. By this we know the spirit of truth and the spirit of error."—1 St. John, iv. 6. The test of the spirit is in the fact that it does or does not *hear* the Apostles. If it hear them, it is of God; if it hear not them, it is a spirit of error. The editor of the *Observer*, then, must prove that he hears the Apostles, before he can have the right to assume that his internal monitor is of God; and if he does not hear them, we have the right to tell him that it is *not* of God, but an error, a delusion.

But how will our friend of the *Observer* prove that he hears the Apostles? Will he answer, as we have often been answered by persons who take his ground, that he hears the Apostles because he holds the Apostolic faith? To hold the Apostolic faith is the same thing as to hear the Apostles. This, then, would be to prove *idem per idem*, which is not allowable. Will he allege that he hears the Apostles, because he holds the faith as contained in the Holy Scriptures? This would be to attempt again to prove *idem per idem*; for, on the assumption, which he must make, that the Scriptures contain the whole revealed word, the faith as contained in them is the same thing as the Apostolic faith, and to hold it is the same thing as to hear the Apostles. But how will he prove that he holds the faith as contained in the Holy Scriptures? By the internal monitor? This is what he says, but this would be to reason in a *vicious* circle; for it would assume the monitor to prove the faith and the faith to prove the monitor. How, then, will he prove that he hears the Apostles?

This is conclusive. The editor of the *Observer* makes, in his reply to us, the internal monitor the witness to the fact of revelation; that is, he proves his doctrine by his private inspiration,—"God speaking audibly by his word to the ear, or silently by his spirit in the heart." But the holy Apostle tells him that he must prove his inspiration by his doctrine, for, if he have not the true doctrine, that is, if he hears not the Apostles, his inspiration is not of God, but is the spirit of error. He and the beloved Apostle of our blessed Lord are diametrically opposed, and, if we are to take the Apostle's authority in preference to his, it must be conceded that the doctrine is not and cannot be proved by the internal monitor.

Let not the editor of the *Observer* reply to us again, that it

is not necessary to prove the witness, that is, the internal monitor. He must prove it, not for others only, but for himself; for, according to the blessed Apostle, he must hear the Apostles, or his internal monitor is of no authority, but is a delusion, the spirit of error. Till he proves it to be of God from the fact that he hears the Apostles, he is bound to regard it as a false witness, or at least a witness not competent to testify. He must, then, prove his inspiration, establish the fact that his witness is of God. How, we ask again, will he do it?

Will he shift his ground, and say that he is in the communion of the Apostolic Church, and hears the Apostles because he hears their legitimate successors, who continue their authority and doctrine? This would be a good answer in our mouth, but not in his; for it abandons private inspiration as the witness to the fact of revelation, and assumes with us the Catholic Church. If he take this ground, he makes communion the test of doctrine, and doctrine the test of the internal monitor, and by so doing condemns himself and the whole Protestant world; he yields the whole principle in debate, and leaves to be settled between us only the simple question of fact, — whether his church or ours be the Apostolic Church; and that his is the Apostolic Church we deny, and he must be a bold man to assert; for, even assuming its identity with the Anglican, which may be questioned, it is obviously schismatic and heretical, and withal only about three hundred years old, as he is well aware, and as we have proved unanswerably, in our essay in reply to the *New York Churchman*, in our Review for October, 1844, entitled, *The Anglican Church Schismatic*; as also in the essay on *The Church against No-Church*, in the number for April last. The editor of the *Observer* is therefore precluded by his own position, by the position of his church, and the very doctrine of private illumination for which he contends, from assuming Catholic ground; and yet it is only by assuming Catholic ground that he can prove his right to follow his internal monitor. Here is the difficulty in which he is placed. He assumes that the inward monitor is its own witness and authority, and therefore may be taken as the witness to the fact of revelation, the authority for saying what is or is not the revelation or word of God. The spirit, he assumes, witnesseth itself, and has no need to be tested by a criterion or standard distinct from itself. Here is his fundamental error, and that of all who contend for either private reason or private inspiration as the witness to the fact of revelation. But, according to the blessed Apostle,

they must prove the spirit by the doctrine, and not the doctrine by the spirit. Hence, no private spirit is of any authority, even to the individual who professes to have it, unless it heareth the Apostles ; and, as we have seen, the proof that it heareth the Apostles is that it gathereth to the Apostolic communion. Hence, we are to take for our principle, The church proves the doctrine, the doctrine the private spirit ; not the private spirit proves the doctrine, and the doctrine the church or communion.

But it is due to the *Observer* to say that it has attempted to answer, in part, one or two of the objections we urged against its private witness. We objected, If private illumination be the witness to the fact of revelation, those not privately illuminated have not the evidence necessary to warrant faith in the revelation. But no blame can attach to a man for not believing what is not sufficiently evidenced to warrant belief. Therefore, those not privately illuminated are not to blame for not believing the revelation Almighty God has made. But whoever does not believe is to blame, for unbelief is admitted to be not merely an effect of sin, but a sin itself. Therefore, there must be, independent of private illumination, sufficient motives of credibility to warrant belief. To the argument the editor does not reply ; he merely alleges, that, if any are not privately illuminated, " the fault is their own. All may have the promptings of the Spirit, if they will. The grace of God which bringeth salvation hath appeared to *all* men teaching," &c. — p. 327. As to the soundness of our own argument, we will here raise no question ; it will suffice to show that the editor of the *Observer* has not refuted it. The position, that it is their own fault if not privately illuminated, is not proved. The illumination is a free gift, not dependent on our will, nor meritable by us. It is not due us in the order of nature, as something which God in our nature promises us. It must, then, be proved that Almighty God has promised it in the order of grace to all who comply with the conditions of its reception which he has instituted ; or we can have no more right to say that it is our own fault if we have it not, than we should have to say it was the fault of the primitive believers that they were not all inspired as apostles and evangelists. But this the editor does not prove.

The fact alleged, that all may have " the promptings of the Spirit, if they will," if admitted, does not prove the assertion ;

for there is a wide disparity between "the promptings of the Spirit" and the private illumination, which is a re-revelation of the whole word of God, and by which one is able to say, infallibly, what is or is not the word of God originally revealed. To prompt is not to illumine, but simply to incite or move to action. But, in point of fact, the promptings of the Spirit are not contingent on our will; for they must precede the motion of the will as its necessary conditions. The Spirit does not prompt us because we will that it should prompt us, nor because we will what is pleasing to God; but it prompts and assists us, that we may will what is pleasing to God. To deny this would be to fall into the Pelagian heresy.

The text quoted from St. Paul, Tit. ii. 11, 12, if it proves any thing to the purpose, proves too much. If the editor understands by the word *grace* the private illumination in question, — which, by the way, is not its meaning, — and relies on the fact that it is asserted to have appeared unto *all* men, it proves that all are specially and infallibly inspired, which obviously is not the fact, as he himself admits; for, if it were, no man could err as to what is and what is not the word to be believed. But, assuming that he so intends to understand the text, we demand his authority for saying that the *grace* spoken of is the private illumination in question. Will he allege the fact, that the grace is said to be *teaching*, &c.? This will not avail; because he must prove what it teaches is the word of God we are commanded to believe. But this the text itself does not assert. The text simply asserts that "the grace of God our Saviour hath appeared to all men, instructing us, that, renouncing impiety and worldly desires, we should live soberly, piously, and justly in this present world," — that is, certain practical duties which presuppose a knowledge of the faith, as already possessed. But waive this. The grace teaches — how? Through the body of pastors and teachers? Then the text makes for us. By private illumination? Where are the proofs?

We objected, again, to the private witness, that, if this were the witness, the fact whether any one embraces the faith or not could never be known out of the bosom of the individual. The *Observer* replies, that it is not necessary that it should be. If there is to be a public faith, it is necessary, for reasons already assigned; and, if we may believe the blessed Apostle, according to the order actually adopted, it is necessary to be known, even if there is to be only a private faith; because private faith must find its authority in the public faith.

The *Observer* asks, p. 327, "How can it be known whether this or that individual will finally be saved?" Whether this or that individual will finally be saved is not necessary to be known; because the fact whether he will or not is not a fact all men are required to believe, as an article of faith. The sneer, that "the Romish Church may devise arbitrary rules by which it may pretend to know who are sound in the faith and who are not, who are going to heaven and who to hell" (p. 328), may do for a writer who feels himself as little bound, in an argument, to tell the truth as to observe the rules of logic; but its force is all in its malice. The Catholic Church claims to be able to say what is sound faith, but not who actually is sound in the faith, any farther than the internal faith is manifested by the external profession and conduct. She claims to be able to say what one must do in order to be saved; but not whether this or that individual will or will not be saved. The doctrine the editor would charge upon the Church belongs to his own Evangelical school. We do not, as Catholics, know whether we deserve love or hatred. We know if we keep the commandments we shall enter into life, and that we can keep them if we will; but whether we do keep them in the sense demanded, or whether we shall persevere unto the end in keeping them, we know not, and cannot know unless by a special revelation. We hope, but take heed lest we fall.

But, if we object to the *Observer's* doctrine of private illumination, we by no means pretend that divine grace even to enlighten the understanding is not essential to the elicitation of faith. Faith is a theological virtue, and no theological virtue is possible by mere natural force. Faith demands the supernatural elevation of the subject as well as the supernatural revelation of the object. It would demand this, even if we were in the integrity of nature, and had suffered no damage from sin. It demands it, then, *a fortiori*, in our actual state; for, in consequence of sin, our will is turned away from God, and our understanding is darkened. We do not love the truth; we are not able to perceive and appreciate the motives of credibility. We have ears, but we hear not; hearts, but we understand not. Let no man dream that by mere natural force, by mere intellectual acuteness, strength, or effort, he can elicit an act of faith. Faith is the gift of God. But what is termed the grace of faith is not an inward revelation of the word, is not needed to propound the word, to supply the defect of evidence, or to

strengthen, in themselves considered, the motives of credibility ; but to incline the will to the truth, and to strengthen the intellect, to remove the scales which blind the eyes of the mind, so as to enable it to see and appreciate the motives of credibility which are already furnished, and which are amply sufficient to warrant the most undoubting belief. These motives are in themselves sufficient to meet the demands of reason, and ought to command our assent, and we have no excuse for not yielding it. When we do not yield it, the fault is ours ; not in the defect of evidence, but in the perversity of our will, which hinders the grace of God from flowing into the understanding, and producing that state of mind in which to believe is easy, and without which to believe is morally impossible. But this gracious assistance, which inclines the will and elevates the understanding, is something very different from the private inspiration or illumination against which we have reasoned. The one merely puts us in the condition to believe a revelation already made and sufficiently accredited ; the other is a new revelation, superseding the external revelation, the external evidence which accredits it, and becoming itself both the word to be believed and the authority on which it is to be believed. The grace we allege to be necessary is everywhere promised us in the Holy Scriptures ; the private illumination we reject is nowhere promised us, and we have no reason to expect it.

We have now replied to all that the editor of the *Observer* has suggested, or that is implied in his suggestions, which has or can have any bearing on the question at issue. We have replied fairly and fully, because we have wished not merely to refute him, but to discuss the general subject, and place it in its true light before our readers. We shall expect a fair and logical reply to what we have said ; and if the editor of the *Observer* do not give a fair and logical reply, we shall not hold ourselves bound to take any notice of what he may allege. It becomes neither him nor us to discuss any subject unfairly, for neither of us can, we should hope, feel any complacency in a victory won at the expense of candor or of truth.

As to the portion of the *Observer's* article which attacks the Catholic Church, since it has no bearing on the real question at issue, we do not hold ourselves bound by the rules of logic to reply to it. The question at issue, we have shown, is not what is possible *with* the Roman Catholic Church, but what is possible *without* it. Should the editor of the *Observer* prove

that faith is not elicitable by means of the Roman Catholic Church, he would not advance a single step in his argument ; he would be no nearer proving that faith can be elicited without it, than when he commenced. To follow him in his attacks on the Church would only be giving him a chance to change the issue, and make the question turn on the merits of Catholicity, and not on the merits of Protestantism, to which we will neither contribute nor consent. He promised to refute our argument, and we hold him to his promise. If he succeeds in proving that he can have the faith required without the Catholic Church, he proves all that it is necessary to prove in order to refute us. If he does not prove this, no matter what else he proves, he does not refute us. When he shall admit that he cannot prove this, and frankly abandon his Protestantism, we will meet all the difficulties he can allege in the way of eliciting faith by means of the Roman Catholic Church. But till then, he has no right to call upon us, nor are we bound by the nature of the question at issue to meet them.

Were it not that we will not consent to divert the discussion from the point we have made, we could easily remove all the difficulties the editor of the *Observer* has suggested ; for they are all founded in mistake as to the actual facts of ecclesiastical history, or misapprehension of Catholic faith and theology. When he speaks of the number of books which a Catholic must read in order to ascertain what he is to believe, he denies the distinction between faith and theology to which we called his attention, and overlooks the distinction between explicit faith and implicit faith, which was recognized in our definition of faith, and which he will find explained in the early part of our present article. The whole Catholic faith may be found in the catechism, and may be learned without any book at all ; for the Catholic Church does not, like Protestantism, make the knowledge of letters the condition *sine qua non* of salvation. Our friend forgot himself, and took up against his own side. It is not necessary to salvation that we believe *explicitly* all the truths Almighty God has revealed, but that we believe them *explicitly* or *implicitly*. He who believes the Church is from God and infallible, and who is in the disposition of mind and heart to believe whatever she proposes, believes, implicitly at least, the whole revelation of God, and in its "exact sense" ; for, if infallible, the Church can propose it in no other than its exact sense, as "it lies in the mind of the Spirit." *

* To believe something explicitly is to believe it under the proper

The *Observer* asserted that the articles of faith were expressed in the Holy Scriptures in propositions "as clear and as intelligible as language can make them." We denied this, and alleged in support of our denial that the articles of faith are more clearly and definitely expressed in the creed and decisions of the Church, which is evident from the fact that men perpetually dispute as to their meaning as expressed in the Holy Scriptures, while they do not dispute as to their meaning as expressed in the creeds and decisions of the Church. The editor of the *Observer* meets the argument by alleging that there are disputes among Catholics as well as among Protestants. But even if this were true, our argument might still be sound; for it was urged only to prove that the faith as expressed in the Holy Scriptures is not expressed in propositions as clear and as intelligible as language can make them, — which is not disproved by proving that there are disputes among Catholics, but only by proving that these disputes are equal to the disputes among Protestants, and extend to as many

and particular terms under which it is proposed to us. Thus, he, who believes the Son of God assumed human nature and is God and man, believes explicitly the mystery of the Incarnation; he who believes the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are one God and three persons, believes explicitly the mystery of the Trinity. But to believe something *implicitly* is to believe it in another; either as in a more general principle in which it is contained, or as in the doctrine of the teacher to which it pertains, or as in a shadow or figure, which is known to have significance, although the thing signified is not clearly apprehended. But it must not be inferred from any thing in the text, that belief in this last sense is the only faith that is of necessity as the medium of salvation. It is necessary to believe *explicitly* God as the author of the order of grace, that he will reward the just with beatitude and will punish the wicked, according to the words of the blessed apostle, Heb. xi. 6. "He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that seek him." Also, as Catholic doctors in general teach, it is necessary to believe explicitly the mysteries of the Incarnation and of the Trinity, for, according to the words of our Blessed Saviour in St. Mark, xvi. 16, "He that believeth not (that is, believeth not the Gospel) shall be condemned"; and in St. John, xiv. 1, "Ye believe in God; believe also in me"; iii. 36, "He that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him"; and, according to the words of St. Peter, Acts iv. 12, "Nor is there salvation in any other. For there is no other name under heaven given to men whereby we must be saved." From these and many other texts which might be adduced, it is evident that explicit faith in the principal or primary doctrine is necessary as the medium of salvation. All we would say is, that the number of articles necessary to be believed with *explicit* faith is very few, and therefore the necessity, save when it concerns establishing truth or overthrowing error, of the long study the *Observer* alleges, does not exist.

points of faith ;— a fact the *Observer* has not proved, and cannot prove. But there are no disputes among Catholics that turn on the meaning of an article of faith. There are disputes among Catholics, we admit, but they are disputes concerning matters which are not of faith, which the Church has not decided. Not one of the instances the *Observer* cites is a dispute concerning an article of faith, but all are disputes on questions on which there is no decision of the Church, or which are not covered by her decisions. The dispute between the Gallicans and Ultramontanes is not, as it supposes, a dispute as to the meaning of a canon. Both parties admit the canon of the Council of Florence, which the editor quotes ; both parties agree as to its meaning ; and dispute only as to questions it does not cover. The question as to the temporal authority or supremacy of the Holy Father is a dispute among doctors, and has nothing to do with faith at all ; *for no article of faith, no decision of the Church, claims temporal supremacy or authority for the successor of St. Peter.* The temporal authority which was possessed by the popes was not possessed by virtue of their office as visible head of the Church, but, if one may so speak, by virtue of what was the common law of Europe ;— because that authority was an integral part of the political order which then obtained. That order has now passed away, and the office which for many ages was filled by the ecclesiastical power is now filled by the money power ; and the part of mediators between the temporal princes, which was played by the Gregories, the Innocents, the Bonifaces, is now played by the Barings, Rothschilds, and Biddles ; whether for the better or for the worse it is not for us to say.

The *Observer* is quite mistaken in saying, that in reference to these disputes we cannot avail ourselves of the distinction between faith and opinion. “ This,” it says, “ is a valid plea for Protestants, but not for Romanists. *We* say that agreement in great fundamental truths is necessary ; and we say, further, that in these vital truths there is between all *orthodox* Protestants a substantial agreement, while they disagree only on those minor topics which are matters of opinion only. But this distinction between faith and opinion, whoever else it may serve, can avail Mr. Brownson nothing ; for he avers that it is necessary to believe the whole revelation as the condition *sine qua non* of salvation, that faith consists in believing *all* the truths God has revealed.” — pp. 332, 333. The distinction between faith and opinion we can avail ourselves of, but not of

such a distinction as the *Observer* points out. The distinction we contend for is a distinction between what is revealed and what is not revealed. What is revealed we hold to be of faith ; what is not revealed is matter of science or of opinion. We can, then, very consistently contend that the whole revelation must be believed, and yet tolerate differences on matters of opinion. But the distinction the *Observer* speaks of is a distinction *in the revealed word itself*, and presupposes one part of revelation is of faith, and another part of minor importance, a matter of opinion only. Of this distinction we do not wish to avail ourselves, for we do not admit that any part of God's word is a matter of opinion only ; and we would thank the *Observer* to tell us by what authority it can say that any thing God has revealed may be rightfully treated as a matter of opinion.

The *Observer* makes it a sin in us, that "opinion has no place in" our "creed." Is that which is held as *opinion* held as one's *creed* ? What is the meaning, in theological language, of *credo* ? If one admits opinion into his creed, what is his creed but an opinion ? The editor of the *Observer* distinguishes between faith and opinion. Does he include in his *creed* any thing not of faith ? Of course not. Why, then, complain of us for not admitting opinion into ours ? But by what authority does he distinguish in God's word what is necessary to be believed, and what is not, and include the former in his creed, and exclude the latter from it ?

The *Observer* says, in these vital truths there is a substantial agreement between all *orthodox* Protestants. This is saying, in other words, that all who do not substantially differ do substantially agree ! Who are *orthodox* Protestants, and by what authority can Protestants say who are or are not orthodox ? The only answer they have to the question, what is orthodoxy and what heterodoxy, is that given by the Protestant student : — "Orthodoxy is *my* doxy, heterodoxy is *your* doxy." Protestants are all orthodox, each in his own estimation ; all heterodox in the estimation of each other. The editor of the *Episcopal Observer*, notwithstanding his airs, has no more right to call himself orthodox than the editors of the *Christian Examiner*, between whom and himself there is a fundamental difference, have to call themselves orthodox. Of all pitiable sights, the Protestant talking of orthodoxy is the pitiablest. The editor of the *Observer* can claim to be less heterodox than his Unitarian brethren, only because he departs

less from the Catholic faith ; and the moment he alleges this, he recognizes the authority of the Catholic Church, which it is his main business to calumniate. It is worthy of note, that Protestants in general feel themselves sound in the faith just in proportion as they find themselves agreeing with the Catholic Church.

The editor of the *Observer* would do well, when he wishes to attack the Church on historical grounds, to be careful to draw his history from authentic sources. If he relies on such authors as Bishop Hopkins, or any authors his own church can furnish, he will be betrayed into many ridiculous mistakes. These Anglican ecclesiastical historians are in all cases unsafe guides, and in no instance, even in matters comparatively indifferent, have we found them worthy of reliance. The position of their pretended church is such that it is not safe for them either to see or to tell the truth.

The editor of the *Observer* would also do well, before attempting to pit council against council, to ascertain what is a council, and that the Catholic predicates infallibility of no council not held to be œcumenical, and of no acts of an œcumenical council not approved by the sovereign Pontiff. Had he known this, he would not have spoken of the *second* council of Ephesus, nor have told us that "the second council of Ephesus, held in 449, condemned Flavianus and sent him into banishment for rejecting the heresy of Eutyches ; and the council of Chalcedon, convened two years after, condemned and banished Dioscorus for maintaining the heresy discarded by Flavianus." — p. 330. For there was no *second* council of Ephesus. The only council of Ephesus was held in 431, before Eutyches had even broached his heresy. Nor was Flavian ever condemned by any council. The mistake of the learned editor arose, probably, from his confounding an illegal and tumultuous assembly, commonly known in history as the Ephesian *Latrocinium*, with an œcumenical council, which it was not, and was never admitted to be. This shows the necessity of studying ecclesiastical history, before attempting to write it.

Protestants frequently allege that council has contradicted council, council has contradicted Pope, and Pope has contradicted Pope and council ; but no instance of such contradiction ever has been or ever can be adduced, for no such instances exist. The instances commonly adduced are all founded in mistake, and are as easily answered as that about Flavianus and Dioscorus. The Protestant either calls that a council

which was not a council, or he mistakes the real question decided, or the actual purport of the decision, in consequence of his general ignorance of Catholic theology and history.

But, as we have intimated, we have no intention of following the *Observer* through his attack on the Church. If he concedes his inability to maintain his own thesis, we will then meet him, or any one else, on the merits of Catholicity. But, till then, we will not consent to be diverted from the main issue we have raised.

In conclusion, we will say, our argument has run out to a greater length than we intended, and to a greater length than the feeble arguments, if arguments they can be called, of the *Observer* really warranted; but we make no apology to our readers, for we have aimed to give to our remarks a general character, and a fair, full, and final discussion of that branch of the subject to which we have in the main confined ourselves, rather than to effect the comparatively insignificant purpose of refuting the editor of the *Episcopal Observer*.

ART. II. — *National Greatness.*

NATIONAL greatness is at all times and in all countries a subject of very deep interest, and one on which it is highly dangerous to entertain false or erroneous views. It is especially so for the American people; because we have founded a government which rests on popular opinion, and must follow its direction; and because we entertain very lofty notions of the greatness to which we have already attained, and are disposed to indulge in no little patriotic pride when contemplating what we have done since we became an independent nation, and looking forward to what we are likely to do hereafter.

It is true, that now and then is heard a discordant note in the general harmony of self-glorification; it is true, that here and there a disappointed, discontented, perhaps ascetic voice, is heard intimating that all is not gold that glisters, that the sparkling eye and blooming cheek do not always indicate sound health and promise long life, and that beneath the festive robes and wreaths of flowers may often, as at Egyptian feasts, be detected the ghastly and grinning features of death; but, in

general, the great mass of us, from New England's loftiest statesman down to the pettiest Fourth of July orator, loudly applaud ourselves for what we have done, are sure that we have chosen the right path, that we surpass in true wisdom all the nations which have been or now are, and that nothing remains for us but to keep on in the way we have thus far followed, and indulge the most glorious and thrilling anticipations of future greatness and renown.

And have we not the right to do so? We are merely of yesterday; and yet, what have we not done! We have felled the primitive forests, and planted the rose in the wilderness; we have erected the thronged city, the populous town, the thriving village, where within the memory of the middle-aged man prowled the beast of prey, or curled the smoke of the wigwam. We have intersected a continent with our canals and railways; we have whitened every ocean with our sails, and filled every port with our ships; and are rivalling, in the quality, variety, and extent of our manufactures, the more renowned industrial nations of the globe. Our whole population is employed. The hammer of industry rings from morning till night, till far into the night, and we seem to have the Midas gift of turning whatever we touch into gold. Nor have we stopped here. We have dotted the land all over with meetinghouses, schoolhouses, academies, colleges, and universities, and our whole population goes to school. We have an active press, throwing off daily its million of sheets for our instruction or amusement. We have hospitals, asylums, retreats for the insane, the blind, the deaf, the dumb; poor-houses for vagrants and paupers; gaols and penitentiaries for the vicious and criminal. Over all we have a free, pure, economical, and effective government, admirably reconciling the authority of the state with the freedom of the subject; and withal the priceless blessings of religious liberty, permitting sects the most opposed one to the other to meet as brothers, leaving every man free to worship God, — or not to worship him, — according to the dictates of his own conscience. Have we not a right, then, to applaud ourselves? Are we not, in fact, a great people? And is not this a great country?

So most of us think, feel, say; and woe to him who should dare think, feel, or say otherwise. And yet, it may be worth our while to subject this estimate which we form of ourselves to a more rigid examination than we seem to have done. If it be well founded, the examination will confirm it; if not well founded,

the examination will do no harm, — for few of us are prepared to adopt a conclusion unfavorable to national pride and vanity.

That this is a great country, if we speak of the territory, is very true, though not much greater than China, and far less than Russia, and withal a great part of it as yet uncultivated, and no little of it even untrodden by civilized man. But whether we are a great people or not, or whether we have any special ground of self-adulation, is another and a different question ; and a question which will be variously answered, according to the views which are taken of what constitutes true national greatness. Our judgments of the comparative greatness of different nations depend entirely on the standard of greatness we adopt, and by which we judge them. We call a people great or small in proportion as they do or do not conform to our standard of greatness. Vary the standard, and we vary our judgment. The people we called great, when judged by one standard, we may call not great, if judged by a different standard. All, therefore, depends on the standard we adopt. Consequently, in order to determine whether we are really a great people or not, we must first determine what is the true standard of national greatness.

What, then, is true national greatness ? We answer, that nation is greatest in which man may most easily and effectually fulfil the true and proper end of man. The nation, under the point of view we here consider the subject, is in the people. Its greatness must, then, be in the greatness of the people. The people are a collection or aggregation of individuals, and their greatness taken collectively is simply their greatness taken individually. Consequently, the greatness of a nation is the greatness of the individuals that compose it. The question of national greatness resolves itself, therefore, into the question of individual greatness. The greatness of the individual consists in his fulfilling the great ends of his existence, the ends for which Almighty God made him and placed him here. No man is truly great who neglects life's great ends, nor can one be said in truth to approach greatness any farther than he fulfils them.

In order, then, to determine in what true national greatness consists, we must determine in what consists true individual greatness ; and in order to determine in what true individual greatness consists, we must determine what is the true end of man ; that is, what is the end to which Almighty God has appointed man, and which he is while here to labor to secure. What, then, is the end of man ? For what has our Maker

placed us here ? To what has he bidden us aspire ? Were we placed here merely to be born and to die, — to live for a moment, continue our species, toil, suffer, drop into the grave to rot, and be no more for ever ? If this be our end, true greatness will consist in living for this life only, and in being great in that which pertains to this life. The greatest man will be he who succeeds best in amassing the goods of this world, in securing its honors and luxuries, or simply in multiplying for himself the means of sensual enjoyment. In a word, the greatest man will be he who most abounds in wealth and luxury.

We mean not to say, that, in point of fact, wealth and luxury, worldly honors and sensual gratifications, are the chief goods of even this life ; but simply that they would be, if this were our only life, if our destiny were a destiny to be accomplished in this world. It is because this world is not our home, because we are merely travellers through it, and our destination is a world beyond it, that the life of justice and sanctity yields us even here our truest and most substantial pleasure. But confine man to this life, let it be true that he has no destiny beyond it, and nothing could, relatively to him, be called great or good, not included under the heads of wealth and luxury. Nothing could be counted or conceived of as of the least value to him that does not directly or indirectly minister to his sensual enjoyment. No infidel moralist has ever been able, without going out of his own system, or want of system, to conceive of any thing higher, nobler, more valuable, than sensual pleasure.

But this life is not our only life, and our destiny is not accomplished here. The grave is not our final doom ; this world is not our home ; we were not created for this world alone ; and there is for us a life beyond this life. But even this, if we stop with it, does not answer our question. We may conceive of a future life as the simple continuation of our present natural life, and such the future life is conceived to be by not a few among us, who nevertheless flatter themselves that they are firm believers in the life and immortality brought to light through the Gospel. Every being may be said to have a natural destiny or end, which its nature is fitted and intended to gain. The Creator, in creating a being with a given nature, has given that being a pledge of the means and conditions of fulfilling it, of attaining to its natural end. Man has evidently been created with a nature that does not and cannot find its complete fulfilment in this life. He has a natural capacity for more than is

actually attainable here. In this capacity he has the promise or pledge of his Maker that he shall live again. The promises of God cannot fail. Man therefore must and will live again. But this is only the pledge, so to speak, of a natural immortality, and reveals to us only a natural destiny. It is only a continuation of our natural life in another world. The end we are to labor for, and the means we are to adopt to gain it, must be precisely what they would be in case our life were to terminate at the grave. Our future life being still a natural life, what is wisest and best for that portion we are now living would be wisest and best for that portion we are hereafter to live. Hence, what is wisest and best for time would be wisest and best for eternity.

Hence it is that we find so many who, though professing belief in a future life, judge all things as if this life were our only life. They look to the future life only as the continuation of the present, and expect from it only the completion of their natural destiny. They agree in all their moral judgments, in all their estimates of the worth of things or of actions, with those who believe in no future life at all. They profess to hope for a future life, but live only for time; because their future life is to be only a continuation of time. Hence they say, as we ourselves were for years accustomed to say, He who lives wisely for time lives wisely for eternity; create a heaven here, and you will have done your best to secure your title to a heaven hereafter.

Hence it is that the morality of many who profess to be Christians is the same which is adopted and defended by infidels. This is so obviously the case, that we not unfrequently find men who call themselves Christians commending downright unbelievers in Christianity as good moral men, and who see no reason why the morality of the infidel should not be the same in kind as the morality of the Christian. Hence it is supposed that morality may be taught in our schools, without teaching any peculiar or distinctive doctrine of Christianity. Morality, we are told, is independent of religion, and not a few regard it as sufficient without religion. So common has this mode of thinking and speaking become amongst us, that we heard the other day a tolerably intelligent Catholic, who would by no means admit himself to be deficient in the understanding or practice of his Catholic duties, say, that, if a man were only a good moral man, he did not care what was his distinctive religious belief. Many who go farther, and contend that

religion is necessary to morality, contend for its necessity only as a sort of police establishment. It is necessary, because the natural sanctions of the moral law are not quite sufficient to secure obedience, and religion must be called in by its hopes and fears to strengthen them.

Now all this is perfectly consistent and right, if it be true that man has only a natural destiny. We ought, in such a case, to judge all things which concern us precisely as if this were our only life. Religion could be of no value farther than it strengthened the police, kept people from picking one another's pockets or cutting one another's throats. But man's destiny is not natural, but supernatural. Almighty God created him with a specific nature, but not for an end in the order of that nature, or to be attained by its simple fulfilment. He created him to his own image and likeness, but appointed him to a supernatural destiny, — to an end above what is attainable by the fulfilment of his nature, — to an end not promised in his nature, and which is not bestowed as the reward of fulfilling it. This end is to know and love God; but in a sense far higher than we can know and love him by our natural powers, and as he is now beheld through a glass darkly, or seen dimly through the medium of his works, as we see the cause in the effect. It is to see him face to face, and to know and love him with a knowledge and love the same in kind, though not in degree, with which God knows and loves himself; — this is the end for which man was intended, and which it is made his duty and his high privilege to seek. But this end surpasses the utmost capacity of our nature, and requires not only a supernatural revelation of God, but the supernatural elevation of our nature itself. It consists in our being made partakers of the divine nature in an ineffable sense, and in a sense above that in which we partake of it in being created after the image and likeness of God. Hence, St. Peter says, "By whom [Jesus Christ] he hath given us very great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of his divine nature." — 2 St. Pet. i. 4. So also St. John: — "We are now the sons of God, and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know, that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him; because *we shall see him as he is.*" — 1 St. John, iii. 2.

This fact in these times is overlooked. Men have wished to rationalize the Gospel, to find a philosophic basis for the mysteries of faith. In attempting this, they have labored to bring the whole of divine revelation within the domain of rea-

son, and have been led to exclude, as no part of it, whatever they found themselves unable to bring within that domain. Reason is necessarily restricted to the order of nature, and can in no instance, of itself, go out of that order. Hence, revelation has come very widely to be regarded as only a republication of the natural law, as at best only a running commentary on it, designed simply to explain the natural order, and not to reveal anything above it. Men who claim to be Christians, and even ministers of the Gospel, everywhere abound, who have no faith in the supernatural order, scarcely a conception of it. We spent nearly two hours the other day trying to enable a Protestant minister, and he by no means a weak or ignorant one, even to conceive of the supernatural; but in vain. So perverted had his mind become by the false theologies of modern times, that he could attach no meaning to the assertion, "There is a supernatural order." He could use the word *supernatural*, but it had no meaning for his mind not within the order of nature. Thousands are in the same sad condition. To them nature is all, and all is nature. Indeed, the word nature itself has no definite meaning for them. If a man by a word raise the dead, it is natural; if Moses smite the rock and living waters gush forth, it is natural, — all by a natural power, a natural law. Travelling in the same direction, they lose themselves in a wilderness of absurdities. Natural laws cease to be laws imposed on nature, laws she must obey, and from which she cannot withdraw herself, and become forces, agents, creators. It is not strange, then, that they lose sight of the supernatural destiny of man, and look only for a natural destiny, to be obtained not as a reward for obedience to grace, but as the natural consequence of the cultivation or development of our natural powers. Read the writings of the celebrated Dr. Channing, or of the school which he founded or to which he was attached, and you shall never find a single recognition of the supernatural order, properly so called, — any allusion to a supernatural destiny. The highest end you will find presented is that to which we may attain by the unfolding of our higher nature, of our natural sentiments of love and reverence. The school goes so far as to contend that our nature is susceptible of an unbounded good, and that our natural sentiments of love and reverence are capable of an infinite expansion. Yet these are *rational* Christians, and they boast of their reason! They talk of the absurdities of Catholic theology, and see no absurdity in suppos-

ing that a finite nature may be infinitely expanded, or that a nature can be something more than it is without any thing *supernatural*.

But this by the way. The true end for which man is to live is the supernatural end to which we are appointed, the beatitude which God hath promised to all that love and serve him here. His true end is not the fulfilment of nature, but what the Sacred Scriptures term "eternal life"; and "This is life eternal, that they may know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." — St. John, xvii. 3. We cannot know God, without loving him. Hence we say, the end of man is to know and love God. But to know him intuitively, as he knows himself; for we are to see him as he is, — not as he appears through the medium of his works, but as he is in himself. We cannot thus know him naturally, for thus to know him exceeds the power of the highest possible created intelligence. We must be *like him*, before we can see him as he is, — be made, in a supernatural sense, partakers of his divine nature. To know him intuitively as he is in himself is, however, the glorious destiny to which we are appointed, and to which we may attain, if we will. A more glorious destiny we cannot desire. In it we possess God himself, who is the sovereign good. Even here we find our highest good in knowing the truth and loving goodness, dim as is our view of the one, and feeble as is our hold of the other. What must it be, then, when we come to behold, by the light of glory, our God face to face, with no cloud intervening to obscure his infinite beauty, no distance between us and his ineffable love? Well may it be said, "Eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive what our God hath prepared for them that love him." He will reward them with no inferior, no created good; but will give them himself, will himself be their portion for ever.

But this supernatural destiny, since it is supernatural, is not naturally attainable. We may cultivate all our natural powers, we may fill up the highest and broadest capacities of our nature, realize the highest ideal, and yet be infinitely, — we use the word in its strict sense, — *infinitely* below it. It is not attained to by "self-culture," by the development and exercise of our highest natural powers, including even the boasted sentiments of love and reverence. It is nothing that is due, or ever can be due, to our nature. It is a gift, and can be obtained only as bestowed. But it will be bestowed only on the

obedient, and is bestowed as the reward of obedience. Our destiny is eternal life, and the condition of obtaining it is obedience. Obedience is not, as some of the sects teach, the end for which we were made. We were made not that we might obey God, but that we might possess God; and we obey him as the condition of possessing him.

Obedience consists in fulfilling this law, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyself." — St. Luke, x. 27. This law requires us to love God supremely and exclusively. It is not enough that we love God more than we love any thing else, but we must love only him, and our neighbour and ourselves only in him and for the sake of him; otherwise we do not love him with the *whole* heart, soul, strength, and mind. But even this is not all. No love of which we are naturally capable is the fulfilling of this law, is that charity without which we are as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. The end is supernatural, and, if the end be supernatural, the means must be supernatural; for there must be some proportion between the means and the end, and between natural means and a supernatural end there is no proportion. Man by his natural strength, even if he had never sinned, could not keep the law of charity in that sense in which obedience has the promise of eternal life. The obedience itself must be supernatural, and therefore is not possible, unless our nature be elevated, *supernaturalized*, by divine grace, by which our acts have a supernatural character, and a supernatural merit.

We may say, then, that Almighty God has appointed us to a supernatural end, that he has made that end attainable only by perfect obedience, and the obedience possible only by means of supernatural grace. The end for which we are intended and the means of obtaining it are both in the supernatural order, in what is called the **ORDER OF GRACE**, not in the order of nature. We must live not in and for the order of nature, but in and for the order of grace. Then our chief attention is to be directed to the means, influences, ministries, disciplines by which we are lifted out of the order of nature, and placed in the order of grace, on the plane of our destiny. These are dispensed, exercised, enjoined by our blessed Saviour through his Holy Church, which he has established for the purpose, and which represents to us and for us the supernatural order. God through the Church does not merely reveal to us the end for

which he intended us, and the means of obtaining it, but also dispenses the helps we need in our weakness to lift us out of the order of nature and to sustain us in the order of grace; and it is only through her ministries and disciplines that, in the ordinary course of his gracious providence, he does or will grant them, or, if he in some sense grant them, that they prove effectual. Then the indispensable conditions of obedience by which we obtain the end for which we were intended cannot be possessed but by submission to the Church, and observing whatever she proposes or commands. When we do this, and freely cooperate with the grace given to all men, we are just, and are placed in that state in which obedience merits eternal life.

We can now answer the question we have asked, namely, In what consists true greatness? We began by assuming that true greatness consists in living for the end for which our Maker intended us. This end we now see is supernatural, and obtainable only by supernatural means. True greatness must consist in living for this supernatural end, and in yielding the supernatural obedience by which alone it is to be obtained. It evidently, then, consists in nothing natural, but in being lifted out of nature and placed in the order of grace, as we have said, on the plane of our destiny. The least in the order of grace is infinitely superior to the greatest in the order of nature. True greatness is, simply, in that supernatural justice and sanctity in which man was originally constituted, which he lost by sin, which is restored by grace, and by which we are made heirs of the promises, and translated into the number of those to whom our blessed Lord himself will give a crown of life.

This answer is not ours, but the answer which Almighty God himself gives us in his revelation. Tried by the rule implied in this answer, not a few of the world's judgments must be reversed. At one stroke we must cut from the roll of great men the immense majority of those the world delights to honor, and holds up to the reverence and emulation of our youth. Renowned princes, statesmen, heroes, poets, philosophers; scholars, authors, must lose their rank, and sink below that of ordinary men. Your Goethes, Byrons, Shelleys, Scotts, Bulwers, Victor Hugos, Balzacs, Eugene Sues, George Sands, Kants, Hegels, Cousins, shrink into insignificance before the simplest Christian who has given his heart to God. What are

your Alexanders, Hannibals, Cæsars, Napoleons, before a St. Gregory, a St. Bernard, a St. Francis, a St. Ignatius, a St. Xavier, a St. Charles? your Dukes of Wellington before your St. Patricks, St. Ninians, St. Columbas, or countless hosts of those whose names are unheard on earth, and known only in the Lamb's book of life? The saints are the only true nobility. No man is great but as he is good, but as he lives in the order of grace, and loves God above all things and with his whole heart and soul, and his neighbour as himself in and for the sake of God.

We have now a standard of greatness by which we can determine who is and who is not great, and by which we may determine the real value of things and conditions. Am I poor? What if I am? Does my poverty interfere with my obedience? does it or can it debar me from obtaining that justice and sanctity in which alone is true worth, true greatness, all that it does not belittle me to crave? Am I unknown, held in no repute, despised? What of all this, if I am known and honored of God? What is it to me that I am despised by men, if I am owned by the King immortal and invisible, who with his own hand will bestow upon me a crown of life incorruptible and eternal in heaven? Talk of human respectability, of one's standing in society, of the honors one receives from the state or the mob! What is all this to him who is in the communion of the saints and martyrs of all ages and climes, who listen to his prayers, and bear them as sweet incense up before the throne of the living God? Am I rich, am I honored, have I praise of men, do the crowd run after me, the wise and venerable listen when I speak? What of all this, if I am poor in the grace of God, have no honor in heaven, no assurance of the reward set before me,—if, when I die, I go to hell, while the poor beggar that lay at my gate is borne by the convoy of angels to Abraham's bosom?

As of the individual, so of the nation. In like manner as justice and sanctity constitute the greatness of the individual, so do they constitute the greatness of the nation. "Justice exalteth a nation, but sin is a reproach to any people." The great nation is the holy nation, rich in true obedience, and carried away by a divine passion for God and all holy things. Suppose your nation does increase in wealth, in luxury, in refinement; suppose it does fell the primeval forest and enlarge its borders, multiply its manufactures, extend its commerce, and make all climes pour their riches into its lap; what then? Does

it follow that such a nation is great, is glorious, and has reason to applaud herself for her achievements and to exult over the poor and simple? "Blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord." Where is it written, Blessed is the nation whose God is Mammon, and whose worship is Thrift? Where are the nations who forgot the Lord, who put their trust in their ships, their traffic, their wealth, and luxuries? Where is that ancient Tyre, "whose merchants were princes, and her traders the nobles of the earth"? Where are all the nations of the old world, once renowned for their extended commerce, the richness of their stuffs, and the variety of their manufactures? They have passed away like the morning vapor, and a few solitary ruins alone remain to point the traveller to the seats of their world-renowned idolatry.

Taking the principles we have established, we can easily answer the question, whether we are or are not a great people, — whether the path we are pursuing leads to true national greatness, or whether it leads from it. Are we as a people intent on gaining the end for which our Maker designed us? Are we remarkable for our humble observance of the precepts of the Gospel? Are we diligent to yield that obedience to which is promised eternal life? Far, very far, from it. We are a proud, loud-boasting, and vain-boasting people. Our god is mammon, and our righteousness is thrift. Is it not so? To what do we point as proofs of our greatness? Is it not to our industrial achievements, our railroads, canals, steamboats, commerce, manufactures, — material wealth and splendor? But where are our moral achievements, the monuments of our enlightened zeal for God, and humble devotion to his will? Religion we have in name, in form, in many forms and many strange forms; but where is the deep, all-pervading, all-active conviction that this world is not our home, that it is but an inn in which we may lodge for a night, but in which we may not, must not, dwell? Alas! the dominant passion of our country is worldly wealth and worldly distinction. We see it in the general pursuits of the people; we hear it in the almost universal tone of conversation; and we see it distinctly in the general scramble for wealth, in our demoralizing political contentions, and the all-devouring greediness for place and plunder.

If we look at the great political questions which agitate the public mind, we shall perceive that they are all questions concerning wealth, the means of facilitating its acquisition, of making it pass, or preventing it from passing, from the few to the

many, or from the many to the few. Such are your bank questions, your tariff questions, your land-distribution questions. If you go beyond these, they are questions of the honors and emoluments of office. Not a pert upstart among us who has made his maiden caucus speech, but regards himself as qualified for any office in the gift of the people, from that of village constable up to that of president of the United States, and feels that he suffers great wrong, and adds another striking example of neglected merit, if not rewarded for his disinterested and patriotic exertions by some snug place with a fat salary. Scarcely a man seems contented to remain in private life, to live in obscurity, unheeded by his countrymen, in all humility and fidelity laboring to discharge his duty to his God, and to win the prize of eternal glory. We love the praise of men more than the praise of God; the low and transitory goods of time more than the high and permanent goods of eternity. If we are poor, we are discontented, we regard ourselves as most miserable, and rail against Providence, who permits inequalities to obtain among brethren. No one is contented with his lot in life. We are all ill-at-ease. We would all be what we are not, and have what we have not. And yet, with admirable simplicity, we ask, Are we not a great people?

Nearly all the action of the American people, collectively or individually, has reference solely to the affairs of time. Government sinks with us into a joint-stock concern for the practice of thrift. It has no divine authority, no high and solemn moral mission. In education even, the same low and earthly view obtains. We educate for time. We seek to fit our children for getting on, as we call it, in the world, — to make them sharp, bold, enterprising, and successful business men. We teach them, indeed, that knowledge is power, — but power to outstrip their fellows in the pursuit of worldly goods. We teach them, indeed, that sloth is a mortal sin, — but sloth in the affairs of time and sense, not sloth in regard to our spiritual duties. We teach them to respect public opinion, to strive to be respectable, to be honored among men; rarely, and almost always ineffectually, to respect the law of God, to seek honor of God, and to despise that of men. Hence, they grow up timid time-servers, trimmers, moral cowards, afraid to say their souls are their own, to avow their honest convictions, if their convictions chance to be unpopular, or to follow God in the faith and worship he has ordained, if not held in repute, or if embraced only by the poor, the simple, of whom the world

makes no account. To make a sacrifice for Christ, to give up all, houses, lands, wife and children, for God, that we may have treasure in heaven, strikes us as something wholly uncalled for, as folly, as madness, worthy only of the dark ages of monkish ignorance and barbarity. To a worldly end conspire all our education, science, literature, and art. Whatever cannot be pressed into the service of man as a creature of time and sense is by the immense majority of us condemned as useless and mischievous.

That we measure all things by the standard of this life and this world is evinced by the judgments we pass on other nations. In judging others, we always judge ourselves. Tell us what nation you place highest in the scale of nations, and you tell us what are your own views of what constitutes true national greatness. We, as a people, very generally count highest in the scale of contemporary nations those in which the national energy displays itself most exclusively in an industrial direction, and which are most successful in multiplying wealth and luxury. Since the great events in the sixteenth century, which out of courtesy we must call the Reformation, although it was any thing but a reformation, there has sprung up a new social order, not known in the Middle Ages, and not yet universally adopted in Catholic countries. The whole tendency of this order is in an industrial direction. It places this world before the other, time before eternity, the body before the soul, the praise of men before the praise of God. It esteems the riches of this world more than the riches of divine grace, and bids us strive to live, not in the order of grace, but in the order of nature. Under this order the great aim is to be rich, independent, well off in time; to be distinguished, held in high repute one by another. We reverse the maxim of the Gospel, and say, Be not anxious for the soul, take no heed to the worship of God, nor to obedience to his laws; but seek first to get on well in this world, look to the main chance, get rich, — honestly, of course, if you can, but get rich, — be distinguished, and then the kingdom of God and his justice will be added unto you; or if not, — it will be no great matter.

Under this order, astonishing industrial triumphs have been achieved. Man has made the sea and the land his tributaries, the winds his messengers, and flames of fire his ministers. Banking-houses, exchanges, cotton-mills, docks, and wharves supplant the old cathedral, the abbey, and the way-side chapel. It is only such nations as stand highest in this order that we

call great. If, by an excess of modesty, we place any nation above our own, it is Great Britain. In our estimation, no nation has surpassed her in the wisdom of her policy, none equals her in true national greatness and prosperity. In worldly power, in worldly wealth, in vast industrial enterprises, in wonderful productive facilities and energies, she unquestionably stands at this moment unrivalled ; but tried by the standard of greatness we have adopted, there are few, if any, nations on the globe that can rank far below her. What, in fact, are her national characteristics ? We grant her people have been brave, are bold, enterprising, industrious, ingenious ; but as a nation she is proud, arrogant, worldly, hypocritical. Her church establishment is a mockery, and her coffers are filled with the plunder of almost every people. The sun never sets upon her empire, and visits no people that does not curse her dominion. She is gorged with spoils, and drunken with the blood of the poor, the weak, the defenceless.

Nay, with all her wealth, with all her productive power, with all her devotion to the interests of time and sense, the condition of the great mass of her population, even in reference to this life alone, is far below what it was before she started on her new career, and compares unfavorably with that of the mass of the populations in most Catholic countries even now. The lower orders in Spain and Italy, over whose sad condition we shed so much — ink, are, even as to their physical comforts, altogether superior to the lower classes in Great Britain. An Italian or Spanish peasant has a personal freedom, an elevation of mind, a dignity of soul and of manners, that you shall in vain look for in an English operative. He feels that he is a man, that there is something of nobility attaching to every soul, since our blessed Lord assumed human nature and died to redeem it. He has at least the free use of his limbs, and free access to the blessed light and air of heaven, and is not imprisoned in a Union Workhouse. And say what you will of Popish ignorance and superstition, the worship of Our Lady and the Saints is at least not more degrading than the worship of the gin-shop. We have seen it recently stated, on what purports to be good authority, that in England every sixth person is a pauper, and large masses of the people, it has been proved by parliamentary commissions, grow up without any religious instruction, and live in a manner as gross and brutish as that of the South Sea Islanders, — many having never heard even the name of their Maker, except when blasphemed.

There are immense estates, immense wealth, boundless luxury for the few, and the most squalid poverty and frightful distress for the many. The soil of England, which a hundred and fifty years back had at least some two hundred and forty thousand proprietors, has now less than thirty thousand. The increase of pauperism has kept pace with this concentration of the soil in the hands of fewer and fewer proprietors. Such is the tendency of your boasted industrial order in Great Britain. But in Italy, poor degraded Italy, which our *Christian Alliances* are about to visit with their benign countenances, the highest statements we have seen make the number of paupers, not one out of every six as in England, but only one out of every twenty-five; and the provisions for education are so ample, especially in the Ecclesiastical States, that the poorest father may give his son, free of expense, the best university education in the world. Yet we weep over Italy, and glorify Great Britain.

If there be any truth in the principles we have laid down, — principles which rest not on our authority, but on the authority of God, — a nation is not to be accounted great in proportion to its worldly wealth and splendor; and if there be any truth in history or experience, a nation, in directing its chief attention to these, to the growth of material wealth and power, not only cannot attain to true greatness, but must inevitably fail to secure even the temporal well-being, for any great length of time, of the great mass of its population. We are beginning ourselves to experience, and we shall experience more and more, the truth of these assertions. Here the people make the laws. But, in making the laws, they of necessity follow their dominant passion. The laws in a democracy are always true exponents of the character, the tastes, habits, and passions of the people. The dominant passion of our people at the present moment is the acquisition of material wealth, either for its own sake, or for sake of the ease, independence, and distinction it is supposed to be able to secure. Take any ten thousand men at random, and ask them what they most desire of government, and they will answer you, if they answer you honestly, — Such laws as will facilitate the acquisition of wealth. The facilitating of the acquisition of wealth is at the bottom of every question which has any bearing on our elections. Let these men vote, and they will vote for such laws as they believe will most effectually secure this end. But suppose such laws to be enacted, how many out of the ten thousand will be in a condi-

tion to take advantage of them ? Certainly, not more than one in a hundred. There will be, then, nine thousand and nine hundred men joining with one hundred to enact laws which in their operation are for the exclusive benefit of the one hundred. The whole action, the inevitable action, of every popular government, *where wealth is the dominant passion of the people*, is to foster the continued growth of inequality of property. The tendency of all laws passed, if passed by the many, will be to concentrate the property in the hands of the few, because each one who aids in passing them hopes that his will be the hands in which it is to be concentrated ; — at least, such will be the tendency, till matters become so bad that the many in their madness and desperation are driven to attempt the insane remedy of agrarian laws. When, under our new system of industry, which allows little personal intercourse between landlord and tenant, proprietor and operative, which connects the operative simply with the mill and the overseer, the concentration of property in a few hands becomes general, it involves the most fatal results. We see in England only half the evil it would produce with us ; because there, save in the manufacturing districts, some elements of the old feudal system still remain to mitigate it. But here the evil would have no mitigation. We should have an aristocracy indeed, but one without a single quality that makes an aristocracy even endurable. An aristocracy not based on high birth or on sanctity is always intolerable. But the new order is at war with high birth, generous breeding, and is plebeian in its spirit and tendency. It is supported, commended, on the ground of its alleged popular tendencies, and its hostility to whatever remains of the old feudal order. Its direct and inevitable tendency is to substitute the cotton-mill for the old baronial castle, and your “ Plugsons of St. Dorothy of Undershot,” as Carlyle calls them, for the well-born, the well-bred, and the really noble, — men who have risen from the gutter without a single virtue or a single generous quality, solely by their success in tasking the industry of others, and in getting by means of their business operations a controlling influence in the industrial world. These “ Plugsons ” become our chiefs, our nobles, whose names head subscription papers, and who are seen figuring as presidents of banks, and other moneyed corporations, of lyceum and railroad meetings and conventions. The great mass sink to mere machines, doomed to tend on other machines. It is to this miserable result that leads the path we

have hitherto pursued, and are now pursuing. We have not yet reached the goal; we have not seen the worst; but are driving on towards the worst with more than Jehu speed. We have in full operation all the causes which necessarily produce the state of degradation implied; and which will produce it, with all its attendant evils, much sooner, perhaps, than even the greatest croakers among us apprehend.*

* We say not that this is the necessary result of popular government, as such; for it is not, save when and where the dominant passion of the people is for the goods of this life. Where the people are truly religious, where they live not for time but for eternity, and are bent on laying up treasures not on earth but in heaven, no such result from popular government would or could follow. But the popular tendency of modern governments has been in nearly all cases the offspring, not of religion, but of the want of it. The new order is the result of the decay of religious faith, of rebellion against the spiritual government Almighty God has instituted, and of a growing devotion to the goods of time and sense. The aim of all our modern popular movements has been to depress the spiritual order and to elevate the material. Men lose sight of the end for which they were intended, cease to have reference in their aspirations and conduct to the things which are invisible and eternal, and come to place their affections wholly on this world and the things which pertain to it. In no instance have they broken away from the old social order for the sake of heaven; but in all instances for the sake of earth. They have demanded a new and better social order, not as more favorable to obtaining the end for which Almighty God intended them, but as likely to yield more earthly delight and satisfaction. Hence, popular government, or the tendency to popular government, wherever we see it, is an evidence of the worldly-mindedness of the people, of their decaying faith and growing infidelity. Consequently, as a matter of fact, wherever we find a popular government, we may regard the fatal results we have pointed out as inevitable, unless arrested by the operation of some cause foreign to that operating in the people and government.

Yet, if the people, or the great majority of them, were truly Christian, if the dominant spirit or passion of the nation were for heaven as our true destiny, and to gain heaven in the way and by the means Almighty God himself has ordained, we see no reason why popular government would not work well, and deserve all the eulogiums it has ever received. Certainly we are not among those who would distrust it. It is only the godless republic we fear; it is only where the people are wedded to this world, where they do not own the Lord, do not believe, do not feel in their souls, that this world is not their home, that we are here only to prepare for another and a better world, that we are to walk here by faith, not by sight, and live by promise and not by fruition, that we doubt the democratic tendency. Democracy with the Church would be a good form of government, if not indeed the best of all possible forms; without the Church, it is the worst, as our own experience as a people, if we continue as we have been going on, will soon demonstrate to all who have eyes to see or hearts to understand.

If, then, we speak of the fatal results of popular government, it must be

But this is not all. In all the great industrial nations, so called, or where the new order prevails, and especially with us, the great mass of the people are ill-at-ease. They belong in more senses than one to the "movement party." Rarely do you find one contented with his lot, or satisfied to remain in the social position in which he was born. The absurd notions of equality which have been propagated turn all heads, and make every one feel that he ought to occupy the first rank. No one is willing to occupy a subordinate station. We are all equal, and, therefore, all would be first. The poor man cannot content himself in his poverty to serve God where he is, and count himself as living well, if living for God. No; he must be another; he must be rich; he must stand as high socially as his neighbour. So he puts off his spiritual duties, neglects the goods he might obtain, and risks every thing in trying to be what he is not, and in striving to win what when won would be worse than useless. No one seems to remember, none seem to believe, that "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven"; that "Better is the poor man that walketh in simplicity, than a rich man that is perverse in his lips and unwise"; or that "Better is a dry morsel with joy, than a house full of victims with strife." We look with pity and contempt on those who show no ambition to rise in the world. We regard it as a "lower deep" in the degradation of the Austrian or Italian peasant, that he is contented to live and die a peasant. We regard him who neglects an opportunity to rise in the world, to acquire wealth or distinction, as wanting in the proper spirit of a man. Hence, everywhere strife and contention; everywhere rivalry, competition, envy, jealousy, heart-burnings, efforts to rise, pull down, keep

understood of popular government not in itself considered, but where the people are not Christian, where they have not the Christian faith living and active, or, as we have said, where the dominant passion of the people, as with us, is for worldly wealth and distinctions. The fault is not in the form of the government, but in the spirit of the people. Were the people what they should be, the government would be all we could wish. But no popular government can be wiser and better than the people, rarely so wise and good as the general average. It is not the government that needs changing or reforming, but the people from whom it emanates. If our politicians would bear this in mind, and seek to secure better governmental results by increasing the intelligence and virtue of the people, instead of studying merely to ascertain and conform to the popular will as it is, they would render us some service, and would not deserve the very general reprobation which they now receive from the wise and good.

down, — at all events, to be ourselves at the top. And what avails all this uneasiness and discontent? What avails all this struggle, uproar, and confusion? Does it make us happier here? Does it help us obtain the end for which our Maker intended us? No, no. What, then, does it all prove, but that we make a false estimate of life, — that we place greatness, whether national or individual, in that in which it is not, and in which it cannot be?

It is sometimes asked, what is to be the fate of this republic? If we continue on as we are, it is easy to foresee what it will be. We shall be what were Tyre, and Sidon, and Carthage, and what they are now. It is written, that “the wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations that forget God.” — Psalm ix. 18. And, say what we will, we as a people do forget God. We have, it is true, our meetinghouses, and places where we assemble on Sundays; and we call ourselves by the name of Christ, to take away our reproach. But the exchange is our temple, and mammon is our god. We are an idolatrous people, and pay our devotion to the meanest of all the spirits that “kept not their first estate.” For an idolatrous people there is no good, no hope; because every people that forsaketh the living God shall sooner or later be blotted out. The Lord God hath said it, and it is not for us to reverse his decrees. We must put away our idolatry, return from our groves and “high places” to the Temple we have deserted; for there is no good for nations, any more than for individuals, but in loving God and keeping his commandments.

This conclusion, doubtless, is not remarkable for its novelty. It is, we own, but the old story which is constantly repeated by those the world heeds not. But truth is old, not new, and our good rarely comes from novelties. We have followed after new things long enough. We have sought out many inventions; we have followed the suggestions of a lying spirit, and been deceived wellnigh to our ruin. It is now the part of wisdom to retrace our steps, to return to the old things we have left behind, from which we have wandered so long and so far, seeking rest and finding none. Nay, if we want novelty, we may find it in the old paths so long deserted; for to the greater part of us the old is newer than the new.

We mean not, in what we have said, to condemn industry, nor even wealth, in their place, and when pursued with reference solely to God. We believe voluntary poverty for the sake of God is highly meritorious; but a man may also be rich without sin, although riches are a temptation and a snare,

and he who has them not is more blessed than he who has them. What we have meant to condemn is the worldly spirit, is the tendency to make wealth and luxury, or the goods of this life, ends for which we may live and labor. This is always sin, as it is always folly and madness. We may make our industry and wealth meritorious, by pursuing them for the sake of God, and using what we acquire according to the law of charity. We are to seek first, as the end of our exertions, the kingdom of God and his justice, and all else we need will be added unto us. But all are not required to seek this in the same mode. There are diversities of gifts and callings. Some are called to follow the evangelical counsel to forsake houses and lands, wife and children, for Christ's sake. These do nobly, and have the promise of a hundred-fold in this world, and of eternal life in the world to come. Others are called to serve God as pastors and teachers, by ruling the Church, feeding the flock, instructing the ignorant, strengthening the weak, reclaiming the erring, comforting the sorrowing, and befriending the friendless ; others by exercising authority in the state, watching over the public weal, executing the laws, and maintaining justice between man and man ; others, again, by industrial efforts, by the production and exchange of the necessities and conveniences of life. Each to his calling ; and each in his calling may, if he will, serve God, and gain the salvation of his own soul. But whatever the calling, it must be pursued for the sake of God, in the spirit of humble obedience ; and whatever the act performed, it must be referred to God, who is our ultimate end, as he is our first beginning.

We have spoken freely, and not flatteringly, of our countrymen ; and yet we have not spoken without feeling an American heart beating in our bosom. A great people in the higher and truer sense we are not. That we have in the industrial order achieved much, and that as to our simple material condition we compare favorably with any other people, we are far from questioning. That in education, so far as it tends to prepare us for success in this world, we have done much, we freely admit ; and that, as a people, we are by no means deficient in natural acuteness, strength, or activity of mind, or wanting in the ordinary regard for the general welfare of one another, we are far from asserting. Compared with other nations, we have undoubtedly no special cause for national mortification, though less cause for pride and vanity than we commonly imagine. Yet we know no reason why a man should blush before the native of any other country to be called an

American. It is not between us and other nations that we have been instituting a comparison. We have compared our nation not with others ; but have sought to measure it by the standard of greatness furnished us in our holy religion, — the only standard by which it becomes us to try ourselves. Tried by that standard, we are indeed most shamefully wanting, and should blush and hang our heads.

In saying this, we do not feel that we forfeit the character of a true patriot. We may be wrong, but we have always held that the worst citizen of a republic is he who flatters the people, assures them they are wise and virtuous, can do no wrong, and have the right, irrespective of the laws of God, to do whatever they will. We have never believed that we must consult the will of the people as the rule of our faith or of our practice. We have believed it the duty of every citizen to do all in his power not to conform to public opinion, but to set it right whenever he has good authority for believing it wrong. We are not to do what will please the people, but to do what we can to influence the people to will what is pleasing to God. Such has been our belief ever since we commenced addressing the public in speech or in writing, and such is our belief now, and probably will be as long as we live. It is too late for us now to turn courtier or demagogue. If this is a fault in us, there is no lack of aspirants to public favor to atone for it. We love our country. We are resolved to do all we can to sustain her institutions ; but we are not of those who have great facility in shouting Democracy, and praising the dear people. We see evil tendencies at work ; we see the golden, or rather *paper*, age of demagogues advancing, and we tremble for our country. To us, the direction things are taking seems likely to prove disastrous. We raise our voice, feeble though it be, and unheeded as we fear it will be, to contribute our mite to stay the advancing tide of ruin. We have raised it with a patriot's love, and with a patriot's grief ; but with the Christian's hope. Bad as appearances are, a good God as well as a just God watches over us, and we dare not distrust his mercy. It may be he will have mercy on our nation ; that he will yet make ours the chosen land of his abode ; that he will in very deed be our God, and we shall be his people. We would not see our experiment in behalf of popular freedom fail ; we would see it succeed. It will not fail, it will succeed, if we return to God, put our trust in him, and live for the end to which he has appointed us.

ART III. — *Dangers of Jesuit Instruction. A Sermon preached at the Second Presbyterian Church in St. Louis, September 25, 1845. By Rev. WM. S. POTTS, D. D. 8vo. pp. 21.*

THE author of this sermon, we presume, from its doctrine and tone, is a Presbyterian minister, and most likely pastor of the church at which it was preached. We know nothing of him except what the sermon itself tells us. From that we gather that he stands high in his own estimation, has some earnestness and zeal, but is rather deficient in theological and historical knowledge, as well as in the meekness and sweetness of the Christian temper.

The sermon is from Eph. vi. 4, — “Bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord,” or, as the Catholic version has it, “in the discipline and correction of the Lord”; and is designed to set forth the solemn obligations of Christian parents to give their children a truly Christian education, and to point out one remarkable instance in which they violate these obligations.

“The text,” he says, “is an apostolic precept given to those who hold in the Church of Christ the important and responsible relation of parents. The Church, consequently, requires, in every case in which the Sacrament of Baptism is administered to a child, that the parents bring themselves under a solemn obligation to ‘endeavour, by all the means of God’s appointment, to bring up their child in the nurture and admonition of the Lord.’”

“As in the administration of this Sacrament in the case of an adult, he gives himself up unto God, through Jesus Christ, to walk in newness of life; so parents, in presenting their children, make a formal surrender of them to God, and obligate themselves, as guardians and instructors appointed for the express purpose, to bring them up as God’s sons and daughters. For their diligence and faithfulness in the discharge of this duty every parent is to answer, first, to the Church officers, whose duty it is to see to the fulfilment of the vows publicly made in the Church, and secondly, to the great Judge of quick and dead. Hence arises the double duty, that officers should see to it that the Church is fully instructed in reference to the nature of this covenant engagement, and that parents carefully consider the meaning of the vow that rests upon them.” — p. 3.

The inquiry might arise here, Who are these “Church offi-

cers" ? and, especially, who is to see to it that they rightly instruct, or do not misinstruct, the Church ? The Church officers instruct the Church ; but who instructs and appoints the Church officers ? The earth stands on the turtle ; but what does the turtle stand on ? If the sermon reaches a second edition, we hope the author will condescend to enlighten us on this point.

The explanation of the precept of the text, though it overlooks the immediate sense intended by the blessed Apostle, is well enough. The general duty of Christian parents to educate their children in a Christian manner is set forth with tolerable clearness. It is a solemn duty, and one which it is to be deeply lamented parents too often and too fatally neglect. The parent who brings his child to the Sacrament of Baptism incurs a solemn obligation to do all in his power to bring him up in a truly Christian manner ; and if he do not, and the child through that neglect be lost, terrible will be the account he will one day be called upon to settle with his Maker and his Judge. But the main design, and much the larger part, of this sermon is devoted to pointing " out one of the instances in which parents violate this command."

" The case," the author says, " to which I allude, is the indifference manifested by Christian parents to the characters, morals, and religious sentiments of the instructors of their children. Many parents act upon the principle, that it is of no importance what may be the morals or sentiments entertained by a teacher, provided there is no immorality exhibited before the pupils, and no attempt to inculcate sentiments deemed erroneous. But no opinion could be more untrue, or more practically dangerous. The Scripture declaration, as a man ' thinketh in his heart so is he,' will be found true. His teachings and example will be insensibly influenced by the doctrines he holds, and there will occur a thousand ways in which the pupil will distinctly comprehend the views and feelings of the preceptor ; and these views will not have the less influence, from the fact that he makes no direct effort to impress them upon the pupil's mind. A direct effort of this kind would put the learner on his guard ; but the other plan allays all fear, and the poison silently and imperceptibly works. The child is subjected five sevenths of his time to this influence, and the remaining portion to a different influence ; no wonder, then, that the poison has gained so fast, that errors are fixed beyond remedy in the mind before the parent is aware that they exist at all. Hence, every one soliciting at your hands the post of instructor of your children should be willing to submit his opinions and life to the most rigid scrutiny,

before he asks that so important a trust should be confided to him." — pp. 6, 7.

The principle laid down here we regard as a sound one. We should find it extremely difficult to bring ourselves to intrust the education of our children to instructors we held to be unsound in the faith. There is no torture we would not endure sooner than trust them to the care of Presbyterian teachers, even in matters but remotely connected with faith and morals. We agree entirely with Dr. Potts in the principle he lays down, and are quite certain, that, if the Americans generally would adopt it, and act upon it, there would soon be an end of that monopoly of education throughout the United States, which has hitherto been enjoyed by Presbyterians and the Calvinistic Congregationalists. The great majority of the American people are anti-Calvinistic, and if they were not shamefully indifferent to the doctrines entertained by those they employ as instructors, we should not see, as is even yet the fact, the greater part of our colleges, academies, and literary institutions under Calvinistic control.

But, if we agree with Dr. Potts in the principle he lays down, we are far from agreeing with him in the application he makes of it. From the fact, that parents are bound to bring up their children in the discipline and correction of the Lord, he infers that they are bound not to intrust them to Catholic instructors. But this is a plain *non sequitur*; for none but Catholic instructors do, or can, impart a truly Christian education. He would also infer from the same premises that Christian parents can in conscience employ none but Presbyterian educators; which is another *non sequitur*. Educators cannot impart what they have not; and Presbyterians must be Christians, before they can give a Christian education. That they are not Christians now, we have the right to say; since, in a recent act of their general assembly, asserting the invalidity of Catholic baptism, they have *unchristened* themselves. Men are made Christians in the Sacrament of Baptism. The Presbyterians have no baptism but that which they derived from the Catholic Church, and their title to the Christian name rests on the validity of that baptism. They have declared that baptism invalid. Consequently, according to their own declaration, they have always been, and are, a set of unbaptized — *Presbyterians*, and therefore completely out of the pale of Christendom. Evidently, then, if Christian parents are bound to give their children a Christian education, they must not employ Presbyterian instructors.

Dr. Potts asserts that Catholic individuals and ecclesiastical orders are at the doors of Protestants, "asking Christian parents to commit their children to their hands to be educated, and, of course, — for this is the parent's vow, — to be trained up for God." — p. 7. This, if so, is no doubt horrible, and not to be tolerated ; for we suppose Protestants are not at liberty to refuse the request. But we are inclined to think he labors under a slight mistake. We are sure that Catholics do not solicit Protestants to intrust them with the education of their children. We establish schools for our own children, that we may discharge the duty the preacher is laboring to enforce ; and it can be no sin in us to request Catholic parents to send their children to Catholic schools. We do not request Protestants to send their children to our schools ; we are not particularly desirous of receiving them, and some of our colleges will not receive them at all. It is a favor we confer on Protestants, when we admit their sons and daughters into our schools, for which they should thank us ; both for their own sake and their children's sake, not abuse us.

We think also the preacher is ungenerous in objecting to our schools because they furnish education at "reduced prices." This objection comes with an ill grace from the party that claims to be the especial friends of education, and the founders of free schools. That our schools give a better education and at less expense than Protestant schools we do not question ; for our instructors are for the most part vowed to poverty, and devoted to the work of education not for the love of money, but for the love of God. Education is with them a religious vocation. They are men and women dead to the world, and alive only to God, and no doubt they have special graces from Almighty God for the work to which he calls them. They are thus enabled to educate better than Protestants can, whatever their zeal, diligence, learning, or natural ability ; and, as they have no expensive families or position to maintain, they can educate much cheaper than Protestants can. This sufficiently accounts for the excellence and cheapness of our schools, and for their ability to compete more than successfully, wherever established, with Protestant schools. But this surely implies no fault on our part, and can be no ground for condemning us or our schools.

But the reduced prices at which our schools furnish education is not the only objection the preacher brings against them. He thinks the Christian parent cannot send his children to our

schools, because Catholic instructors are not sound in the faith. He proceeds, therefore, to set forth wherein Catholics have not the essential Christian faith. If Catholics do not hold the essential truths of the Christian religion, parents undoubtedly cannot with a safe conscience commit their children to their care. No parent can safely trust his children to an infidel or a misbelieving instructor. So far, we agree with Dr. Potts. But this question as to the orthodoxy of Catholics is a somewhat delicate question. It is simply, Does the Catholic Church hold and teach the true Christian faith?

Now, it is undeniable that we cannot decide this question, unless we have some standard or criterion of orthodoxy. What is this criterion? By what standard does the zealous Doctor propose to try the Catholic faith? By the Bible? Well, by the Bible as he understands it, or as Catholics understand it? If as Catholics understand it, then he must concede the orthodoxy of Catholicity; for the Catholic faith is authorized by the Catholic understanding of the Bible. But will he say, as he himself understands it? But whence does it follow that Dr. Potts, who preaches at the Second Presbyterian Church in St. Louis, understands the Bible better than the Catholic? Why, are we to say that the Catholic faith is heterodox, because it does not agree with his understanding of the word of God? Is he infallible? Does he pretend it? Then how settle the question, whether his or the Catholic's understanding of the Bible be the true understanding?

“But take the Bible itself; neither your understanding of it, nor mine, — but the Bible, the precious Bible, the very word of God itself.”

With all my heart. But the Bible is nothing to us, unless we attach some meaning to it; and if we attach a false meaning to it, then what we take to be the Bible is not the Bible. We do not take the Bible, unless we take it in God's sense, — in the sense intended by the Holy Ghost, who dictated it. How shall we ascertain this sense?

But the good Doctor is troubled with no questionings of this sort. The earth rests on the turtle, and it does not occur to him to ask what the turtle stands on. We should not be over-curious, and no Christian ever allows himself to ask impertinent questions. So he tacitly assumes his own infallibility, that the turtle stands on his own feet, — for what else should a turtle stand on? — and proceeds to try the Catholic faith.

“ Our first inquiry is into the doctrines held by these teachers ; that is, by the Papal Church. The Christian parent, lying under a solemn vow, must know whether the instructor of his child holds the essential truths of the Christian religion. It has been generally the opinion of Protestants that Roman Catholics were not wrong in those doctrines that are fundamental in the Christian faith, but that their great error consisted in the load of trumpery, such as the worship of the Virgin Mary, and of saints and relics ; the doctrines of purgatory, penance, and auricular confession ; of transubstantiation, and the adoration of the bread ; which, being wrought into the way of salvation as revealed, served to cloud the mind, and, in most cases, entirely mislead the worshipper from the true objects of faith. This opinion has risen from the circumstance, that Rome held the same symbols of faith with the Protestant Churches, as the Apostles’ and Athanasian creeds. But these formularies of doctrine are so brief, that without explanation it is impossible to know what is the faith held by those professing to embrace them. The Apostles’ creed may be adopted by every description of errorists professing to receive the Bible ; and the same is true of the creed of Athanasius, with the single exception of Arians, whose error it was designed to detect. Hence, the opinion of Protestants referred to was manifestly made up on insufficient evidence.” — pp. 7, 8.

This is a beautiful extract. So Protestants have hitherto been mistaken as to the real character of the Church. Well, there is some comfort in that. If they have heretofore erred, it is certain they are not infallible, and may therefore err again. Drowning men will catch at straws. So, since it is admitted Protestants may err, we will conclude it is *barely* possible they do err, when they deny that the Church believes and teaches “ the essential truths of the Christian religion.”

But the question of the criterion or standard still comes up. By what authority does our Presbyterian friend distinguish between the essential truths of the Christian religion, and the “ trumpery ” with which they are loaded ? This question continually haunts us, and, like Banquo’s ghost, “ will not down at the bidding.” We are even anxious to cast off all “ trumpery ” ; but you must prove to us that what you require us to cast off is trumpery, before we can consent to cast it off. What is the authority for saying this or that is trumpery ? The Bible ? That answer will not suffice ; because the moment that is introduced, the question comes up, What is the true sense of the Bible ? How determine that ? By private judgment ? But I have private judgment as well as you. If I am required

to submit my private judgment to yours, the right of private judgment is denied, and then you are as badly off as I. Moreover, our private judgments clash. You call some things trumpery which I revere as sacred. If the right of private judgment is admitted, you cannot be required to submit your private judgment to mine, nor I mine to yours. Where is the umpire to decide between us? The Presbyterian General Assembly? But, at the very worst, the authority of the Catholic Church is equal to the authority of the Presbyterian Assembly; why, then, shall I submit to the Assembly rather than to the Church? As a prudent man, how can I do so? Your Assembly is quite young and inexperienced. It represents a sect born only the other day, and which includes at best only a small portion—a very small portion—of those who profess to be Christians, and they no prodigies for their intelligence or their amiability. Who has given them authority to teach? What, in fact, is their authority, making all you can of it, before the Catholic Church, which now embraces, and which has embraced from the times of the Apostles, the overwhelming majority of all who profess, or have professed, the Christian religion, and from which you have pilfered all the Christianity you have? To exchange the authority of the Catholic Church for that of the Presbyterian Church would be like Glaucus exchanging his golden armor for the brazen armor of Diomed. Sure we are we should get only *brass* in return. No, no, most excellent Doctor, we cannot make so foolish an exchange. You must bring me higher authority than that of the Presbyterian Assembly, especially since it has *unchristened* itself, before its decision will suffice for determining what are the essential truths of the Christian religion, and what is mere “trumpery.”

For our part, we shrink from calling the devotion Catholics pay to the blessed Virgin and the saints by so harsh a word as “trumpery.” To brand with that name the uniform practice of the great mass of professed Christians for eighteen centuries, including the greatest, best, and holiest men and women that have ever lived, requires, to say the least, very respectable authority, and is not to be done lightly. Dr. Potts knows perfectly well that Catholics pay supreme worship to God alone, and that they are strictly forbidden by their religion to give that to a creature which is due only to God. We honor the blessed Virgin, we admit; for the angel Gabriel honored her, when he saluted her “full of grace”; for God himself honored her, when he chose to become her son, and to

love and obey her as his mother ; and we cannot believe it wrong for us to honor whom God and his holy angels honor. Dr. Potts, doubtless, professes to believe that Jesus Christ was both God and man, two distinct natures in one person, — that he was truly born of the Virgin Mary, and that she was literally and truly his mother, as much so as any woman is the mother of her son. If so, he must believe that she is still his mother, and that our blessed Lord still loves and honors her as such. If she is still his mother, if he still loves and honors her, he cannot regard it as “trumpery” that we, too, love and honor her. Would our Presbyterian friend regard it as a slight to himself, if such were our esteem for him that we loved and honored his mother for his sake ? Would he regard our disrespect of his mother as a proof of our love and esteem of him ? If he is not a bad son, he would be more offended at our want of respect to his mother than at our want of respect for himself, and would resent it quicker and more deeply. Was our blessed Lord not a good son ? Why, then, tell us it is “trumpery” for us to honor his Virgin Mother ? Alas ! how little does our Presbyterian minister know of the sublime mystery of the Incarnation ! How much does he lose by his ignorance of the exquisite tenderness and grace of that devotion which Catholics pay to the Mother of our Lord ; who by the Holy Ghost declared that henceforth all nations should call her “Blessed” ! St. Luke, i. 48.

Nor are we willing to regard it as “trumpery” to honor the saints. We have always supposed that the saints have honor in heaven, that God himself loves and honors every saint ; that to be loved and honored of God is included in the reward of sanctity. May I not love and honor whom God loves and honors ? If we love God, will not our hearts overflow with love to all that are dear to God ? And who are dearer to God than the saints who have washed their robes white in the blood of the Lamb, who have borne the cross here below, fought the good fight, won the victory, and now sing their triumph in songs of benediction and joy before the throne of God himself ? May we publicly assemble to honor the memory of the statesman, the patriot, and the hero, stained, perhaps, with a thousand vices and crimes ; and yet must not honor the saint whose life was fragrant with divine grace, and whose footsteps have hallowed the earth ? Or is our crime in the fact, that we believe the saint still lives, and that there is a blessed communion of saints, including the saints above and the saints below,

binding us all together as one body, united to God as the soul? May we request the suffrages of those we love, who are still in the flesh, and not the suffrages of those who are released from their bondage, and are now in the very presence of God? Has the departed saint lost a portion of his faculties, or has his heart become callous to the wants of those for whom, when he was in the flesh, he would willingly die? O, call not the devotion we pay to the saints, the interest we beg in their prayers, "trumpetry"! You know not what you say; and may the saints pray God to forgive you for blaspheming him in them!

We do not worship "relics." We regard and honor them for what they represent, or the worth to which they are related. They are memorials we value and treasure up. Has Dr. Potts never a memorial of a dear friend, now departed, with which he would not willingly part? Is that picture of his ever honored mother, which the pious son preserves with so much care, or that locket, which was her mother's, the pious daughter prizes so highly, mere trumpetry? The New Englander makes his pilgrimage to the rock on which our forefathers landed, and the descendants of the Pilgrims, when erecting in the old town of Plymouth *Pilgrim Hall*, place a fragment of that rock in its walls. The patriot feels rich in the cane, snuff-box, or paper-cutter, made from the wood of "Old Ironsides," and we saw but a few days since that the representative of our government in Peru had sent to the National Institute at Washington a fragment of the flag of Pizarro, together with one or two other valued relics. We go into our State House, and we see old muskets, swords, a headless drum, and other curious relics of the earlier Indian wars or of the Revolution, preserved with great care. All this is proper, and is commended by even the sternest of the Puritan race. But it is all "trumpetry" to preserve with respect the relics of a saint of God, one whose presence blessed the race of men, and who has been crowned in heaven! We may preserve with affectionate care the coat of Washington, or visit with reverential feeling the room where Voltaire penned his blasphemy, or the bed where he slept after having reviled the religion of God; but it is all "trumpetry," if the pious Christian preserves the sacred tunic worn by his Lord when he tabernacled with men, or finds his devotion quickened on beholding it. It is only the relics of those dear to God, who followed him in humility and all fidelity, who, by his grace, won immortal vic-

stories over the world, the flesh, and the devil, who came off more than conquerors through him who loved them ; it is only the sacred relics of such as these it is offensive to God that we should preserve, or "trumpery" that we should respect for the sake of the worth to which they are related. The lover may wear the picture of his mistress next his heart, and poets will sing his praise, and romancers immortalize him ; but if I wear next to mine the image of the Virgin Mother of my God, whose heart was transfixed with a sword of grief, as she saw her divine Son suffer and die that I might have life and joy, it is all "trumpery." You may fill your houses and grounds with statues of heathen gods and goddesses, naked dancing-girls, and wild bacchantes, or hang round your rooms the pictures of bandits, cut-throats, and villains ; but if I place in my study, or the Church places upon her altar, the image of the Crucifixion, or if in my devotions I kneel before the cross, or the image of the Queen of Saints, it is all "trumpery," besotted superstition, debasing idolatry ! O miserable Protestantism, thou wert born of contradictions ; thou stealest away the brains and petrifiest the hearts of thy votaries ! The fatal cup of Circe wrought not more frightful transformations in the companions of Ulysses, than thou dost in those who drink from thine.

The doctrines of purgatory, penance, and transubstantiation we pass over for the present ; but the charge, that Catholics adore "the bread," even Dr. Potts must be aware is not true, — not true, even if it were possible for us to be mistaken in the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. We do not adore the bread, for we do not believe there is any bread there. What we adore is not what we see with our eyes, what we detect with any of our senses, but our blessed Lord himself, whom we believe to be, not *represented*, but *concealed* under the appearance of bread and wine. Our adoration is intended for God, for the Incarnate God, — is directed to him, and is adoration of him, even if he be not present in the manner we believe. Yet it is not strange that Protestants, who regard themselves as the more enlightened portion of mankind, since they believe Jesus Christ is *represented* by a piece of bread, should suppose that Catholics must believe him to *be* bread ; for to believe him to be bread is, after all, not so far removed from believing that bread represents him as some may imagine.

But here is another curious extract.

“The Papal system of doctrine was never settled until the Council of Trent, which closed its sessions in 1564. Previous to this, Councils had dealt very much in formularies, and they had defined and changed, affirmed and condemned, in so many different ways, that it was no very unusual thing for that to be rank heresy in one section of the Church that was orthodox in another, and opinions of every shade and hue were held by different teachers in that communion. The Protestant controversy compelled Rome to settle her faith, and the great and last General Council convened at Trent in 1545 for this purpose. Their decrees, having been confirmed by the Pope, according to the doctrine of that Church, are infallible and unalterable.” — p. 8.

This is easily said, but not easily proved. That heresies have arisen in the Church, both before Luther and since, nobody denies ; but that they have ever been permitted in the Church by any portion of the Church is not true. The faith of the Church is always and everywhere the same, and never have individuals in one age or one country been authorized to hold what in another age or country has been counted heretical. No doubt, Protestantism would delight to find that the Church had contradicted herself ; but this, though often asserted, has never been made out, and never can be. The faith of the Church is that which the Church through her pastors teaches authoritatively, or commands her children to believe ; and she always and everywhere has commanded one and the same faith. It is in vain Protestants assert the contrary. They have never succeeded, and never can succeed, in adducing a single instance which impugns this statement. The holy Council of Trent made not the least alteration in the faith. It simply defined it more fully on certain points than it had been before, repeated several former definitions which had been controverted, and condemned the new heresies which had arisen. To say that the Catholic faith was not settled till the Council closed its sessions, in 1556, betrays either an ignorance or a recklessness which is by no means creditable to him who says so.

But here is something worse yet.

“It has been thought by Protestants, that, if there was one doctrine held by the Papal Church that was entirely free from error, it was that of the Trinity. Yet, in the Catechism of the Council of Trent, we find the following explanations on this subject : — ‘ Let him, however, who by the divine bounty believes these truths, constantly beseech and implore God, and the Father, who made all

things out of nothing, and orders all things sweetly, who gave us power to become the sons of God, and who made known to us the mystery of the Trinity, that, admitted, one day, into the eternal tabernacles, he may be worthy to see how great is the fecundity of the Father, who, contemplating and understanding himself, begot the Son like and equal to himself; how a *love of charity* in both, entirely the same and equal, *which is the Holy Ghost*, proceeding from the Father and the Son, connects the begetting and the begotten by an eternal and indissoluble bond; and that thus the essence of the Trinity is one, and the distinction of the three persons perfect.'—p. 27. So that a love of charity, proceeding from the Father and the Son, is, in the Romish notion, the Holy Ghost.

“Concerning the eternal generation of the Son the same Catechism gives us the following as an illustration:—‘As the mind, in some sort looking into and understanding itself, forms an image of itself, which theologians express by the term “word”; so God, as far, however, as we may compare human things to divine, understanding himself, begets the eternal word.’—p. 36. So far as this illustration teaches any thing, it is, that the Son of God is a representation of an idea in the mind of God.

“On the manner of Christ’s birth we have this remarkable instruction from the same source:—‘As the rays of the sun penetrate, without breaking or injuring in the least, the substance of glass; after a like, but more incomprehensible manner, did Jesus Christ come forth from his mother’s womb without injury to her maternal virginity, which, immaculate and perpetual, forms the just theme of our eulogy.’—p. 40. The humanity of Christ is here denied. He is not the seed of the woman, and no more a descendant from Adam than was the angel that wrestled with Jacob at Peniel. Now, whatever may be said of the orthodoxy of Rome, and the correctness of her teachings in other things, there can be but one opinion amongst Protestants concerning these views of her authorized standard; that the doctrines of the Trinity and the humanity of Christ, as we hold them, are denied.”—pp. 8, 9.

The objection to the first extract is, that the Holy Ghost is said to be the “love of charity,” *charitatis amor*,—but why this is objectionable the preacher does not tell us, and we do not know. The Father loves the Son with an eternal and infinite love, and the Son loves the Father with an eternal and infinite love, and from their mutual love *proceeds* infinite and Eternal Love, which is the Holy Ghost. This love is termed *amor charitatis*, because theologians distinguish several kinds of love; and the highest, purest, and most perfect love is what they term the “love of charity.” The word charity does not, as our learned preacher seems to imagine, express

the object of the love, but its quality, and determines the love in question to be that love which is termed charity, not some other kind of love, as, for instance, *amor concupiscentiæ*, or *amor amicitiaë*. The Catechism merely terms the Holy Ghost, in plain English, Charity, or most perfect love, proceeding from the charity or most perfect love of the Father for the Son, and of the Son for the Father. This is the worst that can be made of it. But what is there objectionable in this? Does not the Apostle St. John (1 St. John, iv. 16) say, *Deus charitas est*, or, as the Protestant version has it, "God is love"? If the blessed Apostle calls God charity, or love, why may not the Catechism call the Holy Ghost, who is God, also charity or love?

Does our Presbyterian minister fancy that he sees in the assertion, *charitatis amor qui Spiritus Sanctus est*, an attack on the personality, or, indeed, the substantiality, of the Holy Ghost? He must bear in mind, first, that, in the sentence he quotes, the Catechism is not defining nor even giving a general statement of the Mystery of the Holy Trinity; but in the paragraph from which it is taken is giving a caution against subtle speculations concerning this mystery, teaching that the words in which it is expressed are to be religiously observed, and admonishing us to pray diligently that we may be found worthy at last, when admitted into the eternal tabernacles, to see and understand what here we must believe on the authority of God, without seeking too curiously to ascertain how or why it is that God exists in unity of essence and trinity of persons. And in the second place, he must bear in mind that the doctrine of the Trinity, as it is to be received by faith, the Catechism here presupposes, because it had in the previous sections given a clear, distinct, and precise statement of it. We quote from the paragraph but one preceding the one from which the author takes his extract.

"Tres enim sunt in una divinitate personæ: Patris, qui à nullo genitus est; Filii, qui ante omnia sæcula à Patre genitus est; Spiritus sancti, qui itidem ab æterno ex Patre et Filio procedit. Atqui Pater est in una divinitatis substantia prima persona, qui cum unigenito Filio suo et Spiritu sancto unus est Deus, unus est Dominus, non in unius singularitate personæ, sed in unius Trinitate substantiæ. Jam verò hæc tres personæ, cùm in iis quidquid dissimile, aut dispar cogitare nefas sit, suis tantummodò proprietatibus distinctæ intelliguntur. Pater siquidem ingenitus est; Filius à Patre genitus; Spiritus sanctus ab utroque procedit. Atque ita

trium personarum eandem essentiam, eandem substantiam confitemur; ut in confessione veræ sempiternæque Deitatis, et in personis proprietatem, et in essentia unitatem, et in Trinitate æqualitatem piè et sanctè colendam credamus." — Art. I. 12.

If this does not satisfy the worthy preacher, the fault must be in himself.

The second extract is not fairly made. The Catechism of the Council of Trent is designed mainly to guide, direct, and assist pastors in the instruction of their flocks. It not only lays down what is of faith; but suggests the explanations which theologians adopt to enable the mind to conceive them with less difficulty. This is the case in the paragraph from which Dr. Potts quotes a part of a sentence. We quote the whole paragraph.

"Ex omnibus autem, quæ ad indicandum modum rationemque æternæ generationis similitudines afferuntur, illa proprius ad rem videtur accedere, quæ ab animi nostri cogitatione sumitur, quamobrem Sanctus Joannes Filium ejus, (1 Joan. i. 1,) Verbum appellat. Ut enim mens nostra, se ipsam quodammodo intelligens, sui effingit imaginem quam Verbum Theologi dixerunt; ita Deus, quantum tamen divinis humana conferri possunt, seipsum intelligens, verbum æternum generat; *etsi præstat contemplari, quod fides proponit, et sincerâ mente Jesum Christum verum Deum et verum hominem credere et confiteri, genitum quidem, ut Deum, ante omnium sæculorum ætates, ex Patre; ut hominem verò natum in tempore ex matre Maria Virgine.*"* — Art. II. 15.

There is here no occasion for comment. The idle objection of the preacher is not worth answering.

The third objection will vanish, the moment the preacher shall learn to distinguish between *conception* and *parturition*. The illustration is brought to enable us to conceive the possibility of the birth of our Lord without damage to the virginity of his mother, not to teach the silly heresy the sagacious Doc-

* "But of all those things which are made use of as similitudes to show the manner and way of his eternal generation, that seems to come nearest the matter which is taken from the thought of our mind; wherefore St. John calls the Son his Word. For, as our mind, in some manner understanding itself, forms an image of itself, which theologians call Word, so God (as far as human things may be compared with divine), understanding himself, generates his eternal Word; nevertheless it is better to contemplate what faith proposes, and with a sincere heart to believe and confess that Jesus Christ is true God and true man, begotten indeed, as God, of the Father, before all ages and generations, but, as man, born in time, of his mother the Virgin Mary."

tor deduces from it. The passage we have just quoted proves that the Church teaches the humanity no less than the divinity of our Saviour, as might well be inferred from the fact, that we call the blessed Virgin the mother of God, and as such delight to honor her.

If the Doctor has any doubts as to the soundness of our faith in the respects in which he seeks to impugn it, we refer him to the Athanasian creed, which he knows is authoritative for all Catholics, and which, with due deference to him, we must believe is express, not only against Arians, as he alleges, but against all who impugn the doctrine of the Trinity or that of the Incarnation. Did he ever read it? Has he ever found a Socinian, a Unitarian, or a Sabellian that could subscribe to it? Nay, what standard has he himself for the doctrine of the Trinity, but the Nicene and Athanasian creeds? And what evidence can he give that even he himself holds the true doctrine of the Trinity, but the fact, that he holds it as the Catholic Church has defined and still defines it?

The next objection the preacher makes to the Catholic Church is to her "rule of faith,"—that is, he objects that she does not adopt the Protestant rule of faith. The Protestant rule of faith is "the Bible alone." We deny it. The Bible alone is not and never can be the Protestant's rule of faith. The pretensions of Protestants in this respect are arrant nonsense or rank hypocrisy, with which they humbug themselves or seek to humbug others. Where in the Bible alone does this Presbyterian Doctor find his doctrine of infant baptism? his obligation or his right to keep the first day of the week, instead of the seventh, as the Sabbath day? nay, his doctrine of the Trinity itself? Separate the Bible from the commentary on it furnished by the belief and practice of the Church in all ages, leave merely the naked text, with grammar and lexicon, and there is not a man living who can maintain any consistent system of doctrines from it without doing violence to its letter and its spirit. It would be a book of riddles, and no one could make any thing out of it, except here and there a portion of it. If Protestants take the Bible alone, why do they differ so among themselves? why have they so many commentators? and why is it that those born and brought up Presbyterians, as a general rule, find the Bible teaching Presbyterianism, and those brought up Unitarians find it teaching Unitarianism? Every sect has its traditions, and by these it, consciously or unconsciously, interprets the Bible. It cannot avoid doing so, even if it would.

But what authority has the Protestant for asserting that the Bible alone is the rule of faith? He must establish his rule, and from the Bible itself, or he has no right to assume it. This he has never yet done, and this he never can do; for the Bible nowhere professes to be the rule of faith. It commands us to hear the Church, and assumes throughout that the Church is the ultimate authority in controversies concerning faith. Moreover, the Bible alone is not and cannot be the rule of faith. A rule of faith is that by which controversies concerning faith may be decided. But the Bible alone cannot decide controversies; for it is, in itself considered, a dead letter, and cannot speak till made to speak by some living authority, and because nearly all the controversies which arise are controversies concerning what is the faith as contained in it.

Our Presbyterian friend is quite indignant that the Church receives as canonical certain books which he is pleased to term apocryphal. Will he tell us on what authority he denies the canonicity of these books? Is not, even humanly speaking, the authority of the Council of Trent equal to any authority he can bring against it? We do not recollect any Protestant synod that has ever assembled, more respectable for their numbers, their learning, their ability, or their piety, than were the fathers of the Council of Trent. These decided, as the Church had previously decided and held, that the books in question were canonical; and the preacher must bring us an authority higher than theirs for saying they are not, before we shall be convinced they are not rightfully included in the sacred canon. He admits that the Presbyterian Church is fallible, and he can say no more of the Catholic Church. If his Church is fallible, it may err as to the canon as well as respecting other matters. Her authority, then, can never be a sufficient motive for setting aside the authority of the Catholic Church. How will he, then, prove to us, that in this very matter he himself is not the party in error?

The Church, it seems, errs not only in her rule of faith, but in her faith itself, especially in her doctrine of justification. She teaches concerning justification a doctrine which is different from the Protestant doctrine. Admitted. What then? Why, then, she is wrong. We beg your pardon. Before you can say we are wrong because we differ from you, you must prove that you are right; for, till then, it may be that you are wrong because you differ from us. But "the doctrine of justification by faith has ever been the peculiarly cherished doc-

trine of Protestants."— p. 10. Granted. But Protestants are fallible, and may have cherished with peculiar affection a falsehood. But "Luther pronounced it the doctrine by which the Church stands or falls."— *ib.* But Luther also said that all who entertain the views of the Eucharist taught by the Sacramentarians, which views the author of the sermon before us entertains, when they die, go straight to hell. Was Luther right in this? No? Then Luther was fallible. Then he may have erred in this doctrine of justification. Then how do you know he did not? By what criterion do you determine when Luther taught truth and when falsehood? From the Bible? But Luther had the Bible as well as you; and how know you that you understand the Bible better than he did? We also have the Bible, and we say the Bible is against you both; and how will you determine that your interpretations of Bible doctrine are better than ours? Do you say our Church is fallible? We deny it; but admit it, and even then it is as good as yours, for yours is not infallible.

But this is not all. Luther's doctrine of justification by faith alone is rejected by many Protestants themselves. Swedenborg sends Luther to hell for teaching it; the Unitarians, Universalists, Quakers, some Anglicans, the Genevans, the majority of the French Protestants, and a great part of the German Protestants, virtually, if not avowedly, reject it. It is hardly true to say of any Protestant sect, at the present day, that it really holds it as it was taught by Luther and his brother innovators. Dr. Potts ought in justice to convert his Protestant brethren to this doctrine, before making it a ground of accusation against the Church that she does not teach it. If she were to accept it, she would gain nothing, for she would still be arraigned by Protestants, who, with Bible in hand, would undertake to convict her of accepting a false doctrine.

Moreover, the doctrine in question is a very bad doctrine. As originally set forth by the Reformers, it is, Believe firmly that God remits your sins for Christ's sake, and you are justified, without any respect to a moral change which may be effected in you. The justified man, morally considered, or considered in relation to his actual intrinsic character, is just as much of a sinner as he was before justification. The only difference between the justified and the unjustified is, that the sins of the former are not imputed, while the sins of the latter are. Thus you may sin as much as you please, but so long as you believe firmly that God remits your sins for

Christ's sake, not one of the sins you commit will be imputed to you, or reckoned as sin. This was Luther's doctrine, and hence, when a young man asks him his advice as to the best manner of resisting the temptations of the Devil, tells him to drink, get drunk, to sin lustily and spite the Devil. But to justify signifies to make just, and no man destitute of justice is justified. The error of the Protestants is in placing justification in the simple remission of sin. Sin may be remitted, and yet the man want justice. Consequently the remission is not alone justification. God is a God of truth, and can call no man just who is not just. But we will let another speak for us in this matter.

“ ‘Justification’ is that action or operation of Divine Grace on the soul by which a man passes from the state of sin; from an enemy, becomes a friend of God, agreeable in the Divine sight, and an heir to eternal life. This act of transition from the one state to the other, with its operating causes, is called ‘justification.’ From the circumstance of its being a spiritual and interior operation, it is evident that it affords an opportunity for theological subtleties to those who would make use of it; and, at the same time, renders it difficult to expose the error which those subtleties may be employed to foster. The Church, therefore, has always preserved her ancient and orthodox teaching under the form of sound words, which heresy has ever betrayed itself by refusing to adopt.

“ Thus, in both communions, justification is acknowledged to be, as to its efficient source, from, and through, and by Jesus Christ alone. But in the Catholic system, this justification, occurring in the modes of the Saviour's appointment, is not only the imputation, but also the interior application, of the justice of Christ, by which guilt is destroyed, pardon bestowed, and the soul replenished by the inherent grace and charity of the Holy Spirit.

“ According to the Protestant principle, justification is when a man believes with a firm and certain faith or conviction in his own mind that the justice of Christ is ‘imputed’ to him. This is that ‘faith alone’ by which they profess to be saved. The sacraments, for them, have no other end or efficacy, except as signs to awaken this individual and personal faith, so called, and as tokens of communion. Neither is it that any intrinsic or interior operation takes place in the soul by this, in which she is changed, by a transition from the state of sin, now remitted and destroyed, to a state of justice wrought for her and in her, by the application of the merits and infusion of the grace of Christ. No; this is the Catholic doctrine. But, according to the Protestant principle, no such change takes place. According to that principle, the impious man is not made just, even by the adoption of God, or the merits

of Christ. But, leaving him in his injustice, it is conceived that his sins are no longer imputed to him, but that the justice of Christ is imputed to him. Thus, a criminal is under guilt and condemnation; but, in consideration of a powerful and innocent intercessor, the chief magistrate pardons him. It is only by a certain fiction of thought and language that such a person can be considered innocent; or that his intrinsic guilt can be conceived of as still existing, but as imputed to the one who interceded for him, and the justice of that intercessor imputed to him. Such is the exact likeness of justification, as taught in the theology of Protestantism. But it is to be observed that the sphere which is assigned as the seat of this species of fiction is the mind of God himself! The sinner is not intrinsically or really justified in this system; but we are told that God, on account of the merits of Christ, is pleased to regard and 'repute' him as such; that is, God 'reputes' him to be what, in reality, he knows him not to be!

"St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans, speaks of the faith of Abraham as having been reputed to him unto justice. And Luther, to meet the exigencies of his case, seized on the letter of this passage, and distorted its spirit and meaning. God had made rich promises to Abraham and his posterity. The hope of this promise was in his son Isaac. And God, to try the faith of his servant, directed Abraham to immolate this, his only son, as a sacrifice to his name.

"Such an order, under such circumstances, was calculated to throw deep and impenetrable mystery over the previous promises treasured up in the mind of the patriarch. Nevertheless, he falters not in his confidence, but obeys without a moment's hesitation. He sinks all the apprehensions arising from the suggestions of flesh and blood, and, in the simplicity of his confidence, prepares to execute what had been commanded. And it is only when his hand is uplifted to strike, that God manifests his acceptance of the will, which, however, embraced the work itself, that he is no longer permitted to execute.

"Such was the faith of Abraham. But it is evident that it embraced the works, and that, so far as obedience, will, intention, purpose, and even feelings, were concerned, Abraham had already completed the sacrifice. Thus, the same Apostle writes in the Epistle to the Hebrews, ii. 17, 'By faith Abraham, when he was tried, offered Isaac; and he that had received the promises offered up his only begotten son.'

"As, however, the outward immolation was not actually or physically consummated, Luther was pleased to exclude it altogether from the faith of Abraham, contrary to the express words of St. Paul himself. The error of Luther has been incorporated, with but slight modifications, into the theology of all the other Protestant

denominations. Hence the doctrine of salvation by 'faith alone.' By faith, to use their own phraseology, the sinner 'seizes' on the merits of Christ, — by believing firmly that they are 'imputed' to him. It is not that by this he is made just or innocent, but God is pleased to *declare*, to *suppose*, to *repute*, — let us say it with reverence, — to *imagine* him as such. It is all God's work; he has not the smallest share in it; and thence the seductive boast of the system, that thus 'all the glory returns to God, and nothing to man.' Under the same plea, good works were decried as hindrances, rather than helps, in the matter of justification. It was supposed, indeed, that, by a necessary consequence, they would appear in the life of the believer, as the fruit and evidence of his faith. But even then they could be of no advantage to the soul. Neither could sin, except that of unbelief alone, defeat its salvation. To such a point of insanity did Luther carry his doctrine on this subject, that he declares, that, 'if adultery could be committed in faith, it would not be a sin.' 'Si in fide fieri posset adulterium, peccatum non esset.' — *Luth. Disput. t. 1. p. 523.*"*

This is sufficient, and far more to the purpose than any thing we could ourselves say, and shows conclusively that Catholics "depend for salvation on the merits of Christ alone." These merits obtain for us not only the grace of forgiveness, but also the grace of justification, whereby our works are rendered meritorious. They are the source and ground of our merit, and without them we could merit nothing. Thus, in our act of Hope, we say, "O my God! relying on thy goodness and promises, I hope to obtain forgiveness for my sins, and life everlasting, through the merits of Jesus Christ, my only Lord and Redeemer."

The author of the sermon makes further quotations from the Council of Trent, which, he says, teach that "all true righteousness is at first imparted, then increased, and afterwards restored if lost," by the holy Sacraments (p. 11). Well, what then?

"These quotations are sufficient to show the groundwork of the Papal plan of salvation; *the Sacraments by their own power confer grace; thus the believer is regenerated by baptism, united to Christ by the Eucharist, is then able to keep the whole law, and deserves heaven for his good works.* A plan that is the very opposite of Christ's, as revealed in the word of God. And if salvation is only

* Rt. Rev. John Hughes, D. D., Bishop of New York. From the Introduction to "An Inquiry into the Merits of the Reformed Doctrine of 'Imputation,' as contrasted with those of 'Catholic Imputation.'" By Vanbrugh Livingston." New York. 1843.

found by embracing Christ's plan, then the Papal system, so far from teaching the essential truths of salvation, teaches a system that will inevitably destroy the soul. If the question is asked, Are there not true Christians in that Church? My answer is, I think so; but they are the children of God, not *because* of the teachings of that Church, but *notwithstanding* those teachings. They are those, who, from the word of God, have gathered the system of Christ, and hold a plan of faith the opposite of that of Rome, whilst they still continue in her communion, instead of obeying God's command, 'Come out of her, my people.'— p. 12.

"The Sacraments confer grace by their own power"; but what is their own power? Simply the power of God, who instituted them. He is himself the *causa efficiens* operating in the Sacrament. Is it contrary to Christianity to look upon God as conferring grace? "The believer is regenerated by Baptism." Very well. Is it contrary to Christianity to assert that the individual is regenerated by the Holy Ghost in the Sacrament of Baptism? If we asserted that the water used in baptism, or the words pronounced by the administrator, regenerated, as efficient causes, the recipient, we should doubtless contradict the "plan of salvation." But we see no contradiction in saying that one is regenerated in baptism by the Holy Ghost operating in it. If any one should have called the burning bush that Moses saw God, he would have been wrong, and yet he might have said God was in the bush. The Sacraments are instrumental causes of grace, but God is himself the efficient cause. "We merit heaven by our good works." Granted, if be understood good works wrought in us by grace, or by us through grace; otherwise, we deny it. The merit comes through the grace, which itself comes through the merits of Christ, and therefore it is only through the merits of Christ that we do or can merit heaven. The merit itself is of grace, not of nature. Nothing we are naturally able to do does or can merit eternal life. Our Saviour says, "Without me ye can do nothing." We do not merit the grace; that is freely bestowed in reward of the merits of Jesus Christ, and it is only through that grace working effectually in and through us that we are enabled to merit everlasting life.

Our liberal Presbyterian minister, we are gratified to perceive, thinks there may, after all, be some Christians in the Catholic Church. We are much obliged to him, and shall be still more obliged to him when he proves that there can be good Christians out of the Catholic Church. He asks us to

come out of her. Well, where shall we go, if we leave her? Into the Presbyterian communion, and offend by so doing the immense majority of the Protestant world? When all Protestants will agree as to what is the true Church of Christ, the true Christian faith, and "Gospel ordinances," we will consider the question of leaving the Church, but till then we cannot entertain it. We have had disputation and vexation enough for our short life, and we cannot consent to come out of the Church, unless we know where and to what we are to come. As matters now stand, we should, if we joined the Presbyterians, be assured by five hundred other sects that we were wrong. And the Scriptures also say something about the dog returning to his vomit, and the sow to her wallowing in the mire. We have been a Presbyterian once.

The preacher (p. 13) speaks of the "idoltrous services" of the Catholic Church. We answered this charge of idolatry in our last Review, and have no occasion to say any thing in addition to what we then said. The charge is as silly as it is false. Yet one cannot but be grieved at the ignorance or the malice that makes it, and at the fatal effect it has in keeping the great mass of Protestants from the way of life.

After these charges, the preacher proceeds to sketch the history of the Jesuits, and to show what an intriguing and dangerous set of mortals they are. We have no room to follow him through this part of his discourse. He falls, of course, into almost as many errors as he makes assertions. But we must leave them for the present. In the mean time we cannot forbear expressing our full conviction that the Society of Jesus is under the special guidance of Almighty God, and that he will avenge himself on its persecutors. France warred against the Jesuits and expelled them; she had her reward;—Spain warred against the Jesuits and expelled them; she is now reaping her reward. We want no better proof of the sanctity and utility of the Order than the fact, that Protestants, infidels, and tyrants are everywhere opposed to it. It is remarkable now what dread the word *Jesuit* inspires. Who are the Jesuits? Simple priests vowed to poverty, devoted chiefly to educational and missionary labors, without power or influence, save what is in their faith, talents; learning, zeal, and sanctity. When such men inspire terror, the just may take courage, and thank God that we have them. The Order is unquestionably one of the most efficient instruments in the hands of God for recalling the erring, confirming the wavering, converting the

unbelieving, and of consolidating the empire of our Lord in the hearts and lives of men, and hence the hostility it everywhere has encountered and still encounters. Hence the nations rage and the people devise vain things against it ; hence the wicked foam at the mouth and gnash their teeth, and kings and princes conspire against it. In vain. "Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me ? It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks." The Lord knoweth how to defend his own. This Order is dear to him, and for the sake of its saints and martyrs he will protect it and crown it with new honors.

To hear people talk, one would think half the world were Jesuits. They swarm everywhere. One cannot turn over a leaf, but a Jesuit will start up. They are omnipresent. They are omnipotent. They are at the bottom of all movements, — of every intrigue, every outbreak. Nobody is safe. Yet the Order counts in all less than five thousand members, dispersed on missions among infidels, or employed in the quiet and simple business of education. It is strange that such a small company of men should create so much terror and alarm. Alas, "conscience makes cowards of us all."

Dr. Potts tells us, "The children in the Ecclesiastical States are kept in ignorance." — p. 13. The population of the Ecclesiastical States is about two and a half millions. In these States there are seven universities ; and in the city of Rome, with a population of a hundred and fifty thousand, there are for the children of the poorer and middle classes at least three hundred and eighty schools, the greater part of them supported by private munificence. To assert that the Church holds that "ignorance is the mother of devotion" (*ib.*) betrays more ignorance than malice. If it were so, we should have fewer Protestants in the world. The Church undoubtedly holds that there may be false learning, false philosophy, deceitful, vain, that puffs up, makes its possessors wise in their own conceit, indocile, and unwilling to bow in meekness and humility to the word of God ; and such learning and philosophy she unquestionably does not encourage ; for she holds and teaches what her invisible Spouse has said, that "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." But real knowledge, but true learning, that knowledge and learning which make "wise unto salvation," she does her best to impart and diffuse. Would that we could say as much of her calumniators.

For ourselves, we do not suffer ourselves to be humbugged

by the cry about education. Give us the right sort of education, and the more of it the better ; give us the wrong sort, and the less of it the better. Our people are a reading people ; better that they could not read than that they should read the miserable trash the press is now sending forth. We have lived long enough to learn that not every "whitened heap yonder" is to be taken as so much flour. Immense danger may lurk under specious names. We are, as we have always been, the friends of education, but not of bad education, or of an education which educates for earth instead of heaven, for the devil instead of God.

The author of the sermon thinks the aim of the Jesuits in this country is, by the education of youth, to counterwork Protestantism (p. 17). What ! is the Doctor afraid of education ? Is Protestantism not proof against light ? We thought it was the boast of its friends that it was born of the advanced intelligence of the human race, and had the capacity to expand and adapt itself to every change of the human intellect. A moment ago, the Doctor upbraided us with our love of ignorance, accused us of not educating our children ; and now he is afraid, if we educate, it will be all up with Protestantism. Really, it is a hard thing to please a Presbyterian Doctor of Divinity.

"They [the Jesuits] will involve this land in troubles and conflicts." — *ib.* The truth never yet was preached, but it produced troubles and conflicts. Our blessed Lord himself said, "Think not that I am come to send peace on earth." No doubt, if the Gospel is preached here truly, faithfully, boldly, by its earnest and devoted missionaries, the wicked will be offended, and the devil will do his best to stir up troubles and conflicts. But we would rather have war than peace with error, with sin, with the world, with the flesh, with the devil. If Dr. Potts would not, then all we have to say is, that he does not appear to agree with our Lord and his Apostles.

But they will gain an influence which they will turn to the ruin of liberty (*ib.*). But we thought one of the principal charges against the Jesuits was, that they were the enemies of crowned heads, and king-killers. If so, they must be ultrarepublicans. In monarchical governments they are dreaded as enemies of the monarchy, in republics as the enemies of popular liberty ! This is singular. We have before us the *Remonstrance for the Divine Right of Kings*, written by the English Solomon, the learned King Jamie, in which he labors

to prove that the Catholic Church is at war with kingly government, and for that reason ought not to be tolerated. Our American Calvinists, men who began here by founding a theocracy, or rather a *minister-ocracy*, and made church-membership the condition of citizenship, are now terribly alarmed lest the Jesuits shall overthrow democracy and set up a king. When our Calvinistic brethren shall show that they have some regard for any other liberty than the liberty of governing, we will listen to their fears on this head. We are Americans as well as they, love our country as much, and have as much at stake as any one of them; for, in becoming a Catholic, we did not cease to be a man, a citizen, or a patriot; and we are as well convinced as we are that we are now writing, that the preservation and wholesome working of our democratic institutions depend on the general prevalence among our people of the Catholic religion. We say this not merely as the Catholic convert, but as the citizen who has not wholly neglected political and philosophical studies.

But it seems that "the character of the instruction imparted in our schools has nothing in it giving them a peculiar claim to popular favor, unless it be their prices."—p. 16. Perhaps the Doctor is not a competent judge. It is possible, also, that he is not acquainted with all the names the order has produced since its restoration, for we could mention some of the names which are at least "above mediocrity." As educators, the French University seems to stand in awe of them. The Doctor would do well to become acquainted with their schools, before undertaking to discuss their merits. Perhaps, were he to do so, he would not hazard the assertion, that "a graduate of one of these universities is not qualified to enter the junior class at Princeton, Yale, or any of the more respectable Protestant colleges of our land." The regular course of studies in our Jesuits' colleges is as thorough, as extensive, and of as high an order, as that of the best Protestant colleges, and those who take the regular and full course will have, on graduating, no occasion to regard themselves as inferior to the graduates of Protestant universities. University education in this country, whether by Catholics or Protestants, is, however, we are willing to admit, far from being what it should be. The characteristic of our people is to "go ahead." We are impatient, averse to long, slow, and toilsome labor. What we cannot do quickly we will not do at all. We will not spend the time necessary to become thorough scholars; consequently

the whole scholarship of the country, with a few individual exceptions, is limited and superficial. The Jesuits cannot at once overcome this. Their education becomes necessarily in some degree *Americanized*, and is, no doubt, less thorough than it is generally abroad, or than it will be here when their colleges have had time to become more thoroughly established and are more liberally supported.

But be this as it may, the Jesuits' colleges are admirably adapted to the present wants of the Catholic population. They suit us very well, and whether they suit Protestants or not is a matter of small moment. We ourselves have four sons in the colleges of the Jesuits, and, in placing them there, we feel that we are discharging our duty as a father to them, and as a citizen to the country. We rest easy, for we feel they are where they will be trained up in the way they should go ; where their faith and morals will be cared for, which with us is the great thing. It is more especially for the moral and religious training which our children will receive from the good fathers that we esteem these colleges. Science, literature, the most varied and profound scholastic attainments, are worse than useless, where coupled with heresy, infidelity, or impiety.

As to the female schools under the charge of the Ursulines, the Sisters of Charity, of the Visitation, the Sacred Heart, &c., we want no better proof of their excellence than the simple fact, that Protestants, notwithstanding their prejudices against the religious orders, send, and are eager to send, their daughters to them, and feel that they are safe so long as under the more than maternal care of the good sisters. That it is not the price that induces Protestant parents to send their daughters to our schools is evident from the fact, that the project for a sort of female university, started by some good Protestant ladies, at Cincinnati, if we have not been misinformed, cannot be got under way for the want of scholars, notwithstanding the expense for the pupil is to be merely nominal. The institute has funds in abundance, ladies who are pledged to instruct gratuitously, and nothing is wanting but scholars. Unhappily, these cannot be got for either love or money.

The disparaging terms in which Dr. Potts speaks of the instruction imparted by the sisters are natural enough from a Presbyterian minister, but may be refuted at any time by a few minutes' conversation with a young lady educated in one of our female academies. There is something in the very atmosphere of the Catholic schools that gives an inexpressible charm

to the female character, which we have never found in a Protestant, not brought up in some degree under Catholic influence. There is a purity, a delicacy, a sweetness, a gentleness, a grace, a dignity, about a Catholic lady, that you shall look in vain for in a purely Protestant lady, however high-born or well-bred. It is only in the Catholic lady that woman appears in all her loveliness, worth, and glory. It is Catholicity that has wrought out woman's emancipation, elevated her from her former menial condition, rescued her from the harem of the voluptuary, and made her the companion, and not unfrequently more than the companion, of man. Every Catholic daughter has a model of excellence in the Blessed Virgin, and not in vain from earliest infancy is she taught to lisp *Ave Maria, gratia plena, Dominus tecum; benedicta tu in mulieribus*; for the Holy Mother rains grace and sweetness on all who devote themselves to her honor and implore her protection.

The association with those who honor the Blessed Virgin, see in her the model of every female grace and every female virtue, and whom she honors with her special protection, is not without its chastening and hallowing influence, and the loveliest and the noblest Protestant ladies we have ever known are those who have been educated in Catholic schools. The good sisters have nothing to fear from the aspersions of Dr. Potts. Their pupils will speak for them, and constitute their defence. Yet, if Protestants do not like our schools, all we have to say is, let them go and institute better ones, — if they can.

But enough. We have lingered too long upon this not very remarkable sermon; but as we have done little else than to make it the thread on which to string some observations, perhaps not wholly uncalled for nor inappropriate to the time and country, we hope we shall be forgiven. The Church may be assailed, will be assailed; but we know it is founded on a rock, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. It is now firmly established in this country, and persecution will but cause it to thrive. Our countrymen may be grieved that it is so; but it is useless for them to kick against the decrees of Almighty God. They have had an open field and fair play for Protestantism. Here Protestantism has had free scope, has reigned without a rival, and proved what she could do, and that her best is evil; for the very good she boasts is not hers. A new day is dawning on this chosen land; a new chapter is about to open in our history, — and the Church to assume her rightful position and influence. Ours shall yet be-

come consecrated ground, and here the kingdom of God's dear Son shall be established. Our hills and valleys shall yet echo to the convent-bell. The cross shall be planted throughout the length and breadth of our land, and our happy sons and daughters shall drive away fear, shall drive away evil from our borders, with the echoes of their matin and vesper hymns. No matter who writes, who declaims, who intrigues, who is alarmed, or what leagues are formed, this is to be a Catholic country; and from Maine to Georgia, from the broad Atlantic to broader Pacific, the "clean Sacrifice" is to be offered daily for quick and dead.

ART. IV. — *Methodist Quarterly Review for July, 1845.*

ART. VII. *Brownson's Quarterly Review, No. V. 1845.*

THE *Methodist Quarterly Review* for July, 1844, contained a paper on the literary policy of the Church of Rome; the avowed purpose of which was "to exhibit the proofs that the Church of Rome has ever waged a deadly warfare upon the liberty of the press, and upon literature; and that her expurgatory and prohibitory policy has been continued to the present hour; not only against the truth of revelation, but equally against the truth in nature and in science,—both learning and religion having been the doomed victims of her perennial despotism." To this paper, so far as concerned hostility to the press, literature, and science, we replied in our *Review* for last January. To this reply of ours the article before us is a rejoinder, attempting to make good the original charges, notwithstanding what we alleged against them.

In our reply we retorted the charge of unfriendliness to literature upon the Methodists themselves, who, we said, had originally manifested a great contempt for human science and learning, and cannot, in this country at least, boast of having made a single permanent contribution either to literature or science. The *Review* thinks this charge is not true, for one Mr. Elliot has written "A Delineation of Roman Catholicism," which has even been republished in England. We confess, when we wrote, we had not heard of this work, and we have not yet seen it; but we will engage beforehand that it is nothing

but a tissue of falsehood, misrepresentation, ignorance, impudence, sophistry, and malice; in the main, a mere repetition of what Protestants have been constantly repeating from the first, and which has been refuted time and again. We are always safe in saying this of any work written by a Protestant against Catholicity, and, *a fortiori*, of a work written by a Methodist. Yet if the author or Reviewer will send us a copy of the work, and we find on actual examination that we are mistaken as to its real character, we will make all necessary retractions.

We stated that "the Methodist press is, if we are rightly informed, under the strict surveillance of the bishops and elders." The Reviewer says we are wrongly informed, for the bishops and elders have no power over it whatever. Yet he tells us the editors and agents are appointed by the Conferences, and are aided by the advice of a council (p 458). The Conferences are composed of "bishops and elders." The bishops and elders, then, appoint the editors and agents, and we presume also the council of advice. We should think this were exercising *some* power over the press. Furthermore, in the intervals of the General Conference, these editors and agents are accountable, the Reviewer tells us, for their *official* conduct, "to the book committee, who have power, after due forms of trial and conviction, to *displace* them for malpractice." — p. 459. The book committee must be appointed by the particular Conferences, or by the General Conference, and in either case by the bishops and elders. The bishops and elders, then, through the book committee, exercise a strict surveillance over the Methodist press. The point on which we were intent was, that the Methodist press is not free, and we find, by the Reviewer's own admissions, it is less free than we had supposed. There is a power which appoints the editors and agents, furnishes them a council of advice, and then there is a tribunal to which they are accountable, before which they can be tried and convicted, and which has power to *displace* them for malpractice; that is, should they publish what their masters disapprove. Surely, this is subjecting the press to a very stringent control, and we must still retain our opinion that the charge against the Catholic Church of hostility to a free press comes with an ill grace from a Methodist.

We stated, also, that "the Methodist people generally have great scruples about purchasing books, even of their own de-

nomination, when not published by their own book society." The Reviewer says this is not true. We know from our own knowledge that it *was* true a few years since to some extent, and we know, and the Reviewer admits, that the Methodist elders do "urge their people to patronize their publishing establishments."—p. 459. It seems, however, we were wrong in speaking of their "book society," for they have no book society, but a "book concern." We acknowledge our mistake. The simple fact is, the Methodist denomination is itself, properly speaking, a huge society, and this society carries on a large book concern, and seeks as far as possible to monopolize the whole publishing business of its members.

We denied that the Catholic Church has ever been hostile to the liberty of the press, and asserted that the Reviewer had not adduced a single fact in proof of his charge. In the article before us, he appears to think we were wrong in this; for he adduced some extracts from the encyclical letter of the Holy Father, bearing date August 16 (15), 1832, which goes far at least to prove it. We had, and now have, that letter before us, but it does not sustain the charge we denied. The Reviewer misquotes and perverts the sense of the passages he professes to give. The Holy Father does not declare, "Liberty of conscience is an absurd and erroneous opinion, or rather a mad conceit," as the Reviewer asserts; but that the opinion, that liberty is to be asserted and maintained for the conscience of each one, is absurd and erroneous, or rather a madness. *Atque ex hoc putidissimo indifferentismi fonte absurda illa fuit ac erronea sententia, seu potius deliramentum, asserendam esse ac vindicandam cuilibet libertatem conscientia.* What is condemned is not liberty of conscience, rightly understood, but that false view of the liberty of conscience which releases conscience from all obligation to conform to the truth, and which makes the conscience of each the sovereign arbiter in all cases whatsoever. Conscience is free, has all its rights, when subjected only to the will of God; but that its freedom demands that it must in no instance be restrained,—that the individual, under plea of conscience, must be free to conform or not conform to the law of God,—free to run into any and every excess of error and delusion, to subvert all religious, social, and domestic order, is indeed an absurd and erroneous opinion, a real delusion, which every right-minded man must condemn. That the Holy Catholic Church does not allow liberty of conscience in this sense, which is not liberty,

but license, we have never denied, and trust we never shall. The Church leaves the conscience all the liberty, that is, all the rights, it has by the law of God. If the Reviewer is not satisfied with this, he must bring his complaint against his Maker, not against the Church.

In fact, this notion of the unbounded license of conscience no man in his sober senses can undertake to defend. We remember to have read some years ago, in one of the Protestant missionary journals, of a pious Protestant convert among the heathen, who, on her dying bed, having but a poor appetite, thought she might, perhaps, eat the *little finger of a very young child, if nicely cooked!* This her conscience permitted. Was the liberty of her conscience to be respected? The conscience of the Anabaptists required them to run naked through the streets, and that of the early Quakers required them, especially the women, to go naked into the religious assemblies and prophesy. Was their conscience to be respected at the expense of public decency? There is, or at least was two or three years ago, a new religious sect in Western New York, who reject marriage, allow promiscuous sexual intercourse, and practise various obscene and filthy rites which we dare not name. Is the liberty of their conscience to be respected? There was, too, Matthias, the famous New York prophet, whose queer conscience commanded him to claim his neighbour's property and his neighbour's wife as his own. Was the liberty of his conscience to be allowed? We have a friend who is conscientiously opposed to paying taxes to the government. Shall the government respect his conscience, and exempt him from the payment of taxes? We have another friend who believes it decidedly wrong to use money. So, when he steps on board the steamboat at New York for Boston, he insists on having a free passage, because his conscience will not let him pay for it. Shall he go scot-free through the world? One man is conscientiously opposed to the observance of Sunday; do you respect the liberty of his conscience? Another is opposed to the employment of chaplains by legislative assemblies; do you respect his liberty of conscience? Not at all.

It is evident from what we have advanced, that some bounds are, and must be, set to the license of conscience, — that there must be somewhere a limit beyond which the plea of conscience is not to be entertained. But where is this limit? Where are these bounds? Who shall determine? The individual for himself? No; for that would be to leave con-

science without any restraint whatever ; because *conscience is each man's own judgment of what the law of God commands or permits*. If you leave the individual to determine for himself, you leave conscience without law. You must, too, respect the determination of one as much as that of another. Individuals as such are all equal, and you have no right to prefer the judgment of one to that of another. The judgment of the Libbeyite of Western New York, of Matthias, the prophet, of the anti-Sabbatarian, of the anti-chaplainite, must be held as respectable as your own. This, then, will not do. If any bounds are to be set to conscience, it must be by an authority above the individual, and which may command the individual, and enforce its commands on the individual.

What is this authority ? The civil government ? We deny it ; for the civil government, except as the executive of the commands of a more ultimate authority than its own, has no right to meddle with conscience. Shall it be the authority of some one of the sects ? Which one ? Why one rather than another ? Of all the sects combined ? That is impossible ; because one will insist that the law of God allows a latitude to conscience which another denies, and their agreement is out of the question. But waive this ; we still say no ; because the sects are all, taken singly or together, by their own confession, fallible, and may, therefore, misjudge, allow what the law of God prohibits, and forbid what the law of God permits. Moreover, conscience is accountable only to God, and to subject it to any fallible authority is intolerable tyranny. If, then, there be not on earth an authority through which Almighty God speaks, and interprets infallibly his own law, you have and can have no authority for restraining the licentiousness of conscience. But, if you have such authority, whatever restraints it imposes on conscience will be restraints imposed by the law of God, and therefore restraints perfectly compatible with the liberty of conscience. The authority of the Catholic Church is such authority, and therefore her control of conscience is not, and never can be, an attack on the liberty of conscience. It leaves it all the freedom Almighty God gives it, and that is all it has a right to demand.

The same or similar remarks may be made in reference to the freedom of opinion. The unrestricted freedom of opinion is no more permitted by the law of God than is the unrestricted freedom of conscience. The Holy Father condemns not the liberty of opinion, properly so called, but the *immoderata*

libertas opinionum, that is, the licentiousness of opinions. If there be any truth in Christianity, the mind is as accountable to God as the body, and licentiousness of mental action is as reprehensible as the licentiousness of bodily action. We are as accountable for our opinions as we are for our deeds. Else what means the confession we all make, that "we have sinned in *thought*, word, and deed"? If there is no law to which the mind is accountable, there can be no sin in thought, for sin is the transgression of the law; and where there is no law, there is, and can be, no transgression of the law. If there be a law to which the mind is accountable, then are we bound to conform to it, and are not free to do what it prohibits. Then the liberty of mind, of thought, of opinion, as well as the liberty of conscience, has its limits. And is it not so? Is there a Christian who dares assert that we are free to think and form opinions which are repugnant to the law of God? No; and we dare tell even this godless generation, let it declaim as grandiloquently as it pleases about the inalienable rights of the freeborn mind, that the mind has no rights but what Almighty God gives it, and we have no right to think what he forbids. We are bound to submit our very thoughts and imaginations to his divine law.

We say the same as to freedom of speech. We may sin in *word* as well as in *deed*. Speech, then, is subjected to the law of God; and the liberty of speech is only the liberty to say that which the law of God permits. We shall be called to account before God for our words, as well as for our thoughts and deeds. There is, then, a limit beyond which the liberty of speech does not and cannot extend. To prohibit beyond that limit is not to abridge the freedom of speech, nor to make war upon it; because, beyond that limit, Almighty God has given man no freedom of speech.

The principle here asserted is applicable to the press. The press is nothing but public speech, and its liberty must be subject to all the restrictions to which the law of God subjects thought and speech in general. The press has no liberty to publish what is contrary to the law of God, and when it is forbidden to publish what is contrary to the law of God, its license is indeed restrained, but its liberty is left untouched. We are not ignorant that this question of the press is a delicate question, and one on which it is impossible to speak as a Christian man should speak, without giving to the ill-natured and wicked an opportunity to pervert your meaning, and make the great

mass of the people believe you mean what you do not mean. But it is a question that presses home upon every parent, every citizen, not to say every Christian. The licentiousness of the press at home and abroad has become so great as to threaten all that is dear and sacred. Every thing venerable, every thing sacred in religion, in the state, in the family, is attacked with remorseless fury. Our youth grow pale over publications which pervert their understandings, extinguish every virtuous sentiment, and excite to terrible activity every evil propensity. Respectable booksellers keep, if not on their counters, at least on their back shelves, books which the Christian father or mother would be filled with horror to see in the hands of a son or a daughter. And those mischievous works are sent out at a price that places them within the reach of even the poorest. The infection becomes universal. No rank, no age, no sex, no condition, escapes it. Is this a time to talk of the blessings of a free press? Books are companions, and bad books are bad companions, the very worst species of companions. They are made by the base and remorseless the vehicles of corrupting the innocent and unsuspecting. The licentious and designing have only to send a selection from the cheap publications of the day before them, and the way is prepared for them to follow. They have, too, books of all kinds, adapted to all dispositions. Our homes are no longer sacred. Corruption steals in by our very firesides, and we close our eyes and ears, lest we discover it in those nearest and dearest to our hearts. Will you tell us this is the inevitable consequence of a free press, and that, if you touch the freedom of the press, you take away the palladium of our liberty? Liberty! What is liberty, where the moral health of the people is gone, where virtue ceases to exist, and your community is nothing but a mass of rottenness?

Some restraint on the licentiousness of the press is unquestionably necessary. This the Methodist Reviewer admits, p. 464, in admitting that Protestant sects make the reading of books "of an irreligious tendency" a matter of discipline. What restraint is necessary, or by whom it shall be imposed, is another question. Religion is the only basis of morals, and it is idle to expect good morals where there is no religion. Every book which attacks religion, which tends to undermine faith in divine revelation, or which gives a false view of the dogmas of faith, is a bad book, an irreligious book, and repugnant to good morals, — a book no man has the right to pro-

duce, no press to publish. No restraint on the licentiousness of the press will be effectual which does not extend to all books which tend to undermine or corrupt the faith of the people in the one only true religion. But who shall impose such a restraint? Evidently no authority is competent to impose such a restraint but an authority which is competent to say *infallibly* what is and what is not the true religion. This cannot, as we said in the case of freedom of thought, be the civil authority, for the civil authority is not infallible; and, moreover, has no jurisdiction in the case, since its jurisdiction does not extend to spiritual matters. It might misjudge and suppress good books, under pretence of suppressing bad books; and through its control of the press it would consolidate its tyranny and screen its oppressions from animadversion. Nor can it be the authority of any one of the sects, nor of all the sects combined; because the sects are all by their own confession fallible, and may err as to what is the proper degree of restraint, may permit books which ought not to be permitted, and suppress books which the well-being of individuals and of society requires to be published.

In this state of things, what is to be done? Do not answer us with Milton and Jefferson, that "error is harmless where reason is free to combat it." No such thing. "Error," says the Chinese proverb, "will travel over half the globe, while truth is pulling on her boots." The doctrine of the harmlessness of error assumes two things which are not true; first, that the mass of mankind are capable, *in all cases*, of distinguishing between truth and error; and, secondly, that they have no natural inclinations or prejudices which warp their judgments and lead them to prefer the error to the truth. If the first were true, we should not find men equally great, wise, and good, embracing opposite doctrines; the second is contradicted by all experience. No matter how free reason may be, no error ever yet was harmless, or ever can be harmless. Error puts on a thousand disguises, appears in a thousand specious shapes, corrupts the simple, the young, the unsuspecting, does the mischief before reason detects her and exposes her in her true character. What capacity to distinguish between truth and error have the mass of our youth of either sex, who in hotels, steamboats, and elsewhere, pore over the prurient pages of Byron, of Moore, of Eugene Sue, George Sand, and Paul de Kock? We repeat it, *some* restraint is necessary. That it is difficult to say, as matters are with us,

what restraint is practicable, or by whom the restraint should be imposed, is undoubtedly true. For ourselves, we see no way of disposing of the question, but to leave to the state the power to suppress such publications as are grossly and palpably immoral and blasphemous, and to each denomination such supervision over the reading of its members as it judges proper. This is as far as the Church goes or ever has gone. She never restrains the liberty of the press, but seeks to restrain its licentiousness, or to guard against its licentiousness by exercising a careful supervision over the reading of her children. This she does by examining from time to time the books which are published, and placing in the index such as are hurtful, dangerous, or unprofitable.

If the Reviewer attends to what we have here advanced, he will understand why we denied, in the most positive terms, that he had, notwithstanding his quotations from the encyclical letter of the Holy Father, adduced a single fact in proof of his assertion, that the Church of Rome is hostile to a free press. The "execrable liberty of booksellers" the Holy Father condemns is not the legitimate freedom of the press, but its license. We do not war against freedom when we war against license. Liberty is freedom to do whatever is permitted by the law of God, that is, whatever Almighty God gives us the right to do; license is freedom to do what the law of God does not permit, what Almighty God does not give us the right to do. Liberty is violated only when one's rights are denied or abridged. But in forbidding a man to do what the law of God gives him no right to do, we do not deny or abridge any one of his rights; therefore do not violate his liberty. The government does not violate the liberty of the subject when it commands him not to steal or to murder, or when it imprisons the thief or hangs the murderer; for no man has the right to steal or to murder.

But the Holy Father in his encyclical letter goes no farther in principle than our Protestant countrymen go. We read, but a short time since, in one of our city newspapers, that the grand jury of this county had made inquiries concerning the conduct of our booksellers, and threatened to present some of our *respectable* booksellers, in case they should not speedily clear their shops of certain infamous and immoral publications. Even while we are writing, the Rev. Mr. Kirk, the commander-in-chief of the *Christian Alliance*, and his friends, are denouncing in the city of New York the cheap publications of the

day, and declaring they must be suppressed. What is this but making war on the "liberty of booksellers"?

The main fact, however, on which the Reviewer relied for proofs of the hostility of the Church of Rome to the freedom of the press was "the expurgatory and prohibitory indexes." We have stated that these indexes are a mere matter of discipline. The Church examines the books published, and places in the index those she forbids or cannot recommend her children to read. She publishes the index for the guidance of all her children throughout the world. But in this she does no more than the Reviewer admits the Methodists themselves do. He admits the Methodists make the reading of books of "an irreligious tendency" a matter of discipline, and goes so far as to admit by implication, that the author who publishes a book "that would injure the morals of [the] community, and subvert the whole social compact," (p. 465,) may be visited with legal penalties. This is going full as far as the Church goes, even admitting that she goes as far as the Reviewer contends. The only thing, then, he can complain of is that she publishes beforehand what books she holds to be of an irreligious tendency, that the faithful may know the law before being summoned to answer for its breach.

But it appears that the Church puts in the index certain books which the Reviewer does not regard as of an irreligious tendency. If she prohibited only "such books as Paine's *Age of Reason*, Volney's *Ruins*, &c., no one would have cause to complain" (p. 463); but she goes farther, and claps in the index some of the admired *chefs-d'œuvre* of Protestantism. This is, no doubt, provoking to our Protestant friends. But we suppose the Methodists claim the right to determine the books the reading of which shall or shall not be made a matter of discipline in the case of a Methodist; will the Reviewer, then, tell us why the Church has less right to determine what is suitable reading for a Catholic? Will the Methodist ask the Church what a Methodist may read? Of course not. Why, then, shall the Church be required to ask the Methodists what a Catholic may or may not read? The judgment of the Church, on any hypothesis, is as respectable as the judgment of the Methodists, and we are not aware of her having ever condemned a book which, even in our private judgment, did not in some way or other tend to undermine faith or morals. Protestant books are rarely suitable reading for Christian men or women.

In our reply to the Reviewer, we said, "The Catholic regards no act of the Church, even of the highest dignitaries of the Church, as infallible, unless the act of the whole Church. There are only two ways in which the Church is assumed to act as the whole Church, — that is, in a universal council, or, what is the same thing, the unanimous or morally unanimous consent of all the bishops or pastors of the Church, or through the Pope, deciding *ex cathedra* as the representative of the Church; and a man may be a Catholic without believing the decision of the Pope, unless assented to by the body of bishops, is to be regarded as infallible. But we, for ourselves, hold the decisions of the Pope, when he represents or decides for the Church universal, are infallible."

The Reviewer contends that in this we do not state the Catholic doctrine correctly. "Mr. B.," he says, "is but a novice in Romanism. . . . We heard Bishop England preach upon the peculiar dogmas of Rome in the Cathedral in Baltimore, in 1840, and he asserted that infallibility was lodged in the Church collectively. He said a bishop might err, a council might err, and the Pope might err; but the whole Church could not err." — p. 466.

Our own statement is substantially correct. It was written some months before we became a Catholic, and we should use somewhat different terms were we to write it now, yet we should not alter its sense. The only objection we make to it is, that we seem to resolve the assent of the bishops dispersed abroad and congregated in council into one and the same mode of expressing the assent of the Church. This is not correct. They are two different modes. We should therefore have said there are *three* ways, instead of only two, in which the Church is assumed to act as the whole Church. This, however, is a mere formal correction, and does not affect at all the substance of the statement.

We pay, as we are in duty bound, great respect to any assertion concerning the Catholic faith made by so eminent a prelate as the late Bishop of Charleston. But we may be permitted to doubt if he ever used the precise language ascribed to him. We had on a certain occasion, as the Reviewer will remember, full proof that our Methodist friend could not well trust his own eyes; and we have no assurance that his ears are better than his eyes. But if the Bishop actually used the language ascribed to him, he used it in a sense different from the one the Reviewer imagines. He may have said a single

bishop can err, for that nobody denies ; but that all can, or any considerable number can, in what pertains to faith and morals, no Catholic can assert or admit. If he said a council might err, he meant a particular council, that is, a provincial or national council, not an œcumenical council ; for every Catholic holds as an article of faith the infallibility of œcumenical councils. He may have said the Pope can err in matters of administration, acting on misinformation or as a private doctor ; but, if he said he might err as visible head of the Church, when deciding for the whole Church, *ex cathedra*, a question of faith or morals, he uttered a private opinion, which few Catholics share with him. The difficulty the Reviewer has conjured up is one which has no real existence. The sense of the Church is easily ascertained on any point of faith or morals.

“ Upon Mr. B.’s theory,” says the Reviewer, “ all we would have to do would be to consult the ‘ Holy Father ’ at Rome, and implicitly submit to his decisions.” — p. 466. Not on *our* theory, but on the Catholic theory, for we have no theories of our own. Certainly, when the Pope decides, we submit, for we recognize his right to decide, and we believe his decisions are infallible. “ But,” continues the Reviewer, “ when the decisions of one Pope contradict those of another, and especially when the same Pope decides different ways at different times, it is a little difficult to determine which is right, or to see the signs of infallibility anywhere.” — *ib.* Unquestionably. But we deny the supposition. One Pope has never in his decisions contradicted those of another, and no Pope has ever decided different ways at different times. Protestants make the assertion, but why do they not adduce the instances, at least one instance, of such contradiction ? Show us from ecclesiastical history one single well authenticated instance of such contradiction, and we are for ever silent. Bring forward, then, the instance, or never again make the assertion.

The Reviewer tries to be quite witty in relation to the degree of liberty which, according to the view we gave, Catholics must enjoy, which he defines to be the “ liberty to hold and teach what his Holiness the Pope says they may.” But wit is not our friend’s forte. Nevertheless, we have no objection to his definition. Liberty to hold and teach what the Sovereign Pontiff says we may is all the liberty we ask ; for it is liberty to hold and teach the word of God in its purity and integrity, — “ the faith once delivered to the saints,” —

which is all the liberty Almighty God allows to any man. The Reviewer, we presume, holds that he is amenable to law, and that he is at liberty to do only what the law permits. Why should not we ridicule him for this? Has he yet to learn that law is the basis of liberty, and that where there is no sovereign authority there is no law? Liberty is not in being free of all law, but in being held only to the law. We believe the Church, and the Pope as visible head of the Church, is the organ through which Almighty God promulgates the law. Consequently, in our own estimation at least, in submitting to the Pope, we find, instead of losing, our liberty. At any rate, we have all the liberty we want. We know from experience what Protestant liberty is. We know all that it has to attract, but we never conceived of true liberty till we became a Catholic. In the absolute surrender of ourselves to Jesus Christ, in becoming his *slaves*, we become true freemen. "If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed." It is idle, so far as we are concerned, to sneer at us for our submission to the Pope. Call us slaves, if you will, you will not move us. We know your slavery and our freedom. We ask no other freedom than that of absolute obedience to God in his Church; and you, if you knew any thing of the glorious Gospel of Him whose name you bear, "to take away your reproach," would also ask no other. Did not St. Paul glory in being the *slave* of Jesus Christ?

But it seems, after all, that we mistook in our reply the thesis of the Reviewer. He did not mean to say that Rome had produced no literary men, or that she had really warred upon literature as such, but only upon "every species of literature which could not be made tributary to her hierarchy."—p. 468. All we have to say in our defence is that we took the author's thesis according to his own formal and official statement of it. If he stated his design to be to prove one thing, but really attempted only to prove another thing, that was not our fault. If men will write without method, in a loose, declamatory style, paying no attention to the relation there may or may not be between their positions and their proofs, their premises and conclusions, they must be answerable for the consequences. The Reviewer stated positively that his design, among other things, was, "to exhibit the proofs that the Church of Rome had ever waged a deadly war upon literature." The proposition here set forth we denied, and we asserted that the Reviewer had not adduced a single fact in proof of it. In this we

were right. Whether he had or had not proved something else, and some things not at all to his own credit, we neither asserted nor denied.

But take his thesis as amended, we are ready to meet it. Fairly translated, it means that the Church of Rome has never encouraged, but has done her best to discourage, every species of literature not consistent or at war with the religion of Jesus Christ, as she had received the authority and the command to hold and teach it. So understood, we are far from controverting the thesis of the Reviewer. If the Church has so done, it is only another proof of her fidelity to her sacred trust. We hold religion before literature and science, and are barbarian enough to say that we have not the least conceivable respect for any literature or science not directly or indirectly enlisted in the service of religion, or, if you prefer, in the service of the Roman Catholic Church. Infidel literature, or science pressed into the service of infidelity, or even into the service of mammon, we grant, has no attractions for us, and, in our judgment, contributes nothing not really injurious to the best interests of mankind. If the Reviewer thinks differently, we thank God the Church does not think with him. What benefit to mankind does the reviewer think has accrued from the writings of Hobbes, Tindal, Collins, Morgan, Mandeville, Voltaire, Rousseau, Helvetius, D'Holbach, Dupuis, Cabanis, Destutt de Tracy, Goethe, Schiller, Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Heine, Eichhorn, Gesenius, Paulus, Strauss, Feurbach, Godwin, Byron, Shelley, Bulwer, Victor Hugo, De Balzac, George Sand, Paul de Kock, Eugene Sue, and hundreds and hundreds of others we might mention had we room? Genius, talent, learning, are never respectable, unless enlisted in the cause of religion, unless they bow low at the foot of the cross, and lay their offerings on the altar of the crucified God. Is the Reviewer prepared to deny this? If not, let him say no more against the expurgatory and prohibitory indexes of the Church. The Church was not instituted to foster literature or science, but to train men up for God. Yet she has never ceased to honor men of science, to patronize men of literature, and of every species of literature, when they did not seek to abuse their gifts and prostitute their genius, ability, and acquirements to the injury of religion, to the corrupting of men's minds and hearts, to leading them into doubt and darkness to their everlasting ruin. This was all that she had a right to do, and all that could be asked of her. If the Church

in her relations with literary and scientific men has erred at all, it has been in the fostering care she has extended to them, and in the leniency with which she has viewed their aberrations. She has always proved herself a kind, affectionate, and forbearing mother to them.

The Reviewer abandons the case of Virgil, Bishop of Salzburg, which he had before adduced as proving the hostility of the Church to science, but holds on to the case of Galileo. He makes two points against us. 1. That Galileo's doctrine was actually condemned as a heresy; and 2. That the Inquisition, which condemned him, claims infallibility for its decrees. In proof of the first he cites at length what he asserts is the *sentence* of the Inquisition. But as he does not tell us whence he obtained this document or where it may be found, and as he cites it in English, not in the original Latin, it is not admissible testimony. That in the sentence of the Inquisition the doctrine of the earth's motion is declared to be a *heresy*, we have not denied, and do not now deny. But this is the language of the theological *qualifiers* who examined the case in 1616, and is merely recited in the sentence in 1633. In 1616, the case, at the request of Galileo and his friends, was sent to the Inquisition, and the theological qualifiers to whom it was committed qualified the doctrine as heresy; but, in consequence of Galileo's promise to refrain from teaching the doctrine, no final action was had on the subject, and the fact whether the doctrine was or was not a heresy was not decided, but remained as the report of the qualifiers. In 1633, when Galileo was finally condemned, the question did not turn on the point whether his doctrine was or was not heretical, but on the point whether he *had* actually taught the doctrine after he had been forbidden to teach it. The Inquisition merely cites the report of the *qualifiers*, without passing upon the question of the heretical character of the doctrine itself, and condemned Galileo not because his doctrine was a heresy, but because he had continued to teach it in contempt of authority. The fact, then, that the Inquisition employs the terms *heresy* and *heretical* does not prove that it adjudged the doctrine itself to be heretical. In order that it should prove this, the character of the doctrine should have been the precise question before the court. Any lawyer will inform the Reviewer that the court decides only the precise point or points before it. What else it may allege is an *obiter dictum*, or the mere private opinion of the judge, and without authority. The terms *heresy* and

heretical also prove nothing, because they are the mere *stylus curiæ*, and are frequently adopted by the Inquisition where it is manifest the offence is not, strictly speaking, heresy. That Galileo was condemned for teaching, or rather, for the manner in which he taught, the doctrine of the earth's motion, we did not deny; but that the doctrine itself was condemned as heretical we did, and do still, deny. We quoted, in proof of our denial, the words of the Pontiff under whose reign he was condemned, and of Galileo himself. We also showed that the reigning Pontiff was himself favorable to the doctrine, and that at the very moment of the condemnation of Galileo it was publicly taught in Rome by the professor of astronomy in the Pope's own college. It is idle, then, to pretend that it was condemned as a heresy.

The doctrine of the motion of the earth as a scientific hypothesis had long been promulgated at Rome, and Galileo might have taught it undisturbed, if he had chosen to observe certain very proper restrictions. The difficulty was in the fact, not to be denied, that the doctrine of the earth's motion is repugnant, or apparently repugnant, to the literal sense of the Holy Scriptures. It was never held that the literal sense of Scripture might not be set aside on competent authority, and a less literal construction adopted. But this can never be done to make way for a conjecture or a hypothesis. Science and revelation can never be in contradiction; but what you allege as science must be science, must be absolutely demonstrated, before it can be taken into the account in the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures. Now, in the time of Galileo, the doctrine of the earth's motion was not demonstrated, was at best a mere hypothesis; and therefore to have undertaken to explain the texts which seemed to contradict it, and which, as they had hitherto been understood, did contradict it, so as to make them conform to it, was, to say the least, rash, and implied a heretical disposition on the part of him who should so undertake. Here was the rock on which Galileo split. He undertook to explain the Scriptures in accordance with his theory, and treated the Scriptural objections with a degree of levity and contempt incompatible with a becoming respect for the language of the inspired writings. Had he followed the direction of Cardinal Bellarmine, who suggested that it would be time enough to take into consideration the interpretation of the texts which seemed to oppose the theory after the theory should be prov-

ed to be demonstrated, no one would ever have disturbed him.*

As to the second point, we would remind the Reviewer, that, while we accept his authority on any question of the constitution of the Methodist society, we do not recognize it where he assumes to speak as a Catholic doctor. We told him, and we tell him again, that the Inquisition is not an institution of which Catholics predicate infallibility. It is no essential part of the Church, and its decrees have been and may be set aside by a higher authority. "It is sufficient for us to know," says the Reviewer, "that the decrees of that court claim to be infallible, and are enacted with that claim with the Pope's knowledge and approbation, and the condemnation of heretical books and persons by the holy officer are as much the act of the Church of Rome as any act of the supreme Pontiff."—p. 477. Here are many things jumbled together that should be kept distinct. We have no time or space to disentangle them. The Inquisition without the Pope is evidently not infallible, according to Catholic principles. Admit its decrees, when formally approved by the Pope, and thus made his, are to be held by Catholics as infallible, it still will not affect the case before us; for the approbation of the Pope was not thus given to the condemnation of the doctrine in 1616, and in 1633 it was not, as we have seen, in question. The act which received the Pope's approbation was the condemnation of Galileo in 1633, when the question turned not on the doctrine, but on Galileo's contempt of authority.

"And whatever Mr. B. may say, this has been the opinion of abler and better informed Roman Catholics than himself."—p. 477. If the Reviewer means that it is the opinion of abler and better informed Roman Catholics that the Inquisition is an institution of which Catholics predicate infallibility, we deny it, and challenge him to prove his assertion. If he means simply that some Catholics as well as Protestants have taken a different view of the condemnation of Galileo from the one we have given, we do not deny it, and have no wish to deny it, for Catholics are not infallible, and may err in their version of historical facts.

* For a full discussion of the subject, and references to the proper authorities, we refer our readers to the article on *Galileo and the Inquisition*, in the eighth number of the *Dublin Review*, from which we have drawn pretty much all the materials of our former and our present reply, and which is our authority for what we advanced then and have repeated now.

“ And in the preface of the Jesuits’ edition of Newton’s *Principia*, we have the clearest evidence that the editors supposed his system under ban of the Church. This is the language :— ‘ Newton in his third book supposes the motion of the earth. We could not explain the author’s propositions otherwise than by making the same supposition. We are therefore forced to sustain a character not our own ; but we profess to pay the obsequious reverence which is due to the decrees pronounced by the supreme pontiffs against the motion of the earth.’ ” — p. 477. This would seem to be conclusive ; but, unhappily for the Reviewer, this Jesuits’ edition of Newton’s *Principia* is a pure fiction. The Jesuits never published such an edition, and the language quoted never was written by a Jesuit. The language betrays at a single glance its origin. There are no decrees, and there never were any decrees, pronounced by the supreme Pontiffs against the motion of the earth. The Jesuits never published an edition of Newton’s *Principia*, except the edition by Father Boscovich, and that is not the edition referred to. The edition cited was got up by a couple of infidel editors, in France, we believe, and was palmed off as an edition of the Jesuits. The extract the Reviewer quotes from the preface bears the living impress of the French infidel of the last century. No Jesuit could ever have spoken thus ironically of what he held to be a decision of the sovereign Pontiff. It would be even more out of character than for the Reviewer to invoke the Blessed Virgin, or to officiate at High Mass.

We here take our leave of the *Methodist Quarterly Review*, by simply reminding the editor that he is not qualified to be our biographer. His assertion, that there “ are hundreds of living witnesses who heard our atheistical lectures in the city of Boston,” is absolutely and unqualifiedly false ; for we never gave an atheistical lecture in the city of Boston or elsewhere in our life. We never were, properly speaking, an atheist, a Transcendentalist, or a pantheist, the assertion of the Reviewer to the contrary notwithstanding. For a few months, some years ago, we had, it is true, some doubts as to the existence of God ; but, since the latter part of the year 1830, we are not conscious of having had, even for a moment, a single doubt cross our mind of the existence or the providence of God. It is true that we fell unconsciously into some speculations which had a Transcendental and pantheistic tendency ; but, the moment we discovered that they had that tendency, we renounced them, and for the very reason, that they had it.

We have been, ever since we resided in Boston, or for the last ten years, constantly writing and publishing against both Transcendentalism and pantheism. We have had errors enough, without having laid to our charge errors we have never entertained. There are few people living who can write our biography, and if journalists would confine themselves to the discussion of our writings, and let the personal life and history of the writer go, they would show their good sense and discretion. The *Methodist Quarterly* has always been unfortunate in its attempts to enlighten the public concerning us personally. Will it not learn wisdom from experience?

ART. V. — *The Roman Church and Modern Society.*

Translated from the French of PROFESSOR E. QUINET, of the College of France. Edited by C. EDWARDS LESTER. New York : Gates and Stedman. 1845. pp. 198.

THIS work purports to be a publication of M. Quinet's course of lectures on the present state of the Catholic Church. Its design may be gathered from the following extract, taken from the preface, written we presume by its American editor.

“In France, where a strong religious feeling is springing up of late years, a feeling which the Jesuits have endeavoured to avail themselves of for their own purposes, this work has exerted a most salutary influence. By delineating the Roman Church as it actually is, by showing the spirit which actuates it and the hands that direct it, and by the contrast he draws between these and the true spirit of Christianity, the true Catholicism, M. Quinet has rendered a service to the cause of religion in France which cannot be estimated too highly.

“But it is not in France and Italy alone that this work is destined to have an influence. The depth and comprehensiveness of the author's views, the vast scope of his thought, the extent and minute accuracy of his historical researches, and the consummate skill with which he applies the whole of history to his subject, render it a work of universal interest and importance.

“We see here clearly pointed out the elements of the greatness of the Roman Catholic Church in former times, and the causes which have led to its present state of decadence, — the means it has

employed in all ages to accomplish its designs of universal dominion, and the reasons of their failure, — the agencies it is bringing to bear upon modern society, and the course it is necessary to pursue in order to baffle its designs.

“ We see also in what respects it is the antagonist of LIBERTY, though scrupling not to make use of that sacred name, whenever it can subserve its purposes of despotic authority. We see how, instead of sympathizing in that spirit of progress which is the life of modern society, it is ever struggling to preserve that state of utter immobility, or rather to bring about that retrograde movement, which leads to spiritual death. Have not these things an importance and an interest for us on this side of the Atlantic, as well as for Europeans ?

“ Moreover, this is not an affair of the Roman Catholic Church alone. Every church, every sect of Christendom, may here learn a lesson ; a lesson of Christian toleration and brotherly kindness, — a lesson of moderation in the midst of zeal, — a lesson of perpetual progress.

“ The effects of this discussion in Europe are already apparent. The Jesuits, that powerful association, whose malign influence rested like an incubus upon the clergy, and through them upon the people of France, have already been compelled to abandon her soil. The mode also of their departure is remarkable, as differing entirely from their usual manner of proceeding. They have not waited to be expelled by the government, but they have voluntarily retired. They have given up the contest in France. They have felt that public opinion was too strong for them.

“ This result is in a great measure to be attributed to the labors of M. Quinet, and of his friend and colleague, M. Michelet. The work of which this is a translation, and the joint work of both these eminent men upon the Jesuits, have, by enlightening the public as to their real character, been mainly instrumental in relieving France from their presence.” — pp. v. — viii.

The first question which naturally arises, on reading this, is, What is “ the true spirit of Christianity, the true Catholicism,” with which M. Quinet contrasts the Catholic Church ? We cannot well determine the value or importance of an author’s judgments, till we know the point of view from which he writes, and the standard by which he judges. Happily, we have not to seek far in order to answer this question. M. Quinet published some time since a work entitled *Ahasuerus*, from which we translate a few pages, which we find quoted with approbation by M. Pierre Leroux, in the article *Bonheur* in his *Encyclopédie Nouvelle*. They are from the Third Day, entitled *Death*. The scene is laid in the Cathedral of Strasburg.

The dead are represented as coming out of their tombs, and bitterly complaining that our blessed Saviour has deceived them ; for they have not found that heaven he promised them, and in which they had placed all their hopes of happiness.

“ CHORUS OF DEAD KINGS.

“ O Christ ! O Christ ! why hast thou deceived us ? O Christ ! why hast thou lied to us ? For a thousand years we have rolled in our tombs, beneath our chiselled slabs, trying to find the gate of thy heaven ;— we find only the web which the spider spins above our heads. Where, then, are the sounds of the viols of thy angels ? We hear only the sharp saw of the worm that eats our tombs. Where is the bread with which thou wast to nourish us ? We have only our tears for our drink. Where is thy Father’s house ? where his starry canopy ? Is it the dry fountain we have hollowed out with our nails ? Is it this polished slab against which we strike our heads day and night ? Where is the flower of thy vine which was to heal the wound of our hearts ? We have found only the lizard that crawls over our marble slabs, and we have seen only the snakes which spit their venom on our lips. O Christ ! why hast thou deceived us ?

“ CHORUS OF WOMEN.

“ O Virgin Mary ! why have you deceived us ? On awaking, we have sought by our sides our children, our little ones, our darlings, who should smile upon us from their azure nests ; we have found only brambles, dead mallows, and nettles, sinking their roots over our heads.

“ CHORUS OF CHILDREN.

“ How dark it is in this stone cradle here ! How hard is my cradle ! Where is my mother, to take me up ? Where is my father, to rock me ? Where are the angels, to give me my robe, my beautiful robe of light ? Father, mother, where are you ? I am afraid, I’m afraid here in my stone cradle.

“ THE EMPEROR CHARLEMAGNE.

“ Christ ! Christ ! since you have deceived me, give me back my hundred monasteries concealed in the Ardennes ; give me back the golden bells baptized in my name, my shrines and *chappelles*, my banners spun on the wheel of Bertha, my ciboriums, and my people kneeling from Roncevaux to the Black Forest.

“ CHORUS OF WOMEN.

“ Give us back our sighs and tears.

“ CHORUS OF CHILDREN.

“ Give us back our crowns of flowers and baskets of roses

which we have strewed along the path of the priests on Corpus Christi.

“ POPE GREGORY.

“ And what avail me now my double cross and triple crown? The dead gather around me, that I may give to each his portion of nothingness. Woe is me! Heaven, hell, purgatory, these were all in my own soul; the hilt and blade of the archangel’s sword flamed only in my own breast; the infinite heavens are naught but those my own genius rolled together or spread out as a tent to shelter itself in the desert. But may be the hour is about to strike when the gate of Christ will turn on its hinges. No, no, I have waited long enough. My feet are dried up, kicking against these marble slabs; my eyes have fallen from their sockets, in looking into the dust of my tomb; my tongue is worn out, in calling Christ, Christ; and my hands are empty, always empty. Look, look, my good lords, it is the truth. Let not the dead show me their sores, let the martyrs hide their wounds. *I can heal no one.* I give but the spider’s web in return to those who have given their crowns to Christ, and I bring in the hollow of my hand but a pinch of ashes for those who have looked for a kingdom of stars in the ocean of the firmament.”

This is tolerably explicit; but if any doubts remain in the minds of our readers, the following from the work before us will dispel them.

“ I follow with my eyes, during forty years, the reign of a man who is the sole spiritual director, not of his country, but of his epoch. From the retirement of his chamber, he governs the kingdom of minds; intelligences regulate themselves every day by his; a word written by his hand in a moment overruns all Europe. Princes love, kings fear him; they do not feel sure of their kingdoms, if he is not with them. Peoples, on their part, adopt without discussion, and repeat with eagerness, every syllable that falls from his pen. Who exercises this incredible power, that had been nowhere witnessed since the Middle Ages? Is it another Gregory the Seventh? Is it a Pope? No, it is Voltaire.

“ He shakes with a terrible laugh the gates of the Church, which, placed by St. Peter, were opened for the Borgias. It is the laugh of the universal spirit, which disdains all *particular forms* as so many deformities; it is the ideal which sports with the real. In the name of the mute generations whom the Church was bound to console, he arms himself with all the blood she has shed, all the stakes, all the scaffolds she has raised, and which must sooner or later be turned against her. This irony, mingled with wrath, belongs not merely to one individual or one question; then mingles

there the laugh of all the abused generations, of all the tortured dead, who, recollecting that they found on earth violence instead of gentleness, the wolf in place of the paschal lamb, stir themselves, and mock in their turn, even in the depths of the sepulchre.

“That which makes the *wrath* of Voltaire a great *act* of Providence is, that he strikes, ridicules, overwhelms the infidel Church with the arms of the Christian spirit. Humanity, charity, fraternity, — are not these the sentiments revealed in the Gospel? He turns them with irresistible force against the violences of the false teachers of the Gospel. The angel of wrath, in the Bible, pours out at once upon the condemned cities sulphur and bitumen, in the midst of the blowing of the winds; so the spirit of Voltaire walks over the face of the divine city; he strikes at once with the lightning, the glaive, the sarcasm. He pours out gall, irony, and ashes. When he is weary, a voice awakens him and cries, Continue! Then he begins again; he becomes furious; he strikes where he has already struck; he shakes what he has already shaken; he breaks what he has already broken. For a work so long, never interrupted, and always successful, is not merely the affair of an individual; it is the vengeance of a deceived God, who has taken the irony of man as an instrument of wrath.

“No, this man does not belong to himself; he is led by a superior power. At the same time that he overturns with one hand, he founds with the other; and there lies the marvel of his destiny. He employs all his faculties of raillery to overthrow the banners of particular churches, but there is another man in him; this man, full of fervor, establishes upon their ruins the orthodoxy of common sense.

“He feels in every fibre the false, the lie, the injustice, not only in a moment of time, but in each of the pulsations of the human race. Particular churches had founded the Christian law, but for themselves. Voltaire makes the Christian law the common law of humanity. Before his time, they called themselves universal; and this universality stopped at the threshold of a communion, of a particular church; whoever did not make a part of it was out of the evangelical law. Voltaire envelopes the whole earth in the law of the Gospel.

“What is this, I ask, if it is not the *Christian spirit itself*, the universal spirit of union, fraternity, vigilance, which lives, feels, suffers, and remains in intimate communion with all humanity, present and past? This is the reason why the earth proclaimed this man as the living speech of humanity in the eighteenth century. Men have not been deceived by appearances; he tears in pieces the letter; but he makes the universal spirit shine forth. For this reason we proclaim him still.

“In good faith, what have they opposed to him? What adversary has entered into the strife against him? In the camp of the past, where has there appeared the combatant who, to conquer Voltaire, would have need to show himself more vigilant than he, more fervent than he, more universal than he, in the cause of justice against force and violence?”

“In the precipitate movement of our age, the dust has been raised to heaven over the steps of our generations; some persons have exclaimed with joy, — Voltaire has disappeared; he has perished in the gulf, with all his renown. But this was one of the artifices of true glory; the small men alone were the dupes of it. The dust falls again; the spirit of light, whom they thought extinct, reappears; he laughs at the false joy of the darkness. Like one resuscitated, he shines with a purer brilliancy; and the age, which had begun by rejecting him, ends by confirming in all his immortal part.

“The work of Voltaire is in necessary relation with Catholicism; even in attacking it, he strikes with its own weapon, history. It was necessary, in order that the tradition of the eighteenth century should be the source of the future world, that there should be found a man who, springing out of Protestantism, should represent in the new work the genius of the dissenting churches. This man is Rousseau.

“In him, the genius of the religious revolution of the sixteenth century mingles itself with the ferments of France. To take away from the movement of the eighteenth century every appearance of sectarianism, that it might not be a solely Catholic and Roman revolution, this stranger Rousseau must issue from the fold of Luther, and bring among us something of the spirit of the Doctor of Wittenberg. His arms are those of the Reformation, not history, but logic, reason, individual authority, and eloquence always. Through him, the soul of the revolution of the sixteenth century passes into the French Revolution; more even than Voltaire, he renders Rome irreconcilable with France.

“In the skepticism of the Savoyard vicar I discover no trace of grief. It is a skepticism of hope rather than of disappointment. He confesses himself very frankly, he explains, unveils himself. In this doubt I perceive a great commencement of faith; the Savoyard vicar trusts to the times to come to unveil what remains obscure to him. Properly speaking, he officiates at the altar of the *unknown God!* It is the first stone of a new society.

“*Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, triple crown of that new Papacy that France has shown to the earth.* From the height of the modern Vatican it speaks truly to the city and the world, *urbi et orbi.* It does not address itself merely to the Roman race, it

invites all the races of humanity; and the schismatics whom the papacy had not been able to overcome, I mean the Germanic, Greek, Slavonic nations, as well as the Latins, the emperors and kings of peoples, as well as the kings of the intellect, the Guelphs, as well as the Ghibelines, if any remain, submit to this orthodoxy of the universal spirit. Those whom Gregory the Seventh had not been able to curb, the successors of the emperors, the Great Frederic, Catherine, Joseph the Second, bend the knee! They have discovered a superior power, which gives or takes away their crowns! Like those first kings who came out of barbarism, they have recognized the supreme seal of the spiritual power!" — pp. 142–149.

We think there can now be no mistake as to what, according to M. Quinet and his American editor, is "the true spirit of Christianity, true Catholicism." It is, when divested of a few fine phrases, which mean nothing, simple old-fashioned infidelity, the bald deism of the English deists; or, at most, English deism mixed with the pantheism of Spinoza, the atheism of D'Holbach, and the *Sans-culottism* of Marat and Robespierre. Voltaire, inspired by Luther, assisted by Montesquieu, and reinforced by Rousseau, is avowedly its purest and most faithful representative. The contrast, then, which the author draws is, in simple terms, a contrast between Catholicity and Voltairism. That this contrast is striking, we admit; that Catholicity and Voltairism are natural enemies, and that there is and must be war between them till one or the other is exterminated, we are not disposed to question; but is it certain that this is to the discredit of Catholicity? Are our Protestant friends, in their hatred of the Church, prepared to join hands with the followers of Voltaire, and to republish, after the example of the late Abner Kneeland, the *Dictionnaire Philosophique* as the *Family Bible*?

Nevertheless, the book before us is an instructive one to those who know how to read it. There can be no question that Voltaire is the legitimate successor of Luther, and that the English Deists and French Philosophers are simply the complement of the Reformers. This is admitted by the more advanced minds among the Protestants themselves, and a slight history of Protestantism abundantly proves it. The best commentary on principles is furnished in their historical developments. The Reformers in the sixteenth century began by making war on the authority of the Church. "They did not perceive," to borrow the language of a French Catholic writer of the last century, "that they were

making a breach through which all sorts of errors would soon find an entrance, — that, in order to overturn successively the dogmas and even the foundations of the Christian faith, it would only be necessary to follow the path they were marking out. In point of fact, adopting their method, the Socinians very soon rejected all the doctrines which seemed to them to be incomprehensible, and summoned to the tribunal of reason the very oracles of the divine word. The deists, instructed by their example, refused to admit any revelation at all, and called in question many truths of natural religion. At length, armed with their arguments, materialism dared raise aloft its head, and deny the existence of God himself. Struck by the shock of these conflicting systems, the skeptics conclude that nothing is certain, that as regards religion and morals the philosopher must hold himself in a state of absolute doubt. Hence is born *indifference* to all opinions, disguised under the name of *Toleration*. The human mind in the excess of its folly and madness can go no further.

“ This progression is clearly marked by the epochs of the individuals who have been at the head of the different parties, and by the date of their respective works. Luther began to dogmatize in 1517 ; Calvin, in 1532 ; Lelio, Soelinus, and Gentilis, towards 1550 ; Viret, one of the Reformers, speaks of the first deists in his *Christian Instruction* in 1563 ; Vani- ni, a decided atheist, was executed in 1619 ; Spinoza appeared only forty years later ; La Motte le Veyer and Bayle, both skeptics, wrote at the close of the same century ; Montaigne had preceded them.

“ In England, the progress of incredulity has been the same. After various combats among the different Protestant and Socinian sects, deism has its proselytes. Lord Herbert of Cherbury, the first English author who reduced it to a system, published his book, *De Veritate*, in 1624 ; Hobbes, Toland, Blount, Shaftesbury, Tindal, Morgan, Chubbs, Collins, Woolston, Bolingbroke, have followed in his train. This last, as Hobbes and Toland in theirs, has sowed in his works the principles of atheism ; and David Hume has subsequently avowed skepticism in his.

“ Our French infidels, who speak now so boldly, are only the echoes and copyists of the English. This is a fact easily verified. They have begun by teaching deism ; insensibly they have come to pure materialism ; to complete the degradation, absolute Pyrrhonism now shows itself openly in the greater part of their works. . . .

“ This phenomenon constantly renewed cannot be the effect of chance. It had already been remarked, among the ancient philosophers, three hundred years before our era. The dogmas of natural religion and morality had been too feebly established by Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, who preceded that epoch, and who mingled many errors with their essential truths. The Epicureans and Cynics, who then appeared, attacked, some the existence of God, at least, his providence, and others the laws of morality. These aberrations were replaced by the hypotheses of Pyrrho and his descendants, who would admit no truth at all.

“ It needs only right reason to be convinced not only of the necessity of a revelation, but also of a visible authority to guide us in matters of religion. One of these truths flows necessarily from the other. The author of the article *Unitaire* in the *Encyclopédie* shows very clearly what is the progression a reasoner must make, when once he has leaped the barrier of authority.” *

We are aware that the philosophy of the nineteenth century professes to be a revolt against that of the eighteenth. M. Cousin, and some of the Germans, as also the Transcendentalists in this country, profess to have arrived at results less repugnant to religious faith than those which M. Bergier shows to be the legitimate results of Protestantism. But this is not the fact. The new philosophy, as it is called, though differing in its method and its terminology from that of the eighteenth century, is yet substantially the same, as M. Quinet ably establishes. We quote a few paragraphs on this point.

“ Thus ends, under the terror of the Church, the outbreak of philosophy in the sixteenth century. The spirit of Machiavel, on its knees, strikes its bosom, and whispers a prayer; this prayer lasts yet.

* *Traité Historique et Dogmatique de la Vraie Religion, avec la Réfutation des Erreurs qui lui ont été opposées dans différens Siècles.* Par M. l'Abbé Bergier. Introduction, §§ viii., ix. We regret that our limits do not permit us to extend this extract through the following three sections of the masterly Introduction to the *Treatise on True Religion*, by the Abbé Bergier, a writer who followed Voltaire and his associates step by step, and triumphantly refuted every one of their charges and arguments against the Catholic Church and religion. The particular treatise from which we quote, republished at Paris in 1827, in ten volumes, 16mo., is a work which we should be glad to see placed within the reach of our American public generally; for, as we have heretofore intimated or asserted, the great moral disease of our times is want of faith in the supernatural.

“ If the French philosophy of the eighteenth century had again entered upon this ambiguous path, it would doubtless have experienced the same fate ; the world would not have been moved by it ; happily, it took quite the contrary course. How so ? It showed the world an idea superior to that of the Church ; and at the same moment, the Church felt itself struck by weapons it no longer possessed. It found itself face to face with a power which, while denying all forms, all sects, all particular churches, and, in some sort, visible Christianity, still retained what is most vital in Christianity, — its spirit.

“ As long as there had been set up in opposition to the Roman Church another church, whether Protestant, Greek, or Jansenist, the former had been able to take hold of its adversary, and resist its blows ; they were forces of the same nature ; there was for that a tradition of controversies which might last indefinitely. If she was attacked, she had, on the other hand, a hold upon an enemy of the same family. It was a conflict between two churches ; they disputed about their forms. But here was a totally different adversary, — the very fruit of Christianity, the spirit, the soul of it, which, developed, and divested of forms, turns against the very principle of forms ; the body of Christianity is on one side, the spirit on the other. Jacob is assailed in the darkness by the invisible, invincible, impalpable wrestler. It is the combat between the Church and philosophy in the eighteenth century.

“ But this era is the era of impiety, doubt, skepticism, genius of the void, of sensation, and what not ! It is easy, from the height of a laborious orthodoxy, to hurl these anathemas against this epoch. It remains to be seen what foundation there is for this interdiction.

“ The future is always skeptical in regard to the past, since it separates from it. Evidently the eighteenth century has ceased believing in many things ; but it is equally certain that the foundation of this age is a universal faith in *what is most important in the heritage of Christianity*, — I mean, in the power of the invisible, *of the thought*. By this are united all the men of this time ; the remembrance of one almost necessarily recalls another.

“ They believe to such an extent in thought, that they are persuaded that all the rest is nothing, — that an idea is sufficient to renovate, to nourish the world, — *that humanity possesses energy enough in itself to throw off the whole burden of the times, and reconstruct, at a given moment, a new world upon a new ideal*. Are these materialists ? Are these skeptics, who believe that *our soul* can create a new universe ? And yet they would cut off from the living tradition of French philosophy

these men, who will always be the focus of it. Because they could not find in Jean Jacques Rousseau an array of school formulas, I have seen the time when they refused him the title of Philosopher; without reflecting that one may all his life handle and make a parade of formulas, without having the least particle of a philosophic spirit, which is truly the spirit of creation.

“ Yes, let us return to the intelligence of this great age, and not allow ourselves to be amused by words. Whoever does not see a philosophy proclaim spiritualism accuses it of having only comprehended matter; let us enter more deeply into things.

“ It is not enough for a philosophy to murmur externally a form of idealism, of heroism, in order to belong truly to the kingdom of the spirit. One may be very materialist, while all the time talking of the idea. And on the other hand, an age which makes no public pretension to idealism, but which puts it in practice, and makes it pass into the life, this is truly an idealist age, — it makes spiritualism a reality. By this test, show me an epoch in all the past which has had *more faith in the soul*, which has shown more of it, which, to obtain the victory, has had less need of the physical forces. It is the moment when speech, till then buried in mystery, becomes life, reality. In a political point of view, France is crushed by the enemy; to judge her only by the eyes of the body, you would think her powerless. It is, on the contrary, the moment when she reigns, with an uncontested power, over the universe; her arms are tied, but she commands the world. What is this, then, but the reign of the spirit? Because it has become visible, do you no longer see it?

“ When it formerly dwelt in the Church, and was veiled, you supposed it present. It quits the Church, and passes into the age; because it comes nearer to you, do you not recognize it?

“ Ah! we have sinned against this age; and in saying so, I accuse no one in particular; but I am in accordance with the highest philosophic authority of our times. While, in our own country, every man who pretends to philosophy thinks it proper and in good taste to begin by repudiating this eminently French age, is it not extraordinary that the great master of abstraction, *par excellence*, a foreigner, Hegel, salutes it, on the contrary, as the fundamental era of thought? * The only enthusiastic page, perhaps, that this great mind has written, marks the spiritualist genius of our eighteenth century. After this, will any one have the courage to see in this heroic season of the human mind nothing but what the schools call the doctrine of sensation? †

* *Das Geistreich selbst.*

† In Italy, Romini continues this war of train-bands long after it is at an end.

“At the moment when it was in good taste in France to abjure Voltaire, it was with Goethe that he found a shelter. Goethe received this great exile; he learned from him the magic gift to communicate life, electricity, to multitudes. He translated Diderot. Lord Byron made himself the disciple of J. J. Rousseau; he attempted to unite together the soul of the author of the *Confessions* and that of the old man of Ferney. With the vast horizon that it opens, the Profession of Faith of the Savoyard vicar reappears in other terms in that philosophic theology which extends from Kant to Schleiermacher. The vast labors of the greatest critic of the present time, M. de Wette, do they not very often seem commentaries upon opinions hazarded by Voltaire?”

“Thus, after immense labors, men returned to the results perceived by the eighteenth century. Hegel proclaimed its metaphysical foundation, Goethe its literature, as the source of life; De Wette confirmed its criticism; so that one may say that the whole contemporary movement is a new development, a new power of the spirit of that same age. We were abjuring it among ourselves at the very moment when it remained victorious.” — pp. 132–142.

It being evident that Protestantism receives its complement in infidelity, or the rejection of all authority and with it all revealed religion, the Protestant world are compelled to take one of two alternatives, namely, — either to avow themselves infidels, or to assume that infidelity is really and truly Christianity. They can maintain their right to the Christian name and character only by maintaining that the true spirit of Christianity, Christianity freed from the false views of its advocates, the formulas of the schools which obscure and pervert it, is substantially what all the world has hitherto agreed to regard as infidelity. Infidelity, according to our author, is the spirit of Christianity warring against its body, or the dead forms in which its misguided and selfish friends have sought to imprison it. We beg our readers to bear this in mind. It is the key to much which they will find in what is sometimes called the “movement party,” the “party of progress,” the “party of liberty,” or the “party of the future.” The new school of the nineteenth century is professedly Christian; but M. Quinet is right in regarding it as identical in substance, in spirit, with the Voltairan school of the eighteenth century. The only difference is, that the one school calls that Christian which the other believed to be the rejection of Christianity. The new school is the old under a new name. It does not convert infidelity to Christianity, but Christianity to infidelity; and its

Christianity consists solely in denouncing whatever is anti-*infidel* as anti-Christian. Here is the key to the whole teachings of the Progressist, the St. Simonian, Fourierist or Societary, Rationalistic, and Mythic Schools of modern Europe and America. And here is the significance of those numerous younglings starting up in our day and seeking to obtain the direction of affairs, — such as “young Italy,” “young Switzerland,” “young Germany,” “young France,” “young Spain,” “young Ireland,” and “young America.” “Young England” forms, we believe, a partial exception, and, though characterized by many of the follies we expect in youngsters, has, upon the whole, it would seem, a tendency in an opposite direction. But, with the single exception of “young England,” all the *younglings* of the day are really *infidel* at heart and in doctrine. They all denounce whatever the Christian believes which is distinguishable from what is approved by the *infidel*.

The great mass of those who reject the authority of the Church will accept, substantially, the doctrine of M. Quinet, which, we have seen, is nothing but the old French *infidelity* under a new name and a new disguise. The more advanced portion of the Protestant world, those who have pushed the Protestant principle farthest, have no more affection for dogmatic Protestantism than they have for Catholicity. Old-fashioned Lutheranism or Calvinism is as hateful to them as is the Church; and not a few of them openly say, If we must have a church and a creed, let us by all means have the Catholic. This is not without significance, and is worthy of the serious consideration of all who are not prepared to sink to the lowest depths of incredulity and irreligion.

A close examination of the extracts we have made from the book before us will leave us in no doubt as to the doctrine of this new school. The author is defending the old French school against the charge of materialism. He wishes to prove that they were spiritualists, and even religious, in the higher and truer sense of the term. On what facts does he rely? They believed, forsooth, “in the power of the invisible, of thought,” “that humanity possesses energy enough in itself to throw off the whole burden of the times, and reconstruct, at a given moment, a new world upon a new ideal,” and “that our soul can create a new universe.” — p. 135. “Show me an epoch in all the past which has had more faith in the *SOUL*.” — p. 137. Human thought, humanity, the human soul, these are the highest

objects of which it is pretended they conceived. These, too, are evidently the highest forces, the highest authority, recognized by our author and the new school. The providence of which he speaks is nothing but the instincts or natural tendencies of humanity, or, more simply, human nature. The energy that is to reconstruct the world is simply the energy of human nature, and the greater good that is hoped for is to be created by the human soul. And men are to be accounted great, noble, *religious*, because they are able to confine their views to humanity, and look for nothing which surpasses the power of the soul! "The true spirit of Christianity, the true Catholicism," is to exclude God from our faith, and to place all our dependence on the innate energy or irrepressible instincts of man!

We see here in full bloom, or rather, come to full maturity, the seeds of error sown in the early age of the Church by the British heresiarch, Pelagius. Man is raised above God, and the Creator is lost in the effort to save the creature. "What do you preach?" said we some time since to one of the leaders of "the movement." "The religion of humanity." This it is. The religion of humanity takes the place of the religion of God; and instead of the oracles of God, we are to consult the instincts and tendencies of humanity! The revelation of God's will is assumed to be made to us in humanity. Humanity is God's word, the inspired volume from which we are to collect the true Catholic faith and worship. We speak literally. The doctrine, that humanity is inspired, and that God reveals himself from age to age in the tendencies of the masses, and that this is his highest revelation, is expressly taught by the chiefs of the school. This is the doctrine of the book before us. Would you know God's will, ascertain what in your age and country is the popular tendency. That to which at any given time or place the race seems tending is what God wills, is his law, — what you must not resist, but are bound to obey. These chiefs boldly tell us that we have the right, and are bound, to affirm of humanity all that the Evangelists affirm of Jesus Christ. This is the real significance of Christianity. The Gospel is a sublime myth. Jesus Christ symbolizes the divinity of human nature, and the humanity of the divine nature. God and man are one and the same nature, and the Incarnation is a myth intended to represent the belief of the early Christians in one nature in two persons, and not two natures in one person, as theologians have believed. Thus hu-

manity is God, or God is humanity, no matter which. For us there is no God beyond humanity. The dark background of being on which man is traced by an invisible pencil is to us as if it were not, for, as Hegel teaches, it arrives at self-consciousness only in man. These chiefs must assuredly be great men, or how else could they beget such huge absurdities or utter such big blasphemies? But all this shows that the age is humanitarian; that it takes literally the maxim, *Vox populi, vox Dei*; and erects its temples and its altars to human nature. Very religious!

Assuming that humanity is divine, inspired, God incarnate, and that her will is always supreme, M. Quinet arraigns the Church for not countenancing what he calls "the party of the Future." There is now, he contends, throughout all Christendom, an obvious tendency to what are called social ameliorations. This tendency is the new life, the spirit of the age. Everywhere we see a party opposed to the existing social order, warring against authority, zealous for liberty, and calling aloud for a redress of grievances. This party is assumed to represent humanity. Its voice is her voice; its authority is her authority; and through it she speaks out from her own mighty heart for REFORM, for PROGRESS, for LIBERTY, for the elevation of her oppressed and down-trodden children. Whoso does not rally under the banners of this party is wedded to the dead past, is a friend of abuses, a minion of despotism, an enemy to light, to science, to truth, to freedom, to the onward march of the masses to the fulfilment of the glorious destiny of humanity.

The party of the future, it is assumed, is the Christian party. Did not Jesus Christ come to be the father of a new age, to introduce a new order, which in its progress and development was to swallow up the old world, whether Jewish or Pagan? Did he not promise his followers a good they had not as yet attained to, and bid them aspire to a glory hereafter to be revealed? What, then, was he but a reformer, an innovator, one who sought to destroy the order he found existing, and, in spite of its opposition, to introduce a new and more advanced order? And what is it to be a Christian but to imitate Christ, to seek to do as he did, and like him to be reformers, innovators, revolutionists, choosing rather to die on the cross than to submit to the established order of things? In order to be his disciples, it is not incumbent on us to believe what he taught and to do what he commanded, as professed Christians

have generally held, but to do for our age what he did for his. The Christian party was the movement party, the progressive party, and he—we shudder to write it—was the leading infidel of his age and country. Now the Church can be true to him only on condition of making common cause with the movement party of our times,—the party that resists authority and clamors for change and innovation under the specious guise of social amelioration. But the Church does not make common cause with this party; she even sides with its enemies, and exerts herself to sustain existing institutions, and to uphold legal authority. Then she is opposed to reform, to progress, to liberty; at war with the sacred instincts of humanity, with the *Welt-Geist*, or spirit of the age, and *therefore* with Christ himself. Then the spirit of Christ commands us to resist the Church, to overturn its authority, and free ourselves from its thralldom.

We assure our Christian readers that we are not caricaturing the views of the movement party. All we say its chiefs have said in sober earnest, and the spirit which says it is common to all its members, whether calling themselves Protestants or Catholics; for many who should be Catholics are of the party. Let the Church denounce Young Ireland, and Young Ireland—not old Ireland, thank God—is prepared to denounce the Church. One of our papers castigates, without mercy, the *Dublin Review* for its able exposition of the madness of Young Italy in attempting to revolutionize the Italian States, and thus, unintentionally, we presume, joins hands with the *Christian Alliance*. In France and Spain there is, as well as in Germany and America, the same spirit. The movement party is placed above religion, and made the criterion by which to determine the Christianity of the Church. The Church is allowed to be Christian only in proportion as she is believed to be on the side of those who are seeking to renew the horrors of the French Revolution, under pretence of social amelioration.

Yet this same party, with a consistency peculiarly its own, denounces the Church, whenever it attempts to emancipate itself from dependence on the civil powers. A great question arises in France; the Church takes the side of liberty against the government, and M. Quinet and his whole pack are loose upon her. In this country, the standing objection to the Catholic Church is, in substance, that she holds herself independent of the civil authority; just as if she could aid the cause of freedom, when subjected to the civil tyrant!

We cannot, in the brief space now at our command, undertake to clear up all the questions which are involved in these views. That the Church does not make common cause in all cases with the movement party we very cheerfully admit. She holds herself answerable to God for her conduct, not to the self-styled representatives of humanity. She has not received her commission from humanity, but from humanity's Maker and sovereign Lord. It is for humanity to obey her, not for her to obey humanity. Her teachings, not the instincts or tendencies of human nature, are the law, the measure of right and wrong, of good and evil. Your big words, your appeals to the mighty heart of humanity, to the new life, the spirit of the age, all your fine phrases about liberty, progress, social amelioration, and all that, are of no avail. Where the Church condemns you, you are wrong, not she.

Yet it is false to say that the Church ever opposes light, science, liberty, or social progress. Does she oppose liberty in Poland, where she is the unhappy Pole's only protector? Did she oppose it in Belgium? Does she oppose it in France, where she stands firm against the government for the liberty guaranteed by the charter? Does she oppose it in Ireland, where her whole influence is on the side of social amelioration? She opposes not liberty, but license. She unquestionably does oppose the modern revolutionary spirit; but when she finds men, like O'Connell, who seek liberty and social amelioration only by peaceful and legal means, she does not oppose them, but blesses them, and makes their cause sacred. As for light, science, and all that, it does not become you to speak. She undoubtedly does not accept all your theories, all your mad speculations and airy dreams; but you have no light she rejects, — have made no discovery in science she does not accept. But you talk of your light, as if you were the lights of the age, — of science, as if you had amassed an amount too vast to be compressed within the narrow inclosure of the Church. Quite a mistake, Gentlemen. If you set aside your guesses, your dreams, your mere theories, your unsupported speculations, and reserve only what you have really established, what may be said to be demonstrated, you have nothing not known to the Church long ages before you were born. The Church accepts all your light, and can find room to stow away all your truth; but she has no fondness for your darkness, and no space for your error and falsehood. With your doctrines and speculations she is quite familiar, for

they are nothing but old errors and heresies, which she discarded and condemned many ages ago, and which the real movement party has long since outgrown. You are no creators, no inventors. With all your genius, you cannot even invent a new blasphemy. You remind us of the little girl who stood watching the western sky as the sun went down. The sun went down, the twilight came; and, as the darkness deepened, the evening star became visible. "Father, father, see there, God has made a star!" So when you see here and there a feeble star, which the darkness gathering over your mental heavens makes visible, you fancy, in an ecstasy of delight, that it is a new creation, or at least a new discovery. Him who is enamoured of his own intellectual progress we may always safely set down as one who has yet to learn that he is — a fool. The Church does not oppose progress, but she may, we own, oppose your *doctrine* of progress; for she has never yet seen a man lift himself up by his own waistbands, or motion without something fixed and immovable to communicate it. Your doctrine of progress assumes that man without going out of himself can make himself more than he is, the imperfect is able to perfect itself, the possible to make itself real, nothing to make itself something, and that there can be motion without rest. Really, Gentlemen, you are profound philosophers. You can move the world, and without *the where* to stand deemed so indispensable by old Archimedes! It is no wonder that you regard the Church as behind the age.

Progress there may be, but not without a power foreign to the subject of progress. The error of the movement party is not in demanding progress, but in demanding it of man alone, and where it is suicidal to demand it. The condition of progress is fixed, permanent, and immovable religious and political institutions. The movement party overlook this fact, and demand progress in institutions themselves. They seek to set the institutions themselves afloat, and thus loosen every thing; which superinduces a state in which all progress is impossible. The grand error is here. The party kills, as in the fable, the goose that lays the golden egg, in the hope of getting more than one egg a day, and thus cuts off the source of golden eggs altogether. It is only this madness which wars upon the established order, and seeks to destroy, for the sake of progress, the condition of all progress, that the Church opposes.

But it may be asked, if institutions are not or may not be progressive. In themselves considered, no. Religious insti-

tutions may be improved or perfected miraculously by the supernatural providence of God, or without a miracle, by transplanting the institutions of one country to those of another, by missions, colonization, or conquest; and civil institutions also by colonization, conquest, or the aid of religious institutions already established and in their vigor; but not otherwise. This is philosophically demonstrable, and historically verifiable. There is no such thing as self-perfecting institutions. Without one, or another, or all of the efficient causes we have mentioned, improvement in religious or civil institutions is absolutely impossible; for the simple reason, that the imperfect can never without the aid of a foreign power become perfect, nothing can make itself more than it is; or, as we say, there is no motion without rest, — no man can lift himself up by his own waistbands.

If we turn to history, we shall find that institutions, though they may decline, are never progressive. There is no instance on record of a spontaneous civilization, — no instance of a savage people emerging of itself from the savage state. The earliest period of all civil and political institutions is their purest and best period. The history of all states is a history of decline, corruption, deterioration of their institutions. The struggle of nations is always for lost rights, lost privileges. *Magna Charta* is but an attempt to stay the progress of corruption, and to preserve a portion of what had been enjoyed from time immemorial. The earliest of the pyramids is the most perfect as a work of art. The *Cloaca Maxima* of Rome was built before the epoch of authentic history. The traditions of every people point to a state of society in the past superior to that which is at present enjoyed. The wisest and most salutary laws of all modern nations, save such as are derived from Christianity, have their origin in the night of ages, — have existed and been in force from time immemorial, for a time so long that “the memory of man runneth not to the contrary.” Never expect from institutions a worth or adaptedness they do not possess in their origin.

The historian of modern society can trace a progress of civilization effected by Christianity, but no progress in institutions, properly so called. Improvements in administration may have been introduced, though even this, if taken absolutely, may be questioned; but in all cases where change, innovation, has struck at fundamental institutions, it has been a corruption, the sign of decay, and the precursor, if not the cause, of evil.

England has suffered from every change in her old constitution. France by her changes was brought to the very brink of ruin ; she owes the preservation of her nationality to the mercy or the policy of her conquerors, and it has only been in proportion as she has restored the old order that she has begun to resume her rank among the nations. Spain lies bleeding at every pore ; her whole energy is relaxed ; and she seems almost on the verge of dissolution. What has brought her to her present deplorable condition ? *The party of progress, the innovators, the lovers of change, the madmen who would improve her institutions.* There is of old a curse pronounced against all who remove "the ancient landmarks" ; and Sallust, when he would brand a man with infamy, designates him as one who is *rerum novarum cupidus*.

We admit the Church does not take sides with the mad dreamers, and we assure the revolutionists that she will never be their accomplice. They may rail as they will, they may appeal to the "irrepressible instincts of humanity," talk largely of liberty (meaning thereby license), of progress, of science, of light, and in the excess of their philanthropic zeal convulse the nations, and turn the ruthless hordes of their myrmidons against her, sack her temples, desecrate her altars, violate her virgins, massacre her priests, imprison her sovereign Pontiff, as they did in the memorable French Revolution ; but they will never seduce or drive her from her fidelity to her heavenly Spouse. She will remain immovable while all around her is in commotion, and her calm, unalterable voice will make itself heard above the confused roar of maddened millions, command the strife to cease, and *be obeyed*. That she does not do what she is asked to do by these men greedy of new things is among the proofs that she is from God, and that he continues to fulfil his promise to be always with her unto the consummation of the world. If these men want progress, let them learn submission, let them obey the Church and be counselled by her, and not undertake to counsel her. She has received the authority to teach ; they have received only the command to OBEY. The progress they should seek is progress in obedience, in meekness, in humility, in patience, resignation ; for with their present tempers there is, and can be, no good for them.

Our space will not permit us to discuss now the question M. Quinet raises in its bearing on nationalities. He praises Voltaire for his universality, and condemns the Church because

she is not, in his view, as broad as humanity. Yet he wishes her to league with nationalities, be Gallican in France, Spanish in Spain, German in Germany, English in England, Italian in Italy, American in America. A singularly consistent view of Catholicity this. The Church knows no distinction of races or of nations. She deals with all as simple human beings, and seeks to bring all into the unity of one fold, to make all hearts one, in the unity of the same faith, the same hope, and the same charity. To her the soul of the Flathead Indian is as precious as the soul of a professor in the College of France. If civil governments receive her law, and serve her, it is well and good; she accepts their service, and they do their duty; if they refuse to do so, she leaves them to take their own course, and proceeds on without them in her work of love and mercy. She holds her authority not from them; and she will continue to maintain and teach that the law of God is paramount to theirs. They may rebel, they may conspire against her, and seek her destruction; but He that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at their folly, in his hot displeasure shall chastise them with his rod of iron, and break them in pieces as a potter's vessel. It is for them to fear, not for her. It is idle to summon up national prejudices against her. She disdains them. Before her, as the Irish proverb says, "Man is man the world over, — nothing less, nothing more."

• The danger of Catholicity to liberty is an idle dream. You can have no true liberty without her, and the only liberty that is endangered by her is the liberty of those who desire no law but their own will, no restraint but their own caprice. If this is against her, so be it. Be willing to love God and do your duty, and you will have nothing to fear from the Church.

ART. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *La Reforme contre la Reforme; ou Retour à l'Unité Catholique, par la Voie du Protestantisme.* Traduit de l'Allemand de HOENINGHAUS. Par MM. W. et S., précédé d'une Introduction par M. AUDIN. 2 vol. 8vo.

THE German title of this work is, "Das Resultat meiner Wanderungen durch das Gebiet der Protestantischen Literatur: oder, die Nothwen-

digkeit der Rückkehr zur Katolischen Kirche, ausschliesslich durch die einigen Eingeständnisse Protestantischer Theologen und Philosophen, dargethan; von Dr. Julius v. Höninghaus. Aschaffenburg. 1837." We have not ourselves as yet read this work, but we have seen a very able and interesting review of it in the *Dublin Review*, which Messrs. Casserly and Sons have done well to republish in their valuable little volume, entitled *The Bible Question fairly Tested*; New York, 1844. The author was, we believe, a distinguished Protestant minister of Berlin, but is now a member of the Catholic Church. This work was the result of his inquiries as a Protestant, and, though an able defence of Catholicity, is taken, with the exception of the brief analysis which the author places at the head of each chapter, entirely from Protestant writers. We translate the following brief but interesting notice of the work from the *Ami de la Religion*, Sept. 2, 1845.

Catholics eminent for their knowledge and penetration comprehended and announced, from the very origin of the Reformation, that the principle of free inquiry, which serves as the foundation of the Protestant edifice, would in its inevitable consequences end in the total denial and ruin of all revealed religion. This truth, which was perceived in the beginning only by the more advanced minds, has at length become manifest to all, and at this moment is a fact evident in the highest degree to minds of the least penetration. To become so, it only needed to leave it to time to bring about the development of the erroneous principle which the schism of the sixteenth century assumed as its point of departure. Often already had Catholic writers, following the footsteps of the immortal author of the *Variations*, pointed out in the writings or in the situation of the dissident churches a tendency, more or less striking, to an early dissolution; but we own we were scarcely prepared to find a Protestant writer, grave and earnest, weeping in the sorrow of his heart over the anarchy which everywhere afflicts the dispersed and isolated Protestant churches, coming forward to unveil before the Christian world the scandal of these intestine dissensions, and to expose the death with which for the most part they are already struck. Never before has the Reformation been so vigorously attacked as in this work of Höninghaus. He has laid under contribution the most distinguished and best known among Protestant writers. It is their confessions, their declarations, which he extracts and combines in a speaking picture, as it were, that accuse the schism of Luther of the evil it has done to Christian unity, and the deplorable ravages it has made since that fatal epoch. It is deeply interesting to see a partisan of the Reformation, an adept, establishing, clearly demonstrating, from the writings of Protestants themselves, that Protestantism never had the capacity to found a veritable church; that the evil it has done it is impotent to repair; that it ought never to have abandoned tradition; that the faith taught by the Catholic Church reaches back to apostolic times; that there is no possible salvation but in returning to the Catholic Church, &c.

M. Audin, so honorably known in the religious world by his learned and conscientious researches on Luther and Calvin, crowned with a well-merited success, and who seems to have received from heaven the mission and the gift to denude the wounds of Protestantism, and at the same time to apply the remedy, has not contented himself with simply making known to us the remarkable work of Höninghaus by a French edition and translation, but has in some sort identified himself with the author, and so appropriated to himself the subject treated by the German as

to give us a clear and detailed analysis of it. This analysis forms the introduction to the book; it is a complete summary of its contents, and its perusal will fully initiate the reader into the plan and labors of the author.

The work is comprised in eleven chapters. The author begins by depicting the actual state of Protestantism in the different countries which have embraced the Reformation; and from this he arrives easily and naturally to the conclusion, that Protestantism does not form a veritable church; that it nowhere offers unity of doctrine; that it resembles a worm cut up into pieces, each of which moves and writhes so long as there remains something of the original vital impulse, but which gradually loses even that remnant of mutilated life. It is only an aggregation of a multitude of churches of different opinions, with nothing external or internal to unite them in one communion. And, in fact, there can be no union among them, for they everywhere hold different dogmas and principles.

Having enumerated the divers sects scattered over Europe, the author continues:—

“The population of America is broken up into innumerable religious fractions. Besides the Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Calvinists, Baptists, Quakers, Swedenborgians, Universalists, Unitarians, Tunkers, &c., there is a multitude of minor sects flowing from these as from their source, and of which each has its own distinct hierarchy. The Catholics alone have been able to avoid these internal divisions. . . . Protestant missionaries sent among idolatrous nations help effectually to spread disunion. One instructs them in the spirit of the Baptists; another teaches them Methodism; a third makes of them Hershutters; a fourth, Quakers; a fifth, Calvinists; a sixth, rigid Lutherans; a seventh makes the souls confided to his care learn by rote the Thirty-nine Articles of Anglicanism, — each acting always in the spirit of his sect.”

The doctors of the Protestant churches contradict each other on the most important points of religion (they are Protestant authors only who speak in Höninghaus). Thus, one will declare that original sin is a fundamental article of faith, inseparably connected with doctrines absolutely essential to the very preservation of faith, such as the doctrine of grace, the doctrine of the necessity of works, of revelation, and of redemption; another will teach that in the progressive spirit of the Evangelical Church the dogma of original sin is left behind, as unsupported by Scripture, and as repugnant to the development of the Christian spirit. The most essential Christian dogmas, such as the Holy Trinity, the Resurrection of the Body, the Last Judgment, the Eternal Pains of Hell, — are admitted by some, rejected by others.

In the fourth chapter the author proves that the only remedy for the evils to which Protestantism is the prey would be to return to the Catholic system of the infallibility of authority. And, in fact, revelation once admitted, the Bible once received, if in religion you start from a supernatural principle, you must necessarily acknowledge that the Divinity who has deigned to grant us a revelation must take care that its sense be not abandoned to the arbitrary judgment of men. The very enunciation of doctrines which are to remain above the province of reason suffices to preclude the possibility of their being left to the arbitrary interpretation of the human mind. For, if God has really revealed those doctrines as truths indispensable to salvation, their interpretation can belong

only to a body of teachers always guided by the assistance of the Holy Ghost. Scripture alone, without an authority which determines their true sense, cannot be a sure and infallible guide, because it is susceptible of as many different interpretations as there are interpreters. In support of this, Höninghaus cites several passages from Protestant authors as positive as any thing which could be said by Catholic theologians themselves. One of them says, — "The Protestant Church is only a stump, and will ever remain a stump." "We are," says another, "only a broken link of the Catholic Church." And again: — "Nothing in the world is more respectable than the decision of a truly œcumenical council. . . . If Christ is during every age with his Church, he cannot permit a decision contrary to faith ever to be made in such assemblies. THE WORK OF THE VENERABLE FATHERS ASSEMBLED AT TRENT IS THE CONSECRATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH DRAWN FROM THE HOLY SCRIPTURES AND APOSTOLIC TRADITION."

One of the most interesting chapters is the seventh, in which the author gives the history of the Reformation. The curious revelations to which these not suspicious testimonies give a degree of credit wholly irrecusable the better enable us to comprehend the rapidity of the astonishing success which followed the first efforts of the Reformation, — to see how the passions of princes and of the people found in it free and full scope for their satisfaction, without experiencing any obstacle. M. Audin willingly enlarges, in his Introduction, on this part of the work. He doubtless felt that these details deal a mortal blow at Protestantism. We cite a few paragraphs, which will enable our readers to judge of the interest which Höninghaus throws over his subject.

"The historians whom the author analyzes," says M. Audin, "seem, in reciting the triumphs of the Reformation in Germany, to have had always before their eyes this saying of Luther, — 'THE GOLDEN RAYS OF OUR MONSTRANCES MAKE MORE CONVERTS THAN OUR SERMONS.' The goods of the clergy offered to the Electors a rich prey. The secularization of a convent brought them lands, pastures, vineyards, forests, abbatical *menses*, libraries, tombs, often garnished with precious stones. If you travel over Germany, you are astonished to find in the museums of certain Evangelical princes chasubles intertissued with silk, precious chalices, and golden ciboriums. To become possessors of these treasures, it was necessary only to pronounce these four words, — I believe in Luther. The *credo* of St. Athanasius gave heaven to the Christians of the time of Arius; the Wittenbergian *credo* in the time of Luther gave abbeys to the Saxon Electors. . . .

"In England the Reformation warred first against the dead. England was the land of tombs, and of tombs covered with precious stones; and the minions of Henry the Eighth, says the historian, would have plundered the tomb of the Redeemer, if they had been sure of finding in it a few grains of gilded dust. They began at Canterbury, where two splendid tombs, those of Austin and Thomas à Becket, attracted these birds of prey. Austin had established Christianity in England; Thomas à Becket had dared, under the reign of Henry the Second, to resist the king who strove to oppress the Church. The tombs were plundered. It required eight men to roll to the gates of the temple the two boxes filled with gold and silver taken from the sepulchre of Becket. Austin was suffered to keep his heavenly crown as confessor of Christ, but Thomas à Becket, by the royal order, lost his, and could no longer be invoked as a saint. His name was erased from the calendar. The same royal hand, which was shortly after to sign the death-warrant of Thomas More, drew a black line in the prayer-book over the name of Thomas à Becket. Thanks to that blot of ink, no Englishman may any

longer say, 'St. Thomas à Becket, pray for me.' After the tombs came the convents. Not a kneeling-stool was left. We read in a document cited by the historian, — '*Item, handed over to his Majesty four chalices of gold with their four patens, and one golden spoon, the whole weighing one hundred and seventy ounces. Received, Henry, king.*' The autograph is in London.

"In Sweden, the Reformation could not fail of success, for the state was bankrupt, and Gustavus Wasa loved money. The king, therefore, says Menzel, eagerly embraced doctrines which allowed him to appropriate to himself the immense wealth of the clergy. . . . Denmark was subjected to Christiern the Second, an ambitious prince, avaricious, cruel, the cowardly assassin of the patriots whom he feared. He was himself the slave of Duweke, a Flemish girl of base extraction. The mistress of the king had taken a fancy for the doctrines of Luther. Confession was somewhat onerous to this chaste lady. She succeeded easily in *converting* her royal lover."

It must be confessed, that, if Protestantism contented itself with the dry narrative of these apostasies, which too frequently remind us of the question of Judas, *What will you give me, and I will deliver him to you?* the recital would become a little wearisome; but by the side of these noble Judases, the author has, in the interest of truth, placed the noble examples of firmness and Christian faith exhibited by the Catholic clergy. The bishops in his narration appear radiant with majesty. They are despoiled, they protest; they are cast into prison, they are silent; they are led to death, they chant their hymns of triumph.

Whilst the power of the new church is consolidating itself in Germany, whilst the Reformation gains numerous partisans in Bohemia, Poland, and Hungary, whilst it finds a powerful support in France in the nobles, whilst in the Low Countries the revolutionary spirit of the people seizes with avidity on this element of revolt, Catholicity receives from a man poor and without science an aid far more efficacious than the victorious arms of the Emperor or the treasures of the New World. Ignatius Loyola was then founding the Company of Jesus. The author here hesitates not to make the most beautiful eulogium of this Company, and cites in proof a long passage from the historian Menzel. Another Protestant says, that "The Order of the Jesuits has unquestionably contributed more than all others to the preservation of the Roman Catholic faith in those countries which had not as yet embraced Protestantism."

In another chapter the author compares the Protestant institutions with the Catholic, and everywhere assigns the superiority to the latter. He enlarges on Bible societies and Protestant missions. He carries his readers with these missions over the four quarters of the globe, and even to the centre of Oceanica, and makes them see the sterility of their works in contrast with the fruitfulness of the Catholic missions, marching from victory to victory.

Such is this work of Höninghaus, composed of pages selected from Protestant books not heretofore translated into French. In reading them, it is easy to perceive that the dissident writer, while making the defence of our faith, retains somewhat of the old leaven of sectarianism. But if all traces of this kind were effaced from the work, it would be entirely a Catholic book. It is well that at certain turns of thought, at certain epithets, we are reminded that the historian or the theologian does not belong to our communion.

There is, in these two volumes published by M. Audin, a great number of pages very pleasing and attractive. They are marked by a vast erudition; perhaps they are too erudite, and demand too much applica-

tion and effort on the part of the reader to be properly appreciated. The author has not treated separately each subject which he announces, and given it by aid of his citations a suitable development; but he has preferred to arrange and connect in consecutive order the citations themselves, and to make them form the very groundwork and body of his history. It surely was not to spare himself labor and pains, to attempt to reduce to order, to harmonize, so to speak, the thoughts of so many different authors; to make such a multitude speak on the same subject, and to fetch from so many mouths the same echo of approbation of the Catholic Church. This advantage, so conducive to the triumph of truth, will certainly compensate for the efforts of application certain passages in this book would appear to exact of the reader. However, this work, we are sure, is destined to find its merit acknowledged by all, especially by the serious and reflecting.

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2. — *A History of Ireland, from its first Settlement to the present Time; including a particular Account of its Literature, Music, Architecture, and Natural Resources, with upwards of Two Hundred Biographical Sketches of its most eminent Men; interspersed with a great Number of Irish Melodies, original and selected, arranged for Musical Instruments, and illustrated with many Portraits of celebrated Irishmen, and a series of Architectural Views.* By THOMAS MOONEY, late of the City of Dublin. Boston: By the Author. 1845. 12mo. pp. 1651.

THE subject of this history is one to which no American should be indifferent. There is not a more remarkable people on the globe than the Irish, and none whose history is more worthy of an attentive and profound study. During several centuries of our era, Ireland was the instructress of the European nations, and, in nearly every age since, her scholars have honorably distinguished themselves, especially in poetry and eloquence. No inconsiderable portion of English literature, if we may be pardoned the bull, is Irish. It suffices to mention the names of Swift, Berkeley, Stæele, Goldsmith, Sheridan, and Burke. But to us Ireland is more especially interesting for her misfortunes; the unheard of wrongs which she has for so many ages endured; her firm attachment to the Catholic faith under every privation, and amid every temptation; and her recent patriotic efforts to resume her rank among the nations of the earth. The Irish, wherever scattered abroad, are the enemies of oppression, and the ardent — perhaps too ardent — friends of liberty; and we cannot but hope that the time is not far distant when oppression shall cease in their own native isle, and Tara's harp be restrung, and Tara's halls once more resound with the songs of national freedom. We, as a people, have a warm sympathy with Ireland. We remember her generous sympathy with us in our own struggle for independence; that she has furnished a large portion of our own population, and no inconsiderable number of those we delight to honor; and through all our borders ascends the fervent prayer for her deliverance.

Of the merits of Mr. Mooney's work we are but imperfectly qualified to speak. The late day at which we received a copy has not given us time to read it with the care requisite to enable us to pronounce a final

judgment. Moreover, we are not familiar enough with Irish history, ancient or modern, to be able to judge of the merits of the work regarded simply as authentic history. So far as we have read, without vouching for the accuracy of all its details, and reserving to ourselves the right to question, in some instances, both its facts and its theories, we may say that we have found it exceedingly interesting. The author, or rather compiler, has brought together a great mass of valuable information; and if he has not given us a complete history of his nation, he has at least given us a series of highly interesting and instructive lectures on its history. The work is well printed, and its illustrations are creditably executed. It is written in a free, easy, attractive style, which at times rises into a high order of eloquence; and its author is evidently not only a warm-hearted Irish patriot, but a writer of commendable industry and no inconsiderable literary merit. Some may question his taste in several matters of minor importance, and especially the method he takes of bringing his work to the notice of the public; but we trust nothing of this kind will lead any one to underrate his ability, or tend to prejudice any one against the work itself, which those who have read it with more attention than we have, who are altogether more familiar with Irish history than we are or can pretend to be, and whose judgments in any case we should prefer to our own, assure us is really the most complete and readable history of Ireland easily accessible. We hope it will be extensively read; and if it contribute somewhat to a juster appreciation of the Irish character, and tend to create a deeper interest in Ireland's struggle for a redress of grievances, not in vain will it have been written and read.

3. — *Puritanism, or a Churchman's Defence against its Aspersions, by an Appeal to its History.* By THOMAS W. COIT, D. D. New York. Appleton & Co. 1845. 12mo. pp. 527.

THE Puritans certainly have their faults, and we allow ourselves at times to speak of them in no complimentary terms; but somehow or other, we rarely, if ever, read an attack upon them by others, without being strongly moved to take up the cudgels in their defence. Our old Puritan blood warms in our veins, and we are ready for the fight. Especially is this the case, when we find them attacked by an Episcopalian. We recognize no right in the Episcopalians to call our ancestors hard names. If we ourselves sometimes do so, that is all in the family; but an Episcopalian is a stranger, and has no right to interfere in our family quarrels. In a religious or an ecclesiastical point of view, the Puritan has no occasion to hang his head before an Anglican. Both claim to belong to the Church, and with equal reason, for one is as far from it as the other; both usurp rights which belong only to the Church of Christ; both favor religious establishments, and claim the right to punish heretics and dissenters; both persecute; but the persecutions of the Puritan are as a drop in the bucket, compared with those of the Anglican. Neither has any virtues except those which receive their reward in this life, and in these the Puritan excels. The only real difference between them is, that the Puritan is the more consistent of the two. Both are dissenters, only the Puritan is a dissenter from a dissenter. The Anglican is in this the worse of the

two; for he dissents from the Church which has authority from Christ; the Puritan dissents from a church which has, at best, authority only from the state. We would rather be a Puritan than an Anglican, though we thank God, that, through his great mercy, we are no longer either.

As to the book before us, it is crude, declamatory, and destitute of all literary merit. Dr. Coit is a scholar and a man of ability. He appears to have had the facts before him, and might have given us a good history of Puritanism. He ought to be ashamed of having sent out so hasty, confused, and ill-digested a work; and we will not pardon him, till he revises it, compresses it at least three fourths, reduces his ample materials to order, and relates his facts in a straightforward manner, so that one can get them from his book, even in case he should not happen to be previously familiar with them.

4. — *History of the Variations of the Protestant Churches.* By JAMES BENIGN BOSSUET, Bishop of Meaux. From the French. New York: J. & D. Sadlier. 1845. 2 vols. 12mo.

WE welcome right heartily an American edition of this valuable work by the celebrated Bossuet. Every Catholic who is likely to come in contact with his Protestant neighbours should own and study it; and every Protestant who would appreciate his own religion, and ascertain the sandy foundation on which he is building, should also make himself familiar with it. We thank the Messrs. Sadlier for their enterprise in bringing it out, and trust they will find their interest in having done so.

5. — *I Promessi Sposi. The Betrothed.* By ALESSANDRO MANZONI. New York: Appleton & Co. 2 vols. 12mo.

WE have experienced too much romance in real life, and seen too much of the effects of romance and novel-reading on those very dear to us, to be able to recommend the reading of novels and romances. It is not well to waste over scenes of fictitious woe the tears and sympathy due to the real miseries of life. Yet we can recommend this romance by Manzoni, which, by the by, is too well known, and too highly appreciated wherever known, to stand in any need of our recommendation. So far as we are acquainted, it is deserving to rank first among the first romances in any language. It is the production of true genius, and breathes a spirit and inculcates a moral that one is the better for being familiar with.

6. — *The Catholic Keepsake.* Edited by PROFESSOR WALTER. Philadelphia: Fithian. 1845. 12mo. pp. 252.

THE paper, printing, and binding of this new Catholic annual are very beautiful, and do the publisher great credit. The illustrations are not so

happy. They will be better hereafter. We have read the volume with much pleasure; and if we had not read it at all, from the known taste and ability of its accomplished editor, we should not hesitate a moment to recommend it to our readers. We are glad to see the efforts our Catholic publishers are making to furnish our Catholic public with a good stock of Catholic literature, and especially to witness the improved style in which they are sending out their publications. There was a time when Catholic publications in this country were sent out in quite a shabby dress. This time is passing away. Messrs. Dunigan and Sadlier, New York, Fithian and Cunningham, Philadelphia, Murphy, and the conductors of the Metropolitan Press, Baltimore, and Donahoe, of this city, deserve honorable mention for the general typographical neatness and beauty of their publications. We must not let heresy have the advantage in typography. The edition of the Holy Bible recently issued by Messrs. Sadlier, and especially that issued by Mr. Dunigan, of New York, are both very beautiful, and deserving, as they no doubt receive, the liberal patronage of the Catholic public.

- 7.— *The Christian's Guide to Heaven, or a Manual of Spiritual Exercises, with the Evening Office of the Church in Latin and English, and a Selection of Pious Hymns.* Boston: Donahoe. 1845. 16mo. pp. 288.

THIS is a very good little manual of piety, and, though not superior to many others in common use, will yet be very acceptable to the devout Christian. The addition of the Ordinary of the Mass we think would be an improvement. The Hymns are selected with judgment and taste. The size is very convenient, and the book presents a very beautiful specimen of typography.

- 8.— *The Jesuits.* Translated from the French of MM. MICHELET and QUINET, Professors in the College of France. Edited by C. EDWARDS LESTER. New York: Gates & Stedman. Boston: Haliburton & Co. 1845. 12mo. pp. 225.

THIS work was received too late to be noticed at length in our present number. All we can say of it now is, that it is not unworthy of its two infidel authors, nor of its American editor.

* * * THIS number commences the third volume of our Review, the *second* of the Catholic series. The work properly begins with the second volume, of which we can, to a limited extent, furnish new subscribers with the numbers. The general character of this Journal is now well known, and we can appeal with confidence to the American Catholic public for its support. Such a work, it is believed, is needed, and it is evident that it must rely almost exclusively on the Catholic public for patronage.

We cannot expect a large number of Protestants to continue to take and pay for a work devoted to a cause against which they protest. The Review is decidedly and exclusively Catholic, and must be supported by Catholics henceforth or not at all. We have no reason to complain of the liberality of the Catholic public for the past year, and none to distrust its continuance. The bishops and clergy have, we believe, very generally approved our labors, and to their liberal encouragement and support we are deeply indebted. On them we must depend for the success of the work, and against their wish we should be sorry to have it succeed, if it could. It is only through them we can receive or are willing to receive the support of the Catholic public for any publication.

We have aimed to deserve the liberal support we have received; but we are deeply sensible of the imperfection of our labors, and are pained to think how far short our Review falls of what a Catholic review should be. But, novice as we are in the Catholic faith, we have done the best we could. We have aimed to be true to the Church, and to be at least sound in the faith. We have not wished to put forth any crotchets of our own, or to attempt to *improve* the doctrines taught us. The Catholic Church, faith, and worship, as they are, always have been, and always will be till the end of time, is what we have embraced, what we love, what we seek to defend, — not relying on our own private judgment, but receiving the truth in humility from those Almighty God has commissioned to teach us, and whom he has commanded us to obey.

We cannot promise to do better or otherwise for the future than we have done for the past. Having, however, set forth and defended the great questions between Catholics and Protestants, we may be able hereafter to give to our pages more variety, and introduce articles of a more popular character; thus adapting the work, if not to a better, at least to a wider, circle of readers. But the public must take it as it comes. Committing it to the care of Him without whose blessing nothing can prosper, we start on this new volume, grateful for the past, and with cheerful confidence in the future. It was confidently predicted a year ago that we should turn back to Protestantism before the year was out. The year is out, and we are still a Catholic, and much firmer in the faith than we were at its commencement. It is idle for our old friends to look for our return to the errors and speculations we have abandoned. We are satisfied with the Church. We have thus far found it all and more than we expected. The more we become acquainted with it, the more true and altogether lovely does it appear. We have experienced during the year a peace, a serenity of mind, a joy and consolation in the midst of many afflictions, that we never knew before, or believed it possible for any one to experience in this life. We have found what we sought, and we ask for this life no greater boon than to be permitted to labor to refute the errors we formerly taught, and to promote the cause of Catholicity among our countrymen. With these remarks we send out this first number of a new volume, with the wish of "A HAPPY NEW YEAR" to all our friends and readers, Protestant as well as Catholic.

ERRATUM. — Page 109, line 36, for *chappelles* read *chappelles*.

BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1846.

- ART. I. — 1. *Praelectiones Theologicae Majores in Seminario Sancti-Sulpitii habitæ. De Matrimonio. Opera et Studio* JOS. CARRIÈRE. Parisiis. 1837. Vol. III.
2. *De Justitia et Jurs.* Parisiis. Vol. II.
3. *Compendium Theologiæ Moralis Sancti A. M. DE LIGORIO. Auctore DEOD. NEYRAGUET.* Ruthenis. 1839-44.
4. *Theologiæ Moralis concinnatæ a FRANCISCO PATRICIO KENRICK, Episcopo Philadelphiensis.* Philadelphix. Vol. I. 1841. Vol. II. 1842. Vol. III. 1843.

THE author of the two works which we have placed first on our list is a professor in the celebrated seminary of Saint Sulpice, and one of the vicars-general of the Archbishop of Paris. The lectures which he delivered to the numerous students of that institution form the groundwork of the learned and voluminous treatises in which he labors to adapt theological principles to the altered state of affairs in France and the actual laws, and to solve many practical cases which perplex the clergy in the exercise of their holy ministry. It is not for us to say whether, in all cases, he has been successful in untying the knot; but we can cheerfully bear testimony to his great learning and high integrity. The compendium next on the list is from the pen of a priest of the diocese of Rhodéz, in Gascony, and was first published in 1839; but has already passed through three editions, the last of which was in 1844. It is what it professes to be, an abstract of the moral doctrine of St. Alphonsus de Liguori, whose words are, for the most part, retained. In a volume of above eight hundred pages, the substance is given of what fills three large volumes of the great

work of the Saint, besides his practical manual, called *Homo Apostolicus*. Of the excellence of this work its success affords most satisfactory evidence. The last on our list is a work in three volumes, which, in three successive years, issued from the Philadelphia press, from the pen of the present Bishop of Philadelphia. It also is, to a great extent, a compendium of the work of St. Alphonsus, especially in what regards matters of a delicate character, which the author generally expresses in the very words of the Saint, to shield himself against censure under such high protection; it being, however, his object to adapt the moral system to our laws and usages, he has necessarily introduced much that is not to be found in St. Alphonsus or other European writers, who, for the most part, were guided by the civil law in what regards legal questions, whilst the common law and our State legislation are frequently referred to by Bishop Kenrick. We do not feel competent to pronounce on the merits of this work; but not to appear to send our readers across the Atlantic for information, we take leave to refer to this domestic specimen of Catholic morality scientifically treated, and invite attention to a science full of practical interest, and which presents social attractions at this moment, when the echo of the ravings of Exeter Hall against Peter Dens has scarcely ceased, and may have awakened suspicion in some minds as to the purity of our moral system. We shall introduce our readers not only to the lecture-hall, but to the college *penetrabilia*, the lonely room of the student, and submit to their inspection what might not be uttered without wounding delicacy.

Ethics, as a Christian science, are the principles of morals as divinely revealed and sanctioned. Independently of revelation, certain rules of action are known to us from reason; and a power of discriminating between right and wrong, virtue and vice, is inherent in our nature; so that the nations to whom the divine revelation has not been made known are to themselves a law; which when they obey, they do, as it were by natural instinct, much of what is prescribed by God in his revealed law, and when they transgress it, they are self-rebuked, and condemned by conscience.* These principles, written on the hearts of all, are recognized and inculcated by the Christian science, which takes them as its basis, whereon it erects a divine superstructure. They are

* Rom. ii. 14, 15.

simply and authoritatively propounded ; and to enforce them effectually, motives of a high order are proposed, and the most solemn and awful sanctions are added. Instead of leaving each one to discover by reflection this secret law, and to unfold to himself its precepts, our science lays them down broadly and clearly, with their consequences, — at least, such as directly flow from them ; and promulgates them, in the name of God, to the young, in the simple language of the catechism, and to all, from the pulpit or altar. A Christian child, after short instruction, knows, with the assurance of faith, what Plato, or Aristotle, or other philosophers, perceived but dimly, and with great admixture of gross error, after many years of profound investigation.

There is an affecting tenderness and sublimity in every moral principle taught by Christianity, inasmuch as it is commended, sealed, and hallowed by the great mystery of Redemption. The Christian teacher does not insist merely on the conformity of the law to the dictates of reason, and on the propriety of sustaining the dignity of man by acting accordingly. Neither does he confine himself to the solemn sanction given to the natural law by its promulgation amidst the thunders of Sinai. He tells of a Redeemer's love ; he points to the cross, and shows the crimson tide that flowed to wash away man's transgressions. Each precept is proposed, not merely in the name of a sovereign who must be obeyed, but as the will of a Saviour, with boundless claims on our gratitude and love. Sin is not only intrinsically base, because contrary to reason and nature ; it is not merely treason against Supreme Majesty ; it is black ingratitude to a Divine Benefactor ; it is the revolt of a ransomed slave against the Lord that bought him ; it is the " crucifying again to one's self the Son of God, and making him a mockery " ; it is the " treading under foot the Son of God, and the esteeming unclean the blood of the testament by which he was sanctified."

The sanctions of the moral law, which Christianity presents, are the highest imaginable. The philosopher can only urge that virtue gives peace to the heart, sustains the dignity of human character, gains the esteem of men ; and if he speaks of futurity, it is only with a faltering tongue, uttering the language of conjecture. The torments of a guilty conscience stung with remorse, the shame and censure which follow the exposure of guilt, the wretchedness which it produces, the punishments which society inflicts on certain crimes, and the

possible evils that may be endured hereafter, are the grounds of philosophical remonstrance against sin. Earthly rewards and punishments were the immediate sanctions of the Mosaic dispensation ; whilst the Christian moralist promises with confidence eternal rewards for a cup of cold water given in the name of Christ, and foretells with certainty that torments without end await those who transgress and do not penance.

The Sermon on the Mount is the compendium of Christian morality, which is developed throughout the sacred writings of the New Testament, especially in the Epistles of St. Paul. There is, indeed, in this divine book no appearance of system, nothing that savors of didactic forms, no professed or implied design to furnish a complete code of morals ; but great principles are laid down, and sometimes applied to particular events or persons ; and many vices are specifically denounced, and the sanctions of futurity are urged with great force. If we add the precepts of the decalogue, incidentally referred to in the New Testament, and all the moral maxims contained in the ancient Scriptures, the obligation whereof is in their nature perpetual, we shall have abundant materials for a complete moral system.

The science, *as such*, may not have been cultivated in the commencement of Christianity. The Apostles spoke with authority, and not as theorists. Under divine illumination, they prescribed the good which was to be performed, and warned the faithful to shun all that bore the appearance of evil. They solved the doubts that arose in regard to many practical questions, such as the duties of the married state, the use of meats sacrificed to idols, and they entered into many other details. Their successors, doubtless, imitated their example, when called on as priests of God to declare his law, which was sought from their mouths as from his chosen messengers. Of their moral instructions little has escaped the ravages of time. They were, for the most part, delivered orally to the assembled faithful, or addressed, we may presume, to individual inquirers. The chief documents of that high antiquity which have come down to us are general exhortations to charity, obedience, and religious fervor, and apologies for the Christians, addressed to their persecutors, with some doctrinal essays. As we descend the stream of time, authors in considerable number appear in view ; but they were chiefly employed in combating error, or in expounding Scripture ; and only incidentally or oratorically put forward and applied the principles of morals. Tertullian, indeed, may be classed with the earliest casuists ; since

he canvassed the question of the lawfulness of wearing the military crown, and denied it to be allowable, on account of the heathenish superstitions wherewith he considered it to be connected. In the same spirit he condemned the Christian sculptor who for gain employed his chisel in forming idols, although he took no part in their worship; and he inveighed against all Christians who assisted at theatrical amusements, which were then full of heathenish allusions. The discourses of all the Fathers abound with moral lessons, and with invectives against the gross vices of the day. With intrepid zeal Chrysostom denounced the luxury of the Empress Eudoxia, and of females generally, and exposed the wanton waste of precious metal employed for the meanest purposes, whilst the poor of Christ were perishing. Ethics were thus presented in a popular form; but we have no systematic treatise of a comprehensive kind which can claim this antiquity. In the writings of Augustine we have the like oratorical exposition of moral duties, and invectives against breaches of the Christian law, with a treatise on falsehood, and the solution of some special cases. At a much later period, when the diligence of theologians had methodically arranged what was written in a desultory manner in defence of the doctrines of Christianity, the moral code was likewise reduced to order, and its parts were presented in the like close and combined form; both which important services, cost what it may to our pride to make the humiliating acknowledgment, we owe to the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages. The fuller development of ethics is, indeed, still more recent; but it may be doubted whether the investigation of so many possible cases, attended as it has been with the hazarding of many dangerous opinions, has added much to the simple beauty of the moral system found in the writings of St. Thomas of Aquin. Let, however, the meed of praise be given to the mariners to whose enterprise and observation the modern navigator is indebted for the knowledge of each small isle, rock, and shoal, each gulf, current, and eddy, which are now so minutely marked on the well dotted chart. This takes nothing from the merit of those who first ventured on the broad ocean, trusting to the compass, and furnished with the mere elements of nautical science. Much less can the labors of modern divines in the detailed application of moral principles detract from the praise due to the luminous simplicity and great comprehensiveness of the moral system taught by the Mediæval doctors.

The connection between this science and sacramental confession is manifest ; since the office of confessor is that of judge and physician, and the judge must be thoroughly acquainted with the law, the physician must have studied attentively the maladies to which man is liable. Hence, the study of casuistry, as practical ethics are called, has been almost wholly neglected by those sects which have expunged penance from the list of the sacraments. Jeremy Taylor, after a weak apology for the want of books of cases of conscience in his communion, points to the true cause. "It is not to be denied," he observes, "but the careless and needless neglect of receiving private confessions hath been too great a cause of our not providing materials apt for so pious and useful a ministration."* But then we may be asked how this science remained so long unheeded, if confession be an original practice of Christianity. The science, in its main principles, was doubtless cultivated from the beginning ; since all moral instructions were so many scientific lectures (according to modern phraseology), although not couched in scholastic form, or presenting all practical cases in minute detail. Doubtless, special and secret instructions were given, at all times, to the aspirant to the ministry by clergymen of experience or of high authority, and the mode of administering penance was taught with the other sacramental instructions, which it was held unlawful to commit to writing, lest they should fall under the eyes of the uninitiated.

In the infancy of the Church the study of ethics was necessarily far more simple than at present. It was confined to the great principles of Christian morals, and their application to cases for the most part obvious and easy of solution. In the progress of ages, new and difficult cases arose, from the new phases which society assumed, and from the special relations of the Church to various governments. Ecclesiastical discipline was formed, modified, and changed ; laws were enacted ; cases proposed to the sovereign pontiff by bishops and others were authoritatively solved ; and opinions were submitted to his judgment, some of which were found worthy of censure. The science is consequently highly complicated in its details at present, whilst it retains the simplicity of its principles. It were unfair to argue that there were no law and no judicial tribunal in the days of Alfred or Edward, because there remain

* *Ductor Dubitantium*, or the Rule of Conscience. Preface.

no positive records of that early date, and the principles of common law are proved by decisions far more recent, which, however, presuppose, declare, and apply the great legal rules acknowledged since the time of those monarchs.

The minds of men have been exercised in various ways on the truths of Christianity, from the time of their original promulgation. These were embraced by the mass of believers in the fulness of faith, and were practically exhibited in the Church; but the temptation of prying into the unfathomable mysteries of the Incarnation and Trinity agitated the East for many ages. Then discipline was attacked by the Iconoclasts, and the unity of the Church was subsequently rent by the abettors of Photius and Michael Cæularius. The West, in its turn, suffered from the attempts of Berenger to reduce a divine doctrine within the limits of human conception, and, after successive outbursts of error, the whole fabric of religion seemed to totter, when Luther, with a giant's hand, sought to overthrow it. Scarcely had the controversial tide begun to ebb, in the middle of the seventeenth century, when ethics became the great matter of inquiry and dispute among theologians. The pontiffs, true to the duties of their high office, weighed the various opinions in the scales of the sanctuary, and rejected, without fear or favor, all that were found wanting. On the one hand, they struck down the harsh advocates of principles too severe for human weakness; on the other, they rebuked the imprudent patrons of excessive indulgence.

The errors into which some casuists have fallen should not, however, bring the science itself into disrepute; since these must be regarded as individual extravagances. Wherever authority does not guide, reason, arguing from premises that seem indubitable, will oftentimes draw erroneous inferences; and the deformity of sin, which, if exposed without veil, would excite horror, may be concealed by some adventitious circumstance. If the gross absurdities which were maintained by the most eminent philosophers of antiquity, and which have been rivalled, if not surpassed, by some moderns, do not warrant the rejection of all philosophy, or a low estimate of its value, why should the errors of some divines involve in disgrace a science which is certain in its principles and true developments, and is pure and sublime in its tendencies? Besides, it should not be forgotten that some of the propositions which were denounced to the Holy See for condemnation were invented by interested accusers, and the meaning of others was

artfully perverted by separating them from the context which qualified them, and several were but opinions hazarded on subjects which presented a complex character, difficult of solution. It is a singular fact that St. Augustine, in regard to a particular case, pronounces an opinion which is now generally considered extremely severe ; and on another point seems almost to justify what no divine at the present day could be found to sanction.* This shows that the holiest and most enlightened men may err in matters not decided by the Church ; and it should dispose us to regard with indulgence those who, with upright intentions, advance opinions that, on mature examination, may not be found tenable. The satires of Pascal have involved in disgrace the whole society of Jesuits, because some objectionable principles had been maintained by individual members, which, however, were exaggerated and caricatured by the artful and caustic Jansenist. It is the glory of the Society, that, whatever indulgence it showed to human weakness, its members themselves generally exhibited in their own conduct evangelical perfection. It is, indeed, the characteristic of the saints to be severe towards themselves, and indulgent towards others ; and only a few years have elapsed since the Church has enrolled in her list of triumphant confessors Alphonsus de Liguori, a moralist remarkable for the mildness of his opinions, which some branded as relaxed, but still more conspicuous for virginal integrity, pastoral zeal, and all the high qualities of an Apostolic prelate. The popular character of his principles in France may be conjectured from the rapidity with which the excellent compendium of M. Neyraguet has passed through several editions.

It is not, however, our object to vindicate any class of theologians, but to give an insight into Christian ethics as they exist, pruned by the hand of authority from the excrescences which spoil their beauty and usefulness. There remain, it is true, many opinions of a questionable kind still afloat on the theological sea. The chief pastors have not taken on themselves to decide every moral question that has been a subject of discussion ; since the endless variety of phases which human actions may assume might render this extreme minuteness in defining the limits of right and wrong hazardous and perplexing. It was enough to defend the great principles of morality, and their application to important cases, against the temerity of

* *De Serm. Domini*, n. 50.

men whose zeal was not according to knowledge. The freedom of opinion which is left does not render the science of little value, since it presents a comprehensive rule of duty with the highest sanction of authority. Omitting to speak of the exact sciences, we ask, What other science can offer an equal amount of useful knowledge with fewer questionable points? Not certainly chemistry, which by undergoing an entire revolution has not strengthened its claims on our confidence; not geology, with its Plutonian and Neptunian theories; not medicine, which, for the most part, is matter of experiment, with very doubtful issue, — kill or cure. We stop not to inquire whether law be a science, or art, since, unhappily, we know too much of its glorious uncertainty to fear its rival claims. Our science has broad and deep foundations, absolutely immovable; and the superstructure is solid and secure.

Ethics are not matters of sterile speculation, but essentially practical, regulating the actions of man, his words, his affections and thoughts, by the divine law. Man, inasmuch as he is a free and responsible agent, is the object of this science, which, leaving to physiology to contemplate his physical organization, and to medicine to treat of his corporal maladies, considers him as a moral being, subject to impulses which he must restrain and direct, and bound to the performance of certain duties. Her immediate end is to establish and maintain order in man himself by subjecting the animal appetite to reason, and, in case nature still revolt, by influencing the judgment and will, so as to prevent any consent or voluntary delectation in that which is irregular. Internal peace is secured by this control of the appetites and inclinations. Using the goods of life for his nourishment and comfort, man abstains from excessive indulgence, and thus he is not enfeebled by debauchery, or brutified by intoxication, or disturbed by passion. The disorders consequent on the original transgression yield to the superior influence of religion. The science, however, contemplates the possible deviations from her principles and laws, and is employed in devising remedies for all imaginable prevarications, as well as in determining the amount of moral guilt attached to them respectively. She considers man, in every class of society, and in every station of life, as a frail and sinful being; and whilst she lays before him his duties, she supposes the possibility of defects and transgressions. Without waiting for the evidence of actual guilt, she visits the high places of the land, and marks the defilements by which human weakness may stain

offices the most holy. She follows the sinner into the sanctuary, deprives him of the benefit of asylum, erects her tribunal at the very altar of God, and decrees the punishment of profanation and sacrilege. The walls of the cloister do not oppose an obstacle to her scrutiny. The musings of the convent-cell, — the whisperings of the tempter that addresses the frail daughter of Eve even within the earthly paradise, — are all judged of by her according to the standard of Him who searcheth the heart and reins. No place is deemed too holy to exclude temptation, no perfection so complete as to remove danger. With scales taken from the sanctuary she weighs each circumstance which may aggravate guilt, or change altogether its character; with minute accuracy she numbers the transgressions; and with unsparing strictness she unfolds the obligations which arise from their commission; whilst with a mother's solicitude she points to the means necessary to insure pardon. It is, however, unjust to suppose that the cases laid down by casuists are so many realities, since they are generally mere creatures of imagination, designed to illustrate and apply the principles. It may be that several similar sins have been, in various circumstances, committed; but their commission cannot be proved or inferred from mere hypotheses; much less is it fair to argue their frequency from the fact that they are spoken of as possible. As well might the character of a nation be assailed, because the laws decree punishment against such as may be guilty of unnatural enormities. Surely it is from the criminal records, and not from the statute-book, that the amount of crime should be estimated, nor does even the conviction of an individual culprit establish the general criminality of the body to which he belongs. If a theologian dwell on the guilt of a sacrilegious priest, is it just to infer that sacrilege is the ordinary characteristic of the priesthood? If he exaggerate the profanation of the holy ministry, does it follow that it is constantly profaned? If he condemn the looking back with regret on the world which has been forsaken, and the forfeiting in secret the purity which was vowed to God, with what appearance of reason is it inferred that the cloister is the habitation of unclean spirits? *Honni soit qui mal y pense.*

Moral theology reviews the relations of man to his fellow-men individually, to his family especially, to his country and her government, and to society at large. This is a wide and vast domain. Some of these relations are of the most deli-

cate kind, which many think should be covered with an impenetrable veil, since their exposure shocks public sentiment, and the glance of curiosity may bring death to the soul. The French infidel affects horror at the *cahiers* which are submitted to the ecclesiastical student to prepare him for the ministry of the confessional, by giving him an insight into mysteries of which he has no practical knowledge. The calumniators of Dens have paraded and exposed in the vernacular tongues all that this excellent divine thought necessary to detail, that what is lawful and what is forbidden might be accurately discriminated, and marriage maintained in every respect honorable, — the bed undefiled. The tract of Sanchez, *De Matrimonio*, written on his knees, at the foot of the crucifix, with an iron girdle around his loins, has been singled out for denunciation, as an index of Spanish corruption, an insult to public morals, a libel on Christianity. Even Saint Alphonsus de Liguori has not escaped the censure of the advocates of decorum and morality! Protestant and infidel have joined in the war-cry against Roman casuists; but is it meant that the law of God does not regulate the relations of man and wife? Is it supposed that the first laws of nature can be defeated without sin, or that nothing must be said to disturb the false tranquillity of the transgressors? Are crimes which the marriage-veil conceals from the public eye less abominable before God than the frailties of the inexperienced and unprotected, which are followed by exposure and shame? Whoever entertains such views forgets what St. Paul has said to inculcate the duties of the married state,* and what Moses has recorded respecting the punishment of their violation. Of Onan it is written, "The Lord slew him, because he did a detestable thing."† In times of primitive purity and simplicity, the holiest prelates of the Church, such as Chrysostom and Augustine, entered into details from the pulpit which the public ear will not now suffer. Shall we, on this account, consider all such offences against the fundamental law of nature as imaginary, and shrink from their contemplation, and in every circumstance affect utter ignorance of their possibility or their malice?

It is amusing to see Michelet solicitous about the purity of the young Levites, on their being allowed to peruse the *Diacœnal*; it is highly ludicrous to hear the corrupt compiler of extracts from Dens, whilst putting every dangerous detail within

* 1 Cor. vii. 3.

† Gen. xxxviii. 10.

the reach of every school-boy or girl, affecting to be shocked at the impropriety of instructing the clergy in the like details, the ignorance whereof would expose them, like unskilful physicians, to mistake the diseases which they may be called on to cure. Since the matrimonial relations form an essential part of Christian morality, — since the laws are founded in nature, and have God for their author, — since the transgressions are pointed out in Scripture, and the severest punishments are there denounced against the transgressors, — the professor of Christian ethics must study them. The innocence of his life, the solemnity of his obligations, and the daily exercises of piety which are enjoined on him, are so many protecting influences in a study, the pursuit of which, although not free from danger, is, under these circumstances, infinitely less dangerous to the Levite than the morbid descriptions of Sue or Bulwer are to the young female reader. Nay, we will say confidently, there is far more danger to a youth, male or female, from the premature reading of certain Scriptural facts and enactments, than there is to the theological student from the study of all the details of Dens, Sanchez, or Saint Alphonsus. Those who know vice only in the abstract, by studying its deformity, are generally remarkable for great innocence and purity of manners, and are never found, on this account, less delicate or refined in their intercourse with society. It is not presented to them in the pages of the casuist in the glowing colors wherewith it is depicted in romance, or with the charms wherewith stage representation invests it. The tear of sympathy for the faithful lovers does not steal down the cheek, nor does the bosom throb with high emotions. Adventure, intrigue, stratagem, are not employed to give interest to the narrative. Vice is considered as base, degrading, producing wretchedness and ruin, the worst enemy of man, and as that which God hates with perfect hatred ; its fatal results in time and eternity are portrayed ; and is it in circumstances like these that innocence, which in age more tender resisted the rude blasts of the world, is most likely to be blighted ?

Some affect to believe that the crimes contemplated by theologians belong to extraordinary epochs, when man was rendered savage by wars, and his passions defied all control. Would to God that it were so ! Still would their labors have their value, because suited to circumstances which may somewhere exist, and may sooner or later occur among ourselves. But, alas ! what is man everywhere, and at all times ? Truly an

irrational animal, — a weak and corrupt being, with beastly propensities. What crime has been committed at any period of the world, and in any state of society, that does not find a parallel in the criminal records or the newspaper reports of modern times? For those who can see beneath the surface of society, and view the depths of human corruption, what sinks of vice open to the sight! Moral theologians, then, deserve well of humanity, who, instead of indulging vain fancies of human perfection, or following phantoms for the improvement of our race, have considered the vices of men, and sought out the suitable remedies. It is a grand and consoling spectacle, which Christianity alone presents, — that of men removed from the influences which might pervert their judgment, and engaged in the consideration of human actions in reference to the divine law, that they may guide the unwary and enlighten the doubtful in all the numberless difficulties whereby the mind is perplexed, and without fear or favor say what is lawful and what is forbidden. This is a science of the highest advantage to individuals, and to society generally. Its professors are engaged in no metaphysical subtleties; they are utilitarians in the highest and best sense. They are counsellors whose advice is gratuitous; they are physicians whose unbought sympathies alleviate much of suffering, whilst they study to effect a cure.

To such as are anxious that subjects of a delicate nature, and crimes that are atrocious, should not be treated of in moral theology, we beg to remark, that God, in the ancient dispensation, was pleased to specify in detail matters the most delicate,* and to mark out for punishment unnatural crimes; and the Apostle descended to the like specification in several portions of his inspired Epistles.† From what part of the Scriptures can it be gathered that vice is to be warred against most effectually by dissembling its existence, and to be rooted out by conniving at its growth? Specifications are revolting to the feelings of the pure and the refined. Well, then, let them be avoided in familiar conversations, wherein the Apostle would not have impure crimes to be at all mentioned; let them be avoided in the pulpit, where, nevertheless, in better and purer times, they were used by holy and zealous men; let them be avoided in books of general instruction, which may pass into the hands of the innocent and young; — but the code

* *Leviticus, passim.*

† *Rom. i. 26, 27; 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10.*

of Christian morals cannot, on this account, suffer mutilation. Its foundations are in the eternal law ; it necessarily embraces all human actions in every variety of circumstance ; none can be withdrawn from its cognizance. To write on ethics, and not treat of impure and unnatural sins, is the same as to limit the writers on *materia medica*, *anatomy*, or other branch of medicine or surgery, to such details as may not be indelicate or revolting. Away with such affectation ! The moralist should narrowly and closely consider every thing that is embraced by the science ; and in proportion to the diligence wherewith he has pursued his investigation into the depths of human malice, — accordingly as he has studied the human heart, which no one can thoroughly fathom, and as he has become acquainted with the weakness and depravity of man, so will be his prospect of success in the skilful treatment of the moral patient. Let no one rashly judge the man who, with a view to effect a cure even in cases which seem desperate, considers crime in all its phases and all its deformity, and familiarizes himself with that which he utterly loathes and detests. “ All things are clean to the clean ; but to them that are defiled, and to unbelievers, nothing is clean ; but both their mind and conscience are defiled.” * The imagination is easily excited without any external cause ; an ambiguous word, a gesture, a look, suffices to raise the tumult of the passions and dethrone reason ; death enters by all our senses ; but the man, who, sensible of his own weakness, relies only on divine aid, may without fear unfold the pages of Sanchez, and consider over the various actions that come under review, to determine their moral character. The purity of his intention, and the necessity of the study for the proper discharge of the office of guide, instructor, counsellor, and physician, are his safeguards ; and the grace of God is sufficient to preserve him undefiled. Let those fear who court danger, — who let fall the *équivoque*, — who indulge the dangerous glance, — who pore over the obscene tale, — who in the crowded theatre, with excited minds, view at one moment the syrens in gaudy array, at another the successful intrigue invested with all the charms of happiness. They are not the persons to warn the theological student of the dangers attendant on the study of moral points in the silence and solitude of his retreat.

We have some doubts whether the title of theology has

* Tit. i. 15.

been appropriately given to Christian ethics, as they do not immediately regard God; but we are not disposed to be over-fastidious in this respect, especially as it serves to mark the sublime character of the science. Our friends of the bar are highly eloquent when they undertake to describe the excellence of the law, of which, borrowing the words of Hooker, they say, "Her seat is the bosom of God." Of the common law they speak in raptures, as most comprehensive, there being no such thing as *casus non pravius*, a case for which adequate provision is not found in it. Of course we bow assent, but at the same time we assert the superior claims of the moral science. The law, technically so called, determines only the external relations of society, — binds to acts of duty, enforces external rights, and punishes transgression. Its sanctions are human and earthly, and limited to time. Our science is eminently celestial in her origin, comprehensive in her application, and her sanctions are divine and eternal. The law, in whatever sense it may be said to be derived from the eternal rule of righteousness, does not always harmonize with it, or enforce its dictates. In consequence of its general character, it often fails in individual instances, and, by a tenacious adherence to rule, it leaves wrong without redress, and right unsupported. Its application depends much on momentary influences brought to bear on the judges; and generally it cannot be effectually applied to some whose station seems privileged. Christian ethics are essentially based on right and justice, and in no case are controlled by technicalities to the prejudice of equity. The science presents general principles which admit of no deviation; but the circumstances of particular cases may cause a combination of principles which will necessarily result in the triumph of right. She literally and absolutely comprehends all cases, — all the actions of men of every class from the beginning to the end of time, the rich and poor, the noble and the lowly, the learned and the ignorant, are bound by her authority. She admits no privileged caste, no individual exemption. The monarch is subject to her rule equally as the poorest slave. Where the law fails by reason of the imperfection of its language, or the secrecy of the crime, or other cause, ethics review the act, censure it, affix the penalty, and put the seal of the Sovereign Judge to the sentence. The prejudices of society and many local influences often interfere with the administration of justice, but have no control over the Christian moralist. Las Casas, in the court of Spain, condemned op-

pression ; Soto, in her schools, repeated the eternal principles of justice, as Aquinas, ages before, had expounded them. The rule of Christian ethics is not self-interest, which corrupts the judgment, or public opinion, which establishes a superficial and false morality. No individual, however exalted, no majority of votes, however overwhelming, can change a particle of this code, which admits neither of repeal nor of modification. It survives the overthrow of dynasties ; it loses nothing by revolutions ; it pervades all forms of society, and claims dominion over the children of the forest, the barbarian, and the savage. Where no herald proclaims the mandates of this daughter of the Eternal, she whispers them to the conscience of the lonely wanderer ; where no officer of justice enforces her laws, she punishes transgression by the sting of remorse and the anticipations of future woe.

We have, no doubt, wearied the patience and wounded the sensibilities of many of our readers ; but the importance of making known the true character of Catholic morality must plead our apology. Deceive ourselves as we may, " God is not mocked." Christian ethics do not consist in fine phrases, addressed to ears polite, in a flowery sermon, or a popular essay ; but they are plain and stern rules of conduct, derived from the eternal and divine law, and governing man in all his most secret actions and thoughts. Others may practise the art of adorning sepulchres which are full of corruption ; but this science explores unsparingly the secret maladies which prey on the moral constitution, and labors for their cure. She is contented with no fruits, however specious to behold, unless the core be sound. Donations for works of charity, zeal to spread the faith, religious exercises practised with assiduity, are not sufficient for her demands. Order must be established within ; the eye of the intention must be purified, that the whole body may be lightsome. It is of no avail that we come up to the standard of public morals, and that our carriage in society be free from censure, and our good works elicit praise. If one vice lurk in the heart, — if one passion be secretly indulged, no matter whether it be lust, avarice, or ambition, — if we be self-righteous, — if our justice surpass not that of the scribes and Pharisees, — we cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven. Those who are serious in the affair of their salvation will not easily complain of the minuteness or indelicacy of Catholic theologians, and will rather feel benefited when they can peruse, in their own language, the most important points of prac-

tical duty, such as may be found in the excellent work with an humble title, *The Poor Man's Catechism*. The rich will be judged by the same standard as the poor man. The voice of flatterers will at length cease to delude men into the opinion of their own innocence, merely because they shrink from scrutinizing their guilt; they will learn to judge themselves, that they may escape condemnation; and the purity, beauty, and perfection of the Christian character will appear, not in affected delicacy or ignorance, but in the deep, solid, and uniform sense of duty, displayed in the secrecy of domestic life no less than in the public walks of society.

ART. II.—*The Shortest Way to end Disputes about Religion.*

In two Parts. By ROBERT MANNING. Boston: Patrick Donahoe. 1846. 12mo. pp. 296.

WE welcome a new American edition of Manning's *Shortest Way* with much pleasure. It is a work which was originally published in the early part of the reign of George the First, but is as well adapted to the state of religious controversy now as it was then. It is written in a free and easy style, with now and then a pleasant touch of humor. It seizes and states with great truth and distinctness the real questions at issue between us and Protestants, and sustains the positions it assumes with proofs and arguments which must be conclusive to every honest and intelligent mind sincerely bent on ascertaining the one true religion. We can unreservedly commend it to our Protestant readers generally, and, if they will honestly and diligently study it, we are sure they will not fail to be convinced that our blessed Lord has in very deed founded a church with authority to teach, and that this church is the one in communion with the See of Rome.

We regard it as an especial merit of this little work, that it places the controversy between Catholics and Protestants on its true ground, and confines it to the real questions open for discussion between them. The only questions really open for discussion between them are, Has our Lord actually established a church with authority to teach? and, if so, Is this church the Roman Catholic or some other church? The

particular doctrines we hold we cannot discuss with Protestants; because we hold no particular doctrines as doctrines of revelation which we believe or can establish independently of the authority of the Church teaching them. That authority, if established, forecloses all debate on particular questions; for, if established, it is good authority for whatever the Church teaches. As Catholics, then, we have done all, when we have established that authority. Protestants have made no progress in refuting us, till they have set that authority aside; and they can set it aside only by maintaining either that our Lord has established no church with authority to teach, or by showing that the church he has established is not the Roman Catholic Church, but some other church.

The infallibility of the Church can be no special question; for it is necessarily implied in the divine authority of the Church. The divine commission to teach necessarily carries with it the divine pledge of infallibility in teaching. It is repugnant to reason to suppose that Almighty God can authorize a church to teach, without rendering it competent to teach. But a fallible church, liable to deceive or be deceived, which may mistake or misrepresent the truth, and teach for the word of God what is not the word of God, is not competent to teach. When we say God authorizes the Church to teach, or gives it authority to teach, we only say, in other words, that he holds himself responsible for what she teaches, or will own her doctrines for his doctrines. But if she could err, mistake the truth, and give us falsehood in its place, God could become responsible for error, and authorize the teaching of falsehood; which is both impious and absurd. If the Church has authority to teach in his name, she is his representative, and we cannot reject her without rejecting him. "He that heareth you heareth me, and he who despiseth you despiseth me; and he that despiseth me despiseth him that sent me."—St. Luke x. 16. To discredit an ambassador is to discredit the government he represents. We must, then, accept what the Church teaches, if she be authorized by him to teach, or be guilty of refusing to believe God himself. But, if the Church were fallible and could teach error, the case might occur in which we should be obliged to believe falsehood on pain of disbelieving God. But by no possibility can it ever be necessary, in order to believe God or to respect his authority, to believe falsehood; for he is truth itself, and cannot deceive or be deceived. If, then, he has founded a church, and authorized it to

teach, it must be able to teach infallibly. The question of infallibility loses itself, then, in the question of the divine commission or authority of the Church. The divine authority established, the infallibility must be conceded.

Nor can there be any serious or protracted dispute, if it be conceded that Almighty God has established a church with authority to teach, that the Roman Catholic Church is the one he has established. There is, in fact, no other church or pretended church which can with any show of reason claim to have received from God the authority to teach. All the Oriental sects, except the schismatic Greek Church, are obviously out of the question, and need not detain us a moment. It cannot be the schismatic Greek Church; for it undeniably has, in the course of ages, changed on some essential points its ancient faith. On some points, at least, it has at one time believed differently from what it has at another, and therefore has erred; and if it has erred, it is not infallible; and if not infallible, it cannot be the church authorized by our Lord to teach. Moreover, Protestants cannot set up the Greek Church as the authoritative church; because it differs from them on all points except one, — the supremacy of the Pope, — on which they differ from us; and it has by a solemn act condemned and anathematized all the distinctive doctrines of Protestantism. No Protestant sect is the church in question. Because, 1. All Protestant sects, by their own confession, are fallible; 2. They are all quite too recent in their origin; 3. No one among them is really a teaching body; 4. No one of them can put forth any claims to a divine commission, which cannot be urged with equal propriety and force by every other. The presumption is always against every communion separate from the Roman Catholic, in the fact, that the origin of every other communion, as a distinct communion, is subsequent, and, for the most part, long subsequent, to the times of our Saviour and his Apostles. If our Lord founded a church at all, it is no more than fair to presume that it must date from his time or that of his Apostles. Consequently, the fair presumption is, that any pretended church or communion, whose origin is of a more recent date, is not the church our Lord established. This presumption must be removed, before we can even entertain the question of the divine commission of any communion separate from the Roman Catholic. But this presumption never has been removed, and never can be. And, in point of fact, the common sense of Christendom seems pretty general-

ly. to admit, that, if our Lord has founded an authoritative church at all, it must be the Roman Catholic, because obviously it can be no other.

This being so, Protestants must either accept the Roman Catholic Church and stand condemned for remaining out of its communion, or else take the ground that our Lord has founded no church with authority to teach. There is no other alternative for them. **THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OR NO CHURCH.** That these are the only alternatives, we think is admitted by the common sense of Christendom. Intelligent Protestants now generally admit it, and take as their justification for not being Catholics the ground of No-churchism. The idea of a church formally constituted and expressly authorized by Almighty God to teach, to say authoritatively what is and what is not divine revelation, is very nearly, if not quite, an "obsolete idea" in the Protestant world. Protestants may, indeed, continue to speak of the Church, but they no longer understand it in the Catholic sense. They do not mean by the term a body authorized by Almighty God to teach; but the aggregate of dispersed individuals who profess to receive Jesus Christ for their master; a voluntary association of individuals for religious purposes; or the doctrines, disciplines, organizations, institutions, originating in the Christian dispositions of individuals, and continued and sustained as the means of promoting what, in modern phraseology, is termed "the Christian life." The dispositions may have been produced or fostered by the Holy Spirit; but the church resulting from them, and which is their exponent, is of human origin. Jesus Christ may have wished to have a peculiar people, a people zealous of good works; and such a people he has, and, most likely, always will have; but it is not necessary that they should be distinguished by any external mark or badge. This people, or rather these individuals, however scattered abroad or dispersed through all communions, may, in a general sense, if you will, be termed the Church; and they, from time to time, in this place or in that, may organize themselves into distinct bodies or associations, with such by-laws and regulations as they judge proper or most consonant to the spirit or intention of their Master; but they have received no formal constitution from our Lord himself, and have no outward visible government to which they must submit on pain of being separated from the communion of Christ. This, in brief, is the prevailing notion of the Church among Protestants, that to which

all, though not with equal steps, are tending, and which, indeed, the more advanced have already reached. But this, evidently, is not the idea of a church founded by Almighty God, and by him expressly authorized, commissioned, to teach; for such a church has and can have no teaching faculty. It cannot propound the faith and cherish the piety of individuals; for it is itself merely the exponent of the faith and piety which the individuals already have. The believers precede the church, not the church the believers. The church derives its doctrines from its members, not the members theirs from the church. It may *express* their faith, but cannot teach it. Obviously, then, a church in this sense is not a church having authority to teach; and the assertion, that our Lord founded a church only in this sense, is tantamount to the denial of the fact that he has founded any authoritative church at all.

It must not be alleged that we here give, as the views of Protestants in general, what in reality are only the views of Unitarians and those usually denominated Liberal Christians. Liberal Christians, though apparently a small minority, are in reality, we apprehend, the immense majority of the Protestant world, so far as the Protestant world is on this side of infidelity; and it will never do, in forming our estimate of Protestantism, to leave them out of the question, or to count them either as few or as insignificant. They are, at all events, the more consistent and the more advanced portion of the Protestant world, and a sure index to the goal at which all, unless they retrace their steps, must sooner or later arrive. We see in them but the simple historical developments of the principles of the Reformation. They are the legitimate disciples of the early Reformers, and the Protestant Reformation is much better studied in them than in the Reformers themselves. If we would thoroughly appreciate any human system, whether of faith or philosophy, we must study it in its historical developments, and therefore in the disciples rather than in the master. In the master the system is still in germ, and its essential vices are concealed by the foreign matter which he retains from his former life, — matter which does not belong to the system, and which it, as it develops itself, will not assimilate, but cast off. The disciple seizes only what is essential to the system, consciously or unconsciously eliminates all the foreign matter accidentally connected with it in the mind of the master, and pushes its fundamental principles to their last consequences.

Time thus becomes the best commentator, and the latest disciples are always the truest representatives of the system. Liberal Christians are, therefore, to be taken as the truest representatives of Protestantism. They are its latest disciples ; they afford the historical developments of the doctrines of the Reformers, and the historical developments of a doctrine are always to be taken as the counterproof of its logical developments ; for reason is in the race as well as in the individual, and history is nothing but reasoning on a large scale, logic reducing itself to fact.

The early Reformers were born and brought up in the bosom of the Catholic Church, and retained after their revolt much which they had imbibed while they were Catholics. The system they were able to construct was not all of a piece, but a compound of new and old, — of Catholic truth and their own inventions. It was, therefore, necessarily inconsistent with itself. The old would not assimilate with the new, nor the new with the old. The moment it became subjected to a free development, this original incongruity of its parts must inevitably manifest itself. It has done so. A portion of the Protestant world, unable, or unwilling, to subject their doctrine to the action of their own minds, still hold, or attempt to hold, on to Protestantism as it came from the Reformers, and amuse us by contending for elements which mutually contradict and destroy one another. But the rest, all who have some mental activity, some logical capacity, and who must have some consistency and coherence of parts one with another in the system they espouse, seize, some on the old, the Catholic elements retained, and follow them back to the Catholic Church, where they belong ; others, on the new, the peculiarly Protestant elements, and push them to their legitimate results. Liberal Christians are of this latter class, and, therefore, systematically considered, the only legitimate Protestants, so far as Protestantism may be said to stop short of absolute infidelity. If there are others arranged on the Protestant side, they are following in the wake of these, returning to the Church, or persons who cannot, will not, or dare not reason, or, if reasoning, want the courage or the honesty to act conformably to their convictions. In a logical survey of Protestantism, we can take as Protestants only those who are true to what there is in Protestantism that is peculiar, characteristic ; and these are unquestionably the so-called Liberal Christians. The views of Liberal Christians are, therefore, genuine Protestantism.

Moreover, all Protestant sects, without a single exception, when the controversy is with Roman Catholics, as a matter of fact, take the ground of Liberal Christians, of No-churchism, whenever they do not take openly that of infidelity. The Episcopalian, boasting his "admirable Liturgy," for the most part filched and diluted from us, is a Churchman only when his face is against dissenters; he is himself a dissenter, a Liberal Christian, a No-churchman, the very moment his face is turned against Rome. The high-toned Presbyterian, claiming to have received the keys of the kingdom of heaven, with power to open or shut it to whom he will, in his warfare against the Roman Catholic Church draws his shafts from the quiver of his Unitarian brother, and only tips them anew with a more deadly venom. He is less of the gentleman, more of the savage, than the Unitarian; but both are ranged on the same side, drawn up on the same battle-ground, and fight with substantially the same weapons. So is it with all the sects. Whatever reminiscences of the Church they may retain, or contend for in their disputes one with another, they all take, expressly or by implication, the ground of No-churchism, whenever it concerns opposing the Church of Rome; and since opposition to the Church of Rome is undeniably the essence of Protestantism, we have, and must be admitted to have, a perfect right to take the views of Liberal Christians on the point in question as the essential views of Protestants in general.

Protestants, then, cannot deny the authority of the Roman Catholic Church, if they admit that of Christianity itself, without assuming the ground that our Lord has founded no church with authority to teach; and it is, as a matter of fact, in reality only by assuming this ground that they attempt to do so. But have they a right to assume this ground? We think not; for to their denial we may oppose the living, undeniable fact of the Church herself, existing in uninterrupted succession from the very time of the Apostles to the present moment, asserting herself to be the Church of Christ, received as such for fifteen hundred years from the beginning by nearly all Christendom, and still received as such by the overwhelming majority of all who bear the Christian name. Here is a fact which cannot be denied, any more than the fact of the sun in the heavens. This fact is *primâ facie* evidence that Christ did found a church, and that she is the church he founded. Now, before Protestants have or can have the right to say Christ founded no

church, they must rebut this *primâ facie* evidence, and prove that this Church, which claims, and has so long been admitted, to be the Church of Christ, is not his church. Here is a point our Protestant brethren do not seem to have duly considered, — a fact they are not at liberty to overlook.

Now, it will not be enough for Protestants to deny that the Church is the Church of Christ, and then call upon her to produce her titles ; because the question is not, Shall the Roman Catholic Church be admitted to be the Church of Christ ? but, Shall she be declared to be *not* the Church of Christ ? It is not a question of putting the Church in possession, but of ousting her from a possession she holds and has held from the beginning, and for the greater part of the time without any serious opposition. The question is not on admitting the title of the Church, but on impeaching it. The *onus probandi* is, therefore, on the shoulders of the party contesting it. It is for them to show good and valid reasons for setting aside the title of the Church, and ousting her from her possession. A government *de facto* is, presumptively, a government *de jure*, and must be respected as such, till it is proved not to be. The Roman Catholic Church is unquestionably the Church of Christ *de facto*, and is therefore to be presumed to be his Church *de jure*, till evidence is produced which convicts her of usurpation. Protestants were born under the Church, and owe her allegiance till they show that she has no right to their allegiance. This view of the case, which cannot be objected to, renders a simple denial of the right of the Church to call herself the Church of Christ insufficient to put her to her proofs, or to render it necessary for her to produce her titles. The denial must be sustained by reasons which, if admitted to be good, prove that she is not his church. We ask now our Protestant brethren to produce these reasons. They say the Roman Catholic Church is not the Church of Christ. How do they propose to sustain their assertion ? On what grounds will they make it good ? They cannot say, as they seem now disposed to say, our Lord has founded no church, therefore the Roman Catholic Church is not the Church of Christ ; because they must prove that she is not the Church of Christ, before they can have the right to allege that our Lord has founded no church. They have no right to say there is no sun in the heavens, till they have shown that what is and always has been taken to be the sun is no sun. How, then, will they prove that the Church falsely assumes to be the Church of Christ ?

Protestants may *say* the Roman Catholic Church is not the Church of Christ, — and this is, in fact, about all the proof they ever seriously undertake to give, — but their *say so* is not sufficient ; because it is neutralized by the counter assertion of the Church herself. The assertion of the Church that she is the Church of Christ is, at the very lowest, worth as much as their assertion that she is not. They are confessedly fallible ; their assertion is therefore fallible and may be false ; but she at worst is only fallible, and her assertion is no more likely to be false than theirs. On any hypothesis, Catholic assertion is as good as Protestant assertion ; it may be infinitely better, — for the infallibility of the Church is not an impossibility ; but worse it cannot be. Consequently, the simple assertion of Protestants can never outweigh the simple assertion of the Church, and therefore in the argument can amount at best only to zero.

Will it be replied that the Church is the party interested, and that her testimony is therefore inadmissible ? The argument may be retorted with equal, and, in fact, with more than equal force ; for she is no more, but even less, a party interested than are the Protestants themselves. If they fail to impeach her title, they stand condemned before the world as rebels against God, as struck with the sentence of excommunication from the Church of Christ, and out of the way of salvation ; whereas she, if she fail in vindicating herself, is still as well off as they are, even in case of success. If the claims of our Church were set aside, we should still occupy as high ground as the Protestants can. We should be members of a fallible church, with no infallible guide, and no infallible faith, — the precise condition they are in now, and would be in then. Evidently, then, the Church is even less a party interested than are Protestants. Then, if they may testify against her, she may testify in her own favor. But, in point of fact, we claim for her only the right to rebut, with her assertion that she is the Church of Christ, the unsupported assertion of Protestants that she is not. In a suit at law the defendant's denial is always sufficient to rebut the simple allegation of the plaintiff ; and this is all we claim for the Church. Her assertion, then, always, at lowest, neutralizes and reduces to zero the assertion of Protestants.

Protestants, then, must go further and introduce independent testimony to sustain their allegations. What testimony can they adduce ? Will they say, the Church has corrupted or does not teach the doctrines of Christ, and therefore cannot

be the Church of Christ? The allegation is good, if sustained. But how will they sustain it? Simple assertion will not answer; for the Church asserts to the contrary, and her assertion is as good as the assertion of her opponents. How do Protestants know that the Church has corrupted or does not teach the doctrines of Christ? Have they received authority from Christ to teach or expound his doctrines, and to say, infallibly, what they are and what they are not? Of course not; for they are confessedly fallible. But the Church is only fallible, even at worst, and therefore is as good authority for saying the doctrines of Christ are what she declares them to be, as theirs is for saying they are not. Their fallible authority is therefore insufficient to convict her of corrupting or not teaching the doctrines of Christ.

But will our Protestant brethren appeal to the Bible, as an independent authority, and say, that, notwithstanding the fact of the Church, they have a right to go behind the fact, and prove from the Bible that the Roman Catholic Church is not the Church of Christ, by proving that Christ founded no church? We object to this, in principle; because the certainty that the Bible is given by divine inspiration is subsequent to the fact that the Church is the Church of Christ, and therefore the authority of the Bible is not sufficient to set aside the authority of the Church. But we will consent to yield up the Church, if there be adduced a single text which clearly and unequivocally asserts, expressly or by necessary implication, that our Lord founded no church; though we will accept no inference drawn from the silence of the Bible, if silent it be, because the Bible does not profess to give a full account of all that Jesus did, but the reverse. — St. John, xxi. 25. But these restrictions, so far as concerns the question before us, are in fact unnecessary; for, in the first place, no text can be adduced which unequivocally declares or necessarily implies that our Lord founded no church; and, in the second place, there are many passages which expressly teach or necessarily imply that he has founded a church, and given it authority to teach all nations even unto the consummation of the world. — St. Matt. xxviii. 19, 20. Certainly the Holy Scriptures, *as the Church understands them*, plainly and unequivocally teach that our Lord has founded and commissioned a church to teach. The appeal to the Bible, therefore, is for us and against Protestants.

Will Protestants say, the Church misunderstands or misin-

interprets the Holy Scriptures? But how know they that? Are they themselves infallible interpreters of the Word? If so, they refute themselves; for they can be infallible interpreters only on condition that they have received from Christ authority to teach; and if they have received authority from Christ to teach, they are a church with authority to teach; which is the fact they deny, since they assert that Christ has founded no church with authority to teach. If they are not infallible, they are fallible, and then can oppose to the understanding of the Church only their own fallible interpretations. But the Church, as we have seen, is at worst only fallible, and no more likely to err in her interpretations than they are in theirs. Consequently, their interpretations can never be a sufficient motive for setting aside hers, since she is as likely to be right as they. The Holy Scriptures necessarily cease to be an independent authority the moment it comes to their interpretation; for then they only say what the interpreter makes them say, and the authority which speaks is not theirs, but his; and here is the reason why they can never be that rule of faith which Protestants allege them to be. No controversy between us and Protestants is or can be settled by an appeal to them; for as we interpret them they sustain us, and our interpretation must be set aside, before they can be used against us. But, unhappily for the Protestant, let him do his best, he can bring against our interpretation no authority paramount, even on his own hypothesis, to that of the Church. Here is the fatal defect of all his reasonings against the Church. They are all based on an authority confessedly not paramount to hers; for, if she be fallible, we still have all that Protestants have or can pretend to have. We have the Holy Scriptures, reason, common sense, as well as they. We may have infinitely more than they; for an infallible church is infinitely superior to a fallible one, but in no contingency can we have less. At worst, we have all they have at best. We are men as well as they, and, man to man, every way their equals. Strip us of our infallible Church, we should suffer an infinite loss; but even then we should only be reduced to the utter nakedness in which they are and glory to be. This is a fact that they are apt to forget; but, if they will bear it in mind, it will suffice to show them that all their attacks are from too low a position to make any impression upon the Church. They must rise to an infallible authority themselves, before they will be able to set aside the claims of the Church to be the Church of Christ.

There are but two ways in which it is possible for Protestants to impeach the title of the Church. The first is to convict her of contradicting in her teaching some known principle of reason ; the second is to convict her of having contradicted herself, or of having taught doctrines which mutually contradict one another. No church can be from God that teaches, as the word of God, any doctrine which contradicts a known principle of reason. But we say a known *principle* of reason. A doctrine may be repugnant to our feelings, it may run athwart our prejudices, fancies, or caprices, and therefore seem to us very unreasonable, and yet contradict no known *principle* of reason. It must also *contradict* reason. A doctrine may be *above* reason, belong to an order lying altogether out of the range of reason, and yet *contradict* no known principle of reason. To be *above* reason is not necessarily to be *against* reason. The Church unquestionably has taught, and continues to teach, doctrines which are above reason, and concerning the truth or falsity of which reason has nothing to say ; but no doctrine that contradicts any known principle of reason. Even the holy mysteries of the adorable Trinity and the blessed Eucharist form no exception to this assertion. They are above reason, incomprehensible to reason, impenetrable mysteries, we admit ; but there is nothing in them or connected with them, that the Church commands us to believe, which contradicts reason in any respect whatever. The Unitarian has never demonstrated, never can demonstrate, the falsity of the doctrine of the Trinity ; nor has the Sacramentarian ever detected any contradiction of reason in the Real Presence. The most either can say is, that reason of her own light does not affirm them.

Again ; the Church never contradicts herself, or teaches doctrines that contradict one another. She doubtless modifies her discipline, and changes her canons, repeals old ones and establishes new ones, according to the exigencies of time and place ; but she never teaches at one time or place a doctrine as of divine revelation, which she does not teach as such in all times and places. The assertions of Protestants to the contrary are all founded on misapprehension or misrepresentation of her actual teaching. No real instance of contradiction of herself, or variation in doctrine, has ever been detected by even the most learned and subtle of her opponents, and never will be. Nor does she ever teach one doctrine which contradicts another doctrine she teaches. Even her enemies are struck with the sys-

tematic consistency and coherence of her teaching. The infidel Saint-Simon declares that her catechism and prayers are the most profoundly systematic works ever written.

It is clear, then, that in neither of these ways can Protestants impeach the title of the Church. They can, then, sustain none of the allegations set forth in their declaration against her; because they can produce no authority in their support paramount to that which they must, on any hypothesis, concede to her. Her simple denial is always sufficient to render nugatory all they can adduce against her. Their objections thus removed, her title stands good, and they are bound to respect it. Every man has the right to be accounted innocent till he is proved guilty, and a *primâ facie* case must be made out against him before he can be put upon his defence. Now, as nothing the Protestants do or can bring forward is sufficient to deprive the Church of the presumption of innocence, or to turn it against her, they are obliged to respect her as the Church of Christ, and are therefore precluded from alleging that Christ founded no church with authority to teach. They cannot, then, in order to excuse their heresy and schism in not being Roman Catholics, fall back on No-churchism. They must either become Roman Catholics or fall back still further. They must deny the authority of Jesus Christ himself, and fall back on INFIDELITY. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OR INFIDELITY, — these, in the last analysis, are, after all, the only possible alternatives, as we have shown, from a different point of view, on more occasions than one.

No doubt, this conclusion is offensive to our Protestant friends, and we would gladly say something more grateful to their feelings, if we could. It is no pleasure to us to displease others; we take no delight in giving pain to a single mortal. But charity, as distinguished from a sickly sentimentality, not unfrequently compels us to utter unpalatable truths. If we love our brethren, if we really desire their spiritual and eternal welfare, we must not, for fear of disturbing their equanimity, or of wounding their feelings, forbear to tell them the dangers which surround them, and the untenable ground on which they attempt to stand. Men may say what they will, seek to deceive themselves or others as they may; but it is still true that between Catholicity and infidelity there is no middle ground on which a man who can reason and is not afraid to reason can take his stand.

Protestantism, in the hands of the Reformers, as we have

seen, was not all of a piece, but a compound of heterogeneous elements. The Reformers brought with them from the Church several important elements of Catholic truth; but these elements had and could have no affinity for the new elements introduced. The new elements were in their nature repugnant to these, and must either expel them or be expelled by them. The latter would have been the death and annihilation of Protestantism; the former alone was compatible with the continued existence of Protestantism. The history of Protestantism, from its origin to our times, — its internal history, we mean, — is simply the history of the mutual struggle of these two classes of elements; and the great and astonishing progress, *religious* progress, of the Protestant world for these three centuries, and of which we now hear so much, consists exclusively in throwing off more and more of the Catholic truth, — Catholic error, as the Protestant would say, — and reducing the whole Protestant system into harmony with the peculiarly Protestant elements, or new elements introduced by the Reformers themselves, and for the sake of which they broke away from the Church. The struggle of the new and the old, we have seen, so far as the new gains the victory, results in Liberal Christianity. But Liberal Christianity, if it be not absolute infidelity, is not, after all, the last result. There is “a lower deep,” or a further progress, inevitable, before the whole of Protestantism is harmonized with the peculiarly Protestant elements.

If we take up Protestantism as we received it from the Reformers, analyze it, and subtract the Catholic elements retained, the remainder will unquestionably be what is peculiarly or distinctively Protestant, and all that Protestantism has a right to call her own; for we unquestionably have a right to claim as ours, and deny to be hers, all she has stolen from the Church, or which is part and parcel of the teachings of the Church. The Catholic truth abstracted, there will be found to remain for Protestantism, in its essential elements, only a revolt against God, the denial of his authority in his Church, and the attempt to set up man in the place of God, and to make him worshipped as God. In a word, it was, undeniably, simply the assertion of the superiority of the human over the divine; for the Bible, for which it contends, is, *when humanly interpreted*, only a human authority. Subject the matter to the most rigid analysis possible, and you shall never make more or less of Protestantism than this. This is it, and the whole of it, when reduced to itself, and compelled to operate with its

own essential elements. Now it needs no argument to prove that this is in reality, if not in fact formally, modern infidelity; for modern infidelity, in its essential elements, is simply the substitution of man for God, — the assertion of the superiority of the human over the divine. Protestantism, in so far as it is Protestant and distinct from Catholicity, is essentially the same thing, then, as infidelity. It is in vain you deny it. There is not a dogma insisted on by Protestants, that, when divested of every Catholic element, is not infidel, or that any avowed infidel is not ready to admit. The infidel finds occasion to dissent from the Protestant only when and where the Protestant agrees with the Catholic. This is a fact of no mean importance, and proves that Protestantism, in so far as Protestant, is only another name for infidelity. Where, then, is the middle ground between Catholicity and infidelity, on which one can stand?

If we turn to the historical developments of Protestantism, we shall find this conclusion confirmed. We exclude, as of no account in the argument, the large mass of Protestants who receive what is given them, and merely follow, if they move at all, the beck of their leaders; because in these there are no developments; but if we confine ourselves to the leaders, to those who have labored for and effected some development of Protestantism, we shall find that every new development has cast off an additional portion of Catholicity, — Popery, as it is called, — and brought the Protestant system a step nearer to this result. Liberal Christianity, in which, to say the least, the Protestant sects have for the most part resulted, is much nearer open, avowed infidelity than the teachings of Luther and Calvin. New England Calvinism is resulting or has resulted in Unitarianism; but Unitarianism, as taught by Worcester, Ware, and Norton, has still too much of *Popery* to satisfy the younger members of the sect; further developments are attempted, and we find reproduced the Naturalism of Parker, the Pantheistic Idealism of Emerson, or the rank Humanitarianism of our old friend Ripley and his Fourierite associates. Survey the Protestant world calmly, and you shall find very little firm belief in Christianity as a supernatural and authoritative religion left. The mass of intelligent men among Protestants, who profess to believe it at all, profess to believe it as a philosophy rather than as a religion. But Christianity is not believable as a philosophy, till divested of all that distinguishes it, or is peculiar to it as Christianity. Men believe it as a philosophy only in pro-

portion as they *infidelize* it, reduce it to mere Naturalism, which is to deny it as a divine revelation altogether. Here is the grand fact of the Protestant world as it now is. The most it does, as a Protestant world, is to take refuge in Liberal Christianity. Liberal Christianity indeed! For it liberates man from all restraint but the restraints of his own nature, and freely gives away all that is peculiarly or distinctively Christian.

There is no mistaking the inevitable tendencies of the historical developments of Protestantism. They are *humanizing* and *materializing* every department of life. Man becomes the central figure of every group. All begins and ends with him. Human sentiments of kindness and liberality are raised above the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity; and it is conceived to be the greatest service we can render our age, to assert everywhere the supremacy of man, and to enable him to stand "alone in his glory,"—or his shame. The love of man, philanthropy, usurps the place of love of God, and the authority of human instincts and passions that of the Creator and Lord of the universe. We see this everywhere. The whole modern popular literature of the anti-Catholic world, that literature which is the exponent and the intellectual nourishment of the masses, is unblushingly infidel, immoral, and indecent. So far, then, as logical conclusions confirmed by historical facts afford any ground of reliance, we may repeat that the alternatives are infidelity or the Roman Catholic Church. It is the just judgment of God, that, if you will not have his religion, you shall have none.

Is it not time for the serious-minded still in the Protestant ranks, who are startled by the developments of Strauss and Parker, and who would not willingly "deny the Lord that bought them," divest themselves entirely of the robe of Christ's justice, and stand before God and before man in utter nakedness, to ask if it be not better, after all, to return to the Church of our forefathers, than to plunge headlong into the bottomless hell of modern infidelity? We grant, their prejudices against the Church are strong and deep-rooted, and that nothing but the grace of Almighty God can overcome them; but is not the alternative of rejecting the Church terribly appalling? In the heyday of our youth, with ardent passions and buoyant hopes, unsubdued by the world's cares and vicissitudes, feeling ourselves sufficient for to-day and thoughtless for to-morrow, we may turn a deaf ear to the invitations and warnings of re-

igion, and look upon infidelity as a light and pleasant companion; but as age creeps on, the curls of beauty fall from our temples, the lustre of our eyes grows dim, and the world begins to look sear and sombre; as we experience in ourselves the vanity of our young dreams, and find our early companions, one by one, dropping away; or when, with the fond anxieties of a father or a mother, we see our children growing up around us, and are forced to look forward and ask what in our love we desire for them or are willing to leave them to, we no longer view infidelity with complacency, or find ourselves able to rest in its cold negations, without any shelter from the fickle and heartless world, any protection from its gay fancies, its hollow friendships, its fatal allurements, and its strange and sudden vicissitudes. Then, for them, if not for ourselves, we ask for a God, a Saviour, a temple, an altar, a priest. The French infidel, teaching his beloved little daughter the prayers and catechism of the Church, reveals the workings of paternal affection, its want of confidence in all systems of mere human speculation, and its deep and earnest cry, that, if not for us, O, at least for our children, let there be religion, let there be faith, hope, and love. We beg our Protestant friends who still retain some reminiscences of that faith which has tamed the wild barbarian heart, which has made weak and timid woman dare to face the horrors of the amphitheatre, or joy to greet the martyr-flames that waft her soul to heaven, that has converted the nations, made all earth consecrated ground, and covered it over with the monuments of its purity, tenderness, and beneficence, to pause and reflect well before they consent longer to contribute to swell the tide of infidelity and immorality which threatens to overrun the modern world, and bring back the ages of barbarism and heathen darkness and corruption. In the name of all that is sacred, by motives as sweet as heaven and terrible as hell, we implore them to retrace their steps, and seek some surer footing than the slippery rocks, with fiery billows rolling below, on which they now are attempting in vain to stand.

But to return; if there be any force in the reasoning we have thus far set forth, it is in vain that Protestants attempt to deny that our Lord has founded a church, or that the Roman Catholic Church is the church he has founded. They are bound, then, to be Roman Catholics, or boldly deny the authority of Jesus Christ himself in every sense in which it differs from the authority of Plato and Newton, Leibnitz or Locke,

and fall back on absolute infidelity, which is only another name for absolute death. This is enough for our present purpose, and excludes the Protestant world from all right to call itself Christian. The negative proofs we have offered are sufficient to vindicate the title of the Church; but if any of our readers are disposed to go further and inquire for the affirmative proofs of the Church, — for she has affirmative proofs in abundance, — we refer them to the work before us. They will find them ample, clearly and convincingly set forth. But for ourselves, we do not need them. The simple HISTORICAL EXISTENCE of the Church is enough for us. It is idle, with the grand fact of the Church before our eyes in all ages, from the Apostolic to our own, to pretend that our Lord has founded no authoritative church, and equally idle to pretend that it can be any other than the Roman Catholic. Even Protestants themselves, No-churchmen as they are, with an inconsistency to which they have been perpetually condemned, very generally admit that the Roman Catholic Church was once truly the Church of Christ. It is, then, for them to show when she ceased to be the Church of Christ, or to admit that she is still his Church. They cannot deny her to be still his, unless they convict her of having changed. But she has never changed; no historical research can convict her of having ever fallen into schism, or of having taught at one time a doctrine which she does not teach now, or of teaching now a doctrine she has not uniformly taught from the beginning. She stands ever the same, the immovable but living type of the unchangeability of that God whose Spouse and representative she is; and so long as we behold her standing before us resplendent in her robes of light and love, as young, as beautiful, as glorious as when she struggled for her very existence with Jew or Pagan, or concealed herself in caves and cemeteries, we ask no other refutation of Liberal Christianity, or its impudent offspring, infidelity. We see her standing by the grave of the old world, and at the cradle of the new, unmoved, as the torrents of wild barbarians pour down from the North, and hear her voice sounding out over the weltering chaos they introduced, and commanding order to arise out of confusion; we find her moulding a new social world, sending out her martyr-missionaries to all lands, and converting all the nations hitherto converted to the Christian name; we trace her unchanged and unchangeable through all the vicissitudes of eighteen centuries, the rise and fall of empires and dynasties, the loss of one world and the gain of another, as

the one grand central fact around which revolves the history of the world, and in which it finds its unity and its significance, and we bow down our rebellious head and worship. You may tell us she is a masterpiece of human wisdom and skill, the *chef-d'œuvre* of human contrivance; but in vain. We have heard of human contrivances, and are not ignorant of human history or human philosophy, and can but smile in your face when you tell us she is the creation of human craft and passion. Tell that idle tale in the nursery, not to men with beards on their faces, lest they talk to you of a strait jacket, physic, and good regimen. Behold her, where she stands, exposed to all the storms of human passion and all the rage of hell, for eighteen centuries, as young, as beautiful, as vigorous, as when her chief disciple returned to Rome to seal his apostleship with his blood; bend your knee, beg to be forgiven, and say no more of human contrivance. Human contrivances! You have had them. Your glorious Reformation is but a human contrivance. For these three hundred years you have had free scope for human contrivance, you have revelled in human contrivance; you have contrived and contrived, rejected one plan and then another, adopted now this one, now that, altered it now here, and now there, but with all your wisdom, genius, craft, passion, aided by all your boasted progress of modern times, what have you been able to construct to compare in exquisite proportion, in the beauty and symmetry of the whole and coherence of the parts, in strength, durability, and admirable adaptation to the end for which it was designed, with this glorious old Catholic Church, which nor time, nor men, nor devils can affect, and which you would fain persuade us was the handiwork of besotted monks and effeminate priests in an age of darkness? You are of yesterday, and yet your works crumble around you; they rot and fall, and bury the very workmen in their ruins. O my brother! for God's sake, nay, for the sake of our common humanity, say no more. Put that idle dream out of thy head, return to thy allegiance, and find the covert from the storm you in vain shall seek from your own handiwork.

ART. III. — *Histoire Religieuse, Politique, et Littéraire de la Compagnie de Jésus, composée sur les Documents inédits et authentiques.* Par J. CRÉTEINEAU-JOLY. 5 vol. 8vo. Paris. 1844.

THE day, we believe, is dawning when justice will be done to the Jesuits, the most eminent and useful order of men that the Church has yet produced. Hitherto, their history, like that of the Christians of the earliest ages, has been identified with persecution and suffering. Alone, the Order has had to contend with more enemies, and more merciless ones, than the whole Church together. For not only has it unflinchingly stood its ground as a faithful body-guard, exposed to the hottest of the battle, but it has been subjected to cruel attacks from the very persons it defended, and has seen itself sacrificed as a propitiatory offering to the common enemies of both. Conceived in an age of spiritual insubordination, and born for holy strife, the Society of Jesus, from the first moment of its existence, has manned the battlements of the Church with intrepid champions of the truth. From the halls of her colleges, and from the depths of the wilderness and the forest, she has sent forth missionaries, theologians, and confessors innumerable, the lustre of whose virtues was eclipsed only by the marvellous successes that everywhere attended their labors. The council-chambers of kings, the palaces of nobles, the cottages of the poor, the cells of prisoners, the beds of the dying, have alike witnessed their magnificent achievements. During the three centuries of the existence of the Institute, never for a single moment has its renown ceased to fill the earth. Religion, morals, politics, oratory, poesy, the exact sciences, literature, travels, history, discovery, the fine arts, all have felt its influence, all have belonged to its domain.

No task, therefore, we think, can be undertaken, at once more delicate and more difficult, considering the important place they must necessarily occupy in the modern history of the world, and the number and zeal of the enemies that their learning and success have raised up against them, than correctly and impartially to delineate the history of the Jesuits. Yet this task has been undertaken by M. Créteineau-Joly, and it appears to us with triumphant success. Never have we been so fully convinced that their ablest defence is the plain, unvarnished recital of their deeds, as in reading this work, — the work, not of a Jesuit, nor

of an admirer of the Jesuits, nor of a pupil of the Jesuits, but of a man of education, of a penetrating mind, of thorough research, and, above all, of sound good-sense.*

The work of M. Créteineau-Joly is somewhat bulky, consisting of five octavo volumes, of some five hundred pages each. It is written in a style at once elegant and dignified; and we are much mistaken, if any man of good taste, after having read one chapter, could be easily persuaded to forego the pleasure of perusing the entire work.

We translate the introductory pages of the author, both to convey to our readers an idea of the nature of his undertaking, and as an introduction to a few remarks of our own upon the influence of the Jesuits on the civilization and moral improvement of the world.

“I undertake a work difficult, — perhaps impossible. I propose to recount the origin, the development, the grandeur, the sacrifices, the studies, the mysterious combinations, the conflicts, the vicissitudes of every kind, the ambition, the faults, the glories, the persecutions, and the martyrdoms of the Company of Jesus.

“I shall tell of the prodigious influence that this Society has exercised upon religion by its saints, its apostles, its theologians, its orators, its moralists; upon kings, by its directors of conscience and by its diplomatists; upon the masses, by its charity and salutary instructions; upon literature, by its poets, its historians, its scholars, and its writers, in every language, so eminent for the purity and elegance of their style.

“I shall show it from its very birth battling for the Church Catholic, and for the monarchies that Protestantism, yet in its cradle, had already undertaken to destroy.†

“I shall penetrate into its colleges, whence have come forth so many famous personages, the glory or the dishonor of their country.

“I shall follow it beyond the seas, over those unknown oceans whither the zeal of the house of the Lord led its fathers, who, after having been a light to illumine the gentiles, enlarged the bounds of

* In speaking thus favorably of M. Créteineau-Joly's work, we would not be understood as indorsing all his private opinions on events involved in obscurity, and especially on some points of English history.

† The author would express himself more accurately to our sense, if he had said *governments* instead of “monarchies.” The Jesuits always support the legitimate order of the country where they are established; and in countries where republicanism, as with us, is the legitimate order, they are as firm defenders of republicanism, as they are of monarchy, where that is the legitimate order. They defend the legal order, and are never revolutionists in favor of one form of government or of another.

civilization and science, and revealed to those sitting in the shadow of death how beautiful are the feet of them that preach the Gospel of peace.

"I shall study its Institute, so little known, and of which men have discoursed with so much love or with so much hatred. I shall thoroughly investigate its policy, according to its detractors so dark and tortuous, so open and straightforward according to its defenders; but which has left an indelible imprint upon the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, the epoch of the world the most remarkable for the diffusion of knowledge and the magnitude of events.

"I shall not suffer myself to be influenced by the enthusiastic sentiments of admiration which the Society of Jesus has gathered around it, or by the prejudices or angry feelings which its omnipotence has perpetuated.

"The Jesuits do not count me in the number of their scholars. They have never beheld me among their neophytes. I have been neither their friend, nor their admirer, nor their adversary. I owe them no gratitude. I have no prepossession in their favor. I am neither of them, nor with them, nor for them, nor against them. They are to me what Vitellius, and Otho, and Galba were to Tacitus. I know them neither by injury nor by favor. A historian, I rest upon history, relying only on truth, seeking only, by the aid of facts uncontested and incontestible, to deduce logical consequences, and forming an opinion only after the most conscientious examination."

The author, we confess, has pledged himself deeply, but he has faithfully redeemed his pledge. Nothing can be more satisfactory to one who sincerely desires information than the fidelity and candor with which he portrays the characters of the distinguished men of the Society, describes their toils and achievements, delineates the most remarkable traits of their history, and depicts the blessings showered upon the world by their missions and their colleges. And in the brief sketch of the labors and influence of the Jesuits which we propose to give, we shall draw from his pages, and rely on his authority, as we find it convenient, and without reserve.

This illustrious order dates its origin from the middle of the sixteenth century; but, before entering upon a narrative of some of its achievements, we must glance at the condition of Europe, as regards civilization and religion, at and prior to that epoch.

The first three centuries of the Christian era were crimsoned with the blood of persecution. The Church had to grapple

with tyranny, false philosophy, barbarism, ignorance, and superstition. Rivers of blood flowed from her bosom, millions of her children were immolated, before the trembling nations bowed to her yoke, and professed her faith. Then she stood forth in her glory. The sages of Rome and of the Areopagus were mute before the tent-maker of Tarsus and the fishermen of Galilee. The cross of Christ was reared in every village and hamlet, and glittered in the diadem of the Cæsars.

During the following five or six centuries, the splendor of Christianity was doomed to be obscured and the march of civilization to be checked. Swarms of merciless and ignorant barbarians, from the extremities of the North, invaded the empire with fire and sword. Some poured in like torrents, ravaging and devastating the land; others, wearied with pillage and massacre, established themselves in the regions they had blasted. Goths, Visigoths, Vandals, Franks, all had alike been nursed with blood, and all were alike distinguished for their ferocity and contempt of the arts. They recognized no law but that of passion and of force. Hence the necessity of the feudal system, which was established for the purpose of keeping in check the torrent of crimes and disorders of every kind that were inundating Europe. This was effected mainly by the efforts of the Church, which, amid the breaking up of the very elements of civilization, and the storms of war, and the death-cry of millions, made her voice be heard, her laws respected, and her pastors obeyed; and thus, out of this same feudal system, she may be said to have produced the modern monarchies of Europe, and for the second time to have civilized and Christianized the world.

But though many of these barbarians sincerely embraced Christianity, yet the submission of not a few in the Northern countries seems to have been sullen and incomplete. Hence that uneasiness under the yoke of the Gospel, manifested to no inconsiderable extent from the very beginning; hence their continual resistance to the salutary ordinances of their bishops and pastors, and an ill-concealed longing to recover their former liberties, and to become once more desperadoes and assassins; hence, too, those secret societies and mutinous combinations, nurseries of numerous and abominable heresies, which so often and so deeply afflicted the Church.

This spirit of opposition to religion smouldered like a subterranean fire in the bosom of the Church, which at times it heaved and convulsed, — and occasionally, as during the pontificates of

Gregory the Seventh and Innocent the Third, exploded for a moment, till, in the sixteenth century, it burst forth in terrific fury, and spread far and wide the accumulated fires and scoræ of centuries, threatening in its progress again to desolate and barbarize the world.

We regard the great Protestant movement of the sixteenth century in the main, therefore, as a political effort on the part of the nations, inheriting the predilections and passions of their forefathers, to shake off a yoke to which they had never cheerfully submitted. It is a remarkable fact confirming this statement, that the Reformation, so called, found its supporters numerous just in proportion as it advanced toward the north; and it is also a fact, that the Goths, Vandals, and other barbarians descended from the north, and established themselves chiefly in the northern countries of Europe.

Such being the temper of these indomitable spirits, nothing was wanting to excite a general outbreak, but a bold and reckless adventurer to stand at their head and lead them on. Wickliffe had attempted it in England; John Huss, in Bohemia, and Jerome, in Prague; each with but a partial success, but with a success sufficient to embolden Luther, who was destined to be the successful champion of innovation, revolt, and disorder.

Martin Luther was an apostate monk, — arrogant, presumptuous, and bold, — with the bearing of a maniac toward those who should dare to contradict him. Moreover, he had considerable learning, which, aided by a great volubility of language and rapidity of thought, a voice of thunder and a fiery and haughty air, gave him all the qualifications requisite for a heresiarch of the first magnitude. It is said that he dreamed of the Roman purple, but, seeing it only in the distance, he hoped to bring it nearer by making himself formidable. Accordingly, armed with certain real or fancied abuses that formed no part of the doctrine or discipline of the Church, he set himself forth to dogmatize and dictate to the Church, and summoned her to his tribunal. She, however, yielded not to the summons thus insolently made, and treated him as an apostate and a heretic, and he became what history relates of him.

Such was the man, who, knowing full well that the spirits were prepared and only waited for the word, — knowing full well, that, with the blood of Goths and Vandals coursing in their veins, the spirit of insubordination and irreligion were there also, — such was the man that unfolded the banner of religious independence,

and sounded the tocsin of revolt. Nor was he deceived in his expectations. With the rapidity of lightning, the word passed from mouth to mouth, from people to people, and in a few years the greater part of the Northern nations of Europe were found in open rebellion against the Church. Anarchy resumed her empire. War, massacre, pillage, sacrilege, and every crime, desolated the nations. Laws, human and divine, were laughed to scorn; spirits of darkness roamed at large, and the Church herself was menaced with ruin; the holy city was sacked and pillaged, and the Sovereign Pontiff barely escaped with his life; bishops and priests were butchered in cold blood; ladies of the highest rank, young maidens, and holy nuns were seized and violated by a brutal soldiery; nay, to such excesses was carried this infernal spirit of fanaticism, that the Turkish Sultan himself publicly declared his horror of it, and in the name of humanity demanded that it should cease.

It was at this trying moment, when the world seemed relapsing into barbarism, and men's hearts were failing them for fear, and the faithful were looking tremblingly for succour to Him who had promised them that the gates of hell should never prevail against his Church,—it was then that the Eternal raised up a host of holy and learned men as champions of the faith. Then appeared upon the noisy field of strife blessed peacemakers, who, when need was, proved themselves also fearless and successful warriors. Then arose a Thomas of Villeneuve, a Bartholomew de Martyribus, a St. Charles Borromeo, a St. Francis of Sales, a St. Philip Neri, a St. Vincent of Paul, a St. John of the Cross, a St. Theresa, and, on the chair of St. Peter, a Paul the Fourth, and a St. Pius the Fifth, and, above all and more than all, a St. Ignatius Loyola, with his Spartan band of companions and followers, whose influence on the civilization and religion of Europe and the world we now proceed, with as much brevity as possible, to consider.

St. Ignatius of Loyola was born in the year 1491, of noble parents. He joined the army and marched against the French. At the siege of Pampeluna, he displayed extraordinary valor and was severely wounded. During his convalescence, he called for a romance to amuse the tedious hours of his confinement. As none could be found, the *Lives of the Saints* was brought him. The perusal of this inspired him with an ardent desire to imitate their holy lives, and with an insatiable thirst to become a partaker of their immortal glory. From this moment he attached himself to the armies of Christ, and consecrated his

life to his service. His religion partook of all the ardor of his brilliant imagination, and of all the energy and bravery of his character. On his recovery, he retired to a grotto near Manresa, where he composed his *Spiritual Exercises*. Having accomplished his studies, he undertook the execution of a design he had long cherished, the establishment of a religious order for the extirpation of error and the conversion of the world; and associated with him nine others, possessed of a piety, zeal, courage, and self-denial equal to his own.

It has ever been in the order of Providence that evils should be met by remedies, and heresies, the greatest of evils, by sturdy champions of the truth. Thus, to the Arians was opposed St. Athanasius, to the Pelagians and Manicheans, St. Augustine, to the Albigenses, St. Dominic, and to Lutherans and Calvinists, St. Ignatius and his companions. Indeed, it is a remarkable fact, that, at the precise epoch when Luther publicly sustained the thesis of his apostacy in the Diet of Worms, and composed his book against monastic vows in the solitude of Alstadt, St. Ignatius was consecrating himself to God in the chapel of Monte Serrato, and was composing his *Spiritual Exercises* in his retreat at Manresa. At the time, too, that Henry the Eighth proclaimed himself spiritual head of the Anglican Church, and ordered, under penalty of death, that the very name of the Pope should be effaced from every document and from every book, St. Ignatius was laying the foundations of an order that professed, in a most special manner, obedience to the Sovereign Pontiff, and zeal and activity in enlarging the bounds of his jurisdiction.

After innumerable difficulties, Ignatius succeeded in obtaining for his company the solemn approval of the Pope, in 1540, under the name of the Company of Jesus, whence the members were called Jesuits; and this was but one of an infinite series of brilliant triumphs that followed the labors of the Jesuits, so long as the world was worthy of such men. They stood forth an impregnable breastwork against the armed legions of error, and advanced shield to shield, a Macedonian phalanx, to battle against the enemies of God; and the momentum of their onset secured them the victory. In a few years, the enemy's camp was one of confusion, contention, and flight. The plague was stayed. The thundering torrent of infidelity and atheism, which, like an ocean-surge, was inundating Europe, was driven back and hemmed within its natural bounds, where it was left to roar and waste its impotent fury. Entire nations, that had fallen

victims to the maddening delusions of a false philosophy, hailed with gratitude these messengers of Heaven, and returned with exultation to the bosom of the Church. Kingdoms and tribes innumerable, in other regions, where the light of the Gospel had never before penetrated, were converted to Christianity and to civilization, insomuch that infinitely more souls were gained in America and the Indies than had been lost in Europe.

But the partisans of error and irreligion, restless under defeat, continued to attack the Church on every side. According to Loyola, the points of defence should correspond in number. Hence, he digested a code for the government of the Society, in which he devised the most gigantic plans of operation, and developed them with astonishing sagacity. He anticipated every possible obstacle to success, and furnished the means of averting or surmounting them. From the loftiest themes, he descended to the minutest details, solving every difficulty, placing a curb on every passion, and seeking in the very extension of his institute to give the Church an ascendancy, which, in this age so rife with disorders, she seemed almost afraid to claim for herself.

“Loyola was aware, that, on the day of battle, the most experienced officers stand apart, in order to watch with more composure the conflict which they direct. A general of an army ought, by means of the orders that he issues, to be everywhere present to his troops. Their movements, their courage, their very life, depend on him; he disposes of them in the most absolute manner; and the very physical inaction to which, in consequence, he subjects himself augments his intellectual energies. It is he that stimulates, that restrains, that combines the springs of action, and that assumes the responsibility of events. Such was the admirable policy of Ignatius Loyola. He dispersed his companions over the globe; he sent them forth to humiliation or to glory, to preach or be martyred, while he from Rome, as a central point, communicated force to all, and, what was still better, regulated their movements.

“At Rome, Ignatius followed his disciples at every step. In an age when communication was neither easy nor expeditious, and when each political revolution added to the difficulty, he found means to correspond with them frequently. He had a perfect knowledge of the state of the missions, and was acquainted with the joys and sufferings of the missionaries; he sympathized with them, and thus shared their dangers and their struggles; his orders were anxiously expected, his counsels were scrupulously followed. More calm than they, for he was uninfluenced by local passions, he decided with greater discernment, he regulated with greater unity of design.” — Vol. I., pp. 183, 184.

The position of the Church was indeed a deplorable one. From every city, from every village, yea, from every monastery and convent, there marched forth an enemy armed at all points to contend against her. True, she met them without shrinking, and fulminated her censures ; but the people, swollen with pride, and allured by the specious novelties of the day, were not disposed to yield to the just censures of the Church.

Ignatius understood perfectly the state of things and the nature of the remedy required, and he shrunk not from a contest which the number of the assailants rendered so uncertain, nay, so perilous. Like an experienced general, he marshals into the field the soldiers that he himself had drilled for combat and for martyrdom. These soldiers advance, incapable of fear or retreat, as a rapid view of their movements and their victories in the different countries into which they penetrated will amply prove.

England was at this time a prey to the most extravagant opinions in church and state. Henry the Eighth, the legitimate spouse of Catherine of Aragon, became impassioned with Anne Boleyn, and demanded a divorce of the Holy See. Too impatient, however, to await the decision which his own conscience told him would be adverse to his petition, he separated himself and his kingdom from the Roman communion, and, to effect his purpose the more speedily, he set on foot the most terrible system of persecution ever recorded in the annals of tyranny. The English, for the most part, ignominiously succumbed. But the Irish were made of sterner stuff,—and they refused to change their faith as often as it should please their sovereign to change his mistresses. They continued steadfast Catholics. Such a firm resistance did not pass unpunished, but drew down upon their devoted country the most cruel, the most coldblooded, and the most relentless infliction of wrongs and sufferings ever experienced by any people. While Ireland was palpitating under the knife of this royal butcher, and her sons and daughters were perishing for their faith or languishing in dungeons, the venerable and afflicted Archbishop of Armagh appealed in her behalf to the Sovereign Pontiff. Ignatius is summoned, and the holy Father makes requisition for two of his Company. Brouet and Salmeron are charged with the mission. With tears of joy they accepted the perilous embassy, and departed from Rome without companions, without provisions, without money, like veritable apostles, as in some sort they were.

In the year 1542, after innumerable dangers, they arrived in Ireland. But what tongue can describe the desolation and distress that met their eye at every turn? Without teachers or spiritual guides, the people were abandoned to penury, to prisons, and to indiscriminate massacre. The two missionaries were without an asylum and depended upon alms. Little by little, however, they gained the confidence of the faithful, and made known to them the object of their mission. Soon they were surrounded by a flock bold as themselves. Then their zeal knew no bounds; they traversed the isle from one extremity to the other, shriving, administering the sacraments, whispering peace to the troubled conscience, animating the strong, supporting the weak, encouraging all. The widows and orphans were provided for; the churches were restored; the altars of God were again set up; the holy sacrifice was renewed; in a word, the object of their mission was accomplished, and, a price being set on their heads, they were recalled to Rome.

A vast field of labor was prepared for them in Italy, of which a large portion had been seduced and corrupted by the innovators of the age. The fathers of the Company of Jesus, as an advanced guard, dispersed themselves in every city. Success everywhere crowned their efforts. Errors were extirpated. Abuses were corrected. Convents and monasteries were reformed. Ecclesiastics of every rank became zealous and devout. Apostate monks and priests returned to the bosom of the Church. Teachers of false doctrine and sedition were confounded. Hospitals and confraternities were established for every work of mercy. In two or three years, heresy and irreligion could scarcely be found in regions that had been their strongest holds.

We have already alluded to the causes that disposed the Germans and other nations of the North to receive with alacrity the doctrines of the Reformers. Many other causes came in as auxiliary, and, indeed, the doctrines and principles of the Reformation were such as to recommend themselves to the passions of men. The German States, under the tutelage of Luther, Melancthon, Bucer, and Carlostadt, and France and Switzerland, under that of Zuinglius, Calvin, and Beza, soon became one vast political arena, where each one, by disputing and commenting on the texts of Scripture and the holy fathers, attributed to himself that infallibility that he denied to the Church Universal. From their vain disputes and disorder-

ly assemblies swarmed forth hosts of fanatics, proud, cruel, and relentless, unhappy victims to the most extravagant errors, and in their turn perverting and corrupting millions.

The Sovereign Pontiff was profoundly afflicted at the degradation and misery into which this portion of his flock was plunged; and the Emperor Charles the Fifth, hitherto so timid and compromising, felt the necessity of applying a remedy. Lefèvre, one of the earliest companions of Loyola, received orders to penetrate into Germany. He was a consummate theologian, a persuasive orator, and, above all, a virtuous priest. On his arrival, in October, 1540, he soon perceived that but little was to be gained by openly resisting the sectaries, and therefore applied himself chiefly to the spiritual resuscitation of Catholics, and particularly of the clergy, whose morals were in very many cases fearfully lax. He went from city to city, giving retreats to all classes, to bishops, prelates, electors, ambassadors of kings, doctors in theology, priests and multitudes of the commonalty. Charles, Duke of Savoy, chose him for his spiritual director. Germans, Portuguese, Spaniards, and Italians crowded around him, and adopted the rule of life that he recommended. The *élite* of the nobility regarded him as their spiritual father, and bore with them to their homes in other and distant lands the sweet remembrance of his counsels, and the virtues that he had inculcated. By the edification of their example they confirmed the people in the true faith, or led them back to the centre of unity.

Le Jay and Bobadilla continued the work thus gloriously begun. In Ausgburg, the Catholic worship was reëstablished, mainly through the persuasive eloquence of Bobadilla. Le Jay astonished the world by the marvellous conversions which followed his labors at Ratisbon, Nuremberg, and Ingolstadt. In short, heresy and irreligion trembled and fell before them, and the faithful rejoiced and took courage.

Lefèvre returned to Germany in 1543, and at Mayence he publicly expounded the Holy Scriptures. His lectures were attended by all the inhabitants, and multitudes were brought back to the Church. Nor was this all; his lectures attracted crowds of strangers, who, from all parts of the provinces of the Rhine, flocked to listen to a priest who enjoyed such an extraordinary reputation for piety and learning.

Canisius, regarded as one of the most solid and brilliant spirits of his age, and as one of the ablest doctors in the University of Cologne, listened with delight to the discourses of

Lefèvre, — had an interview with him, — and his vocation was decided. Canisius became a Jesuit. Throughout the German empire he reared and unfolded the standard of the cross, and by his comments on the Holy Scriptures, and his expositions of Christian doctrine, he dissipated, in a great measure, the clouds of anarchy and false doctrine that, in whirling masses, were drifting over the land, and displayed to the astonished minds of men the light of truth beaming from the sun of justice.

Such marvellous successes attended the labors of Le Jay, Canisius, and Lefèvre, that Jesuits were demanded wherever irreligion showed its front. The prince of Transylvania requested them for his estates; the Archbishop of Strigonia for Hungary; the Bishop of Breslau for Silesia; Sigismund for Poland. Everywhere, by their illustrious virtues and unctuous exhortations, they forced the people back to the religion which their fathers had ingloriously abandoned. The Archbishop of Cologne apostatized, but the zeal and charity of Lefèvre saved the flock. Cologne remained faithful, and manfully withstood every effort at corruption. France herself was saved from anarchy and infidelity, at least for a century, by the labors of Jesuits, who, despite a thousand obstacles, found means to establish themselves in that kingdom. It was the Jesuit alone who could make head against the rabid fanaticism of Calvinism on the one hand, and the slippery treachery of Jansenism on the other. It was he alone that dared from the pulpit speak boldly to his sovereign and his courtiers, while others dealt only in flatteries and pompous eulogies.

It is impossible in the compass of a single article to enter into details, but we have already stated sufficient to show what we proposed, namely, that before the band of Loyola whole armies trembled and fled in dismay; that each man in that little band was himself a host; and that the march of irreligion and barbarism was in Northern Europe stayed by their efforts, and entire cities and provinces won back to the faith of their fathers. It remains now to convey a general idea of the successes which attended them in foreign climes.

Francis Xavier departed for the Indies, and, after a tedious voyage of thirteen months, landed, in May, 1542, at Goa, the capital of the Portuguese acquisitions in India. Here he found religion in a most deplorable state. Among the Portuguese, revenge, ambition, luxury, avarice, and debauchery seemed to have extinguished the Christian virtues. The sacra-

ments were neglected ; the exhortations and censures of the bishop were despised ; and no dam was found sufficient to arrest the torrent of retrogression. The natives of these and all the neighbouring countries were addicted to the grossest abominations and superstitions, resembling men in nothing but the outward form ; and they who had embraced Christianity had already relapsed into idolatry. So great, however, was the zeal of Xavier, and so successful his labors, that in less than six months every thing was completely changed. The children crowded around their benefactor, and with eagerness listened to his instructions. Through their children the hearts of the parents were reached, and again by their example the very savages were stimulated to action, — and all, with scarcely an exception, abandoned their unlawful practices, and, with tears in their eyes, and contrition in their hearts, threw themselves at the feet of our apostle, and voluntarily resigned themselves to his spiritual direction. The fruits that accompanied and followed their conversion were a sufficient proof and guaranty of its sincerity.

After this, Xavier visited the coast of the Pearl Fishery, where the chief persons of the country and most of the inhabitants embraced Christianity, and adopted the usages of civilized society. Endowed with the gift of tongues and the power of working miracles, a like success everywhere attended him. The whole kingdom of Travancore embraced the Gospel. In a few years forty-five churches were here erected, and in one day Xavier baptized ten thousand idolaters. His fame extended far and wide, and from every quarter the gentiles flocked around him, demanding baptism, and urging him to visit their several countries. He could not yield to the prayers of all, but replied to them by sending forth missionaries animated and formed by his spirit. The island of Amboina, the Moluccas, the isle Del Moro, Ceylon, with several of its kings, Tanore, with its king, Manaar and Coulan, and a large part of the vast empire of Japan, accepted the yoke of the Gospel and of civilized life. So great, at times, was the number of those to be baptized, that, for very weariness in administering the sacrament, the holy missionary was scarcely able to move his arm. It is said, that, with that one arm, he baptized one million of pagans.

Burning with an insatiable desire to spread the kingdom of Christ, the indefatigable missionary meditated yet other and more brilliant conquests, and fixed his eyes upon the Celestial Empire. But the hour for the conversion of the Chinese had not

yet come. God accepted the intention of his servant, and called him to receive an immortal crown.

"The missionary was within sight of China. The benedictions with which the Portuguese had encircled his name, the rejoicings manifested wherever he went, the recital of the innumerable obstacles to be surmounted before he could penetrate into the country, nothing was capable of making the least impression upon his mind. He obtained an interview with some of the natives, who, astonished at his doctrine, counselled him to pass into their country, whence, said they, the emperor has not long since despatched learned men to study abroad the different religions.

"At this news, Xavier, transported with joy, resolves to be landed upon the beach from a small boat; but the interests of the Portuguese merchants are opposed to his desire. They entreat him to postpone his apostolic labors till after their departure. He accedes to their solicitations.

"When the hour for entering into this vast kingdom had arrived, when human motives no longer restrained him, the father falls a victim to a consuming fever. Behold him, destitute of all succour, alone, exposed, upon the beach, to all the inclemencies of the season. He feels a presentiment of his approaching death, he predicts it in express terms, and has but one regret, which is, not to live long enough to open to his successors the empire that lay before him.

"A Portuguese, touched with compassion, receives him into his cabin. The malady rapidly progresses. The very medicines administered by a mistaken charity add new force to the fever that consumes him. Delirium seizes upon his brain.

"On the second of December, 1552, at the age of forty-six years, the Jesuit expired.

"His name, his virtues, his miracles, the multiplicity of his voyages, the success of his exhortations throughout the East, the favors that, by his prayers to God, he had so often obtained for the relief of suffering humanity, or for the consolation of families, presented themselves vividly to the recollection of all. The shores that he had evangelized, the regions that he had visited, the desert wilds through which he had pursued the savages, in order to offer them, by the cross, the blessings of civilization, — the isles that he had bedewed with his sweat, and that his fellow-missionaries have fertilized with their blood, all these different people, unknown to each other, united in one common sentiment of human sorrow and holy exultation.

"They mourned the father of whom death had bereaved them. They implored the protection of the saint who from the highest heavens was watching over their happiness. From all those king-

doms that Xavier had conquered to the faith, there rose homage to his memory. His bier, born in triumph, was surrounded with veneration; the people crowded its passage; the banners of every nation honored it on the seas; the very ambassadors of the Great Mogul, though Mahometans, bowed down before that corpse that corruption has always respected. Long after the decease of the Jesuit, the ships which passed the spot where he died displayed their flags, and saluted, by a full discharge of artillery, the land where the Apostle of the Indies breathed his last sigh."—Vol. I., pp. 244—247.

In 1549, the Jesuits, not content with the conversion of the Indies, crossed the Atlantic, and announced the Gospel in America. Brazil, where they commenced their labors, was in a state of barbarism. Vice existed under every form. The people were cannibals. They were merciless and without natural affection. The Jesuits here found a field of labor just suited to the extent of their charity and the ardor of their zeal. They traversed the country, plunged into the forests, penetrated into the very huts of the savages, and, by their gentle manners and soothing language, and a thousand services which they cheerfully rendered, they gradually gained the confidence of the natives, and were at length received into their cabins and listened to with attention. They inveighed with zeal against the exactions and oppressions of the Portuguese, and proved themselves at all times the friends and advocates of the natives, not as slaves, but as freemen. By dint of perseverance and patience they gained the very cannibals. To induce them to accept the yoke of civilization, it was necessary, first, to subdue them to that of the Gospel, and they succeeded. The wandering tribes were gathered into settlements, and taught the arts of civilized life. Churches arose; schools were opened; colleges were endowed; religious houses were established; and in a few years the whole empire of Brazil became a Christian empire.

The march of civilization had commenced, and it was not to cease. Deputations from the very heart of the continent came to solicit baptism and Jesuit missionaries; and though seventy of the latter were taken prisoners on the seas, by the ships of French Calvinists, and savagely slaughtered and thrown into the deep, yet others were ever found eager to confront the same perils, and to endure the same labors and sufferings. Barefooted,—without raiment, save a cassock,—a crucifix and chaplet depending from the girdle,—the staff of the pilgrim, and

the breviary of the priest, in the hand, — the shoulders laden with the ornaments indispensable to the Sacrifice of the Mass, — the humble, though fearless, Jesuit directed his steps to the interior of these wild and almost deserted regions. He penetrated the densest forests ; he toiled through vast morasses ; he waded the shallow streams, and swam the deep ones ; he clambered over the mountains, and scaled the beetling crags ; he traversed vast prairies and desert plains, exposed to the scorching rays of a tropical sun ; and, abandoning himself to the protection of Providence, he confronted ferocious beasts and more ferocious men. All these fatigues, all these perils, had God alone for witness. The Jesuit braved them, not for earthly fame or honor, but with a single and unblenching eye to the conquest of souls. Wherever he encountered a savage, he extended towards him his arms, and by signs made him comprehend the object of his mission. By words of kindness, and smiles that betokened peace, he sought to allure him to the way of the cross. If he resisted, then the Jesuit threw himself at the feet of the wild man, bedewed them with his tears, embraced him with affection, and by the most ardent demonstrations of charity strove to gain his confidence. If, as sometimes happened, the savages still refused to yield, the Jesuit was nowise discouraged. He became their servant and slave ; he yielded to their caprices ; he followed them in the chase ; he interested himself in their affairs ; he became a partner in their toils, their sufferings, and their amusements. And though many of these holy men fell victims to their zeal, and bedewed the earth with their blood, yet that very blood proved, as it ever has, the veritable seed of Christians. New warriors instantly occupied the posts of the slaughtered, and followed up their work, until, little by little, the barbarians were instructed in the laws of God, and in the precepts and obligations of Christianity, which at length they embraced with a fervor, a simplicity, and a unanimity that would have honored the primitive ages of the Church. Soon there was no hut or settlement in all those regions that had not been visited and blessed by a Jesuit.

Peru, Chile, New Granada, Buenos Ayres, Paraguay, Uruguay, Guatemala, presented each a similar theatre of the apostolic toils and sufferings of the Jesuits. In North America, California, Mexico, Florida, and Canada, numerous tribes of Indians, such as the Hurons, the Algonquins, the Illinois, and, in our own day, under the marvellous efforts of the illustrious

father De Smett, the Flatheads, the Snake Indians, and the Crows, and many other tribes of the Rocky Mountains, have heard the voice of the Jesuits and embraced Christianity. Blessed Christianity! which has succeeded in realizing the dreams of sages and philosophers, and converted numberless tribes of ferocious and brutalized men into communities of brothers, — extinguished in them the spirit of cruelty and revenge, and breathed into them that of meekness, docility, and love, — offering to an amazed and incredulous world an example of the practice of every virtue, and a model of the truest civilization.

In contemplating this admirable spectacle of the nations converted and civilized by the Jesuits, Buffon, a witness who will not be suspected of partiality, exclaims :—

“ These missions have made more men than the victorious armies of the princes that subjugated them have destroyed. The meekness, the charity, the good example, the virtues constantly practised by the Jesuits, have touched the hearts of the savages and vanquished their distrust and their ferocity. They came of their own accord to ask to be instructed in a law that rendered men so perfect. To that law they submitted, and were reunited to the society of men. Nothing has done more honor to the Jesuits than to have civilized these nations, and to have laid the foundations of an empire without other arms than those of virtue.”

Thus scarcely a century had elapsed since the establishment of the Society, and already it covered the four great continents of the earth, and had borne the standards of Christianity and civilization to the remotest isles of the ocean. It had missionary stations in Japan and Ethiopia, — in the Indies and Peru, — in Brazil and Mogul, — in the remotest archipelagos and the bleakest islands, — in the heart of Africa and on the banks of the Bosphorus, — under the cedars of Lebanon and in the wigwam of the Illinois, — in China and in Canada, — at Madras and Thibet, — in Goa and in Baltimore. In humble imitation of the great Apostle, the Jesuits made themselves all things to all ; infirm with the suffering, weak with the feeble, ignorant with the unlettered, learned with the refined, diplomatists with princes. In China they were mandarins, astronomers, and artists ; in Carthage, slaves to the very negroes ; in Hindostan, Bramins and Pariahs ; in India, Bonzes ; in Canada and in the valleys of the Missouri and Mississippi, hunters and fishermen ; and all this with but one design, which, like a bright star, preceded them and shone upon their path, and was the guide of all their

actions ; — THE GREATER GLORY OF GOD AND THE WELFARE OF THEIR RACE. Thus, while the sectaries and philosophers of the day were predicting the downfall of the Church, and shouting in triumph over the apostasy of nations, the Jesuits were conducting new worlds and new nations, of which the Old World had never before heard even the names, and laying them at the foot of the throne of St. Peter.

As far as our limits would permit, we have aimed to convey a clear and correct idea of the influence on the civilization and moral improvement of the world of the Jesuits considered as missionaries. We have accompanied them into the cottage of the peasant, and into the palaces of kings. We have followed them to the very extremities of the earth, and witnessed the zeal with which they braved suffering and martyrdom in order to convey the blessings of true civilization to the savages of the North, to the cannibals of the South, and to the luxurious inhabitants of the East. We turn now to regard them in other, and, if possible, still more amiable and useful toils ; in rearing the youth of every land, and training them to virtue and wisdom.

The system of education laid down by St. Ignatius in his *Constitutions*, and which, by undeviating application, has become an integral element in the very being of the Society, is the most perfect and the wisest ever devised by the genius of man. Three hundred years of experience have not been able to discover in it a single defect, nor in all that length of time has it diminished aught in energy or in its marvellous results. Indeed, it has displaced and superseded all other systems, however venerable for antiquity, however approved by experience. It has been adopted in its leading principles, not only in the colleges of other religious orders, but also, as far as practicable, in the colleges and schools of Protestants themselves, and in the very universities of infidels. It constitutes the basis of all that is substantially good in the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Göttingen, and Paris. From it has been borrowed all that the schools in the cities and villages of our own country possess of merit or of excellence.

Its distinguishing feature — that which elevates it far above all former systems of education — is its marvellous aptitude for penetrating into the characters and appreciating the sympathies and hearts of childhood, and, above all, in rendering all physical, and even intellectual education, subordinate to the moral and religious culture of the mind. The first object in a Jesuit

college is to make Christians ; the second, to make scholars and men. As, in that age so prolific in arts and inventions, every science and every art proceeded from religion as its source, and flowed back upon religion as its end, — and as religion had been glorified and honored by the lyre of Tasso, the muse of Dante, the chisel of Michel Angelo, and the pencil of Raphael, so Ignatius Loyola would that it should be honored and glorified by the piety of guileless youth, on whose tender souls, more capable of receiving beautiful impressions than the canvass or the marble, he would fain stamp the images of virtue, the impress of God. What remarkable penetration ! What depth of wisdom ! The sole object of the Society was to enlighten the world, to extend as far as possible the blessings of Christian civilization. To accomplish this object, what mode more effectual than to mould the plastic minds of youth and train them to piety and virtue, that, when they should occupy the places of their fathers on the arena of the world, they might shine as burning lights, and illumine the path of those around them, and thus oppose a formidable barrier to the torrent of incredulity with which the nations of the earth were menaced ? Two great moral principles were constantly set before their pupils in all the colleges of the Jesuits ; first, to be good Christians ; second, to be good citizens. Hence, in all their instructions, they never interfered with the politics of the countries in which they were established. They were conservatives, in the truest sense of the word. In their view, the authority of governments resided rather in possession than in right. Hence, they were monarchists, imperialists, legitimists, or republicans, according to the form of the government under which they lived, and their pupils therefore were taught to respect and to obey “the powers that were,” and that as a Christian duty.

To the Jesuits is the world indebted for the establishment of normal schools,* or schools to prepare young men to act as teachers, where they are initiated in the art of making study agreeable to their scholars, and of exercising that wise and salutary discipline that touches the heart, and makes the learner love his preceptor and imitate his virtues.

But the Jesuits extended their zeal and talents farther than inculcating the principles of virtue and religion. Inflamed by

* This perhaps may be thought by some to be a little too strongly expressed, and to overlook the educational services of the Dominicans.

a passion for literature and science, — a passion that gives a charm to solitude, and cheerfulness to suffering, — they aimed to fire their pupils with the same passion. To this end, they introduced into their colleges branches till then unknown in colleges, such as polite literature, history, eloquence, poetry, and the exact sciences. Special professors were appointed for the Latin, Greek, Hebrew, and various other languages. To excite emulation and enthusiasm, they invented those classical contests in which memory is set at conflict with memory, and mind with mind; and they introduced those solemn distributions of prizes, during which prevails such a virtuous excitement, and which are followed by such blissful remembrances. Men of the highest intellectual attainments consecrated their entire lives to the work of planing away the difficulties of the dead languages. They plunged fearlessly into the darkness in which they had so long been buried, and instantly, as by magic, light shone around them. Some explained and developed the first principles, while others were engaged in the more arduous toil of preparing dictionaries.

Nor in these employments did the Jesuits confine themselves to the civilized nations of Europe; but everywhere — throughout all the continents, and in all the islands where they had planted the cross or which they had fertilized with their blood — they busied themselves in the blessed work of disseminating knowledge, and imparting a thirst of it to their pupils. Amid the perils of persecution and the agonies of martyrdom, they were composing elementary books and catechisms. The Indians, the Japanese, the Chinese, the inhabitants of Western Asia, the Africans, and the countless tribes of America, were astonished to see their languages, which some of them scarcely knew themselves, enriched, under the hands of the Jesuits, by grammars and dictionaries, and elementary and entertaining books of instruction.

The pursuit of knowledge in the schools of the Jesuits was made an agreeable pastime, and was invested with a thousand delightful associations. It was disengaged from the aridities of the schools, and presented under the most alluring aspects, and with a multitude of ingenious expedients to enlist the sympathies of youth. Amusements of every sort, historical and Scriptural dramas, songs and ballets, the arts and sciences, poetry and music, the electrical machine, the galvanic battery, the microscope and telescope were all called to aid in this magnificent design.

l. 2. 12.

A system of instruction, based on such principles, pursued with such ability, and set in operation by such men, could not, it may be supposed, fail of success. It must furnish to each successive generation men whose lives, attainments, and characters should shed a lustre on science, on their respective countries, and on Christianity. Such is, indeed, the fact. It has in every age formed and sent forth into the world illustrious popes, prelates, princes, generals, magistrates, and scholars. Among them we may name a Gregory the Thirteenth, and a Benedict the Fourteenth, — a St. Francis of Sales and a Bossuet, — a St. Liguori and a Fénelon, — a Cardinal de Fleury and a Frederick Borromeo, — with a long retinue of popes, cardinals, and prelates, that have honored the Church by their virtues and talents. In the magistracy we may name a Montesquieu and a Bouhier, a Malesherbes and a Le Jay. In the department of letters, a Tasso and a Galileo, a Molière and a Fontenelle, an Edmund Burke and a Kemble, a Muratori and a Buffon. In the cause of patriotism, a Richard Shiel and a Daniel O'Connell. But why should we proceed? — time would fail to repeat the host of names that, in every portion of the known world, have thrown a halo of splendor around the schools and the educational system of the Company of Jesus.

It is no longer, therefore, a subject of astonishment, that the Jesuits had to encounter the bitter hatred and opposition of infidels, disorganizers, and anarchists. They were the successful champions of religion, the determined opposers of sedition and rebellion, the teachers of sound philosophy, and the surveyors and engineers in the progress of civilization. They alone, by their missions, their schools, and their colleges, were able to make head against the downward tendencies of the age. It is a remarkable fact, that, so long as the Jesuits controlled the colleges and universities of Europe, religion, literature, science, and the arts were ever on the ascendant; and that precisely at the fatal era of their suppression, impiety, anarchy, and barbarism threatened the downfall of civilization, and partially triumphed. The fall of the Jesuits was the tocsin of the French Revolution, and the Robespierres and Desmoulins of that terrific period were the first generation educated in the universities after that event, whereas scarcely a pupil of a Jesuit college ever took any prominent part in revolutionary measures. The great Chateaubriand, after the suppression of the Order, and before its restoration, fully appreciated its important influence on the rising generation: — “Europe,” says he, “has suffered an irreparable

loss in the Jesuits. Education has never since lifted up her head. They were singularly agreeable to youth. The refinement of their manners divested their lectures of that pedantic air so repulsive to childhood. As the greater part of the professors were men of letters, and of estimation in the world, their pupils regarded themselves as members of an illustrious academy." — *Genie du Christianisme*, Tom. VIII., p. 199.

The Jesuits, with all their zeal for the propagation of Christianity and the education of youth, were not found backward in the cultivation of the arts, and in the promotion of science and literature in general. It was a Jesuit, Father Fabri, who discovered and made known the circulation of the blood, at the same time, if not before, the discoveries of Harvey. Many of the fathers labored with signal success in the field of philosophy; at the head of these unquestionably stands the celebrated Suarez, who has been classed with such men as St. Thomas, St. Bonaventura, and Scotus, having received from Benedict the Fourteenth the honorable title of *Doctor Ezimius*, as to them had been already assigned those of *Doctor Angelicus*, *Doctor Seraphicus*, and *Doctor Subtilis*; and when in France the spirit of infidelity stalked proudest, the French Academy awarded to Father Guénard a prize for the best essay on the question, In what consists the spirit of philosophy?

In pulpit eloquence the fathers stood unrivalled. Their sermons were for the most part extemporaneous, and no orators better understood the art of riveting attention and enforcing conviction. It was not worldly fame they sought; the only fame they desired was that of having brought sinners to the cross. In churches, in the public squares, and at the corners of streets, they produced the most marvellous effects upon the people; controlling their feelings at will; exciting them to tears, filling them with joy, nerving them to vigorous action. Nor in the presence even of emperors, kings, and nobles did they fear to reason of justice, temperance, and judgment, and a success attended them like to that which in brighter days had followed the labors of St. Paul, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, St. Chrysostom, and St. Bernard. Segneri in Italy, Tolet in Spain, Vieira in Portugal, Coster in Belgium, Canisius in Germany, Bourdaloué in France, were but single examples amid hosts of others, alike distinguished for the charm of their eloquence, the dignity of their style, and the persuasive unction of their language.

The Society has furnished historians in every language. In Italian, a Pallavicini; in Spanish, a Mariana, who has been named the Livy of the Peninsula; in French, a Daniel, a Charlevoix, a Du Halde, a Bouhours; in every Christian land, not only local historians and biographers, but also contributors to the immortal *Acta Sanctorum* of the Bollandists.

In the department of jurisprudence, the Society of Jesus is not wanting in distinguished writers. Among the most brilliant were Lineck, Schwartz, Stephanucci, Lascaris, Schmidt, and a host besides, of whose labors other and more ambitious authors have availed themselves, and thus secured a perpetual renown, while the names of the Jesuits are almost forgotten.

In astronomy and mathematics the Jesuits have never been surpassed, perhaps never equalled. It was Father Clavius that reformed the calendar, a reform now almost universally adopted; in mathematics, he was the oracle of the age in which he lived. Father Guldin stood in intellectual contact with Kepler, and was able to solve his most difficult problems. Father Gregory de St. Vincent was author of the well known *Theoremata Mathematica*, and of another work equally celebrated.* According to Leibnitz, St. Vincent, Descartes, and Fermot constituted the triumvirate of geometry. But these names are all eclipsed by that of Father Riccati. "His treatise on the Integral Calculus has never been surpassed. He is always clear, always exact. No sooner does he invent new methods and new theorems, than these methods and theorems find their adaptation."—Vol. IV., p. 313. Father Kircher was at home in every branch of science, whether physics, mathematics, languages, hieroglyphics, history, music, antiquities, or the exact sciences, and secured a renown that the brilliant success of those who built from the materials that he furnished them could never obscure. Father Scheiner discovered the spots on the sun's disk long before Galileo. Eschinardi, from his observatory at the Roman College, was the first that discovered the great comet of 1668. Other Jesuits, scattered over the seas, perceived it and calculated its progress, while its existence was yet unknown in Europe. It was Deschales who demonstrated that the refraction of light was an essential condition to the production of the colors in the rainbow and in prisms, a discovery which afterwards served as the basis of the Newtonian theory. Father Lana, by means of scientific calcula-

* *Opus Geometricum Quadraturæ Circuli.*

tions, discovered the air-balloon, and, one hundred years before the Abbé Sicard, explained the manner of teaching the deaf, dumb, and blind to read and write, and communicate with their fellow-creatures and with each other.

It was the Jesuit Paez, who, in 1618, discovered the sources of the Nile ; and in 1740, Manuel Roman, another Jesuit, applied himself during nine months to ascertain its course. In 1673, the mouth of the Mississippi was discovered by Father Marquette, who started in a row-boat from Lake Michigan, and followed the course of the river to the Gulf of Mexico. Other Jesuits broke paths in the wilderness and forest, and prepared the way for the discovery and population of new countries, and made known to commercial enterprise lakes and rivers, and boundless seas. Father Albonel did what soldiers and adventurers had not the courage to undertake, — he opened a road from Quebec to Hudson's Bay ; and in this our day, the illustrious De Smet, stimulated by zeal for the conversion of the savage tribes of the West, has penetrated to the Rocky Mountains, ascended the Mississippi and the Missouri to their sources, and thus realized in his own person the desires and the hopes of the ancient members of the Institute.

They were Jesuits that discovered the febrifuge properties of quinine, and introduced it into the European pharmacopœia, that transplanted the rhubarb plant and the ginseng, and naturalized them in Europe, and gave to commerce the gum-elastic and vanilla. A Jesuit in India discovered the process and the mordants for printing calicoes. Another took advantage of a residence in China to learn the art of manufacturing and coloring porcelain, which he communicated to the French government ; hence the magnificent porcelains of France, more rich and beautiful than those produced in China itself.

Thus, in every age, in every clime, have the Jesuits been not only zealous apostles of Christianity, but also successful promoters of the arts, of science, and of civilization.

“ Though separated often by half the circumference of the earth, though personally unknown to each other, they corresponded from every region. Scattered here and there, they remarked the phenomena of nature. They transmitted the results of their observations to their brethren in Europe, which, made upon the spot, were regarded as of authority by the Academies.

“ Their zeal for science allowed nothing to pass unobserved ; with them every object presented matter of instruction ; for in the very depths of those vast countries, the field of their apostolic toils, they encountered everywhere vestiges of ancient worship or of

history, monuments long forgotten, arts unknown, and medicinal plants. Upon this field, vaster than any that had ever been presented to the eyes of associated men, they toiled, so long as the Society of Jesus existed, with a perseverance that accorded not a day of repose." — Vol. IV., p. 324.

We have alluded to the suppression of the Jesuits. We cannot close this article without saying a few words upon so extraordinary an act. Yes! notwithstanding the extent and fecundity of its missions, — notwithstanding the splendor and renown of its colleges, — notwithstanding the piety and learning of its fathers, — in the midst of its brilliant career, and while at the zenith of its glory, the Society of Jesus, the brightest constellation in the Christian galaxy, was suddenly extinguished. And, what is more surprising still, the act was performed by the common father of the faithful, by the Pope himself.

Clement the Fourteenth was elevated to the chair of St. Peter in an age rife with political and religious storms, when anarchy and impiety stalked insolently over the earth, and predicted and demanded the downfall of religion and the cessation of Christian instruction. But the Jesuits were the most able and successful defenders and disseminators of both. Hence the cry of extermination against the Jesuits, uttered by the anarchists and freethinkers of France and Germany. Hence, too, the numberless modes devised, and calumnies fabricated, to render them odious to princes and to people. Falsehoods and sarcasms, — books and pamphlets, in which their theology and morals were misrepresented and falsified, — unblushing reports, which soon became popular, that the fathers were stimulated solely by cupidity and ambition, — such were the arms with which the impious demagogues of Spain and Portugal, and the Jansenists and philosophers of France, rebutted the triumphant and logical arguments of their opponents; and with these, alas! they succeeded. Carvalho, minister, or rather monster, at the court of Joseph the First, of Portugal, — a man without principle, a slave to the most brutish passions, a shameless scoffer at religion, yet enjoying the confidence of his royal master, — had conceived the design of exterminating the Catholic faith from the realm. To effect his purpose, he saw that he must begin with the Jesuits. But the Jesuits were the idols of the people, the guides and counsellors of the nobility, the aids and minute-men of the bishops. A bold step was necessary, one that should appall and paralyze. He fabricated against them and matured in secret a charge of fearful magnitude; — it was no other than that

of conspiring against the life of the king ; and in 1759 he procured an edict, by which, without giving them a moment's warning, or an opportunity to substantiate their innocence, or even the form of a trial, they were declared traitors and rebels, their goods were confiscated, and they were driven naked and penniless into exile.

The accusations preferred against the Company in France were equally false ; yet, in 1762, through the insidious arts of another Carvalho, it was declared incompatible with the institutions of the state, and the Jesuits received orders to abandon their houses and colleges, and to adopt a secular dress.

The policy that had succeeded so well in Portugal was followed in Spain by the prime minister, D'Aranda, who falsely implicated the Jesuits in a popular insurrection at Madrid. Their goods were confiscated, they were expelled from the Spanish territory and colonies, and forbidden ever to set foot therein again. This example was speedily followed by the king of Naples and the Duke of Parma.

But this was but the beginning of the afflictions of the Jesuits. Not content with chasing them from their dominions, all the sovereigns of Europe, with few exceptions, infected with the mad ferocity of Choiseul, Carvalho, and D'Aranda, demanded, with stunning vociferation, the suppression, the destruction, the annihilation of the entire order. *Crucify him ! crucify him !*

All eyes were turned to Rome, — the Jesuits' for protection, their enemies' for extermination. The latter prevailed. They represented to the Holy Father that the suppression of the Jesuits was necessary to save the faith, to prevent schism, to promote education, to secure the liberties of the Church and state, to render men more Catholic and more virtuous, and princes securer on their thrones. Clement the Fourteenth was not the enemy of the Jesuits ; but persuaded, undoubtedly, that the act of suppression would restore the peace and tranquillity so ardently desired, after having exhausted every art and appliance to evade the dread responsibility, at length, in 1773, he signed the fatal brief, and the Company of Jesus was no more. That brief was the death-warrant of the afflicted pontiff. He had riven his own heart, and soon after he died full of sorrow, exclaiming, — “ They made me do it ! they made me do it ! *compulsus feci ! compulsus feci !* ” *

* That the suppression of the Jesuits, according to our human modes

And now we may be allowed to inquire, What were the benefits reaped, either by the Church or state, in consequence of the suppression of the institute of Loyola? Were any of those that had been promised, and that danced like night-visions before the misguided defenders of the Church, were any of them ever realized? Not one. Instead of long, sunny days of unity and peace, the Church, bereft of her children and body-guard, put on sackcloth and mourning. The faithful stood aghast with fear, — holy prelates and pastors wept and prayed in secret, — the march of the Gospel was stayed, — the missions were abandoned, — darkness and confusion covered the earth, — crimes and abominations unutterable followed, such as, while history recounts the deeds of men, shall be the terror and the amazement of the civilized world. *It was to preserve religion*

of judging and speaking, was a fatal error, a deplorable calamity, is no doubt true; and yet, perhaps not, if viewed as it existed in the designs of Providence. "All these things are against me," said the patriarch Jacob, when forced to go down into the land of Egypt, where his son Benjamin was retained; and yet he was mistaken. That the Holy Father cannot err, when deciding *ex cathedrâ* a question of faith or morals for the whole Church, we firmly and devoutly hold; and although we can admit that he might err in a question like that of suppressing the Jesuits, without prejudice to the infallibility we claim for him, yet we confess we are hardly willing to say he actually did. We do not like to admit even to ourselves that the Holy Father really errs in any important measure which he solemnly authorizes or approves. What to our dim reason and feeble judgments may seem to be a fatal error, a deplorable calamity, may, in reality, be wise and salutary. We see but little, and that but indistinctly. We see never the end, — the termination of events. It is necessary to see a measure in its providential relations and termination, in order to pronounce definitively concerning its character. It may be, after all, that Almighty God had his purposes in the suppression of the Jesuits, and that the measure was necessary to his greater glory, and the ultimate prosperity of his Church. "Whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth." He may have designed, on the one hand, to vindicate the Society itself from the charges preferred against it, and to edify the nations, by the meekness, silence, and obedience with which so powerful a body would submit to the order for its dissolution and dispersion; and, on the other hand, he may have designed to humble the Society, and admonish it, that, powerful as it was, invaluable as were the services it had unquestionably rendered, it was by no means indispensable to him or to his Church. Perhaps there was danger of vainglory; perhaps, too, there was danger that the Order would, in many minds, usurp the place of the Church herself, and the daughter receive the homages due only to the mother. After all, the Church had existed without the Order, and could so exist still. Our Lord also may have wished to confer on the Society bearing his name still greater honor, by making its history more similar to his own, and to teach the world in its resurrection, as in his own, that death hath no power over what is his, — that virtue, though

and monarchy that the Church and state combined to suppress the Jesuits. Twenty years after, to a day, the French republic solemnly renounced all religion and all monarchy, forced the people to renounce them on pain of death, slew their own king, a son of St. Louis, upon a scaffold, and erected the crime of regicide, which they had accused the Jesuits of tolerating, into a republican virtue. A little later, and all Europe presented a scene of battles and of blood; forty kingdoms were overthrown; kings were made and unmade at the will of one man. The Popes and the College of Cardinals were made prisoners in Rome, and afterwards transported to France and incarcerated.

The fatal error was discovered, and publicly as well as pri-

for a moment held captive, is sure to burst its bands and lead captivity itself captive. The sublime example of perfect submission presented by the Jesuits throughout the world, on receiving the order dissolving them, was worth more to the Church than it cost. While we scout every suspicion against the Order, while we cheerfully acknowledge its invaluable services to religion and civilization, while we fully admit it to have been founded by the special interposition of Almighty God, and to be under the special protection of Him whose sacred name it bears, we think we need not blame the pontiff who suppressed it, but recognize the Lord's hand in the suppression, as well as in the resuscitation, and be as slow to accuse Clement the Fourteenth of error, as Pius the Seventh.

What we say here militates not in the least against the view taken in the text. All the text is intended to express is a firm conviction of the innocence and worth of the Order, and that its suppression, according to our human modes of judging, was attended by most deplorable consequences. This we admit; but we add this note for the purpose of showing, that, in saying all this, we do not necessarily accuse the sovereign pontiff of having done wrong in issuing his brief. We confess we are slow to bring an accusation against the sovereign pontiff, even in matters where faith permits us to canvass freely his acts. We would not willingly or consciously refuse to admit error or wickedness, wherever we find it; but we shrink, we own, from charging the Pope with erring, merely because we do not chance to see the wisdom and propriety of his acts, or because they seem to us unwise and improper. We would use our liberty as not abusing it. The sovereign pontiffs, when they act from their own judgment, may doubtless err; but they have reason and judgment as well as we, and perhaps are not more likely to err than we are. The reverential and obedient spirit that submits in all meekness and humility is dearer to God than the rash, captious, and insubordinate spirit that finds fault, and resists. It is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong. Under the circumstances, it may be the suppression of the Jesuits was wise and salutary. It is our duty always to presume the public measures of the sovereign pontiff are wise and just, unless we have positive evidence to the contrary.

vately avowed ; and from every quarter of Europe, and louder than all from Spain, Portugal, and France, there arose a cry for the restoration of the Jesuits. That cry was heard, and in 1814, just forty-one years after the suppression of the Institute, Pius the Seventh published the bull for its restoration, amid the cries of joy, the acclamations, and the plaudits of the Christian world. The Roman people accompanied Pius the Seventh from the Quirinal Palace to the church of Gesu, where the bull was read, and the Pope's return to his palace was a triumphal march.

“ It was in the church of Gesu, in presence of the whole Sacred College and of the patricians of Rome, that the bull was promulgated. Father Pannizoni, Provincial of Italy and General for the time being, received it from the Pope's hands. All the old Jesuits that could be assembled were present, saluting with tears of filial piety their mother risen from the dead. Eighty-six venerable men hasten to reassume the yoke of obedience. Albert of Montalto, aged *one hundred and twenty-six years*, during one hundred and eight of which he had been a Jesuit, stood at the head of these veterans of the Order. An immense void was to be filled, and the sons of the noblest families in Italy eagerly offered themselves to the work. By the side of the Angiolini, the Crassi, the Pannizoni, arose an Altieri, a Pallavicini, a Patrizi, an Azeglio, a Ricasoli, who in concert with the Fathers Piancini, Sinone, Manera, and Secchi, infused new vigor into that body, whose courage had never faltered in presence of danger.” — Vol. V., pp. 523, 524.

From that day the Society has constantly and rapidly increased. It has revived its missionary stations, it has reopened its colleges, it presents each day new aspirants to sufferings and martyrdom, and, vigorous, active, and successful as in its palmiest days, it is now occupied in every quarter of the globe in the sublime work of civilizing and evangelizing the world.

Thus, as faithfully as the limits of a single article would permit, we have endeavoured to convey an idea of the immense benefits conferred upon the world by the humble fathers of the Company of Jesus. We have not aimed to give a history of the Society, but merely to sketch an imperfect outline of their labors in the cause of religion and humanity. In an entire volume it were impossible to narrate the half of what they have achieved for the human race ; sufficient, however, has, we think, been said, to show how faithfully they accomplished the two primary objects of their mission, — the advancement of true religion, and the promotion of useful knowledge.

In conclusion, we cannot too strongly urge it upon our readers never for one moment to lend an ear to the calumnies of the enemies of the Jesuits. Who are those enemies? The enemies of God and of his Church, — the impious, the abandoned, the insane.

Indeed, no encomium can speak more eloquently the praises of the Society of Jesus, or more effectually commend it to our respect, than a retrospective comparison of the character and avowed sentiments of its opponents on the one hand, and its partisans and defenders on the other. For, if such men as Marion and Servin, Pombal and D'Aranda, Choiseul and Florida Bianca, Calvin and Beza, Arnauld and St. Cyr, Voltaire and D'Alembert, and, in this our day, Guizot, Michelet, and Eugene Sue, accompanied by a dense cloud of infidels and blasphemers, have been associated in desperate league to oppose, vilify, and persecute the Society of Jesus, it has not been, we may be certain, with an eye to the advancement of the glory of the Most High, and the dissemination of Christianity, and the amelioration of society, and the preservation of law and order; but rather to compass an end dark and sinister, to overturn established governments, to blast virtue, to sap the foundations of Christianity, to break in pieces the chair of St. Peter, to exterminate the Catholic faith. The confusion of ideas, the infidelity, the crimes and unutterable abominations which immediately followed the suppression of the Order, and the fiendish exultations of those by whose efforts and writings it was effected, constitute an imperishable evidence of the truth and justice of our assertion.

If, on the other hand, we consider that among the friends and warm defenders of the Jesuits are to be numbered thirty illustrious popes, — a St. Charles, a St. Philip Neri, a St. Theresa, a St. Francis of Sales, a St. Vincent of Paul, a St. Liguori, and a host of saints and martyrs who have been at once the pride of Christianity and the glory of their age, not one of whom ever breathed a word against the Jesuits, but all of whom have coöperated with them and combated for them; the most illustrious emperors of the German confederation, from Rodolph to Maria Theresa, Henry the Fourth of France, and Louis the Fourteenth, Sobieski, John the Third and Fifth of Portugal, Frederick of Prussia, and Catherine of Russia, the kings and princes of the north and of the south; all the members, with the exception of some three or four who had scandalized the faithful by their disorders or heresies, — all the

members of the Sacred College of Cardinals, the most venerable and learned body in the world ; archbishops and bishops occupying the most distinguished sees, such as Hovius, Bossuet, Fénelon, and the illustrious De Beaumont ; generals and fathers of the different religious orders, the Benedictines, the Dominicans, the Cistercians, the Franciscans, the Augustinians, the Carmelites, the Trinitarians, the Theatins, and the Barnabites, who, magnanimously forgetting every sentiment of rivalry, warmly and eloquently espoused the cause of the persecuted Jesuits ; magistrates and scholars, patriots and poets, historians and philosophers, Montesquieu and Le Jay, Tasso and Corneille, Leibnitz and Bacon, Descartes and Buffon, De Maistre and Bonald, Chateaubriand and O'Connell ; — if, we say, such men be the friends and defenders of the Jesuits, may we not, ought we not to, be justified in honoring and revering them as the most fearless and potent champions of truth, as the most unsparing enemies of vice and irreligion, and as the most enlightened heralds of civilization ?

Happy art thou, my country, refuge of the exile and home of the pilgrim, to have received within thy borders some choice bands of these honored fathers, who, from their peaceful solitudes and the laborious fields of their missionary toils, invoke and obtain the benedictions of Heaven on thy sons ! Happy art thou to have thy loveliest mountains crowned with colleges of the Institute of Jesus, which, like blazing beacons, illumine the path of thy pilgrims, and shed abroad upon the hearts of thy children the light of truth and the fervor of virtue !

In our next Review we propose to take up and consider the more serious of the charges which are commonly urged against the Society of Jesus, in reply to the infamous work, *The Jesuits*, by Messrs. Michelet and Quinet, recently translated and published among us by that literary charlatan, Charles Edwards Lester, — a man who will, no doubt, ere long, sink to his native level.*

* Since the above was written, we have read with considerable interest and pleasure an article entitled *The Jesuits*, in the *Southern Quarterly Review* for January last. The article is written with ability, and, considering it is by a Protestant, with a good deal of fairness. The writer, however, falls into some errors of fact and speculation, which we may notice when we come to consider the charges preferred against the Jesuits. The same number of the *Review* also speaks at some length of the Jesuits, in a scorching criticism of the *Wandering Jew*, by Eugene Sue. We thank this able periodical for its earnest denunciation of the work of the French

ART. IV. — *The Constitution of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, containing the Confession of Faith, the Catechisms, and the Directory for the Worship of God; together with the Plan of Government and Discipline, as ratified by the General Assembly at their Sessions in May, 1821, and amended in 1833.* Philadelphia. Haswell & Co. 1838.

A REVIEW of the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church, confined chiefly to its confession of faith, may not present that degree of interest or attraction which might be found in that of some of the *new works* which are daily poured upon our book-devouring community; but it has seemed to us that it might, nevertheless, be highly useful, inasmuch as it will give us an opportunity of showing the venom of error at its fountain-head, and of exposing in a strong light the frail fabric of Protestantism, by laying bare the weakness and instability of its foundations. Even on the score of novelty, the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church may, after all, not be devoid of interest. It is true, its substance is old, we might add antiquated, made up, as it is, from shreds taken from Calvin, Knox, and others; but Presbyterians, as Protestants in general, can always affix a character of novelty to their church constitutions and doctrinal opinions, for they hold it to be the inalienable privilege of freemen to change their articles of faith and methods of church government so as to suit the times and follow the *onward march of mind*. Hence, the editors of the work before us are very particular in stating all the improvements, modifications, amendments, corrections, additions, and subtractions, which the said Constitution underwent at the period of its publication; and we find on the title-page a solemn declaration of a committee of Presbyterian divines, that the present edition “is a correct and authentic copy of said Constitution, as *amended*, ratified, and in force at the present date” (1834). As the Constitution of the

novelist, a work which no person should touch for any other purpose than to commit it to the flames. We are glad to see that the American press is beginning to wake up to its infamy, and to denounce it in terms not wholly inappropriate; for it is a work that aims at the destruction of every domestic and social virtue. We have been silent, because we presumed no Catholic would read it, and because our denunciation of it would not have been regarded by our Protestant countrymen.

Presbyterian Church changes, very much like the Paris and London fashions, it is probable that there is one more recent than this now before us ; but this must suffice for our present purpose, and the more so, because it is the one adopted by both the *Old School* and the *New School* Presbyterians before their schism in 1837.

Some may think that it is altogether useless to discuss the inconsistencies and errors of the Presbyterian Constitution, and that any attempt at argument against them would be only time and labor lost, since Presbyterians and Calvinists, from their intense hatred to every thing Catholic, seem to be inaccessible to reason and argument, when presented by Catholics ; and we confess that this to a great extent is true, and has almost decided us to desist from our present ungrateful undertaking. We know there is a sin for which St. John said, "*Non pro illo dico, ut roget quis*" ; we know there is a spiritual pride which renders men as headstrong and insensible as old Satan himself ; and we fear that no small portion of it has fallen to the lot of the followers of the sour, morose, selfish, hating, and hateful Calvin. Still, the fear that some may not profit by the truth is no good reason for concealing it, or for refusing to advocate and support it by arguments. The ways of God are mysterious, and he can, even from stones, raise up children to Abraham. Moreover, had we no other reason for undertaking a review of the Presbyterian Church Constitution and Confession of Faith than a simple sense of justice to ourselves, it would be amply sufficient. The Calvinistic pulpits and press resound with hardly any thing but declamatory and incendiary invectives against the Catholic Church. The General Assembly never meets, without appointing a preacher to deliver, *ex officio*, a solemn address against Catholicity, and it has been customary for it to proclaim hypocritical fasts for the downfall of *Popery*. This propagandism against us may be met with everywhere, not only in the pulpit and lecture-room, but even in the railroad-car and the steamboat, where, orally or by tracts, the most insipid and absurd tales against our institutions and people are circulated. The virulence of this Calvinistic opposition to Catholicity shows itself chiefly in the Presbyterian newspaper press. It is there — we are sorry it has been our duty to look into such disgusting trash — Calvin still disgorges, in filthy streams, the venom and rancor with which his disappointed ambition and revengeful pride filled him. These attacks, constantly repeated,

demand always a new resistance. This unholy warfare against the true Church we must try to put down, — not by calumny, insult, vituperation, and the like, but by solid argument, by discussions based on sound logic, by the exhibition of that brilliant aureola of sanctity, unity, miracles, and other irresistible evidences which must for ever encircle the brows of truth ; and by unravelling the contradictions, inconsistencies, paralogisms, sophisms, misrepresentations, and other tortuous arguments, which must always form the hideous train of error.

Nothing appears to us more likely to effect this end than the critical examination and discussion of the formularies which the most numerous sect of Protestants present us, as containing the foundations of that religious system which they would substitute for the dogmas, doctrines, and government of the Catholic Church, with their reasons for rejecting the latter and embracing the former. We propose, therefore, in what follows, to discuss the plan of religious doctrines and ecclesiastical government, as understood by Presbyterians. We shall confine ourselves chiefly to the *Confession of Faith*, the first and most important piece in the work we have quoted, that from which all the rest is deduced, and on which the whole fabric of Presbyterianism rests.

Before entering upon our main subject, it may be well to premise, that, if but one point of doctrine contained in a confession of faith be unfounded, and unsupported by any motive of belief, — much more, if but one point be evidently false and reprobated by Scripture, good sense, and whatever else must serve as the vouchers of the truth, — it follows, immediately and inevitably, that the Confession is an imposition, the work of men who either were deceived or meant to deceive, and that the church or society admitting it as its standard of belief is not the Church of Christ, or the true Church ; for a religion that contains one plain falsehood is not a religion of heaven, but of men, rather of Satan himself ; since a confession of faith in which there is one error can have no ground for admitting firmly any of the articles it may contain. Any society proposing such a confession betrays its human origin. No matter what good things may be found in such a symbol or formulary of faith, it is deprived of the seal of Heaven, which is incompatible with the least error ; and the society imposing it on its members is only a human, not a divinely constituted society, — therefore, not the society founded by Christ, and consequently not the Church of Christ. If not the Church of

Christ, then not that society in which salvation is to be found. This is only the expression of reason and common sense. All Christians, for instance, agree, that, if *one* error were found in the Bible, the Bible could not be the work of God. So, also, if a church enjoin any one article of faith which is a falsehood, it is not and cannot be the Church of Christ. Thus, the Catholic Church would consider *all* her titles to divinity and truth forfeited, if a single error had crept into her creeds, and formed one, even the least, of her articles of faith. But if only one error professed by a religious society destroys all its titles, what shall we say, if the confession, instead of containing only one error, contains scarcely a single truth, and is nothing but a tissue of false reasoning, unwarranted assertions, palpable contradictions, wilful misrepresentations, and gross corruptions of the word of God and divine traditions? This last is the fact with regard to the Confession of Faith now under consideration; and we trust to make good to every unprejudiced mind, before we close, that it has no other support than that of the authority of the prince of that empire where no order but "everlasting horror dwelleth."

Still further, as preliminary to our main design, it will not be amiss to state summarily the history of the introduction of the Presbyterian Confession into the world. During the civil anarchy in which ended the reign of the unfortunate Charles the First, the Scotch Presbyterians; having obtained a decided ascendancy, there was convened by order of parliament an assembly of divines, who for many years held theological sessions at Westminster, and, with a view to obtaining a "thorough godly reformation," concocted there that precious code of doctrine, government, and discipline, which was to unfetter the whole world, and carry out fairly the principles of the glorious Reformation, which had almost sunk under the mitigated *Papism* of Elizabeth and James the First. It belongs to the history of England to record the disputes, quarrels, tricks, frauds, and various manipulations which characterized the sittings of these divines; but, after a protracted and stormy discussion, at last came out the Confession of Faith, and other formularies of Presbyterian orthodoxy, which received, in 1649, the full sanction of the parliament of England, — the great judge of English Protestant controversies.

The confession of faith given by the Westminster divines, and hence often called the *Westminster Confession*, is nearly the same with the Scotch confession of faith which appeared

in 1560. The immediate lineage of the Presbyterians from the goodly Calvin thus clearly appears; for John Knox, whom the Presbyterians represent as having "lighted his torch at the candle of God's word," was the friend and pupil of Calvin, and he was the master spirit who, through *fas et nefas*, introduced the Reformation into Scotland, and determined its confession. Of the character of this apostate priest it is not necessary to speak; for, if it be a disgrace to humanity to have produced a Nero or a Robespierre, Presbyterianism is not to be envied the glory of having produced a John Knox.

The confession of faith framed by the Westminster divines is the standard of the various hues of Presbyterians found in the United States, — the *Old School* Presbyterians, who perhaps justly claim the unenviable privilege of being the true, lawful, and uncompromising children and successors of Calvin and John Knox, the *New School* Presbyterians, the *Associate Presbyterians*, the *Associate Reformed Church*, and the *Cumberland Presbyterians*. It is also implicitly, if not explicitly, the confession of faith of the *Congregationalists* and of the *Dutch Reformed*, who are strong Calvinists in doctrine. The population adhering to it the world over may, perhaps, be set down at about fifteen millions; the Catholic population over the whole globe, we may add by the way, is not much below two hundred millions.

The Confession opens with a chapter on the "Holy Scriptures," no doubt to make the doctrine given in that chapter the foundation of what is to follow. But the subject of the authority of Scripture is beset with insuperable difficulties for Protestants; and although they continually boast of following the Scriptures, although they wish to have the name of receiving the Bible above all men, and of making the Bible a voucher for all they say, still it is impossible for them, on their own principles, to come at any thing positive concerning its authority. They cannot prove its inspiration; so, with all their pretended respect for it, they have undermined its authority, and are compelled, on their own principles, to view it merely as a human book which may be correct on the whole, but only after the manner of other human books written on human subjects by judicious authors.

We begin with the first paragraph of this chapter, which runs thus: —

"Although the light of nature, and the works of creation and

providence do so far manifest the goodness, wisdom, and power of God as to leave men inexcusable, yet they are not sufficient to give that knowledge of God, and of his will, which is necessary unto salvation; therefore it pleased the Lord, at sundry times and in divers manners, to reveal himself, and to declare that his will unto his Church; and afterwards, for the better preserving and propagating of the truth, and for the more sure establishment and comfort of the Church against the corruption of the flesh and the malice of Satan and of the world, to commit the same *wholly* unto writing, which maketh the Holy Scripture to be *most necessary*; those former ways of God's revealing his will unto his people being now ceased."

The doctrine laid down in this paragraph it is then attempted to support by arguments; but what kind of argument can be given in an introduction to the belief of Scripture, and in support of its authority? Common sense tells us that it cannot be Scripture itself; else, one might as well quote the authority of the Koran to prove the Koran, and the forger of a will might adduce the very will itself as a proof of its genuineness. Yet, notwithstanding this plain dictate of common sense, the framers of the Confession quote Scripture all at once, and thus open the way to that long string of false, inconsistent, and absurd proofs with which the book abounds. The plainest rules of logic seem to have been quite beyond the reach of these powerful geniuses. Faith must be reasonable,—that is, founded on reasonable motives, or motives capable of forcing the assent of a judicious mind; for if not, it becomes fanaticism, superstition, credulity, downright nonsense. It is this reasonableness of motives which makes the distinction between Christianity and Mahometanism or paganism.

But waiving this want of logical strictness and propriety, and taking up the Scripture proofs adduced, we shall find that the Scripture says nothing at all of what it is made to say. We select from the passage quoted the three following propositions which it contains, and which we maintain are unsupported by Scripture, utterly false, and even contradicted by others in the same passage. 1. That what the Lord revealed at sundry times and in divers manners *was committed wholly to writing*. 2. That this makes the Holy Scripture *most necessary*. 3. That the former ways of God's revealing his will unto his people *are now ceased*.

1. The first position assumed, that "it pleased the Lord to

commit the same (that which he had revealed at sundry times, and in divers manners) *wholly* unto writing," is attempted to be proved by the following Scriptural quotations, which we scrupulously transcribe.

"Luke i. 3, 4. It seemed good to me also, having had perfect understanding of all things from the very first, to write unto thee in order, most excellent Theophilus, that thou mightest know the certainty of those things wherein thou hast been instructed. Rom. xv. 4. For whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning; that we, through patience and comfort of the Scriptures, might have hope. Isaiah, viii. 20. To the law and to the testimony: if they speak not according to this word, *it is* because *there is* no light in them. Rev. xxii. 18."

Now, we ask, is there any thing in those passages to prove the peculiar position assumed in the text, namely, that the revelations of God were committed *wholly* unto writing? These quotations suppose that things were written, and written for our instruction and comfort; but where is the passage proving that *all* was written? There is none; and hence these quotations are nothing more than a vain display of Scriptural erudition, or rather, a petty theological trick, and dialectical sleight of hand, by which evidence is brought for only a *portion* of a proposition, and still the *whole* proposition is confidently asserted. As if one were to say, *Something* was written, therefore *all* was written; which is a form of argument too obviously false to need refutation.

We will, however, go rapidly over these texts, and show that they have no bearing on the question. The last, from Revelations, or the Apocalypse, xxii. 18, is not expressly cited, which shows, perhaps, that little reliance is placed on it in support of the position assumed. The text is, "I testify to every one that heareth the words of the prophecy of this book; if any man shall add to these things, God shall add upon him the plagues written in this book." This reference, then, is intended to convey the impression, that, if any one adds any thing to Scripture, he will incur the wrath of God, and consequently that all has been written. But what an abuse of Scripture is not such an interpretation! For any reader that will take up this chapter will see that the meaning of the writer of the Apocalypse is, that no one should either add any thing to, or subtract any thing from, that Apocalypse, as is most obvious and expressly stated in the very passage. Here is, then, the queer argument used by the writers of the Con-

cession : St. John, at the conclusion of his Apocalypse, threatens with the vengeance of Heaven the one who shall either add to or subtract from his book, or the one who shall interpolate and corrupt his book ; therefore all things are written in Scripture !

The text taken from Isaias, — “ To the law and to the testimony : if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them, ” — is not more to the purpose. These words of the prophet have long been the cant of Scotch fanatics ; and this is strange enough ; for the “ testimony ” there mentioned naturally leads to the notion of *tradition*, which it is their great object to discard. Any one who will read the passage will find it somewhat obscure ; but the meaning which will present itself to his mind will be, that the prophet inveighs against those who consulted pythons and wizards, and exhorts them to have recourse rather to the law and to the testimony. But no powers of imagination can draw from it the conclusion that every thing is written, even that which was revealed by Christ ; for Isaias speaks of a law written hundreds of years before Christ.

The text from St. Paul to the Romans says merely, that what was written was written for our learning ; but it does not say that the *whole* of God’s revelation was committed to writing. In fine, the passage from St. Luke is brought forward with no better grace. The passage states, that the writer, after having received full information from eyewitnesses, wrote for the purpose of giving to Theophilus a full certainty in regard to the matters of which he wrote. But it does not say that he wrote *all* that was revealed. It is true, the passage states that the writer had “ perfect understanding of all things from the very first, ” and, without entering into a discussion as to the propriety of the translation used by Protestants, we say, it is perfectly evident St. Luke does not mean that he wrote absolutely every thing which Christ did or taught ; for if so, he would have been guilty of a barefaced lie, in the very first line of his Gospel, since St. Matthew, St. Mark, and St. John say a great many things which he does not record ; therefore he must mean merely that he was fully informed of all the things which he wrote about. Now, we hope, all can see the difference between the assertion, I vouch for the truth of *every thing* I write, and this other assertion, I write with truth *every thing* that can be written upon the subject. These remarks show, with absolute evidence, that none of the texts

adduced by the Presbyterian Confession of Faith prove that the revelations of God were committed wholly unto writing. This is sufficient to prove to the Presbyterians that their tenets are totally ungrounded, that their faith has no foundation, and that they believe without any motive or reason capable of making any impression on a reasonable man. But their doctrine is not only purely gratuitous ; we can even prove, by the most obvious arguments, that it is absolutely false, and clearly at variance with Scripture itself and with common sense.

St. John concludes his Gospel with the following declaration: — “ There are also many other things which Jesus did, which if they were written every one, the world itself, I think, would not be able to contain the books that should be written.” Who, in the face of this declaration, will dare assert that every thing is written ? Here, as a manifest proof that it never was the plan of Divine Providence that all should be written, the Evangelist closes his account with the avowal, that he knows many things more that Christ did, many more words that he uttered, and many more examples that he gave, than he commits to writing. The same Apostle concludes his two last Epistles with a declaration which seems to have been written purposely to contradict the assertion of Presbyterians. “ Having many things to write unto you, I would not by paper and ink ; for I hope that I shall be with you, and speak face to face.” The Apostle had many things to write, and consequently these things were necessary, or at least useful, and still he declines writing them. Who will, in the face of this declaration, maintain that every thing pertaining to the revelation of God is written ? Again, St. Paul, no doubt, made important regulations concerning the Lord’s Supper, as he asserts in those words, — “ The rest I will set in order when I come.” — 1 Cor. xi. 34. Can Presbyterians point out the place where these regulations are found ? Furthermore, the same Apostle, writing to the Thessalonians, tells them, — “ Remember you not, that, when I was yet with you, I told you these things ? and now you know what withholdeth, that he may be revealed in his time.” — 2 Thess. ii. 5, 6. The Thessalonians, then, had learned *orally* from St Paul, and knew what withheld Antichrist. What is that thing ? Is it written anywhere ? There is, then, a revelation which certainly was not committed to writing.

The first chapter of the Acts of the Apostles expressly states that Jesus Christ employed the forty days which elapsed between his resurrection and ascension in teaching his Apostles,

— “for forty days appearing to them, and speaking of the kingdom of God.”—verse 3. And now where are those heavenly instructions given by Christ, now risen from the dead, to his Apostles, who were now, in a great measure, freed from that carnal sense and those grovelling ideas which had besotted their hearts during their former intercourse with him? Those instructions which lasted forty days take up only a few lines in the Scriptures; whereas, the discourse of our Lord on the eve of his death, a discourse which could have lasted but a few hours, takes up five chapters. No doubt, these discourses for forty days were of the greatest importance, since the sacred writer says they related to the *kingdom of God*; and who can doubt but that the necessity of giving those instructions was one of the great objects of the stay of the man-God among mortals? Scarcely any thing of these discourses is written; not that the Apostles had forgotten them, but because it was not deemed proper to write them. This fact, taken in connection with another, shows how absurd and untenable is the Protestant theory about the sufficiency of Scripture. History represents to us the Christian Church springing from its cradle with dogmas, rites, practices, fasts, feasts, sacraments; and yet there is no direct mention of many of those things in Scripture, at most only a remote or obscure allusion to a few. Who, then, can resist the conclusion, that the Apostles received upon those points instructions which they delivered orally, and which they *wrote*, not with ink on paper or parchment, but in a more substantial, imperishable, and authentic way, in the habits and practice of the faithful? Many things, in particular concerning the sacred rites of divine institution which we call Sacraments, are not mentioned in Scripture; but such rites were unquestionably written in the practice and habits of Christians; which was a safer way to propagate them than writing them in a book, especially as the latter way had many inconveniences, since the pagans should not be allowed a free access to those peculiar rites which they would understand but imperfectly from a book, and which they would disfigure; and hence we find, in the very first ages of Christianity, frequent allusions to the fact of the rites and mysteries of Christians being made a subject of secrecy, so as to conceal them from the knowledge of the pagans. And this law of secrecy, which history proves most clearly, was nothing but the continuation of the plan alluded to in the Scriptures themselves, — not to write every thing, but to transmit much by the belief, practice, and habits of the Christian people.

To descend to particulars corroborating these general remarks, we ask, where is it written that children can be validly and lawfully baptized? Where is it written that immersion is not necessary in baptism, and that aspersion and infusion are lawful modes of administering that sacred rite? Where is it written that the Sacraments of the Church are validly administered by sinners, and by wicked ministers? We say, it is written nowhere in Scripture. But all this was written in the practice of the Christian Church, and hence is admitted not only by Catholics, but by Presbyterians also. A proof that these points are not clearly set down in Scripture is, that the largest body, perhaps, of Protestants in the United States, the Baptists, deny the validity of baptism conferred on children, or on adults by infusion. We know, too, that laymen can administer baptism validly; and though Presbyterians deny it, they show only their inconsistency, or their *heresy*, — a word which means *choice*; for among traditions they choose those which suit them, and reject the others. But as the traditions all stand on the same ground, they should either be admitted in their totality, or rejected in their totality. Furthermore, how do we know that baptism can be administered but once? By tradition alone. For if one says that Scripture does not order its reiteration, it is equally certain that neither does it forbid it. And hence, at most, we could only conclude that the Scripture says nothing about it; and then something held as true and essential by Presbyterians themselves is not written in Scripture; and then the assertion, that all the doctrine of Christ is written, goes by the board. Scripture says not that baptism conferred by a layman is null; still, Presbyterians hold it null, against the tradition of the Church. Scripture says nothing about the repetition of baptism, and Presbyterians hold, with the tradition of the Church, that it cannot be repeated, — a good exemplification of that spirit of contradiction by which they admit just enough of tradition on some points to put a whip into the hands of their opponents, while they reject it on others.

We have mentioned several points about which the Scriptures say nothing, though the Presbyterians themselves hold them to be revealed. But we are far from having exhausted the list of those points which were revealed, but which were not written in the Scriptures. To mention a very striking example, we find it written in Scripture that it is forbidden to eat blood and things strangled. “It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, to lay no further burden upon you than these

necessary things ; that you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication." — Acts xv. 28, 29. Here, then, the Scripture, or the Holy Ghost, declares it a *necessary* thing to abstain from blood ; and still, all Christians, from time immemorial, have held it a thing lawful to eat blood or things strangled, and we have no doubt but the strictest Presbyterian would make no scruple to eat blood-pudding, if he relished it. Where is it written, we ask, that this prohibition to eat blood was to cease ? Where is the passage of Scripture that says, that after a certain time required to *bury the synagogue with due honor*, as theologians say, — that is, after there would be no danger of scandalizing the Jews, to whom blood and strangled things were an abomination, — the eating of blood and of strangled things would become a thing indifferent in its nature, and consequently lawful ? The assumption, then, that every thing is written in Scripture, is evidently unwarranted.

Again, what part of Scripture declares that the washing of feet prescribed by our Lord, in St. John xiii., is only of a spiritual nature ? " If I, then, being Lord and Master, have washed your feet, you also ought to wash one another's feet. For I have given you an example, that, as I have done to you, so you do also." Hence, among the thousand and one Protestant sects which have arisen since Luther, we have one taking the modest title of " Church of God," though its existence is not of an earlier date than 1820, that believes firmly in *feet-washing*. " She believes that the ordinance of feet-washing, that is, the literal washing of the saints' feet, according to the word and example of Christ, is obligatory upon all Christians, and ought to be observed by all the Churches of God."* These sectarians are unquestionably right, if we have Scripture only for the rule of faith ; for no text more positive could be brought forward to prescribe feet-washing ; but the Apostles who were present, and knew what our Lord said better than we can, wrote, not in a book, but in the practice, and rites, and habits of the churches they founded, that this washing was spiritual ; and hence we know with equal certainty that this washing is a spiritual one, and that all is not recorded in Scripture that Christ revealed to his Apostles. To obtain another clear instance of the silence of the Scriptures on many points which were revealed and known at first, we have only to read

* *History of the Religious Denominations in the United States*, p. 180.

the two genealogies of Christ, the one in St. Matthew, and the other in St. Luke. The reader of Scripture will be in a real dilemma as to the meaning and agreement of these genealogies; and the fact is, that they have exhausted the ingenuity of commentators. The commentators propose many solutions of the difficulty; but with the avowed conviction, that it is impossible to tell which is the true one. Now a few words, added to either, or both, of these genealogies, would have cleared up for us the whole difficulty. But these words were not added, because the thing was clear at the time the genealogies were written, when all the circumstances of time, place, and persons were fully understood. The loss of these circumstances has rendered the enigma insolvable, — an evident proof that all was not written.

But on no subject does it more clearly appear that the Almighty never intended that all things pertaining to religion should be written in the Scriptures, than by their complete silence on the Christian festivals. That these festivals are essential to religion is sufficiently obvious to all from reason alone, and is admitted, at least for the celebration of Sunday, by all shades of Presbyterians. The conduct of God in relation to the chosen people, who had so many festivals commemorative of the great events of his mercy to them, together with the historical documents of the early Christian Church, must convince every one who is not determined to be a skeptic, that Christ left powers and orders to the Apostles and to the Church to institute feasts and anniversaries, so that, besides Sunday, there have always been in the Church other festivals, such as the commemoration of the death of Christ by humiliation and fast, the anniversary of his resurrection, or Easter, of the descent of the Holy Ghost, &c. Now, where is mention made in Scripture of these festivals, including the weekly festival, Sunday? Nowhere. We find, indeed, express mention made of the *abolition* of the Jewish Sabbath. St. Paul solemnly declared that Jewish festivals, new moons, and Sabbaths were all gone. "Let no man judge you in meat, or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the Sabbaths." — Colos. ii. 16. But we see nowhere that Sunday was to replace the Judaical Sabbath, or Saturday. *Allusions* to Sunday are found in the Scripture, it is true; but Scriptural allusions prove nothing, unless interpreted by tradition. The fact, that there are only *allusions*, which prove nothing when detached from tradition, shows that it never was

intended that all the Christian doctrine and practice should be committed to writing. But there is no allusion to the Christian fast of Lent, or to the Christian Easter, and other Christian festivals; nevertheless, who can reasonably deny their institution and observance in the very time of the Apostles, when he reads in authentic history, that Polycarp, who had long lived and conversed with the Apostle St. John, went from a remote province of the East to Rome, for the purpose of conferring with the bishop of that city, the successor of Peter, not indeed upon the keeping of Easter, which was instituted both in the East and the West, but upon the particular and *proper* day at which Easter should be kept, — a question which was partly astronomical? * Who can doubt that the festivals kept in memory of the principal events of Christ's life were either appointed formally by the Apostles, or at least instituted in conformity with their teaching and practice? Let us take Christmas as an example. This day is not spoken of in the Gospel. Still it is kept by the Christian world on the 25th of December. It is true that Presbyterians reject this as unscriptural, and we read there was at one time a fine of five shillings, in Massachusetts, on every one who kept Christmas. But this only shows the folly of rejecting every thing not found in Scripture. What does it matter whether we find it written on paper, that Christ was born on a certain day of December, and that Christians ought to keep that day as one of joy and gratitude, or whether we find the same written in the practice and the customs of a whole people? The latter is by far the most substantial way of transmitting the event. What does it signify, for instance, that the Constitution of the United States does not mention that George Washington was born on the 22d of February? Every one knows this to be a fact, from the festivities usual on that day; and to one who now would venture to deny this fact, on the ground that the Constitution does not mention it, no answer would need to be returned. No one, then, can doubt that Christians have always kept, and should keep, days in commemoration of Christ's birth, death, and resurrection. † The fact, that noth-

* Hier. De Script. Eccles.

† The *Martyrology* for the 25th of December has the following account. "In Nicomedia, the martyrdom of several thousand Christians, who, being assembled on Christmas day to celebrate the holy mysteries, were shut up in the church by order of the Emperor Diocletian, who caused a fire to be kindled all around, and a stand with a censor to be

ing is said of such festivals in Scripture, shows, then, that the Scriptures were never intended to record every thing.

In fine, the most irrefragable argument that all is not written in Scripture, is that the canon, or list of Scripture books, is nowhere given in Scripture, so that it is impossible for Presbyterians to prove their inspiration and divinity. But more of this hereafter, when the Confession brings this subject more directly before us. We will not, however, dismiss this subject without quoting the positive testimonies of Scripture to show that all was not written, but much left to be transmitted by tradition. St. Paul writes to the Thessalonians, 2 Thes. ii. 15, — “Therefore, brethren, stand firm, and hold the traditions which you have learned, whether *by word*, or by our epistles.” No clearer statement of our doctrine can be imagined. If any should object that what is here called tradition *by word* was afterwards written in the other Epistles of St. Paul, because this to the Thessalonians was among the first he wrote, we would ask, where is the date of the Epistle to the Thessalonians written? It is written nowhere, and certainly not in the Scripture. But where does the Apostle say that he will on some other occasion write those discourses, or *traditions by word*, which he commands them to keep? This silly objection, however, will not apply to the Second Epistle of St. Paul to Timothy, the one which he wrote a short time before his martyrdom, and the same in which (iv. 6) he says that he is ready for sacrifice, and that the time of his dissolution is at hand. Now in that Epistle he charges his disciple in the following words: — “The things which thou hast heard from me, before many witnesses, the same commend to faithful men who shall be fit to teach others also.” Here the Apostle alludes, not to what he has

placed before the door, whilst a herald cried out with a loud voice, that all those who wished to save themselves from the fire should come out and offer incense to Jupiter; they all answered, that they preferred dying for Christ, and, the fire being kindled, they were all consumed in it, and thus deserved to be born in heaven that day that Christ was born on earth for the salvation of the world.” Here the reflection forces itself irresistibly upon the mind, — we must believe witnesses who die for what they assert. The death of those thousand Christians on Christmas day will render Christmas dear to us, although Presbyterians would impose fines on us for keeping it, as unscriptural; though a plain and unprejudiced man will conclude that if any refuse to commemorate the birth, death, and resurrection of Christ, such do not acknowledge Christ as their father.

written, but to what he has *said*, and which Timothy had *heard* before many witnesses ; and he directs Timothy, not merely to *write* the same, but to *intrust* and *commend* it to others, who will be fit to teach others ;— thus establishing a tradition of holy doctrine quite distinct from Scripture. Here it is evidently asserted, that St. Paul had taught Timothy, that Timothy was to teach faithful men, and these faithful men, other men. Thus is the Christian doctrine transmitted ; and it is transmitted in all its purity through these successive teachings, because the Holy Ghost is promised to the body of pastors who teach in the Church. The same Epistle, i. 13, 14, has the following no less conclusive passage, containing also a promise of the Holy Ghost to watch over the sacred deposit of holy doctrine intrusted to pastors : — “ Hold the form of sound *words* which thou hast heard from me in faith, and in the love which is in Christ Jesus. Keep the good deposited in trust to thee by the Holy Ghost who dwelleth in us.” Here the Apostle charges him to keep, not writings, but words, — not what he has read, but what he has *heard* ; and the Holy Ghost is said to dwell in us to accomplish this holy purpose. We could easily add numerous and evident testimonies of all Christian antiquity, to show that all was not written in the Scripture ; but we think we have dwelt enough upon this first false assertion of the first article of the Confession, and have shown sufficiently that Presbyterians fail in proving their position, that the whole revelation of God was committed to writing, and that the contrary assertion is incontrovertibly established by every sort of positive and conclusive argument.

2. But it is time to pass to the second assertion we have taken exception to, namely, that the Scriptures are *most necessary* ; and we begin by discussing the proofs of this necessity adduced by the Confession, which we transcribe in full.

“ 2 Tim. iii. 15. And that from a child thou hast known the Holy Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation, through faith which is in Christ Jesus. 2 Pet. i. 19. We have also a more sure word of prophecy ; whereunto ye do well that ye take heed, as unto a light that shineth in a dark place, until the day dawn and the day-star arise in your hearts.”

Here are, then, the mighty, the all-convincing proofs of the absolute necessity of Scripture, which our Presbyterians adduce. The Presbyterians must count largely on the simplicity of the readers of the Confession, to have the courage to

offer them such proofs as these. As for ourselves, we can of course only smile at them. To begin with the text of St. Paul to Timothy ; what is there in that passage that has any the least bearing on the *necessity* of Scripture ? No doubt the Presbyterians mean in their Confession, that, if any Scripture be most necessary, it is the New Testament. But this passage speaks of the Old Testament only ; for the Old Testament was the only Scripture Timothy could have learned in his childhood, since it was the only one which was then in existence. This passage, therefore, could not in any manner prove the necessity of the New Testament. But it does not, in the least, prove the necessity of even the Old. It contains not one word about the *necessity* of the Scriptures. From the fact, that Timothy had known the Sacred Scriptures from his infancy, we can no more conclude that the Scriptures are necessary, than we can conclude that Latin or Greek are necessary because we have known them from our childhood. It is said in the text, that the Scriptures are *able* to make one wise ; but if we are to draw any conclusion from this, it is not that the Scriptures are necessary, but useful. If I say that mathematics are *able* to sharpen one's intellect and judgment, I imply, that there are other methods besides mathematics, and that mathematics are not absolutely necessary.

The text from St. Peter is equally defective as a proof of the necessity of Scripture. St. Peter is speaking of the prophecies of the Old Testament, and if what he says proves the necessity of any Scripture, it is that of the prophecies of the Old Testament, and of nothing more. But the Apostle says nowhere that the prophecies even are necessary ; he simply says that they are a firm and sure word. He adds, that Christians do *WELL* to attend, but does not say that it is *most necessary* that they should attend, to this word of prophecy. Hence, these proofs of the necessity of Scripture are totally unworthy a serious refutation, and prove only one thing, that the compilers of the Confession considered it their duty, by means of Scripture texts, to throw dust into the eyes of their readers. They would, doubtless, have brought forward better proofs, if they had had them to bring ; and we need no better evidence that it is impossible for Presbyterians to make up a confession of faith from the Scriptures alone, than these *pretended* Scriptural proofs themselves.

Having shown that there is no Scripture proof of the *necessity* of Scripture, we will now go farther, and prove by very

conclusive arguments that the Scriptures are *not* absolutely necessary ; for true religion was for a long time preserved and propagated without them, and the teaching of the pastors of the Church is adequate to preserve and propagate the religion of Christ, even independently of them. The Scriptures were not given to supersede this teaching of the pastors, but chiefly to afford them a greater facility in the discharge of their trust. The teaching of the pastors may suffice without Scripture, but the Scriptures cannot suffice without that teaching.

The assertion, that the Scriptures are most necessary, is at variance with two indisputable facts : — 1. That God never left the world without the true religion ; and 2. That he did leave it without any Scriptures at all for over two thousand years, namely, from Adam to Moses. Adam, Noe, and many in the time of Noe, of whom St. Peter speaks (1 St. Pet. iii. 20), Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Melchisedech, and innumerable others, followed the true religion, were acceptable in the eyes of God, and obtained salvation, and yet they had no Scripture. But as they had a revealed religion, we must conclude that even a revealed religion can be propagated without Scripture. That they had a revealed religion, we know from positive facts, and it may be collected from the very text of the Confession already quoted, where, on a new perusal, the reader will find it stated that reason alone cannot give that knowledge of God which is necessary unto salvation. If those men — as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who are certainly of the number of the elect, since God calls himself the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob — obtained salvation, and salvation cannot be obtained by the light of nature or of reason alone, they must have had the light of revelation ; and since they had not Scripture, Scripture cannot be “most necessary.” So that we find on this point a plain contradiction in the very first article of the Presbyterian Confession, and this first contradiction is speedily followed by another, in which Scripture is stated to be, on the one hand, *most necessary*, and, on the other, to have been resorted to, only as the means of “*better* preserving and propagating the truth ! ”

The truths which were preserved and propagated during more than two thousand years anterior to the law of Moses were both very numerous and very important. The unity of God, supreme arbiter and creator of all things, formed the first and most important of these truths. Then came the attributes of God, which were known during that period, as

will appear to those who read Genesis ; then the creation of man to the image and likeness of God ; the fall of man and original sin, which was known from the history of the human race, and is alluded to by holy Job ; also, the immortality of the soul, which must have been revealed, since we find it established and believed everywhere ; and certainly, after the fall of Adam, man could not know by reason alone that he was immortal. Another point revealed, and not written, was the redemption of man, and the promise of a Redeemer or Messiah. Another revelation still was that of the practice of offering sacrifices, and for the most part bloody sacrifices, which we find existing long before Moses. Also, long before any Scripture was written, God gave to Abraham and his posterity the precept of circumcision, which was faithfully transmitted for several centuries. We see, in fact, a complete system of religion, including important revealed truths, composed of dogmas and precepts, faithfully preserved without Scripture for more than two thousand years ; and it is therefore supremely absurd to assert, as a general proposition, that the Scriptures are "most necessary."

If the Scriptures are most necessary, the first thing the Apostles should have done, before separating to spread themselves over the world, would have been to compose them ; but every one at all conversant with history knows that this is precisely what they did not do. For many years the primitive Church was without the New Testament, and the different parts of that sacred volume were not all written at once, but on accidental occasions, as the circumstances of places and persons seemed to require ; precluding, therefore, the idea, that the Apostles intended to leave in their writings a complete system of religious instruction. We know that St. Thomas, the Apostle, went to the East long before the greater part of the New Testament had been written. Could he have left to the Christians in the East the Gospels and Epistles written in the West ? If the Scriptures are most necessary, the Apostles, by separating before having composed them, exposed themselves to the danger of leaving the nations they converted without that which, according to the Presbyterian Confession, was most necessary. Can we believe this ? The conduct of the Apostles, then, in respect to the composition of Scripture, shows conclusively that they did not deem Scripture to be most necessary, as Christianity could be, and actually was, established and propagated by the preaching of the

word, without it. Hence, St. Irenæus, who had almost conversed with St. John, and is more likely to know what the Apostles said and did than are the Presbyterians who met at Westminster sixteen hundred years after Christ, tells us that there were nations fully Christian, who nevertheless were without the Scriptures. "What!" says he, "even if the Apostles had left no Scriptures, should we not follow the order of tradition which they delivered to those with whom they intrusted the churches? A state of things found among many barbarous nations, who believe in Christ without paper or ink, but have salvation written in their hearts by the Holy Ghost, believing in one God, creator of all things through Jesus Christ his Son." *

It must be a matter of surprise, that the doctrine of the *necessity* of written, divine laws, or a written religion, should have found a foothold in countries like England and America, where there are so many unwritten laws by which the most common and important relations of life are governed more universally and effectually than by the ponderous volumes of the *written laws* composed every year at Washington and elsewhere. What is the *common law* which here and in England governs the most important transactions of life, but a law written originally only in the customs of our Saxon ancestors? How do we know that by marriage the husband becomes possessed of all the personal property of his wife? How do we know that husband and wife form but one person before the law? How do we know that parents are entitled to the earnings of their minor children? Or a thousand other very important features of our legislation, which become so apparent to us when we travel in other countries, where different customs obtain? We know all these things from the *common law*, which is called even by jurists themselves the "unwritten law." The common law is said to be "unwritten," because it never was the result of a written or printed legislation made by any prince or court of England; for it preceded every statute or written legislation, and it was written in the customs and habits of the people, before it was written in books. Hence, to the present day, no one can point out any code or legislative enactment by which those articles are found to have been introduced and become obligatory, but their existence is proved by the doctrine of jurists and by the decisions of courts; but

* Adv. Hæc., Lib. III., c. 3.

courts have no right to make laws ; and hence a recourse to their decision is nothing else than an appeal to a witness of a law made before. The state of English countries as to the common law is a good representation of the polity of the Christian Church as to divine and ecclesiastical laws, and their enforcement. Courts of justice make their decisions from written laws or statutes, and unwritten laws or the *common law* ; so does the Church make her decisions from the whole word of God, both written on paper and parchment, and unwritten on parchment, but written in the practice and habits of the Christian people ; with this difference, however, that courts of justice are only a *human* authority, whereas the Christian court is one gifted with assistance from above. "I am with you all days to the end of ages." The similarity here indicated runs through another important feature of the two sorts of laws. The common law, although unwritten in its nature, is still written equivalently, because it has been a frequent matter of written discussion among jurists, and because the *cases decided* by courts are written. So also the points of the Christian doctrine, not written originally, are written equivalently in the works of the Fathers, and in the decisions of the Councils. We may conclude, then, that, if human laws can be preserved and have been preserved without writing, by human societies with the influence of nature and reason only, much more so can unwritten divine laws be preserved and kept faithfully with the supernatural influence of Heaven ; and therefore it is a glaring absurdity to make the Scriptures most necessary, and a still greater one to make them contain every thing, and to constitute each individual the judge of their meaning.

All Christian dogmas and precepts are *facts* which can be preserved and transmitted by testimony and tradition, as other facts ; hence, the fact, that America is a newly discovered continent, and since settled by Europeans, is plain and evident independently of any written account of the voyages of Columbus and others. All books might be destroyed, and this fact nevertheless be faithfully transmitted for centuries. But with regard to the divine and religious facts which constitute Christianity, there is a peculiarity which greatly facilitates their faithful transmission by tradition, and renders changes and alterations impossible. Those religious traditions are tangible and permanent practical facts. The fact of the newness of our continent has nothing practical ; but take a Christian tra-

ditionary dogma,—say, that laymen can baptize in case of necessity. This is a practical fact, because at all times there are and there have been cases where, recourse being impossible to the regularly appointed minister, and where, there being danger of death, laymen have performed this duty. No change, then, could occur in this fact, any more than in that other practical traditionary fact, that the day which we call Sunday is truly the weekly commemoration of Christ's resurrection. Religious traditions have another advantage, that of having been spread over a wider extent of country ; for, from the origin of Christianity, the whole world received this sacred deposit ; hence, if the tradition be found at very distant points, there is every evidence of its truth. Again, no tradition is kept with greater fidelity than the divine instructions which form that sacred deposit which Timothy was charged by the Apostle to keep so precious ; and as the importance of those traditions is greater than that of any other, innumerable persons would step forward to oppose any change that would be contemplated by innovators. The history of the Church is but one illustration of these remarks. Hence, tradition alone can preserve religion ; and if, humanly speaking, we could come to this conclusion, what an additional strength will it not receive from the positive assurance of Christ to be all days with the pastors of the Church to enable them to *teach* right, and with the faithful to enable them to *believe* right ! We must, then, conclude, that the assertion of the Presbyterians, that the Scriptures are most necessary, is not only unfounded, and left unproved by them, but is positively disproved by every kind of argument appropriate to the case. But if Scripture be not *most necessary*, what is it then ? It is most useful and most beneficial ; it is a sweet pledge of divine mercy ; it is a treasure of infinite value. Hence, no one has ever entertained a greater respect and a greater love for the Scriptures than the Catholic Church, and no one has ever shown a greater assiduity in meditating on the sacred writings than the Catholic clergy. This is not, however, at present, the point at issue ; and we pass to the third assertion contained in the first article of the Presbyterian Confession of Faith, that the "former ways of God's revealing his will unto his people are now ceased."

3. Presbyterians, then, gravely inform us that the former ways by which God revealed his will unto his people are now ceased. The assertion is not, perhaps, as clear as it might be,

but, as it is, what proof do they give of it? Perhaps the proof will throw some light on their meaning. What is, then, O learned divines! the proof of your assertion, that God ceases to reveal his will unto us as he did formerly? Here is the sole and whole ground of the assertion, as found in the Confession: — “Heb. i. 1, 2. God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in times past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the worlds.” We have read this passage over and over again, to ascertain what bearing it can have on the assertion. But we have racked our brains to no purpose. We can discover nothing leading at all to the learned conclusion of the Westminster divines. Truly there must be a peculiar logic for “Presbyterian heads”; and they should have appended it as a valuable and indispensable supplement to their Confession. God spoke in times past by the prophets; he has lately spoken to us by his Son; therefore the former ways of God’s revealing his will have now ceased. This is admirable. The following argument would be in keeping with it: John Calvin and Knox promulgated and established Presbyterianism; the Westminster divines improved it, talked, and wrote much about it; therefore modern Presbyterians have nothing more to say about it, and the best thing they can do is to shut their mouths altogether. If this conclusion be not contained in the premises, it nevertheless indicates their wisest policy; for the more they talk of Presbyterianism, the more do they expose its nakedness.

The peculiar absurdity of the proof adduced by Presbyterians is, that it implies that God, after our Lord had spoken and risen to heaven, ceased to reveal his will to men as formerly; which makes the Apostles themselves common men, and deprives them of the ability to use any of those “former ways” by which the prophets could reveal the will of God. This conclusion, fairly and fully accepted, destroys the inspiration of the New Testament; for it was written many years after “God had spoken by his Son.”

If we go to the very foundation of the assertion of the Presbyterian divines, we shall find it to be totally at variance with the text of Scripture they quote, and one which they were unwilling publicly to confess. The following is implicitly the course of reasoning which led them to the conclusion they adopted. We Presbyterians, of course, form the

true Church, the spouse of Christ, the saints of God. But we see among us no sign of a vivifying influence of heaven ; we see no extraordinary display of the power and mercy of God by signs and wonders ; we see no *miracles* performed among us, and dare not even dream of them ; we see among us no supernatural virtues, but every thing common, trivial, and worldly ; quarrelling about Scripture, uncertainty and doubt as to the most fundamental articles of Christianity, are the leading traits of our religious system ; we see the clergy sighing for “filthy lucre,” and making it the basis, the measure, and the end of their preaching, and the laity entertaining a profound contempt for the clergy ; we see in our Church no other unity than the privilege granted to each one to construct his creed differently from the others, — no other sanctity than that of cursing the Pope and hating every body, — no other apostolicity than a descent from Simon Magus through all the heretics that have disfigured the Church in the lapse of ages, — no other catholicity than the narrow limits of the General Assembly, annual or triennial, both confined to a very small corner of the globe ; we see among us nothing but human passions, worldly views, ambitious projects, Satanic pride, and hearty hating ; — and *therefore* we conclude that God’s former ways of revealing himself to his people have long since ceased. Certainly the conclusion is eminently and undeniably true, when confined to the Presbyterian Church, in which, assuredly, the former ways of God’s revealing his will unto men have ceased, long ceased, or, to speak more properly, have never existed. It is well to record this tardy avowal of Presbyterians ; for in it they concede that neither Luther, nor Calvin, nor the other innovators, had any *extraordinary* call from Heaven to reform the Church ; and as they had not the *ordinary* one, it follows necessarily that they were sent by nobody, and consequently that they were intruders, — a set of ambitious, proud, stubborn, and rebellious men, who stamped upon the very face of their enterprise a seal of condemnation and reprobation. “I did not send these prophets, yet they ran ; I have not spoken to them, yet they prophesied.” — Jer. xxiii. 21.

Not so with the Catholic Church ; she has kept, ever since the time of the Apostles, the marks of a supernatural influence and agency, — marks as extraordinary and miraculous, nay, much more remarkable, than those by which God revealed himself to men under the law of nature or the Jewish dispen-

sation. We do not pretend that she has received new revelations of articles of faith ; for this would suppose that Christ left his work imperfect, when founding the Church. But we maintain that Christ has not "left himself without testimony," — Acts xiv. 17, — even miraculous testimony, of his presence, and of his influence on her. This is no more than what is clearly promised to her. "I am with you all days." "These signs shall follow them that believe ; in my name they shall cast out devils." "Keep the good deposited in trust to thee by the Holy Ghost *who dwelleth in us.*" — 2 Tim. i. 14. It is true, there has been no Scripture added since the Apostles ; but the solemn decisions of the Church, chiefly in her general councils, have the same certainty as Scripture, though not inspired in the same way ; and hence, a great Pope, St. Gregory, said he received and revered the definitions of general councils as the four Gospels ; and so hath God spoken also through the last general council assembled in Trent ; indeed, it is nothing short of a miracle, that all those councils, and the latter in particular, have been admitted without a dissenting voice by so many millions of Christians, among whom are numbered so many eminent scholars and profound philosophers. Had the authority of those councils been merely human, they would have met with a very different fate. The heroic sanctity of so many of the children of the Church has been a perpetual miracle in her bosom. *The Lives of the Saints* are a proof of it, and it is only in her communion that such a book can be found. In fine, miracles and prophecies have always illustrated the Church, from the time of the Apostles. He who wishes to be satisfied of this has only to read the history of the Church, where at each page he will find proofs of celestial agency transcending the ordinary course of nature ; he will find that the prophets of the new law have been greater than those of the old, — that St. Augustine in England, St. Boniface in Germany, St. Francis, St. Dominic, St. Bernard, St. Francis Xavier, St. Ignatius, St. Francis Regis, St. Vincent of Paul, are, in point of miracles and other extraordinary effects of divine power, incomparably superior to Isaias, Jeremias, Jonas, and others who have written portions of the inspired volumes. As an incontestable proof of God's revealing himself by miracles in the Catholic Church, we merely mention that in every century since the rise of Protestantism many saints have been canonized. Now, according to the rules of the Roman court, no saint is publicly proposed to the veneration of the faithful,

unless at least three miracles be proved by evidence superior to every sort of objection. The objections which are stated against those miracles are far more severe, more precise, more subtle, than Protestants ever would think of. We admit, it is easy to laugh at the idea of miracles; but it is easy also to be an infidel; and we confidently assert that any one who will take the trouble of examining the authenticity of those miracles must admit them, or be an incorrigible skeptic.

So far we have disposed of the first article of the first chapter of the Presbyterian Confession of Faith, and have pointed out three gross errors which it contains, besides other minor contradictions. We are now ready to take up the second article, which runs thus:—

“Under the name of Holy Scripture, or the Word of God written, are now contained all the books of the Old and New Testament, which are these, Genesis Revelation, all which are given by inspiration of God, to be the rule of faith and life.”

We find in the notes the following Scriptural authority.

“Eph. ii. 20. And are built upon the foundation of the Apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner-stone. Rev. xxii. 18, 19. For I testify unto every man that heareth the words of the prophecy of this book, if any man shall add unto these things, God shall add unto him the plagues that are written in this book; and if any man shall take away from the words of the book of this prophecy, God shall take away his part out of the book of life, and out of the holy city, and from the things which are written in this book. 2 Tim. iii. 16. All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness.”

This second article is not less important than the first, nor less abundant in false proofs. It is an equally good specimen of Presbyterian logic. We pass over the assertion, that *Scripture is the rule of faith and life*; for we do not construe it as meaning the *sole* rule of faith and life,—a point which we shall have occasion hereafter to examine. The present article sets forth the inspiration and canon of Scripture, excluding, of course, from the canon some books, of which mention is made in the following article. Upon this important topic we unqualifiedly assert, that it is an utter impossibility for Protestants to establish that there are inspired books, and especially which they are.

But let us first examine the proofs adduced by the Confession of Faith. They are reduced to the following masterly enthymem. *We read in Scripture that Scripture is inspired ; therefore, the Scripture is inspired.* Now it so happens, that the first assertion is false in its generality ; but, admitting it to be true, the conclusion would still be gratuitous and unsupported. Admit, then, that the Scripture says that the Scripture is inspired ; what will this avail you, unless you know from some other quarter that the Scripture is infallible ? White paper will bear any thing. Is it enough to write at the beginning or end of a book, *Inspired by the Holy Spirit*, to make it so ? Then the book of Mahomet is inspired, and, to come nearer home, so also is the book of Mormon. Hence, unless there be some infallible authority, and some evident and irrefragable proof independent of Scripture, to establish the inspiration of Scripture, it is perfect folly to adduce Scripture as a proof of its own inspiration. For let it be carefully remarked that the inspiration of Scripture is not an *external*, but a *purely internal* fact ; consequently, not admissible on the same ground which would compel any man who is not a skeptic, even an infidel, to admit the *public* facts recorded in the Old and New Testaments, merely as points of authentic history. There is but one way in which the book of Scripture can prove itself inspired, and that is by exhibiting the great seal of Heaven, namely, miracles. Hence, if a Presbyterian, on taking his Bible, were to hear, not in his imagination, but in reality, a voice proceeding from the book itself, and telling him, *Every thing found here is given by the inspiration of God*, or if this book applied to a dead man by the one who inquires into its inspiration were to raise him to life, then might its authority be established from its intrinsic merits, but not otherwise ; or else any impostor, by writing that he is inspired, might compose Scripture.

But do the Scriptures in reality say that they are inspired ? The Presbyterians adduce three testimonies to prove it. The first asserts that we are built upon the foundation of the Apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ being the corner-stone. But how Presbyterians can conclude from this that Scripture is inspired is a mystery to us, and especially how they find in it the name of all the books inspired. This text, viewed in relation to the New Testament, with which we are more particularly concerned, would support the assertion of Presbyterians only on the supposition, 1. That none but Apostles wrote the

New Testament ; 2. That the Apostles were inspired in every thing they wrote ; 3. That we know with certainty that all the parts of the New Testament bearing the name of Apostles come truly from them. But these three positions are either false, or at least teem with insuperable difficulties for Protestants. It is false that none but Apostles wrote the New Testament. St. Luke and St. Mark were not Apostles, but merely disciples of the Apostles, like Barnabas, Clement, Hermes, and Ignatius, whose writings are not a portion of Scripture. Now the writings of St. Luke and St. Mark form over a third of the New Testament. That the Apostles were *inspired* in every thing they wrote is not clear or demonstrated. The most that one is bound to admit is, that they were infallible in their solemn teaching ; but this differs from inspiration. Lastly, how do Presbyterians know that a portion of the New Testament comes from an Apostle, merely because it bears the name of an Apostle ? How do they know that the Epistle of James, that of Jude, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Apocalypse, come from the Apostles ? We ask them in reference to those portions of the New Testament, because all who have a slight acquaintance with antiquity and Biblical criticism know that many sincere Christians, in the very first ages of Christianity, doubted the authenticity and inspiration of those and other portions of the New Testament, and the question can be set at rest only by the infallible assistance promised to the Church in deciding doubts which arise. It is indeed exceedingly strange and anomalous, that Presbyterians should make up their minds with certainty, that the Epistle to the Hebrews, or that of James, come from the Apostles, and that the *Symbol of the Apostles* does not come from them. If they were built upon the foundation of the Apostles, as the text now under discussion has it, this Apostles' Creed would have been found at the head of their Confession. The truth is, however, that the Confession does not say a word about it ; and though it is found in the book whose title heads this article, it seems to have been thrown in at the end of the Shorter Catechism as a kind of outwork, and is given there simply as the Creed, and not as *the Apostles' Creed*. Hence, the text, that "we are built upon the foundation of the Apostles," does not prove the inspiration of the New Testament. To found an argument on this text, the author of the last portion of Scripture should have been an Apostle, and he should have drawn up a list of the inspired writings, and have closed

his book with the solemn assertion, that his own book, together with all those mentioned in the list, are inspired, and all that are inspired. But such is not the fact. The Scriptures say not a word about the one who wrote the last portion of the New Testament, so that from them we do not know whether he was an Apostle or not, while we know with certainty that he mentioned no catalogue of inspired writings.

The second text adduced by the Westminster Presbyterians is taken from the last lines of the Apocalypse, and is neither more nor less than a threat to the rash copyist who should either add to or take from the Apocalypse. But that book does not say that its author was inspired. Moreover, it does not say that he was an Apostle. Protestants call his book the Revelation of John the Divine; and though the tradition of the Catholic Church attributes it to St. John the Apostle, it is nothing to their purpose, for Presbyterians reject tradition. It is well known, too, that some commentators have doubted whether John the Divine was the same with John the Apostle; and Beza, a celebrated Calvinist, attributes it to another John, namely, John Mark, — Acts xii. 25. In fine, there is nothing in this text from the Apocalypse which asserts that all the books mentioned in the Presbyterian catalogue, from Genesis to Revelation, are inspired.

But we pass to the third testimony, adduced from St. Paul. This testimony is at least a little more to the purpose; but it wholly fails to establish the Presbyterian catalogue of inspired writings. The Protestant version says, "All Scripture is given by inspiration, and is profitable," &c. But the Vulgate, and others say, "All Scripture given by inspiration is profitable," &c., omitting the *and*. Which is the true reading? Only St. Paul himself could tell us whether he used that *and* or not. Certain it is, that the Greek Testament, such as the common edition has it, is not free from errors, — by no means to such a degree as to be the one St. Paul wrote, without the variation even of a single *and*. Certain it is, also, that St. Paul could not say, and surely did not say, that all Scripture (*γραφή*), that is, *all writing*, is given by inspiration of God; for this would make the *Holy Scriptures* quite too voluminous. But waiving this remark, which we give only to show the straits to which those who make Scripture alone the rule of faith are reduced, and, admitting that St. Paul is speaking of the *Sacred Scripture*, that he declares it to be divinely inspired, there are still several difficulties which occur. How

shall I know, and this with infallible certainty, that this Epistle is truly from St. Paul, and that St. Paul was infallible in teaching Timothy? For a letter to an individual does not bear on its face sufficient guaranties of authenticity to set such an important point at rest. How do we know that St. Paul was an Apostle? From the *Acts*? But the *Acts* were not written by an *Apostle*; and hence, for one who wants to build upon the foundation of the Apostles, this leaves a link in his chain of certainty missing. Will it be said, these objections are only cavils, and that they savor of skepticism? We grant they are cavils for a Catholic, for whom all these points are decided by a higher authority; but they are no cavils for Protestants, and they show that those who wish to remain Protestants, and who possess logical heads and sound dialectics, must become skeptics, and throw Christianity to the winds, or at least Unitarians, and consider the Scriptures as *probably* written by the authors whose names they bear, and as a good and moral, but merely a *human* book. However, we grant all the above remarks on the text of St. Paul are not *absolute* difficulties, but only *relative*; here is, however, one which is most obvious and absolute, and which must reduce Presbyterians to complete silence. The Scriptures of which St. Paul speaks can be no other than those of the Old Testament; for the text, taken in its totality, says, that Timothy from a child had known the Holy Scriptures, and it is of those Holy Scriptures known by Timothy from his infancy that St. Paul says they are inspired. Now it is obvious that those Holy Scriptures, which Timothy, yet a child, had known, were the Old Testament; for these were the only Scriptures then in existence; since all the New Testament was not written at the time when St. Paul wrote, and none of it when Timothy was yet in his infancy. This argument will not and cannot be denied by Protestants, and hence they must confess that this text proves at best only the inspiration of the Old Testament.

But here is another difficulty not less formidable than the foregoing. St. Paul says the Old Testament is inspired; but what constitutes the Old Testament? Of this he says nothing, and of this no sacred writer says any thing, — a clear proof that the Scriptures do not contain all that is necessary, and that by them alone no one can form his belief; for while we are told the Old Testament is inspired, we are not told which are the books composing the Old Testament, so that the enumeration given by Protestants is purely *human*,

not Scriptural. Besides, they fail in the main point, which is to establish the inspiration of the New Testament, the portion of Scripture in which we are evidently most intimately and vitally interested ; and the difficulty is increased ten-fold by the fact advanced by Protestants themselves, that one third of the New Testament was written, not by the Apostles themselves, but by their disciples. But before we proceed any farther, we conceive it to be required by the thread of the discussion to state here the process by which Catholics come to the knowledge of the inspiration of Scripture. The method is plain, obvious, and free from every vicious circle, and false dialectics ; it is conclusively and eloquently expressed by the great light of the Church, in the fourth and fifth centuries, St. Augustine :— “ I would not believe the Gospel, if I were not moved by the authority of the Catholic Church. If, then, I obey them when they tell me, Believe in the Gospel, why should I not obey them when they tell me, Believe not in Manicheism ? ” * Hence, the Church teaches me the inspiration of Scripture, and I believe it. But now what evidences to me the authority of the Church ? The Church evidences herself to me to be the spouse of Christ, the representative of Heaven, the ambassador of the Almighty, and the organ of God, by that mass of moral and historical proofs which skepticism or blindness alone can reject, when duly proposed. The Church is composed of innumerable witnesses, who, for ages linked in unbroken succession, unanimously and firmly attest and certify to me, that, 1846 years ago, a heavenly personage appeared, who performed innumerable miracles, and commissioned men, called Apostles, to preach his doctrine, promulge the true religion, and establish a Church, or religious society, in which, and in which alone, the doctrine of salvation should be taught to the end of time. That society attests to me, that God inspired some men to write more at length the plan of that divine religion, and the circumstances of its establishment ; and I believe the testimony of that society, because it consists of men who were not deceived, could not have been deceived, were not deceivers, and could not have been deceivers ; because the testimony of that immense mass of witnesses I perceive to be sealed with the blood of innumerable martyrs ; because, in fine, *miracles*, the usual *seal* of Heaven, have at all times borne out the testimony

* Contr. Epist. Fund., c. 5.

of that society. Hence, as that society claims to have received from divine inspiration these volumes, together with the right of interpreting them, and as she hurls her anathemas against gainsayers, these pretensions and privileges of the Church must be real, or else Heaven would sanction fraud and imposture by its miracles. The testimony of that Church is further corroborated by the eminent sanctity of thousands of her members, who have always held all the doctrines taught by that Church as absolutely necessary to salvation ; which, together with so many other considerations we might adduce, proves that Church to be in possession of the true doctrine descended from heaven ; and consequently, upon her testimony, I admit as inspired all the books for which she claims inspiration. The perfect agreement of the doctrine of those books with what she teaches me is another argument of the divinity and truth of the system of religion which she holds. Our method of reasoning is, therefore, that of sound dialectics. The Church and Scripture stand with regard to one another, as the heir and the will constituting him heir. The will must be proved to come from the testator by other modes besides a mere assertion to that effect found in the will ; but thus proved, the heir may investigate and define his rights from the will itself. Hence, Catholics may quote the Bible to prove the Church, not only by an argument *ad hominem* against those who admit it to be infallible, but also as the explanation and development of the will of Him whom they prove by invincible arguments to have dictated it.* We believe the Scripture to be inspired,

* This illustration must not be pushed too far. So far as it concerns the special argument in the text, it is apposite and unobjectionable ; but it must not be interpreted to favor the notion, that the Church in teaching is restricted to the office of simple interpreter of the Sacred Scriptures, or that she has no rights but such as are contained in, or may be deduced from, the written word. The Church received the *whole* revelation of God, irrespective of the written word, and would possess, and could teach, the whole, even if there were no written word. She has the will and all its contents, in her divine traditions, and therefore does not necessarily depend on the written word for a knowledge of what they are. Moreover, the whole revelation was not written ; or, in other words, the Church has received more than is recorded. The whole, then, of what she is commissioned to teach is not deducible from what is written. Her authority and her doctrine remain complete without the written word, and to us, as her children, it is no question what the Scriptures teach, but simply what the Church teaches. Nevertheless, after the Church has established the fact of the inspiration of the Scriptures, then she may appeal to them, as we allege in the text, in explanation and development of her rights.

because the Apostles and their successors have so taught the Church, and have taught us to believe in the Church, having made this belief in the Church one of the articles of their creed ; and we believe the teaching of the Apostles, because they proved their doctrine by their miracles. The fact, that the Church has always believed in the inspiration of Scripture upon this testimony of the Apostles, and that she teaches it as an essential doctrine, is too obvious, and too generally admitted, to stand in need of proof. We conclude, then, that Catholics have the highest evidence of the inspiration of Scripture, while for Protestants the question is involved in darkness which nothing can dissipate. Hence, it is not surprising to hear that many Protestants, especially in Germany, reject the inspiration of Scripture altogether.

But it is time to pass to the third article of the Presbyterian Confession of Faith. It runs thus :—

“The books commonly called Apocrypha, not being of divine inspiration, are no part of the canon of Scripture, and therefore are of no authority in the Church of God, nor to be any otherwise approved, or made use of, than other human writings.”

We subjoin likewise the Scripture authority.

“Luke xxiv. 27. And beginning at Moses and all the prophets, he expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself. Ver. 44. And he said unto them, These are the words which I spake unto you, while I was yet with you, that all things must be fulfilled which were written in the law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms, concerning me. 2 Peter i. 21. For the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man, but holy men of God spake *as they were* moved by the Holy Ghost.”

This article is a thrust at the Catholic Church, which admits, besides the books mentioned in the Presbyterian canon of Scripture, in the Old Testament, the following : namely, Tobias, Judith, some chapters of Esther, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, Baruch, fragments of Daniel, and two books of Maccabees.

Now we ask Presbyterians, how they know that these books, in spite of the belief of the Catholic Church, are not of divine inspiration. Is it because they are commonly called Apocrypha, as the text seems to insinuate ? But who calls them Apocrypha ? Presbyterians ? But is this a proof that they are Apocrypha ? and if Unitarians call all Apocrypha, is it a

proof they are all Apocrypha? The Confession, however, hints that such books are *commonly* called Apocrypha. This is false; they are commonly called inspired books. Let us count the votes. Those books are called inspired Scripture by the two hundred millions of Catholics spread over the globe; they are called inspired Scripture by the Greek Church, though separated from the Catholic Church; and that Church alone outnumbers all the Protestant denominations put together. Those books are held to be inspired Scripture by all the other Oriental Christian sects. Hence, there are at least four or five Christians calling these books inspired Scriptures to one calling them Apocrypha. At the rise of Protestantism, all editions of Christian Bibles contained the books now called Apocrypha by Protestants. The Latin version, the Septuagint, the Syriac version of the Scriptures, contain them all. In fact, these books have always been *commonly* called Scripture, and had the authority of prescription in the Church by long continued possession, when it came into the heads of Protestants to deny their authority.

However, the Westminster divines pretend to give a better proof of the want of inspiration in these books, than a mere name given them by the interested party. They offer Scripture authority; and the proofs they adduce are at least amusing. The first is, that Christ, after his resurrection, "beginning at Moses and all the prophets, expounded to them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself." This is the mighty argument by which Presbyterians show that Baruch, Judith, Tobias, &c., are not inspired. But that text says nothing of them; how, then, can Presbyterians conclude they are not inspired? They will answer, perhaps, that Moses and all the prophets constitute the whole of the Sacred Scripture. Be it so, if you choose. But what is meant by the word *prophet*? and, this definition being settled, how do you prove that Baruch, Judith, Tobias were not prophets? *Prophet* may mean only an inspired man. If you say that *prophets* means those who have announced future things, then the writer of the books of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, the writers of several of the historical books, the books of Kings, for instance, and the Paralipomena, or Chronicles, as Protestants call them, have no claim to prophecy, since they either relate past events, or give moral lessons. This is a primary difficulty for Protestants. Another and a greater one is, that Baruch, Judith, and Tobias were prophets, properly so called; for they

announced things to come, as we see by reading their books, which must, at least, be considered as *human* books of great merit and reputation. So those personages were prophets, and received miraculous gifts from heaven. If, then, this text of the New Testament quoted in the Confession proves any thing, it proves the inspiration of these books; and if it destroys the authority of the Maccabees, as a merely historical book, it destroys also that of the Paralipomena; if it destroys the authority of Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus as moral books, it destroys also that of the Proverbs and Ecclesiastes. The text adduced, then, either proves nothing, or too much; if it favors either side, it favors the Catholics; for Christ speaks of *all* the prophets and of *all* the Scriptures, and since these books were known in his time, they are rather included in *all* the prophets than excluded.

The second text adduced by the Presbyterians is not more happy than the first; for in this new enumeration of Scripture are mentioned the law, the prophets, and the Psalms. Here Christ adds the *Psalms* to the other parts, but this demands no material change in the remarks we have just made; on the contrary, it shows that Christ did not intend to make a complete enumeration of the parts of the Bible; and we say that the word *prophets* includes all the books rejected by Presbyterians, or else it excludes many admitted by them. In fine, the last text adduced by Presbyterians, from 2 Pet. i. 21, is ridiculous in the highest degree to prove the want of authority in Baruch, Judith, Tobias, &c.; it says that the prophets spake not of themselves, but as moved by the Holy Ghost; but it does not say, that prophets *only* can write Scripture, or that Baruch, Judith, and Tobias were not prophets.

Not only is there no passage of Scripture against those books, but we may safely assert that the text adduced above to prove the inspiration of the Old Testament applies to these books. "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine." St. Paul says, generally, that *all* Scripture is inspired by God. Now we say that this term *all* includes the books rejected by Presbyterians. To establish this, we have only to remark that St. Paul in the text speaks of the Scripture or Bible, as it was found in the celebrated Greek version of the Septuagint; for St. Paul wrote to Timothy in Greek, and it is likewise an evident fact that the Apostles used and quoted the Septuagint. St. Timothy, to whom he writes, was born in Lyconia, a Grecian province, of

a heathen father and a Jewish mother ; and a proof that he was not over-Jewish is, that he had not been circumcised at an advanced age, when St. Paul circumcised him for the greater advantage of the Jews for whose conversion he was to be employed. All this shows sufficiently that the Greek edition of the Bible was the one which Timothy had read from his infancy, and the one which St. Paul recommended as divinely inspired. Now the Septuagint edition of the Bible contained these books, and consequently they come under the name, *all Scripture*, used by St. Paul. A convincing proof of the fact of the Greek version of the Bible, or the Septuagint, containing these books is, that the old Latin version of the Bible, made from the Septuagint in the first century, as also the Syriac version, made in the same century, and which is one of the most esteemed by the learned, contains these books. The Arabic, Armenian, and many other versions, also contain them, having been made from the Septuagint. This argument is absolutely unanswerable. The Greek Church has never used any other Bible than the Septuagint, and, as she admits these books, they must always have been in that version. But this fact is so well established, that it is clear St. Paul must have included these very books under the name "*all Scripture*." These books were held sacred by those who adopted the Septuagint, and, having quoted this version, and knowing that they were in it, St. Paul could not have said *all Scripture* is given by inspiration, if these books had not been inspired. If they were not, it was his duty to have warned his disciple Timothy and others against ascribing to them divine authority. Since, then, we do not find in his Epistles that Tobias, Judith, Baruch, &c., are not inspired Scriptures, we must conclude he did not wish to prevent the faithful from believing them to be inspired Scripture, and consequently, if we are wrong in so believing them, we are wrong because the Apostles themselves have deceived us.

But the texts quoted do not contain the real grounds on which Protestants reject the books in question. Their true reasons for rejecting them are to be found elsewhere. They had, in rejecting them, two objects in view: the first, to contradict the Catholic Church on a point which could be maintained with some show of argument ; the second, to escape the inferences drawn by Catholics from those books against doctrines which they had broached. The pleasure and gratification of contradicting the Church was the chief reason for re-

jecting the "so-called Apocrypha." The Jews did not admit them into their catalogue of Sacred Scriptures, and hence the Hebrew Bibles of the present day do not contain them. Moreover, some fathers of the Church have doubted their canonicity. Protestants, then, and Presbyterians especially, could not but seize with avidity this occasion of calumniating the Church, as if she admitted human books among the inspired writings. This reason, which Presbyterians are ashamed or unwilling to acknowledge in their Confession, is, however, the true one why they reject what they call the Apocrypha. But that they are exceedingly unfortunate and unlucky in this, as in other quarrels with the Catholic Church, is evident from what we have already said, and have yet to add. To understand this matter fully, it must be borne in mind that before Christ there were two divisions of Jews, — some who remained in Palestine and continued to use the Bible written in Hebrew, and others scattered through the various parts of the Grecian empire, and particularly in Egypt, who were better acquainted with the Greek than the Hebrew; for the Greek was then the predominant language of the world. For the use of this latter division of Jews, numerous in Alexandria and other parts of Egypt, the Scriptures were translated into Greek several centuries before the coming of our Saviour. These were they who used the Greek version of the Septuagint, and, having been scattered through the different provinces of the civilized world, were those to whom the Apostles chiefly preached the Gospel; so that the translation of the Bible into Greek, and the dissemination of Hellenist Jews through the various parts of the world, were among the means which Providence employed to facilitate the diffusion of the Gospel. It was these Hellenist Jews who, even before Christ, placed the books under consideration in the rank of Scriptures, for they associated them to the other canonical books of the version of the Septuagint. As to the Jews of Palestine, they did not put the same books among the Scriptures, because either they were not written in Hebrew, or came too late to be put authoritatively in the canon, which was closed by Esdras. But the fact of the Jews of Palestine not associating these new books with the other parts of Scripture is no argument against them, provided they were afterwards put into the canon by lawful authority. One thing, however, is certain; the Palestine Jews respected these books, and the Talmud and the Rabbins generally quote them. Judith and Tobias espe-

cially, and even Baruch, were publicly read on a certain appointed day.

If it be said that the practice of the Hellenist Jews in placing these books among the canonical Scriptures proves nothing, we may grant that in strictness it does not ; but what proves conclusively and without the possibility of cavil that they are canonical is, that the Apostles took the Scriptures from them in the Septuagint, which is the edition of the Bible they quote, and their testimony and their authority are amply sufficient to entitle these books to the rank of Scripture ; for, as they were infallible, they must know whether such books were inspired or not, were the word of God or the word of man. If they had been only the word of man, the Apostles would have expunged them from the Greek edition ; they would have warned the faithful against the use of such forged word of God ; and as they have not done so, but on the contrary retained the Septuagint, and since all the editions of the Bible used by their immediate disciples, the Latin version and the Syriac, contain these books, we must hold them to be Scripture, not indeed on the testimony of the Hellenist Jews, but on that of the Apostles. Moreover, the Jews who embraced Christianity read the Scriptures for the most part in Greek, and this was an occasion or pretext for the other Jews who rejected Christianity to adhere with greater pertinacity and zeal to the Hebrew Bible ; hence, through a spirit of hostility to the Greeks, they went so far afterwards as to appoint a day of fasting and humiliation for the pretended misfortune of the translation of the Scriptures into Greek, as we read in the Talmud. As those Jews who read in Hebrew were the only ones that retained a sort of nationality among other nations, they, of course, kept in their edition of the Scriptures only the Hebrew books ; and this circumstance occasioned the doubts which arose among some fathers of the Church, as to the canonicity of those books, though they always respected and quoted them. There has never been, however, any real interruption in the tradition of the Church concerning their inspiration, and the Roman Church founded by Peter and Paul has always had them in its Latin version, and they have always been venerated as the word of God. If some fathers, those particularly who knew Hebrew, and lived among the Jews, not finding these books in the canon of the Hebrews, have expressed doubts of their canonicity, it was not a tradition, but a personal notion of theirs, arising, perhaps, from not using

their science according to prudence ; and it is not the sole instance in which a certain science has been an impediment to the simplicity of faith. But even those fathers who made that concession of the non-canoncity of those books to their science, or to the prejudices of the Jews among whom they lived, in practice were carried away by the torrent of tradition ; for they quoted those books ; and St. Jerome in particular, who declares positively in some places that they are out of the canon and are unfit to prove dogmas, believed Judith to have been placed among the Scriptures by the great Council of Nice, gives the name of Scripture to the books of Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus, and is to be understood, when discarding them from the canon, as he himself wrote in his defence against Rufinus, as having spoken after the opinion of the Jews, who reject them ; so that he meant only that they cannot be used to confirm dogmas against the Jews, because they reject them ; and in this way are all those fathers to be understood who seem to deny the authority of these books.

To show now the tradition of the Church with regard to those books, we may quote among the councils one of Hippo in the year 393, two of Carthage at about the same time, and the solemn decrees of Innocent the First in 405, and of Gelasius the First in 493 ; the General Council of Florence, which preceded the Protestant schism by nearly a century, and in which the Greek Church was represented, and lastly the Council of Trent, which only copies the canon of the Council of Florence. We may add, also, the testimonies of some of the earliest and most celebrated doctors of the primitive Church. Some will think it, perhaps, a waste of paper and ink, to quote the Fathers against the Presbyterians ; for these mighty geniuses think themselves far above the Fathers, and despise them as a set of superstitious and ignorant fools. But we cannot allow such a notion, entertained by Presbyterians, and which betrays no less ignorance than pride, to deter us. If Presbyterians laugh at our quotations, we will claim the privilege, not of laughing at them, but of pitying them. We think it self-evident that men who lived almost in the age of Christ and of the Apostles, and who had all the writings we have, and many we have not, should be believed upon a matter of fact, namely, what Christ and the Apostles have taught, in preference to self-made doctors who arose sixteen hundred years after the event. We are invincibly disposed to attribute more weight to the testimony of a Clement, an Irenæus, a Cyp-

rian, &c., who sealed their faith with their blood, than to the unsupported assertions of mercenary teachers, who changed theirs that they might secure to themselves the riches of the ancient Church, and who never knew what it was to suffer for it. We own we are not ashamed to follow for our guides men whose sanctity, science, prudence, and Christian virtues were the object of the veneration of their contemporaries and of succeeding generations, in preference to these Westminster divines, who, in the turmoil of public life and agitating scenes of revolution and political struggles, broached and set forth a confession of faith with the same hand with which they signed the death-warrant of their sovereign. If we are wrong in this, we must plead in excuse that indomitable instinct of nature, which prompts all not utterly depraved to choose virtue, knowledge, modesty, and self-sacrifice, before pride, presumption, cupidity, and self-love.

St. Clement, Pope and martyr, lived in the time of the Apostles, and is mentioned in St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians. We have of him an Epistle to the Corinthians, which must be viewed as one of the most venerable monuments of antiquity. In this he quotes the book of Wisdom, "Who shall say to thee, What hast thou done?" — xii. 12; and also, "Who shall resist the strength of thy arm?" — xi. 22. St. Irenæus had conversed with the immediate disciples of the Apostles, and he shed his blood for the faith. In the fifth book, chapter 35, *Against Heretics*, he quotes at full length a beautiful passage which is taken from the end of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth chapter of Baruch, — "Look about thee, O Jerusalem," &c. St. Cyprian sealed likewise his testimony with his blood, towards the middle of the third century. Nothing is more frequent in his writings than quotations from those books which have been branded as Apocrypha by Protestants. We have taken the trouble of counting twelve quotations from Wisdom, and twenty-nine from Ecclesiasticus; others in the same proportion. St. Athanasius (*Cont. Arian*. 17, 1) quotes as Scripture the following maxim of the book Ecclesiasticus, ch. xv. 9: "Praise is not seemly in the mouth of a sinner"; and he adduces this testimony together with one of about the same import borrowed from Psalm xlix. 16. Now St. Athanasius is one of those who apparently reject the books which are not found in the Hebrew Bible, and this proves the truth of what we have said above, that those fathers who in theory rejected the books in question, admitted them in

practice. St. Augustine, whom at least Presbyterians and Calvinists must respect, if they respect their patriarch Calvin, condemns in positive and most emphatic terms those who, with the Westminster divines, discard the book of Wisdom from the Sacred Scriptures (L. 2, *De Symb.*). "No one," says he, "can reject a passage taken from the book of Wisdom, which has been read in the Church for so many years, and which, from all Christian bishops, to the lowest of the faithful among the laity, penitents, and catechumens, is listened to with the respect due to *divine* authority." We might swell our quotations to a volume; but if what we have adduced does not suffice for our Presbyterian friends, one would rise in vain from the grave to convince them.

Having disposed of this question, we will add a true list of the Apocrypha, that is, of those writings which, though some may have regarded them as Scripture, yet are not held by the Church to possess the authority of the word of God. The word *apocrypha*, a Greek word, means simply *unknown*; hence, a book is said to be apocryphal, when its authority as Sacred Scripture is not acknowledged. It may be an excellent book, and perfectly authentic,—that is, truly written by the one whose name it bears,—or it may not be. The apocryphal books of the Old Testament are the third and fourth of Esdras, the third and fourth of the Maccabees, the book of Henoah, the prayer of King Manasses, and the One Hundred and Fifty-first Psalm; those of the New Testament are the book of Hermas, quoted by some as Scripture, because Hermas was a disciple of the Apostles, and is mentioned in the Epistle to the Romans, xvi. 14; the Epistle of St. Barnabas, which, though truly his, and though his name is found in the Acts in connection with that of St. Paul, is not Sacred Scripture,—for all the disciples of the Apostles were not inspired; the First Epistle to the Corinthians by St. Clement, whose name is also in the Sacred Scriptures (Phil. iv. 3),—a genuine and authentic epistle, but, though quoted by not a few, is not Sacred Scripture; the letter of Christ to Abgarus in answer to a letter from that king, as related by Eusebius; the Apostolic Canons, or canons made by the Apostles, of which the first fifty, though not Scripture, are received by the Roman Church; and, in addition, a large number of Gospels, to some of which St. Luke alludes, when he says, in the preface to his Gospel, "Forasmuch as *many* have taken in hand to set forth," &c. Many of these Gospels have perished; fragments of others have come down to us. These are properly termed apocryphal.

In connection with this subject, we take the liberty of proposing some queries to Presbyterians, and of requesting them to explain what appear to us glaring contradictions in their conduct. When they drew up their catalogue of the Scriptures, on what authority did they take this or that book to be Scripture? assuredly they did not see the books they receive falling from heaven, or Jehovah's throne. Was it on the authority of the Jews, or on that of the Christians? If on the authority of the Jews, then they should reject the New Testament, since the Jews reject it; if on the authority of Christians, they should receive all the books which the Christians received, and as the Christians received all the books which Catholics now receive, even the so-called Apocrypha, they should also receive them. Why, then, do they receive a part, and reject the rest? Will they answer, that they receive those books which were received by the primitive Church? But how do they know that? how do they know what the primitive Church taught? Moreover, if they are obliged to have recourse to the primitive Church, tradition becomes necessary and indispensable, at least to enable us to distinguish the inspired from the non-inspired books. But they reject tradition. Again, if they rely on the authority of the primitive Church, they must admit the Apocrypha which are rejected only by the Jews. For Clement, Irenæus, the authors of the Itala and Syriac versions, belonged to that Church, and are unanimous in receiving them as Scripture. If they discard Tobias, Judith, &c., because some fathers have doubted their inspiration, then why do they admit the Epistle to the Hebrews, that of St. James, and, above all, the Apocalypse; for many fathers, as Protestants themselves confess, have doubted the divine authority of these? Will they say that these writings come from the Apostles, who were infallible? But this is precisely what those fathers doubted; and if it be enough to have the name of an Apostle on the title-page, why do they not receive all the Gospels which bear the name of some Apostle? At least, as many fathers have doubted the canonicity of the Apocalypse as that of the Maccabees; why, then, acknowledge the authority of the one, and reject that of the other? "A weight and a weight are an abomination before the Lord." — Prov. xx. 23. But are Presbyterians candid and sincere? If they admit the Apocalypse, is it not because they can so interpret it as to make it countenance their aspersions and condemnations of the Pope

and the Church of Rome? Finally, will they say they admit the New Testament on the authority of the Apostles who wrote it? But was St. Luke an Apostle? Was Mark an Apostle? Certainly not. They were only disciples of the Apostles, as were Barnabas, and Clement, and Hermas. Why, then, do they admit as Scripture the writings of Luke and Mark, and not those of Barnabas, Clement, and Hermas? To be consistent, they must admit both, or reject both; for the Apostles themselves are equally silent respecting both. What proof have they that Mark was inspired, and that Clement was not? No reason can be assigned, save the testimony of the Apostles, made known by tradition. But if tradition is necessary in this case, wherefore is it to be rejected, as the fundamental tenet of Presbyterians asserts? If tradition be good for one thing, why not for others? If in this case, why not in that of prayers for the dead, the distinction between bishops and priests, the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, the intercession of saints, &c.? Assuredly, on all these points Protestants are entangled in difficulties, from which they can extricate themselves only by consenting to swallow innumerable absurdities, and inscribing on their standard, **CONTRADICTION, INCONSISTENCY, and FALSEHOOD.**

The fourth article of the Presbyterian Confession of Faith, which we have now reached, is, that

“The authority of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed and obeyed, dependeth not upon the testimony of any man or church, but wholly upon God (who is truth itself), the author thereof; and therefore it is to be received because it is the word of God.”

Since we have thus far objected to every article, it may be thought that we are hard to please, if we also object to the present. When we read a law of Congress printed in the newspaper, we assuredly admit the law, because it comes from Congress, and not because the editor, who may be deserving of no credit, places it before his reader. When a constable serves an execution, it is the authority of the court we respect, not that of the constable. Nevertheless, this fourth article can find no more favor with us than its predecessors. It is a shaft at St. Austin, whose assertion we have already quoted, and at the Catholic Church, on whose testimony we receive the Scriptures. It, however, need not detain us long, for a very obvious distinction will at once disclose its sophistry. The doc-

trines taught in the Scriptures are one thing, and the genuineness of the book itself is another. The doctrines are believed because revealed or taught by God himself; but why is the Bible believed to have come from God? It does not, in a miraculous manner, proclaim to all that it is the word of God. What is it, then, that makes you believe it to be his word? The Catholic answers, The testimony of the Church, for which God himself vouches by miracles and other marks of his authority. The Protestant has nothing, at least, as we shall soon see, nothing reasonable, to answer. In a word, if God speaks, we believe on his authority, and it would be ridiculous and blasphemous to believe God because Peter or James assures us that what God says is true. But in order to believe that God hath spoken, we must have motives of credibility, or reasons sufficient to convince a sound understanding that he has really spoken; otherwise, faith would be only superstition and credulity. Hence, it is absurd to reproach Catholics with attributing a greater authority to the Church than to the word of God. When Mary believed that she would conceive and bring forth the Son of God, without any detriment to her virginity (Luke ii.), she believed in God, and made an act of heroic faith, as Elizabeth said afterwards, "Blessed art thou that hast believed." But on whose testimony did she believe? On that of the angel Gabriel, who brought her the message. Would she have believed without the testimony of the angel? Assuredly not. Did she reverence the angel more than God? By no means; but the apparition and declaration of the angel were the motives of credibility on which she believed the message to be truly from God, and without which her belief would have been only fanaticism or pride. In this way St. John, in the Apocalypse, gives clearly the motives of credibility for the revelation which it contained. "The revelation of Jesus Christ which God gave . . . and signified sending by his angel to his servant John, who hath given testimony to the word of God."—i. 1, 2. As John gave testimony to the word of God, that is, that God spoke it, so does the Church now; and as the testimony of John was proved true by incontestable evidence, so also is that of the Church. As the testimony of John did not derogate from the majesty of the word of God, or the respect due to it, nor suppose any pride in him, neither does the testimony which the Church bears to Scripture imply the least irreverence, or pride, or arrogance, on her part.

The fifth article of the Confession, the last we shall now consider, will confirm, from the mouth of the Presbyterian divines themselves, all we have asserted concerning the impossibility of Presbyterians arriving at the inspiration of Scripture, besides presenting a few more of those glaring contradictions with which, as so many bright stars, they intersperse and adorn their creed.

“ We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to a high and reverend esteem for the Holy Scripture ; the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man’s salvation, the many other incomparable excellences, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the word of God ; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit bearing witness by and with the word, in our hearts.

“ 1 Tim. iii. 15. But if I tarry long, that thou mayest know how thou oughtest to behave thyself in the house of God, which is the church of the living God, the pillar and ground of the truth.

“ 1 John ii. 20, 27. But ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know all things. — But the anointing which ye have received of him abideth in you, and ye need not that any man teach you ; but as the same anointing teacheth you of all things, and is truth, and is no lie, and even as it hath taught you, ye shall abide in him.” &c.

The doctrine embodied in this article is, that the testimony of the Church renders the inspiration of Scripture probable ; the internal excellences of Scripture demonstrate that inspiration ; still, we believe Scripture to be the word of God, because we hear the Spirit of God in our hearts telling us it is his word. A more monstrous accumulation of absurdities, of sophisms, of fanaticism, it would be difficult to condense within the same number of lines. The assertion, to be true, should run: The internal excellences of Scripture render its inspiration somewhat *probable*; the testimony of the Church renders it *certain* ; the Holy Ghost by his divine grace makes us assent, in a *supernatural* manner, and in a way *conducive to salvation*, to the inspiration of Scripture and the doctrine it contains. Stated in this way, the assertion would be correct. But the Westminster divines, after having disclaimed all human testimony in Art. IV., now tell us that the testimony of the Church moves us to a high and reverend esteem of Scripture. Then they should at least have “ a high and reverend esteem ” for the

books of Tobias, Judith, &c., which had, at the time of the rise of Protestantism, the testimony of the whole Church both in the East and in the West. But does not the passage you quote to inculcate this high and reverend esteem for the Holy Scripture say more than you make it say? You conceive a high and reverend esteem for Scripture from "the Church, which is the pillar and ground of the truth." — 1 Tim. iii. 15. But if the Church be the *pillar and ground of the truth*, and if the Church tell you that these books or those are the word of God, you must not only *esteem* them, but believe them to be the word of God; otherwise, the Church would cease to be "the pillar and ground of the truth," by telling you to receive as inspired by the Holy Ghost writings which have only a human authority. The Church evidently would then be the herald and the basis of error. Presbyterians therefore adduce here a text which, fairly considered, overthrows the whole fabric of their belief in Scripture. The Church is the pillar and ground of the truth: they admit this. Then, as a matter of course, they must admit what the Church teaches, and admit it not only as probable, but as the very truth of which the Church is the pillar and ground. By adducing this text, then, they *cut their own throat*; this text, if it prove any thing, proves not only that Scripture must be esteemed, but also believed, on the testimony of the Church. It proves that not only Genesis and the Gospels are Scripture, but also Tobias, Judith, &c. Calvin, who seems to have been a little keener than the Westminster divines, found himself not a little troubled to explain this text of St. Paul, that the Church is the pillar and ground of the truth; and was compelled to assert that the Church is the pillar and ground of the truth, not because she teaches the truth, but because she keeps the Scriptures, which are the word of God. But on this principle every man who has a Bible in his pocket is a pillar and ground of the truth, and booksellers will become not only the pillar and the ground of the truth, but its citadels, and fortresses, and spiritual rocks of Gibraltar, because they keep in their shops hundreds and thousands of copies of the word of God, with romances and obscene books. To state such an absurdity is to confute it.

But let us pass to the consideration of the arguments by which Presbyterians contend that Scripture abundantly evidences itself to be the word of God. The first is, "the heavenliness of the matter." But is every book that treats of *heaven* an inspired book? and what will become of the inspiration of some books, if tried by this Presbyterian touchstone? The

Song of Songs, — can you determine that to be inspired from the heavenliness of the matter? If you admitted tradition and the testimony of the Church, you might, perhaps, find that its subject is heavenly; but with Scripture alone, you cannot; for not even the name of God is mentioned in the whole book. The book of Ruth, from the heavenliness of its matter, will hardly produce a conviction that it is inspired, and so of some other historical books of the Old Testament. This test, applied to the Epistle of Paul to Philemon, or to the Second and Third Epistles of St. John, might give very unsatisfactory results. Hence, this test of the inspiration of a book may be a conjecture, but it will never amount to a demonstration. But if inspired books are to be tested by this mark, we say that Tobias, Judith, Wisdom, and Maccabees are far more heavenly in the matters they treat of, than most of the other books of the Old Testament. In these books we find the clearest allusions to heaven and eternal life, and the brightest examples of heavenly virtue. Is there any thing more heavenly than the conduct of Tobias? — any thing more heavenly than this maxim, “We are the children of saints, and look for that life which God will give to those that never change their faith from him”? — Tob. iii. 18. Is there any thing more beautiful and heavenly in the whole Testament than the martyrdom of the seven Maccabees and their heroic mother? 2 Macc. vii. We say it, then, confidently, if the heavenliness of the matter be a test of inspiration, those books which Protestants stigmatize as “Apocrypha” must have the first place in the canon of Scripture. So is it with error; when its advocates try to cover one side opened to attack, they are forced to uncover another which they have equal interest in protecting; the present and the other tests of inspiration assigned by Protestants apply as well, and perhaps better, to those which they brand as spurious, than to those which they choose to retain.

The second test of inspiration is “efficacy of doctrine.” The Bible is inspired because its doctrine is efficacious. So do our modern doctors think. But we should rather contend that the Bible is efficacious because it is divine. Will an unprejudiced man say a book is inspired because it persuades to the adoption of the doctrine it teaches? If so, immoral books would be the most certainly inspired of all; for their doctrine is terribly efficacious. The Koran also would be inspired; for it has been tolerably efficacious; and the Book of Mormon threatens to be the same. This mark of inspiration will not

answer, even admitting a book to contain the best doctrine in the world. A man may write eloquent pages on the practice of virtue, and persuade others to adopt it, and we have still no voucher for his inspiration. Otherwise, all good and pious ministers of God would be inspired ; which is somewhat more than any body is prepared to admit.

“ The majesty of the style ” is the next evident mark of inspiration adduced by the Westminster divines, — a queer test, we must confess. This test we take to be applicable to the original languages in which the Scripture was written ; for otherwise the majesty of the style would prove the inspiration of the translator rather than that of the author ; and we know of very clumsy translations of the Bible. The appreciation of this test would, then, require the full knowledge of the Hebrew and Greek languages ; for a smatterer in those languages would scarcely venture to decide upon the merits of the style. How many are competent to the task may be a delicate question ; but we hardly think it would be excessive rashness on our part to doubt if the Westminster divines themselves were altogether competent judges. It is not among people involved in political turmoils, it is not in our parliaments, our houses of representatives or senate-chambers, that we find such eminent Greek and Hebrew scholars. Moreover, a portion of the Presbyterians themselves — the Cumberland Presbyterians — will reject this test, since they separated themselves from the main body chiefly because they would not subject their ministers to the necessity of learning Greek and Hebrew. We may also remark that St. Paul did not insist very strenuously on this proof of his inspiration ; for in his Second Epistle to the Corinthians, xi. 6, he says, — “ Though I be *rude in speech*, yet not in knowledge.” And when we reflect that many books, having no claim to inspiration, have a fine and majestic style, and that the appreciation of style presents so many difficulties, and varies so with different individuals, we can set very little, if any, value upon this test of inspiration.

Another evident mark of inspiration, according to the Westminster divines, is “ *the consent of all the parts.* ” Taking this test of inspiration, we venture to say, that, assuredly, the Confession of Faith is not a work *inspired*, — that is, from above ; for, whatever else it may claim, it can claim nothing like a “ *consent of all the parts.* ” We have gone over only the first five articles, and it would puzzle the reader to count the many contradictions we have found in it. If the Bible be inspired from God, surely

there can be no contradictions in it. But the fact, that there are no contradictions in a book, does not prove that it is inspired ; it proves, at most, only that the author speaks the truth, and is a man of sound judgment. Who ever thought of ascribing inspiration to our mathematical treatises, because there is in them a consent of all the parts ? But it cannot be denied that there are in the Bible many *apparent* contradictions, which it often requires no small amount of learning and research to remove or reconcile ; and it is this fact that supplies infidels with their arguments against our holy religion. That all these apparent contradictions are cleared up, and very satisfactorily too, we cheerfully and loudly acknowledge ; but we say, that, if we did not know from other independent and infallible sources of information that the Bible is inspired, this character of the consent of all the parts could never lead to a firm assent to its inspiration.

The other means of arriving at the inspiration of Scripture, such as “ the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man’s salvation, the many other incomparable excellences, and the entire perfection thereof,” are all as little conclusive as those we have just considered. When we once know, by some positive, undeniable fact, that the Scripture is the word of God, we may find all these excellences, but not before ; and to found the inspiration of Scripture upon such tottering motives is to deliver it up to the contempt of unbelievers. We say, then, that the external motives of credibility in the inspiration of Scripture assigned by Presbyterians are altogether illusory, and that the point can be settled only by recourse to the testimony and declaration of the Church, whose doctrine has always received, and continues to receive, the stamp and approbation of Heaven.

But it is chiefly upon the internal motives of credibility that Presbyterians rely. They believe in Scripture because the Holy Spirit bears witness in their hearts. A man, when driven to this last resource of fanatics, visionaries, and impostors, the resource of Mahometans and Mormons, should at once own himself vanquished. This pretence is exceedingly convenient, for it supplies the place of argument and logic. *I remain a Presbyterian, because God tells me in my heart that I am in the true religion.* We do not think it worth while to undertake seriously to confute this assertion. All reasonable persons have an irresistible inclination to laugh

at this peremptory mode of settling a controversy. Pity, disgust, or merriment, if the subject were not so grave, would be the only answers suitable to be given. We knew of a deluded lady, who, fearing she had "sinned the day of grace away," staid on her knees some hours, and at last obtained full forgiveness, because she felt her heart as "big as a hat." When the Lord speaks in an extraordinary manner, he gives *external* miraculous signs of his presence, as one may read in so many different passages of Scripture, especially in the call of Moses, Gideon, and Samson. The ordinary operation of divine grace in the hearts of the just, though supernatural, can never be a foundation for any assertion or discovery; and this divine grace is never given as the ground for believing or maintaining any thing contrary to the doctrine held and proposed by the Church of Christ, which doctrine is founded, not upon internal and invisible revelation accessible to nobody, but upon facts performed in the face of the whole world, and of a brilliancy greater than that of the sun. Nor do we need to dwell upon the passage of St. John, with which visionaries would try to uphold their delirious notions, — "Ye have an unction from above, and ye know all things." For such persons as bring forward their own visions and imaginations, on the strength of this text, should prove first that this is said of them, and not rather the following: — "Thou sayest, I am rich, and made wealthy, and I have need of nothing; and thou knowest not that thou art wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked." Yes, they have the best reasons for applying to themselves the following passages. "If one will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as a heathen and publican." — Matt. xviii. 17. "O senseless Galatians! who hath bewitched you, that you should not obey the truth?" "The animal man knoweth not the things that are of the Spirit of God." Hence, it is not to every one that opens the Epistle of St. John, that this is said, — "You have an unction from above, and ye know all things"; it is to such as love God with all their heart, are docile to their pastors, and revere in them the authority of Christ; for St. John immediately adds, "I have not written to you as to such as know not the truth, but as to such as know it." He who does not acknowledge thoroughly and sincerely the Church to be the ground and pillar of truth, to be the rock against which the gates of hell shall not prevail, has no share in those words of St. John, but rather in these of St. Jude: — "These are they who separate themselves, sensual men, having not the Spirit." — Ver. 19.

But we must conclude here, for the present, our review of the Presbyterian Confession of Faith. We have found it full of false reasoning, of arbitrary and absurd applications of Scriptural passages, of obvious and strongly marked contradictions, of shallow views, and false conclusions. We have conclusively established, we think, that Presbyterians have in no respect whatever any reason or argument to offer in defence of the inspiration of Scripture, and that there is for them no rational ground on which to believe it to be the Word of God. We have also shown, that, on every principle, even on their own, they cannot refuse to admit as Scripture some books which they choose to reject. We may, then, conclude that Presbyterianism precludes the very possibility of making an act of faith, of believing any thing reasonable this pretended Confession of Faith may contain, undermines Christianity, and leaves men with empty shadows and sonorous words instead of religious truth. It is not a *confession*, it is a real, stanch, bold, and blasphemous *negation* of faith.

ART. V. — *Schiller's Æsthetic Theory.*

THE following communication, sent us by the accomplished translator of Schiller's *Æsthetic Prose*, noticed in our Review for July last, we very willingly insert, out of esteem for the writer.

“ This Review, for July, 1845, contained an article on Schiller's *Æsthetic Prose*, a work then just translated. It was more particularly a critique of his *Æsthetic Theory*, as developed in the series of letters upon human culture, raising fundamental objections thereto from the Christian point of view. But as it seemed to the writer of this that the theory in question not only sacrificed no Christian principle, but rather corroborated and sustained them all, at the same time being, if well understood, the ally and harbinger of Christian culture, the editor has, with great courtesy, opened his pages for a vindication of Schiller's position. The present article is an attempt at such, rather than at a distinct reply to the Review. As briefly as possible, it will be an exposition of the *Æsthetic Theory*, and its relation to Christianity. This, however, will involve a reply to the chief objection raised by the Reviewer against it; and

the attempt is hazarded from a deep sense of the beauty and practical necessity of the theory, and from a desire to establish it in the esteem of those who are watching for every thing that tends to reproduce the divine life in human hearts.

“ At first sight, Schiller's theory would seem to have no relation at all to any question of morals or of Christian culture. But this is owing solely to its abstract and æsthetic form. It seems intended to establish, by metaphysical disquisition, the laws which develop, at the best, only a true artist, or a good citizen of the state. Its composition was prompted by the events of the French Revolution, that great effort of the individual to annihilate the state, and substitute every shade and extreme of idiosyncrasy in place of that legal development and composite order of humanity which respects the state, because that is the finest result of the man. Schiller seems only to wish to solve that political problem, without recourse to experience: Can there be a pure state, and at the same time a pure humanity? or rather, What instrumentality will effect the latter, in order to create the former? He states the fine arts to be this medium, beauty to be a necessity of humanity, and the secret of culture to consist in the final equipoise of opposing impulses by its agency. And, at first sight, all the significance of his theory seems to be exhausted at this point alone. Even Herder called it one-sided and partial, probably because its form was purely æsthetic, while he must have seen that it was capable of a Christian application, and was intended to minister to every want of the human soul, whether political, moral, or artistic. The Reviewer sees this potential capacity of the theory, but considers it nevertheless to be deficient when carried to its ultimates. To us rather it seems eminently to subserve the cause of Christianity, and, for a pure product of the intellect, to be singularly manifold and exhaustive. It states a prime condition for the successful embodiment of Christianity in the life of man.

“ If Schiller meant to declare that the evolution of this ideal beauty, and the consequent equilibrium of reason and desire, of the subjective and the objective man (person and condition), completed man's culture, established a virtuous character, and fulfilled his destiny, the Reviewer might well object; since such a declaration would only raise a problem that would remain for ever innocent of a solution, — namely, How can this ideal beauty secure the absolute right? how can it, furthermore, *decide the will in favor of that right?* If Schiller meant to say that the *play-impulse* was equivalent to love, or even charity, that virtue was an affection of the passive nature, or that the said impulse could nerve a struggle against desire in favor of duty; if, in fine, it was his object to show, by means of his theory, that man can originate and put into practical operation the means of positive virtue, — that he is at once

lever and fulcrum, weight and power,— we might well thank the Reviewer for exposing the hateful visage of this idolatry, and for reprobating a system that would make revelation superfluous, and leave unanswered all the imminent question of grace and prayer. But to us,— we speak in deference, and yet with a feeling of great certainty,— to us Schiller appears to be guilty of no such blunders, but, on the contrary, to frame a theory which virtually excludes their possibility.

“ Briefly, the validity of his theory depends upon the force and meaning given to the play-impulse. If we can precisely define its function, we shall be able to decide whether or not the theory in question is ultimately Christian.

“ The *Æsthetic Letters* are an attempt to display the process which evolves man's freedom. Schiller explains, that he does not mean that freedom ‘ which necessarily appertains to man, considered as an intelligence, and which can neither be given to man nor taken from him ; but that which is based upon his compound nature.’ — p. 93. If this freedom, or equipoise of man's two essential ingredients, the residue of a last analysis, and the corroboration of his humanity, can be secured, he is thus, and thus alone, able to make definite acquisitions, to fulfil the laws of right, and to express in life all the moral truth of which he is conscious. It is evident that we are now giving his theory its Christian application, purposely avoiding to notice its capacity to include the citizen or the artist. Schiller confines himself throughout to this simple proposition of the necessity of freedom as the condition of culture. He does not say how man acquires a cognition of that duty which this state of freedom alone can make available to him ; whether it is an idea of the pure reason, or whether it is revealed to him *ab extra*. The decision of that question is not necessary to the integrity of his theory ; no matter in what way the ideas of right and of duty are presented to man, he can realize them successfully only through this preëstablished harmony, this freedom of his compound nature. Till that is gained, the free-will which he possesses as an intelligence is a superfluous and only potential energy. It can act with vigorous accuracy only when freed from either of his two ground-impulses, that is, when they mutually cancel each other, as forces, by the creation of an equipoise. But what shall create it ? What shall induce this state in man, which is neither subjectively nor objectively contingent, and yet neither internally nor externally constrained,— the state of *play* or freedom ? Schiller declares, that the intuition of beauty can alone create it, and evolve this play-impulse, which is not a force, but only the condition, the appearance, of a force, as a certain indeterminate state of water must precede its crystallization. It is a condition of mere determinableness, and yet without it no determination can ensue.

“The *Letters* themselves sufficiently and happily explain the validity of the division of man's nature into two primary impulses, the possibility of their indifferentism, or the evolution of the play-impulse, and also the manner in which the cognition of beauty can effect it. ‘As the æsthetic inclination of the mind gives the first impulse to freedom, it is easy to perceive that it cannot result from freedom, and consequently can have no moral origin. It must be a gift of nature; favoring accident alone can loose the bonds of the physical condition, and lead the savage to the shrine of beauty.’ — p. 129. Yet it is an accident which has all the conditions of universality and necessity. Nature is invariable in this respect, and everywhere makes her first attempt upon the mind as beauty. If Schiller seems, in any place, to make it a condition of certain circumstances and favorable conjunctures, he refers to the development of the ideal beauty; but even the savage is rescued from his animality by ‘delight in show, inclination for ornament and for play.’ The progress of the race from the necessitous state of nature to the state of freedom, which evolves the highest beauty, as among the Greeks, is described with great felicity in *Letters* XXVI. and XXVII. But all of them have such a strict logical sequence from the very first, and so skilfully develop the main idea, while clearing away objections, that to designate the particular scope of any fragment is only to tempt objections, which, after all, do not impinge upon the main design.

“To return. That this cognition of beauty is the only effective medium for the production of freedom will be evident when we attempt to apply any other known process or method of influence. In vain will you make a representation of truth, with the hope of bringing the will into harmony with duty. The will has not yet been provided with a free arena for its volitive power, and to say that any representation of duty will create this freedom is to say that the house can build the workmen. The will cannot make choice of duty, and attempt to fulfil the high requisitions of religion, till it is extricated from the distracting warfare of two impulses yet in a state of nature. That particular degree of culture is prerequisite which consists in removing the constraint of nature, and substituting an intermediate condition, which the will can take advantage of for the ulterior purposes of growth. The earth, with its cold moisture, its dark and coarse grains and passages, can never quicken the willing seed; the air, with its warmth and sunlight, a vast solution of vegetative principles, cannot tempt forth a single fibre to take root in nothing. But a mutual equipoise of these extremes, in lively activity and yet in harmony, is the only condition upon which the germ will put forth its capacities and establish its personality. The realization of the great law of duty is man's destiny; to that all culture points; the end cannot itself be a prelimi-

nary, the undeveloped and embarrassed will cannot do homage to the right, any more than a kraal of Hottentots can worship the tenderness of Raphael, or the majesty of Michel Angelo.

“Schiller still farther proves that the cognition of beauty is the only medium for the production of freedom, by proving that beauty is a necessity of humanity, and that its first development in any race or clime, whether rude and fragmentary or graceful and complete, is the first evolution of the play-impulse, which is equivalent to freedom. This requires an examination of experience and a historical treatment, better suited to an artistic discussion than to the purely abstract method pursued by Schiller. Still, a few hints and indications of facts sufficiently define his meaning, while they prove that moral culture has hitherto advanced, up to a certain point, in exact proportion to the development of the idea of beauty, even of that imperfect beauty afforded by experience. ‘In man, as presented by experience, beauty finds an already depraved and perverse matter, which robs it of its *ideal* perfection, in proportion as he blends with that his *individual* disposition. Far from defining its conception, with the crowd of critics, from isolated phenomena, and making *itself* responsible for the deficiency which man displays under its influence, we know, rather, that it is man who transfers to beauty the incompleteness of his individuality.’ — p. 80. He contrasts Rome with Greece to show that moral culture has advanced in exact proportion to the development of beauty, as far as a certain point. This point has always been identical with the point of highest cognition of the idea of right. The Greek nature was an example of perfect equipoise and freedom; the reason why so much, and yet why no more, determination ensued, is to be found in the degree to which truth and duty were cognized. The race was susceptible, but the moment did not favor, compared with the present. *Now*, ‘the favoring moment finds an unsusceptible race.’

“We now see the reason why Schiller, in common with all the highest minds of Germany, lays so much stress upon the phenomenon of Grecian art and culture. Seen from his point of view, it appears as if Greece was intended to symbolize to us the æsthetic state of freedom, which is the condition for all positive life, for the realization of all deeds of heroism and virtue. Its broad and equable development contrasts nobly with our one-sided and fragmentary culture, and we almost forget its indifferentism when contemplating its character of harmony and repose. The intensity of our modern life, the morbid growth of single faculties, the universal respect for the function as the unit-measure of the man, the million mental deformities which obtain in our social state, do more than spoil artists, scholars, citizens, and are quite as fatal to the heart as to the head. Our will is not free, as much because our culture offers it no vantage-ground of freedom and repose, as be-

cause certain passions and habits keep it down, like Gulliver fastened with a million hairs. Every thing concurs to mar our natures, and defeat our destiny, — the passional man rules with blind force, and interferes to complete the confusion commenced by a false development of intellect, and a culture which does not give us harmony and freedom, but only civilization and disease. A nineteenth century full of ancient Greeks would be full of better Christians. Had the old Athens of Plato been in that line of culture which went forth from the manger in Bethlehem, there would have been a veritable Zion; because the culture of the Greek secured to him his will, while the revelation of Christ would have manifested to him the way.

“ At the foot of the broad staircase of the Louvre, which leads to the picture-gallery, where modern art has collected numerous symbols of diseased modern culture, odds and ends of mind, monstrosities, partial beauties, entire shams, intense passions of the theatre and the pot-house, battle-pieces, portraits with eyes and noses of determined idiosyncrasy, there stands an antique bust of Jupiter. The stranger, eager to ascend the marble steps and revel in all the promised beauties of his catalogue, is arrested, in spite of his hot dilettantism, by that majestic antique, whose repose and self-sufficiency convey the keenest rebuke to the child of modern culture, hastening to distract and belittle himself still farther with the novel trifles of modern art. With what a godlike indifference do the serene eyes look forth beyond the bustle and *empressement* of that broad and splendid staircase, up which continually streams a current of little fragments of men and women, but no whole nature! It must be a man of uncommon impertinence who can gaze unabashed at that countenance of freedom, and who does not feel humbled beneath that expression of potential will. One is willing to linger for ever at the portal, and the obligation to go and see the pictures suddenly becomes distasteful and intrusive. The spell was hidden in that old chisel, long ago rusted and rotted, which struck out these lineaments of a self-poised nature, of a will waiting for its highest object. If only some green peak of the Olympic ridge had overshadowed Nazareth, and to a race so susceptible had been revealed its highest destiny!

“ But it were foolish in us to ignore so rich an experience as that ancient culture, and refuse to define it, to appropriate its lesson and make it tell upon the life of to-day. The Catholic Church has herself done the next best thing. She has filled her chapels with sweet faces of Mary, and holy, suffering faces of martyred saints; the vistas of her majestic naves are closed with canvasses made immortal by Annunciations, Ascensions, or that divine and melting tragedy of sorrow; the Mass of Mozart sweeps over that sea of bending hearts, so full of surging passions, like the voice of Jesus

over the stormy lake; the sanctified art of the Middle Ages invites men and women, in the very act of worship and confession, to tranquillity, and strives to create that free æsthetic condition which renders possible the mightiest efforts of a heaven-directed will. But has that art itself the requisite tranquillity? Has it not all the faults of modern culture? With rare exceptions, does it not too often distract and agonize, and miss the breadth and repose of antique art in too exclusive appeals to veneration, to sympathy, or to fancy? And yet whatever freedom from austerity, whatever grace and dignity, is found in the hamlets of the South of Europe, may safely be attributed to the altar-piece of the nearest church, or the perpetual miracle of its chiselled spire.

“With respect to Schiller’s theory, the point to be kept in prominence is this: the play-impulse is only an indeterminate condition. It cannot be equivalent to love, it affords no determination in any province of human nature. It is null, as far as positive action is concerned; and yet it is not null, because it makes determinate action possible. Schiller distinctly says:—‘It has been explicitly proved, that beauty affords no result either to the intellect or the volition, that it interferes in no operation either of reflection or resolution, that it only imparts to both the ability, but leaves the actual use of this ability undefined. Thus all external assistance is removed, and the pure logical form, the idea, must address itself directly to the intellect; the pure moral form, the law, directly to the volition. . . . Thus the most important task of culture consists in subjecting man to form, while yet in his pure physical life, and in making him æsthetic, so far only as the realm of beauty can ever extend,—since the moral condition can unfold itself only from the æsthetic, and not from the physical condition.’

“It follows from this, that, even if Schiller held the opinion, that virtue was to be placed in inclination, and duty to win obedience in the guise of beauty, it could in no wise be deduced from his æsthetic theory, nor could the play-impulse be rendered responsible therefor, because it is responsible for nothing; it only makes human nature fallow for the reception of truth, and free to gird itself for any struggle. Schiller did indeed diverge from the asceticism of Kant, and was not satisfied with his Judaic promulgation of the moral imperative. But while he sought to infuse the Christian principle of love or charity into the ethical system of Kant, he never meant to assert that duty could be made play, or that virtue was any thing less than a positive acquisition, based upon the sternest renunciation. It is to be won because it is decreed to be an imperative necessity of our natures; it is the end of our being. Yet none the less can we be taught to love that which is so supremely hard to obtain; and his nature certainly is the highest and best developed, the nearest to the Christian type, who has succeeded

in making his inclination coincide with the law of duty. Schiller was not so weak in theory or in practice as to demand that duty should be made easy; he did not believe in the *accidental*, but in the *necessary*, agreement of duty and inclination. The former results from the demands and impulses of a nature not yet in perfect balance, of a volition not yet free. The latter is the product of a nature which commenced with the æsthetic condition. 'That truly advances morality, which destroys the opposition between inclination and goodness.'

"There is much in the two essays, *Upon the Necessary Limits in the Use of Beautiful Forms*, and *Upon Æsthetic Manners*, which assists one to form a correct notion of the strictness of Schiller's ethical scheme. While in the *Letters* he allows to beauty no determining power, but only seeks to construct a determinable condition, in these *Essays* he limits with severity the influence of taste, declaring that no morality can exist where satisfaction determines the will. His great merit here consists in his skilful statement of the relation of taste and morals; a noble subject, and upon which no little loose thinking prevails. And nowhere does he utter one word of treason against the Christian duties of self-denial and sacrifice, but contends that these are part of virtue, and therefore to be loved.

"But how can they be loved, and how can virtue generally become an object of desire? Only by a personal experience of its desirableness, since our present condition demands a radical reversal of the soul's action. Our nature rather attaches the charm of inclination to the party of the passions. The savage, whom no culture has yet freed from the dominion of his physical condition, who does not desire nobly, because he does not contemplate noble ends, and who cannot will loftily, because no culture has bestowed upon him the requisite freedom, is a prey to his impulses, and that which is mere passional force cannot even be called inclination. The man, who, by means of the æsthetic condition, has emerged from his barbarism, and is free to choose to the extent of his cognitions, may be said to err through inclination; he follows the bias of his passions. But if he decides always, no matter at what sacrifice of inclination, in favor of virtue, he is under the constraint of duty; and yet this is the passage to that state of highest inclination, where duty begins to be loved on its own intrinsic merits, which it has by being identical with the nature of God, the lawgiver. This is the Christian state of charity, and ensues when we begin to love the Lord with all our heart and soul. The will is still determined by the necessity of duty, but renunciation is less severe only because our inclination now harmonizes with our duty. An intermediate struggle has turned the tables completely, and we play at that which was formerly our toil. This is the meaning of Schiller,

when he speaks of the coincidence of inclination and duty; he objects, with special distinctness, to the confusion of the natural inclination of the sensuous man with that inclination whose sole condition is the abolition of the former. And when he says, 'That truly advances morality which destroys the opposition between inclination and goodness,' he refers to that æsthetic condition which first sets in freedom the palsied will, and makes it able to abolish the natural inclination by commencing that intermediate struggle which leads to the love of duty. Thus we fall back again upon the function of the play-impulse, which is the first result of culture, regarding man as a race, and announcing a general law. Schiller's theory gives man his freedom, without lending a bias to his will. What condition more favorable for the cognition of right and duty, and for the realization in life of Christian principles!

"Then, so far as the main idea of this theory is concerned, one is at liberty to frame what special theology he will. It is opposed to neither the Catholic nor Protestant formulas, and is made neither more nor less valid by the application of any particular creed. The Catholic may believe in a supernatural order, and claim for it a vital difference from the order of grace assumed by the Protestant; the former may insist that though the latter makes use of the supernatural diction, he means nothing but the natural order and a natural destiny, — and the latter may maintain that the supernatural order of the Catholic is nothing but the Calvinistic order of grace. Schiller's theory contradicts neither position; it simply makes virtue possible, be it presented for cognition in forms never so various. It decides neither for nor against either; and the play-impulse is so strictly defined, that it cannot surpass its function to decide any thing whatever in the domain of theology. That function having now been explained, we leave the discussion of the theory, though many interesting but subordinate points might claim our attention. With many thanks for the editor's courtesy, we forbear trespassing farther upon his valuable pages, albeit the temptation is not small to write at greater length concerning Schiller and the value of his æsthetic works."

Mr. Weiss, the translator of Schiller's *Æsthetic Prose*, dissenting from our remarks on Schiller's æsthetic theory, in our Review for July last, has sent us the foregoing communication in its defence. He contends that we were wrong in representing that theory as repugnant to Christianity; for, in his judgment, it "not only sacrifices no Christian principle, but rather corroborates and sustains them all; . . . being, if rightly understood, the *ally* and the *harbinger* of Christian culture." If we adopted his reading of Christianity, we might, perhaps, admit this; for we confess we see no essential

difference between Schiller's æsthetic theory, and that Liberal Christianity, of which our friend is a worthy and devoted preacher. But when we speak of Christianity, we of course mean Christianity as the Church teaches it ; for we admit no Christianity, properly so called, independent of the Church ; and it is with the Christianity inseparable and indistinguishable from the Church, that we maintain Schiller's theory is utterly incompatible.

Schiller's theory is invented as a new theory of moral and social improvement, and, as such, arrogates to itself a part, at least, of the work which we are taught to ascribe to Christianity. This is alone sufficient, be its character in other respects what it may, to stamp it as anti-Christian ; for Christianity is sufficient and exclusive, and demands, and can admit, in the work of moral and social improvement, no rival and no ally. Any new theory in regard to such a work, or any theory outside and independent of Christianity, though really intended to be auxiliary to Christianity, must always be set down as repugnant to Christianity. Man cannot, without culpable presumption, attempt to do the work of God. When and where God speaks, he must be silent.

Schiller addressed his *Æsthetic Letters* to a nobleman of high rank, who was enamoured of the principles of the French Revolution, or rather who was carried away by the vague notions of liberty and felicity to be realized on earth, so rife throughout all Europe during the latter half of the last century, and still entertained by our young dreamers, socialists, radicals, and disorganizers. Schiller appears to have been as radical as any of his contemporaries in regard to the end they contemplated, though differing from many of them as to the proper method to be adopted for its realization. He, as well as they, believed in the possibility of a return of the age of gold, of recovering the Eden forfeited by sin ; and the real question which agitated him, and determined the tone and direction of his speculations, was, What are the practical means of reproducing this age of gold, or, in other words, of introducing and maintaining universal, social, and political freedom ? He begins by assuming that this freedom, or the right constitution and healthy action of the state, depends, as its necessary condition, on the inward or personal freedom of the individual. In this he differs from the French Republicans. They said, the freedom of the individual is the end, and the freedom of the state is the means ; reform the state, as the condition of reform-

ing the individual ; and therefore they made the revolution, deposed and beheaded their sovereign, and guillotined such of the noble, the beautiful, and the good, as preferred their recollections to their hopes. Schiller recoiled from this, as well he might. He reversed the maxim, and said, the freedom of the state is the end, that of the individual the means ; reform the individual, as the condition of reforming the state ; and gave us his æsthetic theory. This sounds much more philosophic than the formula of the French Republicans, but in reality it is less so. The Republicans made the state exist for man, and man for himself ; Schiller made man exist for the state, and the state for — nothing ; since, if the individual be able to attain to the freedom supposed without the state, the state is superfluous.

But having assumed that the freedom of the individual must be the foundation of the freedom of the state, Schiller's problem became, How shall the citizens or subjects of a state acknowledged to be corrupt and tyrannical be emancipated, and established in that personal freedom which is the prerequisite to social and political regeneration ? This, if we have not totally misapprehended it, is his real problem. The answer, as we gather it both from himself and his translator, is, that "the medium of this emancipation is the cognition of beauty," that is to say, the fine arts, artistic or æsthetic culture.

Man, according to Schiller, in his rude or primitive state, prior to æsthetic culture, is, in the category of nature, subject, to the law of necessity. This necessity is twofold, — the necessity of his condition, and that of his own nature. He is in this state not properly a *person*, but a *thing*, and subjected to natural laws as are other things. He can act, indeed, but to an end, not for the sake of an end, — instinctively, but not from reflection and volition, — and therefore is incapable of performing what are strictly speaking human acts, — *actus humani*. The first thing to be done, then, is to emancipate him from the thralldom of nature, to constitute his personality, and place him in the condition in which he can act freely, from reflection and volition. That is, he must be translated out of nature into humanity. This translation out of nature into humanity, or this constitution of the personality, is the evolution of what Schiller terms the play-impulse (*Spieltrieb*). How is this to be done ? By the cognition of beauty, or æsthetic culture. Hence the mission of art. It is art which liberates man from the thralldom of nature, creates him man, harmonizes all his

faculties or impulses, and constitutes him master of his condition and himself.

We understand this doctrine very well, but have now neither time nor space to enter into its full examination. It will suffice for our present purpose to consider it under its more popular aspects, and to indicate some of the points which are hostile to our holy religion.

1. The fundamental assumption with regard to the free and happy order which may be realized on this earth is false and unchristian. At the bottom of all Schiller's speculations lies the assumption, that there is, as it were, a heaven which we may realize in this world and from this world; that it is possible to introduce and maintain a political and social order in which all our natural wants shall be satisfied, in which we shall be free from all constraint, exempt from all troubles, disappointments, and vexations, in which there shall be no disturbing forces, no anxiety, no sorrow, no wrath, no bitterness, but all shall be peace, plenty, love, and joy. But this, Christianity teaches us, is neither possible nor desirable, and therefore is never to be proposed as an object of pursuit. In assuming it, and proposing it as an end, Schiller is, then, at war with Christianity, as are all classes of socialists of the present day. The Christian looks upon this life as intended by Providence to be a penance, a probation, a trial, a discipline, and places his hopes of happiness exclusively in the world to come. It is idle to deny this. Christianity was not given to remove the evils and misery of this life, but to teach us patience and resignation under them; and to enable us to convert them into the richest blessings, by humbly submitting to them for God's sake. It sanctions none of the maxims of the socialists, but reverses them all. God's ways are not man's ways. When he comes to redeem us, he comes not in the greatness, majesty, and glory of the Godhead, but with his divinity veiled under a human form, — not with the lofty step of the conquering hero, or the pomp and state of the earthly monarch, but as a servant in lowly life, the son of a poor virgin, living in poverty and want, and followed only by fishermen and publicans, and at last dying on the cross. Even now, when he comes upon our altars or communicates himself to the faithful, to gladden the heart, strengthen the soul, and give us a foretaste of heaven, he conceals not only his divinity, but also his humanity, and appears under the ignoble forms of bread and wine, — teaching us that our greatness is in our littleness, our

strength in our weakness, our glory in our humility. He comes not thus, as mad dreamers allege, because his mission is specially to the poor, because he comes merely, as we hear it blasphemously taught, as a modern socialist, radical, leveler, or democratic revolutionist, — but to sanctify poverty, to abash the pride of the world, and to show us that our good is not in that which the nations seek after, but in that which they despise; for the poor man, that is not also poor in spirit, is no dearer to him than the rich man “faring sumptuously every day.” It is through much tribulation and suffering that we must enter into the kingdom of heaven. Therefore it is that the saints always turn their backs on the world, trample its riches and luxuries beneath their feet, and make themselves poor and afflicted, that they may have true riches and joy with Christ in heaven. All this may be foolishness to our socialists and conceited reformers, but the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men. Salvation comes from the humility of the cross. What the Christian looks for in this world is not earthly felicity, is not that he may be full with the goods of this world, and have his “eyes stand out with fatness,” but that he may sacrifice the sacrifices of justice, and hope in God for his reward hereafter. He believes that blessed are the poor, those that suffer, and those that weep; for the afflictions of this life are designed by our merciful Father to prepare us for the beatitude of the life to come. He thus seeks the cross, and embraces it with the most ardent affection; and, in so doing, receives the highest good he is capable of receiving.

The error of our socialists on this point is one of no small magnitude. They all — and in this respect we do not see that Schiller differs essentially from them — regard our true good as realizable on earth, and in some way or other dependent on our external condition. In this they show clearly their hostility to Christianity. Our real good is not realizable in this life, save by promise; for we do not and cannot accomplish our destiny here. We live here by hope, not by fruition. Then, again, what is really for our good here is in no case and in no sense whatever dependent on our external condition. It is, in all cases, independent of circumstances. We need no change in our external condition and circumstances, in order to receive the highest good of which we are capable. God may be found by the humblest and most abject slave, as well as by the proudest potentate of the earth; and the soul

that finds God, or to whom God reveals himself, has all good, even the supreme good itself. While we are seeking to better ourselves by bettering our condition, to prepare ourselves for virtue and happiness by struggling to create a new political, social, or industrial order, we overlook this fact, draw our minds off from God, fix our affections on things of the earth, and lose for ever our true good. Labor not for the meat that perisheth, but for the meat that endureth unto everlasting life. If you would be truly wise, seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and fear nothing for the rest. If you believe not this, have at least the manliness to avow that you believe not Christianity.

2. But we cannot accept Schiller's account of the rude or primitive state of man. Man is not primitively a thing, but essentially a person. There is no such necessity of nature as is alleged, from which he needs to be emancipated. Man, we admit, is enslaved, is a slave to his condition, and to his appetites, propensities, and passions; but if there be any truth in Christianity, this slavery is voluntary, not necessary, — the effect, not of his want of freedom, but of his abuse of his freedom. So far as this is not the case, he is never, and can never, be emancipated. As long as he lives, he must be affected in both his intellect and his sensibility by the objective world; for he does not and cannot make the world in which he lives; and so long as he remains here, concupiscence remains, against which he must struggle. We deny, on the one hand, that man is subject to such a necessity of nature as Schiller assumes; and, on the other, the possibility of such a liberty as he contends for.

3. So far as man is voluntarily enslaved, he needs to be emancipated; but we deny that the emancipation implied is effected or can be effected by the cognition of beauty, or even of truth and goodness. The simple cognition is never sufficient to liberate the soul, and place man, in his interior nature, above himself and his condition. If there be any thing certain, it is, that Christianity teaches that this liberation is possible only by divine grace infused into the heart, elevating and strengthening the will, and inclining it to God. So far as the evolution of Schiller's play-impulse designates a state of freedom not purely imaginary, but possible and desirable, it is to be effected, not by æsthetic culture, but by the infusion of divine grace and by *Christian* culture, or ascetic discipline.

These three considerations are sufficient to justify our objec-

tions to Schiller's theory on the ground of its repugnance to Christianity. But Mr. Weiss thinks that it is, nevertheless, the ally and harbinger of Christianity. His view, if we rightly seize it, is, that the evolution of the freedom Schiller intends to express by the word *play-impulse* is the necessary preparation for Christianity, or preliminary condition of its operation and influence. It is, therefore, necessary to Christianity, the "prime condition of the embodiment of Christianity in the life of men." If Schiller's account of the rude or primitive man were to be received, some preparation for Christianity would undoubtedly be necessary, for Christianity can do nothing for man before he exists. Man must be, before he can be the subject of Christian influences. But if this account be rejected, and man assumed to be in all states what Christianity represents him to be, no such preliminary work is necessary or admissible. No preparation for grace is admissible, because grace must go before all efforts at our emancipation, or else those efforts will be unavailing. It can go before, for we know it can begin to operate from the first moment of our existence, since the holy prophet Jeremias and St. John the Baptist were each sanctified from his mother's womb, and since infants from the moment of birth are regenerated in holy baptism.

But it seems that we were wrong, according to Mr. Weiss, in identifying Schiller's play-impulse with love, and also in ranking Schiller among modern idolaters. Possibly we were; but it may be well to bear in mind that the complaints of misrepresentation, which theorists and their friends make whenever their theories are represented in an unfavorable light, are, as a general rule, to be received with some hesitation. For ourselves, we are much inclined to believe that whoever will set forth any modern theory, German theory especially, in its true light, will be accused by its friends of ignorance, of misapprehension, and misrepresentation. The modern mind, the modern German mind in particular, is remarkable for its subjectivity, and the universe it explains by its theories is never the universe existing objectively *in re*, nor even in the conceptions of the general reason, but the universe which exists in the individual reason, imagination, fancy, or idiosyncrasies of the theorist himself. The theorist constructs his theory, not from *data* furnished him by the objective world, the world which exists alike for all men, but from *data* which are furnished by the world which exists for him alone, or the few who may be able to content themselves to see all with his eyes.

This is especially true of nearly all our modern German theorists. Though boasting of their universality and "many-sidedness," they are remarkable for their narrowness, "one-sidedness," and egoism. Their eyes are always fixed on their own individual *Ich*, or *me*, and rarely in their speculations do they ever get out of its sphere. It is this fact which makes it so extremely difficult for them to explain themselves to scholars of other schools, and which makes them fancy, whenever their theories are translated by scholars of broader and more comprehensive views, that they are misrepresented. The fact is, that, when their theories are exhibited to the general intelligence of mankind, they do not recognize them, because they are then necessarily divested of what they had received from the idiosyncrasies of their framers. This æsthetic theory of Schiller, for instance, is deduced from another theory entertained by its author, and this other theory, not from man and nature as they really are, or as they are in the general intelligence, but as they are in Schiller's own *Ich* or *me*. But in explaining it, we must not explain it from Schiller's point of view, for that he himself has done, and our explanation would be no explanation at all; but we must explain it from the point of view of the universal reason, or of objective truth. In doing this, we necessarily and very properly eliminate all that is idiosyncratic, all that depends on Schiller's own peculiar mode of seeing reality, and retain only what may be made intelligible to all men, and without Schiller as well as with him. But we cannot do this without making the theory appear very different, and apparently another theory, from what it appears to him and to his friends. Yet we do not thus misrepresent it, but truly represent it.

In the brief exposition we gave of the theory in question, we aimed simply to present its leading features in the light of general philosophy, or its essential principles in such a light as to be truly apprehended by the general intelligence. We sought, in a word, simply to translate the theory out of Schiller's private reason into the reason of the race; and we have seen, as yet, no ground to think that we did not render him truly and faithfully. That Schiller used the term *play-impulse* to designate the freedom or state which he assumed to result from the cognition of beauty or æsthetic culture, we were not ignorant; but we identified it with love, for the very reason that he gave it as the *effect* of the cognition of beauty. If Schiller relied on this effect as the condition of virtue, he relied on sentiment,

or an affection of the passive nature, which we term love, as distinguished from charity, because it can be nothing else. Thus we reasoned, and if Schiller himself reasoned differently, that was his fault, not ours. Schiller certainly relies on art or æsthetic culture to evolve that inward state which is to him the condition *sine qua non*, at least, of all virtuous action. But the subjective principle of the power or influence of art is the sensibility. The province of art is to embody or reveal the beautiful. The intellect apprehends the beautiful, which affects the sensibility and produces a sentiment which, in our language, is called *love*. Here begins and ends the whole influence of art. Here is the whole sphere of the influence of æsthetic culture; for any culture extending beyond this sphere is not æsthetic, but moral, religious, social, or intellectual. Then, in making the cognition of beauty the medium of the liberation of the individual from the thralldom of nature, and of placing him in the condition to do his duty, or to be virtuous, Schiller necessarily relied on love. To excite this love by appeal to the sensibility, and to evolve the play-impulse, are precisely one and the same thing, as all must admit. Where, then, is our error in identifying the play-impulse with what we termed love?

We are not quite ignorant of the German æsthetic theories in general. We know very well that many among ourselves, half Germanized, regard man as endowed with a faculty distinct from intellect, from will, and from sensibility, to which art addresses itself, — a faculty which they cannot name, define, nor describe, and the existence of which no sound psychologist can admit. There is no peculiar mystery in the influence of art. Such is our nature, that, when we have intuition of the beautiful, it moves our sensibility, attracts us towards it, and affords us a sensible delight. This is all. Beauty appeals, as beauty, not to the intellect, not to the will, but solely to the sensibility. In relation to the intellect it is truth, to the will it is goodness. But art, as art, deals with beauty alone, and its aim is to affect the sensibility. It may affect it, and turn it towards what is true and good, and then it aids intellectual and moral culture; or it may turn it in an opposite direction, and then it becomes the minister of vice and corruption. In the former case, it is commendable and useful; in the latter, it is not. But it is as much art in the one case as in the other. There is more perfect art in the *Elective Affinities* than in the *Wilhelm Tell* or the *Wallenstein*.

Nor is it true that the general tendency of art, or æsthetic culture, is to liberate the mind. The panders to vice know very well that art is one of the most effectual means of enchaining their victims, and do not fail to enlist architecture, poetry, music, painting, sculpture, in their service, as is but too well known; and we may lay it down as an invariable rule, that art uniformly tends to corrupt, when not *preceded* and accompanied by high spiritual, or moral and religious culture. Art, in the hands of the saint, ministers to virtue; in the hands of the sinner, to vice. The soul must have been liberated, the will elevated, its affections purified, by other than æsthetic influences, before æsthetic culture can aid moral progress. The "love of show and finery" is not a proof of that inward freedom desired, is not a preparation for the gospel of truth, as our friend imagines; but is itself a vice, and the indication of a soul already enslaved by a hateful passion. Certainly we cannot regard those of our sisters, or our wives and daughters, who manifest the love for show and finery in the highest degree, as being the nearest the kingdom of heaven, or as being in the best possible state to listen to the Gospel, and to yield to its self-sacrificing precepts.

That we were wrong in classing Schiller with modern idolaters, we do not admit. Modern idolatry does not consist in worshipping wood or stone, four-footed beasts, the stars of heaven, or images made with men's hands; but in worshipping humanity itself. For charity it substitutes the sentiment of love, for the love of God the love of man, for heaven the earth, and for revelation the instincts of the race. It makes man the beginning and end, the *a quo* and the *ad quem* of all right action. From man, too, it looks for all its strength, all the force or power requisite to work out our true good. All its theories presuppose the sufficiency of man, and its study is to find out how man, by exerting his own energy, may effect the end he holds to be desirable. It may admit in words a Supreme Being, but this Supreme Being is to be found only in the fixed and invariable laws of nature and the human soul, and aids us only because such is the character of these laws, that, if we conform to them, we shall find ourselves better off than if we neglect them. To obey him is simply to follow nature, to conform to the natural order,—the old Epicurean doctrine under a new dress, entirely excluding Providence, and all active interference of the Creator in the government of the world. God has made the world, and leaves it to itself.

If it recognizes Jesus Christ, or, out of deference to the prejudices of the age, resolves to *patronize* him for a time, it is simply as a brother man, who is worthy of our respect, inasmuch as he has suggested some wise rules for the regulation of life, and has set us in his own life an example of a very high order of excellence, worthy of our imitation, and serving to show us what we may ourselves be and do if we choose.

Now, it is well known that Schiller was no Christian, or may be known by any one who will read his *Philosophical Letters*. He was in his way a Reformer, and sought to remake man; but all his theories imply that he did not look beyond man himself, and that man is his own beginning and end. His love was for man, his hope was placed in man, and out of man, by aid of æsthetic culture, was to arise the new and brilliant social order he contemplated. He therefore belonged to the class of modern idolaters, and we were not wrong in designating his theory as one of the forms of modern idolatry. Practically, it would prove to be one of the worst of these forms, because it places first in order of time and rank, and as the foundation of all other culture, æsthetic culture; which is to place the sensibility above reason and will. To place sensibility above reason and will, when it comes to morals, is to place the inferior soul above the superior, the flesh above the spirit.

There are several other matters on which Mr. Weiss, in vindicating Schiller, touches, that we must reluctantly pass over. He has travelled and can speak of art from personal observation, an advantage we cannot claim. But, with all deference, we must doubt the superiority in all respects of Grecian over Christian art, or of the Greeks as a race over the Jews. We do not think it is really a matter of regret that our Lord did not choose to be born of a Greek virgin instead of a Jewish, or that in this respect the Supreme Wisdom committed a blunder. We are far also from believing the Gospel would have been improved, even if "some green peak from the Olympic ridge" had overshadowed the cradle of Bethlehem. The Greeks have unquestionably contributed somewhat to the artistic culture of the race, but we owe far less to this vain, fickle, turbulent, faithless race, than is commonly imagined by scholars. Of what is valuable in modern civilization, which we have retained from the ancient heathen world, a much larger part is due to the ancient Romans than to the ancient Greeks. The Greek mind was subtle, but sophistical. It

wanted the balance, the sober common sense, and the firm grasp of principle, which belonged to the Roman mind. But this is a topic we cannot now discuss.

Schiller's translator thinks that the nearer inclination and duty coincide, the nearer do we approximate the Christian type ; that is, we advance in Christian perfection in proportion as we find in our flesh less and less opposition to duty. There may, perhaps, be a sense in which this is true ; but we confess we do not know in what sense. As long as we live in this world, concupiscence remains, and there must be a struggle, a warfare, between the flesh and the spirit ; and the more we advance in sanctity, the higher the degree of perfection to which we attain, the more severe does the struggle become, because the more acute is our perception, on the one hand, of what is good, and, on the other, of what is evil. The greater the saint, the greater the struggle ; and hence it is that the saints always regard themselves as the greatest of sinners, and are the most deeply affected by a sense of their imperfections, the most convinced of the necessity of mortification, and of the assistance of divine grace to keep them from falling. That, in proportion as we advance, the inclinations of the will coincide with duty, is true ; but that the inclinations of the flesh, the inclinations in question, do, we have not yet learned, and do not believe ; for the saint must always say " in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing, for it is not subject to the law of God, nor indeed can be." Hence, the combat must be maintained, and, till we are raised in glory, ever will it be necessary to chastise our bodies, to mortify the flesh, and to be assisted by supernatural grace, to prevent the flesh from gaining the mastery over the spirit. — But we are probably talking of matters foreign to the ordinary thoughts of our Liberal Christian preacher, and of which we ourselves are but poorly qualified, neophyte as we are, to speak at all. We leave the subject, confident that we have said enough to justify us in asserting as we did, that Schiller's *Æsthetic Theory* is incompatible with Christianity. It is one of the numerous theories invented in modern times to supersede the Gospel of our Lord, and therefore we cannot entertain it, cannot afford it any countenance, but must, whatever the genius or ability it indicates in the author, condemn it as a theory, and without reserve.

BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JULY, 1846.

ART. I. — *Liberalism and Catholicity. A Letter from a Protestant Minister, with a Reply.*

THE following letter comes to us from a very estimable young Protestant minister of our acquaintance, and for whom we have personally a very high regard. It was occasioned by a conversation we recently had with him, in which we labored to impress upon his mind that he was bound in prudence and in morals to give the great question of Catholicity, at least, a fair, candid, and thorough investigation. We do not know whether he expected us to publish his letter or not; but it deserves a reply, and a more elaborate reply than we are just now able to give it, unless we may at the same time make it answer the purpose of an article in our Review. Moreover, the "obstacles" of which he speaks may be in the way of others as well as of himself; and therefore, in replying publicly, we may be doing a service not only to him, but also to a whole class, and perhaps a very numerous class. We suppress his name and residence, that we may not have even the appearance of betraying any confidence, expressed or implied, which he may have reposed in us.

“ ——— April 9, 1846.

“ DEAR SIR : —

“ I have considered your arguments, saving this month's number, which I have not yet read. But there are certain obstacles which prevent the reasonings from having much weight, and seem to me to make the case logically hopeless.

“ I. I do not object to your position, that 'faith is impossible out of the Catholic Church'; for the only 'Catholic Church' I can acknowledge at present comprises 'those who share the faith and sal-

vation of Christ,' so that this becomes an identical proposition. The epithet 'Roman' to me neutralizes that of 'Catholic.'

"II. Again, if *faith* means any thing else than trust, or apprehension of things spiritual, whichever definition I choose to take (as distinct from intellectual belief of given propositions), or if *salvation* means any thing else than the progressive enlightenment, freedom, and spiritualizing of the soul (as distinct from the deliverance from impending torture in the flames of hell), you must be aware that such other interpretations of these words require some authorized interpreter to sustain them. You cannot suppose I am ready to accept such interpretation without proof; and you would hardly be guilty of such a paralogism, as to make use, in argument, of a proposition sustained by an authority which it is the very purpose of your argument to lead me to accept. And if you quote Scripture (as Mark xvi, 16 and Heb. xi, 6), you must be aware, that, even granting absolute authority to every word of Scripture (which is the utmost limit of intellectual faith a non-Romanist can have), I am at perfect liberty, by my own principles, to give any such explanation to any of the words as is in accordance with my general belief and prevailing habits of thought. As a matter of logic, then, whatever else your arguments may be, they cannot have any force to draw me towards accepting your position. As I said before, logical Romanism and logical Liberalism are each complete and consistent in itself, and there is no passage-way of reasoning between them. As for illogical Protestantism, you may seize on its inconsistencies, and force it logically to one or the other of these two positions; but when it has reached either of them, it takes something besides argument to bring it over to the other.

"III. There is another difficulty in the way of your argument, which you have not met to my own satisfaction. To accept the claims of the Roman Church either involves an 'act of faith,' or it does not. If it does, this is the same as saying that an act of faith (granting your own definition and usage of the phrase) is required, preliminary to any possible, or even supposable, act of faith; which is absurd. If, on the other hand, such acceptance does not involve an act of faith, then the investigation of the claims of that Church becomes a purely intellectual process, requiring only the clearness of mind and moral honesty which any other intellectual process requires. And on my ground (I do not say on yours), it is utterly wicked and absurd to denounce any penalty beforehand upon any result deliberately and candidly arrived at. Such denunciation would be a defiance of the first and simplest axiom of all reasoning together between man and man; namely, that no threats must be introduced, or any extraneous element whatever, to influence the determination either way.

"I do not say that no Protestant can ever become a Romanist.

This would be to contradict well known facts. But I do say that no purely logical process can suffice for such a result; and this impossibility your own arguments have abundantly shown. Of course, until your proposition of the authority of the Roman Church is accepted, your deduced assertions or corollaries (such as the impossibility of faith without it, the superiority of its culture, and the peculiar blessedness of its belief or ritual) must go for nothing at all. You must be logician enough to see this, and its bearing on the minds of your Protestant readers. And I do not see how you can avoid perceiving that your whole train of reasoning is a parallogism; because the authority and necessity of the Roman Church are assumed in every single step, and consequently your arguments can have no logical weight with one who does not accept them.

“I do not blame you for thus assuming and continually bringing forward what has become the principle and groundwork of your faith. It would be inconsistent with my own principles not to welcome, or at least respect, every evidence of faith and sincerity, coming from any quarter of that Holy Catholic Church or spiritual communion, which includes every pure thought, and righteous desire, and holy life of every age. It would be painful to meet one who differs from me, even in grave matters, as perforce an antagonist. The Roman hierarchy, not the faith of Romanists, is what, in my understanding, I am steadily opposed to; and far be it from me to reproach any one for his adherence to that which gives him life and strength. But I do wonder a little that you should use the arguments and appeals you do, supposing they can have effect on those you mean to influence; or else that by a false show of logic you should seek unfairly to bewilder, and perhaps convert, those who are not prepared to understand or appreciate the real points of difference. You could not much value such conversion as that.

“You rightly speak of this as (on your ground) the gravest question that a man can propose to himself. You cannot consent that it should be answered in a bewildered, sophisticated, and hurried state of mind. And the real answer to it, as you must know, is through the history of the Church and the world. A profound historical investigation, a thorough appreciation of the grounds of historical evidence, a familiarity with the events and lessons of past ages, and especially a clear and systematic understanding of the religious and intellectual culture, as well as political and social institutions, of the human race, are the essential preliminaries to the intelligent and independent determination of that question. My argument (III.) must convince you that this is the only way to answer it; at least, the only way in which I should be willing to answer it. And for those who have not ability or leisure for such an inquiry, we need not imagine their case must be hopeless. As I believe the

Roman Church itself acknowledges unavoidable ignorance will be pardoned; and the true condition of salvation is, that each should act up to the measure of faith or of light he has.

"There are two methods of argument by which one may be led from his own to another form of belief. The one is purely logical, proceeding from certain common principles, known and acknowledged on both sides. I think I have abundantly shown that this method can have no weight with a consistent and intelligent Protestant. The other is historical; based on a critical investigation of past facts and institutions, and involving an amount and kind of labor and learning, which must, from the nature of the case, be attainable by very few. As to this latter, which I maintain to be the only legitimate method of establishing your position, you must be aware how very incompetent I am at present to carry it to a certain conclusion. In the mean time, it is only laying claim to that amount of honesty which every opponent of common sense must allow (or else all his arguments are but worthless bullying and blarney), to say, that whatever shall seem to me established, I will acknowledge and profess, whether Romanism or 'No-Church.' And from the axiom (which every religious inquiry demands), that a just and merciful God presides over the issues of human life, I cannot possibly feel any alarm or distrust in pursuing such an investigation with perfect independence of mind; or feel the smallest hesitation or scruple in acting consistently with my present convictions, until a course of reasoning like that I have indicated shall compel me to abandon them.

"Till then I am yours in respect, though in dissent."

The first remark we make on this letter is, that it fully concedes, what we have so often asserted, and what is becoming a very general conviction, that there is no middle ground between Liberalism — No-Churchism as we call it — and Catholicity. This is much, and augurs well. It proves that the writer has good stuff in him, that he is no *via media* man, trying to steer his course equidistant between truth and falsehood, — no time-server, no trimmer, no logical coward, shrinking from the avowal of the legitimate and necessary consequences of his own premises. It is true, he at present inclines strongly to the side of Liberalism, but this does not discourage us. He will hardly need to try Liberalism as long and as thoroughly as we tried it, before he rejects it, and gladly embraces Catholicity. If he retains any consciousness of a single religious want, if he ever feels himself, as all not utterly reprobate do and must feel themselves, oppressed with a load of guilt, and beset on every hand with numerous, powerful, and vigilant

enemies to his virtue ; or if, in some trying moment of his life, he is forced to send an anxious glance into the darkness which for him must brood over the tomb, and which no ray from natural reason can furrow, even for a single instant, he will never be able to content himself with mere Liberalism, but must demand, whether he find it or not, something less vague and negative, something more positive, more illuminative, more effective to heal, to elevate, to protect, and to sanctify the soul.

In replying to the objections urged in the letter before us, we shall not follow precisely the order adopted by the writer, but an order which better suits our own convenience, and which will better enable our readers to perceive the bearing, connection, and force of what we have to offer. Whatever the writer of the letter intended, his objections are, strictly speaking, not so much objections to the Church, as to our method of setting forth and defending her claims ; but we shall consider them both as they affect our own reasoning and as they affect the question of the Church herself. The principal objections urged are resolvable into the two following, namely:—1. The authority of the Church is, in its nature, unprovable. 2. An act of faith in the Catholic sense is impossible. These are regarded as objections *a priori* to Catholicity, and requiring to be removed before any argument or testimony in her favor can be introduced.

I. The authority of the Church is, in its nature, unprovable. This the writer contends is evident from our own arguments ; all the arguments we have used or can use in support of the Church involve a paralogism ; for they all proceed from premises which it requires the authority of the Church to furnish or legitimate. We begin with what concerns the arguments we have ourselves used. The writer alleges in effect against them : You conclude the Church, without which faith is not possible, from the necessity of faith to salvation. But the Church is as necessary to prove to me that faith is necessary to salvation, or that there are or can be such things as faith and salvation in the sense you contend, as it is to enable me to elicit an act of faith. We reply,—

1. That our argument involves a paralogism, when adduced in defence of the Church against those who do not admit salvation and faith as its indispensable condition in the sense we allege, may be true ; when adduced as an *argumentum ad hominem* against those who admit both, we deny. But it was only as an *argumentum ad hominem* we adduced the special argument

objected to. We were reasoning against those Protestant Christians who admit our premises ; and our design was to show them, that, on their own principles, they are bound either to accept the Catholic Church, or to deny the possibility of salvation.

2. Though in one part of our argument we argue as the objection alleges, yet in the main argument itself we do not. By recurring to the article entitled *The Church against No-Church*, in our Review for April, 1845, pp. 143, 144, the only article we have published in which we give a general argument for the Church, it will be seen that our point of departure is farther back, and that we proceed to argue to the Church from the necessity of faith to salvation not till after we have established both faith and salvation in the very sense in which we take them in the argument. That we began by assuming "the divine origin and authority of the Christian religion" we grant, because we were defending the Church against one who claimed to be a Christian, and a Christian minister ; and we judged it, as we said expressly, to be discourteous to reason with him as we would with a Jew, Pagan, Mahometan, or Infidel. We presumed we had a right to take him at his word, and that it would be superfluous to go farther back in our argument than to the simple assumption of the Christian religion as a divine and authoritative religion. Assuming the divine origin and authority of the Christian religion, we proceeded to establish, by authorities that could not be objected to without rejecting Christianity altogether, that all who receive it at all are logically bound to receive the Catholic Church, or admit that Christian salvation, whatever it may mean, is impossible. This argument is legitimate, not only against those who admit salvation, and faith as its indispensable condition, but also against all who admit the Christian religion at all as a divine and authoritative religion.

3. If only a part of our general argument be taken, it involves a paralogism when urged against those Protestant *Christians* who reject Christianity altogether, we concede ; that it does when taken as a whole, we deny. The writer objects to the argument because he takes only that part of it which had a special purpose, and overlooks it as a whole. In the article referred to, pp. 174 - 179, which we shall soon quote at length, when turning to the positive proofs of the Church, or the divine commission of the *ecclesia docens*, we go back of Christianity itself, and point out and defend the method by which the divine authority of the Church may be established against those who

reject all revelation, on the ground of our correspondent, that the supernatural is not provable. We then show that the authority of the Church is provable without any *argumentum ad hominem*, or the assumption of any premise which reason is not competent to furnish or legitimate. It must be shown what we have there said is not to the purpose, is unsound in principle, or unsustained by facts, before we can be rightfully accused of attempting to prove the Church by a paralogism.

4. Moreover, we publish, Reviewer as we are, our arguments in detached essays, and nowhere profess in any one essay to give a complete view of the argument for the Church, or of all we may have to adduce in her defence. It is necessary to take what is urged in one essay, though not in another, so far as pertinent, as an integral part of our general argument. The essay our correspondent has noticed is simply a reply to some special objections raised by the *Episcopal Observer* to a part of the reasoning in our previous article on *The Church against No-Church*, the main purpose of which was not to prove the Church against all classes of objectors, but against a special class, as its title indicates; though, in prosecuting the argument, we took occasion incidentally to indicate the method of defending the Church against several classes. But in the same number (April, 1845), we insert, from the French of the celebrated Dr. Evariste de Gypendole, an article which professes to defend the Church, not against one class of objectors only, but against all objectors, past, present, and to come; and which actually contains, amid a world of wit and pleasantry, not duly appreciated by our unbelieving readers, an argument absolutely conclusive, in which we defy all the intellects in the world to find the least flaw or fallacy. If Christianity had a miraculous origin, or if the phenomena it exhibits are inexplicable without a miracle, it is from God, is his truth, and you have nothing to do but to receive it as such. Mrs. Jones, at her distaff, or any old woman in the land, of either sex, knows enough to know this. If you deny miracles, be so good as to explain the introduction of Christianity into the world, its reception, spread, and preservation as a divine, authoritative religion for eighteen hundred years, down to the present moment, among what on all hands must be conceded to be the most civilized, enlightened, and moral portion of mankind. There stands the fact before you, and there it has stood in all ages and in all lands for eighteen hundred years, no more to be denied or mistaken than the nose on your face. In some way you must explain it; and it

will require a miracle a million times greater to explain it without a miracle, than it will to explain it with a miracle. Here is what the excellent Doctor proves, and which you do not seem to have remarked.

Does our Protestant minister doubt it? Let him reflect, that, however agreeable or acceptable the Christianity he contends for may be to natural reason and the natural heart, the Christianity the race has believed, and still persists in believing, is quite another thing. The Christianity it has believed, and still persists in believing, is repugnant to our whole nature. It mortifies our pride, crucifies our natural propensities, balks and baffles our reason, commands our detachment from the world, the abandonment of our dearest and most cherished interests, the entire renunciation of ourselves, and the total surrender of even our reason and will, all that we have, and all that we are, to an absolute authority, in whose decisions we have no voice, and which, be they what they may, we must receive without question, and from the heart and conscience obey, without reserve and without reluctance. Does this commend itself to our young friend? Is he prepared to accept this religion? Will he go down on his knees before a man like himself, perhaps even a sinful man, and tell him all the secrets of his life, all his offences, his most filthy acts and thoughts, even those which he reddens to recall in the silence and solitude of his own self-examination? Will he? Not he. He can hardly restrain himself as he reads our statement. All that he regards as noble and manly in his nature rises indignant, as he contemplates this religion even at a distance. He feels that such a religion outrages all his rights and dignity as a man. He looks with a sort of loathing on the mean-spirited slaves who not only consent to wear, but even voluntarily bow down their necks to receive, its degrading and debasing yoke. It is too much for him. His benevolence is fired, his higher and nobler instincts are aroused, and, as it were, call out to him from the very depths of his humanity to rise, arm himself, go forth and strike, and strike home, for freedom, — to break asunder the bonds of the insulting tyrant, and liberate his long enslaved brethren from their thralldom, — to knock off, and for ever, those fetters which have rusted into their flesh, and eaten into their very souls. So feels, so speaks, human nature in our young friend, when he contemplates the Catholic religion. But human nature in all ages, and in each individual, is essentially what it is in our young Protestant minister; and in all, and in every age, then, it must, so far as human nature,

have manifested the same repugnance to this religion it does in him, and been as opposed to its reception as he finds it. Does he think this religion could ever, without a miracle, have gained a footing in a world presenting such an opposition as his? Could even he, without a miracle, embrace it? Yet it has gained a footing, and become the dominant, the only progressive, religion of the race. Men have received it, have believed it, have submitted their reason to it, bowed down their stubborn wills to it, have fought for it, have suffered the extremest tortures for it, died for it, allowed themselves to be burnt, to be crucified, to be torn by wild beasts for it, and, perhaps, more than all, have *lived* for it, and lived it. How, on the principles of human nature, without the intervention of Almighty God, without a miracle, a perpetual miracle, could this religion make its way in the world,—not only without, but in despite of, the civil authority, against an opposition as strong as that which our young friend experiences, perpetually renewed in each age and in each individual submitting to it? But if you concede the intervention of the Almighty, if you concede miracles, it is from God, is his religion; the controversy is ended, and the “bite in the head” is radically cured. Here is no paralogism, but a rigid induction from incontestable facts, and absolutely conclusive against all objectors, past, present, and to come, as the excellent Dr. Evariste de Gypendole justly maintains. This argument, though extracted from an admirable little French work, and translated for us by an eminent member of the Catholic hierarchy in this country, we have a right against the opponents of the Church to claim as ours. The writer of the letter is mistaken, then, when he assumes that we argue to the Church only from premises not attainable without assuming the authority of the Church.

5. Nor does what the writer alleges, with regard to our use in controversy of the Holy Scriptures, sustain his assumption that we respond to our opponents only by a logical fallacy. There are two senses in which we can legitimately quote the Scriptures:—1. Against all classes of opponents, as simple historical documents, not authenticated by the authority of the Church, but in the same way as we authenticate Herodotus or Thucydides, Xenophon or Diodorus Siculus, Livy or Tacitus, Eusebius or Ammianus. In this sense, after having authenticated, we have just the same right to quote them for the historical facts they record, as we have any other historical documents; and these facts are legitimate against all objectors, from what

ever point of view they object. 2. The second sense is as authority against all who profess to hold them to be the word of God, and to take them as the sufficient and exclusive rule of faith ; on the ground, that every man is bound by the logical consequences of his own principles, that it is lawful to conclude against a man from his own admissions, to convict him on the testimony of his own witness. In this last sense, the argument is an *argumentum ad hominem*. In the essay on *The Church against No-Church*, and in the subsequent articles we have published in defence of it, we have quoted the Scriptures, it is true, but never except in one or the other of these senses. When reasoning against those who do not hold the Scriptures to be the word of God, we quote them only as simple history, but as an authentic history, which no one can successfully question ; but when reasoning against those who concede them to be the word of God, we quote them in either sense. The objection so common among Protestants, that Catholics cannot quote the Scriptures in defence of the Church, without involving themselves in a *vicious* circle, arises from their not distinguishing between the Scriptures as historical documents, and the Scriptures as the inspired word of God. To prove that they are the inspired word of God, and therefore matter for divine faith, we need the authority of the Catholic Church ; but to prove them to be historical documents, and good authority in regard to the historical facts they record, we do not need this authority. We cannot prove them in that sense in which they may be a rule of faith, without the authority of the Church ; and if we quoted them in this sense in defence of our positions, save as an *argumentum ad hominem*, we should indeed be guilty of the parallogism alleged. But this we do not do. In the sense of history, we do not depend on the authority of the Church to authenticate them, and therefore may legitimately quote them in defence of our positions against all classes of objectors, without being guilty of any logical fallacy at all, any more than we should be in quoting the public acts of the Jews and Romans, or the historical facts which make in our favor, recorded or alluded to by Pliny, Tacitus, Celsus, or Julian. Is this distinction, which is very real, too nice, too subtle, for our Protestant doctors ? If not, why do they disregard it, and constantly allege that we take the Church to prove the Scriptures, and the Scriptures to prove the Church ?

6. Nor are we debarred, by danger of a parallogism, from quoting Scripture in defence of our positions, by the fact, that

our opponents have the same right to put their explanations upon the words of Scripture that we have to put ours upon them. Grant, says the objector, in effect, absolute authority to the words of Scripture, still I have a perfect right to give them such explanations as are in accordance with my general belief and prevailing habits of thought, and these explanations you cannot set aside without assuming that authority of the Church which you are to prove, but have not as yet proved, because it is the very point in question. But it is necessary to distinguish. If his explanations do not violate the plain, natural sense of the words in the connection they stand in, and are authorized by the ordinary rules of understanding books, discourse, or language in general, we concede his right to give them; otherwise, we deny it. For, if he were at liberty to give an arbitrary meaning to the words, an obscure, unheard of, or unnatural meaning, — as if, where he reads *yes*, he should understand *no*; *God*, he should understand *man*; *grace*, he should understand *nature*; *life*, he should understand *death*; *heaven*, he should understand *hell*, — he would not yield absolute authority to them, which the objection concedes; indeed, he would yield to them no authority at all, and admit in them no independent sense by which he would or could be bound. If he concedes the absolute authority of the words of Scripture, he can have no right of explanation incompatible with that authority. He must, then, in all cases, be bound by the plain, obvious, natural sense of the words, according to the ordinary rules of understanding language in general. If not, language would at once be annihilated, and there would be an end to all interchange of thought between man and man.

But as either party has the same right to his explanations, and as there is as yet no umpire to decide between them when their explanations clash, both parties must, as a matter of necessity, confine themselves, in their use of Scripture, to what is clear, express, about which there is and can be no reasonable dispute; we do not say about which there may be no cavil, for there is nothing at which there may not be cavil; but about which there can be no reasonable question, — no question, in a fair, candid, or prudent exercise of reason. But so long as we confine ourselves to what is clear and express, to what is expressly said or *necessarily* implied, if the words are to be taken in a plain, obvious, and natural sense, we have a right to quote Scripture in defence of our positions, and in doing so, we fall, necessarily, into no paralogism or logical fallacy.

In what we quote from the Scriptures, we confine ourselves always to what is clear and express to our purpose, and never adduce texts in any sense but that in which it is evident they must be taken, if taken in any sense at all. Our Protestant minister, then, we repeat once more, is mistaken in his assumption; we do never employ the logical fallacy he assumes we do, — as he himself would have perceived, if he had considered our arguments more attentively, before raising his objections to them.

II. But it is time to pass from the objection as it concerns the arguments we have used, and to consider it more immediately as it concerns the arguments which may be used. The writer's thesis, we must bear in mind, is, that the authority of the Church is logically unprovable. "I say," he says, "that no logical process can suffice for this result [the conversion of a Protestant to Catholicity], and this impossibility your own arguments have abundantly shown." That our own arguments do not show this is evident from what we have said. The most he can say against our arguments is simply that they do not prove that the authority in question is provable; but from this he cannot legitimately conclude that there are no arguments that can prove it. Moreover, the only argument of ours he has noticed, and from which he argues against us, is simply an *argumentum ad hominem*, designed to convince those Protestant Christians who profess to believe in salvation, and faith as its condition *sine qua non*, that they must accept the Church, without which faith is not possible, or deny the possibility of salvation. To argue, from the fact that this argument does not prove the authority of the Church to those Protestant Christians who reject Christianity altogether, that the authority of the Church cannot be proved by argument, is very much like arguing, from the fact that a certain cobbler is not a good sculptor, that there is not and cannot be a good sculptor; but it is hardly lawful to conclude, because a given thing is not done in doing a certain other thing, that it cannot be done at all.

But what else does he bring forward to sustain his position that the authority of the Church is unprovable? Nothing, nothing at all. He has, in fact, offered not a single reason to show that it is not as provable as any other position which may be taken. He begins by telling us that he has considered our reasoning, but there are certain obstacles which make the case logically hopeless. He assumes that there are certain *a priori* objections, which place the authority of the Church on such a

footing that no argument in its defence can be entertained. This he should have made appear, but this he has not done. He has surprised us with no new objection, and the objections he has urged are nothing but objections which might have been taken from ourselves, *minus* our answers. We anticipated him in all he has said on this point, and answered him in advance, — as he would have seen, if he had read what we wrote, or taken leisure to master what he read. We assure him that we do not understand his right to urge against us objections we have ourselves taken up, without condescending, at least, to notice our answers. It may be a convenient way to refute a man, to take up the objections he raises against himself, and suppress his answers, and one of which Protestants in their controversies with Catholics not unfrequently avail themselves, as we have in our own case had occasion to remark ; but whether it is the most honest or even honorable way in the world or not, we leave to others to settle.

The objection of our friend, simply stated, is, that the authority of the Church, being supernatural, and lying out of the range of natural reason, cannot be legitimately argued to from any premises which natural reason can supply, or which can be valid for natural reason. This objection is precisely the objection we raised against ourselves, and attempted to answer, in our essay in defence of the Church, already more than once referred to. That we cannot argue to it from premises supplied by natural reason alone, as the object of divine faith, we concede ; but that we cannot as the object of human faith, we deny ; and this is sufficient for our purpose ; for, if we are able to argue to the authority of the Church from premises that are valid for natural reason in that sense in which reason objects to it, it is false to say that it is not provable to natural reason. In proof that it is provable by natural reason to natural reason, which is the real point, as we shall hereafter show, we simply quote what we replied when raising the objection ourselves to the Church as the supernatural witness to the fact of revelation, in the article, *The Church against No-Church*, Vol. II., pp. 174 – 179.

“ But it is objected, that, if the witness to the supernatural must be itself supernatural, the supernatural can never be witnessed to natural reason, and therefore man can never have any good grounds for believing the supernatural, unless he be himself supernaturally elevated above his nature. For the competency of the supernatural witness is a supernatural fact which can be proved only by another supernatural witness, which in turn will require

still another, and thus on, *in infinitum*, which is impossible. But we must distinguish between the competency of the witness to testify to the fact of revelation and the motives of the credibility of the witness. The competency of the witness depends on its supernatural character; the motives of credibility are such as natural reason may appreciate. The credibility of the witness is supernaturally established to natural reason by means of miracles. A miracle is a supernatural effect produced in or on natural objects, and therefore connects the natural and supernatural, so that natural reason can pass from the one to the other. Since the miracle is wrought on natural objects, it is cognizable by natural reason, and natural reason is able to determine whether a given fact be or be not a miracle. From the miracle the reason concludes legitimately to the supernatural cause, and to the divine commission or authority of him by whom it is wrought. Having established the Divine commission or authority of the miracle-worker, we have established his credibility by having established the fact that God himself vouches for the truth of his testimony. The miracle, therefore, supersedes the necessity of the supposed infinite series of supernatural witnesses, by connecting the natural immediately with the supernatural. It is God's own assurance to natural reason, that he speaks in and by or through the person by whom it is performed. Then we have the veracity of God for the truth of what the miracle-worker declares, and therefore infallible certainty; for God can neither deceive nor be deceived.

"The supernatural, it follows from what we have said, is provable. Consequently the character of the Apostolic ministry, as the supernatural witness to the fact of revelation, is provable, that is, is not intrinsically unprovable. It becomes a simple question of fact, and is to be proved or disproved in like manner as any other question of fact falling under the cognizance of natural reason. The process of proof is simple and easy. The miracles of our blessed Saviour were all that was necessary to establish his Divine authority to those who saw them; for it was evident, as Nicodemus said to him, 'No man can do these miracles which thou doest, unless God be with him.' St. John, iii. 2. These accredited him as a teacher from God. Then he was necessarily what he professed to be, and what he declared to be God's word was God's word. This was sufficient for the eyewitness of the miracles.

"But we are not eyewitnesses. True; but the fact, whether the miracles were performed or not, is a simple historical question, to which reason is as competent as to any other historical question. If it can be established infallibly to us that the miracles were actually performed, we are virtually and to all intents and purposes in the condition of the eyewitnesses themselves, and they are to us all they were to them. Then they accredit to us, as to them, the Divine commission of Jesus, and authorize the conclusion that whatever

he said or promised was infallible truth ; for whether you say Jesus was himself truly God as well as truly man, or that he was only divinely commissioned, you have in either case the veracity of God as the ground of faith in what he said or promised.

“ Now, suppose it to be a fact that Jesus appointed a body of teachers, and promised to be always with them, protecting them from error and teaching them all truth ; and suppose, farther, that the appointment and promise are ascertainable by natural reason, infallibly ascertainable. We should have infallible certainty that Jesus Christ does speak in and through this body, that it is infallible in what it teaches, and therefore what it declares to be the word of God is the word of God ; for it is infallibly certain that Jesus Christ will keep his promise, since the promise is made by God himself, and it is impossible for God to lie, or to promise and not fulfil. In this case, calling this body of teachers the Catholic Church, we could make our act of faith without the least room for doubt or hesitation. ‘ O my God ! I firmly believe all the sacred truths the Catholic Church believes and teaches, because *thou* hast revealed them, who canst neither deceive nor be deceived.’

“ Assuming the facts in the case to be as here supposed, the only points in this process to which exceptions can possibly be taken, or which can by any one be alleged to be not infallibly certain, are, 1. The competency of natural reason from historical testimony to establish the fact that the miracles were actually performed ; 2. Admitting the facts to be infallibly ascertainable, the competency of reason to determine infallibly whether they are miracles or not ; 3. The competency of reason from the miracle to conclude to the Divine authority of the miracle-worker ; 4. Its competency from historical documents to ascertain infallibly the fact of the appointment of the body of teachers, and the promise made them. These four points, unquestionably essential to the validity of the argument, are to be taken, we admit, on the authority of reason. Can reason determine these with infallible certainty ? But, if you say it can, you affirm the infallibility of reason, and then it of itself suffices, without other infallible teacher ; if you say it cannot, you deny the possibility of establishing infallibly the infallibility of your body of teachers.

“ We reply by distinguishing. Reason is infallible within its own province, we grant ; but in regard to what transcends its reach, we deny. To deny the infallibility of reason within its province would be to deny the possibility not only of faith, but of both science and knowledge, and to sink into absolute skepticism,—even to ‘ doubt that doubt itself be doubting,’—which is impossible ; for no man doubts that he doubts. Revelation does not deny reason, but presupposes it, and supplies its defect by faith. The objection to reason is not that it cannot judge infallibly of *some* matters, but

that it cannot judge infallibly of *all* matters. But because it cannot judge infallibly of all matters, to say it can judge infallibly of none is not to reason justly. As well say, I am not infallibly certain that I see the tree before my window, because I cannot see all that may be going on in the moon. It is infallibly certain that the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time; that two things respectively equal to a third are equal to one another; that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; that what begins to exist must have a creator; that every effect must have a cause, and that every supernatural effect must have a supernatural cause, and that the change of one natural substance into another natural substance is a supernatural effect; that every voluntary agent acts to some end, and every wise and good agent to a wise and good end. These and the like propositions are all infallibly certain. Reason, within its sphere, is therefore infallible; but out of its sphere it is null.

“Human testimony, within its proper limits, backed by circumstances, monuments, institutions, which presuppose its truth and are incompatible with its falsehood, is itself infallible. I have never seen London, but I have no occasion to see it in order to be as certain of its existence as I am of my own. History, too, is a science; and although every thing narrated in it may not be true or even probable, yet there are historical facts as certain as mathematical certainty itself. It is infallibly certain that there were in the ancient world the republics of Athens, Sparta, and Rome; that there was a peculiar people called the Jews, that this people dwelt in Palestine, that they had a chief city named Jerusalem, in this chief city a superb temple dedicated to the worship of the one God, and that this chief city was taken by the Romans, this temple burnt, and this people, after an immense slaughter, were subdued and dispersed among the nations, where they remain to this day. Here are historical facts, which can be infallibly proved to be facts.

“Now the miracles, regarded as facts, are simple historical facts, said to have occurred at a particular time and place, and are in their nature as susceptible of historical proof as any other facts whatever. Ordinary historical testimony is as valid in their case as in the case of Cæsar’s or Napoleon’s battles. Reason, observing the ordinary laws of historical criticism, is competent to decide infallibly on the fact whether they are proved to have actually occurred or not. Reason, then, is competent to the *first* point in the process of proof, namely, the fact of the miracles.

“It is equally competent to the *second* point, namely, whether the fact alleged to be a miracle really be a miracle. A miracle is a supernatural effect produced in or on natural objects. The point for reason to make out, after the fact is proved, is whether the effect actually witnessed be a *supernatural* effect. That it can do

this in every case, even when the effect is truly miraculous, we do not pretend ; but that it can do it in some cases, we affirm, and to be able to do it in one suffices. When I see one natural substance changed into another natural substance, as in the case of converting water into wine, I know the change is a miracle ; for nature can no more change herself than she could create herself. So, when I see a man who has been four days dead, and in whose body the process of decomposition has commenced and made considerable progress, restored to life and health, sitting with his friends at table and eating, I know it is a miracle ; for to restore life when extinct is no less an act of creative power than to give life. It is giving life to that which before had it not, and is, therefore, an act which can be performed by no being but God alone. Reason, then, is competent to determine the fact whether the alleged miracle really be a miracle. It is competent, then, to the second point in the process of proof.

“ No less competent is it to the *third*, namely, the Divine commission of the miracle-worker. In proving the event to be a miracle, I prove it to be wrought by the power of God. Now, I know enough of God, by the natural light of reason, to know that he cannot be the accomplice of an impostor, that he cannot work a miracle by one whose word may not be taken. The miracle, then, establishes the credibility of the miracle-worker. Then the miracle-worker is what he says he is. If he says he is God, he is God ; if he says he speaks by Divine authority, he speaks by Divine authority, and we have God’s authority for what he says. The third point, then, comes within the province of natural reason, and may be infallibly settled.

“ The *fourth* point is a simple historical question ; for it concerns what was done and said by our blessed Saviour in regard to the appointment of a body of teachers. It is to be settled historically, by consulting the proper documents and monuments in the case. It is not a question of speculation, of interpretation even, but simply a question of fact, to which reason is fully competent, and can, with proper prudence and documents, settle infallibly.”

Here we prove clearly and conclusively, that the authority of the Church is provable, or not *a priori* unprovable ; and also how it may be proved, and proved with infallible certainty, — not with the infallible certainty of divine faith, of course, but with that of human faith, — which is all the certainty we for the moment were concerned with, and which, since it is all reason can demand, is infallible in relation to reason. In doing this, we prove that we have a good case, that we may be permitted to come into court, and adduce testimony in our defence. Our Protestant minister, then, must yield or join issue with us, not on the law, but on the evidence ; and this issue we of course are

prepared to meet. But he will not trust himself to this issue. There never would have been much controversy concerning the facts in the case, if the authority they are adduced to prove had not been assumed in the outset to be unsusceptible of proof. Christianity is rejected, whenever it is rejected, before the facts which sustain it are discovered to be uncertain or insufficient. Their doubtfulness or insufficiency is an after-thought, resorted to to justify the rejection to ourselves or to others.

III. The second general objection urged is, that faith, in the Catholic sense, is impossible. We do not understand the author of the letter to deny the possibility of faith in general, but the particular species of faith we contend for. He denies what Catholics call divine faith, but not simply intellectual or human faith. This we gather from what he himself says. He defines faith to be trust or apprehension of spiritual things; and though he distinguishes this from intellectual assent to given propositions, we do not understand him to mean that intellectual assent is never to be yielded to any propositions at all, but only to a given class or order of propositions. That he wrote the letter before us is a given proposition, to which the intellect assents or does not assent. *Our* intellect assents to it. Is this assent unauthorized? If he says it is not, he concedes intellectual assent; if he says it is, he also concedes intellectual assent, because he cannot deny that it is authorized, without assenting intellectually to a proposition. Two and two are four. Here is a given proposition, in regard to which he must say he intellectually assents to it, intellectually dissents from it, or is unable to say whether he assents or dissents; but in one case or another he intellectually assents to a given proposition, though not to the same proposition. He who denies affirms; for the denial affirms the falsity of what is denied; and when the denial and affirmation are in the same order, both as to the subject and as to the object, one is as much an act of faith as the other. When, by the grace of God, I deny Liberalism to be the revelation of God, I make an act of faith as well as when by the same grace I affirm the truth of Catholicity. Universal denial is impossible; because he who denies at least affirms his own existence as the subject denying; and no man can doubt that he doubts. Moreover, the writer, in defining faith to be trust or apprehension of things spiritual, necessarily concedes faith in the sense of intellectual assent to given propositions. He

will not say, most assuredly, that in that apprehension of things spiritual, which he calls faith, the things apprehended are denied, but must concede that they are affirmed. If affirmed, there is intellectual assent to a given proposition; for nothing but propositions are ever affirmed or denied. Trust also implies belief, and belief as distinguished from that intellectual assent termed knowledge; for it refers always to the future, of which we have and can have no direct and positive knowledge. The sun will rise to-morrow, is a given proposition. The writer doubtless *trusts* that the sun will rise to-morrow; but he could not so trust, did he not so believe. Belief is necessarily in all cases the basis of trust. But belief is always and necessarily an intellectual assent to a given proposition; since it would obviously be a contradiction in terms, either to say that a man believes what he does not intellectually assent to, or that he believes without believing any thing. We are, therefore, bound, in simple justice to the writer, to presume, that, when he distinguishes faith from intellectual assent to given propositions, it is not his intention to deny all intellectual assent, nor all faith in the sense of intellectual assent to given propositions, but only intellectual assent to given theological propositions, or that species of faith which Catholics denominate divine faith. Hence the impossibility of eliciting faith, which he asserts, we must restrict then to divine faith, and not extend to all faith, whether human or divine. Furthermore, we do not, in the objection we are about to consider, understand the objector to affirm the impossibility of eliciting faith on the ground that the authority is not possible, but on the ground that it is not possible to elicit it by means of the authority. If he took the first ground, this objection would resolve itself into the one we have just examined, and would be answered in what we have already said. But he distinguishes it from that, and evidently does not intend to adduce it as an additional proof of the impossibility of the authority, but as a proof that the authority, if proved, would avail nothing, since it is impossible by its aid to elicit an act of faith in the Catholic sense. The evident intention of his argument is to disprove, not the possibility, but the utility, of authority. Hence, we must so interpret it as to save the possibility of the authority. This premised, we proceed to the argument.

“ To accept the authority of the Roman [Catholic] Church either involves an act of faith, or it does not. If it does, this is the same as saying that an act of faith is required preliminary to any possible or even supposable act of faith, which is absurd;

if it does not, then the investigation of the claims of that Church becomes a purely intellectual process, requiring only the clearness of mind and moral honesty which any other intellectual process requires." From which, we suppose, he would conclude that an act of faith is impossible, or, if possible at all, possible only as merely intellectual or human faith, neither of which Catholicity can admit. We reply, — To the first part of the dilemma, we concede the supposition, but deny the consequence ; because the act of faith necessarily, as faith, includes both antecedent and consequent, and therefore the acceptance of the authority is the act of faith, not its preliminary. To the second part, we deny of course the supposition, but concede the conclusion. There is a difference between the investigation of the claims of authority, and its acceptance by an act of divine faith. The investigation is unquestionably a purely intellectual process, but the faith elicited on it may be not merely intellectual, but divine, as Catholicity asserts ; because the investigation never motives the assent, but simply removes the intellectual obstacles to it.

The conclusion, in the first part, evidently rests on the assumption, that the acceptance of authority is distinct from and prior to the act of faith elicited on it, and therefore requires to be motived by a distinct and prior authority. This we deny, because, —

1. It involves a contradiction. If the objection proves any thing, it is not the impossibility of eliciting faith by authority, but the impossibility of authority itself, since it denies authority can authorize till accepted by us, — which is to deny it to be authority ; for it is the essence of authority to authorize *per se*. But to deny the possibility of authority is to contradict the intention of the argument, which, as we have seen, was to concede the possibility of authority, and to prove its inutility. Moreover, the assumption involves a contradiction in terms, and is not supposable. There is a contradiction in terms, where the subject is denied in the predicate. But the assumption does deny the subject in the predicate. The subject is the authority of the Church ; the predicate is, that it cannot authorize unless accepted by us, or simply that it depends on us for its authoritativeness. But that which depends on any thing not contained in itself for its authoritativeness is not authority ; for, as we have said, the essence of authority is to authorize *per se*. In making your assumption, you either suppose authority or you do not. If you do, you deny it in your predicate, since your predicate

denies that it is in itself authority. If you do not, your argument concludes nothing, for your predicate has no subject.

The writer intended by this argument either to prove the impossibility of authority, or the impossibility of faith by authority. Not the first, as is evident from the terms of the argument itself, and from the fact, that if he had he would have been only repeating the argument in another form, which he had just urged, and which we have refuted in proving the authority provable; for, if provable, it cannot be metaphysically impossible. Then the second; but if so, he contradicts his intention, and makes the un-supposable supposition of an unauthoritative authority. He who supposes authority at all supposes, by the very force of the word, that which can authorize without any virtue but its own. This objection, then, is less creditable to the dialectician than to the "consistent Protestant."

2. We retort the argument. The objector, as we have seen, admits, at least, the possibility of human faith. But his argument, if it proves any thing, proves that no act of faith, not even of human faith, is possible. The assumption in the argument is, that authority cannot authorize *per se*, by its own virtue, but must be accepted by a preliminary act before it can motive an act of faith. This preliminary act of acceptance must be itself an act of faith; for it is absurd to pretend that we can elicit faith on an authority that we do not believe, or that the assent *on* it can transcend the order of assent *to* it. Then this preliminary act of faith will require a prior and distinct authority to motive it, and this in turn will require to be accepted by a new act of faith motived by a new authority, and thus on *in infinitum*; so that no act of faith can be assumed to be possible without the assumption of an infinite series of acts of faith, motived by an infinite series of authorities, which is infinitely absurd. According to this reasoning, there can be no authority for faith, and no faith on authority. But all faith is on authority; for the very definition of faith, as our correspondent well knows, is *assent on authority*. Therefore there can be no faith. This definition of faith is *per genus*, not *per differentiam*; and therefore assent on authority must be essential to faith in general, common to all the species of faith, and therefore to human faith as well as to divine faith. Faith, then, is assent on authority. But either the acceptance of the authority involves an act of faith, or it does not. If it does, this is the same as saying an act of faith is required preliminary to any

possible or even supposable act of faith, which is absurd. If it does not, then no act of faith is possible ; for it is absurd to say there can be faith on an authority not believed. Our correspondent, then, must either deny the possibility of an act of even human or intellectual faith, or abandon the principle of his objection, and concede that authority may be competent to motive its own acceptance, and therefore its acceptance not necessarily imply a preliminary act motivated by a distinct and prior authority.

If the writer insists, and denies that he concedes the possibility of even human faith, as specifically defined, we will go further, and retort his argument in the region of what is called knowledge. His argument, if admitted, proves not only that faith specifically defined is impossible, but that all science and intuition are impossible. He is a bold man who is prepared to deny all human faith, all human belief, and proves that he does not fear to take his stand on the very edge of the gulf of absurdity ; but he who is prepared to deny all knowledge, whether discursive or intuitive, proves that he has already taken the plunge into the gulf itself. But he, who asserts that authority cannot authorize till its acceptance is motivated by another authority, does deny not only all faith, but all knowledge, whether discursive or intuitive. Faith and knowledge, though specifically distinguishable, are generically the same. Both are assent, and assent on authority. The denial of all assent on authority is, therefore, the denial of all knowledge, as well as of all faith.

That all knowledge, whether discursive or intuitive, is assent on authority, is as certain as any thing can be to natural reason. Demonstration, as the word itself indicates, merely *shows* the mind the conclusion in its relation to some principle or principles which the mind holds to be indubitable. It is the preamble to the assent yielded, but in no conceivable case its motive ; and hence it is, that we not unfrequently find persons, not destitute of intellectual ability, who resist the force of the clearest demonstration. Two things respectively equal to a third are equal to one another. The demonstration of this consists in the discursive process which enables the mind to perceive that the equality predicated in the one case is the equality predicated in the other. The motive of the assent yielded to the conclusion is the principle that the same is the same, things identical are identical, what metaphysicians call the principle of contradiction or of non-contradiction. In every demonstration, the process is the same. The demonstra-

tion does not demonstrate its principle, but reduces the demonstrable matter to the principle or principles applicable in the case, and the mind assents solely on the authority of the principles. In discursive knowledge, it is clear, then, that there is, contrary to the principle of the objection, immediate assent on authority.

In intuition, whether internal or external, whether of principles or of material objects, it is the same. The same is the same; the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time; whatever begins to exist must have a cause; no contingent being can exist without a sufficient reason, &c.;—are principles, however variously they may be expressed, which every reasonable being admits and must admit; but which cannot be proved, since every process of proof demands them as its postulates. We may be told that they are intuitively beheld; but this only means that they are beheld as constituent principles of reason, or simply as that which the reason declares immediately to be necessary truth. The intuition does not seize them *in se*, but simply in the reason, and the assent to them has and can have no motive but reason herself. Suppose the authority of reason, their validity is supposed; deny the authority of reason, and their validity is denied. The assent, then, to what are called first principles is solely assent on authority. In external intuition, the assent is also on authority. I behold a tree, a house, the sun; at least, so I say, but question the authority of my senses; how, then, could I say so? The assent I give to the proposition, I see a house, a tree, a man, the sun, or that in either of them I see a real object, rests for its motive on the authority of my perceptive power, and therefore is assent on authority. The whole of human knowledge, turn the matter as we will, resolves itself, in the last analysis, into assent on the authority of our faculties, that is to say, belief in our faculties; in science, belief in reason, in perception, in the perceptive power. No metaphysical analysis of either the objects apprehended, or of the faculties apprehending, can get behind this, as is easily proved; because, in attempting to verify the authority of our faculties, we must assume them, and the proof of them is necessarily the proof of the same by the same.

Now, to accept the authority of our faculties either involves an act of faith, or it does not. If it does, this is the same as saying an act of faith is required preliminary to any possible or even supposable act of faith, which is absurd. If it does not, then

no act of knowledge is possible. Therefore, either no knowledge is possible, or an act of faith does not necessarily demand an antecedent act of acceptance of its authority by virtue of an antecedent authority. Our young friend, then, must either abandon the principle of his objection, or deny all knowledge. But this last he cannot do, if he would ; because he can make the denial only by virtue of his faculties, and in making it necessarily supposes their authority. But, their authority supposed, it is false to say there can be no knowledge. Moreover, he cannot affirm his objection against us, without making an act of faith in the faculties on whose authority he affirms it. This act of faith is legitimate, or it is not. If it is, his objection is unfounded, because a legitimate act of faith is possible ; if it is not, the objection is unfounded, by the very terms of the proposition, because it is made on an illegitimate authority. So in either case the objection falls to the ground, and the writer is precluded from the right to urge it.

4. The assumption on which the argument rests confounds the act of faith with the act of reasoning. It denies faith to be possible, because it is not discursive ; which is as if we should say, an act of faith is not possible, because, if possible, it would be an act of *faith*, and not an act of *reasoning* ; or as if we should deny the possibility of Peter, because, if he should exist, he would be Peter, and not John. The argument assumes that in faith the authority is concluded by one act, and that which is received on it is concluded from it by another act, and then asks, But from what is the authority concluded ? But this process is reasoning, not believing, — the act of discursion, not of faith. Faith, if it be faith, is *immediate* assent on authority, and therefore necessarily includes *in one simple, indivisible act of assent* both antecedent and consequent. This is faith ; and faith, in this sense, we have shown, we must admit, or else deny the possibility of all demonstration and of all intuition. The solution of the whole difficulty lies in this distinction between faith and discursion. In discursion, we proceed by successive steps from antecedent to consequent ; but in faith we do not. In reasoning we first conclude the authority, and then what the authority proposes ; but faith does not conclude at all ; it includes in one simple, indivisible affirmation both the authority and that which the authority proposes. Had our young friend been aware of this rather important fact, he would have spared us his objection ; for he would himself have seen that the acceptance of the authority in the act of faith does not require

faith does not require an act precedent to the act of faith motivated by a distinct and prior authority. Hence, our denial of the consequence in the first part of the dilemma is justifiable, and for the reason assigned, namely, because the act of faith, as faith, necessarily includes both antecedent and consequent, and therefore the acceptance of the authority is the act of faith, and not its preliminary.

IV. This distinction between the act of faith and the act of reasoning solves also the difficulty there may seem to be implied in the second part of the dilemma, namely: — If the acceptance of the authority does not involve an act of faith, “the investigation of the claims of the Church becomes a purely intellectual process, requiring only the clearness of mind and moral honesty which any other intellectual process requires.” The investigation of the claims of the Church, on either alternative proposed, is a purely intellectual process; for only the intellect investigates, and whatever objection to Catholicity this implies, we must meet it, on the supposition that the acceptance of the authority does involve an act of faith, just as much as on the supposition that it does not. But there is no objection implied, unless Catholicity teaches, or is obliged to teach, that the assent in the act of faith is by virtue of the investigation, or motives or reasons which investigation discovers and adduces, as is evident of itself. But this she neither does nor is obliged to do. For, —

1. It involves a contradiction in terms. Faith is immediate assent on authority, without any other motive than is contained in the creditive subject and the credible object, as already established. To make it depend on the motive adduced by investigation would be to make it depend on some motive not contained in the creditive subject and the credible object, and to make it, not faith, but reasoning; for then it would be mediate, not immediate, assent, — a logical inference from a given antecedent. But to assert that faith is reasoning, a logical inference, is to contradict one’s self in terms, for it is to deny the subject in the predicate.

2. The assent to any proposition is never, in any case whatever, by virtue of the preliminary investigation, or previous reasoning. This is evident from the analysis of the act of demonstration already given. In the act of reasoning there is never, strictly speaking, a new act of assent; for nothing is allowed to enter into the conclusion not previously contained

and declared in the premises. The conclusion only repeats, in a more clear and definite form, if you will, what had already been asserted in the premises ; and consequently, in assenting to it, we only assent to what we had already assented to in another form and under other conditions. No reasoning can be carried on for a single moment, unless all that is to be concluded is admitted before reasoning begins ; and all that reasoning ever does is to clear up our knowledge, and show that sometimes, perhaps always, in assenting to what we do assent to, we assent to more than we are aware of, or that our principles have a wider and more varied application than we at first perceived or suspected. This is evident in regard to syllogistic reasoning, as the opponents of that species of reasoning have clearly demonstrated. But all reasoning is syllogistic, and there is no actual or possible argument that may not, as logicians show, be reduced to a regular syllogism. The distinction set up by some writers on logic between syllogistic reasoning and inductive reasoning has no foundation in reality. Every induction is an enthymem, and the suppressed premise may be easily supplied. But, however this may be, there is no advance of knowledge, that is, no new assent in induction. What is understood by induction, as the term is generally used, is simply generalization or classification, — that is, the assertion of a general law from the observation of a certain number of particulars ; but the generalization, the moment it transcends the particulars observed, or is applied to other particulars, save so far as identical with these, and therefore improperly called *other* particulars, is in the predicament of the syllogistic conclusion which concludes what is not declared in the premises, and is a mere assertion, hypothesis, conjecture, or fancy. There is, then, and can be, in reasoning no new matter assented to ; consequently, the assent given in the conclusion is only a repetition of the assent previously given in the premises, and as that was given prior to the act of reasoning, it cannot be motived by it, or be in virtue of it.

These two considerations show beyond the possibility of dispute, that Catholicity is not obliged to suppose the assent of faith to be by virtue of the intellectual process of investigation, and could not do so without placing herself in conflict with all the laws of belief and of science. Reasoning never does and never can motive the assent ; all that it is or can be in any supposable case is the mere preamble to the assent, removing such obstacles as may intervene intellectually between the creditive

subject and the credible object. A great deal of useless labor would have been spared, if this fact had been more generally borne in mind. But Catholicity not only is not required to suppose the assent is by virtue of the investigation, not only has no right to do so, and would condemn herself if she did, but she actually does not. For,

3. The assent on the part of the subject she teaches is by virtue of the *donum fidei*, or supernatural gift of faith. The investigation, however successful, could not give us faith; it could only show us that the authority of the Church and what she proposes are involved in what is already believed or assented to by us, — or simply, that we must either accept the Church and what she proposes, or deny the fundamental principles of reason. But this would not be what she understands or intends by faith, nor the least conceivable approach to it. The act of faith, in her sense, is a supernatural act, requiring a supernatural object and a supernatural subject. Simple human reason is not the creditive subject, and cannot elicit the act of faith, unless supernaturalized, that is, supernaturalized *in quantum* creditive subject, by the *donum fidei*, which is not the act of faith, but the virtue of faith, — a supernatural elevation of the natural *vis creditiva*, or power to believe. This is the gift of God; not a natural gift, that is, not a gift given in the fact that we are human beings, but given supernaturally, in elevating us from the order of nature to the order of grace. Thus supernaturalized, the creditive subject is placed on the plane of the supernatural credible object, and they are thus correlative creditive and credible; and if no obstacle intervene, the act of faith is not only elicitable, but elicited, without other motive than is contained in the subject and object, as is the case with every act of faith, whether human or divine, — by virtue, not of the preliminary process of reasoning, but of the *donum* or gift of faith supernaturally bestowed on the subject. This is what Catholicity teaches, and she affirms the possibility of faith on these conditions and no others. Therefore, conceding the investigation of the claims of the Church to be a purely intellectual process, it does not follow that the act of faith itself, whether understood of the assent to the authority, or of assent to what the authority proposes, is a purely intellectual act, or an act of faith on simple human reason or authority.

V. But our Protestant friend may reply, — Granting all this, it follows that you do not conclude the authority by a logical

process ; and this is precisely what I tell you. " I do not say no Protestant can ever become a Romanist [Catholic]. This would be to contradict well known facts. But I do say that no purely logical process can suffice for such a result, and this impossibility your own arguments abundantly show." And is not this precisely the sum and substance of what you have now, *ex professo*, proved ?

1. This objection does not take us by surprise, nor find us unprepared with an answer. In the first place, we remark that the objection is here supposed in a sense somewhat different from the one intended in the letter. The objection there is not that a logical process cannot suffice because the subject cannot be, in relation to the supernatural object of faith, *creditive* subject, unless supernaturalized by the infused virtue of faith, or the *donum fidei* ; but because the arguments we use in proving the credibility of the Church all involve a paralogism, or the fallacy of attempting to prove the same by the same. This we have denied, and shown that our arguments in relation to their purpose as arguments are sound, and as strictly logical as arguments can be. This answers the objection in the sense intended by the writer.

2. In the second place, we have never pretended that the actual conversion of a Protestant to a Catholic demanded nothing more than a logical process, or that the assent of faith could be the logical consequent of a logical antecedent. To that conversion, to that assent, we have uniformly contended that the grace of God, the supernatural gift of faith, was not only useful, but necessary as the medium. The logical process was simply to show that such assent, though above our natural reason, is in accordance with it, and has all the conditions natural reason can demand or conceive to be essential. It was not urged as the motive of assent, or that by virtue of which the assent is elicited ; for that we knew it was not, and could not be, for that it is not even in human faith. If the writer intended, then, to allege that the logical process is insufficient because it does not and cannot supply the motive or virtue by which the act of faith is elicited, he objected to what was not in question, and was betrayed into the fallacy called *ignorantia elenchis*.

3. But, thirdly, we deny that the assertion of the absolute necessity of the *donum fidei*, as the virtue by which the act of faith is elicitable and elicited, militates in the least against the sufficiency of the logical process. There may be, and undoubtedly are, many operations for which logic does not suffice. It

does not suffice to impart soundness to a gangrenous limb, to build a house, to navigate a ship, to paint a Madonna, or to chisel a crucifix ; for in all these there is required a power which logic does not and cannot generate or furnish ; but it would be absurd for this reason to pronounce the logical process insufficient, if it sufficed for what in any of these operations it is needed, or for which it would not be illogical to demand it. That logical process suffices, which suffices for the legitimate purpose or end of a logical process, or which accomplishes all which, according to the nature of logic, there is for it to accomplish. In the case supposed, the conversion of a Protestant or unbeliever to Catholicity, ascertain what there is for which logic is needed, or for which logic, according to its office in other cases, can be demanded, and if it suffice for that, it cannot be pronounced insufficient, but must be held to be sufficient. This premised, we proceed to determine what it is logic, in the supposed case, is needed for.

1. The logical process is not needed, either in human faith or in divine faith (for in this respect both are the same), to supply any of the *positive* conditions of faith. The subject and object must both be given independently of the logical process, or not given at all ; and the subject must also be given as creditive, and the object as credible. The logical process never furnishes, and is never required to furnish, the subject with the faculty of believing, or the object with the capacity of being believed. Our Protestant friend would hardly expect by a logical process to bring his horse to believe his Liberalism, and the demonstration does not *make* the object credible, but merely *shows* it to be so. But all the positive conditions of faith are supposed when the subject and object are supposed, the one creditive, the other credible ; because faith is immediate assent, demanding no motive or virtue but what is contained in the subject assenting, and object assented to, and this, too, whether the object be naturally or supernaturally credible, and the subject naturally or supernaturally creditive.

2. The logical process is never wanted in the case of actual believers, or in that of the children of the faithful, until they make an act of infidelity. Nothing is wanting or can be added, where all the conditions of faith are present. The believer has in the Sacrament of Baptism received the *donum fidei*, or grace of faith, and by this is creditive subject, and the Church has through her pastors and teachers proposed the credible object, and he has therefore all that is necessary or can be conceived

as necessary to elicit an act of faith, and an act of faith having all the legitimacy any act of faith ever has, or which reason ever does or can demand. So in the case of the children of the faithful. They receive, when brought to the Sacrament of Baptism, the *donum*, or virtue of faith, which gives them the power (as soon as their reason shall be so far developed as to render them capable of performing a proper *human* act) of believing, and the Church is present to instruct them, to propose the credible object, and they elicit the act of faith at once, without the necessity of any previous investigation or logical process whatever. This faith is not blind, is not credulous, is not illegitimate; because it has all the conditions of faith which reason demands or can conceive. It is as reasonable, as enlightened, and stands on as high and as firm ground, as the faith of the most erudite scholar, the acutest dialectician, and the profoundest philosopher, elicited only after the most laborious researches, the most patient investigation, and the most penetrating and subtle analysis. Logic is not needed for believers, or for children, in case the children are baptized and properly instructed. These, then, we may leave out of the question, as sufficiently provided for, and as having no occasion, either in order to become believers, or to justify their faith to themselves, to resort to a logical process.

3. The logical process can be necessary only in the case of unbelievers, when they would inquire into the reasonableness of the faith, and when we would convict them of being unreasonable in not believing. In a word, the only occasion or necessity there is for a logical process is furnished by infidels and heretics. These are to be converted, and logic may sometimes be used as an effective instrument for their conversion. It is here, then, we are to look for the precise work there is for the logical process; and if it suffices for what there is here for it to do, it suffices for all for which logic is needed, and is, therefore, sufficient.

4. As none of the positive conditions of faith depend on the logical process, we are concerned with unbelief only as it coexists with these conditions. If there is no belief because no creditive subject or no credible object, the difficulty is not a logical one, and it is illogical to demand its removal of logic. If all the conditions be present, the unbelief can arise only from some obstacle which obstructs their operation. This obstacle must be on the part of the object or on the part of the subject. It cannot be on the part of the object, if the Church be present supernaturally proposing it, or within reach of the subject, if disposed

to listen to her instructions. It must, then, be on the part of the subject. If on the part of the subject, it must be either in the defect of the *donum*, or on the part of the will, or the intellect, or both together. If in the defect of the *donum*, as that is one of the positive conditions of faith, it does not now concern us. Logic cannot obtain it, and we do not pretend that divine faith can be elicited without it ; and yet it is always the unbeliever's own fault, if he have it not. If it is on the part of the will, the obstacle is a moral one, and we have nothing to do with it at present. It is, then, the individual's own fault that there is an obstacle to his believing, and to believe at any time is possible to him if he wills it. Nothing remains, then, but the obstacle on the part of the intellect, and it is only with intellectual objections that logic ever deals, or is expected to deal. What the logical process, then, is needed for, is simply to remove the obstacle to assent which is interposed by the intellect.

5. The intellect may and does raise numerous objections to the Church ; alleges that God has never revealed himself supernaturally to men ; that he has never founded a Church with authority to teach ; that the Roman Catholic Church is not the true Church, that it has become corrupt, is not what it was, has failed, and should no longer be suffered to cumber the ground ; in a word, the objections urged by our young friend, and all that variety of objections quite too numerous to mention, which may be read — if one have the conscience to do it — in infidel and heretical books. These objections are nothing for the believer, because, having the *donum*, he has a higher authority for his faith than the simply human intellect, and therefore a higher authority than these objections can possibly claim or pretend to ; and to him, therefore, it is of no manner of consequence whether he knows the intellectual answer to them or not. But in the case of unbelievers, they obstruct the operation of grace, and hinder them from following it to the Holy Sacrament, in which they would receive the *donum*, and be able to elicit faith. They require in the case of these to be removed, and the ordinary instrument to which we resort for their removal is the logical process ; though the grace of God may, and sometimes does, suffice to remove them without any preliminary logical process at all, or to produce faith in spite of them, and it is always better to rely on that, than on our investigation. But be this as it may, for those who demand a logical process, here is its work, its precise work, and its only work, — simply what we are doing or trying to do in the case of our young

friend, to show that the objections urged by the intellect are unfounded, not authorized even by the intellect.

6. Now the precise question before us is, — Does or can the logical process suffice for this work? If it can, it suffices for all for which it is needed, and our young Protestant minister is refuted; if it cannot, we may be right in our belief, but mistaken in our logic. That the logical process can and does suffice for this we have shown in the former part of this present article, in reply to the objection that the supernatural is not logically provable, for we have shown there that it is logically provable. The supernatural does not require, as we have said, to be proved to the believer, because he has for his faith in the *donum fidei* what is above proof, and sufficient to override any objection the intellect can suggest; for by virtue of the *donum* he knows the truth of what he believes with an altogether higher certainty than it is possible for the objector to have in the case of the objection. In his faith, he has the authority of God against the objection; in the objection, he has only the authority of man against God. So long, then, as he is attentive to the graces he receives, and does not by his culpable neglect or deadly sin lose the *donum*, or obstruct its operation, it is absolutely impossible for him to doubt; for only the human intellect can doubt, and he has the supernaturalized intellect overriding the human, and silencing each of its questionings in the very inception. Thus faith, the undoubting faith of the believer, which secures him so much serenity and peace, does not arise from a blind obedience to authority, and a wilful closing of our eyes to inquiry, as unbelievers and Protestants foolishly allege, but from the fact that he has really in the gift of faith a spiritual apprehension above all purely natural apprehension, and is able to affirm the truth from a higher stand-point than the boldest impugner of his faith can any one of his objections. For this no logical process, as we have said over and over again, can suffice or is needed. But this is possible to all who interpose no obstructions, that is, none of the will, and none of the intellect. Those of the will we have dismissed, as not concerning our present purpose; but we may remark, by the way, that the removal of the intellectual objections will do little for the actual conversion of the unbeliever, if his will remains opposed to the Church; and as a matter of fact, in most cases, in a country where the Church is known or is accessible, if we find a man who rejects her, we may at once conclude the principal cause is in the will, and that his intellectual objections are

brought merely to sustain him in his moral repugnance to the Church, and determination to resist her authority. If there were no obstacles in the will, those in the intellect would amount to very little, and would soon disappear entirely. But the intellectual objections are all that now concern us, and these all have their seat in the intellect, as their subject, and rest on its authority alone. To remove them, by showing from intellectual *data* that they have really no foundation in the intellect, is perfectly logical; for, if we in replying to them assume the human intellect, we only assume what you assume in making them; and if our refutation is valid only in the sphere of the human intellect, your objections, granting them all that can be claimed for them, are valid only in the same sphere, since you have no more right to conclude from the human intellect *against* the supernatural, than we have to conclude for it. If you deny the legitimacy of this, we retort your argument; for its whole force consists in the fact that we cannot conclude the supernatural from the natural, since there can be nothing in the conclusion not in the premises, and the supernatural is not in the natural. But to conclude the supernatural negatively is still to conclude it, and this is what you do when from the natural you conclude against the supernatural. The proposition, that the supernatural is *not*, is no more in the natural, than the proposition, that the supernatural *is*. Your objections, then, can be assumed to have force or validity only in the sphere of the human intellect; all that is required for their logical refutation is, then, simply to show that they have no force or validity even in that sphere. The logical process, as a logical process, suffices, then, for their removal, for it meets them with an authority as high as that on which they stand; and if from the human intellect we show they are without foundation, you must either abandon them or admit that the human intellect can contradict itself; and when we have driven an opponent to this alternative, he is refuted, in the only sense in which the word is ever used.

7. But our Liberal minister, not quite comprehending our argument, may perhaps be disposed to object, — Granting that the logical process removes, or is competent as a logical process to remove, the objections the intellect may raise, still it does not suffice, for it does not prove the Church. We say it does; for to remove all the objections the intellect can raise to a proposition is precisely what is meant, and all that ever is or can be meant, by the word *prove*. The proof in no conceivable case ever goes

beyond the removal of the *prohibens*, the objections the intellect raises, as is evident from the fact we have established, that the assent is always immediate, without any other positive motive or reason than is contained in the subject assenting and object assented to, and in the further fact, that there never can be in the conclusion any thing not previously declared and assented to in the premises. To believe is normal, and to elicit faith nothing is needed but to remove obstructions ; and as this is all, and because to believe is normal, and always follows the removal of obstructions, unless voluntarily withheld, the process of removing the obstructions is called demonstration, or proof. But, in strictness, the proof, the demonstration, is never positive, but always negative. When, then, we have removed the obstructions, shown that reason has nothing further to object, we say, and we have the right to say, according to the law in the case, and the uniform usage of language, that we have proved, demonstrated, substantiated, our proposition.

8. This holds good, also, in regard to human testimony. Not to believe on human testimony at all would be as unreasonable as not to believe, on the authority of the principle of identity, or the principle that the same is the same, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. To believe human testimony is normal ; and hence children always believe every one, and all that is told them, till by experience they have learned to distrust. But in after life, however distrustful we may have been rendered by experience of the duplicity of men, we always believe every man's testimony when there are no considerations which impeach it or which tend to take away its credibility. We have and can have no positive reasons for believing, for, if we were to insist upon them, we could never believe any one man without an infinite series of vouchers for his veracity. Why I should believe a fellow-man I know not ; but I know it is a principle of my nature to believe him, when I have nothing to object to his credibility. The verification of human testimony is only a negative process ; and yet what is established on human testimony, against which no valid objection can be brought, is established, proved, in as high a sense as we ever prove any proposition whatever : and the certainty resting on it, and which is called *moral* certainty, is as high as *metaphysical* certainty. Consequently, when we have shown that in those matters which fall under human testimony, and those which are said to demand demonstrative proof, the mind according to its own principles or laws has nothing to object, and cannot object

without contradicting these laws or principles, we have done all that is or can be understood by proving a proposition. The logical process we have pointed out does this in the case of the Church, and therefore it *proves* it, and the human intellect cannot refuse to accept the Church for what she professes to be, without doing violence to itself.

9. That we here clear up the whole mystery of the elicitation of an act of faith, we are far from pretending, if by clearing up is meant removing the remote as well as the proximate mystery. How the subject can be creditive, or how the object can be credible, what is the secret virtue of the believing faculty of the one and of the credibility of the other, we know not, save so far as we see the effects. But this is nothing to us in particular, for, if it is an objection, it is one which concerns others as well as ourselves, since an act of intuition or of discursion as well as of faith, an act of human faith as well as of divine faith, involves it. What constitutes the subject cognoscitive? what constitutes the object cognoscible? the subject able to know, and the object capable of being known? The question is old, and few who have entered somewhat into metaphysical studies can be wholly ignorant of the efforts which philosophers, ancient and modern, have made, by investigation of the cognoscitive subject or the cognoscible object, to wring out the secret, and tell us, not that we know, but how we know. No one has pushed his researches farther in this direction than Immanuel Kant in his *Critik der reinen Vernunft*; but he has ended where he began, simply telling us we know because — we do. All that any man by natural reason can say is, we know because Almighty God has made us intelligent beings, and placed us in relation with cognoscible objects, that we believe because he has made us creditive subjects, and placed us in relation with credible objects, and we should not be what we are, if we did or could not. In supernatural faith, we believe because we are made by the *donum* supernaturally creditive, and by the presence of the Church are in relation with a supernaturally credible object. Here is all natural reason says or can say. That this leaves a mystery unexplained, we do not deny; there is mystery everywhere, could we but see far enough into things to detect it; but here is no special mystery, no peculiar mystery, only the one great mystery common to every act of human life, which lies at the bottom of all things, and which none but God alone can clear up. This is enough; for when we have reduced the special mystery in some particular case to the one

general mystery which envelopes all, we have done all that ever is or can be understood by clearing up or explaining it.

Yet somewhat farther than this the Catholic believer may and does go. To the eye of natural reason, every act of human life, discursively considered, if you wish to go behind reason, involves a *vicious* circle, from which by way of conclusion from a given antecedent it is impossible to extricate ourselves ; and were it not for the act of faith which we make immediately in our faculties, we never should get out of it, or perform a single human act. This act of faith, human faith we mean, including in one simple indecomposable act both antecedent and consequent, by a pure and bold affirmation, lifts us from the circle, and life proceeds. Here is the fact which has turned the heads of our Transcendentalists, and which they have known so little how to use, — an immense fact, not always duly appreciated, but which no sound philosophy can neglect. Yet this act, this pure affirmation, man's first act and the most astonishing act of his whole life, has no logical validity, and, if we insist on concluding it from an antecedent, is logically impossible ; for there is no conceivable antecedent from which it can be concluded. Logically considered, it involves the precise absurdity our correspondent thinks he discovers in the act of divine faith. Hence, in the history of all ages, while the mass of men believe in their faculties, and live a practical life, the few who demand a reason for all they do, though practically believing with the multitude, yet in their speculations have an almost irresistible tendency to universal skepticism. They make, indeed, with the rest of us, their act of faith in the reason, for this they cannot help doing ; but speculatively this has in their eyes no validity, and they see not how universal doubt is to be escaped. Men recoil instinctively from the terrible conclusion that there is no certainty, that a man is not really certain that doubt is doubting, and in all ages there have been philosophers who have struggled manfully against it. Plato and Aristotle among the ancients, Descartes, Leibnitz, Malebranche, Kant, Reid and Stewart, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Cousin, among the moderns, have all tried to overcome the speculative doubt, and legitimate this primitive act of faith ; but we need hardly say that they have done so without the least conceivable success. M. Cousin has spoken as well on the subject as any philosopher, ancient or modern, with whom we are acquainted ; yet he has done nothing but place the difficulty more prominently before our eyes. He thought he had found its solu-

tion in the distinction between spontaneity and reflection, the subjective reason and the objective reason. He supposed the act was by the spontaneous virtue of the objective and impersonal reason, which, as objective and impersonal, was independent of us, and logically antecedent to the primitive affirmation. But we have only our subjective reason as authority for the objective, and by our subjective reason only are we able to say there is an objective reason ; which necessarily destroys the independence of the objective reason, and reduces its authority to that of the subjective and personal. This M. Cousin's bitter enemy, M. Pierre Leroux, the leader of the progressist or modified Saint-Simonian school, discovered, and he thought to escape the objection by seizing on the fact, that in every intellectual phenomenon there are subject and object, which, in our apprehension, are always *me* and *not me*. But nothing was gained ; because there was nothing except our faculties to vouch for the fact that the *not me* was not *me*. Turn which way we will, by natural reason alone there is no escape, as she herself asserts ; because it is demonstrably evident that we have nothing but reason with which to verify reason, and in every effort to verify it we must begin by assuming it.

It is only in the Catholic faith that we are able to find the solution of this difficulty. In the *donum fidei*, which is a *supernaturally* infused power or virtue, we have, as it were, a supernatural reason, superior to natural reason, the antecedent from which it may be concluded, and its primitive act of faith legitimated. We receive the Church on the authority of the *donum*, the supernatural gift, and therefore on an authority above and more ultimate than reason. The authority of the Church, by virtue of this supernatural principle of assent, is really above and more ultimate than reason, and not, as those who are outside of the Church commonly imagine, merely the authority of reason in a disguised form. This authority is, then, really authority for reason, and whatever it proposes is an antecedent from which reason may logically conclude, without any danger of concluding *idem per idem*. Now, the Church teaches us that man was made to the image and similitude of his Maker, and that this image and similitude are in his rational nature. In his rational nature, man participates of the Divine nature, and in that sense in which the essence of the Divinity is to know, and to know without other medium than itself. Hence, it would be a contradiction in terms to suppose the reason could not make the affirmation in question.

This solution is substantially the solution M. Cousin himself gives, but with this difference: he professes to obtain it from the reason itself, from which it is not obtainable; whereas we obtain it by means of supernatural faith elicited by the *donum*, which makes all the difference in the world. If we ask him to verify his solution, he can answer only by a paralogism; but if he ask us to do it, we can answer by the supernatural authority of faith, logically antecedent to reason. Reason in its sphere is valid, because it is a participation of the divine nature, as the *donum fidei* is in the order of grace, and the *lumen gloriae* in the beatified state; but reason herself cannot affirm that she is this participation, for she is too feeble a participation for that, and therefore cannot legitimate herself; and herein is it specifically distinguished from the *donum fidei* and the *lumen gloriae*, each of which participates in a sufficient degree to affirm its own participation. Reason once known to be a participation of the Divine nature is known to be valid in all its normal acts, because it is in some sense God himself who sees and affirms, so to speak, in its intuitions or affirmations. In believing it, *in its sphere, and in its normal exercise*, it is indeed God that we believe; for it is in him we live and move and are, and therefore that we see, and know, and affirm, — substantially the *vision in God* of Malebranche, a doctrine materially true; but formally false, when asserted, as he asserts it, on the authority of natural reason itself; for, as we have seen, it is not discoverable by natural reason, and can be known and established only by the authority of the supernatural faith. This is not the only instance in which philosophers have stolen their solutions from faith, and sent them back to us as the property of natural reason itself.

But, admitting that by the *donum fidei* we legitimate the Church by an authority antecedent to reason, and by the Church we legitimate reason in showing that in its sphere and degree it is a participation of the Divine nature, we are able, by means of the Catholic faith, to get out, not only of practical skepticism, but of speculative or philosophical skepticism also, and to establish human science on a solid and imperishable foundation. But it is only by the Catholic faith this can be done; for it cannot be done without a principle more than human, and that precise supernatural principle which we have in Catholicity. Hence, in a deeper and nobler sense than is commonly imagined, at least by those not Catholics, is revelation the only solid basis of philosophy, — not only because it furnishes *data* not furnished

by natural reason, from which conclusions may be drawn throwing much light on natural phenomena, but because it enables us to verify reason itself, the instrument of philosophy, and without whose verification there can be no sound philosophy.

10. Some will, perhaps, object, since we deny the necessity of all investigation into the motives of credibility, in the case of actual believers, and of children validly baptized and properly instructed from the first, that we lay down the dangerous principle of believing without examining, and throw open the door to the reception of falsehood as well as of truth. The common notion among those outside of the Church is, that no faith can be reasonable which has not been preceded by examination of its motives, and in their case this may be true; because there are obstacles in their way, and they cannot, or will not, believe till they are removed. To them, therefore, we say always, examine patiently, thoroughly, in a meek and humble and prayerful spirit, and you will believe; and we should not feel authorized in calling upon them to believe, if we had not sufficient reasons, which we can offer them, to remove every objection which reason can suggest against believing. But this is an exception to the general rule, rendered necessary in their case, because they are out of the normal order. To others we do not say, examine and then believe; for they already have all that examination can give them. The normal order of life is to begin by believing, not by reasoning; for, till we believe, we have nothing to reason from. To begin in the order of grace by believing is not anomalous, irregular, but conformable to the general law of all life, and therefore cannot be reasonably objected to.

As to the dangerousness of the principle, it is purely imaginary. The *donum fidei* is not a general *vis creditiva*, but simply *vis creditiva* in relation to its special correlative, the supernatural credible object. Its special correlative is God supernaturally revealing himself. As it is a supernatural gift for the express purpose of enabling us to believe this supernatural object, it would be a contradiction in terms to suppose it a power to believe any thing else, and impious to suppose it could be the power to believe any object not strictly and absolutely true. It is not the power to believe where there is no credible object, and where the truth is not there is for it no credible object, and there no faith is or can be elicited. In a word, the creditive subject, made creditive subject by the special infused grace or participation of Almighty God, can elicit no act of faith with-

out a credible object ; and no object, not strictly true, can be, in relation to it, credible object, unless we deny the veracity of God, and allege that he can deceive or be deceived ; for in the *donum* it is by him, and only by him, that we believe, and it is, in some sense, he that believes in us.

Moreover, all faith is belief on authority, and the authority itself is the primary object of the faith ; that which it proposes is only the secondary object, believed inasmuch as we believe the authority proposing. To the elicitation of an act of divine or supernatural faith, not only the supernatural elevation of the subject, by the infused habit or virtue of faith, is necessary, but also the *supernatural authority* proposing itself, and what is to be believed on it as the credible object. This authority must be that of God himself ; for, in the act of divine faith, it is not only by him that we believe, but he himself whom we believe. Then, unless God, who is truth itself, and infinitely *verax*, can propose and believe falsehood, it is utterly impossible to elicit the act of faith, save on condition of a credible object strictly and absolutely true.

This meets, in advance, the objection which might at first sight seem to arise in the case of children of heretics and schismatics. If these children are validly baptized, as they may be, what is to hinder them from believing the doctrines of the sect in which they are born, as readily and as firmly as the children of Catholics do the doctrines of the Church ? These children, if validly baptized, receive the *donum* or virtue of faith, which is all they need or can have before coming to years of discretion ; and if they die in infancy, they will undoubtedly be saved. If, when they come to years of discretion, they obstruct it by no mortal sin, it is in them a power to elicit the act of faith, if the credible object be present, and they will infallibly elicit it. But in the bosom of the sects the credible object is not present, but is wanting, in most cases, even in its secondary sense, in all in its primary sense, namely, the authority proposing itself, and without whose proposition what is to be believed on it, as the dogmas or several articles of faith, is not believable. This authority none of the sects, even by their own confession, have ; they deny all such authority, and make it a capital sin in us that we allege that there is such authority, and that we have it in our Church. Not having this authority, they have not the credible object ; and therefore, even if they have the *donum*, they have not the essential conditions of eliciting an act of faith. Therefore it is impossible, in the bosom of any

of the sects, to make an act of faith, as we have heretofore, on several occasions, proved.

We do not disguise from ourselves that this conclusion may seem harsh and illiberal to our sectarian friends ; and if it rested on our authority alone, we should not dare utter it. But it is not we who say so, but the truth itself ; and we should be wanting in that charity which loves our neighbour as ourselves, if we sought to conceal or to soften it. It is no charity to those who are in error to be left to think their condition is not perilous. We may be as liberal as we will in what is our own, but there is no place for our liberality in that which is not ours, but God's. It is not we, but he, who makes the conditions of salvation, and such conditions as seem to him good ; and it is fair to presume that we could make no better ones, were the matter left to us. Our business, and that of every rational being, is to find out the conditions of salvation actually established in the divine order, and to conform to them, without disturbing ourselves with the question, whether they are liberal or illiberal, pleasing to the unbeliever or displeasing. The Almighty is not very likely to do wrong, or to exact what he does not impart the ability to give. That sectarians do not and cannot elicit an act of faith is no more than they themselves know, or are morally bound to know. Our young friend, himself a minister, and occupying one of our old Puritan pulpits, not only begins by a virtual confession of his want of faith, but writes his whole letter to prove that an act of faith, properly so called, is utterly impossible. Chillingworth, decidedly the ablest champion the Protestant cause has ever counted, confesses that divine faith is not possible on Protestant principles, and boldly contends that God does not demand it. Doubtless, sectarians may generally *think* they have all the faith that it is possible for us human beings to have, but they know that what they have is not properly faith ; for they cannot be ignorant that faith, to be faith, must exclude doubt, and — unless the power of believing is obstructed by sin — even the possibility of doubt. The best among them, those the most firmly persuaded of their orthodoxy, know nothing of the calm, tranquil faith of the Catholic believer, — have no absolute certainty, such certainty as would make them feel it absurd, even by way of hypothesis, to suppose their sect may possibly err ; for every one confesses his sect is fallible, and denies that there is any infallible church. They may think they are as certain as others are, as certain as they can be ; but surely they are not so certain but they would

gladly be more certain. If they could have a higher certainty, how thankfully would they receive it, and from how much secret misgiving would it relieve them! "We *think* we are right; we *think* we cannot be deceived; we hope we are not; we pray that we may not be; we close our eyes and ears to whatever would suggest that we are; yet we do not know; it is possible we are mistaken; we are all liable to err; we try to be right, and we trust a merciful God will pardon us, if we are not." This is the most that we have ever known sectarians able to say; and if sometimes they attempt to say more, it is, if they are not evidently laboring under some hallucination, because they are conscious that more is requisite to come up to the standard of faith. Now, in all this there is no faith, not the most distant approach to faith. Sectarians are, then, not only without faith, but, unless altogether more stupid than we believe them, they know they have no faith; at least, the doubt and mistrust they experience indicate a sufficient knowledge of their want of faith to render them culpable, if they do not to the utmost of their ability inquire if a certain faith be not possible,—a faith so certain that they can conceive nothing more certain, and in which they can affirm the credible object as certainly as they can now their own existence, and more certainly than the mathematician, with natural reason alone, can that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. In every land, the Church is at their door, assuring them such a faith as this is possible, and the indispensable condition of salvation. Do they examine to see if what she says is true? Not at all. They will not seek, therefore they do not find; and whose the fault? It is not ours to say; but we leave it to them to decide, if, when they come to the judgment bar of God, it turns out, as it will, that the Church is right, what valid plea they will have for not having been true, devout Catholics. There stands the Church, or there stands Christ in the Church, knocking at the door of their hearts, his locks wet with the dew of the night, entreating them to arise and let him enter. What excuse have they for bidding him be gone, and not trouble their rest? It is for them, and not for us, to answer. All we say is, "faith comes by hearing," and "without faith it is impossible to please God."

11. When we have established the Church to the human intellect, by removing the intellectual obstacles to its reception, we have the right in all subsequent controversies to appeal to it, as authority which even they who do not as yet receive it by

divine faith are bound, by the laws of their own reason, to acknowledge and submit to. On its authority we then tell them, and they cannot object, since by the very supposition no valid objection can be brought, that they are bound to elicit the act of divine faith, and that if they do not, whoever or wherever they are, it is their own fault ; for, on the same unobjectionable authority, we tell them again that there is a preparatory grace given unto all men, which, if not resisted, — and which need not be resisted, for the act of resistance is a free, voluntary act on the part of him who resists, — will be immediately efficacious in disposing them to believe, and conducting them to the Holy Sacrament of Baptism, in which they will infallibly receive the *donum fidei*, and become able to elicit the faith required. Thus to believe is always in their power, if they will to believe. If they resist the grace of God, if they remain unbelievers, if they persist in opposing the word, however honest and sincere they may fancy themselves, we tell them, on the authority which their own reason declares to be paramount to all others, that they are in fault, are guilty before God, and have no right to expect any thing but everlasting condemnation. “ He that believeth not shall be condemned.” Here we obtain a motive that may operate on the will, and induce it not to resist divine grace, but to suffer it to be efficacious in preparing and finally completing the conversion. Hence the importance, in conjunction with divine grace, of the logical process.

VI. We have now answered the principal objections urged by the letter before us. We have endeavoured to make the answer conclusive, and, at the same time, as simple and popular in its form as the nature of the subject allowed. The reply is long, but it is well known that an objection may be stated in a single line, which will require a volume to refute. If we had been called upon to answer only for philosophers and theologians, we could have answered in much briefer space, and with far greater ease to ourselves ; but all readers are not philosophers or theologians, and it requires not seldom less labor to prepare the answer than it does the majority of readers to receive it. We have aimed to adapt our remarks to the understanding of men of strong and clear minds of all classes and pursuits, and hope we have escaped the fault of being too popular for the professional and too scholastic for the general reader. A few additional remarks, in reply to certain miscellaneous objections

presented in the letter, and we close this already too protracted discussion.

1. Our correspondent tells us, that there are only two methods by which the claims of the Church can be established : the one, arguing from principles common to both parties ; and the other, the historical method. The first he condemns as proving nothing, inasmuch as it assumes, but does not prove, the principles. Will he tell us how it is possible for two parties mutually opposed to argue together, if not from principles common to them both, and therefore from that on which they are not opposed, but agreed ? He decides in favor of the historical method ; but this, so far as it involves argument at all, involves arguments from principles common to both parties. Nothing can be concluded from history by either party for itself or against the other, save so far as both agree on the facts of history ; and these facts, when agreed on, become principles common to both parties, from which conclusions may be drawn. One method, in fact, no more proves its principles than the other ; for reasoning never proves its principles, but must always proceed from premises *given*, not obtained.

We grant the question of the Church is simply an historical question ; yet a question not of all history, but of certain definite facts. The writer of the letter is mistaken in supposing it involves a thorough investigation of the manners, customs, laws, political, civil, and literary institutions and influences of past ages ; for it would be impossible from these to conclude any thing for or against the divine origin and constitution of the Church. He, in assuming this investigation to be necessary, assumes that we have in our natural reason a standard or measure of infallibility, — not merely of what is relatively infallible, infallible in relation to reason, and what pertains to its own legitimate province, — but of what is absolutely infallible ; which we have not, and cannot have ; for, if we had, we should know all that God knows, and be what the devil falsely told our first parents they would be, if they should eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Here is a fact which Protestants seldom appreciate. It was not appreciating this fact which led Professor Park to commit the blunders in his Lecture on *The Intellectual and Moral Influence of Romanism*, which we exposed in our Review for last October. The Protestant forgets, that, if the Church be true, be from God, her teaching must be his reason, the principle or standard by which he is to judge the influences of history, not these the

standard by which he is to judge her teaching. He carries with him always the assumption of private reason as the ultimate authority on all questions which can come up, — not reflecting, that, if private reason be the ultimate authority, there can be no church authority. The Church concluded by private reason, no matter from what *data*, would not be authoritative, for the authority would be that of private reason which concluded it; and in believing what it proposes we should not believe it, but private reason. The assumption of the authority of private reason negatives in advance that of the Church, and renders the proposed investigation ridiculous. It is, as we said, in replying to Professor Park, a plain begging of the question, or the decision in advance against the Church. Yet it is always after having assumed the ultimate authority of private reason, and after having thus decided against the Church, that our Protestant logicians proceed to inquire if the Church be or be not authoritative. And it is precisely this course our young friend unconsciously adopts in the historical investigation he proposes as necessary. Yet he prides himself on his reason, and laughs at Catholic logicians. A little reflection, one would think, would suffice to teach him his mistake, and to show him that it is very necessary to understand the precise question at issue, before proceeding to its solution. All that history can do, all that it is required to do in the case, is to establish two simple facts: — 1. That our Lord did found a Church with authority to teach; and 2. That the Roman Catholic Church is the one he founded. These two facts historically established, as we would establish any other historical facts, all is established, and reason has no further office but to apprehend and submit to what the Church teaches. A very little study will enable our correspondent, with his present knowledge of history in general, to establish these; for they are established by plain and public facts, readily come at, and easily verified. The method he proposes involves the precise paralogism he began by objecting to, and, if pursued, would only bewilder him in a mass of details, from which he could derive no light on the real problem to be solved. We cannot, therefore, understand his incompetency to decide forthwith all there is for him to decide; and we by no means agree that it is necessary for him to delay his obedience to the commands of his God, till he has wasted the better part of his life in a useless investigation. We, of course, do not want him or any one to come blindly into the Church; and we assure him he will find few priests

ready to receive him, till he can give a reason for the faith he hopes to receive ; but he has only to resolve to open his heart to the truth, to abate his confidence in his own infallibility, or power, by unassisted reason, to judge infallibly of revealed truth, and earnestly to pray God to incline his will to his holy word, and to open his understanding to its reception, and the doubt and darkness will flee away, the day-star will arise in his heart, he will experience the ineffable joy of believing, and like the blessed Apostle St. Thomas, but more blessed than he, exclaim, " My Lord and my God ! "

2. Our correspondent mistakes the teachings of the Catholic Church, when he fancies she teaches that the " true condition of salvation is that each should act up to the measure of faith or of light he has." She teaches, and all her children are bound to believe, that out of the pale of her communion there is no salvation ; for she teaches that " without faith it is impossible to please God " ; and faith, we have proved, over and over again, in the sense she takes the word, is impossible without her. God does not command what is impossible ; or, if he commands what is naturally impossible for men to do, he never commands it without bestowing the grace which renders it possible ; and therefore, if they do not always and everywhere do what he commands, the fault is theirs, in resisting the grace given them, and which, if not resisted, would have been efficacious.

Our correspondent has been misled by what some of our theologians say concerning invincible ignorance, and which he totally misapprehends. That God will condemn no man for *invincible* ignorance is readily conceded ; but whether there ever was or ever can be a case of real invincible ignorance, as to what the Church teaches is necessary to be explicitly believed as the medium of salvation, may well be doubted, and is, from the nature of the case, unsusceptible of proof. All baptized children, by whomsoever baptized, are in the communion of the Church, and, if dying in infancy, or before committing any mortal sin, will undoubtedly be saved ; but the most liberal construction of invincible ignorance ever adopted by any Catholic theologian falls far short of the latitudinarian principle assumed. No one is ever admitted to be invincibly ignorant, who has had any possible means of knowing what the Church requires him to believe as the medium of salvation ; and no one, even if invincibly ignorant, can be saved, unless, when dying, he is free from mortal sin ; — two things which can with difficulty, to say the least, be assumed of any adult person out of

the Church, especially of any Protestant. It is hard to conceive any Protestant who could not know what the Church teaches, if he wished. His very Protestantism brings the Church to his notice, and in its history and doctrines tells him so much of her, that he is inexcusable, if he do not go farther, and ascertain what she is and what she requires. If he does go farther, and ascertains what she teaches, he is not in ignorance; and if he then does not believe her, he is a heretic; and heresy, the blessed Apostle assures us, is a *deadly* sin. At any rate, whatever may be said in the case of some, the plea of invincible ignorance cannot avail our young friend. He is an educated man; has studied theology; and he professes to be a minister of the Gospel; he knows there is a church called the Catholic Church, and he has had ample means of knowing what she teaches. His position outside of her, then, if she be the true Church, as she most assuredly is, must be not a little perilous, and altogether unjustifiable.

3. Our young Protestant minister says, it is "utterly wicked and absurd to denounce any penalty beforehand upon any result deliberately and candidly arrived at"; for there must be in "reasoning, between man and man, no threats introduced, or any extraneous element whatever, to influence the determination." In reasoning between man and man, we concede it; but this is not a question between man and man, but between man and his Maker; and the threats or consequences of believing or not believing are intrinsic, not extraneous, elements of the question to be decided. Between man and man, all reasoning, all faith even, is free, and no man has the right to call another to an account for his faith, whatever it may be; for we recognize no human authority in matters of faith. Before God, too, man is free to believe or not to believe, as it seems to him good; but not free to hope the same recompense, whether he believes or disbelieves. Almighty God has promised eternal life to the believer, and threatened the unbeliever with eternal death. "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned." St. Mark, xvi. 16. You can believe or not, as you choose. If you choose not to believe, eternal death will be your doom; if you choose to believe, you may aspire to eternal life. This is an integral part of that very word you are to believe or not believe, into the credibility or incredibility of which you are to inquire. Where is the wickedness in proposing such a word, or in us in telling you that God has revealed such a word, and in urging

you to inquire if we are not right in telling you so? Here is no extraneous element introduced to influence the determination, for nothing is introduced not integral in the question itself. The indignation expressed, then, is misplaced.

Moreover, our correspondent proceeds on a supposition which we cannot grant him. He supposes that men may deliberately and candidly inquire into the authority of the Church and come to different results, or that the authority of the Church is a matter about which men may *honestly* differ in opinion. We do not concede this. Faith is not a matter of opinion; and there can be, after proper examination, no honest difference of opinion about it. The Almighty has not committed the indiscretion of making a revelation for us, and of leaving it so uncertain and doubtful, that men may honestly differ from one another as to what it is. Such indiscretion, or such want of foresight and proper adaptation of means to ends, we might look for in weak and imprudent men, but not in the all-wise and all-powerful God. He, if he has made a revelation at all, must have made it to be believed; and also have made the means of believing it so accessible, so certain and sure, that no one, with ordinary prudence, can honestly seek and not find. If you examine honestly, meekly, candidly, in an humble and reverential spirit, the only proper spirit in which to inquire at all, you will infallibly find that the Catholic Church is the living and authoritative Church of God; for, if you so inquire, you will be submissive to the grace which is given you, and that will subdue your moral repugnance to the Church, and open the eyes of your understanding to her claims. We tell you this, and you have no right to dispute us till you have so inquired, or till you bring us an instance of some one having so inquired, and failed. But if you inquire with a proud and contracted spirit, with haughty reliance on your own infallibility and self-sufficiency, resolutely resisting divine grace, you will not find, and will not deserve to find; for you will inquire amiss, — in a disposition, not to receive, but to reject the truth. And here is the reason why so many who think they are honest inquirers do not find. At bottom you will always find exorbitant pride, an overweening self-conceit, though, it may be, aping the form of humility. There is a want of perfect ingenuousness, of true earnestness, of a loving and reverential disposition. Then, again, thousands who say they inquire do not inquire. How many of those Protestants who condemn Catholicity in such unmeasured terms have ever sat one hour for instruction at the

feet of those authorized to give it? He who would know the Catholic faith should always seek instruction from the living teacher authorized by the Church to teach, and he will never have inquired properly till he has done so.

4. The writer of the letter professes himself to hold to the Catholic Church; so firmly rooted in all men is that article of the creed, "I believe in the holy Catholic Church," and so difficult is it for any one even to conceive the possibility of being a Christian without acknowledging the Catholic Church. The Church hovers over them; and in their wildest extravagances some shadow of her majesty is always present to their hearts and imaginations,—a fact worth meditating long and well. The writer says, the "Catholic Church comprises all who share the faith and salvation of Jesus Christ." Another precious admission, which involves the whole doctrine of exclusive salvation; for if the Church comprises all who share that faith and salvation, then none whom the Church does not comprise do or can share the faith and salvation of Jesus Christ,—and what more do we say, when we say faith and salvation are not possible out of the communion of the Catholic Church?

But who are these who share the faith and salvation of Jesus Christ? The members of the Catholic Church. Agreed. Are they members because they share the faith and salvation, or do they share the faith and salvation because members? If you say the latter, you must determine the Church, and become a member of it, before you can share the faith and salvation, or be truly a Christian; which is the Catholic doctrine. Then what, where, or which is the Catholic Church, or church of which you must be a member in order to share the faith and salvation of Jesus Christ? Here is a very significant question, and which must be answered first of all. If you say the former, that you are members because you share the faith and salvation, which is what we suppose you would say, then you must hold that you get the faith and salvation without the Church. Now, how without the Church do you contrive to get the faith and salvation? How do you determine what they are? How do you determine what are the means of eliciting the faith and securing the salvation? These, you will perceive, are for you, as well as for us, fundamental questions, and must be answered in some way. How do you answer them? and how establish the soundness and sufficiency of your answer? Here is a difficulty you must not evade, but one which you must meet at the very threshold.

You may answer us, as your Liberal Christian friends in general do, that Christianity is a life, — the life of Christ; and that he who truly lives this life has all that is or can be required of him. Agreed, again. We say Christianity is a life, — the life of Christ, — and that all who truly live it have all that they need, either for this world or for that which is to come. But can this life be begotten and lived out of the communion of the Catholic Church? Here is the question. You assume it can, and that you or some of you live it, and by virtue of the fact of living it are brought into the Church. This is a very pretty theory, but will you just favor us with its proofs? You demand of us proofs; do not take it unkindly, then, if we demand proofs of you. We suspect, however, that this is a point on which you do not happen to have any proofs to adduce. You make an assumption, which is demanded by the exigencies of your condition, we admit, but for which you have not the shadow of any authority. You reason in this way: "We who are out of the Church do or may live the true life, and therefore we do or may live the true life out of the Church; and by living it out of the Church, come, *ipso facto*, into the Church." This is Liberal Christian logic, and yet it is the best you have. We utterly deny your assumption. None of you who are outside the Roman Catholic Church do live, approach, or even truly conceive the Christian life. The Christian life is not in the natural order; it is the supernatural life of justice, which places him who lives it on the plane of a supernatural destiny; and it is not and cannot be lived without supernatural faith, — "the just shall live by faith," — and supernatural faith is not possible without the Church. Faith is not, as our Liberalist divines hold, something *in addition* to the Christian life, but that in which the Christian life begins, and without which it cannot be. We have seen that the proper natural human life begins and must begin in an act of faith, in a pure simple affirmation; so in the order of grace, or the supernatural order, the proper Christian life can begin only by a primitive act of supernatural faith, a pure affirmation, which affirms in one and the same act both the antecedent and consequent. For — remark well — the Christian life is not a *continuation and development of our natural human life*, but a new life, which for the individual begins absolutely *de novo*, and therefore demands necessarily a "new birth," properly a *birth*; and therefore all the necessary conditions of birth in general, inconceivable in the special case of the Christian birth without the Church, the Immaculate Bride of the Lamb, the joyful MOTHER of all the faithful.

Nothing is more absurd than to make the children anterior to the mother, and to assume that the spiritual children procreate their own spiritual mother, as is assumed when it is assumed the Christian life may be begotten and lived without the Church, and that the Church is simply the offspring of those in whom it is so begotten, and who so live it. This reverses the whole order of both nature and grace. We cannot, then, accept *your* Catholic Church, nor concede that you, in the remotest degree, while out of the Roman Catholic Church, live the Christian life, or share the faith and salvation of Jesus Christ. We concede you many amiable qualities, many natural virtues, which in their place are respectable; we grant that many of you do all that can be really expected of simple human nature, wounded as it has been by the Fall; we even concede you all the real worth of character you claim for yourselves; but we see in it no approach to the Christian life; and it is because you cannot be born again and live the Christian life out of the Church that you are so earnestly entreated to come into her communion. It is not that we underrate your virtues, but that you underrate the Christian life, when you imagine that you are or can be living it.

Our correspondent thinks that the epithet "*Roman*" applied to the Church neutralizes the epithet *Catholic*. We think differently. Unity is essential to catholicity; for that thing which you call catholic must be one, or it cannot be catholic or universal, but will be multiple, and therefore particular. The unity must be predicable in the same order, too, as the catholicity or universality. If you assume a church, catholic in the visible order, as you do when you speak of it as extended or capable of extension in space, you must predicate unity of it in the same order, or what you term catholic will not be catholic, but a collection or aggregate of particulars. We commend this fact to the learned and metaphysical *New York Churchman*, and to our "*Reformed Catholics*" of the Anglican and Protestant Episcopal sect generally, who pronounce the word *catholic* with so much emphasis, and who would fain persuade us that they are so innocent as really to believe that the world will recognize the *Catholic* Church in an aggregation of particular communions, each distinct and independent of the other, and bound together by no visible bond of unity. If your unity is invisible, your catholicity must also be invisible, and to assert a visible catholic church with no visible unity is nothing more nor less than a simple contradiction in terms. These "*Reformed Catholics*," who would be much more effectually

reformed if at once *reformed* by the grace of God into what they call *Romanists*, must not laugh at our young friend for his notion of a catholic church, made up of isolated individuals, dispersed over the globe, and bound together by no bond of unity, visible or invisible; for they adopt precisely his doctrine, only they take particular communions for their units, and be simply individuals.

The proper name of the Church is "The Holy Catholic Apostolic Church," and the epithet *Roman* is added, not to restrict the meaning of *Catholic*, but simply to mark the visible centre of unity; and since it undeniably must have such a centre of unity somewhere, or not be catholic or universal, it is obvious that the epithet *Roman*, so far from neutralizing the meaning of the word *Catholic*, serves to confirm it, and to make the universality or catholicity of the Church more striking and unmistakable. It defines at once to you the Catholic Church by directing you to its centre of unity. One is struck at times with the slender stock in trade of critical and philosophical knowledge on which our Protestant friends attempt to do business. A little reflection, a little sober thought, would save them from many laughable blunders, as well as from the incivility of applying nicknames, and calling us *Romanists*, a term exceedingly ill adapted to designate our faith or character. Nevertheless the blunders and incivility are theirs, not ours.

5. "The Roman hierarchy, not the faith of Romanists [Catholics], is what I am steadily opposed to," says our estimable young preacher. What would he think of the play of Hamlet with the part of the Prince of Denmark left out by particular request? Not much, we apprehend, of the play itself, and still less of those by whose particular request the part was left out. Very much in the same light as this would strike him does his declaration strike us. "The Holy Catholic Church" is an article of faith in the Catholic's creed, and the hierarchy is not, in his faith, an excrescence of the Church, nor a mere accidental appendage to it, but essential to its very being as the Church. The Catholic faith teaches that the hierarchy of bishops, or pastors and teachers, under their chief, the successor of St. Peter, is of divine institution, and no Catholic can oppose it without opposing his whole faith. The authority on which that rests is the authority on which his whole creed rests, and, if he should admit it to be insufficient for the hierarchy, he would admit it to be insufficient for the other articles of his creed, and then he would have no faith left. No

man, then, can oppose the Catholic hierarchy without opposing directly the whole Catholic faith. Alas ! man is a poor church builder, a miserable church reformer. There stands the Catholic Church, as she has stood for these eighteen hundred years, and as she will stand unto the consummation of the world. Either she is the Church of God, or she is not. If she is not, away with her; we have nothing to do with her, and want nothing which is hers. If she is, as she is as certainly as God exists, then you must take her as she is, as a whole; you have no questions to ask, no suggestions to make, no improvements to recommend. Your sole business is to bow down your reason and will to her, as the visible representative of Almighty God, and to believe and do simply what she commands you. If she does not please you, if she does not suit your taste or judgment, it does not follow that she is in fault. The Almighty was not bound to take you or me into his councils, and it is not likely that it would have been of any great advantage to him, if he had actually consulted us. Men are a little too ready to counsel the All-wise, and to inform him how he ought or ought not to do. It is but becoming modesty to presume that he knew as well as we how to constitute his Church, and that it is for us to seek to conform ourselves to her, and not for her to seek to conform herself to us. The objection is a silly one, if the Church be not of God; it deserves a harsher name, if she be of God.

In conclusion, we assure our young friend that we duly appreciate his liberality in not *blaming* us for becoming a Catholic, and intimating that he can still respect us. We honor his liberality as it deserves. But, after all, the question is not one of human praise or blame, of human respect or disrespect. Human respect, however pleasant it may be, is of no great value, and should never be suffered to weigh in the balance with the love and approbation of Almighty God. If we have his consent or approbation for what we do, it matters little what men may think or say of us. It is not what we think of our young friend's Liberalism, or he of our Catholicity, that is to decide the character and value of either. The Catholic is not likely to feel that he is the party which stands most in need of commiseration, or that he calls for any remarkable stretch of liberality. His great difficulty is in being sufficiently grateful to his Divine Master for making him a Catholic, when so many others, no worse by nature, are left to perish in their error. If he obeys his Church, he knows he is well enough off; that he has a hundred-fold here, and the promise of the life to come.

Our young Protestant friend may think lightly of all this now ; for he is fresh from the schools, in the heyday of life, with his spirits elastic, and his prospects radiant. Youth, health, talents, learning, eloquence, troops of affectionate and applauding friends, — how can he look upon life as he will one day when these disappear or lose their value in his estimation, and, with his ideals all unrealized, he is obliged to look round for something solid and permanent on which he may rest, some safe shelter from the storms and tempests of life? “*Beatus qui intelligit quid sit amare Jesum, et contemnere seipsum propter Jesum. Oportet dilectum pro dilecto relinquere, quia Jesus vult solus super omnia amari. Dilectio creaturæ fallax et instabilis. Dilectio Jesu fidelis et perseverabilis. Qui adhæret creaturæ, cadet cum labili. Qui amplectitur Jesum, firmabitur in ævum. Illum dilige, et amicum tibi retine, qui, omnibus recedentibus, te non relinquet, nec patietur in fine perire. Ab omnibus oportet te aliquando separari, sive velis, sive nolis. Teneas te apud Jesum, vivens ac moriens ; et illius fidelitati committe, qui, omnibus deficientibus, solus potest juvare.*” * We know the writer well. We know God has once spoken by his grace to his heart, and called his attention to the Church, and, as secure as he may now feel, as secure as all his education has tended to make him feel, the great question, What shall I do to be saved? will one day press upon his heart, and demand an answer. The answer with which he now amuses himself and his people will then appear to him a bitter mockery, a sort of Mephistopheles laugh over the deep agony of the once innocent, now guilty, Margaret. When that question comes up, may the good God grant him to be true to the promptings and inspirations of divine grace!

We have concluded our reply. We have answered our young friend at full length. We have not spared his reasonings, but we trust we have said nothing to wound his sensibilities, or to indicate any want of that esteem for him we began by expressing. We beg him to read and *study* what we have replied, for it concerns the most momentous question that can possibly occupy the thoughts of man. If what we have said fail to satisfy him, we shall be happy to receive his objections, and pledge ourselves, in advance, to remove, as far as a complete logical reply can remove any objections, whatever objections he can urge, without denying that very reason on the

* *De Imitatione Christi*, Lib. II., Cap. 7.

authority of which he objects. All we ask is, that he do not repeat his old objections, without undertaking to show that our replies are not to the point, are unsound in principle, or not sustained by the facts in the case.

ART. II. — 1. *Manuel des Confesseurs.*

2. *Praxis Confessarii*, Auctore S. ALPHONSO DE LIGORIO.
3. *The Catholic Question in America.* New York. 1813.
4. *Le Prêtre, et la Femme de Famille*, par MICHELET.
5. *Entire Absolution of the Penitent.* A Sermon preached by Dr. PUSEY, in Christ Church Cathedral. Oxford. February, 1846.

IT may be allowed us, like the scribe of the Gospel, to bring forth from our treasures old things and new, in treating of a usage coeval with Christianity, but which has recently been assailed with no ordinary violence, whilst it has received the homage of a numerous and distinguished class of the Anglican clergy. A veil of mystery hangs over the confessional. The whisperings of the penitent reach the ear of the confessor, there to die away without impress or echo. The counsels, reproofs, exhortations, and injunctions of the spiritual father share in the privilege of secrecy. As might be expected, persons practically unacquainted with this tribunal view it with vague apprehension; and where prejudice has clouded the mind, distrust, suspicion, and evil surmises are indulged of proceedings dark and foul, defying proof and eluding investigation. For some ages, the training for this function of the ministry partook of its secret character, it being deemed unsafe to commit to writing the sacramental forms, or the rules by which the priest was to be guided in the difficult science of directing conscience, — *ars artium regimen animarum*, — but that period of reserve has long since passed away. The *disciplina arcani* is scarcely conceivable, now that the press has divulged and spread abroad, not only the mouldering volumes of the monastic libraries, but even the loose sheets to which confidential communications were sometimes committed; and the Gospel adage, that no secret shall remain unrevealed, is now literally fulfilled in the many treatises which prepare the priest for the exercise of the absolving power. Of these we have noted two at the head of

our list ; — the first, a French manual for confessors, which the Anglican Bishop of St. David's, Dr. Thirlwall, on occasion of the Maynooth discussion last year, mentioned with commendation ; — the second, a treatise of St. Alphonsus de Liguori, embodying the principles of his famous work on Moral Theology, and applying them to practice. A glance at this work will satisfy the reader that the holy author was a stranger to the Oxford principle of reserve in communicating knowledge, since he contemplates every imaginable abuse of the ministry, in order to mark its penalties and remedies.

The sermon of Dr. Pusey, recently delivered on his resuming the function of preaching in Christ Church cathedral, at Oxford, after three years' suspension on suspicion of orthodoxy, presents him still laboring for the restoration of ancient doctrine and discipline, which he fancies may be recovered from the ruins of the English Church. He boldly advocates the power of forgiveness, and highly commends the practice of confession, deeply deploring its neglect ; but, as if it were not allowed him to see the whole truth, or to proclaim it, from his present position, he spoils his manly advocacy of the forgiving power, by presenting confession as a disciplinary rite, which, although of great advantage, is not of absolute necessity. This is the more surprising, since it appears, from a letter which, a few months ago, he addressed to an inquiring friend, that he recommends the most detailed examination of conscience on the ten commandments, the seven deadly sins, and other particulars, as a preparation for confession ; which could not be reasonably hoped to be made so minutely, if no divine precept rendered it necessary. We may, however, congratulate ourselves on the near approach of this distinguished man to correct sentiments, and his high esteem of a practice which generally forms the most serious obstacle to conversion ; and we may hope that light will soon be granted him to view it as it truly is, — a divine ordinance, in which the mercy and wisdom of our Saviour-God are wonderfully displayed.

In truth, the reasoning of the learned professor on the power communicated to the Apostles should have led him to acknowledge the divine institution of confession ; for the power is manifestly discretionary and judicial, to be exercised wisely and justly ; consequently, with full cognizance of the cause on which judgment is to be passed. Christ cannot be thought to have sent his Apostles to forgive or retain sins, at their good pleasure, but rather so as to give to the penitent full assurance of pardon,

and leave the impenitent burdened with their sins. If the power, as Dr. Pusey contends, was real and effectual, and not a mere proclamation, in general terms, to whoever might prove fit to enjoy its benefit, it belonged to the Apostles and their successors to inquire, examine, and judge, — to ascertain the guilt of the applicant, and his repentance, — to determine his obligations, — to prescribe the conditions which he must fulfil, — and, finally, to pronounce sentence. The authority of acquitting or condemning necessarily implies the right to sit in judgment.

The fact related in the nineteenth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles may be fairly considered an instance of special confession of sins committed after baptism. When the sons of Sceva had adjured some possessed persons in the name of Jesus, whom Paul preached, a man possessed by an evil spirit rushed on them, and compelled them to seek safety in flight. This filled with terror the inhabitants of Ephesus, of whom many who had already made profession of Christianity were awakened to a sense of their sins, and many also resolved to abandon altogether whatever might lead them to relapse into superstitious practices; “many of them who believed came confessing and declaring their deeds.”* From the Greek verb, which is in the perfect participle, it is clear that they had been already believers, consequently members of the Church by baptism. Their confession regarded special acts, as the Greek term indicates. It embraced, as Kuinoel and Bloomfield acknowledge, “sins of every kind,” since distinct mention is made by the sacred writer of the two classes of penitents, of whom the latter offered their magical books to be consumed. The burning of bad books is an evidence of conversion, such as penitents have, at all times, been called on to give, when suing for pardon. There is, then, every reason to believe that a detailed confession of sins was made on this occasion. Bloomfield maintains that the confession consisted in the open avowal of their sinful practices, not in a confidential communication made in secret to a minister of religion; but of this there is no proof in the sacred historian. The publicity of the act which followed, namely, the burning of the books, does not prove that the confession was public. It is clear, at least, that it was a special confession, which could not lose its sacramental character, if made to the priest of God, in the presence of the faithful.

In the early ages of the Church, confession was regarded as

* Acts xix. 18.

so essential and prominent a part of penance, that the whole penitential discipline was frequently called by the Greek term *ἔξομολόγησις*, which strictly denotes confession, and which is borrowed from the passage of the Acts just quoted. This was urged as the only means by which the sinner could quench the flames which his iniquity had enkindled. "If still you draw back," said Tertullian, "let your mind turn to that eternal fire which confession will extinguish; and that you may not hesitate to adopt the remedy, weigh the greatness of future punishment."* This stern African sees no alternative but confession or hell-fire. St. Cyprian, in milder language, expresses the same sentiment: — "I entreat you, brethren, let all confess their faults, while he that has offended enjoys life; while his confession can be received, and while the satisfaction and pardon imparted by the priests are acceptable before God". † St. Basil affirms the same necessity: — "Necessarily," he says, "our sins must be confessed to those to whom has been committed the dispensation of the mysteries of God." ‡

If Dr. Pusey will consult Lactantius, he will feel bound to put a term to his hesitancy, and pass from a society from which confession has been long since discarded, practically, if not in theory, to the true Church, whose title to the Catholic name is confirmed by her tenacity in retaining this divine institution. "Now," he writes, "as all heretical sects deem themselves particularly Christians, and think theirs is the Catholic Church, it should be known, that, where is confession and penance, by which the sins to which weak men are subject are cancelled, there is the true Church."§

We long to see the amiable Doctor relieved from the awkwardness of his position, and enjoying the consolations for which his heart evidently yearns. He now proclaims the Eucharistic sacrifice in churches without altars; he affirms the power of forgiveness in the midst of his brethren, who disavow the sublime authority; whilst others, once associated with him in the work of restoration, are gathered around altars on which the perpetual sacrifice is offered, and humbly kneel at the confessional to receive the assurance of divine forgiveness.

For a considerable time past, the Puseyite school have acknowledged that confession was practised in the early ages, but they maintain that it was public, originally springing from

* De Pœnit., c. xii.

† De Lapsis.

‡ Reg. brev. q. cclxxxviii.

§ Inst., Lib. IV., c. xxx.

the desire of self-humiliation, and afterwards enjoined by the Church as an important portion of the penitential discipline which she found it necessary to establish, in order to check vice and repair scandal. The fathers, however, as we have shown, speak of it as absolutely necessary, and trace it to the divine law. If it be allowed that *public* confession is not divinely enjoined, they must surely be understood of that which is private and sacramental. In fact, the discipline established by the penitential canons was grounded on the conditions, divinely prescribed, on which pardon was proffered from the commencement. By the divine ordinance, sin was to be humbly acknowledged and atoned for, that the sinner might hope for reconciliation. The Church required, that, in certain cases, the acknowledgment should be public, and the satisfaction protracted during a long period. In this view, the penitential canons were reasonable and just; otherwise they must appear arbitrary and intolerable.

If confession was not originally a part of penance, — if it was not a condition for forgiveness, — it cannot be understood how public confession could at all be required. We may conceive, that, where the feelings of the faithful had been shocked by some enormity, the culprit might be called upon to express penitence for his crime; but it is not easy to comprehend how he could be required to disclose other sins, if no divine precept demanded this humiliation, even to one man. The law that would extend the obligation beyond the necessity of repairing scandal would be excessively severe. From the establishment of public penance enforcing the conditions of forgiveness, it is strange to argue that neither confession nor penitential satisfaction is enjoined by the divine law.

It is clear, from the testimony of Origen, that private confession to a priest was to precede and regulate public confession. He advises the penitent to use diligence and caution in the selection of his spiritual physician, since his judgment is to determine whether the disease is to be made known in the assembly of the faithful.* The Penitentiary, established at Constantinople, received in private the confessions of penitents, and instructed them what sins they should publicly acknowledge for self-humiliation. Although Nectarius, in consequence of a grievous scandal, abolished the office, and left all at liberty to approach communion, according to their conscientious convic-

* Hom. II. in S. xxxvii.

tions of their own fitness, private confession continued to be practised there, as well as elsewhere, throughout the Church. Pope Leo found it necessary to forbid the avowal of sins which subjected the offenders to legal penalties; and sustained the prohibition by showing the sufficiency of private confession. "It is enough," said he, "that the guilt of conscience be made known to the priests alone by private confession."*

The zeal of Dr. Pusey and his friends to restore the practice of private confession has been successful to a certain extent; but it cannot be attended with a general return to the ancient practice, as long as the divine obligation is denied. Individuals distressed in mind may seek comfort in private conferences, and may occasionally disclose in confidence something that burdens conscience. To open all the secret wounds of the soul requires something more than a desire of counsel or of sympathy; it must proceed from a high sense of strictest duty, and be supported by entire confidence in the ministry. Those who know that the validity of Anglican orders is strongly contested, and that secrecy is no part of the observance among Anglicans, will be slow to intrust a minister with the knowledge of their frailties. In many cases, these so-called confessions may easily degenerate into what Hannah More styles "the coquetry of religion." "Though far from thinking auricular confession the worst part of another church," this zealous moralist did not approve of its revival in the form of consultations of young ladies with young ministers. "Under the humble guise of soliciting instruction and obtaining comfort, they propose to them doubts which they do not entertain, disclose difficulties which do not really distress them, ask advice which they probably do not intend to follow, and avow sensibilities with which they are not at all troubled."* We have heard of young ministers on this side of the Atlantic who are closely pressing, in this respect, on the footsteps of their Oxford brethren; but these imitations are little calculated to give any idea of the humiliation of the penitent, who, by the entire disclosure of his sins, seeks the remedy which Christ has provided. Empirics are calculated to bring the medical profession into disgrace. How different from *lête-à-tête* conferences is the process in the divine tribunal! "The confessional is a depository of secrets, where the Christian can be unreserved without display, and make revelation of self

* Ep. CXXXVI. alias LXXX. ad Episc. Camp.

* On Domestic Errors.

without egotism ; where he may find authority without harshness, and compassion without over-indulgence."*

The eloquent writer of the article in the *British Critic* (Mr. Ward, if we are not misinformed) gives a just view of this institution, although he had not at that time a practical acquaintance with it. Mr. Faber, after some experiments in hearing confessions, as an Anglican minister, deemed it proper to renounce the occupation, not being quite confident in his own power to absolve. Both these estimable gentlemen, with Mr. Newman and many others, have since presented themselves as penitents to Catholic priests, and are now in the enjoyment of that peace of heart which surpasses all understanding. How is it that Dr. Pusey, with his high esteem of confession, still remains without ?

From the sermon of the Oxford divine, whose deficiencies in faith we would fain supply, we turn to the less grateful task of correcting the foul misrepresentations of the Parisian professor, against whose impure romance Dr. Pusey seasonably cautioned his hearers. The piety of woman is evidently a source of pain and mortification to Michelet, who would deprive her of mental independence, and of the virtues and graces with which religion invests her. To the confessional he traces her dissent from the impious propositions of an infidel husband, her attachment to religious observances, and her veneration for the priesthood; and, strangely enough, he argues that it must be corrupt and debauching ! He invests it with gloom, placing it in a dark recess of the Church, and presents the penitent as approaching when the shades of evening are falling, as if the hour and place were chosen for most unhallowed purposes. But who does not know that in France, and in all Catholic countries, the confessional is placed in an open and conspicuous place, according to the prescription of the Ritual, — “*patenti conspicuo et apto ecclesiæ loco*” ? Who is ignorant that confessions, for the most part, are heard in the early part of morning, and that it is forbidden to hear the confessions of females after sunset ? With us, the press of penitents, and the dependent situation of domestics, prolong this duty to a late hour ; but the surrounding crowd are a guaranty against evil suspicion. Wherever, as in the early missions of this country, confessionals were not erected in the churches, the sacristy, in which the priest sat, was encompassed by a crowd, likely to perceive the slightest motion, and

* *British Critic.*

even in some danger of overhearing the whisper of the penitent. When the missionary erected a temporary altar in the farmhouse, far from any church, the same protection was found in the number of the faithful that pressed forward to avail themselves of his ministry. It may well suit romance to imagine the penitent and confessor in some lonely cell, or darksome cave, where innocence is powerless; but the plain matter of fact is, that confessions are publicly heard, in circumstances that afford complete protection.

Some rail at confession itself as improper and indelicate. They consider it grossly unbecoming that hideous and foul sins should be specified, especially by females, whose modesty naturally recoils from such details. The shamefulness of sin is in its commission, not in its avowal, when made with humility and compunction; and "there is not a worse symptom in our nature than that we blush to own what we have not been afraid to do."* The innocent and pure have nothing to acknowledge. The delicate and refined, whose fastidiousness shrinks from the mention of disgusting improprieties, should have recoiled with horror from their commission. The acknowledgment of them is a painful but necessary atonement to offended virtue, and, far from being immoral, is the first step to a return to rectitude. The disgust experienced in reviewing the frailties which once afforded delight is a bitter medicine, which serves to insure permanent recovery, — the pain with which their exposure is attended is part of the penalty which divine justice inflicts on the sinner. The confession of unnatural and enormous excesses gives glory to God in proportion to the humiliation of the penitent. As he sinks down abashed and overwhelmed with shame, the angels bear on high his sighs, tears, and prayers, which are more fragrant than incense, and sweeter than hymns of praise. God, from his high throne, regards the trembling sinner with compassion, casts all his iniquities into the bottom of the sea, remembers no longer all the prevarications by which he has prevaricated, but accepts him as a child who was dead and has come to life, and gives him assurances of mercy and love.

Many cannot conceive how foul sins may be confessed in decent language; they fancy that the very mention of them is like the breath of pestilence. In the confessional, however, as an eloquent writer observes, "the Christian may steadily, be-

* Hannah More, *Celebs*, c. xlviii.

cause sternly and shamefully, 'look sin in the face,' and name what out of that solemn connection the saints may not name with clean lips, and into a chaste ear."* The accusation of the penitent is far different from the narrative of the adventurer, or the description of the novelist.

"'T is not a tale; 't is not a jest,
Admired with laughter at a feast."

In few words, plain but modest, the sinner declares the nature and number of his offences. He states facts stripped of all exciting circumstances; he enters into no unnecessary details, but simply exposes the grievous wounds of his conscience. When David said, "I have sinned," he acknowledged himself guilty of adultery and bloodshed, and humbled himself before God and the prophet. The penitent states, indeed, more minutely his evil habits and the frequency of his offences; but he is taught to avoid exciting descriptions. The shame which he feels is at once a preservative from freedom of speech, and a remedy for past excess. It is thus that divine wisdom has provided for our frailty by punishing our pride, forcing us to come forth from our lurking-place and abide the sentence of our judge. "The necessity which private confession to a priest imposes of some approach, at least, towards a *definite enumeration*, and so (indirectly) towards a vivid impression, of some of the more grievous and unmentionable sins, is a most powerful security for the amount of shame requisite towards all true penance. . . . By adding to the cup of penitence this one powerful ingredient of shame, she [the Church] has transformed it, by her divine alchemy, from a mere soothing and perhaps not harmless potion, into a medicine of bitter taste, indeed, but most sovereign efficacy." †

It is almost impossible to give to the uninitiated a correct idea of the severe simplicity and strict modesty which characterize the communications of penitent and confessor. Some, who have read over the table of sins in prayer-books, fancy that the confessor puts to each penitent the questions there proposed; whereas they are only designed to aid in self-examination. Others, mistaking the object of our moral treatises, which enter at large into the most delicate matters, assert that our theological students are thus trained to qualify them for the cross-examination of penitents, all of whom, even the purest

* British Critic, for April, 1843.

† Ibid.

and most refined, they consider to be subjected to these disgusting interrogatories. This is a most egregious mistake.

The variety of human maladies is treated of, that the physician may be qualified for every emergency. If he is consulted by one suffering from a cold, or a headache, it will not be necessary for him to inquire after symptoms which mark Asiatic cholera, or dropsy; much less need he enter into all the mysteries of obstetrics. The confessor is furnished with general knowledge, that he may understand the nature of each case which may possibly be presented for his judgment, and so may avoid all unnecessary questions. His duty is to hear and to judge; interrogatories are made only to supply the deficiency of the penitent, whose previous disclosures regulate them. If the strictest reserve be enjoined on the penitent in detailing his offences, the tongue of the priest, consecrated to the Gospel, is guarded, that no incautious word, no superfluous question, may escape him. "Let the priest take care," cries the Roman ritual, "not to detain any one, especially the young, of either sex, or others, with curious or useless interrogations, imprudently questioning them as to what they may be ignorant of, lest they suffer scandal and learn thence to sin." To the authoritative warning of the ritual nothing need be added; yet, for the satisfaction of those who have heard the changes rung on Peter Dens, we refer to this much calumniated theologian. He reminds the confessor that questions regarding impurity are to be put "*sparingly, chastely, and cautiously*"; and explaining the meaning of each term, he says, — "Sparingly, so as to make no curious and superfluous interrogations; chastely, so as to propose them in modest terms; cautiously, to discover the true state of the conscience, without imparting any dangerous knowledge." * The extract from the Manual, recited in parliament by Dr. Thirlwall, is to the same effect: — "It would be impossible to use too much reserve in interrogations relating to the subject of purity, or subjects connected with the breach of the sixth commandment; especially when there is danger of losing a greater benefit than the material completeness of confession. Not to excite passions where they are dormant is a much greater good than the material completeness of the confession." St. Alphonsus directs the confessor to inquire only, in modest and general terms, as to obedience, which

"Is woman's highest honor, and her praise";

* Vol. I., p. 379.

and to be silent as to other points, unless brought under his notice by the questions of the penitent: "De cæteris taceat, nisi interrogatus." *

Whilst our moralists, as well as the Church authorities, anxiously guard against indiscretion, which might impart dangerous knowledge prematurely, some modern votaries of science have absolutely thrown aside all regard to decorum. It was a singular coincidence, that at the very time when some vulgar itinerants were declaiming against the indelicacy of the confessional, lectures on the origin of life were publicly delivered to large audiences of females, who were invited to the close inspection of anatomical models. The curtain which hides the secrets of the marriage-bed was drawn aside, and the use of the power of reproduction pointed out, with the professed view of guarding against its abuses. The authority of the law was in vain invoked against this outrage on morals in the name of science. A well-known contributor to the periodical press published a long article over his proper signature, in which he maintained the propriety of the lectures, and the necessity of early and ample instruction being given to every individual on all that appertains to sexual intercourse. Not so our moralists, who, whilst pointing out with minute accuracy the laws of our being, have used a language intelligible only to the learned. The confessor, furnished with this necessary knowledge for the exercise of his ministry, sits as a faithful sentinel near the fount of human life, to guard the purity of its waters, and prevent their waste. In silence he watches as long as he perceives no wanton outrage; but to the heedless or the daring he proclaims, in tones not to be mistaken, that they must not violate the law of the Eternal, or attempt to frustrate his counsels. He enters not into every minute detail, nor does he deal in mere generalities; but according to the state of mind of the penitent,—his doubts or his remorse,—he instructs him, simply and sparingly, by declaring what is forbidden. **NON LICET.** Is there not something divine in the very idea of a self-denying ministry, that guards with such jealousy the law given by our Creator to the parents of our race, and the blessing which accompanies its observance?

The character of a tribunal which has lasted eighteen centuries may be fairly estimated by the general persuasion of those in the midst of whom it has subsisted. Without referring our

* Praxis Confessarii, c. ii. Circa vi. præc.

readers to distant or past evidence, we at once appeal to the instinctive feeling of the Catholic community around us. The confessional is open to all, of every class and condition, — the corrupt and the virtuous, the illiterate and the learned, the vulgar and the refined, the lowly and the noble. Let any one consult the most depraved who have at any time resorted to confession, and he will find that it is regarded by them as an effectual remedy for sin, so that they flee from it when they are disposed to live licentiously, and have recourse to it when they propose to correct their evil ways. The pure and devoted, whose character is above suspicion, will bear testimony to its sanctifying influence, since they labor by confession to purify their souls from the slightest stains. Can it be imagined that all concur to testify in favor of an institution generally or frequently abused to perverse purposes? The virtuous mother is most solicitous to send her daughter to confession at an early age, to preserve her in innocence; and she grieves when she perceives that her son has ceased to approach it, since she fears that vice has found entrance into his heart. Whenever the zeal of the pious is excited for the reclaiming of the unfortunate, it is by inducing them to present themselves at the confessional that they hope to see it accomplished. Can it be, nevertheless, that its influence is adverse to virtue? We may be allowed to say, with Mr. Sampson, a Protestant lawyer, — “If it led to licentiousness or danger, that licentiousness or that danger would have come to light, and there would be tongues enough to tell it.”*

It must not be forgotten that Protestants have frequent opportunities of knowing the influence of the confessional, and that those amongst them whose relations to Catholics are the most intimate show unbounded confidence in its purity. The Catholic wife approaches it with the full knowledge of her Protestant husband, and sends her daughters and sons to confession with his approbation. Would this be possible, if a shadow of suspicion rested on the mind of the natural protector of the innocence of his children, — the jealous guardian of the virtue of his consort?

It is needless to reply at greater length to the charges advanced against an institution which is essentially directed to wash away the defilements of sin, and which is in the Church like a majestic river whose waters absorb the impurities which

* Catholic Question, p. 89.

they meet with in their course. Confession, as Dr. Pusey remarks, was acknowledged to be a good thing by Latimer himself, who regretted that it had not been retained in England. In the reign of the fourteenth Louis, some Chinese, visiting the capital of France, and being informed of the use of the confessionals, which they saw in the churches, expressed a wish that such tribunals existed in their own country, in which self-accusation might anticipate the rigor of the law, and moral reform take the place of punishment. Rousseau, Voltaire, and a host of others, have acknowledged the powerful restraint which confession places on the passions of youth, and the fruits of restitution and good works which it produces.

The advantages to society arising from the confessional as a means of enforcing the reparation of wrongs can scarcely be estimated. It is properly the judgment-seat, where the culprit, acknowledging his guilt, escapes the penalties of the law, on conditions which combine mercy and justice. The promises of pardon held forth in the divine writings may easily be mistaken by our self-love for unreserved indulgence; but the example of Zaccheus should convince us that reparation of frauds is necessary. In vain do we profess sorrow for injustice, if we be unwilling to repair it. Few, nevertheless, offer at once, like the publican, to restore fourfold; whilst many are most unwilling to part with any portion of their unjust acquisitions. It was consonant with divine wisdom to refer us to the judgment of a disinterested person, instructed in the law of God, and uninfluenced by the false maxims which prevail among worldlings. The confessor is charged with the guardianship of the rights of all, and is bound to enjoin satisfaction for all wrongs which the penitent may have committed. His office empowers him to bind, as well as loose; and he must fearlessly declare to the penitent the necessity of restoring property and character, if either has suffered from his misdeeds. This surely is a most important portion of the sacerdotal duty, and well calculated to commend it to the admiration of all. Without any possible interest, the confessor acts as if he were the hired agent of the injured individual, who is generally unknown to him, and who may be an enemy of himself or his religion. Penitents left to their own judgment generally neglect the discharge of obligations of this kind. We see men notorious for injustice, who profess religion, without caring to atone for the many frauds by which they have amassed wealth; whilst very

rarely is an instance presented of restitution made by any one who has not approached the confessional.

The case reported in the *Catholic Question* regarded stolen property restored through the agency of Rev. Anthony Kohlmann, S. J., who was called on to declare the individual. Mr. Sampson, one of his counsel, eloquently portrayed on this occasion the advantages of confession, many of which are necessarily unknown. "Its utility," he said, "can never be proved by instances, because it cannot be shown how many have been saved by it; how many of the young of both sexes have been, in the most critical juncture of their lives, admonished from the commission of some fatal crime, that would have brought the parents' hoary hairs with sorrow to the grave. These are secrets that cannot be revealed. Since, however, the paths that lead to vice are many and alluring, is it not well that some one should be open to the repenting sinner, where the fear of punishment and of the world's scorn may not deter the yet wavering convert? If the road to destruction is easy and smooth, — *facilis descensus averni*, — may it not consist with wisdom and policy, that there be one silent, secret path, where the doubting penitent may be invited to turn aside, and escape the throng that hurries him along, — some retreat, where, as in the bosom of a holy hermit, within the shade of innocence and peace, the pilgrim of this checkered life may draw new inspirations of virtue and repose? If the thousand ways of error are tricked with flowers, is it so wrong that somewhere there should be a sure and gentle friend, who has no interest to betray, no care but that of ministering to the incipient cure? The siren songs and blandishments of pleasure may lead the young and tender heart astray, and the repulsive frown of stern authority forbid return. One step then gained or lost is victory or death. Let me, then, ask you that are parents," (the advocate addresses the jurors,) "which would you prefer, that the child of your hopes should pursue the course of ruin, and continue with the companions of debauch and crime, or turn to the confessional, where, if compunction could once bring him, one gentle word, one well-timed admonition, one friendly turn by the hand, might save your child from ruin, and your heart from unavailing sorrow? And if the hardened sinner, the murderer, the robber, or conspirator, can once be brought to bow his stubborn spirit, and kneel before his frail fellow-man, invite him to pronounce a penance suited to his crimes, and seek salvation

through a full repentance, there is more gained than by the bloodiest spectacle of terror; than though his mangled limbs were broken on the wheel, his body gibbeted, or given to the fowls of the air."*

As might have been anticipated from this eloquent appeal, but still more from the freedom of our institutions, the court held the priest exempt from answering the questions proposed to him. It was gratifying to Catholic feeling, that a guaranty was thus solemnly given to so sacred a trust. Had the decision been different, the venerable Jesuit father, rather than betray his ministry, would have doubtless gone to prison, like the Augustinian Gahan, who refused to manifest the nature of the communication which he had with Lord Dunboyne at his death, — nay, he would have sacrificed life itself, like St. John of Nepomuck, who was assassinated by order of Wenceslas, king of Bohemia, because he would not reveal the confession of the queen.

A word in regard to the nature of the secrecy of the confessional may be allowed us, before closing this article. It implies no more than the inviolability of the confidence reposed by the penitent in the confessor, who, under no circumstances, can reveal, to any one whatever, any sin disclosed to him in confession, or any circumstance manifested in connection with it, or make any use of the knowledge so obtained to the pain or prejudice of the penitent. There is no obligation on the penitent to declare his name, or the name of his accomplice, or to make any specifications, beyond the acknowledgment of his sins, so that he may preserve a perfect *incognito*; but if he be known to the confessor, he is nevertheless sure that his confidence will never be betrayed.

It has puzzled us sometimes to understand a charge of immorality advanced by some against confessors on the score of this inviolable secrecy. They appear horrified at the principle laid down by St. Thomas, that a confessor, if summoned as a witness, may deny on oath all knowledge of facts known to him only on the confession of the penitent. Yet who does not know that evidence is sought for in courts of justice only as procured by ordinary means? The priest can testify fully, to the extent of any other witness, as to what he has seen, or what he has heard, in any way in which information can be had by others. It must be presumed that he is called on only as

* Catholic Question, p. 89.

an individual deriving information through channels open to all ; and were the design of the court manifestly directed to discover sacramental secrets, it is so unjust that a refusal to comply would be a vindication of natural right to be true to confidence reposed in the witness, and a denial of all knowledge of the fact would be necessarily understood in a qualified sense, of knowledge such as *a witness* could possess. The iniquity of the attempt would put the hearers on their guard against the danger of mistaking the reply as extending to sacramental knowledge. The culprit, pleading "Not guilty," is not thought to utter a falsehood, since his denial receives a modified interpretation from the circumstances ; the lawyer, denying all knowledge of transactions which his client communicated in confidence, is understood of ordinary information, such as he might communicate without detriment to official relations ; and the ambassador, who professes not to know the secrets of his royal master, is not branded as a liar by those who are acquainted with the language of diplomacy.

But it is time to relieve our readers from the consideration of a subject which, though of high importance, may not, as presented by us, have the attractions of many other topics of the day.

ART. III.—*An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine.* By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN. New York : Appleton & Co. 1845. 8vo. pp. 206.

OUR readers do not need to be informed that the distinguished author of this work on the Development of Christian Doctrine, has, within the last year, been admitted to the communion of the Holy Catholic Church ; for who has not heard of the event ; and what Catholic heart has it not filled with devout joy and gratitude ? Mr. Newman has stood for several years before the public as a man of rare gifts and acquirements ; he was at the head of a very influential party in the Anglican communion, and appears to have enjoyed a personal esteem, and exerted a personal influence, which seldom fall to the lot of any but the master minds of their age or country. We may well, then, look upon his conversion with more than ordinary gratitude to the great Head of the Church, and as an event of more than ordinary significance.

Mr. Newman appears, from all we know of his history, to have commenced his career with sincere attachment to the schismatical communion in which he was born and reared, and to have felt that he owed it all his genius, talents, attainments, labors, and affections ; but almost from the first it was seen by close observers that he cherished aspirations and tendencies which, if faithfully followed, must ultimately lead him out of that communion, or destroy the communion itself by absorbing it in the Catholic Church. Hence the great importance which has been attached to his movements, and the lively interest with which his various publications have been read. Some almost flattered themselves that he and his friends would so far *Catholicize* the Establishment as to render its restoration to Catholic unity feasible and certain ; others, looking upon this as improbable, since it would find an insuperable obstacle in English politics, thought it more likely that his movement would end in his own individual conversion, and that of a considerable number of his friends and followers ; others, again, among whom were we ourselves, thought it still more likely that he would stop short in his course, and make up his mind to live and die an Anglican. We felt, on reading the famous Tract 90, that the man who could write such a tract would never want ingenious reasons to justify to himself any course he might choose to adopt. But we did not take sufficiently into the account the difficulties of the position of one standing, like Mr. Newman, outside of the Church, nor make sufficient allowance for the dimness and indistinctness with which Catholic truth ordinarily at first dawns on the Protestant mind, and for the length of time it usually requires to ascertain how much of our past life we may retain, and how much we must give up, in order to place the several parts of our new belief in harmony with each other. We humbly and devoutly thank Almighty God that we were wrong ; that we relied too little on the power of divine grace ; and that, contrary to our expectations, Mr. Newman, and a large number of his friends, have already been permitted to enter that communion, out of which it is madness to suppose we can please God, or secure the salvation of our souls.

We have no disposition to speculate on the probable effect of the recent conversions in England. It may be that Almighty God is about to visit, in the riches of his mercy, the deeply sinning land of our forefathers, and, for his own greater glory, to restore her, contrary to her deserts, to the bosom of Catholic unity. Appearances everywhere indicate that our good God is at

present interposing in a special manner in behalf of his Church, and by a thousand ways preparing the return of the misguided children of the so-called Reformation to their allegiance, to the love and embrace of their Holy Mother, who has never ceased to weep over their folly and madness, and to beseech her heavenly Spouse to save them from themselves. But, whatever may be the ulterior purposes of Him who orders all things well, the conversion of even one soul is sufficient to warrant the fullest joy and gratitude the heart of man can entertain; and we have superabundant cause of devout thanksgiving in what he has already effected. It is enough for us to trust ourselves, and all, lovingly to him, and to pray unceasingly that his will may be done in all and in each.

The book before us appears to have been designed to indicate, to some extent, the process by which its gifted author passed in his own mind from Anglicanism to Catholicity, and to remove the principal objections to the Catholic Church, which he himself had raised in his previous publications. As the production of a strong, active, acute, and cultivated mind, enriched with various but not always well digested erudition, brought up in the bosom of heresy and schism, nurtured with false learning, false philosophy, vague and empty theories, gradually, under divine grace, working its way to the truth which gleams from afar, but which the intervening darkness renders fitful and uncertain; it is a work of more than ordinary interest, and one which the enlightened and philosophic few, fond of psychological researches, and of tracing the operations of sectarian or individual idiosyncrasies, may read perhaps with profit. A Protestant, ignorant, as Protestants usually are, of Catholicity, may even fancy the work substantially Catholic, and regard its theory as a convenient one for the Church, and one which she may, without prejudice to any of her claims, if not accept, at least tolerate. It is evident, from the first page of the work, that the author has made up his mind; that he is writing under the full conviction that he must seek admission into the Roman Catholic communion; and that, in his judgment, the theory he is putting forth in justification of the step he has resolved to take is, to say the least, perfectly compatible with Catholic authority and infallibility. He frankly accepts, and in some instances elaborately defends, the principal dogmas and usages of the Catholic Church, and especially those which are in general the most offensive to Protestants; and so little suspicion has he of the unsoundness of his work, so orthodox does he hold it,

that he does not scruple, even after his conversion, to publish it to the world. And yet we presume he himself is now prepared to concede, that, when he was writing this book, he was still in the bonds of Protestantism; that he had not as yet set his foot on Catholic ground; that he had not crossed the Jordan, had not even surveyed the promised land from the top of Mount Pisgah, and that he knew it only by vague rumor and uncertain report. All, to his vision, is dim and confused. He stumbles at every step, and stammers at every word. He puts forth a giant's strength, but only to wrestle with phantoms; and gives us learned and elaborate theories to explain facts which he himself shows are no facts, — ingenious and subtle speculations, where all that is needed, or is admissible, is a plain yes or no. From first to last, he labors with a genius, a talent, a learning, a sincerity, an earnestness, which no one can refuse to admire, to develope Protestantism into Catholicity. Vain effort! As well attempt to develope the poisonous sumach into the cedar of Lebanon.

Whatever may have been Mr. Newman's estimation of his work when writing or consenting to publish it, we cannot doubt that he now judges it as we do. He has now a practical and a filial acquaintance with the Church. He has been permitted to approach her Holy Sacraments; he has eaten "the food of angels"; his heart has been elevated and his vision purged. He is now not an alien, but a son, and a son who can have no will but that of his Holy Mother. No foolish pride of opinion, or mistaken notions of self-respect, can make him cling now to past utterances, because they were his, and labor to defend views which he could have entertained only while yet in ignorance, or, at best, seeing "men only as trees walking." His glory is in getting rid of the old Protestant leaven, and in receiving, on the authority of God in the Church, all the sacred truths which she believes and teaches, and as she believes and teaches them. He cannot feel that it derogates from true dignity and consistency of character to give up falsehood for truth, or to abandon a once cherished theory, when once seen to be both unnecessary and inadmissible. It implies no reproach to him that he was not able, at the time and under the circumstances, from the position in which his Protestantism had placed him, with the training he had received, and the little recourse he had had to the authorized living teacher, to produce a work less uncatholic, and less open to grave objections. The work is all that he could have reasonably expected it to be; and in

refusing to accept it as Catholic, we imply no distrust of the sincerity of his conversion, or of his present orthodoxy.

It is but simple justice to Mr. Newman to say, that it is not for his sake that we are about to point out some objections to his theory of developments. The circumstances under which he wrote, his acknowledged learning and ability, the presumption that he had thoroughly surveyed his ground, and the apparent favor with which his essay has been received by the Catholic press in England, are not unlikely to convey to Protestant, and perhaps to some partially instructed and speculative Catholic minds, the impression, that, if the theory set forth is not exactly Catholic, it at least contains nothing which a Catholic may not accept. The fact, that the author — whether legitimately or not — comes to Catholic conclusions, that he ends by entering the Catholic communion, that he puts forth his theory expressly for the purpose of removing the obstacles which others may find in following his example, and with this view publishes it to the world even after his conversion, can hardly fail to produce in many minds the conviction that the theory and the conclusions are necessarily or at least legitimately connected. And several Protestant reviewers seem actually to entertain this conviction; and they, therefore, hold the theory up to condemnation as the “Romanist” theory; or, as they express themselves, “as the ground on which modern Rome seeks to defend her manifest corruptions of Christian doctrine.” It is therefore due both to the Church and to Protestants to say, expressly, — and we do so with the highest respect for Mr. Newman, and with warm admiration for the truth, beauty, and force of many of the details of his work, — that his peculiar theory is essentially anticatholic and Protestant. It not only is not necessary to the defence of the Church, but is utterly repugnant to her claims to be the authoritative and infallible Church of God. A brief examination of some of the principal features of the theory will justify this strong and apparently severe assertion.

Mr. Newman so mixes up in the same category Christian doctrine, theology, and discipline, — matters in their nature distinct, and never confounded by Catholic doctors, — that it is difficult by express quotations to determine his exact meaning, and those of our readers who have not read his book must rely somewhat on our judgment and fidelity in representing it. But we are familiar with his subject; we have travelled, under circumstances similar to his own, over the greater part of the

ground he brings to view ; we embraced, and for years publicly advocated, a theory substantially identical with his own ; we have studied his book thoroughly and conscientiously ; we have, and, as Catholics, can have, no motive for misrepresenting it ; and we think the statements we are about to give are such as Mr. Newman himself will concede to be strictly just. As we understand Mr. Newman, the problem he has written his book to solve is, How to explain, in accordance with Christian truth, the variations or differences of doctrine and discipline which the Roman Catholic Church presents to-day, from the doctrine and discipline presented by the primitive Church. He does not anywhere draw up a list or give us a formal statement of these variations and differences ; but important variations, not only in disciplines, but also in doctrine, he takes it for granted, there have been. Some hypothesis for their explanation, he thinks, is necessary ; and the hypothesis he suggests he calls "*the Theory of Developments.*" It is the purpose of his Essay, 1. To explain this theory ; 2. To furnish the tests by which development may be distinguished from corruption ; 3. To establish the probability, *a priori*, of developments in Christianity ; and 4. By an elaborate historical application of the theory to the successive ages of the Church, to show that it meets and explains the principal facts in the case. Such is the general design of his work.

We waive, here, all considerations of this theory so far as it is intended to apply to Christian discipline and theology, and confine ourselves to it solely as applied to Christian doctrine. Under this last point of view, we object to the theory that it is a theory, and not a revealed fact. The truth of an hypothesis can never be inferred from the fact that it meets and explains the facts it is invented to meet and explain ; and therefore the admission of any hypothesis into Christian doctrine would vitiate the doctrine itself. Mr. Newman begins his work by telling us that "Christianity has been long enough in the world to justify us in dealing with it as a fact in the world's history. *It may legitimately be made the subject-matter of theories* : what is its moral and political excellence, what its place in the range of ideas or of facts which we possess, *whether it be divine or human*, whether it be original or eclectic or both at once, how far favorable to civilization or to literature, whether a religion for all ages or for a particular state of society, — these are questions upon the fact or professed solutions of the fact, and *belong to the province of opinion.*" — p. 11. But in this

he must be mistaken. Whether Christianity be divine or human is not a question of opinion, but a question of fact, and so is it with all the questions he enumerates. Christianity is a fact in the world's history; this is a fact. But is Christianity what it professes to be? Is this a question of opinion, to be answered only by a theory? or is it a question of fact, to be taken up and settled, one way or the other, as a fact? If it is a matter of opinion, and if it is answerable only by a theory, what foundation is there or can there be for faith? Christianity is a fact, not only in the world's history, but in itself, or it is not. If it is, it cannot legitimately be made the subject-matter of theories, any more than may be the fact that it is a fact in the world's history. Christianity, if received at all, must be received, not as a theory, but as a revealed fact; and when we have established it as a revealed fact, no theory is needed or admissible, for we must then believe the fact precisely as it proposes itself.

But even if a theory might be introduced, Mr. Newman's would not satisfy us. We are not satisfied with his tests of a true development. He gives seven tests:—1. Preservation of type or idea; 2. Continuity of principles; 3. Power of assimilation; 4. Early anticipation; 5. Logical sequence; 6. Preservative additions; 7. Chronic continuance. The sixth, second, and first are all resolvable into one, the simple preservation of the original type or idea. The third, which implies development by assimilation or accretion, is fatal to the sufficiency of the original revelation, by necessarily implying that the developed idea contains what was not in the idea as originally given. The fifth, Logical sequence, in itself is no proof of development. The fourth, Early anticipation, as far as it goes, is proof positive against development. And the seventh, Chronic continuance, is as applicable to corruptions as to true developments; for Mr. Newman fails entirely to show that corruptions are short-lived and transitory, as he alleges. Some writers date the origin of the Pelagian heresy, which is as rife as ever it was, as far back as the garden of Eden; and Mr. Newman himself admits that it remains to be seen "whether Mahometanism external to Christendom and the Greek Church within it" are not yet living, and capable of chronic continuance and activity (p. 48).

Furthermore, before we can proceed to apply tests to determine whether this or that is a development or a corruption of Christian doctrine, we must have a clear, distinct, and adequate

knowledge of Christian doctrine itself ; for how can we say the original type or idea is preserved, if we do not know what it is ? If we do know what it is, what is the use of the tests or their application ? The whole process of the historical application of the tests is, then, at best, regarded as an argument, a mere parallogism. We need all the knowledge of Christian doctrine as the condition of concluding any thing from the application of the tests, which their successful application can give us ; for there can be nothing in the conclusion not previously in the premises. Mr. Newman, like professors of natural science, has been misled by what in these times is called "Inductive Philosophy," — a philosophy which had never had "a local habitation or a name," more than other "airy nothings," if it had been borne in mind that we have no logic by which we can conclude the unknown from the known. When your conclusions go beyond what you have established in the premises, they may, indeed, sometimes be a guide to observation, but they have in themselves no scientific validity.

But, waiving these considerations, we object to Mr. Newman's theory, that it is an hypothesis brought forward to explain facts which are not facts. His problem is no problem ; for it presupposes what no Catholic can concede, and what there is no warrant in the facts of the case for conceding. Mr. Newman proceeds on the assumption, that there have been real variations in Christian doctrine. "On various grounds, then, it is certain," he says, "that portions of the Church system were held back in primitive times ; and of course this fact goes some way to account for that apparent variation and *growth* of doctrine, which embarrasses us when we would consult history for the true idea of Christianity ; yet it is not the key to the whole difficulty, for the obvious reason, that the variations continue beyond the time when it is conceivable the discipline (*disciplina arcani*) was in force." And the view on which his book is written, he adds, is, —

"That the *increase* and expansion of the *Christian Creed* and *Ritual*, and the *variations* which have attended the process in the case of individuals and churches, are *necessary* attendants on any philosophy or polity which takes possession of the intellect and heart, and has had any wide or extended dominion ; that, from the nature of the human mind, *time* is necessary for the full comprehension and *perfection* of great ideas ; and that the highest and most wonderful truths, though communicated once for all to the world by inspired teachers, could not be comprehended all at once

by the recipients, but, as received by minds not inspired, and through *media* which were human, have required only the longer time and the deeper thought for their full elucidation. This may be called the *Theory of Developments*." — p. 19. "We shall find ourselves unable," he says again, "to fix an historical point at which the *growth of doctrine* ceased. Not on the day of Pentecost, for St. Peter had still to learn at Joppa about the baptism of Cornelius; not at Joppa and Cæsarea, for St. Paul had to write his Epistles; not on the death of the last Apostle, for St. Ignatius had to establish the doctrine of *Episcopacy*; not then, nor for many years after, for the canon of the New Testament was still undetermined; not in the *Creed*, which is no collection of definitions, but a summary of certain *credenda*, an incomplete summary, and, like the Lord's Prayer or the Decalogue, a mere sample of divine truths, especially of the more elementary. No one doctrine can be named which starts *omnibus numeris*, at first, and gains nothing from the investigations of faith and the attacks of heresy. The Church went forth from the world *in haste*, as the Israelites from Egypt, 'with their dough before it was leavened, their kneading-troughs being bound up in their clothes upon their shoulders.'" — p. 55. "Butler of course was not contemplating the case of *new articles of faith*, or developments imperative on our acceptance, but he surely bears witness to the probability of developments in Christian doctrine considered in themselves, which is at present the point in question." — p. 57. "Thus we see how, as time went on, the doctrine of Purgatory was opened upon the apprehension of the Church, as a portion or form of penance due for sins committed after baptism; and thus the belief in this doctrine and the practice of infant baptism would grow into general reception together." — p. 192.

These passages do not appear in their full strength, detached, as they are, from the context; but we think there is no mistaking the doctrine they inculcate. They prove clearly that Mr. Newman does not mean simply that there has been a growth in theological science, a variation or expansion of outward discipline, but that there have been in the teachings of the Church herself real variations of doctrine, an increase and expansion of the Christian creed, — a real progress of the Church in her own apprehension and understanding of the sacred deposit of faith committed to her charge, and which she received the command to teach all nations even unto the consummation of the world. She went forth in haste, her "dough unleavened," her creed incomplete, her understanding of her faith imperfect, ignorant, in part at least, in regard to every article of faith, of the precise truth she was authorized to teach.

New definitions are new developments, and indicate that more of Christian truth is opened upon the apprehension of the Church. Before she defines the article, she herself does not clearly and distinctly apprehend what, on the point defined, is the revelation she originally received. As if she had only a confused notion, an intense feeling, and no distinct apprehension of the consubstantiality of the Son to the Father when she drew up the Symbol, and not till she defined it against Arius at Nice; and when she defined the "two natures in one person" against Nestorius, she had not yet fully learned the "one person in two distinct natures," which she asserted shortly after against Eutyches. All may have been implied in the original revelation, but she knew it not; and it is only as time goes on, as mind acts on mind, as controversies arise, as urgent necessities press, that she gradually develops it, and fixes it in her definitions. Thus in her understanding there is a perpetual growth, or a continued increase and expansion of Christian doctrine. The decision of the rule of faith, he tells us, "has been left to time, to the influence of mind upon mind, the issues of controversy and the growth of opinion," (p. 51.) and remains, he supposes, even to this day, "more or less undeveloped, or at least undefined by the Church." (p. 173.) Infant baptism was "unprovided for by the revelation, as originally given." (p. 51.) It is left undecided, "unless by development or growth" of revelation, what is the resource of those who sin after baptism, (ib.,) and the doctrine of Purgatory appears to have been a late development. (p. 192.) *

* We cannot resist, here, the temptation to quote a passage from a recent Protestant work published in this country, — *The Principle of Protestantism in its Relation to the Present State of the Church*, by Professor Schaf, of the German Reformed Theological Seminary, Mercersburg, Pa., — a German, lately from Berlin, and in part attached, we believe, to the school of Neander. He is a young man of very superior abilities. His work has many remarkable affinities with Mr. Newman's. Both works adopt very nearly the same fundamental principles; but one concludes in favor of Protestantism, the other of Catholicity. The passage we quote seems to us a clear and distinct statement of Mr. Newman's leading doctrine, and a much better statement than Mr. Newman himself has anywhere formally given.

"It must be remarked, that, when we speak of advance or progress, we do so with reference only to the *previous apprehension* of Christianity in the Church, and not to *Christianity* itself, as exhibited in its original, and for all times absolutely normal character, in the writings of the New Testament. . . . In its own nature, as a new order of life, Christianity has been complete from the beginning; and there is no room to

Now, in regard to all this, we simply ask, Does the Church herself take this view? Does she teach that she at first received no formal revelation, — that the revelation was given as “unleavened dough,” to be leavened, kneaded, made up into loaves of convenient size, baked and prepared for use by her, after her mission began, and she had commenced the work of evangelizing the nations? Does she admit her original creed was incomplete, that it has increased and expanded, that there have been variation and progress in her understanding of the revelation she originally received, and that she now understands it better, and can more readily define what it is than she could at first? Most assuredly not. She asserts that there has been no progress, no increase, no variation of faith; that what she believes and teaches now is precisely what she has always and everywhere believed and taught from the first. She denies that she has ever added a new article to the primitive creed; and affirms, as Mr. Newman himself proves in his account of the Council of Chalcedon, (p. 145,) that the new definition is not a new development, a better understanding of the faith, but simply a new definition, against the “novel expressions” invented by the enemies of religion, of what, on the point defined, had always and everywhere been her precise faith. In this she is right, or she is wrong. If right, you must abandon your theory of developments; if wrong, she is a false witness for God, and your theory of developments cannot make her worthy of con-

ceive that any more perfect order can take its place, or that it may be so improved as, in the end, to outgrow entirely its own original sphere. But notwithstanding this, we are authorized to speak of advance or progress in the case of the Church itself, and on the part of the Christianized world; and of this not merely as extensive, in the spread of the Gospel among Pagans, Mohammedans, and Jews, but as intensive, also, in the continually growing cultivation and improvement of those four great interests of the Church, doctrine, life, constitution, and worship. The Church, not less than every one of its members, has its periods of infancy, youth, manhood, and old age. This involves no contradiction to the absolute character of Christianity; for the progress of the Church, outward or inward, is never in the strict sense creative, but in the way only of reception, organic assimilation, and expansion. In other words, all historical development in the Church, theoretical and practical, consists in an apprehension, always more and more profound, of the life and doctrine of Christ and his Apostles; an appropriation, more full and transforming always, of their distinctive spirit, both as to its contents and its form. Only so far as a doctrine or ordinance of the Church bears this character may it be allowed to have normative and enduring force.” — pp. 50, 51.

This is bold, manly, and consistent in a Protestant; it is something else in a Catholic.

fidence. If you believe her, you cannot assert developments in your sense of the term; if you do not believe her, you are no Catholic. This is sufficient to show that Mr. Newman cannot urge his theory as a Catholic, whatever he might do as a Protestant.

Mr. Newman proceeds on the assumption, that the revelation committed to the charge of the Church was not a distinct, formal revelation, but a vague, loose, obscure revelation, which she at first only imperfectly apprehended. This is evident from the extracts we have made, and also from what he says when pointing out an error in a passage which he quotes from one of his previous publications. "The writer considers the growth of the doctrine [of Purgatory] an instance of the action of private judgment; whereas I should now call it an instance of *the mind of the Church working out dogmatic truth from implicit feelings*, under secret supernatural guidance."—p. 192. This is a pregnant passage, and may be regarded as a key to Mr. Newman's doctrine of development, and also to his view of the teaching authority of the Church. The development, as is evident from the context, is not the formal definition of the faith against a novel error, but is a slow, painful, and laborious working out, by the Church herself, of dogmatic truth from implicit feelings, — though what kind of feeling an *implicit* feeling is, we are unable to say. "Thus St. Justin or St. Irenæus might be without any digested ideas of Purgatory, or Original Sin, yet have an *intense feeling*, which they had not defined or located, both of the fault of our first nature and of the liabilities of our nature regenerate."—p. 44. It is obvious from the whole course of Mr. Newman's reasoning, that he would predicate of the Church, in their time, what he here predicates of St. Justin and St. Irenæus. The Church had a vague yet intense feeling of the truth, but had not digested it into formal propositions or definite articles. She had a blind instinct, which, under secret supernatural guidance, enabled her to avoid error and to pursue the regular course of development. She had a secret feeling of the truth, as one may say, a natural taste for it, and a distaste for error; yet not that clear and distinct understanding which would have enabled her at any moment, on any given point, to define her faith. She only knew enough of truth to preserve the original idea, and to elaborate from her intense feelings, slowly and painfully, as time went on, now one dogma, and now another. What in one age is feeling in a succeeding age becomes opinion, and an article of faith in

a still later age. This new article gives rise to a new intense feeling, which, in its turn, in a subsequent age becomes opinion, to be finally, in a later age yet, imposed as dogmatic truth. This is, so far as we can understand it, Mr. Newman's doctrine of development, and what he means by "working out dogmatic truth from implicit feelings."

By the "mind" of the Church which works out this dogmatic truth, Mr. Newman does not mean, strictly speaking, the constituted authority of the Church, but the internal sense, very nearly what Moehler calls the "internal tradition," of the collective body of the faithful. When he speaks of the recipients of the revelation, he seems always to have in his mind the *Ecclesia credens*, and to forget the *Ecclesia docens*. He does not appear to have ever heard that Almighty God gave his revelation to pastors and teachers qualified from the first to teach it in its purity and integrity, clearly and distinctly, but that he threw it upon the great concourse of believers for them to receive and make the most of. "The time at length came when these recipients ceased to be inspired; and on these recipients the revealed truths would fall at first vaguely and generally, and would afterwards be completed by developments."— p. 49. This view, if followed out, would suppress entirely the proper teaching authority of the Church, competent at any moment to declare infallibly what is the precise truth revealed; or, at least, would raise the *Ecclesia credens* above the *Ecclesia docens*, and reduce the office of the Church teaching to that of defining, from time to time, the dogmatic truth which the Church believing has gradually and slowly worked out from her implicit feelings. The secret supernatural assistance would then attach to the Church believing, and superintend the elaboration, rather than to the Church teaching; and if to the Church teaching at all, only so far as to enable it faithfully to collect and truly define what the Church believing elaborates; the very doctrine we ourselves set forth in the first number of this Journal, and insisted on, not as a reason for going into the Roman Catholic Church, but as a reason for *not* going into it, and for staying where we were.

Mr. Newman evidently proceeds on the assumption, that Christianity can be abstracted from the Church, and considered apart from the institution which concretes it, as if the Church were accidental and not essential in our holy religion. "Christianity," he says, "though spoken of in prophecy as a kingdom, came into the world as an *idea* rather than an institution, and

has had to wrap itself in clothing, and fit itself with armor of its own providing, and form the instruments and methods of its own prosperity and warfare." — p. 59. If he does not so consider it, all he says on the development of ideas in general has and can have no relation to his subject. "The more claim," he says, "an idea has to be considered living, the more various will be its aspects; and the more social and political is its nature, the more complicated and subtle will be its developments, and the larger and the more eventful will be its course. *Such is Christianity*; and whatever has been said about the development of ideas generally becomes, of course, an antecedent argument for its progressive development." — p. 49. Its divine Author then sent Christianity into the world a naked and unarmed idea. By its action on us, and ours on it, it gradually develops itself into an institution, which, feeble at first, as time and events roll on, strengthens and fortifies itself, now on this side and now on that, pushes deep its roots into the heart of humanity, sends out its branches, now in one direction and now in another, till at length it grows up and expands into that all-embracing authority, those profound and comprehensive dogmas, those pure and sublime precepts, and that rich and touching ritual, which together make up what we to-day call the Roman Catholic and Apostolical Church. Hence the significance of what the author told us in his Introduction (p. 11): "Christianity has, from the first, . . . thrown itself upon the great concourse of men. Its home is in the world; and to know what it is we must seek it in the world, and hear the world's witness of it." *

We meet here an old, familiar acquaintance, — a doctrine which we embraced for years before we became a Catholic, and which for years kept us out of the Catholic Church, as it now keeps out the greater part of our former friends and associates. Assuming that Christianity came into the world originally as an idea, and not as an institution, that it was thrown upon the great concourse of men, to be developed and embodied by the action of their minds, stimulated and directed by it, we held, that, by seizing it anew, abstracting it from the institutions with which it has thus far clothed itself, and proclaiming it as eighteen hundred years of intense moral and intellectual activity have developed it, we might organize through it a new

* "He [*Ego sum vobiscum*] was in the world, and the world knew him not." — St. John i. 10.

institution, a new church, in advance of the old by all the developments which these eighteen hundred years have effected; and we see not, even now, wherein we were wrong, if it be assumed that Christianity was originally given us as a naked and unarmed idea.

This doctrine rests on the assumption, that ideas, in themselves considered, are active and potent, and that they may, as our old friend, the author of *Orphic Sayings*, would express himself, "take unto themselves hands, build the temple, erect the altar, and instaurate the worship of God." This is not only bad theology, but false philosophy, as we attempted to show in an article entitled *No Church, No Reform*, published in this Journal for April, 1844. Ideas, not concreated, not instituted, are not potencies, are not active, but are really to us as if they were not. The ideal must become actual, before it can be operative. If Christianity had come into the world as an idea, it would have left the world as it found it. Moreover, if you assume it to have come as an idea, and to have been developed only by the action of the human mind on it, the institutions with which it is subsequently clothed, the authorities established in its name, the dogmas imposed, the precepts enjoined, and the rites prescribed are all really the products of the human mind; and, instead of governing the mind, may be governed, modified, enlarged, or contracted by it at its pleasure. The Church would be divine only in the sense philosophy or civil government is divine. If Mr. Newman had not been so preoccupied with the solution of the problem which his Anglicanism proposed, it seems to us he must have seen this, and shrunk from advancing his theory of developments.*

* Yet Mr. Newman seems to have had some suspicion of this conclusion. "Nor can it fairly be made a difficulty, that thus to treat Christianity is to level it in some sort to sects and doctrines of the world, and to impute to it the imperfections which characterize the productions of man. Certainly it is a degradation of a divine work to consider it under an earthly form; but it is no irreverence, since the Lord himself, its author and owner, bore one also. Christianity differs from other religions and philosophies in what it has in addition to them; not in kind, but in origin; not in its nature, but in its personal characteristics; being informed and quickened by what is more than intellect, by a Divine Spirit. It is externally what the Apostle calls an 'earthly vessel,' *being the religion of men*. And, considered as such, it grows 'in wisdom and stature'; but the powers which it wields, and the words which proceed out of its mouth, attest its miraculous nativity." — pp. 49, 50.

Mr. Newman mistakes the analogy on which he relies. Undoubtedly the Church has its human side as well as its divine side; but it is not a

A little reflection on a somewhat popular German theory, of which Neander is perhaps the best living exponent, might have led Mr. Newman to suspect the soundness of his own, which is very nearly identical with it. Neander assumes that Christianity came into the world as a life, or the principle of a new and higher life; which, it strikes us, is only another form of words for saying it came as an idea. The German, assuming it to be life, or the principle of life, or a living "idea," placed by its Author in the world uninstituted, concludes that Christianity needs no formal institution, was never intended to be clothed with a formal institution, and that it can subsist, diffuse, and propagate itself, and fulfil its mission, without any other association or organization than that of general society. This also was Schleiermacher's view, as set forth in his *Ueber die Religion: Reden an Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern*. The Englishman, from virtually the same premises, argues, it is true, to a better conclusion, but not, it seems to us, with a better nor even with so good a logic. Certain it is, we ourselves could never obtain his Catholic conclusions from his premises; and it was not till we had been forced to abandon them, that we presented ourselves at the door of the Church, and begged permission to enter.

Our difficulties do not diminish when we take up Mr. Newman's definition of *idea*. An idea, according to him, is the habitual judgment which the mind forms of that which comes before it; and in this sense, he tells us, the term is used in his *Essay*, p. 20. Christianity came into the world as an idea, therefore as an habitual judgment formed by the mind. This, if construed strictly, makes Christianity purely human; for, if it be an habitual judgment formed by the human mind, it has no existence out of the mind, and could have had none before being formed in it. This is a conclusion from which every believer must recoil with horror. But, at any rate, we must

correct view of Christianity to assume that its whole body, including its doctrines and institutions, is human, is a production of man, simply quickened and informed by the Divine Spirit. In Christianity, doctrine represents the divine, not the human, — is not the "earthly vessel," but that which was deposited in the vessel; for nothing can be regarded as Christian doctrine but what was originally revealed. Christian doctrine is the revelation itself, not the view which men take of that revelation. Hence the necessity of the infallible *Ecclesia docens* to keep and propound it. And here is the grand error Mr. Newman commits. He is still, while writing, a decided Protestant, mistaking our notions of Christianity for Christianity itself.

say, according to the author, that Christianity came into the world as an habitual judgment, for it came as an idea. Then it is nothing but an habitual judgment which the world forms. This must be admitted, because he says expressly, "To know what it is, we must seek it in the world, and hear the world's witness of it."— p. 11. But it is an habitual judgment which the world forms of— what? Of Christian doctrine, of the revelation supernaturally made and committed to the Church? Mr. Newman cannot say this, because this would make Christianity the *object* of the judgment, whereas he tells us that it is the judgment itself. Of what, then, is Christianity the habitual judgment which the world forms? We can conceive no answer Mr. Newman can give which will not involve naked Deism, or, at best, mere Quakerism.

Mr. Newman tells us again, p. 20, that ideas sometimes represent facts, and sometimes do not. Does Christianity represent a fact, or does it not? He doubtless intends to teach that it does. But what is the evidence? What is the criterion by which to distinguish an idea which represents a fact from one which does not? He answers:—

"When one and the same idea is held by persons who are independent of each other, and variously circumstanced, and have possessed themselves of it by different ways under very different aspects, without losing its substantial unity and its identity, and when it is thus variously presented, and yet recommended to persons similarly circumstanced; and when it is presented to persons variously circumstanced, under aspects discordant at first sight, but reconcilable after such explanations as their respective states of mind require; then it seems to have a claim to be considered the representative of objective truth."— pp. 20, 21.

This is pure *Lamenaisism* which makes the *consensus hominum* the criterion of truth. It would also authorize us to infer, that, if Christianity, as at its first promulgation, be embraced only by a few, and these mutually connected and similarly circumstanced, and if, at the same time, these all receive it by the same way and under the same aspect, or agree among themselves in their views of it, it would have no "claim to be considered the representative of objective truth." The faith of the Blessed Virgin, the Twelve Apostles, and the Seventy Disciples, must, then, have labored under very serious disadvantages. Moreover, if all the world should be converted, all gathered into the same communion, become of "one mind," as well as of "one heart," there would be room to question

whether Christianity represents a fact or a no-fact. Is this Catholic teaching ?

Nor are we better satisfied with what Mr. Newman says of the process of development. Christianity came into the world as an idea, an habitual judgment ; and we may say of it in particular all he says of development in ideas in general. Ideas, we are told, "are not ordinarily brought home to the mind, except through the medium of a variety of aspects ; like bodily substances, which are not seen except under the clothing of their properties and influences, and can be walked round and surveyed on opposite sides, and in different perspectives, and in contrary lights."—p. 21. Let an idea get possession of the popular mind, or the mind of any particular set of persons, and it is not difficult to understand the effects which will ensue.

"There will be a general agitation of thought, and an action of mind, both upon itself and upon other minds. New lights will be brought to bear upon the original idea, aspects will multiply, and judgments will accumulate. There will be a time of confusion, when conceptions and misconceptions are in conflict ; and it is uncertain whether any thing is to come of the idea at all, or which view of it is to get the start of the others. After a while, some definite form of doctrine emerges ; and, as time proceeds, one view of it will be modified or expanded by another, and then combined with a third, till the idea in which they centre will be to each mind separately what at first it was only to all together. It will be surveyed, too, in its relation to other doctrines or facts, to other natural laws or established rules, to the varying circumstances of times and places, to other religions, politics, philosophies, as the case may be. How it stands affected towards other systems, how it affects them, how far it coalesces with them, how far it tolerates when it interferes with them, will be gradually wrought out. It will be questioned and criticized by enemies, and explained by well-wishers. The multitude of opinions formed concerning it, in these respects and many others, will be collected, compared, sorted, sifted, selected, or rejected, and gradually attached to it or separated from it, in the minds of individuals and of the community. . . . Thus, in time, it has grown into an ethical code, or into a system of government, or into a theology, or into a ritual, according to its capabilities ; and this system or body of thought, theoretical and practical, thus laboriously gained, will, after all, be only the adequate representation of the original idea, being nothing else than what the very idea *meant* from the first,— its exact image as seen in a combination of the most diversified aspects ; with the suggestions and corrections of many minds, and the illustrations of many trials. This process of thought is called the development of an idea." — pp. 22, 23.

That this is intended to be a description of the process of development, which takes place in Christian doctrine, is evident from the title of the book, *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, and from what he says expressly.

"If Christianity be a fact, and can be made the subject-matter of exercises of the reason, and impress an idea of itself on our minds, that idea will, in the course of time, develope in a series of ideas. . . . It is the peculiarity of the human mind that it cannot take an object in, which is presented to it, simply and integrally. It conceives by means of definition or description; whole objects do not create in the intellect whole ideas, but are, to use a mathematical phrase, thrown into series, into a number of statements, strengthening, interpreting, correcting each other, and, with more or less exactness, approximating, as they accumulate, to a perfect image. There is no other way of learning or of teaching. *We cannot teach, except by aspects or views which are not identical with the thing itself we are teaching.* And the more claim an idea has to be considered as living, the more various will be its aspects; and the more social and political its nature, the more complicated and subtle will be its developments, and the longer and more eventful will be its course. SUCH IS CHRISTIANITY; and whatever has been said about the development of ideas generally becomes, of course, an antecedent argument for its progressive development. . . . Nor is the case altered by supposing that inspiration did for the first recipients of the revelation what the Divine Fiat did for herbs and plants in the beginning, which were created in maturity. Still, the time at length came when its recipients ceased to be inspired; and on these recipients the revealed truths would fall, as in other cases, at first *vaguely* and *generally*, and would afterwards be completed by developments." — p. 49.

It is plain from this, that Mr. Newman means to teach that the Church, in order to attain to an adequate expression of the Christian idea or of Christian doctrine, must institute and carry on the precise process of development which he has predicated of ideas generally; for he contends, and he told us as much in the beginning, that she is forced to do so by the nature of the human mind itself. The revelation is not and cannot be taken in all at once. The Church can neither learn nor teach it, except under particular aspects, none of which, he says, can go the depth of the idea, — that is, we presume, of the fact or no-fact which the idea represents; for it is hardly to be supposed that a judgment cannot go the depth of itself; and it is only by collecting and adjusting these particular aspects, that she can attain to an adequate expression of Christian doctrine.

This is naked eclecticism, not in philosophy only, but even in faith.

But this development is effected only gradually, and "after a sufficient time." Some centuries elapse, and the doctrine of Purgatory is "opened upon the apprehension of the Church." — p. 192. She at first cannot take in all revealed truth. She has it all stowed away somewhere, but she only partially apprehends it. As time goes on, as individuals differently circumstanced view it under different particular aspects and from opposite poles, as new controversies arise, bold and obstinate heretics start up, some clamorous for one particular aspect, and some for another, she is able to enlarge her view, to augment the number of her dogmas, and tell us more truly what is the revelation she has received. And this we are to say of a Church we are defending as authoritative and infallible, and which we hold has received the formal commission to teach all nations all things whatsoever our Lord commanded his Apostles! In plain words, was the Church able to teach truly and infallibly in the age of Saints Clement and Polycarp, or of Saints Justin and Irenæus, the whole Catholic faith, and the precise Catholic faith, on any and every point which could be made, — or was she not? If she was, there can have been no development of doctrine; if she was not, she was not then competent to discharge the commission she received? Was what she then taught the faithful sufficient for salvation? Is not what was then sufficient all that is really necessary now? If so, and if she teaches doctrines now which she did not then, or insists on our believing now what she did not then, how will you exonerate her from the charge brought by Protestants, that she has added to the primitive faith, and teaches as of necessity to salvation what is not necessary, and therefore imposes a burden on men's shoulders they ought not to be required to bear? Moreover, where are these developments to stop? Have we reached the end? Has the Church finally wrought out the whole body of dogmatic truth, or are we, like the Puritan Robinson, "to look for new light" to break in upon her vision? Mr. Newman seems to think new developments are needed; for he mentions, p. 173, several fundamental matters, which he says he supposes "remain more or less undeveloped, or at least undefined, by the Church."

Mr. Newman, after Leibnitz, represents heresy as consisting in taking and following out a partial view of Christian truth. Will he permit us to ask him to tell us how, at that period,

when the Church apprehended the truth only under particular aspects, heresy was distinguishable from orthodoxy? Moreover, if there ever was a time when the Church did not teach the whole faith, how he can maintain her catholicity; since to her catholicity, as we learn from the catechism, it is not only essential that she subsist through all ages, and teach all nations, but that she teach all truth?

Whoever glances at Mr. Newman's application of his "tests" cannot fail to perceive that he regards heresies as having been of essential service to the Church in enabling her to develop and fully understand the sacred deposit of faith; and that he sees no peculiar sin in them, but in their anticipating the Church, and bringing out and insisting upon a particular aspect of truth, before her hour has come, before she has reached it in the regular course of development. They are too impatient; they cannot wait the slow course of time, but would precipitate the growth of the Church. "Montanism is a remarkable anticipation or presage of developments which soon began to show themselves in the Church, though they were not perfected for centuries after." "The doctrinal determinations and ecclesiastical usages of the Middle Ages are only the true fulfilment of its self-willed and abortive attempts at precipitating the growth of the Church." "While the prophets of the Montanists prefigure the Church's doctors, and their inspiration her infallibility, and their revelations her developments, and the heresiarch himself is the unsightly anticipation of St. Francis, in Novatian again we see the aspiration of nature after such creations of grace as St. Benedict or St. Bruno."—pp. 165, 166. This requires no comment. But, if heretics go before the Church, and develop truth before she is ready for it, and yet a truth she subsequently accepts, we think she should treat them with a little more indulgence, and that we should rather lament her tardiness than censure their precipitancy. Mr. Newman, strange as it may seem, regards the heretic as generally in advance of the orthodox doctor, and appears to maintain that orthodoxy is formed out of the "raw material" supplied by heretics. "The theology of the Church," he says, "is the diligent, patient working out of one doctrine from many materials. The conduct of popes, councils, fathers, betokens the slow, painful, *anxious* taking up of *new elements* into an existing body of *belief*."—p. 166. It is singular that it never occurred to Mr. Newman, that possibly the heretical views which he seems to admire so much were simply corrup-

tions of doctrines which the Church had taught before them, and that heresy is the corruption of orthodoxy, and not its raw material. As a matter of fact, we suspect, in all cases of coincidence, the orthodox doctor is older than the heretical teacher, as the Church is older than any of the sects.

After all, it is clear that Mr. Newman's *πρώτον ψεύδος*, his mother error, is in assuming that the Christian doctrine was given originally and exclusively through the medium of the written word. How far he assumes this absolutely for himself, or how far his assumption is intended to be a concession to his Anglican friends, it is impossible for us to say; and we confess, that, on reading and rereading the book, we are at a loss to determine whether he is really putting forth a theory which he holds to be true, or only a theory which he thinks may remove, on Anglican premises, the difficulties which the Anglican finds in the way of Catholicity. But this much is certain,—his theory is framed on the supposition, that the revelation was first given in the written word exclusively, and that the Church has herself had to learn it from written documents. Hence, as the doctrine in these is evidently not drawn out and stated in formal propositions or digested articles of faith, but is given only generally, vaguely, obscurely, in detached portions and loose hints, developments have been absolutely indispensable, and must have been foreseen and intended by the Author of our religion. This is what he labors to prove in the chapter entitled, *On the Development of Christian Ideas antecedently considered*, pp. 49—65. But this is sheer Protestantism, not Catholicity, and is never to be assumed or conceded by a Catholic, in an argument for the Church. Catholicity teaches that the whole revelation was made to the Church, irrespective of written documents, and there never was a time when Christianity was confined to "the letter of documents and the reasonings of individual minds," as Mr. Newman presupposes, p. 11. The depository of the revelation is not the Holy Scriptures, *plus* tradition. The divine traditions cover the *whole* revelation, and not merely that portion of it not found in the Holy Scriptures; and it is because the Church has the whole faith in these divine traditions, which, by supernatural assistance, she faithfully keeps and transmits, and infallibly interprets, that she can establish the rule of Scriptural interpretation, and say what doctrines may and what may not be drawn from the written word. The greater part of her teachings are found in the Holy Scriptures, and she for the most part teaches through them, but was never under the necessity of learning her faith

from them, as any one might infer from the very face of the Sacred Books themselves, which were all addressed to *believers*, and therefore necessarily imply that the faith had been revealed, propounded, and embraced before they were written. The Church must precede the Scriptures; for it is only on her authority that their inspiration can be affirmed. They are a part of her divine teaching, not the sources whence she learns what she is commanded to teach. If Mr. Newman had borne this in mind, he would hardly have insisted so strongly on his theory of developments, and would have spared himself the rather serious error of maintaining that the Church appeals to the mystical sense of Scripture in *proof* of her doctrines. The source of heresy is not in the literal interpretation of Scripture, as he imagines, but in attempting to deduce the faith from Scripture by private judgment, independently of the Church. The doctors of the Church are accustomed to adduce the mystical sense of Scripture in *illustration* of Christian doctrine, but never in *proof*, except where the mystical sense is affirmed and defined by positive revelation.

We have been forcibly struck, in reading this Essay, with the wisdom of the plan of instructing by the living teacher, which our Lord has adopted. If any man could have learned Catholicity from books or documentary teaching, we should have said that man was John Henry Newman. He had every qualification for the task which could be demanded, — genius, talent, learning, acuteness, patience of research, and all the books necessary at his hand; and yet, with the best intentions, in a work designed expressly to justify his change of religion to the world, and to open an easy passage-way for others to follow him, he has mistaken Catholicity in its most essential points, and, in fact, written a book which will prove one of the hardest books *for him*, as a Catholic, to answer, he will be likely to find. If, instead of ransacking the libraries of all ages and nations, and amassing an erudition which he was not in the condition to digest, and for the interpretation of which he had no certain guide, he had gone to the first Catholic priest within his reach, and asked him to teach him the catechism, and to explain to him the creed of Pius the Fifth, he would in one week have learned more of genuine Catholicity than he learned in the years he spent in the preparation of this work. No man should ever persuade himself that he knows any thing really and truly of Catholicity, till he has listened patiently and reverently to the living teacher authorized by Almighty God to teach him. The faith is learned by *hearing*, not by *reading*.

Mr. Newman says his theory "has been recently illustrated by several distinguished writers on the continent, such as De Maistre and Moehler."—p. 19. We are not aware of any Catholic writer on the continent, or elsewhere, who has broached a theory bearing any resemblance to Mr. Newman's; and, so far as our own judgment goes, backed by high authority, he totally misapprehends both De Maistre and Moehler, if he supposes they in the least countenance his theory of development. Moehler's method, and some of his forms of expression, may lead, as at one moment they led us, to suppose he did, in some respects, favor a theory of development; but it was as we read him in the pages of his Protestant reviewers, rather than in his own pages, that we were led to do him so great injustice. A closer inspection of his work has satisfied us that it is not so. What Moehler really means is not historical developments, but logical sequence and coherence. His design was, in part, to show Protestants that they are illogical, and, under the relation of logical sequence and coherence, to contrast their teachings with those of the Church. In Protestantism we find a given doctrine which logically implies another as its complement, but this other doctrine is wanting. In Catholicity, whenever we find a doctrine which logically implies another, we are sure to find the latter as an article of faith. All this is very true, and may well be said, without saying one word in favor of developments. De Maistre, so far as we understand him, allows development only in the exercise or application of the divine powers of the Church. If in the early ages less power was actually exercised by the sovereign pontiffs than in some subsequent ages, it was not because their authority was less, their rights less positive and divine, or because their authority was less clearly recognized as a substantive power in the Church, but because there was less occasion for its exercise; the external discipline of the Church, which may vary from age to age, and from place to place, bringing fewer cases immediately before them. The growth or expansion is never of the authority, but simply of its exercise. It is so we understand De Maistre, and Catholic writers generally. Mr. Newman will hardly find a Catholic writer of any note who will sustain his position, that the Church developed itself first as Catholic, and then as Papal. This is doctrine for Oxford, not for Rome.

But enough. It is plain to the Catholic reader, that Mr. Newman errs in consequence of his neglect to distinguish in his own mind,—or, if not in his own mind, in his book,—on the one

hand, between Christian doctrine, that is, divine revelation, and Christian theology and discipline ; and, on the other, between what the Church teaches as of divine revelation, and the speculations of individual fathers and doctors. Take the whole history of the Christian world, so called, from the time of our blessed Lord down to the present moment, including the sects as well as the Church, and considering all that has been going on with all who have borne the Christian name, and in every department of life, there is no doubt but such developments and processes as Mr. Newman describes have to some extent taken place. But he seems to have studied his theory chiefly in the history of the sects, where it is unquestionably applicable, and to have concluded that the Church in its life in the world must be governed by a law analogous to the one by which they are governed, and that his theory may apply to her as well as to them. He forgets that she sprung into existence full grown, and armed at all points, as Minerva from the brain of Jupiter ; and that she is withdrawn from the ordinary law of human systems and institutions by her supernatural origin, nature, character, and protection. If he had left out the Church, and entitled his book, *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, when withdrawn from the Authority and Supervision of the Church*, he would have written, with slight modifications, a great and valuable book. It would then have been a sort of natural history of sectarism, and been substantially true. But applying his theory to the Church, and thus subjecting her to the law which presides over all human systems and institutions, he has, unintentionally, struck at her divine and supernatural character. The Church has no natural history, for she is not in the order of nature, but of grace. Or, if he had simply distinguished between Christian doctrine, in which there is no development, which is always and everywhere the same, and in which not the least shadow of a variation can be admitted, and confined his remarks to theology as a human science deduced from supernatural principles, to the variations of external discipline and worship, and to the greater or less predominance of this or that Christian principle in the practice of individual Christians in different ages of the Church, much that he has said might be accepted, and no very grave error would be taught.

From what we have said it is easy to infer that we do not think Mr. Newman judged wisely in sending this book forth to the public. He did well, on his conversion, to offer it to the

proper authorities for revision ; but he must pardon us for saying that we think he would also have done well, if, when they declined to revise, he had declined to publish. Until we know enough of Catholicity to know when and where to doubt the accuracy of our knowledge, it is a great hardship to be obliged to go to press on our own responsibility. For our own sakes, as well as for the sake of others, we should take every precaution in our power against error. There is error enough in the world, without our being in haste to augment the quantity.

The Church is not of yesterday, nor are we who live now the first enlightened defenders she has had. The best method of defence has hardly been reserved for us to discover ; and perhaps it is a sufficient reason for distrusting any method, that it is new, that it is a discovery of our own. The Church is not here to follow the spirit of the age, but to control and direct it, often to struggle against it. They do her the greatest disservice who seek to disown her glorious past, and to modify her as far as possible, so as to adapt her to prevailing modes of thought and feeling. It is her zealous but mistaken friends, who, guided by a shortsighted policy, and taking counsel of the world around them, seek, as they express it, to *liberalize* her, to bring her more into harmony with the spirit of the age, from whom we, as good Catholics, should always pray, *Libera nos, Domine!* The best service we can render the Church, in our age and country, is to surrender ourselves to her, all that we have and are, and pray Almighty God that we may always have the grace to do her bidding. She is the representative of God on earth ; and we can never do wrong, if we do what, and only what, she bids us. O, it is blessed to feel that we have not to take care of the Church, but that she is able and willing to take care of us !

Most of us who have been brought up Protestants, and have had some literary reputation, when we become converts, in the fervor of the moment, have an almost irresistible impulse to relate our *experience*, and detail the process by which we have been translated from death unto life. Nothing seems easier to us than to bridge over the gulf which divides the Protestant world from the Catholic, and open an easy passage-way for those whom we have reluctantly left behind. But, alas ! few of us can detail the process of our conversion, if we try. We are led by a way we know not, by a hand we see not. "*Spiritus ubi vult spirat ; et vocem ejus audis, sed nescis unde veniat, aut quo vadat : sic est omnis, qui natus est ex Spiritu.*"

St. John iii. 8. The most we can say is, "This one thing I know, that, whereas I was blind, I now see." We believe before we reason, and are often carried onward not only without reasoning, but even in spite of it. The reasoning we should subsequently give would be as likely to mislead others as to aid them. The grounds of our faith are catholic, not individual; and the less use we make of what is individual or peculiar to ourselves in defending it, the better. We did not convert ourselves; God did it, and his be the praise and the glory.

But we say not this for Mr. Newman's sake. He is no longer outside of the Church, seeking to find reasons to justify him in asking admission into her communion. His doubts and misgivings, his advances and his retreats, have given way to firm faith and filial confidence. He does not now, as in his book, believe the Church because by private reason he has convinced himself of the truth of her teachings; but he believes what she teaches because he believes *her*, and he believes her because she has received the formal commission from Almighty God to teach all nations to observe whatsoever Christ commanded his Apostles, and because he has received, through divine grace, the virtue of faith. He has broken with the past, and sees that his present is not a continuation of his former life; for he now understands that Catholicity is not Protestantism developed. His present and his past are separated by a gulf which grace alone can bridge over; and he needs not that we tell him he can more effectually serve those he has left behind by his prayers than by his hypotheses, however ingenious or elaborate. We take our leave of him with the assurance, that, if we have criticised his book somewhat severely, it has been with no improper feeling towards him; and that, when he shall be disposed to address the public again, and from his new position, he will find us among the most willing, the most eager, and the most respectful of his listeners. This elaborate Essay belongs to his past life; let it go with all that Protestantism he abjured before he was permitted to put on the livery of Christ. It belongs not to his Catholic life, and is only accidentally connected with it, either in his own mind, or in that of others. The Essay he will write hereafter, out of the fulness of his Catholic heart, will breathe a different tone, and fetch another echo. It will refresh the Catholic soul, strengthen his faith, confirm his hope, and warm his charity. A noble career opens before him. May God give him grace to run it with success!

ART. IV. — *Margaret, a Tale of the Real and Ideal, Blight and Bloom, including Sketches of a Place not before described, called Mons Christi.* Boston: Jordan & Wiley. 1845. 12mo. pp. 460.

WE have no intention of reviewing at length the book the title of which we have just quoted. Indeed, we have read it only by proxy. We have heard it spoken of in certain literary circles as a remarkable production, almost as one of the wonders of the age. The Protestant lady who read it for us tells us that it is a weak and silly book, unnatural in its scenes and characters, coarse and vulgar in its language and details, wild and visionary in its speculations; and, judging from the portions here and there which we actually have read, and from the source whence it emanates, we can hardly run any risk in indorsing our Protestant friend's criticism. The author is a man not deficient in natural gifts; he has respectable attainments; and makes, we believe, a tolerably successful minister of the latest form of Protestantism with which we chance to be acquainted; though, since we have not been introduced to any new form for several months, it must not be inferred from the fact that we are acquainted with no later form, that none later exists.

So far as we have ascertained the character of this book, it is intended to be the vehicle of certain crude speculations on religion, theology, philosophy, morals, society, education, and matters and things in general. The *Mons Christi* stands for the human heart, and Christ himself is our higher or instinctive nature, and if we but listen to our own natures, we shall at once learn, love, and obey all that our Blessed Redeemer teaches. Hence, Margaret, a poor, neglected child, who has received no instruction, who knows not even the name of her Maker, nor that of her Saviour, who, in fact, has grown up in the most brutish ignorance, is represented as possessing in herself all the elements of the most perfect Christian character, and as knowing by heart all the essential principles of Christian faith and morals. The author seems also to have written his work, in part at least, for the purpose of instructing our instructors as to the true method of education. He appears to adopt a very simple and a very pleasant theory on the subject, — one which cannot fail to commend itself to our young folks. Love is the great teacher; and the true method of education is for the pupil

to fall in love with the tutor, or the tutor with the pupil, and it is perfected when the falling in love is mutual. Whence it follows, that it is a great mistake to suppose it desirable or even proper that tutor and pupil should both be of the same sex. This would be to reverse the natural order, since the sexes were evidently intended for each other. This method, we suppose, should be called "LEARNING MADE EASY, OR NATURE DISPLAYED," since it would enable us to dispense with school-rooms, prefects, text-books, study, and the birch, and to fall back on our natural instincts. These two points of doctrine indicate the genus, if not the species, of the book, and show that it must be classed under the general head of Transcendentalism. If we could allow ourselves to go deeper into the work and to dwell longer on its licentiousness and blasphemy, we probably might determine its species as well as its genus. But this must suffice; and when we add that the author seems to comprise in himself several species at once, besides the whole genus humbuggery, we may dismiss the book, with sincere pity for him who wrote it, and a real prayer for his speedy restoration to the simple genus humanity, and for his conversion, through grace, to that Christianity which was given to man from above, and not, spider-like, spun out of his own bowels.

Yet, bad and disgusting, false and blasphemous, as this book really is, bating a few of its details, it is a book which no Protestant, as a Protestant, has a right to censure. Many Protestants affect great contempt of Transcendentalism, and horror at its extravagance and blasphemy; but they have no right to do so. Transcendentalism is a much more serious affair than they would have us believe. It is not a simple "Yankee notion," confined to a few isolated individuals in a little corner of New England, as some of our Southern friends imagine, but is in fact the dominant error of our times, is as rife in one section of our common country as in another; and, in principle, at least, is to be met with in every popular Anti-Catholic writer of the day, whether German, French, English, or American. It is, and has been from the first, the fundamental heresy of the whole Protestant world; for, at bottom, it is nothing but the fundamental principle of the Protestant Reformation itself, and without assuming it, there is no conceivable principle on which it is possible to justify the Reformers in their separation from the Catholic Church. The Protestant who refuses to accept it, with all its legitimate consequences, however frightful or absurd they may be, condemns himself and his whole party.

We are far from denying that many Protestants, and, indeed, the larger part of them, as a matter of fact, profess to hold many doctrines which are incompatible with Transcendentalism ; but this avails them nothing, for they hold them, not as Protestants, but in despite of their Protestantism, and therefore have no right to hold them at all. In taking an account of Protestantism, we have the right, and, indeed, are bound, to exclude them from its definition. Every man is bound, as the condition of being ranked among rational beings, to be logically consistent with himself ; and no one can claim as his own any doctrine which does not flow from, or which is not logically consistent with, his own first principles. This follows necessarily from the principle, that of contraries one must be false, since one necessarily excludes the other. If, then, the doctrines incompatible with Transcendentalism, which Protestants profess to hold, do not flow from their own first principles, or if they are not logically compatible with them, they cannot claim them as Protestants, and we have the right, and are bound, to exclude them from the definition of Protestantism. The man cannot be scientifically included in the definition of the horse, because both chance to be lodged in the same stable, or to be otherwise found in juxtaposition.

The essential mark or characteristic of Protestantism is, unquestionably, *dissent* from the authority of the Catholic Church, in subjection to which the first Protestants were spiritually born and reared. This is evident from the whole history of its origin, and from the well known fact, that opposition to Catholicity is the only point on which all who are called Protestants can agree among themselves. On every other question which comes up, they differ widely one from another, and not unfrequently some take views directly opposed to those taken by others ; but when it concerns opposing the Church, however dissimilar their doctrines and tempers, they all unite, and are ready to march as one man to the attack. As dissent, Protestantism is negative, denies the authority of the Catholic Church, and can include within its definition nothing which, even in the remotest sense, concedes or implies that authority. But no man, sect, or party can rest on a mere negation, for no mere negation is or can be an ultimate principle. Every negation implies an affirmation, and therefore an affirmative principle which authorizes it. He who dissents does so in obedience to some authority or principle which commands or requires him to dissent, and this principle, not the negation, is his fundamental principle.

The essential or fundamental principle of Protestantism is, then, not dissent from the authority of the Catholic Church, but the affirmative principle on which it relies for the justification of its dissent.

What, then, is this affirmative principle? Whatever it be, it must be either out of the individual dissenting, or in him; that is, some external authority, or some internal authority. The first supposition is not admissible; for Protestants really allege no authority for dissent, external to the individual dissenting, — have never defined any such authority, never hinted that such authority exists or is needed; and there obviously is no such authority which can be adduced. In point of fact, so far from dissenting from the Church on the ground that they are commanded to do so by an external authority paramount to the Church, they deny the existence of all external authority in matters of faith, and defend their dissent on the ground that there is no such authority, never was, and never can be.

But some may contend, judging from the practice of Protestants, and what we know of the actual facts of the original establishment of Protestantism in all those countries in which it has become predominant, that it does recognize an external authority, which it holds paramount to the Church, and on which it relies for its justification. Protestantism, as a matter of fact, owes its establishment to the authority of the lay lords and temporal princes, or, in a general sense, to the civil authority. It was, originally, much more of a political revolt than of a strictly religious dissent, and its causes must be sought in the ambition of princes, dating back from Louis of Bavaria, and including Louis the Twelfth of France; rather than in any real change of faith operated in the masses; and its way was prepared by the temper of mind which the temporal princes created in their subjects by the wars they undertook and carried on ostensibly against the popes as political sovereigns, but really for the purpose of possessing the patrimony of the Church, and of subjecting the Church, in their respective dominions, to the control of the secular power. The Reformers would have accomplished little or nothing, if politics had not come to their aid. Luther would have bellowed in vain, had he not been backed by the powerful Elector of Saxony, and immediately aided by the Landgrave Philip; Zwingle, and Oecolampadius, and Calvin would have accomplished nothing in Switzerland, if they had not secured the aid of the secular arm, and followed its wishes; the powerful Huguenot party in France

was more of a political than of a religious party, and it dwindled into insignificance as soon as it lost the support of the great lords, distinguished statesmen and lawyers, and the provincial parliaments. In Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, the Reform was purely the act of the civil power; in the United Provinces, it was embraced as the principle of revolt, or of national independence; in England, it was the work, confessedly, of the secular government, and was carried by court and parliament against the wishes of the immense majority of the nation; in Scotland, it was effected by the great lords, who wished to usurp to themselves the authority of the crown; in this country, it came with the civil government, and was maintained by civil enactments, pains, and penalties. We might, therefore, be led, at first sight, to assert the fundamental principle of Protestantism to be the supremacy in spirituals of the civil power. But this would be a mistake, because it did not recognize this supremacy unless the civil power was Anti-Catholic, and because the assertion of this supremacy of the civil power in spirituals was itself a denial of the authority of the Church, and therefore could not be made without making the act of dissent. There is no question but the Protestants did, whenever it suited their purpose, assert the supremacy of the state in spiritual matters; and it must be conceded that it is very agreeable to its nature to do so, as is evident from the fact, that even now, and in this country, it opposes the Catholic Church chiefly, and with the most success, on the ground that Catholicity asserts the freedom of religion, or, what is the same thing, the independence of the spiritual authority. Still this cannot be its ultimate principle. The Church taught and teaches, that, though the independence of the civil power in matters purely temporal is asserted, its authority in spirituals is null. To deny this is to deny the Church, and as much to dissent from her authority as to deny her infallibility, her divine origin, or any article of the creed she teaches; and this must be denied before the supremacy of the civil power in spirituals can be asserted. Therefore, if Protestantism did openly, avowedly, assert the Erastian heresy of the supremacy of the civil power in spirituals, it would not justify her dissent by an external authority, unless she could make this assertion itself on some external authority acknowledged to be paramount to the Church. But for this she has no external authority, since the Church denies it, and the authority of the state is the matter in question. She can, then, assert the supremacy of the state only on the authority of some

principle in the individual dissenting, and therefore only on some internal authority. Whatever authority, then, Protestantism may ascribe to the civil power, it is not an external authority, because the authority asserted is, as we have seen in a previous article, always of the same order as that on which it is asserted, and can never transcend it.

Others, again, may think, since Protestants, and especially those among them denominated Anglicans and Episcopalians, occasionally appeal to Christian antiquity, and talk of the Fathers, and sometimes even profess to quote them, that they have, or think they have, in Christian antiquity an authority for dissent, virtually, at least, external to the individual dissenting. But Christian antiquity, unless read with a presumption in favor of the Church, save on a few general and public facts manifestly against Protestants, decides nothing. Understood as the Church understands it, and it evidently *may*, without violence to its letter or spirit, be so understood, it condemns Protestantism without mercy. To make it favor Protestantism even negatively, it is necessary to resort to a principle of interpretation which the Church does not concede, and the adoption of which would, therefore, involve the dissent in question. If we take with us the canon, that all in the Christian Fathers is to be understood in accordance with the Church when not manifestly against her, Christian antiquity will be all on the side of the Roman Catholic Church; if we take the canon, that all in the Christian Fathers is to be understood in a sense against the Church, when not manifestly in her favor, Christian antiquity may, on many important dogmas, leave the question doubtful; though even then it would, in fact, be decisive for the *authority* of the Church, and therefore implicitly for all special dogmas. But, be this as it may, it is undeniable that it is only by adopting this latter canon that Protestantism can derive any countenance from Christian antiquity. But on what authority do they, or can they, adopt such a canon? Protestants call themselves reformers; they are accusers, dissenters, and therefore all the presumptions in the case are manifestly against them, as they are against all who accuse, bring an action or a charge against others; and they must make out a strong *primâ facie* case, before they can turn the presumptions in their favor. This is law, and it is justice. Till they do this, the presumption is in favor of the Church; and then it is enough for her to show that the testimony of antiquity *may*, without violence, be so understood as not to impeach her

claims. Till then, nothing will make for Protestants which is not manifestly against her, so clear and express as by no allowable latitude of interpretation to be reconcilable with her pretensions. That is to say, the Protestant must impeach the Church on *primâ facie* evidence, before he can have the right to adopt that canon of interpretation without which it is manifestly suicidal for him to appeal to Christian antiquity. Take, as an illustration of what we mean, the testimony of St. Justin Martyr to the Catholic doctrine of the Real Presence. It is clear to any one who reads the passage, that the words in a plain and easy sense confirm the Catholic doctrine ; and yet, if there were an urgent necessity for interpreting them otherwise, we are not certain but, without greater deviation from the literal sense than is sometimes allowed, they *might* be so understood as not to be inconsistent with the views of the Blessed Eucharist which some Protestant sects profess to entertain. But by what authority, because they *may* be so interpreted, are we to say they *must* be ? In truth, it is nothing to the Protestant's purpose to say they *may* be, till he establishes by positive authority they *must* be, for it is obvious they also *may* not be. Now, what and where is this positive authority ? Manifestly not in Christian antiquity itself ; and yet it must be had, before Christian antiquity can be adduced as authorizing dissent from the Catholic Church. This authority, as we said before, must be either external to the dissenter or internal in the dissenter himself. It cannot be external ; for, after the Church, there is no conceivable external authority applicable in the case. It must, then, be internal. Then the authority of Christian antiquity, as alleged against the Church, is only the authority there is in the dissenter himself, according to the principle already established, that the authority asserted is necessarily of the same order as that on which it is asserted.

Finally, it will, perhaps, be alleged, inasmuch as all Protestants did at first, and some of them do now, appeal to the written word, or the Holy Scriptures, in justification of their dissent, that they have in these a real or a pretended authority, external to and independent of the dissenter, distinct from and paramount to that of the Church. But a moment's reflection will show, even if the Scriptures were not in favor of the Church, that this is a mistake. The Holy Scriptures proposed, and their sense declared, by the Church, we hold with a firm faith to be the word of God, and therefore of the highest authority ; but, if not so proposed and

interpreted, though in many respects important and authentic historical documents, and valuable for their excellent didactic teachings, they would not and could not be for us the inspired, and, in a supernatural sense, the authoritative, word of God. To the Protestant they are not and cannot be an authority external to the dissenter ; because, denying the unwritten word, the Church, and all authoritative tradition, he has no external authority to vouch for the fact that they are the inspired word of God, or to declare their genuine sense. If there be no external authority to decide that the Bible is the word of God, and to declare its true sense, the authority ascribed to it in the last analysis, according to the principle we have established, is only the authority of some internal principle in the individual dissenting ; for, in that case, the individual, by virtue of this internal principle, decides, with the Bible as without it, what is and what is not God's word, what God has and has not revealed ; and therefore what he is and what he is not bound to believe, what he is and what he is not bound to do.

It is, moreover, notorious that Protestants do really deny all external authority in matters of faith, and hold that any external authority to determine for the individual what he must believe would be manifest usurpation, intolerable tyranny, to be resisted by every one who has any sense of Christian freedom, or of his rights and dignity as a man. Even the Anglican Church, which claims to herself authority in controversies of faith, acknowledges that she has no right to ordain any thing as of necessity to salvation, which may not be proved from God's word written ; and by implication at least, if she means any thing, leaves it to the individual to determine for himself whether what she ordains is provable from the written word or not ; and, therefore, abandons her own authority, by making the individual the judge of its legality. No one will, furthermore, pretend that Protestants even affect to have dissented from the Catholic Church, in which they were spiritually born and reared, in obedience to an external authority ; that is to say, another Church, which they held to be paramount to the Roman Catholic Church. If they had admitted that there was anywhere an authoritative Church, they would have agreed that it was this Church, and could have been no other. In denying the authority of the Roman Catholic Church, they denied, and intended to deny, in principle, all external authority in matters of faith ; and the chief count in the indictment of the Church, which they have drawn up, and on which they have

been for these three hundred years demanding conviction, is, that she claims to be such authority, when no such authority was instituted, or intended to be instituted. We may, then, safely conclude that the affirmative principle on which Protestantism relies for the justification of its denial of Catholic authority is not some authority external to the individual dissenting, and held to be paramount to that from which he dissents.

Then the principle must be internal in the individual himself, and this is precisely what Protestantism teaches; for by her own confession, nay, by her own boast, her fundamental principle is PRIVATE JUDGMENT. This was the only principle which, in the nature of the case, she could set up as the antagonist of Catholic authority; and it is notorious the world over, that it is in the name of this principle that she arraigns the Church, and commands her to give an account of herself. We see, even to-day, emblazoned on the banners borne by the motley hosts of the so-called "Christian Alliance," this glorious device, — THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT. This is their battle-cry, as *Deus Vult* was that of the Crusaders. It is their *In hoc signo vince*. "We want no infallible pope, bishops, or church, to propound and explain to us God's word, to lord it over God's heritage, and make slaves of our very consciences. No! we are freemen, and we strike for freedom, the glorious birthright of every Christian to judge for himself what is or what is not the word of God; that is, what he is or is not to believe." There is no mistake in this. If there is any thing essential, any thing fundamental, in Protestantism, any thing which makes it the subject of a predicate at all, it is this far-famed and loud-boasted principle of PRIVATE JUDGMENT.

In saying this, we of course are not to be understood as asserting that Protestants always, or even commonly, respect, in their practice, this right of private judgment. Practically, every Protestant says, "I have the right to think as I please, and you have the right to think as I do; and if you do not, I will, if I have the power, compel you to do so, or confiscate your goods, deprive you of citizenship, outlaw you, behead, hang, or burn you; at least, imprison you, flog you, or bore your ears and tongue." In point of fact, Protestants, we grant, have very generally violated the principle of private judgment, and have practised, in the name of religious liberty, the most unjust, tyranny over conscience, — unjust, because, on their own principles, they have received from Almighty God no authority

to dictate to conscience, and because they also concede, what is unquestionably true, that conscience is accountable to God alone. Every attempt of any man, set, or class of men, not expressly commissioned by Almighty God, — so expressly that the authority exercised shall be really and truly his, — to exert the least control over conscience is a manifest usurpation, an outrageous tyranny, which every man, having a just reverence for his Maker, will resist even unto death. The Catholic Church, indeed, claims plenary authority over conscience ; but only on the ground, that she is divinely commissioned, and that the authority which speaks in her is literally and as truly the authority of God, as that of the representative is that of his sovereign. If, *per impossibili*, she could suppose herself not to be so commissioned, and therefore not having the pledge of the divine supervision, protection, and aid which such commission necessarily implies, she would concede that she has no authority, and should attempt to exercise none. We cheerfully obey her, because in obeying her we are obeying not a human authority, but God himself. In submitting to her we are free, because we are submitting to God, who is our rightful sovereign, to whom we belong, all that we have, and all that we are. Freedom is not in being held to no obedience, but in being held to obey only the legal sovereign ; and the more unqualified this obedience, the freer we are. Perfect freedom is in having no will of our own, in willing only what our sovereign wills, and because he wills it. If the Church, as we cannot doubt, be really commissioned by God, the more absolute her authority, the more unqualified our submission, the more perfect is our liberty, as every man knows, who knows any thing at all of that freedom wherewith the Son makes us free. But in yielding obedience to a Protestant sect, it is not the same. When any one of our sects undertakes to dictate to conscience, it is tyranny ; because, by its own confession, it has received no authority from God. It is tyranny, even though what it attempts to enforce be really God's word ; for it attempts to enforce it by a *human*, and not by a *divine* authority. It would still tyrannize, because it has no right to enforce any thing at all. It may say, as our sects do say, it has the Bible, that the Bible is God's word, and that it only exacts the obedience to God's commands which no man has the right to withhold. Be it so. But who has made it the keeper and executor of God's laws ? Where is its commission under the hand and seal of the Almighty ? It is, doubtless, right that the civil laws should be

executed, — that the murderer, for instance, should be punished ; but it does not *therefore* follow that I, as a simple citizen, have the right to execute them, and to inflict the punishment. That may be done only by the constituted authorities, and is not my business ; and it is a sound as well as a homely adage, Let every one mind his own business. Protestants, on this point, fall into grievous errors. The simple possession of the Holy Scriptures does not constitute them *keepers* of the word, — even supposing the Scriptures to contain the *whole* word, — and give them the right to dictate to conscience, as they imagine, any more than the fact of my having in my possession the statute-book constitutes me the guardian and administrator of the laws of the commonwealth. Protestants, whenever they interfere with the right of private judgment, convict themselves, on their own principles, of practising on what, in these days, is called “Lynch law” ; and Lynch law is to the state precisely what Protestantism, in practice, is to the Church. This is a fact which deserves the grave consideration of those sects which contend for creeds and confessions, and claim the right to try and punish as heretics such as in their judgment do not conform to them. Even Dr. Beecher himself came very near, a few years since, being *lynched* by his Presbyterian associates ; and if it had not been for an extraordinary suppleness and marvelous skill in parrying blows, hardly to have been expected in one of his age, it might have been all up with him. Our Presbyterian, Dutch Reformed, Puritan, and Anglican friends should lay this to heart, and never suffer themselves to complain of the practice of “Lynch-law,” or to find the least fault with the commission of Judge Lynch himself, — for it emanates from the same authority as their own, and is as regularly made out and authenticated. But this is foreign from our present purpose. It is enough for our present purpose, that Protestants assert, in theory, as they unquestionably do, the right of private judgment, and make it the principle of their dissent from the authority of the Catholic Church.

But all men, at least as to their inherent rights, are equal. The right of private judgment, then, cannot be asserted for one man, without being at the same time, and by the same authority, asserted for all men. Then Protestants cannot assert private judgment as their authority for dissenting from the Catholic Church, without erecting it into a universal principle. We may assume, then, that Protestantism begins by laying down as its principle the right of *all men* to private judgment.

But the right of all men to private judgment is in effect the *unrestricted* or universal right to private judgment. This may not have been clearly seen in the beginning, and there is no question but Protestants intended in the commencement to restrict the right of private judgment to the simple interpretation of the written word. But every one, whatever may be his intentions, must be held answerable for the strict logical consequences of the principles he deliberately adopts ; for if he does not foresee these consequences, he ought not to take upon himself the responsibility of adopting the principles. The right of private judgment, once admitted, can no longer be restricted. If restricted at all, it must be by some authority, and this authority must be either external or internal. If internal, it is private judgment itself, and then it cannot restrict, for it would be absurd to say that private judgment can restrict private judgment. But there can be no external authority, because Protestants admit no external authority, and because we cannot assert an external authority to restrict private judgment, without denying private judgment itself. Either the authority must prescribe the limits of private judgment, or private judgment must prescribe the limits of the restriction ; if the first, it is tantamount to the denial of private judgment itself, for private judgment would then subsist only at the mercy of authority, by sufferance, and not by right ; if the latter, the *authority* is null ; for private judgment may enlarge or contract the restriction as it pleases, and that is evidently no restriction which is only what that which is restricted chooses to make it. It is impossible, then, to erect private judgment into a principle for all men, and afterwards to restrict it to the simple interpretation of the Holy Scriptures.

If we assert the right of private judgment to interpret the Holy Scriptures, we must assert its right in all cases whatsoever ; for the principle on which private judgment can be defended in one case is equally applicable in every case. Will it be said that private judgment must yield to God's word ? Granted. But what is God's word ? The Bible. How know you that ? Do you determine that the Bible is the word of God by some external authority, or by private judgment ? Not by some external authority, because you have none, and admit none. By private judgment ? Then the authority of the Bible is *for you* only private judgment. The Bible does not propose itself, and therefore can have no authority higher than the authority which proposes it. Here is a serious difficulty for

those Protestants who set up such a clamor about the Bible, and which shows them, or ought to show them, that, whatever the Bible may be for a Catholic, for them it can, in no conceivable contingency, be any thing but a human authority. *The authority of that which is proposed is of the same order as that which proposes, and cannot transcend it.* This is a Protestant argument, and is substantially the great argument of Chillingworth against Catholicity, and the one under a slightly different form which we have answered in a preceding article. Nothing proposes the Bible to Protestants but private judgment, as is evident from their denial of all other authority ; and therefore in the Bible they — not we, thank God ! — have only the authority of private judgment, and therefore only the word of man, and not the word of God. If the authority on which Protestants receive the word of God is only that of private judgment, then there is for them in the Bible only private judgment ; and then nothing to restrict private judgment, for private judgment can itself be no restriction on private judgment.

Moreover, if we take the Bible to be the word of God on the authority of private judgment, and its sense on the same authority, as Protestants do and must, then we assume private judgment to be competent to decide of itself what is and what is not the word of God, what God has revealed and what he has not revealed, has commanded and has not commanded, — and therefore competent to decide what we are to believe and what we are not to believe, and what we are to do and what we are not to do. But this is to assume the whole for private judgment, and therefore to assume its unrestricted right. We may, then, assume, in the second place, that Protestantism not only lays down the principle of the right of all men to private judgment, but the right of all men to the universal or unrestricted right of private judgment.

But private judgment itself is not, strictly speaking, ultimate, and therefore, though it be the principle of Protestantism, is not its ultimate principle. The ultimate principle of Protestantism lies a little farther back. Rights are never in themselves ultimate, but must always, to be rights, rest on some foundation or authority. The right of private judgment necessarily implies some principle on which it is founded. Every judgment is by some standard or measure ; for when we judge it is always *by* something, and this, whatever it is, is the principle, law, rule, criterion, standard, or measure of the judgment.

In every act of private judgment this standard or measure is the individual judging. The individual judges by himself, and to judge by one's self is precisely what is meant by private judgment. In it the individual is both measurer and measure, — in a word, his own yard-stick of truth and goodness. But rights, to be rights, must not only be founded on some principle, but on a *true* principle; for to say they are founded on a false principle is only saying, in other words, that they have no foundation at all. The right of all men to unrestricted private judgment, then, necessarily implies that each and every man is in himself the exact measure of truth and goodness. In laying down the principle of private judgment as the principle of its dissent from the Catholic Church, Protestantism, then, necessarily lays down the principle, that each and every man is in himself the exact measure of truth and goodness, — the very fundamental proposition of Transcendentalism, as we established in our Review, one year ago, and from which the other two propositions to which, in our analysis, we reduced its teachings are easily obtained. The identity in principle is, then, perfect; and no Protestant, as we began by saying, can refuse to accept Transcendentalism, with all its legitimate consequences, without condemning himself and his whole party.

This conclusion is undeniable, for the acutest dialectician will find no break or flaw in the chain of reasoning by which it is obtained. We, then, may assume this very important position, that Transcendentalism is the strict logical termination of Protestantism; and if some Protestants, as is the case, refuse to admit it, it is at the expense of their dialectics; because they cannot, or dare not, say, Two and two make four, but judge it more prudent to say, Two and two make five, or to compromise the matter and say, Two and two make three. There are few things which are more disgusting than the cowardice which shrinks from avowing the legitimate consequences of one's own principles. The sin of inconsequence is, as the celebrated Dr. Evariste de Gypendole justly remarks, a mortal sin, — at least, in the eyes of humanity; for it is high treason against the rational nature itself; and he who deliberately commits it voluntarily abdicates reason, and takes his place among inferior and irrational natures. If your principles are sound, you cannot push them to a dangerous extreme; and if they will not bear pushing to their extreme consequences, you should know that they are unsound, and not fit to be entertained; for

it is always lawful to conclude the unsoundness of the principle from the unsoundness of the consequences.

Taking this view of the case, we confess the Transcendentalists appear to us the more respectable, and indeed the only respectable, because the only consistent, class of Protestants. Consistent as Protestants, we mean, not as men; for Transcendentalism is the *ne plus ultra* of inconsistency and absurdity; but as Protestants they are consistent in so far as they carry out with an iron logic the Protestant principle to its legitimate results; and in doing this, in the providence of God, they are rendering no mean service to the cause of truth. They are a living and practical *reductio ad absurdum* of Protestantism. They strip it of its disguises, expose it in its nakedness, and subserve the cause of truth as the drunken Helotæ subserved the cause of temperance in the Spartan youth by exposing to them the disgusting effects of drunkenness.

It is of great practical importance that Protestantism should be exhibited by its followers in its true light, as it really is in itself. Thus far Protestants have owed their success and influence, in the main, to the fact that the mass of them have never seen and comprehended Protestantism in its simple, unadulterated elements. It has always been presented to them in a livery stolen from Catholicity. The great mass of the Protestant people, seeing it only in this livery, have supposed that it appertained to the household of faith, and that they had in it all that is essential to the Christian religion. Unable to penetrate its disguises, unable to distinguish between what was genuinely Protestant and what was surreptitiously taken from the Church, they could not understand the force or truth of the Catholic accusations against them. It seemed to them utterly false to say that they had no faith, no church, no religion, and that their Protestantism necessarily involved the denial of the whole scheme of revealed religion, and left them in reality nothing but mere Naturalism. Had they not something they called a church? Had they not places of worship modelled after Christian temples? Had they not the Holy Scriptures, pastors and teachers, hymns, prayers, — all the exterior forms of worship? Did they not profess to believe in God, the Holy Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, the necessity of Grace, the endless punishment of the wicked, and the eternal beatitude of the just, — all that even Catholic doctors have ever taught that it is necessary as *ex necessitate mediæ ad salutem* to be ex-

plicity believed? Did they not try to lead holy and devout lives, spend much time in prayer and praise, seek earnestly to know and do the will of God, and actually, in many instances, attain to a moral elevation which would more than compare favorably with that of many Catholics? How say, then, that we have no religion, that our principles are at war with Christianity, and lead necessarily to the destruction of all faith, of all Christian morality? Have we not in our Protestantism, as we hold it, a living lie to your unjust charge, your foul aspersion? It must be confessed, that appearances, to the Protestant, were much against the Catholic, and it required considerable insight and firmness of logic to establish the charges which the Catholic, from the principles of an infallible faith, was fully warranted in preferring. But time and events have now made clear and certain to all who can see and reason, what then seemed so doubtful, not to say, so unfounded. In Transcendentalism, which is both the logical and historical development of Protestantism, it may now be seen that the Protestant, not the Catholic, was deceived; that not the Catholic was unjust in his charges, but the Protestant was carried away by his delusions. This is an immense gain, and by showing this, by stripping Protestantism of its disguises, by compelling it to abandon what it had attempted to retain of Catholicity, and to restrict it to its own principles, Transcendentalism is subserving in no ordinary degree the cause of religion and morality. Three hundred years of controversy have resulted in simplifying the question, and in making up the true and proper issue. If the true and proper issue could have been made in the beginning, Protestantism would have died in its birth. The mass of those who have followed the Protestant standard have done so because they supposed *they* had in the Holy Scriptures a divine authority for their belief. Here was their mother delusion. Catholics have really in the Holy Scriptures a divine authority, because they receive them on the proposition of the Church expressly commissioned by Almighty God to propose the truth revealed; but Protestants, as we have seen, since they take the Holy Scriptures only on the authority of private reason, have in them only the authority of private reason, — a merely human authority. It is now seen and understood that the Scriptures, if taken on human authority, have only a human authority; and therefore, as Catholics always alleged, Protestants, with all their pretensions, have only a human authority for the dogmas they profess to derive from them, and therefore are not, and never have been, able

to make that act of divine faith without which, if they have come to years of discretion, they possess no *Christian* virtue, and do nothing meritorious for eternal life. If Christianity be a supernatural life, the life which begins in supernatural faith and contemplates a supernatural destiny, it is now clear that Protestants cannot and never could claim to be truly within the pale of the Christian family, but do reject and always have virtually rejected the Christian religion itself.

This being so, it becomes necessary now either to deny the supernatural character of the Christian life, and therefore the necessity of divine or supernatural faith, or to give up Protestantism as having no claim to be called Christian. This is becoming a general conviction among Protestants themselves, and therefore the tendency to reject Christianity, as a supernatural religion, is manifesting itself all over the Protestant world. Even Bishop Butler, the great Anglican light of the last century, declares the Gospel to be only "a republication of the law of nature"; and we have rarely met with a Protestant, whatever might be his unintelligible jargon about the New Birth, that did not hold, substantially, that the Christian life is merely the continuation and development of our natural life. The old modes of speech, adopted when Christianity was held to be a supernatural religion, are, we admit, in some instances, retained and insisted upon; but they have lost their former significance. *Supernatural* is defined to be *super-sensuous*, as if spiritual existences could not be natural as well as material existences. It is thus Coleridge defines supernatural; it is thus, also, the *Supernaturalists* of Germany, of the school of Schleiermacher and De Wette, understand it, while the Rationalists deny it in name as well as in reality. In no higher sense do we find the word recognized by the mass of Swiss and French Protestants. "What did Almighty God make us for?" said we, the other day, to a worthy Protestant preacher, not without note in this community and the councils of his country. "To develope and perfect our spiritual natures," was the ready reply; that is, to finish the work which Almighty God began, but left incomplete; and this is the reply which, in substance, is almost universally given by those Protestants who plume themselves on having pure and ennobling spiritual views of religion. Thus it is, men everywhere lose sight of their supernatural destiny, and then deny the necessity of a supernatural life, and then the necessity of grace. Thus, in substance, if not in name, they reject the doctrines of the Trinity,

the Incarnation, the Miraculous Conception and Birth of our Saviour, Original Sin, the Atonement, Remission of Sins, the Plenary Inspiration of the Scriptures, and, finally, all that is incompatible with the principle of man's sufficiency for himself, as so many reminiscences of Popery, or traditions of the Dark Ages, and as interposing between the human soul and its Creator, and hindering its freedom and growth. It is idle to deny, that, all over the Protestant world, the tendency to this result is strong and irresistible, and that it is already, as we have said on a former occasion, reached by the more thinking and enlightened portion of Protestants. The true and proper issue, then, cannot be really any longer evaded. Protestants must meet the simple questions of Naturalism or Supernaturalism, of Transcendentalism or Catholicity, of man or God.

No doubt, a certain class of Protestant doctors do, and will, for some little time to come, struggle to stave off this issue, but in vain. Matters have proceeded too far. It is too late. The internal developments of Protestantism are too far completed, the spirit at work in the Protestant ranks is too powerful, to prevent the direct issue from being made. Transcendentalism, under one form or another, has struck its roots so deep, has spread out its branches so far, and finds so rich a soil, that it must ere long cause all the other forms of Protestantism, as the underbrush in a thick forest, to die out and disappear. The spirit of inquiry which Protestantism boasts of having quickened, the disposition to bring every question, the most intricate and the most sacred, to the test of private judgment, which she fosters, and which it would be suicidal in her to discountenance, will compel these doctors themselves either to give up their vocations, or to fall into the current and suffer themselves to be borne on to its termination. Resistance is madness. The movement party advances with a steady step, and will drive all before it. Whatever Evangelical doctor throws himself in its path to stay its onward march is a dead man and ground to powder. There is no alternative; you must follow Schlegel, Hurter, Newman, back into the bosom of Catholic unity, or go on with Emerson, Parker, and Carlyle. Not to-day only have we seen this. Think you that we, who, according to your own story, have tried every form of Protestantism, and disputed every inch of Protestant ground, would ever have left the ranks of Protestantism in which we were born, and under whose banner we had fought so long and suffered so much, if there had been any other alternative for us?

The "No Popery" cry which our *Evangelicals* are raising, and which rings in our ears from every quarter, does not in the least discompose us. In this very cry we hear an additional proof of what we are maintaining. We understand the full significance of this cry. The Protestant masses are escaping from their leaders. The sectarian ministers, especially of the species *Evangelical*, are losing their hold on their flocks, and finding that their old, petrified forms, retained from Luther, or Calvin, or Knox, will no longer satisfy them, — have no longer vitality for them. Their craft is in danger; their power and influence are departing, and *Ichabod* is beginning to be written on their foreheads. They see the handwriting on the wall, and feel that something must be done to avert the terrible doom that awaits them. Fearfulness and trembling seize them, and, like the drowning man, they catch at the first straw, and hope, and yet with the mere hope of despair, that it will prove a plank of safety. They have no resource in their old, dried-up, dead forms. They must look abroad, call in some extrinsic aid, and, by means of some foreign power, delay the execution of the judgment they feel in their hearts has already been pronounced against them. They must get up some excitement which will captivate the people and blind their reason. No excitement seems to them more likely to answer their purpose than a "No Popery" excitement, which they fancy will find a firm support in the hereditary passions and prejudices of their flocks. Here is the significance of this "No Popery" excitement.

But this excitement will prove suicidal. Times have changed, and matters do not stand as they did in the days of Luther, and Zwingle, and Henry, and Calvin, and Knox. The temper of men's minds is different, and there is a new order of questions up for solution. The old watchwords no longer answer the purpose. What avails it to prove the Pope to be Antichrist, to populations that do not even believe in Christ? What avails it to thunder at Catholicity with texts which are no longer believed to have a divine authority? Protestantism must now fall back on her own principles, and fight her battles with her own weapons. She must throw out her own banner to the breeze, and call upon men to gather and arm and fight for progress, for liberty, for the unrestricted right of private judgment, or she will not rally a corporal's guard against Catholicity. But the moment she does this, she is, as the French say, *enfonceé*; for she has subsisted and can subsist only by profess-

ing one thing and doing another. Let our Evangelical doctors, in their madness, rally, in the name of progress, of liberty, of private judgment, an army to put down the Pope, and the matter will not end there. Their forces, furnished with arms against Catholicity, will turn upon themselves, and in a hoarse voice, and, if need be, from brazen throats and tongues of flame, exclaim, "No more sham, gentlemen. We go for principle. We do not unpope the Pope to find a new pope in each petty presbyter, and a spy and informer in each brother or sister communicant. You are nothing to us. Freedom, gentlemen; doff your gowns, abrogate all your creeds and confessions, break up all your religious organizations, abolish all forms of worship except such as each individual may choose and exercise for himself, and acknowledge in fact, as well as in name, that every man is free to worship one God or twenty Gods, or no God at all, as seems to him good, unlicensed, unquestioned, or take the consequences. We will no more submit to your authority than you will to that of the Pope."

This is the tone and these the terms in which these "No Popery" doctors will find, one of these days, their flocks addressing them; for we have only given words to what they know as well as we is the predominant feeling of the great majority of the Protestant people. The very means, in the present temper of the Protestant public, they must use to insure their success, cannot fail to prove their ruin. They will only hasten the issue they would evade. Deprived, as they now are, for the most part, of all *direct* aid from the civil power, the force of things is against them, and it matters little whether they attempt to move or sit still. They were mad enough in the beginning to take their stand on a movable foundation, and they must move on with it, or be left to balance themselves in vacuity; and if they do move on with it, they will simply arrive — nowhither. They are doomed, and they cannot escape. Hence it is all their motions affect us only as the writhings and death-throes of the serpent whose head is crushed.

Regarding it of the greatest importance that the whole matter should be brought to its true and proper issue, and believing firmly, that, when the real alternatives are distinctly apprehended and admitted, the majority of Protestants will choose "the better part," we are not displeased to witness the very decided tendency to Transcendentalism now manifesting itself throughout the Protestant world. It is a proof to us that the internal developments of Protestantism are not only bringing it to its

strictly logical termination, but, what is more important still, to the term of its existence. The nations which became Protestant rebelled against the God of their fathers, the God who had brought them up out of the bondage of ignorance, barbarism, idolatry, and superstition, and said they would not have him to reign over them, but they would henceforth be their own masters, and rule themselves. He, for wise and merciful, but inscrutable, purposes, gave them up to their reprobate sense, left them to themselves, to follow their own wills, till bitter experience should teach them their wickedness, their impiety, their folly and madness, and bring them in shame and confusion to pray, "O Lord, in thy wrath remember mercy; save us from ourselves, or we perish!" To this desirable result it was not to be expected they would come, till Protestantism had run its natural course, and reached its legitimate termination. They would not abandon it, till they had exhausted all its possibilities, and till it could no longer present a new face to charm or delude them. In this Transcendental tendency, we see the evidence that it has run or very nearly run its natural course, and in Transcendentalism reaches its termination, exhausts itself, and can go no farther; for there is no farther. Beyond Transcendentalism, in the same direction, there is no place. Transcendentalism is the last stage this side of NOWHERE; and when reached, we must hold up, or fly off into boundless vacuity. In its prevalence, then, we may trust we see the signs of a change near at hand; and any change must certainly be in a better direction.

We think, also, that we may go farther, and assert that the change has already commenced, that the hosts pressing onward have already begun to recoil, and are making efforts to face about. This is evinced in the eminent and very numerous conversions to Catholicity which are daily taking place in Germany, England, and this country. It is also indicated in the new tendencies we discover in old sects, and in the character of the new sects which spring up. The Free Kirk of Scotland, rabid as it is, is a sign, inasmuch as it seeks to free religion from the control of the civil power; Puseyism, as it is called, is also a sign, though in itself considered a very ridiculous affair, and as far removed from Catholicity as Parkerism itself, — but a sign, inasmuch as the temper from which it springs indicates a Catholic tendency, and a longing which will find no satisfaction out of the Catholic Church. There

are also truth and sagacity in the remark, made to us the other day by a Protestant minister of our acquaintance, that all the new movements in old sects, and all the new sects which arise, indicate a growing conviction of the insufficiency of the Bible when taken on the authority of private judgment, and the need of some divine authority back of it to vouch for it. Thus, the present rapid growth of Swedenborgianism is owing to the fact, that it pretends, in the *Memorabilia* of Swedenborg, to a divine authority logically antecedent to the Scriptures, from which their inspiration and sense may be concluded. So, also, we may add, Mormonism gains adherents by its departure from the Protestant rule of faith, and its pretension to a revelation more immediate, and therefore more ultimate, than the Scriptures. Everywhere there seems to be a growing distrust of the Protestant rule of faith, a growing conviction that it is idle to pretend to have divine authority in a book which is itself received as authoritative at all only on private reason.

We think, moreover, that in Transcendentalism itself, or rather in the Transcendental movement, we discover not only the logical and historical termination of the Protestant movement, but an incipient reaction against it. People who know Transcendentalism only from a distance are very likely to mistake the motives in which the more recent Transcendental movement originated, and the end it contemplated. The fathers of the movement had nothing less at heart than to favor incredulity or impiety. The movement, as they would themselves interpret it, originated in a reaction of the religious mind of the community against the open incredulity and impiety so prevalent during the latter half of the last century. Rationalism, which is not generically distinguishable from Transcendentalism, sprang up in Germany from the effort to refute, on Protestant principles, the writings of the English Deists, as Tindall, Toland, Chubb, Woolston, Collins, Morgan, &c. ; and the *Transcendental philosophy* itself was the result of Immanuel Kant's attempt to give a scientific reply to David Hume's skepticism. In France, the movement which was commenced by Bernardin St. Pierre, Madame de Staël, Benjamin Constant, and carried on by M. Royer Collard, M. Victor Cousin, Jouffroy, Saint Simon, Leroux, was decidedly a reaction against the Encyclopedists, the incredulity, materialism, and impiety of Voltaire, Diderot, Helvetius, D'Holbach, Volney, Destutt de Tracy, &c. In this country it was the same. The inspiration was partly indigenious, and partly caught from Germany and

France ; and the motive was to overturn the infidel philosophy, to cut off doubt in its source, and to obtain a solid and imperishable foundation for faith. In a word, what is technically called Transcendentalism may be said to have originated in the reaction against the incredulity and impiety which culminated in the French Revolution, and which caused such very general alarm for religious, social, and domestic order throughout the civilized world.

All sober and reflecting people felt the shock of the French Revolution. Some, believing the principles it developed, the incredulity and impiety which originated and marked it, to be the legitimate and inevitable consequences of the fundamental principle of the Protestant movement, abandoned the Protestant principle, and sought refuge in the Church. Others, among whom for a time were we ourselves, looked upon this as a weakness, as timidity, as despair, and held that the horrid infidelity which we in common with them deprecated had resulted, not from the Protestant principle itself, but from the fact, that Protestants had never fully accepted that principle, had never carried it out to its legitimate results, and presented the example of real freedom in religion. We, therefore, thought the remedy was to be found in protestantizing Protestantism, in pushing the principle of dissent to its farthest limit ; and we did not doubt, at the moment, that, if we plunged deeper into that principle, we should find an element of belief on which we could reconstruct the fabric of faith. This, in general, was the view taken by those who have latterly been distinguished as Transcendentalists ; and in motives such as these Transcendentalism, technically so called, originated.

In regard to Transcendentalism, we may be allowed to speak with some authority ; for, though we were never properly a Transcendentalist, and though we never entertained a single principle involving Transcendental consequences for one moment after we saw clearly that it involved such consequences, yet we did entertain and defend most of the leading principles of the Transcendental school, and were among the more prominent actors in the Transcendental movement in this country. We know, personally, that those with whom we acted, or who acted with us, had no disposition to disseminate doubt. We were generically Protestants ; we accepted in good faith the Protestant movement, and we confided in the principle of private judgment ; but we deplored the infidelity we everywhere encountered. It was our grief that the temple had been bat-

tered down, the altar overthrown, the Holy of Holies profaned, and the worship of the Most High suspended. How often have we and our more intimate friends, in those very days when our countrymen were everywhere denouncing us as disorganizers, infidels, seeking to destroy faith and abolish religious worship, mourned together over the desolations of Zion, and given vent to our earnest longings to see the waste places restored, the Church of God rise anew from its ruins, with more than its pristine beauty, symmetry, and glory, and the world once more able to say, "I believe"! We felt deeply that doubt is the death of all real life, that there is no living without faith; and our earnest desire, and our unremitting efforts, were to discover the means of its recovery. We owe this statement in justice to ourselves, and to those of our former friends who have not had the happiness of following us into the Church of God.

We all, in common, however we might divide on other questions, agreed that faith had died out, and religion exhausted itself. We knew this to be true of the Protestant world; we knew—for we had ample means of knowing—that the religion of Protestants was little better than make-believe. It had no vitality; it had no power over the life, no hold upon the conscience. And knowing this to be the case with the Protestant world, we concluded that it must be so, *a fortiori*, with the Catholic world. Of Catholicity we knew nothing. We did not believe all we heard said to its discredit; we did not entertain all the vulgar prejudices of Protestants against it; we held that it had been a great and noble institution in its day, which had rendered invaluable services to general civilization and humanity. But beholding it only through the uncertain light of Protestant travesty, misrepresentation, and denunciation, and the still more uncertain light of our own theorizing from *data* furnished by our Protestantism, we concluded that its time was past, that it had done its work, and could henceforth have no legitimate place among the institutions of mankind. It had, according to our theorizing, ceased to be in harmony with the general intelligence of the race, to respond to the wants of the soul, or to take the lead in any important measure for society. The race had found it no longer serviceable, no longer endurable,—had broken away from it, and must now pursue its march through the ages without it. It was no longer to be made any account of, and the Catholic populations were to be considered as if they were not. By their adherence to Catholicity they had withdrawn themselves from the general

law of development. The human race of to-day disowns them, leaves them behind, and recognizes herself only in the Protestant populations, in whom is all the real human life that is left in the world. The line beginning with Adam came down through the patriarchs, the Jewish people, and Jewish prophets, to Jesus Christ; and from him through the Apostles, Fathers, Popes, and doctors of the Church to the Reformers, and from them through the Protestant populations to us. We were the lineal descendants of the people of God, and had, therefore, no occasion to look from the Protestant world to the Gentiles beyond. Confining our views to the Protestant world, as in duty bound, since good Protestants we were, we assumed as our point of departure that there was really no vital religious faith to be found, and that the nations were living without faith, without hope, without charity, without God in the world. With this we were not and could not be satisfied. We felt something better was needed; we believed something better was possible; and we set ourselves to work, with what skill and strength we had, to realize something better. Here is how the writer of this expressed himself some twelve years ago:—

“All the great institutions of former times have been good in their day and in their places, and have had missions essential to the progress of humanity to accomplish. The Catholic institution, Catholicism, which still excites the wrath and indignation of many a religionist, as well as of many an unbeliever, was a noble institution in its time. It was a mighty advance on the paganism which preceded it. It was suited to the wants of the times in which it flourished, and we are indebted to it for the very light which has enabled us to discover its defects. Its vices—and they need not be disguised—appertain to the fact, that it has lingered beyond its hour. It now has, and long has had, only a factitious existence. Its work was long since done, its purpose accomplished, and it now only occupies the space which should be filled with another institution,—one which will combine all our discoveries and improvements, and be in harmony with the present state of mental and moral progress.

“Protestantism cannot be said to supply the place of Catholicism. *Protestantism is not a religion, is not a religious institution*, contains in itself no germ of organization. Its purpose was negative, one of destruction. It was born in the conflict raised up by the progress of mind against Catholicism, which had become superannuated. Its mission was legitimate, was necessary, was inevitable; but may we not ask if it be not accomplished? Catholicism is destroyed, or at least ready to disappear entirely as soon as a new principle of social and religious organization, capable of engaging

all minds and hearts, shall present itself. And this new principle will present itself. Men will not live always in a religious anarchy. The confusion of the transition-state, in which we now are, must end, and a new religious form be disclosed, which all will love and obey." *

The leading thought with the party with which we were ourselves associated was progress. We could, in the state to which Protestantism had reduced us, conceive no end for which man could exist but to perfect himself, or rather to be always perfecting himself (the Fourierists improve on this, and say his end is to perfect the globe and the universe), and we regarded every thing in its relation to this end. Adopting the doctrine of progress, we contended that all institutions should not only aid progress, but be themselves progressive; that, so long as progressive, any institution is true and sacred; and when fixed and stationary, the noblest institution becomes hurtful and wicked. Catholicity, we believed, had been, during its earlier period, progressive, and had marched with the race, gone on with the improvements of the age, and during that period it was truly and preëminently the Church of God; but, in process of time, it contracted, through some original vice inherent in its constitution, a fixed and stationary character, refusing to move, or to suffer its children to move. The Reformers saw this, rebelled against it, and broke away from its thralldom; but they established nothing in its place. The human race, however, advances only by means of institutions. A state of disorder, anarchy, dissolution, individualism, is a state, not of life, but of death. We cannot, then, accept the labors of the Reformers as final; as provisional, as preliminary to something hereafter to be, we esteem them, and regard them as sacred; but we must go beyond them, do what the Reformers did not, — organize a religion, found a religious institution, or a new church, which, while it contains the elements of order and authority, shall yet have the capability of indefinite expansion, of uninterrupted progress, by assimilating to itself whatever new thought, idea, discovery, or improvement, the race, or any portion of it, should suggest or bring forward.

Now here, if we mistake not, was a thought which went beyond Protestantism, and, in relation to it, a thought with its face

* *Christian Examiner*, Boston, Sept. 1834, pp. 66, 69. This extract shows that the writer, though well acquainted with Protestantism, totally misapprehended Catholicity.

turned backward, not forward. The type was in what had been, and not, as we supposed, in the future; and so it proved in our individual case. We struggled individually for this new church, which, as it was to have the power of indefinite progress, of realizing constantly a higher and a higher ideal, we called "The Church of Union and Progress," "The Church of the Ideal," and "The Church of the Future"; and perhaps should be struggling for it now, had we not, one day, through the grace of God, chanced to make two rather important discoveries in mechanics, — namely, that there can be no motion where there is nothing at rest, and that a man cannot, as we have often repeated, lift himself up by his own waistbands. Strange as it may seem, these two notable discoveries wrought a complete revolution in our whole mode of theorizing, nay, put a stop to our theorizing, once for all, and made us look, in our own eyes, exceedingly foolish. If no motion without rest, then our new church can aid progress only in so far as itself shall be immovable. If it is movable, the race cannot be progressive by it, but it must be progressive by the race, and the progress of the race will still be to be provided for. Then either our church will be worthless under the relation of progress, or it must itself be immovable, founded upon a rock, able to defy all the wrath of man and all the rage of hell. Wonder we did not think of that before. If a man cannot lift himself up by his own waistbands, then the church, which, if he constructs it, can have no power but what he gives it, that is, no power but his own, will have no power to lift him from the condition he is in at the moment of constructing it. Then no progress by means of a man-made church. Unity multiplied by unity is unity. Man multiplied by himself is only man. From man you can get only man. The church, then, can, at best, be only man projected, or taking himself as his own multiple. Do our best, then, we can get in the church only what we are out of it, that is, only ourselves; and as ourselves = ourselves, it is as plain as any thing in Daboll or Euclid, that we have with the church no power of progress which we have not without it. It is idle, then, to attempt to construct the new church. It must be constructed for us, and embody a power above ours, or it will avail nothing. Then the church, if it is to be at all, must be given us from above and be immovable; and if so given, all we have to do is to accept it and do what it bids us. Arrived here, what were we to do? Simply to ask whether Almighty God has abandoned us to our ignorance and utter helplessness,

or whether he has provided for our wants? Has he given us such a church? He has. Which is it? The Roman Catholic. Then seek admission into its communion. We did, — were admitted, — and found what we wanted, ready made to our hands, — considerably better, we are inclined to think, than we could have made it.

The great objection to the Transcendentalists is not in the motives by which they were governed, or the end they contemplated. They wished to get rid of infidelity, and to have a solid and imperishable basis for faith. But, born and bred in a Protestant community, they sought their end by means of the Protestant principle. Accepting the Protestant principle, they were obliged to accept the Protestant movement, and, accepting this, they were obliged to accept the infidel movement, which they all saw was part and parcel of the same. It is this fact that caused so much misapprehension in the public mind, and brought down upon them so much unmerited reproach. They believed infidelity, positively considered, the greatest of evils; but, provisionarily considered, it had been useful, inasmuch as it was not possible to attain to faith without passing through it. Voltaire and D'Holbach did but continue Luther and Calvin, and their incredulity was but an accident in their lives. The old Church was based on an external authority, which was wrong; or, if it was not wrong, the Reformers were unjustifiable in their revolt, and the glorious Reformation should be condemned and wept over, and not boasted. If the old Church was wrong, the new order must be founded on an internal, not an external, authority. The Reformers, however, while asserting this internal principle against Catholicity, had attempted to reorganize themselves on the principle of external authority, which was a double wrong; for it was to deny their own principle, and to accept what they held to be a false one. The French infidels, like the Reformers, broke away from Catholicity, but were too keen-sighted not to see the absurdity of Protestant communions affecting to be organized on the same principle. Nothing, then, remained for them but to reject all religion; for it was no gain to renounce the Pope, to come under the presbyter, — or the Church, to come under a Presbyterian Assembly, a Genevan Consistory, or Dutch Classis, or even the civil tyrant.

This provisional justification of infidelity was forced upon us by our Protestant principles, and the necessity we were in of vindicating the Reformers. There was no possible ground

on which we could justify Luther, and Melancthon, and Calvin in leaving the Catholic Church, which would not be equally available for Voltaire, Diderot, D'Alembert, and their associates and followers; and we could discover no possible reason any of them had or could have for separating from the communion of the Catholic Church, which would not be an equally strong reason for separating from any actually existing Protestant communion. If, as Protestantism taught us, the revolt of the Reformers sprang from what was good in them, and from what was bad in the Church, so did infidelity spring from what was good in the unbelievers, and from what was bad in the Church and the sects. If we accepted Protestantism as we did, we were obliged to lay down the maxim, that infidelity is a mark of love of truth and virtue, not of vice and error. Protestantism, not we, was answerable for this abominable maxim.

But, if we accepted infidelity as a necessary phase in the development of modern society, it was only to make an end of it. The first effort was to vindicate the Reformation, and to place ourselves in harmony with its principles, and then to derive from it the advantages we supposed it must conceal. But in this second labor there was, on all hands, an unconscious reaction against the very principle of the Reformation. We were all after faith, — in we knew not what, but still faith, — the power to affirm something, and something which belongs to the unseen world of spirit. We wished to attain to an affirmation that should be valid not only for us as individuals, but for all men and for all times, — something certain, absolute, which no one of a sane mind could question. This already concealed a revolt against the Protestant principle, for it was an aspiration to a catholic faith. But this affirmation could not be made on an individual authority. All felt and acknowledged it. A plain reaction this. But on what authority can it be made? Evidently only on a catholic or universal authority, — an authority common to all individuals and independent of all. So all said. But what and where is this authority? We had all renounced all external authority, and therefore were obliged to seek it in the individual; and in the individual we sought it, thinking to find in the individual what is not individual; and we thought we did find it in the Impersonal Reason, as we and the Eclectics said after M. Cousin, — in the Impersonal Nature, as said the Transcendentalists proper. All that we and our immediate friends said of the "Impersonal or Objective Reason," of "Spontaneity," and all that Mr. Emerson and his friends and disciples

said of "Impersonal Nature," "Instinct," "Over-soul," the "One Man in all Men," was only so much theorizing in favor of an authority not individual, but catholic. It matters nothing to our present purpose that in this way we did not and could not get any thing but an individual authority, as is unquestionably true; it is enough for argument that there was an effort to get something more; for every such effort is manifestly an incipient reaction against the Protestant principle.

Transcendentalism has just now in this community changed its phase. It now assumes the form of Fourierism. In Fourierism this incipient reaction is still more manifest. Its publications boldly denounce the Protestant principle, and carry their hostility to individualism so far as to annihilate the individual altogether. They even talk of unity and catholicity, — explaining the terms, however, in a very uncatholic sense. Yet all this is a sign. It shows a reaction is going on against Protestantism, where, at first thought, we should least expect it, and where, as a matter of fact, Protestantism appears in its most hideous forms. The whole body of your come-outers and socialists are, in their own way, protesters against Protestantism, and, at bottom, seekers after something which is catholic, which is one, and not individual and multiple. We say, then, again, there is in this Transcendental movement not only a tendency to carry out Protestantism to its legitimate consequences, but the commencement of a movement in an opposite direction; and therefore we look upon the movement as an indication, a sign, that Protestantism approaches the term of its existence.

We have no occasion, at present, to point out the mistakes the Transcendentalists, under one form or another, fall into. We have already pointed out their mother mistake, that of supposing the institutions which are requisite for our redemption are to be created or can be created by man himself. We showed this is out of the question, in our Essay, *No Church, No Reform*, in our Review for April, 1844. The Church was instituted by Almighty God, and has never ceased to be in the world one moment since the fall of man, and redemption, in every sense desirable, is certain by obedience to it. The other grand mistake is in supposing that any *internal* authority can be a *catholic* authority; since what is internal must be taken on the authority of the individual reason, and therefore is only the authority of the individual reason. It must, then, be external, or not at all. If external, it must have a divinely prepared

embodiment or representation, or it will be tyranny. A catholic authority built up by man, as the Fourierists propose, even were it possible, would be the most oppressive tyranny imaginable. All who, outside of the Church, aspire to unity or catholicity doom themselves to endless contradictions and perpetual defeats. So far as they aspire to unity and catholicity we rejoice, because the aspiration may lead them one day to the Church; so far as they so aspire out of the Church, and to a unity or catholicity which is to rival hers — we remember our own madness and folly a short time since, and check the utterance of the words which press upon our lips. Yet we must tell them, and we do it in no spirit of exultation, that they labor in vain. Nothing they can do will prosper. They will not believe us now. When we spoke to them from the weakness and ignorance of our own heart, they listened, they believed. Now, when we speak to them, not our own feeble words, not our own darkened wisdom, but the words which have come to us from above, words as true as that God exists, they will not believe us, and we speak but to the winds. O, would to God that they could but know the experience of a Catholic for one hour! O, would they could but for one moment behold the immaculate Spouse of the Lamb, that dear Mother of the faithful, as she looks in her maternal affection on her children! The hardest heart would melt, the most skeptical would believe. O God, must so many souls, for whom thou hast died, be lost? Must that terrible agony thou didst suffer in the garden be constantly renewed each day to the end of the world? O, are we men with hearts, and yet indifferent? Hast thou done all, suffered all, given thyself, to win our love, and we will not give thee our hearts? But let it be as thou wilt. We tell our Transcendental friends that what they crave and seek they may find in the Church, and can find nowhere else. May God give them grace to seek and find. They will do it, many of them, we hope, and the ravages of sin, of heresy, and schism finally be checked, and, in some degree, repaired. For such a result we can all pray, if we can do nothing else; and the faithful need not be informed that prayer does more for the conversion of the world than argument.

ART. V. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *Poverty and the Baronet's Family*: a Catholic Novel. By the late HENRY DIGBY BESTE, Esq. Philadelphia: Wm. J. Cunningham. 1846. 12mo. pp. 287.

Of the author of this book we know nothing except what we learn from the book itself. From a short biographical notice prefixed to the story, it would seem that he was an Englishman, educated at Oxford, and, for a time, a minister of the English Church; that he subsequently became a Catholic, devoted the remainder of his life to the cause of Catholicity, and finally died in 1836, hoping in the mercy of God as "*the reward of an honest life.*" The book itself bears very strong evidence of having been, in part, at least, written by one born on the other side of St. George's Channel, and some eight or nine years after the death of its reputed author. Whether Mr. Beste is a real or fictitious person we know not; and whether the work was really written by him, or by some one in his name, or whether it has been simply compiled by some nameless editor from papers left by him, is more than we know; but if this last, we hope the editor will be more explicit in his next edition, and give us some means of distinguishing what belongs to him and what to the author. It is just as easy to make a straight-forward statement as a circuitous one, and we demand clear and honest statements in a Catholic work. The novel itself we have read with much interest. It is written with life and earnestness, with great truth to nature, and many of its scenes are marked by a high order of genius. Most of the characters are admirably drawn and well sustained, the various incidents of the narrative fall in naturally, and the general grouping, if we may so express ourselves, betokens very respectable artistic skill. The moral intended to be inculcated by the novel is excellent. The author has wished to do justice to the virtues of the humbler classes of society, and to show us that all which is really valuable in human character, all that is really desirable in human life, may be found in the hovel of poverty as well as in the palace of wealth. Lady Foxglove may well envy Albert O'Meara's poor widow. He also aims to enlist our sympathies, and to confirm our respect, for the Irish peasantry, by describing their labors, their trials, their privations, their generous sentiments, their self-denial, and, above all, their simple, unaffected piety, and to teach us that the best service we can render them is voluntarily to share with them their lot in life. All this is excellent, and in the very spirit of our holy religion. We raise the poor, not by making them rich, not by changing their external condition, but by becoming poor, and willingly sharing their labors and privations. The cultivated and noble Bryan O'Meara, living the life of the poor cotter, and mingling on equal terms with his poor countrymen, and seeking, by his intelligence, his refinement, his virtues, his piety, to honor the peasant's calling, is a lesson of immense value. It is, in our degree, imitating the sublime example of Him "who for our sakes became poor."

But, unhappily, the author does not continue true to his first thought. The Christian soon loses himself in the man of the world. His hero soon sinks from the Christian hero into the revolutionist. While we thought he was voluntarily placing himself on a level with his countrymen, and

seeking to alleviate their labors and sufferings by sharing them with them, we find he was organizing them for a political movement against the existing government, and placing himself at the head of the *conjurati*. Here is a fall from heaven to earth, and a complete abandonment of the sublime morality with which the work commences.

Having once fallen to the earth, the author cannot rise again to heaven. His peasant must no longer be a peasant. He must be a nobleman, the heir of a princely estate, and marry a baronet's daughter. Bah! Bryan O'Meara, as the peasant, placed by his superior education and refinement, and the munificence of the friends he had won, above his order, and yet voluntarily consenting to remain a peasant, and to limit his ambition to what he can do without going out of his order, content to labor and suffer here, looking only to the reward hereafter, is a character we love to contemplate, for it recalls the heroic virtues of the saints. But Bryan become *the* O'Meara, the possessor of a princely estate, the husband of Sir Cecil Foxglove's daughter, sinks into the class of ordinary mortals, and we have henceforth no more interest in him than we have in My Lord This or My Lord That. If we were to hazard a conjecture, we should say the first part of the story was written by one hand, with one design, and the last part by another hand, with quite another design; — the first part by a Catholic, the last part by some one who thinks true wisdom is to make sure of this world, and leave to Providence the care of that which is to come.

The true Catholic Christian is indifferent to the vain distinctions of this world. Sin reduces and grace elevates all to the same level. All are to be judged by the same law, the prince and the peasant, the lord and his serf, the master and his slave. Where distinctions of rank exist, the Catholic leaves them to exist, for he is too indifferent to them to seek to remove them; and where they do not exist, he does not seek to introduce them, for he knows they are worthless. Before God he knows the master has no preëminence over his slave, and he has learned that heaven lies as near to the lowly cottage as to the lordly mansion. Rank and wealth are of no avail, if the possessor is not elevated by grace to the heirship of heaven; and poverty and want of rank are no evil to him who, through grace, is made a joint heir of all things with the Son of God. He thus is contented with his state in life, whatever it be, and seeks to elevate the condition of all, not by obliterating distinctions, not by changing the external order of things, but by doing his best to bring all to the love and practice of the true religion, and by inducing all, as far as in him lies, to look beyond this short pilgrimage, beyond this vale of tears, to the Holy City, to the eternal heavens, our true home, where alone are to be found treasures worth the seeking.

2. — *Zenosius; or the Pilgrim Convert.* By REV. C. C. PISE, D. D.
New York: Edward Dunigan. 1845. 18mo. pp. 279.

MR. DUNIGAN is one of our most liberal, enterprising, and meritorious publishers. His publications are all sent out in a neat and chaste style, and some of them are fine specimens of the typographic art. The work before us is the first number of a series of publications he is issuing from

time to time, under the general title of "Dunigan's Home Library." It needs no recommendation from us. Its author is an accomplished scholar, a graceful and classical writer, with a rich and fervid imagination, and an earnest and unostentatious piety. Few men among us labor more diligently or successfully to furnish the Catholic public with pleasant and profitable reading, or to create and extend a pure and elevated literary taste. The general plan of *Zenosius* is excellent, and, if the author had allowed himself sufficient space to fill it up, it would have been a work of great and permanent value. It is well adapted to its purpose as it is, but it might have been made to answer a much higher purpose. Yet it may be wrong to say so. In the present state of the public taste, perhaps there is no greater service that we can render our Catholic community than to furnish works adapted to general reading, especially to the capacities and wants of the mass, who will not read elaborate treatises, or works which treat their subjects in any other than a light, graceful, and popular manner. We have no alternative, but either to furnish them with a class of works of our own, adapted to their actual wants, or to leave them to be corrupted by the light, superficial, mischievous literature which is constantly issuing from the Protestant press. What at first, then, we might be disposed to censure in Dr. Pise as a defect, we may, perhaps, upon second thought, find reason to commend as a merit.

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3. — *The Bible against Protestantism.* By the RT. REV. DR. SRIEL. Boston: Thomas Swaney. 1846. 12mo. pp. 296.

THIS is an American reprint of a work by an Irish prelate, if we have been rightly informed, and of a work which has been highly esteemed. Its design is to show that the Bible is against Protestantism and in strict accordance with Catholicity. It is written in the form of a conference between three brothers, one a Catholic, one an Episcopalian, and the other a Presbyterian. It is a work of much solid merit, and is a good reply to those Protestants who are so strongly addicted to Bibliolatry. It is very handsomely printed, and is sold at a reasonable price. We trust it finds a ready and extensive sale.

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4. — *Father Felix: a Tale.* By the Author of "Mora Carmody," &c. &c. *Tears on the Diadem; or the Crown and Cloister.* A Tale of the White and Red Roses. By MRS. ANNA H. DORSEY.

THESE two little volumes make Nos. 2 and 3 of *Dunigan's Home Library*, but may be purchased separately. They perhaps are all we could ask them to be. The fault we find with them is, that, though they have a Catholic costume and inculcate some Catholic doctrines, they have too many affinities with the spirit of Protestant novels and romances, and tend rather to feed a sickly sentimentalism than to nourish a robust piety. If we are to have romances, we must be on our guard against copying Prot-

estant models. The formal Catholic teaching they may contain will avail little, if the tone and temper be Anticatholic. Romance deals with the passions and tends directly to strengthen them, and therefore to defeat the aims of our holy religion. Romance and novel readers are a helpless race of mortals, always discontented, imagining themselves in a false position, that nobody understands them, and that all things are against them. They are thrown open to every temptation, and unfitted for resistance. We must be exceedingly cautious, then, if we write works of fiction, that their temper, their inner soul, be sound and healthy, that they breathe the spirit of enlightened and solid piety, of heaven, not of earth. The best models to be studied we are acquainted with are the exquisite tales of Canon Schmidt. We never read one of these but we feel armed for the spiritual combat, and strengthened to fight manfully against our spiritual enemies.

5. — *St. Augustine's Confessions or Praises of God.* In Ten Books. Newly translated into English from the Original Latin. New York and Boston: D. & J. Sadlier. 1846. 18mo. pp. 381.

THIS work is too well known to require any farther notice than the simple announcement, that a new edition of it is published, and may be obtained of Messrs. Sadlier, at their bookstores in New York and in this city, where, we are pleased to learn, they have recently opened a branch of their establishment.

6. — *A Short Treatise on Prayer, adapted to all Classes of Christians.* From the Italian of ST. ALPHONSUS LIGUORI. Baltimore: F. Lucas, Jr. 1846. 32mo. pp. 205.

LET every one who desires to advance in Christian perfection buy, read, and study this invaluable little treatise on prayer, which its sainted author preferred to all his other works.

7. — *The Way of Salvation; or Meditations for every Day in the Year.* From the Italian of ST. ALPHONSUS LIGUORI, by REV. JAMES JONES. Baltimore: F. Lucas, Jr. 1846. 32mo. pp. 409.

A PIOUS book, and admirably adapted to aid the growth of piety in those who use it.

8. — *The Ursuline Manual.* New York: Edward Dunigan. *The Flowers of Piety.* New York: by the same. 1845.

THESE two prayer-books are too well known and too highly appreciated to stand in need of any notice. We mention them for the beautiful man-

ner in which they are got up, and for the excellence of their illustrations. The illuminated edition of the first compares favorably with the very best issues from the American press. The second is illustrated with original designs by Chapman.

9. — *The Pious Guide to Prayer and Devotion.* Baltimore: F. Lucas, jr.

A VERY good little manual of piety and devotion, which many individuals will find peculiarly adapted to their peculiar spiritual tastes and devotional exercises.

10. — *Sparks's American Biography*, Nos. VII., VIII., IX. Boston: Little & Brown. 1846.

WE have been trying for some time to find space to notice these volumes at length, but other matters have pressed, and we have been obliged to postpone the fulfilment of our intention. Happily, the reputation of the work stands in no need of a lift from us. As *American biography*, we feel a deep interest in the series, and with the patriotic tone of the work we fully sympathize. We believe the writers aim to be impartial and exact, and we have no great reason to complain of them. The lives which will most interest our Catholic countrymen are those of Father Rale, by Dr. Francis, of Cambridge, and Leonard Calvert, by Mr. Burnap, of Baltimore. The latter, we believe, is acceptable to our Maryland friends; the former appears to have been written with honest intentions, but is not unfrequently inexact in its statements, and inconclusive in its reasonings.

11. — *Martyria: A Legend, wherein are contained Homilies, Conversations, and Incidents of the reign of Edward the Sixth.* By WILLIAM MOUNTFORD, Clerk. First American Edition, with an Introduction. Boston: Crosby & Nichols. 1846. 16mo. pp. 328.

THIS work is by a Unitarian, and is designed to show that the Unitarian heresy was not unknown or insignificant in the early days of the Protestant Reformation, — a fact we are far from disputing. The work is written with some ability, and its author has studied the epoch of which he treats, under certain aspects, with more success than most of his Protestant brethren have done. We of course have no sympathy with the peculiar views of the author, and can but smile at his allusions to Catholicity; yet we regard his work as not uninteresting. It is well adapted to teach those Protestants who deny the Christian name to Unitarians, that they do so at their own expense. We see no reason why the Unitarian has not as much right to claim the Christian name as has the Lutheran or the Calvinist. He has only travelled a little farther in the direction all Protestants take, and is in reality a little more consistent with himself. The pretensions of Calvinists and Lutherans and Anglicans to orthodoxy are ridiculous, and their claim to treat those who dissent from them as heretics or schismatics is quite laughable. They are all

alike out of the ark, and, though one may stand on a higher hill than another, it avails nothing; for the floods that come cover the tops of even the highest mountains, and those on the hills will be swept away by the deluge as well as those in the lowest valleys. When all are involved in the same sin, none should call one another naughty names. No matter how the Protestant world divides and subdivides, they are all in the same category; and unless divine grace brings them into the Church, they must all share the same eternal destiny.

12. — *Historical Sketch of the Second War between the United States of America and Great Britain, declared by Act of Congress, the 18th of June, 1812, and concluded by Peace, the 15th of February, 1815.* By CHARLES J. INGERSOLL. In three volumes. Vol. I. Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard, 1845. 8vo. pp. 508.

PHILADELPHIA appears to be a doomed city. Its calamities of late have come neither seldom nor singly. It had first to bear the terrible calamity of its *financiering*; and then came riot, murder, and sacrilege; and now comes Ingersoll's *Historical Sketch of the War*. Unkind Charles Jared Ingersoll! Had not thy native city suffered enough already? Was she not sufficiently bowed down by her misfortunes, and afflicted by her sons, but thou, too, whom she had honorably distinguished, must throw thy *Historical Sketch* upon her overloaded back? *Et tu, Brute!* It is too bad, altogether too bad; and if Mr. Ingersoll has one spark of humanity not unextinguished, if he have any the least regard for his native city left, he will stop with this first volume, and publish no more. For his own sake we do not ask him to desist; but, for the sake of his native city, which we hope to see outgrow the disgrace which now rests upon her, and which she may outgrow, we beg him to proceed no farther, but to be content with the laurels he is winning as a statesman and legislator. Of his book we have nothing more to say.

13. — *Festus, a Poem.* By P. J. BAILEY. First American Edition. Boston: B. B. Mussey. 1845. 16mo. pp. 412.

WE are late in noticing this book, which we received in due time from the publisher. The poem has been much praised in quarters where praise was hardly to be expected; and perhaps no poem has appeared in our language, for some time, that has really been received with more favor. It must be confessed that the author does not want poetic feeling or talent, and he may have even fancied that he was writing with an honest purpose. There are passages in the work which even we cannot help admiring for their vigor, beauty, and truth to nature; yet, as a whole, we condemn, in the strongest terms we are master of, this much lauded poem. It is a work which should never be opened by one who loves God or man, or has any respect for himself. Genius is never respectable, when enlisted in the service of error and immorality. Moreover, while admitting the author's genius, we must say we have found his work as a whole exceedingly dull, and void of interest. It has all that is objectionable in *Faust*, and that is contemptible in the *Lakists*.

14. — *The Belfry of Bruges, and other Poems.* By H. W. LONGFELLOW. Cambridge: John Owen. 1846. 16mo. pp. 151.

We plead guilty to no slight neglect of the current literature of our Protestant countrymen. This neglect is not owing to any diminution of American feeling, nor to a growing indifference to American literature; but mainly to the fact, that our conversion to Catholicity has induced us to change our Journal, in the main, from a general to a special Review. The great theological questions with which we have had to deal, involving, as they do, man's highest and permanent interests, necessarily take precedence of all purely literary matters, however attractive to the mere scholar, or to the man of taste and leisure. We by no means give in to the notion, that the Catholic Church in this country is a foreign church, and that, by uniting ourselves with it, we, in some measure, expatriate ourselves; but it is true, that, in a country like this, in which the Protestant is the dominant party, and Catholics are in a small minority, and, for the most part, belong to the laboring classes, one, by becoming a Catholic, does, to some extent, necessarily separate himself from his Protestant countrymen, and is obliged to take a less active part in what more immediately concerns them. The literature of our country is a matter of deep interest to us, but as a Catholic we are unable to regard with much favor the literary productions of Protestants. We cannot commend them to our Catholic readers, and to censure them is of little use to our Protestant readers. Catholic life and Protestant life lie necessarily far apart, and there cannot be that mutual interchange of thought and feelings, that giving and taking, which there may be between one Protestant denomination and another. All Protestant denominations belong to one and the same family; Catholics are of another family. Catholicity can hold no divided empire with Protestantism. She will be all, or nothing. She is complete in herself, and has nothing to borrow of another.

But because this is so, it does not follow that we are less patriotic or less American in our feelings than are our Protestant countrymen. The honor, prosperity, and glory of our country are as dear to us as to them, and we trust in any hour of trial we shall always be found as ready and willing to sacrifice on the altar of our country as they are. We feel as deep an interest in the creation of a truly American literature as they do or can. But we feel very sure that true American literature will be the product, not of Protestant, but of Catholic America. It is true, we, as Catholics, are at present a small minority of our countrymen, and are likely to continue so for some time to come; but we are the largest compact body in the country, and are sufficiently numerous already for all the purposes of a national literature. We have only to wait a few years, till our colleges and universities send out their thousands of scholars, to have really a larger homogeneous public than any Protestant can command; and when that is the case, the literature of the country will be in our hands. Then the world will see, taking its rank among the literatures of nations, an American literature, a truly Christian literature, free, rich, pure, and noble, worthy of the glorious destinies of the Republic. We are, therefore, content to leave the Protestant literature to take its course, and to confine our labors and our hopes to Catholic America, — the real America for us, the only America which has the promise of the future.

But we are forgetting Mr. Longfellow and his beautifully printed little volume of poems. Mr. Longfellow is one of our most popular poets, and

he certainly possesses a good share of poetic feeling, and more than ordinary skill in versification. He has uncommon command of the language of poetry, and is exceedingly choice in his diction. Some of his translations are exquisite. But, nevertheless, he is no poet, in the higher sense of the term. He has a sort of dreamy, sentimental merit, and recalls the idle days of our youth, when we lay stretched out at length under the old birchen tree, and listened, half asleep, half awake, to the cat-bird and the neighbouring brook. He does not strengthen us for the active duties of life, arm us for the spiritual combat, or kindle our devotion. Yet, if we find not much to admire in his verses, we find still less to censure. He seldom offends against taste or morals. In the volume before us, the poems which have pleased us best are, "The Norman Baron," p. 36, "The Day is Done," p. 77, and "The Old Clock on the Stairs," p. 96. "The Sonnets" we have not read, for, notwithstanding Wordsworth's admonition, we do "scorn the Sonnet"—in English.

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- 15.—PUBLICATIONS OF THE METROPOLITAN PRESS, BALTIMORE.—1. *Lives of the Saints*. By ALBAN BUTLER. 2. *Mitner's End of Religious Controversy*. 3. *Catholic Christian instructed*. By the RT. REV. DR. CHALLONER. 4. *The Poor Man's Catechism*. By JOHN MANNOCK, O. S. B. 5. *Life of St. Vincent of Paul*. From the French of M. COLLET. 6. *Modern History, from the Coming of Christ, &c.* By PETER FREDET, D. D. 7. *Models of English Literature*. 8. *English Reading Lessons*. 9. *Gems of Devotion*. 10. *Think Well On 't*. By BISHOP CHALLONER. 11. *The Cross in its True Light*. By J. P. PINAMONTI, S. J. 12. *Spiritual Combat*.

We have received these, and two or three other publications, from the Metropolitan Press connected with St. Mary's College, Baltimore. They are nearly all well known and standard works, and deserve mention at this time chiefly in praise of the laudable efforts of the conductors of that press to furnish the Catholic public with publications at a less unreasonable price than has heretofore been charged for Catholic books.

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- 16.—*Life of St. Vincent de Paul, Founder of the Congregation of the Mission and of the Sisters of Charity*. By M. COLLET, Priest of the Mission. From the French, by a Catholic Clergyman. Baltimore: Metropolitan Press. 1845. 12mo. pp. 346.

We have already enumerated this work among the publications of the Metropolitan Press, but it deserves a separate notice. It is an admirably written life of a great saint, and should be in the hands of every man, woman, and child that knows how to read. The translation appears to be made with uncommon skill, and to preserve the freedom, simplicity, and unction of the original. Here and there we detect the foreigner in the translator, and, in two or three instances, he so far mistakes the English idiom as to say precisely the reverse of what he intends. The corrector of the press has also suffered rather more errors to escape his notice than are pardonable. Nevertheless, the book is excellent, and we know not

when we have read any thing so deeply interesting, or better adapted to make one feel how far short he falls of that charity which loves God supremely and exclusively, and his neighbour as himself for the sake of God. It is almost incredible how much good a single poor priest of the living God may effect.

17. — *Poverty; its Legal Causes, and Legal Cure.* Part I. By LYSGANDER SPOONER. Boston: Bela Marsh. 1846. 8vo. pp. 108.

MR. SPOONER is a man who has taken some pains to win notoriety. He has here devised a plan, which, if adopted, would cure all evils, past, present, and to come. The work really indicates some ability and a good deal of hard thinking, but the author's labor is worse than thrown away. He wants to cure poverty, and imagines that he has hit upon a plan by which it may be done. Now, we, for our part, do not believe poverty can be cured; and, moreover, we do not wish it to be cured, for we do not believe that poverty is an evil. One, in whose word we believe, but in which Mr. Spooner does not, for he rejects Christianity openly and publicly, has said, "The poor ye have always with you," and "Blessed are the poor." The evil is not in poverty, but in the spirit with which it is regarded and borne. When submitted to as a penance, it is a great blessing, and the poor are nearer heaven than the rich. If you would cure the evils of poverty, study to cure worldly-mindedness, to wean men's affections from this world, from the low and transitory goods of time, and to place them on things above. Restore the belief, the love, and the practice of Christianity, and poverty will cease to be an evil; men will turn their backs on riches and honors, and voluntarily seek it. All the remedies you seek outside of religion will only aggravate the disease, and redound to your shame. Would you reform society? Go, then, and study at the foot of the cross, and learn to trample the world beneath your feet.

* * * The article in defence of the Jesuits, promised for this number of our Review, is necessarily crowded out by the unexpected length of the first article in the number. It will appear in the number for October.

We observe that editors, in referring to articles which appear in this Journal, almost always refer to the editor personally. This is complimentary to the editor, but is unjust to his contributors. The whole of the first and second volumes, with the exception of two articles translated from the French, and two poetical contributions, were from the pen of the editor. But it is unsafe now to conclude from the fact that an article appears in this Review that Mr. Brownson is the writer, for it may turn out that it is not by him, but by an eminent prelate, or a distinguished divine of the Church. In the last number of the Review, for instance, out of five articles, only two were by the editor. The Review must henceforth be regarded as an impersonality, not as the special organ of an individual. It is designed to be a thoroughly Catholic Review, and whatever may be inserted incompatible with the judgment of the Church we condemn and repudiate in advance. On political and other matters, not of faith, the editor is, however, to be held solely responsible for whatever may appear in his pages.

BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1846.

ART. I. — *A Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion.*
By THEODORE PARKER. Boston: Little & Brown.
1842. 8vo. pp. 504.

IN the analysis we gave, in our Review for last year, of the teaching of Transcendentalists, we reduced that teaching to three fundamental propositions, namely: — 1. Man is the measure of truth and goodness; 2. Religion is a fact or principle of human nature; 3. All religious institutions, which have been or are, have their principle and cause in human nature. We disposed of the first proposition in the number for July, 1845, and of the second in the number for the October following. There remains for us now to consider and dispose of only the third and last.

After what we established in our Review for last July, it is evident that Transcendentalism is virtually the ground on which the enemies of the Church, generally, are rallying and endeavouring to make a stand, and the ground on which they are to be met and vanquished. Protestantism, as set forth by the early Reformers, is virtually no more. It yielded to the well directed blows of Bossuet, and other Catholic divines, in the seventeenth century. But its spirit was not extinguished. It survived, and, in the beginning of the eighteenth century, reappeared in England under the form of infidelity, or the denial of all supernatural revelation from God to men; and, by the aid of Voltaire, Rousseau, and other French *philosophes*, soon passed into France and Germany, and, to no inconsiderable extent, penetrated even into Italy and Spain. Forced to abandon the form with which it had been clothed by Luther and Calvin, and their associates, it found it could subsist and maintain its influence only by falling back on natural religion, and finally, on

no religion. But this did not long avail it. The world protested against incredulity, and the human race would not consent to regard itself as a "child without a sire," condemned to eternal orphanage. Either Protestantism must assume the semblance at least of religion, or yield up the race once more to Catholicity. But the latter alternative was more than could be expected of human pride and human weakness. The Reform party could not willingly forego all their dreams of human perfectibility, "the march of mind," "the progress of the species," the realization of what they called "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," which they had emblazoned on their banners, and in the name of which they had established the Reign of Terror, and drenched Europe in her noblest and richest blood. To abandon these glorious dreams, these sublime hopes, to bow down their lofty heads before priests and monks, to sheathe the sword and embrace the cross, to give up the Age of Reason, and readmit the Age of Faith, was a sacrifice too great for poor human nature. Yet what other alternative was left? The race demanded a religion, — would have some kind of faith and worship. To stand on open, avowed infidel ground was impossible. To return to the elder Protestantism was also impossible, for that had ceased to exist; and if it had not, a return to it would have been only subjecting itself anew to the necessity of going farther, and reuniting with Rome, or of falling back once more on deism, and then on atheism. It must, then, either vanish in thin air, or invent some new form of error, which, in appearance at least, should be neither the Protestantism of the sixteenth century nor the unbelief of the eighteenth. The last hope of the party was in the invention of this new form. Germany, mother of the Reformation, saw the extremities to which it was reduced, and charged herself with conceiving and bringing it forth, as sin conceives and brings forth death. The period of gestation was brief; the child was forthwith ushered into the world. France applauded; young America hurraed; and even Old England pricked up her ears, and calculated the practical advantages she might derive from adopting the bantling.

The bantling is named Transcendentalism, and not inappropriately. The name defines the thing. The Reform party found itself compelled to avoid in appearance alike the younger infidelity and the older Protestantism, and both without any advance towards Catholicity. It must neither assert nor deny revelation, and yet must do both in the same breath; it must

be a believer to the believer, an unbeliever to the unbeliever ; appear to the Christian to assert the supernatural order, to the infidel to admit only the natural order ; and thus reconcile all repugnances, harmonize all discords, and lay the firm and imperishable foundation of "union and progress." The task was, no doubt, difficult and delicate ; but life or death was at stake ; and the Reform party showed itself equal to the emergency. It boldly faced the difficulty, and solved it, in general terms, by asserting that the soul is furnished with a Transcendental faculty, or power which transcends the senses and intellect, and places us in immediate relation with the world of spirit, as the senses do with the world of matter. This faculty receives various names, but all agree in asserting its reality ; some call it instinct, some spontaneity, some consciousness, some the divine in the human, and others reason, distinguishing, or attempting to distinguish, between reason and understanding. These last suppose understanding to be in the centre of the human subject ; on one side the five senses, through which the material world flows into it, — and on the other, reason, through which flows in the spiritual world, or world of absolute and necessary truth. But, as all admit the reality of a faculty transcending the understanding and senses, however diversely named or defined, they are all denominated Transcendentalists, and their doctrine, Transcendentalism, — that is, a doctrine founded on that which transcends or surpasses sense and understanding.

According to Mr. Parker, this Transcendental faculty is a sort of pipe, or conduit, through which the Divinity flows naturally into the human soul. The soul has a double set of faculties, one set on each side. Each at the terminus is furnished with a valve, which the soul opens and shuts at will. If it opens one set, the external world flows in, and it lives a purely material or animal life ; if the other, the Divinity flows in, it becomes filled to its capacity with God, and lives a divine life. As the pipe or conduit through which the Divinity is let in is a natural endowment essential to the soul, and as we open or close its valve, and let in or shut out God at will, the "supply of God" obtained is said to be obtained *naturally*, and as it is really God who runs in and fills the soul, the influx is said to be *divine*, or *divine* inspiration. As it is of God, and received through a natural inlet in a natural manner, it is *natural* inspiration, and distinguishable, on the one hand, from the mere light of nature, and on the other, from *SUPERNATURAL*

inspiration, and may be termed, if you will, natural supernaturalism, natural spiritualism, or "the natural *religious* view."

Religious institutions are constructed by the human intellect and passions, on the ideas of God furnished the soul through this natural channel. They are the more or less successful efforts of men to realize outwardly as well as inwardly the ideas and sentiments of God, of spirit, of the true, permanent, eternal, and absolute, which are supplied by this natural influx of God. Considered in their idea and sentiment, all religious institutions are true, sacred, divine, immutable, and eternal; but considered solely as institutions, they are human, partial, incomplete, variable, and transitory. They may even, as institutions, in relation to their time and place, when they are in harmony with the actual intelligence of the race and respond to the actual wants of the soul, be useful and legitimate. They spring from, at least are occasioned by, what is purest and best in the human soul, and do, then, really embody its highest conceptions of what is highest and holiest.

" Out from the heart of nature rolled
The burdens of the Bible old ;
And the litanies of nations came,
Like the volcano's tongue of flame,
Up from the burning core below, —
The canticles of love and woe."

It is not necessary to denounce the race for having formed to itself religious institutions, nor even to denounce religious institutions themselves, regarded in relation to their legitimate time and place. We should rather view them with indulgence and seek to explain them, to ascertain their real significance, the great and eternal ideas they are intended to symbolize. It is foolish, for instance, to unite with the unbelievers of the last century in their denunciations of the Bible. We should accept the sacred books of Christians; ay, and of all nations, — the Veda, the Zendavesta, the writings of Confucius, the Koran, and the Book of Mormon. All are the sincere and earnest efforts of the soul to utter the Divinity with which it is filled, and each in its degree, and after its manner, is authentic Scripture. Every sincere utterance of an earnest soul is a divine word; for every sincere soul is filled with God, burns with an elemental fire, and is big with a divine message. Hence the worth of sincere souls; hence the importance of studying individualities, what is peculiar, exceptional, without regard to what is common to men in general. If you are a true man,

you can make me a new revelation of God. What can you tell me? Under what new and peculiar phase can you show me the Universal Being? In what new tone are you able to speak?

As all religious institutions have a common origin in the soul, and do, in their degree and after their manner, shadow forth the same idea and sentiment, they are all, as to their idea and sentiment, identical. Mumbo-Jumbo of the African, or Manitou of the North American savage, is, at bottom, the true God, as much as the Zeus of the Greeks, the Jupiter of the Romans, — and either of these as much as the Jehovah of the Jews, or God the Father of the Christians. One or another is nothing but the form with which, in different ages and in different nations, men cloth the eternal and immutable idea of the Highest and Best, which is the same in all ages and nations and in all individuals. The difference is all in the form; there is none in the idea. Mumbo-Jumbo is to the African all the Father is to the Christian; save that he marks a lower stage of civilization, a less advanced state of moral and intellectual refinement, in his worshippers. So far as concerns his worshippers, the service he receives is as sincere, as pure, as available, as acceptable, as that rendered by a Bossuet, a Fénelon, a St. Bernard, a St. Francis, a St. Benedict, or a St. Theresa. Foolish men talk of idolaters bowing down to idols of wood and stone, to images rudely or cunningly carved or painted, adoring creeping things and fourfooted beasts, the elements of nature, or the hosts of heaven; but these idolaters, as they are called, adore what to them is Highest and Best, and we only adore what is Highest and Best to us; and we fall as far short of the Infinite Reality in our conceptions, as they do in theirs. The only idolatry is in substituting the *Eidolon* for the Idea, the symbol for the symbolized, in attaching ourselves to obsolete institutions, and refusing to advance with the race.

The unbelievers were unwise in making war on Christianity. The Christian religion is, no doubt, the sublimest product of man, the least inadequate form with which he has thus far clothed his conceptions of the true, the beautiful, and the good, and as such should be respected. The elder Protestantism is inexcusable for its hostility to Catholicity. The Catholic Church was in its day the highest expression the world could appreciate of the lofty and ennobling ideas which Jesus of Nazareth taught and lived. All honor to those by

whose toils, sufferings, prayers, tears, fastings, watchings, and blood, it was established ; but none, indeed, to the stupid Catholic of to-day, pouring over the legends of dead saints, and foolishly imagining, that, because his church was once beautiful and holy, it must needs be so now, or that, because it could once produce saints, heroes, martyrs, it must needs produce them through all time to come. Poor man ! he gazes so intently on the glory that was, that he is stark blind to the glory that is, or is to be. Foolish man ! he sees not that he is left behind, and that the race goes on without him. O my brother, why lingerest thou amongst the tombs ? The Lord has risen, and goes before thee into Galilee. Seek not the future in the past ; the living among the dead ; but go on with humanity, live its life, and share its progress. The world is not superannuated ; it is still in the heyday of youth, and has a long career before it. Behold, new prophets and new messiahs arise in long succession. Each man may be for his age a new and worthier messiah ; for each, did he but know it, is an incarnation of the living God.

After all, religious forms, institutions, though inevitable and perhaps even useful, for a time and under certain circumstances, are not essential to religion. They are inevitable and natural, when the human race has not advanced far enough to perceive that all which is really essential is the divine idea and sentiment, which are the same in all men. Weak and ignorant men naturally imagine that the idea and sentiment must be inoperative and inefficacious, unless clothed with positive institutions. The African no sooner becomes conscious of the divine idea and sentiment of religion, than he supposes he must embody them. Hence, he proceeds forthwith to locate them, and to clothe them with the attributes of his own humanity, as he has ascertained them. Hence Mumbo-Jumbo and his service. The conception of pure spirit transcends the African's stage of progress, and he fancies ideas must needs want substance, reality, unless materialized, and fixed in a local habitation. But the race has now advanced far enough to correct this mistake. Jesus saw the mistake, and his superiority lies in his having risen superior to all forms, and asserted the sufficiency of the idea and sentiment alone, that is, of **ABSOLUTE RELIGION**. He discarded all forms, all institutions, all contrivances of men, and fell back on absolute religion, on the naked idea and sentiment, and taught his followers to do the same. Here was his transcendent merit.

Here he proved himself in advance of his age, — nay, in advance of all ages since. Unhappily, the world knew him not. His immediate disciples did not comprehend his divine work. They foolishly imagined that he came to introduce a new form, or to found a new religious institution, which, like Aaron's rod, should swallow up all the rest; and even to this day the great mass of his professed followers have supposed, that, to be Christians, they must sustain some formal institution, believe certain formal dogmas, and observe certain prescribed rites and ceremonies. Nevertheless, in all ages, a bold few, branded as heretics by the orthodox of their time, have had some glimpses of the real significance of the Christian movement, and have stood forth the prophets and harbingers of the glory hereafter to be revealed. In our day their number is greatly augmented. Catholics and old-fashioned Protestants may call them heretics, and fear they will deprive the world of its Maker, and man of the Spirit in which he lives and moves and has his being; but this need not disturb us; for these are the Scribes and Pharisees of our time, and do but reproduce the rage of the old Jews and pagans against the early Christian missionaries. Opposition from them we must expect. All who will live godly in Christ Jesus shall suffer persecution. We must be prepared for the malice of those who see the world escaping from their tyranny. But what of that? The brave spirit quails not, and will on its way, though earth and hell oppose. Brave spirits now there are. Germany, classic land of Reform, teems with them; France, the land of beautiful prose, teems with them; England, staid and haughty England, land of deeds and not of ideas, feels their quickening impulse; and young America, daughter of Freedom, and promised land of the Future, leaps with joy to receive them. The mighty *Welt-Geist*, the world-spirit, is on their side, moves in them, and fights and conquers for them; and we may trust that the time draws near, when, in this country at least, we can dispense with all religious forms and institutions, and carry out the sublime thought of Jesus, for proclaiming which, a corrupt and formal age crucified him between two thieves. Then men will be satisfied with absolute religion; then the noble spirit of man will be emancipated, and the godlike mind that would explore all things, and rise to its primal source, will spurn all formal dogmas, all contracting and debasing forms, and scorn to seek the living word of God in the dead petrifactions of crafty priests and besotted monks. Then God

himself will be our teacher, and the soul nestle in the bosom of the All-Father ; then man will be man, dare act out himself, and bow to no authority but that of the Invisible Spirit, to whom gravitation and purity of heart, a man, a maggot, a mountain, a moss, are all the same ; and then the human race will — what ?

Such, in general terms, is Transcendentalism in its most religious aspect, — virtually, if not formally, the view taken by all who to-day represent and continue the Reformers of the sixteenth century. By asserting the influx of God into the soul, they have the appearance of recognizing divine revelation and assistance ; and by asserting this influx to be by a natural channel and in a natural manner, they escape the supernaturalism they abhor and know it would be suicidal for them to admit. They have, then, apparently, in Transcendentalism, all that is necessary to meet the present emergency. In it the party seem to have all the advantages of both belief and unbelief, without the responsibilities of either. By its means they can contradict themselves on principle, without incurring the charge of inconsistency ; make any assertion they find convenient, without the necessity of proving it ; reason against unreason, and take refuge in unreason against reason ; appeal from feeling to argument, and from argument to feeling, from reason and feeling both to the soul's Transcendental faculty, and laugh at their puny assailants. When all fail, and no subterfuge is left, they can refuse to reply, and make their silence a merit. It is unworthy the prophet to engage in controversy, in repelling personal attacks. It is nobler to be silent. Jesus, when accused, opened not his mouth ; why should we ? We only say our say, and you are free to say yours. We throw out our word ; take it for what it is worth. If worth something, as every sincere word must be, take it and be thankful ; if worth nothing, let it go ; why dispute about what is worthless ? It can be but a worthless dispute, and, *ernst ist das Leben*, life is too serious to be wasted in worthless disputes. Evidently, Transcendentalism is the very thing for our present Reform party.

A peculiar excellence of Transcendentalism is, that it permits its advocates to use the consecrated words of faith and piety in impious and infidel senses, and with so much speciousness as to deceive men and women, not contemptible either for their intelligence or their motives. All religious institutions are symbolical, and shadow forth, or *conceal*, real facts. Every

rite, every ceremony, every dogma of religion has its root in the soul, and conceals some truth of the soul. This truth is a truth, and therefore not to be rejected ; but this truth, or fact, is all that in the symbol is valuable, or that it is essential to retain. Penetrate the symbol, then, ascertain this fact, and you have its real meaning, all that it has ever *meant*, even for the race. — Thus, the human race believes in divine inspiration. Very well. Then divine inspiration is a fact. But the human race believes that divine inspiration is the supernatural communication, through chosen individuals, of truths pertaining to the supernatural order. But this is not the fact ; it is only the form with which, through craft, ignorance, or credulity, the fact has been clothed ; not the fact itself, but its symbol. The real fact is, that every man's soul is furnished with a pipe through which God runs into it as it wills, in any quantity not exceeding its capacity. — The Church asserts the Incarnation, — that the human nature and the divine nature were united in Jesus in one person. Very true. She also asserts that the two natures were so united in him and in no other. There she is wrong ; for there she gives not the fact, but its symbol. The real fact is the union of the human and divine in all men, or that no man need look out of his own nature to find God, who is one with the nature of each man. I and my Father are one. — The Christian life is a combat, a warfare ; we must take up the cross, and fight constantly against the world, the flesh, and the devil. All very true. But *the* world, flesh, and devil against which we are to fight are not what stupid ascetics dream ; but low and debasing views of religion, attachment to obsolete forms, and unwillingness to receive new light. The real devil is the conservative spirit. At one time it is the Church ; at another, civil government ; among Protestants, it is the Bible ; among Christians generally, the authority of Jesus. In a word, the devil is always that particular thing, institution, or party which restrains the free action of the soul, and confines it to a prescribed formula, whether of religion, politics, or morals, or whatever would subject the soul to any law or authority distinguishable from itself. Against this, in our own time and country, be it what it may, we must take up arms, fight the good fight, regardless of what may be the consequences to ourselves. — In this way, Transcendentalists appropriate to their own use all the sacred language of religion, and utter the foulest blasphemy in the terms of faith and piety. If we accuse them of rejecting religion, they smile at our

simplicity, and ask us what sacred terms we have they cannot and do not use. But you use them in a false sense. Be not the dupe of words ; we use them to designate the real facts in the case, what you yourselves mean by them, if you mean any thing real by them. Not quite so fast, good friends, if you please. How do you know that it is not we who state the real fact, and you who misstate it, or substitute your interpretations of the fact for the fact itself ? We, by your own admission, are your equals, have all the faculties you have, even the Transcendental faculty itself, if it be a faculty. Wherefore, then, are not our assertions as good as yours ? And why is not the fact that we differ from you as strong a proof that you are wrong, as your difference from us that you are right ?

It is evident from the mode in which Transcendentalists interpret the symbols, notwithstanding some appearances to the contrary, that they hold that religious institutions, regarded as institutions, originate in the human element of religion rather than in the divine. In fact, they are the peculiarly human element itself. In this they show their descent from the Protestant world. Protestants, with the exception of a few high-church men, hardly worth counting, agree that our Lord, though he may have revealed formal doctrines, founded no formal church, but simply deposited in the hearts of his followers certain principles, which, fecundated by our faith and love, lead to the establishment of such forms of ecclesiastical government and discipline as in human prudence are judged to be most convenient. Many go farther, and say he revealed no formal faith or worship, and that his revelation consists solely in placing in the hearts of men certain great " seminal " principles of action. These, warmed into life by our love and obedience, tend naturally to expand and purify our affections, and gradually to extend and clarify our views, and thus enable us to form sounder judgments than we otherwise could of the attributes of God, the nature, relations, and destiny of the human soul, and therefore of moral and religious duties. These judgments, moulded into form, become respectively dogmas, precepts, and rites, and approximate absolute truth of doctrine, morals, and worship, in proportion to the love and fidelity with which we cultivate the principles, or, more strictly, our own intellectual and moral powers. The first class reduce all forms of ecclesiastical government to the same level, and, so far as the form is concerned, find the true church alike under the Papal, Episcopal, Presbyterian, or Congregational form.

The second class not only reduce all forms of ecclesiastical government to the same level, but also all forms of faith and worship, and thus place all professedly Christian sects and denominations, how widely soever they may differ from one another, on the same broad platform, and render it a matter of indifference to which of them one may be attached. Transcendentalists only follow in the same direction, and, by a little broader generalization, bring all religions within one and the same category, whether Pagan, Jewish, Christian, Mahometan, or Mormon. The great majority of Protestants agree with them that all forms of religion, whether ecclesiastical, doctrinal, moral, or liturgical, that is to say, all religious institutions, are purely of human origin, and spring from human prudence, or from human weakness. If there is any difference, it is that the Protestant holds that he is *moved* to their creation by the supernatural principles deposited in his heart, while the Transcendentalist holds that he is moved to their creation by what is purely human. The Protestant makes them a human work, but on a divine principle; the Transcendentalist makes them human in both their cause and their principle. This may seem to be some difference, but it amounts practically to nothing.

The Transcendentalist restricts all that he acknowledges to be divine in religion to the simple idea and sentiment. These are what he calls the permanent in religion, absolute religion, all that is needed, or in fact admissible. This is evident from Mr. Parker everywhere. He professes to reverence Jesus because he proclaimed the sufficiency of absolute religion. He himself holds that all forms of religion are not only not necessary, but mischievous. They tend to hide absolute religion, and to generate idolatry by inducing us to mistake the symbol for what is symbolized, the shadow for the substance. Their existence through all ages and in all countries is a proof of the universal and permanent presence of absolute religion; but they are not it, nor does it need them, or of itself move us to create them. It occasions, but does not cause them. Undoubtedly, if man had no religious idea or sentiment, he would form no religious institutions; but the principle of the institutions is in his own nature, — in his natural tendency, when he is conscious of an idea, to conceive it under some form, to measure it, determine it, and fix its value, give it a location, — that is, an institution, — and to take his conceptions for the idea itself, to imagine that to reject them is to reject it, and, therefore, to seek always to

impose them on himself and on others. But if he only knew that the idea is of itself sufficient, and would, or could, distinguish between it and his conceptions, and refrain from imposing his conceptions as it, he would never form any religious institutions, would be satisfied with absolute religion itself, and never seek to go beyond it. It is clear, then, that Transcendentalists hold that forms or institutions have their principle and cause, not in the religious idea and sentiment themselves, but in human nature as distinguished from them.

But if this be questioned, and it be alleged that the institutions have their principle and cause in the religious idea and sentiment, it will still be true that Transcendentalists teach that they have their principle and cause in human nature ; for they teach that the idea and sentiment are not only natural, but essential elements of human nature, as is proved by their second fundamental proposition, namely, Religion is a fact or principle of human nature, and from the whole drift of their writings and speculations. It is on this assumption that they rest their whole defence of religion against the incredulity of the last century. It is the grand discovery which entitles them to the admiration and gratitude of mankind. The unbelievers of the last century held religion to be an accident in human history, originating in local and transitory causes. This was their primal error ; and it is precisely this error Transcendentalists profess to correct, by showing that religion, reducible in the last analysis to the simple idea and sentiment, is a permanent and indestructible fact of man's nature, an essential element of his very being as man. Grant, then, that the institutions originate in the idea and sentiment, which would seem to be their natural genesis, it is still true that they have their principle and cause in human nature.

But, it may be asked, if the idea and sentiment, or absolute religion, be constitutive principles of our nature, how can they be divine ? The answer to this question is in the identity of the divine nature and the human. In our Review for July, 1845, we proved that Transcendentalists deny all distinct natures, and assert the unity and identity of one and the same nature under all forms of existence, — material in matter, spiritual in spirit, mineral in minerals, vegetable in vegetables, animal in animals, rational and moral in man, — changing through all, and yet in all the same, — nature, substance, being, of all that is or appears. Besides this one nature, identical under all forms, there is no reality. Forms are phenomenal,

variable, unsubstantial, evanescent. This one nature, considered in itself, detached from all forms or phenomena in which it appears, or through which it manifests itself, is God. Hence, nature is divine ; and as this one nature is the particular nature of each specific form of existence, the nature of each is divine, and therefore the nature of man. Then whatever is constitutive of the nature of man is divine, and therefore the religious idea and sentiment.

This, it may be alleged, is only saying, in other words, that they are human ; and then what is gained by calling them divine ? At bottom, so far as he is real being or substance, that is, in his nature, man is, indeed, identical with God, and it matters not which term, man or God, is used ; for one is the equivalent of the other. In this sense we are indistinguishable from God ; for in him we live and move and have our *being*. Hence, to know God, one has only to know his nature, — hence the profound significance of the ancient inscription on the portals of the temple, KNOW THYSELF ; and to obey God, one has only to obey his own nature ; hence the maxim of the ancients, *Follow nature*, and of the Transcendentalists, *OBEY THYSELF*. But man may be considered in his form, as a particular form of existence ; and in this sense he is *formally*, though not really, distinguishable from God. The form is the humanity (*humanitas*), and is in itself empty, limited, transitory. It is, properly speaking, what is meant by personality, which is not the last complement of rational nature, as Schoolmen dream, but its limitation, that which individualizes, renders the nature determinate, particular, and then, of course, as predicable of a tree, a stone, an ox, a maggot, as of man. It is not predicable of God at all ; for to call God personal would be to deny his universality and his infinity, and to make him particular and limited. Hence Transcendentalists are accustomed to say, We believe in God, but not in a *personal* God. All individual things, all particular existences, are indeed God as to their nature, so far as they have real being, and can be said to *be* ; but *in quantum* individual, particular, they are distinguishable from him, and are merely individual, particular, specific forms of him. When we speak of any one of these, we are accustomed to call by its name, not only the form, but the one nature, or God as under that form, or manifesting himself through it. We ordinarily think and speak of man as an individual or personal existence, and do not take note of the fact that his nature is God, or is

nothing but God under the form of humanity. Thus we are led to content ourselves with the human form, and to neglect the divine nature. When we content ourselves with the form, which as form is empty, we live an empty and godless life ; but when we lose sight of the form, and fall back on the great nature under it, we live a divine life, the life of God himself. Here is the advantage of knowing that our nature is one with God, and of calling it divine rather than human.

This answer may be very clear and satisfactory to Transcendentalists, but to us it is not free from embarrassment. To distinguish man from his nature, in which is his whole substance, being, reality, active force, — and yet to conceive him, when so distinguished, therefore as mere unsubstantial form, as capable of acting, confining himself to his personality, or sinking his personality and falling back on the great nature underlying him, decidedly *transcends* our ability. The Transcendentalist evidently struggles to keep clear of pantheism, and perhaps, for the most part, fancies that he succeeds ; but, having begun by denying substantial forms, or all real differences of nature, and by affirming the reality of only one and the same nature under all forms, however numerous or diversified they may appear, he has rendered success impossible, save in appearance, and hardly even in appearance. If man has no substantive existence distinct from the universal substance, no nature of his own distinguishable from one universal nature, he has in himself, in his distinctive character, no active force, is no active force, and therefore can perform no act, can be the subject of no predicate. If you assume that his personality, his individuality, is a mere limitation, an empty or unsubstantial form, you must concede that he as personal or individual is really nothing, and therefore can neither sink his personality nor confine himself to it. The *vis activa*, or *vis agendi*, is not man as personal, as an individuality, but man as nature, in which sense you assume him to be not distinguishable from God. Consequently, whatever you predicate of him is predicated of God, and what you disapprove in him and what you approve are alike the work of God ; for God is the only active or productive force you acknowledge ; and to acknowledge no active or productive force but God is to profess pantheism.

But passing over this, we are still embarrassed. We understand, indeed, how Transcendentalists can call the religious idea and sentiment divine, even while making them constitutive

of human nature. But they go farther, and make the sentiment and idea the *whole* of religion, define them to be absolute religion, and, as religion, all-sufficing. These we have always and everywhere; the same and in the same degree; for they are invariable, permanent, and indestructible facts of nature. Assuming this, our difficulty is to understand the significance and office of inspiration. Here the oracle grows mysterious, and utters only a vague and uncertain response, and, after all our consultations, gives us nothing satisfactory. We confess ourselves at a loss, and altogether unable to discover any good reason why Transcendentalists should recognize the fact of inspiration at all.

In order to throw what light we can on this intricate question, we must observe that Transcendentalists do not all adopt precisely the same ontological views. The American and English Transcendentalists, best represented by Bronson Alcott, and the late J. P. Greaves, take the view we have given, and hold that God is the one universal and indeterminable nature of all particular existences, which particular existences, in fact, are nothing but mere phenomena, or modes in which the Universal Being manifests itself. But the German and French Transcendentalists, the former represented by Hegel, and the latter by Pierre Leroux, though perhaps coming at last to the same result, take a somewhat different view. They undertake to construct God and the universe from the analysis of human Thought, which they reduce to three terms, translatable in plain English by the terms POSSIBILITY, IDEALITY, REALITY. These three terms, then, comprise the universe of Being, in all its actual, conceivable, or possible modes of existence or manifestation. We have, then, first, *possible* being, — second, *ideal* being, — and last, *real* being. The Possible — called by Hegel *das Seyn*, as identical with *das Nicht-seyn*, — by Leroux, *le Ciel*, the *Tien* of the Chinese, the *Void* of the Buddhists, and the *Bythos* of the Gnostics — may be defined the infinite possibility of being. The Real, *das Wesen*, is the *plenum*, or so much of the Possible as has been filled up or become actual being. The Ideal is the mediator between the Possible and Real, or that by which they are made one.

Now, we may contemplate the universe of Being under the three points of view respectively, of the Possible, the Ideal, and the Real. If, under the first point of view, we ask, What is God? the answer is, He is Infinite Possibility. If under the second, He is the Infinite Ideal. If under

the third, He is the actual universe, or sum total of real beings. The Possible tends always to the Ideal and the Real; the Real seeks always its own Ideal and Possible, and in this consists universal LIFE. The Possible realizing itself through the Ideal is the fact we mortals term *creation*. God as possible, realizing himself through the Ideal in actual beings, or in creation, becomes *das Wesen*, real or *living* God. He lives a real life in the life of living beings, and only in their life. Thus we may say God lives and moves and has his being in us, instead of our living, moving, and having our being in him. God, or Being, realizes itself progressively, — not perhaps as to time, but as to order, — and passes successively through all the grades of real beings, till arriving at personality and self-consciousness in man, the highest form of real being. He is everywhere, and everywhere infinitely active; but he is conscious activity, activity that knows itself, knows that it is, only in man, that is, in man's consciousness; and man, therefore, is his THOUGHT, his WORD, — in the language of theology, his Son, his first-born and only begotten Son, the image and likeness of himself.

Each particular being is God, or the entire universe, in miniature, and therefore at once Possible, Ideal, Real; and its life or *living* consists in realizing its Ideal and Possible. As Real, it is limited, finite; as Ideal and Possible, unlimited, infinite. Hence, there is always room for it to continue and extend its realization. Man's life consists in realizing his own Ideal and Possible. Ever does the Ideal, the form under which the Possible is revealed, stretch out beyond him, hover over and float before him. By means of the Transcendental faculty of the soul, he apprehends this Ideal and aspires to it. Contemplating it, he perceives that his real being is not full, that it contains a void not filled up, that he may be more and better than he is, — better because more. His soul is quickened, his heart inflamed, his whole being moved, by the view of the Ideal ever floating before him, the revelation to him of the Infinitely Possible; and he is urged on by an all but irresistible power to seize it, appropriate it, realize it, and thus augment his being, fill up its void. Here is the fact of inspiration. This Ideal is God, from the point of view of the Ideal, and therefore the inspiration is *divine*; it is also man's own nature as Ideal, and therefore the inspiration is *natural*. It is literally an aspiration, or effect of an aspiration, to the Ideal; and by obeying it we realize God, take up more of God into our being, augment our own real being and that of God.

No comments are necessary to show that this theory, which is at present so highly esteemed in Germany, is really nothing but another form of stating what the world has known under the name of French Philosophy, or French Atheism. At bottom, it is simply the doctrine we find in the *Système de la Nature*, attributed to Baron d'Holbach, as M. Leroux, though virtually adopting it himself, has very clearly shown, in one of the numbers of his *Revue Indépendante* for 1843. This sublime doctrine does not seem to be wholly unknown to our American Transcendentalists, and we find decided traces of it in *The Present*, a periodical lately published in New York, and edited by a man of whom we had the right to hope something better, and of whom, if God preserve his reason, we dare yet hope something better, for he seems to us a man of singular purity and ingenuousness; and we also not unfrequently find traces of it in Mr. Parker. But whether Mr. Parker adopts its view of inspiration we are not able to say. He has read much, but digested little. He brings together scraps from Plato, Plotinus, Proclus, Julian, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel, Goethe, Schleiermacher, De Wette, Schelling, Coleridge, Jacobi, Locke, Cudworth, Voltaire, Cousin, George Fox, Benjamin Constant, and Tom Paine, but throws them together in such singular confusion, that, with the best intentions in the world to do him justice, we find it all but impossible to determine what is the precise view he would be willing to have us take as his own. But systematizing his general views as well as we are able, and making him as coherent and consequent as possible, we take him to hold inspiration to be the spontaneous activity of the universal and impersonal nature of which we have so often spoken. This impersonal nature, which, in itself considered, is God, is, as to its essential qualities, power, wisdom, and goodness, and therefore its action is always the action of wisdom and goodness, or, from the point of view of reason, truth, of the affections, goodness, and the sentiments, beauty. Being power or *vis activa*, it is necessarily active, and from within, by its own inherent laws. As its nature never varies, its quantity of action and the direction of its action must be always the same. It is a sort of machine fixed in immensity, immovable under all forms, and generating and supplying to each the quantity of inherently wise, good, and beautiful power each needs, or has the capacity to receive. It is always there, and the particular being

has but to raise a gate, and it flows in, to the measure of the particular being's capacity. This flowing in is *inspiration*.

But this flowing in is not from abroad. To be inspired, we need not receive any thing not already in ourselves. The source of the inspiration is our own nature. But this is what embarrasses us. How our own nature can inspire us, or we from our nature receive more than we receive in having our nature, puzzles us, and we cannot solve the mystery. But, be this as it may, it is certain man is not required to go out of himself for inspiration.

“The word is nigh him, even in his heart. . . . As God fills all space, so all spirit; as he influences and constrains unconscious and necessitated matter, so he inspires and helps free and conscious man. . . . There are windows towards God, as towards the world. There is no intercessor, angel, mediator, between man and God; for man can speak and God can hear, each for himself. He requires no advocate to plead for man, who needs not to pray by attorney. Each soul stands close to the Omnipresent God; may feel his beautiful presence, and have familiar access to the All-Father; get truth at first hand from its Author. Wisdom, righteousness, and love are the spirit of God in the soul of man; wherever these are, and in proportion to their power, there is inspiration from God.” — pp. 216, 217.

That is, in proportion as a man is inspired, he is inspired. There is no gainsaying that. But

“*God's action on matter and on man is perhaps the same thing to him, though it appear differently modified to us. But it is plain, from the nature of things, that there can be but one kind of inspiration, as of Truth, Faith, or Love; it is the direct and intuitive perception of some truth of thought or of sentiment; — there can be but one mode of inspiration; it is the action of the Highest within the soul, the divine presence imparting light; this presence, as of truth, justice, holiness, love, infusing itself into the soul, giving it new life; the breathing in of Deity, the in-come of God to the soul, in the form of truth through reason, of right through conscience, of love and faith through the affections and religious sentiment. Is inspiration confined to theological matters? Is Newton less inspired than Simon Peter?*” — p. 218.

Why not? And, if inspiration be taken not in its authorized sense, how are Mr. Parker's readers to decide the question he asks? Suppose they should deny Newton's inspiration, how would he prove it? And what absurdity is there in asserting that St. Peter was inspired, and that Sir Isaac Newton was not?

“If God be infinitely perfect, he does not change; then his modes of action are perfect and unchangeable. The laws of mind, like those of matter, remain immutable and not transcended. As God has left no age nor man destitute of reason, conscience, religion, so he leaves none destitute of inspiration. *It is, therefore, the light of our being; the back-ground of all human faculties; the sole means by which we gain a knowledge of what is not seen and felt, the logical condition of all sensual knowledge;* our highway to the world of spirit. Man cannot exist without God, more than matter. Inspiration, then, like vision, must be everywhere the same thing in *kind*, however it differs in *degree*, from race to race, from man to man. The degree of inspiration must depend on two things: first, on the natural ability, the particular intellectual, moral, and religious endowment, or genius, wherewith each man is furnished by God; and next, on the use each man makes of that endowment; — in one word, on the man’s *quantity of Being*, and his *quantity of Obedience*. . . . A man of noble intellect, of deep, rich, benevolent affections, is by his endowments capable of more than one less gifted. He that perfectly keeps the soul’s law, thus fulfilling the conditions of inspiration, has more than he who keeps it imperfectly; the former must receive all his soul can contain at that stage of its growth. Thus it depends on a man’s own will, in great measure, to what extent he will be inspired.” — pp. 219, 220.

All this is clear enough, as to the fact, that inspiration is the action of the impersonal nature, which is our real self; but it is not unencumbered with difficulties. “God’s action on matter and on man is perhaps the same thing to him, though it *appear* differently modified to us.” This action is inspiration. Then the stone, the moss, the tree, the maggot, is inspired in like manner, and in the same sense, as man, and the effect differs only in its *appearance* to us. The action is always the same. God does his best to inspire one as much as another; and if one is not as much inspired as another, it is because one has a less quantity of being, or because it makes a less faithful use of its faculties. But he tells us, again, that “inspiration is the *consequence* of the faithful use of our faculties; each man is its subject [he might have added, each block or stone], God its source, truth its only *test*.” — p. 220. Here we are thrown out, quite off the centre of gravity; for we have just been told, that inspiration is “the light of our being; the back-ground of all human faculties; the sole means by which we gain a knowledge of what is not seen and felt, the logical condition of all

sensual knowledge." Hence it follows necessarily, that without inspiration we have no sensual knowledge, that is, knowledge by the senses, no light, and no faculties; and yet inspiration is the *consequence* of the faithful use of our faculties! Decidedly this is too bad. To compel us, without knowledge, without light, without faculties, to use our faculties, and to use them faithfully, and thus gain inspiration, is worse than the tyranny of Pharaoh, in compelling the Israelites to make brick without straw, for they *could* wander over the fields and gather up stubble. Furthermore, truth is the only *test* of inspiration. Then the inspiration is not the communication of truth, for truth is something we must be already in possession of, as a criterion by which to test it.

"He that has most of wisdom, goodness, religion, the most of truth in its highest modes, is the most inspired." — *ib.* Either the inspiration and these are identical, and then the sense is, He who is the most inspired is the most inspired; or the inspiration is the effect of these, and then the possession of wisdom, goodness, religion, truth in its highest modes, is the condition of inspiration, which we suppose to be the author's meaning, — and not it the condition of possessing truth, wisdom, goodness, religion. But as the possession of these, not inspiration, is the end we should aim at, and if these are attainable without the inspiration as a means, what is the office or use of inspiration? Really, we do not know, and we confess we cannot understand why Transcendentalists assert it at all, unless because they think it would not *appear* religious to deny it. Perhaps it is the homage they pay to truth; perhaps the "pear," as Luther called the Christian miracles, which they throw to children. At any rate, the matter is left quite in the dark.

Having done our best to explain away the difficulties likely to embarrass our untranscendental readers, we are led very naturally to ask, what are the proofs by which Transcendentalists attempt to sustain their position, that all religious institutions have their principle and cause in human nature? But Transcendentalists regard this question of proofs as a delicate one, and are apt to look upon the demand for proofs as a decided breach of politeness, a downright piece of impertinence. They do not reason; they affirm, and we should take their simple assertion as sufficient. They are not reasoners, but *seers*; and will we not believe them, when they tell us what they see? Their doctrine rests not on discursion, but on intuition.

The intuition is, indeed, possible to all, but not to all states of the soul. The soul must be prepared, and its vision purged by regimen, and strengthened by exercise. We must, by strict regimen and exercise, rise to the pure empyrean, and then we shall see and know for ourselves. Then no proofs will be needed; and before then none can be appreciated. Proofs offered to one still in the low regions of the logical understanding are pearls cast before swine. What avails it to reason with a blind man on colors? Couch his eyes first. So couch the eyes of the soul, open "the windows towards God," and you will want no proofs; you will see as we see, and all we see. Moreover, you must take the proper attitude to see. The Transcendental attitude is to turn the eyes upside down, and look at things through your legs.* You and the objects you see will then be reversed; and the essence of Transcendentalism is not in seeing what others do not see, but in seeing what all the world sees, — but with the *seer* and the *seen* reversed.

But if, by a rare condescension to our *rationality*, Transcendentalists deign to discuss the question of proofs with us, they refer us to their doctrine of the unity and identity of the one nature, which surges under all forms, and which, out of courtesy to the religious world, they are pleased to call God. What we foolishly imagine to be distinct natures are, as distinct from this one nature, mere forms, mere phenomena, and therefore unproductive. But there can be no phenomenon without being, any more than a shadow without a substance. The being of each particular phenomenon is the one identical nature, universal in all, particular in each. But this nature is named always from the particular phenomenon or class of phenomena in which it manifests itself. Manifesting itself in the phenomenal man, it is called *man* or *human nature*, and is precisely what is meant by man considered as real instead of phenomenal. But as the phenomenal is in itself unproductive, all in the history of man must proceed from this nature, which we term human nature. Religious institutions are facts in man's history; therefore they proceed from, or have their principle and cause in, human nature.

Moreover, if you consider the matter, your demand for proofs is exceedingly foolish. There can be nothing in history which

* "Turn the eyes upside down, by looking at the landscape through your legs, and how agreeable is the landscape, though you have seen it twenty times!" — R. W. EMERSON, *Nature*, p. 64.

has not its principle and cause in nature. But all natures are really one and the same nature, however diversified the forms of its manifestation, and this one nature is the nature of all men and of each man, is in all and in each ; for no man can be without a nature. Then you need but study your own nature, look into yourselves, in order to see and know the truth of our position. All truth is in nature, and all nature is in each man. Each man contains all the facts of history in himself, and can ascertain them from the analysis of his own consciousness. Nature is essentially intelligent, and therefore each man must needs know all that has been, is, or is to be, and therefore all phenomena past, present, and to come. We have, then, a universal intuitive power, and therefore may have the particular intuition of the fact in question. This universal intuitive power is the Transcendental faculty of the soul which we assert, and from which we derive our name of Transcendentalists. Having this faculty, we can of ourselves know all things. Hence our Mr. Parker is a perfect master of all history, corrects the statements of Moses, and gives us a full and authentic account of the creation, the primitive condition of man, and of all that has befallen or is to befall him in his pilgrimage through the ages ; and he could, if he were so disposed, tell us the precise number, age, size, and color, whether blue or ringstreaked, of the dogs that licked up Jezebel's blood. Why not ? He has but to sink the phenomenal man, the *Parkeritas*, which is mere form and in reality nothing, and fall back on the impersonal soul, on his real self, and he is universal nature, the Omnipresent, Omniscient, and Omnipotent God, in which sense he assists at the birth of all phenomena, not as spectator only, but also as creator. He was present when the stars were set in their course ; he beheld when the earth was fashioned and poised on nothing ; he heard the song of the sons of the morning, and to him, as creator, rose the exulting hymn of praise. What we say of Mr. Parker we may say of all men and of each man ; for each is in all, and all are in each. All, then, in and of themselves, may know all things. What need, then, of proofs ? Why carry coals to Newcastle ?

This established, the Transcendentalist can have no further trouble. He carries in him the measure of all things, as he asserts in his first fundamental principle, namely, — Man is the measure of truth and goodness. Nay, not the measure only, but the source of all things. He wills, and it is ; commands, and it stands fast. All historical facts adjust themselves to his

standard, and his explanations of all phenomena are final. What beyond his simple assertion can the most captious or the most *rational* demand? What he asserts is asserted on the highest conceivable authority. The world believes in the fact of inspiration. So far, so good. It believes, or supposes it believes, inspiration to be a supernatural fact,—the communication, in a supernatural manner, of facts pertaining to the supernatural order. If by *supernatural* it means supersensual, all very well; but if more, it is wrong, for there is no supernatural, since there is but one nature, and nature cannot transcend or surpass itself. The world has fancied that Almighty God has not only inspired particular individuals, but that he has established positive religious institutions, which must be accepted and obeyed as the *conditio sine qua non* of pleasing him; but in this it only gives form to the great fact, that it always seeks to embody its conceptions of what is highest and best, and to impose on itself its embodiment as law. It obeys in this, indeed, its highest conceptions, but nevertheless blunders. The world has adored Jesus as the Incarnate God. All right, for he was the Incarnate God, and so is every man. Jesus was only the type of what all men may and should be, the most perfect model of the true man—always excepting Mr. Theodore Parker—the world has as yet beheld. The world has said Jesus was the *only* Incarnate God. In this it has been wrong, through ignorance or craft, has listened to priests and monks, instead of its own great nature. In this way Transcendentalists survey all religious institutions, and tell us, *ex cathedra*, what is true, what is false, where we are right, and where we are wrong. They do it all by virtue of their inherent godship. They cannot possibly err; for they are themselves the infallible criterion, are in themselves the Great Soul, the Universal Soul, Impersonal Nature, the Eternal and All-perfect God.

But, my dear friends, you forget yourselves. On your own principles, we are God as well as you, and have the same Great Soul underlying us that you have. If you plant yourselves on your godship, we must plant ourselves on ours. Ours, as you yourselves assert, is the equal of yours; why, then, are we to yield to you, rather than you to us? If you are right, our godship is one and identical with yours. Why, then, is not its voice as authoritative, when in us and the race it condemns you, as when in you it condemns us? In the race and in us, it testifies alike to what you concede and what you

deny. In the race and in us, it positively rejects your interpretations of the facts of religious history, and pronounces you — *Transcendentalists*. If it is the voice of God always and everywhere the same, how can it testify to one thing in us and to another in you, and why is its denial in you paramount to its affirmation in us? Is it because you look at things with the eyes turned upside down, and through your legs, and we do not? This is something, we own; but it can hardly avail you. How do you establish the fact that your mode of looking is preferable to ours? Nay, it cannot be so good. Ours is unquestionably the most *natural* mode, as well as the easiest and least constrained. On your own principles, all truth is in nature, and the more in conformity one is with nature, the more natural his mode of looking, the truer and more trustworthy is his intuition. Decidedly, then, we and the race, who look at the landscape with our eyes in their normal position, have altogether the advantage of you who look at it with your eyes upside down, through your legs, and, in case of difference, must trust our godship in preference to yours.

The primal error of Transcendentalism, as must be obvious to the philosophic reader, is in the denial of substantial forms or distinct natures, and the assertion of the unity and identity of all natures in one and the same universal nature. Granting this denial and assertion, the greater part of their system follows as a necessary logical consequence. But the absurdity of the consequence is the refutation of the principle. Any principle which compels us to assert that there is no difference between gravitation and purity of heart, between the nature of a stone and the nature of man, and between the nature of man and the nature of God, thus making God the nature of the stone, and therefore stone itself, is refuted by that figure of logic termed *reductio ad absurdum*, and may be dismissed without further comment.

Transcendentalists have probably been led *philosophically* to the adoption of this error, by attempting to reduce the categories of reason to the single category of being and phenomenon. Aristotle gave us ten categories, which he made forms of the object, or at least forms of the reason, with their foundation in reality; Kant has given us fifteen, which he makes purely forms of the subject; Transcendentalists, following Schelling, Hegel, and Cousin, attempt to identify the subject and object, and to resolve all the categories into one. Cousin, indeed, professes to recognize two, substance and cause; but

he resolves that of cause into that of substance, by defining substance, in the last analysis, after Leibnitz and some of the Schoolmen, to be *vis activa*, or acting force ; and, by resolving the effect into the reaction of the cause, he really retains only the category of substance, or being and phenomenon, — which, as Schelling himself has admitted, is sheer Spinozism, or downright pantheism, — the abyss in which all modern philosophy is rapidly losing itself. M. Cousin prides himself on this reduction of the categories, and regards it as his chief claim to originality as a metaphysician ; but, though we own we were simple enough to be taken with it, we consider it the rock on which he split, and the source of his failure. Kant was wrong in making the categories forms of the subject, without any foundation in reality, and thus falling into pure Conceptualism, the old error of Abelard, but which may be rejected without falling into the error of either the Realists or the Nominalists ; but his list of the categories is probably complete and exact, admitting neither of enlargement nor of reduction.

If being or substance, in the last analysis, be *vis activa*, or acting force, it is causative and productive of effects ; and if infinite, it must be capable of producing diversified effects, and effects, in their sphere and degree, themselves productive of effects. Then each of these effects, inasmuch as productive of effects, will be a being, and, as productive of effects diverse from those of others, a being of a distinct and different nature. Transcendentalists admit the category of being as *vis activa* ; they also admit infinite being. Then they must concede the possibility of distinct and different natures. Then they cannot assert *a priori*, that there is only one and the same nature under all forms of existence ; and as they do not pretend to be able to assert it *a posteriori*, to establish it by positive proofs, they have no right to assert it at all.

Transcendentalists have been led also into the same error, by misapprehending the true doctrine of God's immanence in creation. God, say they, is not merely *causa transiens*, but also *causa immanens*, and therefore must be immanent in all his works ; which is true. He must be immanent in his essential character. True again. He is essentially being ; then he must be immanent as being ; then immanent as the being of all and of each. He is essentially cause ; then he must be immanent as cause ; then he is the causativeness of all and of each. But the conclusions do not follow. He

is, indeed, immanent in all as being, not as the being of all and of each, but as *that which creates and sustains* the being of all and of each. He is immanent as cause, not as the causativeness of all and of each ; but as *that which creates and sustains* the causativeness of all and of each. He is immanent, not as the subject, but as that which creates and sustains the subject, and distinguishable from it as the cause from the effect. *Non implicat*, then, to suppose that he creates and sustains different subjects, different beings, distinguishable by *nature* — or their inherent power or quality of producing diverse effects — both from himself and from one another, as all the world believes, as is implied in every speech or language of men, and which must be assumed, or it is impossible to reason a single moment, or even to make a single intelligible proposition. This last consideration is of itself sufficient to convict the Transcendentalists, and ought to silence them for ever. The authority of the human race is for them the highest conceivable authority ; for it is, on their principles, the authority of God. Then, since the race never confounds itself with any other race, — since it believes, and always has believed, there is some real difference between the nature of a stone and a loaf of bread, between a maggot and a man, between man and God, — and as it never gathers grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles, — Transcendentalists are bound to admit the reality of distinct natures, by an authority they cannot gainsay, without abandoning their whole theory.

Assuming the reality of distinct natures, — that God has made and sustains all beings, each after its kind, — that there are real genera and species, substantial forms, — and that each race of beings has its specific nature, then what comes within the scope of that nature is *natural*, pertains to the natural order, and what transcends it is *supernatural*, pertains to the supernatural order. Each specific nature, by the fact that it is specific, is limited, finite ; and then an infinite distance between it and God, who is infinite. Then necessarily an infinite order above the highest specific or created nature, that is to say, an infinite supernatural order, of which the highest conceivable created nature knows and can conceive nothing by virtue of its natural powers. If there is a God, then there is and must be a supernatural order. The Transcendentalists profess to believe in God. Then they must admit that there is a supernatural order, of which they neither have nor can have any knowledge by any natural means. Nothing, then, hinders

God, if he chooses, from revealing supernaturally more or less of this supernatural order to such of his creatures as he has made naturally intelligent. It may be, that the end for which he intended man, when he made him, lies not in the plane of his natural powers, but in this very supernatural order. If so, our true end is attainable by no natural means, and is, and must be, unattainable without supernatural aid. Then either God has made us for an unattainable end, which would implicate his power, his wisdom, or his justice ; or he furnishes us the supernatural aid by which it is attainable, and without which it is not attainable. If he furnishes this aid, he may, if he chooses, furnish it through positive institutions, to the observance of which he attaches the grace needed. But whether he has made us for a supernatural destiny, for an end which transcends the natural order and pertains to the supernatural order, whether he has furnished us the supernatural means of attaining it, and whether he has furnished these means through positive institutions, and, if so, through what or which institutions, are all questions of fact, and must be decided as questions of fact, not of reason. The human race believes that he has made us for a supernatural end, and that he furnishes us the necessary aid through positive institutions, and Catholics believe through the positive institutions which we call the Catholic Church. Transcendentalists believe, or at least assert, the contrary. Here are the parties, and here is the issue. The issue is obviously one of fact, and can be decided only by an appeal to the proper documents and monuments in the case.

If the documents and monuments be authentic, it has been generally conceded the decision must be in favor of the supernaturalists. So have thought believers ; the unbelievers of the last century thought the same, and therefore frankly denied their authenticity. The advocates of religion met this denial, and proved the documents and monuments to be authentic, and by all the rules of evidence to be admissible and conclusive. Transcendentalists saw this, and thus saw that it would be of no avail to attempt to impeach the testimony. But could they not admit it, and even turn it against the supernaturalists ? The thing, if it could be done, would be capital ; it would be overthrowing religion by means of religion. Why can it not be done ? Protestantism has conquered for us the glorious right of private interpretation. It is done. We will accept the documents, but interpret them in our own way, and

show the religionists that they have never understood them. What they have applied to the supernatural order we will apply to man's natural relations, powers, and destiny, and our cause is won.

The documents are authentic. Conceded. Then their testimony must be referred to the natural order, since *there is no supernatural order*. Then, if you attempt to interpret them in favor of a supernatural order, you attempt to impeach them by making them testify in favor of what is not. If you believe them, you must believe with us; if you disbelieve them, you must still believe with us, — for then, according to your own principles, you have no authority for believing otherwise. You, as well as we, are bound to presume the documents are authentic; then they must receive a Transcendental interpretation, and then they prove Transcendentalism, and you must be Transcendentalists on their authority, if on no other. Would you be guilty, or have us guilty, of the absurdity, of the blasphemy, of making them testify to what is false or absurd? This is a fair specimen of the mode in which the author of the work before us reasons in regard to the Bible, and is but a simple statement of the exegetical canon he adopts in its interpretation. The force of the argument lies solely in the assumption that there is no supernatural order, which is false, if there be a God; and its beauty consists in assuming the truth of Transcendentalism, and then gravely concluding that the Scriptures, for instance, if authentic, must be so interpreted as to teach it, and, if they teach it, those who believe them must believe it. This is what may be called *Transcendental logic*, and certainly transcends all the author of the *Organon* ever thought of commending.

But, after all, Transcendentalists must sustain their interpretation of the documents and monuments of religion either by an appeal to the divine and supernatural, or by an appeal to the human and natural. If by the former, they concede what they deny and wish to disprove; if by the latter, they are refuted by the very authority to which they appeal. The human and natural must be collected from their operation; for, so far as inoperative, they are, so far as their authority is concerned, as if they were not. Then, after the divine and supernatural, the assent of the race must be the best and most authoritative exponent of what is human and natural; for it is only in the race that we have a full view of the human and natural in operation. But the race does not

sustain the Transcendentalists ; it agrees, whether believing or not believing, that the sense of the documents and monuments relates to the supernatural. Then the Transcendentalists must abandon their interpretation, as contradicted by the only authority on which they can rely for sustaining it. Then they must admit the supernatural order ; then supernatural revelation ; then positive religious institutions ; and then the Catholic Church ; or impeach the documents. This latter alternative is out of the question, as they themselves admit, by their effort to explain them in accordance with Naturalism. Then nothing remains for them, if they do not wish to write themselves down what Dogberry wished to be written down, to confess that they have been chasing their own shadow, and to beg God to forgive their folly and absurdity, and to receive them as humble postulants at the door of his Church.

We have now gone through with what we proposed to say on *Transcendentalism, or latest form of Infidelity*. We have said all we have judged to be necessary to enable our readers to understand its essential character, and all that can be requisite for its refutation. It can hardly be expected that what we have said will have much influence on confirmed Transcendentalists themselves ; but we trust in God that it may serve to put those who are as yet unbitten on their guard, and make our readers generally more suspicious of the novel principles of modern literature and philosophy. The danger is not, that any man with his eyes open will espouse Transcendentalism, when fully developed, and dressed in its own robes ; but that specious principles which imply it may be imbibed by well-meaning individuals before suspecting the fatal consequences they involve. In fact, all modern philosophy and literature are more or less tinctured with Transcendentalism, and we find not unfrequently traces of it where we are not only sorry to find them, but where we little expected them. The enemy has sown its principles broadcast over the modern world, and they rarely fail to spring up, and flourish, and bear their poisonous fruit. One hardly knows when he is safe in accepting any view or doctrine of a more recent date than the Reformation. Let no man fancy, because he can laugh at the absurdity of Transcendentalism, when full grown, and displaying itself in all its deformity, absurdity, and impiety, that he is in no danger of countenancing it. Even while laughing, he may find that he is sustaining principles which logically imply it.

But, after all, what is the real sum and substance of Transcendentalism, this latest and noblest birth of Time, as its friends regard it, and from which we are promised the universal *palingenesis* of man and nature, — what is it, when reduced to its simple, positive teachings? We have been led through tomes of metaphysical lore; we have been allured by brilliant promises of a recovered Eden; we have been flattered by glowing descriptions of our godlike powers, affinities, and tendencies; we have been transported by the assurance that we may dispense with priests, prophets, intercessors, and mediators, and of ourselves approach the Infinite One face to face, and drink our supply at the primal Fountain of Truth itself; but now, having lingered till the ascending sun has exhaled the dewdrops and exhausted the gems and precious stones which sparkled in rich profusion at our feet, what is the real and positive value of what has so long detained and charmed us? Things are what they are; man is what he is, and by a right use of his faculties may be, do, and know all he can be, do, and know. So far as we are wise, good, and loving, so far we have and know wisdom, goodness, love; and so far as we have and know wisdom, goodness, love, we have and know God, in so far as he is wisdom, goodness, love. He who knows more of these knows more than he who knows less. If the possession of wisdom, goodness, love, be inspiration, then he who has the most wisdom, goodness, love, is the most inspired, — and to be more inspired, he must get more wisdom, goodness, love. To be more inspired, he must be more inspired. If white be white, then white is white; if black be black, then what is black is black; if two be two, then two are two. Or, in two grand formulas from Mr. Parker, “Goodness is goodness,” and “Be good and do good,” and — you will be good and do good! If this is not the whole of Transcendentalism, when divested of its denials, its blasphemy, and its impiety, and reduced to its simple dogmatic teaching, then we have given days, weeks, months, and years, to its study to no purpose. Stated in plain and simple terms, it is the veriest commonplace imaginable. It is merely “much ado about nothing,” or “a tempest in a teapot.” Dressed up in the glittering robes of a tawdry rhetoric, or wrapped in the mystic folds of an unusual and unintelligible dialect, it may impose on the simple and credulous; but to attempt to satisfy one’s spiritual wants with it is as vain as to attempt to fill one’s self with the east wind, or to warm one’s freezing hands on a

cold winter's night by holding them up to the moon. Yet its teachers are the great lights of this age of light, before whom all the great lights of past times pale as the stars before the sun. Men and women, through some mistake not in a lunatic hospital, run after them with eagerness, hang with delight on their words, and smack their lips as if feeding on honey. Our Protestant populations, on whom the sun of the Reformation shines in its effulgence, are moved, run towards their teaching, and are about to hail it as the Tenth Avatar, come to redeem the world. Wonderful teachers! Wonderful populations! Wonderful age!

In conclusion; while surveying the mass of absurdities and impieties heaped together under the name of Transcendentalism, and which attract so many, and even some of our own friends, whose kindness of heart, whose simple manners, and whose soundness of judgment on all other subjects command our love and esteem, we have been forcibly struck with the utter impotence of human reason to devise a scheme which reason herself shall not laugh to scorn. As often as man has attempted of himself alone to build a tower which should reach to heaven, or to connect by his own skill and labor the earthly with the celestial, and make a free and easy passage from one to the other, the Lord has derided his impotent efforts, confounded his language, and made confusion more confused. Uniform failure should teach us the folly of the attempt, and lead us to ask, if it be not the highest reason to bow to the divine reason, and the most perfect freedom to have no will but the will of God. "O Israel! thou destroyest thyself; in me is thy help."

ART. II. — *The Constitution of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, containing the Confession of Faith, the Catechisms, and the Directory for the Worship of God; together with the Plan of Government and Discipline, as ratified by the General Assembly at their Sessions in May, 1821, and amended in 1833.* Philadelphia: Haswell & Co. 1838.

IN the article on the Presbyterian Confession of Faith in this Journal for April last, we disposed of only the first half

of the first chapter ; we hope to be able in this to dispose of the remaining half, and present our readers a complete view of the tenets, or rather inconsistencies and contradictions, which the Westminster divines have contrived to compress within their preliminary chapter, "Of the Holy Scripture." In reality, the controversy should be regarded as ended with the fact we have already established, that Presbyterians are utterly unable to prove the inspiration of the Scriptures ; for, since they profess to found their doctrines on the Scriptures as inspired, it is evident, that, by failing to establish the fact of inspiration, they cannot proceed a single step in the argument, and that their whole fabric falls to the ground, and is only ruins and rubbish, if even so much. But waiving this, and granting them the inspiration of the Scriptures, — not, indeed, on their grounds, but on the testimony of the Catholic Church, which has all the marks of credibility the most captious can ask, — we resume the discussion, and admire anew the beauty and vigor of logic, the marvellous concatenation of conclusions, the acuteness of judgment, the felicitous application of Scriptural texts, which they display throughout their formulary, and which they offer us as their *credentials*.

We have already examined the first five articles of the first chapter ; we commence now with the sixth, which is as follows : —

"The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either set down expressly in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture ; unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit, or traditions of men. Nevertheless, we acknowledge the inward illumination of the Spirit of God to be necessary for the saving understanding of such things as are revealed in the word ; and there are some circumstances concerning the worship of God, and the government of the Church, common to human actions and societies, which are to be ordered by the light of nature and Christian prudence, according to the general rules of the word, which are always to be obeyed."

The proofs of the three parts of the article are, —

"1. 2 Tim. iii. 16, 17. All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness ; that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works. 2. Gal. i. 8. But though we or an angel from heaven preach any other gospel unto you

than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed. 2 Thess. ii. 2. That ye be not soon shaken in mind, or be troubled, neither by spirit, nor by word, nor by letter as from us, as that the day of Christ is at hand. 3. St. John, vi. 45. It is written in the prophets, And they shall be all taught of God. Every man therefore that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto me. 1 Cor. ii. 9, 10, 12. But as it is written, Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him. But God hath revealed them unto us by his Spirit; for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God. Now we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the spirit which is of God, that we might know the things that are freely given to us of God. 1 Cor. xi. 13, 14. Judge in yourselves: is it comely that a woman pray unto God uncovered? Doth not even nature itself teach you, that, if a man have long hair, it is a shame unto him? 1 Cor. xiv. 26, 40. How is it, then, brethren? when ye come together, every one of you hath a psalm, hath a doctrine, hath a tongue, hath a revelation, hath an interpretation. Let all things be done unto edifying. Let all things be done decently and in order."

This article is designed to establish the sufficiency of the Scriptures, and to reject the traditions of the Catholic Church, and we should undoubtedly be bound to admit it, if Presbyterians could show conclusively that all was written, and that all not written is necessarily tradition of men. But this, we proved in our former article, by undeniable facts and even by Scripture itself, they do not and cannot show. We also showed that the Scriptural texts which they adduced to prove that the *whole* word was written prove no such thing, and when adduced for such a purpose are mere mockery, or rather, an imposition attempted on the people. It is not necessary to go anew over the ground we then surveyed; it is enough for us now simply to examine the additional texts which the Presbyterian divines quote in support of the sufficiency of the Scriptures, and against Catholic tradition.

We remark, in passing, the palpable contradiction which the article just quoted bears on its very face. Its authors evidently felt themselves in an awkward position. They were under the necessity of making the article say, The Scriptures are sufficient, yet something is wanting in them; they contain every thing, yet still something must be added. For, after asserting that the Scriptures contain the whole counsel of God, every thing necessary unto faith and life, they suppose that "good and necessary consequences" are still to be drawn

from them, as the condition of obtaining what is truly necessary for faith and life. Is not this asserting and denying the sufficiency of the Scriptures in the same breath? If the Scriptures had been intended by Almighty God to contain his whole counsel, and to furnish us with all things necessary for his glory, and man's salvation, faith, and life, would they not of themselves draw these good and necessary consequences, and not leave a matter so important to the discretion and judgment of our Presbyterian divines? To draw good and necessary consequences from given principles is far from being an easy matter, and is not unfrequently quite impossible. In science, for instance, the law of gravitation contains all the motions of the planets and comets, and he who could draw all the good and necessary consequences it involves would be the paragon of astronomers. This drawing of good and necessary consequences is, in fact, the real difficulty. What more absurd than to assert, that nothing must be added to the law of gravitation in astronomy, or that he who knows that law knows the whole of astronomy? The whole of civil and municipal law is contained in the principle, Give to every one his due. Is every man able to deduce the whole, by "good and necessary consequences," from this principle? and are all works on law to be condemned and reprobated, on the ground, that every man knows the principle, and the principle is all that needs to be known? The immense number of volumes on jurisprudence have been written solely because, in the various cases which arise, it is not always easy to determine what really are the good and necessary consequences to be drawn, and applied to each particular case.

Is it different in religious matters? Take, as an example, carrying the Lord's Supper to the sick. This is not expressly commanded in Scripture. But it is expressly stated, that the Lord's Supper is to be celebrated, and that, unless one eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink his blood, he shall not have life in him. Now, what are the "good and necessary consequences" to be drawn from these two statements as to carrying the Lord's Supper to the sick? Catholics draw one consequence, Presbyterians another; which proves that it is difficult to draw "good and necessary consequences" from Scripture *alone*. In point of fact, the Scriptures neither expressly command nor forbid the practice, and it must therefore be impossible from them alone to come to any *certain* conclusion respecting it, since the practice depends on the will

of Christ, and they, in this instance, tell us nothing particularly of that will, one way or the other. Presbyterians consider the practice superfluous and even superstitious; while the Catholic Church, the Church of England, and all the Oriental sects, are solicitous to impart this sacrament to the dying Christian, and believe this to be not only the most plausible consequence of the words of Scripture, but a positive institution of the Apostles and of our Lord himself. Who dares assert that "good and necessary consequences" from Scripture forbid it? especially since they say nothing expressly about it, and it has been observed, from the time of the Apostles down, by so many millions of Christians, as an apostolic practice, — not indeed written in a book, but intrusted to living men, who continually observed it, and could not possibly mistake or forget it? This is one example among a thousand equally clear and conclusive. It is, then, perfectly idle to tell us that the Scriptures are sufficient, and yet tell us that "good and necessary consequences" remain to be drawn from them, without which they would be insufficient. The great difficulty is in drawing the consequences, and it is in the consequences they draw that men chiefly differ one from another, and fall into their dangerous errors and heresies. No book could be sufficient which should not itself draw and set down expressly all the good and necessary consequences requisite to God's glory, and man's salvation, faith, and life; and as the Bible does not, by the confession of Presbyterians themselves, do this, it is evidently insufficient, and they confess it to be insufficient, even while insisting on its sufficiency.

The article contains, also, another contradiction, not less palpable. It affirms the Scriptures to be sufficient for all that concerns God's glory, and man's salvation, faith, and life, and yet asserts, that, besides them, "the illumination of the Spirit of God is necessary to a saving understanding of the word." There is more in this apparently modest and pious assertion of the necessity of inward illumination to the saving understanding of the Scriptures than may at first appear. It leaves the Scriptures open to every visionary or enthusiast, and wholly destroys their credibility as a monument of our faith. The meaning of a book is to be made out from the natural sense of the terms and expressions it employs, as understood by the community which uses them. If something interior and invisible is necessary to determine that meaning, the book is a mere scrawl or riddle, and utterly unfit to serve any purpose

for which written documents are needed or used among men. The words, "this is my body," have a meaning of themselves, which must be sought in the religious community for which the book containing them was written. If, then, a Presbyterian comes forward and tells us that these words mean "this is *not* my body, but bread," and grounds his assertion on the assumed fact, that he has the Spirit and we have not, we can only treat his assertion as a like folly would be treated in a civil court. The assertion of the necessity of the inward illumination to the saving understanding of Scripture is, then, a flagrant contradiction of the assertion of the sufficiency of Scripture. It makes the Bible, in itself considered, virtually a sealed book, or a book of riddles, whose sense, if sense it have, only a few adepts can make out. Nothing could be more hostile to that sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures which Presbyterians profess to assert as their fundamental principle.* These contradictions can surprise no one at all acquainted with sectarians. Iniquity and error must ever of necessity contradict themselves. Only justice and truth can be always consequent and self-consistent.

But let us pass to the examination of the Scripture testimony by which the Presbyterian divines attempt to prove that the written word contains every thing necessary and is the sole rule of faith and practice. The passage adduced is the same which was previously brought forward, and which we examined in our former article, namely, "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God," &c. ; only it is now produced with the addition of the words, "that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." What more inapposite or inadequate to their purpose could they possibly allege? The holy Apostle is here instructing his disciple Timothy, not giving directions to Christians generally. He speaks, moreover, of the Old Testament, the only Scriptures Timothy could have known from his childhood, since a great part of the New Testament was not written till after St. Paul wrote this Epistle, and the part which was written had, most likely, not yet been collected into a volume. If, then, the text quoted proves any thing to the purpose, it proves too

* The Christian reader will readily understand we here neither deny nor mean to deny the necessity of divine *grace*, to enable one to make an act of faith *meritorious* in the sight of God. But an act of faith is one thing, and ascertaining the meaning of a text of Scripture quite another thing.

much ; for it proves that the Old Testament *alone* is sufficient, which Presbyterians would be as loath to admit as we. Such a conclusion might, indeed, be acceptable to Jews ; but even Presbyterians must reject it at once. Then, again, the text by no means asserts or maintains the *sufficiency* of the Scriptures of the Old Testament, or of the New, or of both together. It simply indicates the Scriptures, and especially those of the Old Testament, the only Scriptures the holy Apostle is then speaking of, as an excellent means of perfecting *the man of God*, — that is, the clergyman, the bishop, or pastor of souls, — of thoroughly furnishing him for every good word and work. All this is true, and does not in the least suppose that the Scriptures contain every thing necessary and are of themselves alone sufficient for every purpose. It simply supposes that the clergyman will acquire perfection by the perusal and study of the Sacred Scriptures. If we exhort a young orator to study Demosthenes, and tell him that this study will *perfect* him as an orator, and furnish him with proper models for every species of composition, we by no means assert or imply that Demosthenes will absolutely suffice for every thing, that there will be no need of Greek grammar and lexicon, without which, perchance, Demosthenes might be a sealed book. Hence, this text, adduced by Presbyterians to prove that the Scriptures alone are sufficient for every thing, and are the sole rule of faith and practice, proves nothing to their purpose. It is one of those illusory and nugatory proofs with which this Confession of Faith abounds, and merely proves either the want of ingenuousness and strict integrity on the part of its framers, or the great difficulty they found in drawing “good and necessary consequences” from the words of Scripture.

But, leaving this text, we turn to the consideration of the Scriptural authorities adduced for rejecting Catholic traditions. The pertinency and force of these authorities consist in a species of trick, which is any thing but ingenuous, and is altogether unworthy the character, we were about to say, even of Presbyterians. We are told that the Scriptures are so complete, that nothing is to be added to them “by the traditions of *men*,” — just as if any Catholic held that traditions of *men* were to be taken as the word of God ! If the question turned on traditions of *men*, traditions broached and set up, after the Apostles, by men who gave out their own visions, fancies, or excogitations for the word of God, we should be

as ready, to say the least, to discard them as Presbyterians are. We grant, nay, earnestly contend, that all such traditions are to be discarded, and this is one reason why we do and must discard Presbyterianism itself, — palpably a mere tradition of men, first concocted full fifteen hundred years after Christ and his holy Apostles. These are not the traditions Catholics assert and contend for. Catholics say Christ and his Apostles taught men, *visá voce*, many things which were not committed to writing, but which have been preserved faithfully in the doctrine and practice of the Church, according to the admonition of the holy Apostle Paul: — “Stand firm, brethren, and hold the traditions you have learned, whether by word or by our epistle.” 2 Thess. ii. 14. These traditions are not the traditions of men, but an integral part of the revealed word, — the revelations and teaching of God (*tradited*) transmitted by men, who can and do transmit many things without writing, as they transmit language, and various practices and habits, which no one finds first, if at all, in books, but which every one learns long before opening a book.

If the Presbyterians had the candor to acknowledge these facts, or if their readers were aware of them, they would see, at a glance, that the passages adduced do not in the least impugn Catholic traditions. Those passages simply condemn traditions of men, — not traditions transmitted by men, but traditions which are of human origin, and which Catholics have always been, and are, the first and the most strenuous to condemn. The first text adduced is from St. Paul. “Though we or an angel from heaven preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed.” The Presbyterian divines bring forward this passage as expressly condemning all traditions; but no selection could be more unfortunate for them. It not only says nothing against traditions, but is an awful denunciation of Presbyterianism, and an express command to all who would adhere to the Gospel of our Lord to hold it accursed. These divines would represent this text to mean, If any body holds any doctrine to be divinely revealed not written in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, let him be accursed: therefore, let Papists, who hold traditional doctrines, be accursed. Yet there is no scholar but would be ashamed to pretend that this is the real meaning; and even Presbyterians themselves, if they would examine the context, would, on this point, agree with us. The Galatians had been converted to Christ by the Apostle St.

Paul, who had taken great pains to make them understand that the Mosaical ceremonies were not only unnecessary, but, if observed in a Jewish spirit, and considered a *necessary* part of Christianity, even superstitious. Some Jewish teachers went among them, and persuaded them to embrace these same ceremonies as necessary, and thus caused them to turn again to the weak and poor elements of the Law. They observed days, and months, and years, and wished again to come under the Law. (iv. 9, 10, 21.) On learning this, the Apostle wrote to them in terms of mingled holy indignation and burning charity. "I wonder that you are so soon removed from him who called you to the grace of Christ, to another gospel, which is not another, only there are some who trouble you, and would pervert the Gospel of Christ. But though we or an angel from heaven preach any other gospel to you than that which we have preached to you, let him be anathema." The meaning of St. Paul is clearly, If any body, even an angel, come and preach to you the necessity of Jewish observances, let him be accursed; and, in a more general sense, If any one, even an angel, preach to you any doctrine *contrary* to that which we have preached, let him be accursed. That this is his meaning, and that the one given in the Confession is absurd, must be manifest to all who reflect that St. Paul says nothing here of a gospel *written*, but speaks simply of a gospel *preached*, — that the Four Gospels were not then written, — certainly not that of St. John, which was not written till many years afterwards, — and that many other portions of the Scriptures were also as yet unwritten, as learned Presbyterians are themselves aware and admit. If the Presbyterian interpretation of the text were admitted, we should be required to reject every writing of the Apostles posterior to the date of the Epistle to the Galatians, even many of the Epistles of St. Paul himself, as another gospel than that which he preached to the Galatians, — a conclusion which even Presbyterians must shrink from with horror. But, if many things were added to the New Testament, containing doctrines not found in the parts written prior to the Epistle in question, every one must see that St. Paul could have meant only what we have alleged, that is, If any one hold any thing *contrary* to the Christian traditions which you have received from us, let him be accursed. The Gospel preached to the Galatians must have been, to a great extent, if not exclusively, a traditional one. Consequently, the meaning of St. Paul must have been,

If any one hold any doctrine contrary to that which has been given to you, whether in writing or orally, it matters not whether in the one mode or the other, let him be accursed. So far, then, from asserting that there must be no traditions, this text, as far as it goes, presupposes and teaches to the contrary.

The Church has always cherished this maxim of the great Apostle, written far more efficaciously in the convictions and practices of Christians than it can be on paper. If any one comes forward preaching any doctrine unknown before him, or irreconcilable with the dogmas already received, the language of Catholics has been from the first, Let him be anathema. On this ground any doctrine which is new is rejected as false; for, if new, it cannot be a doctrine of the Apostles, but must be the offspring of the human intellect or fancy. There is no need of discussion, no need of a long course of reading. Is the doctrine contrary to what has been taught? Then it is false. If, *per impossibile*, an angel from heaven were to preach it, still it is false and to be rejected; for we know that the doctrines taught by the Apostles are from God, and so confirmed by miracles, that it would be absurd not to receive them. We know, also, that God protects his Church against even hell, whose gates can never prevail against it. We know this latter point from innumerable proofs, among which we reckon as not the least this very text of St. Paul, which commands us, if even an angel should come preaching any novelty contrary to the doctrine preached in the Church, not to listen to him.

But what will become of Presbyterianism, if tried by this test, — the touchstone furnished by the great Apostle, the Doctor of Nations? What, in fact, is it itself, but a naked, undisguised, and undisguisable novelty? What is it, but a doctrine undeniably contrary to that of the Apostles, and which has been received in the Church through every age? That it was a novelty at the time when John Calvin and John Knox broached it is so evident, that Presbyterians themselves cannot seriously undertake to deny it. They themselves tell us that they left the Catholic Church in consequence of its *old* errors, *old* superstitions, *old* corruptions, *old* traditions of men. Calvin and Knox gave themselves out as the preachers of *new* and pure doctrines, the propagators of a *new* light, and the authors of a *new* era for the religious world. What was this, but setting aside the ancient doctrine, and substituting a modern

one? But the Apostle solemnly declares, that, if even an angel comes preaching a doctrine different from what has been preached before, he is to be accursed. Alas for Presbyterianism! even if it had been preached by an angel from heaven, we are commanded by the very text which Presbyterians adduce, and are ambitious of engraving on their escutcheon, to hold it accursed; how much rather, then, since it was preached by no angel, but by such men as John Calvin and John Knox, certainly no angels, — unless of darkness! This text of St. Paul, then, instead of militating against Catholic traditions, is evidently a direct and irrevocable condemnation of Presbyterianism itself, indeed of all modern sects, among which Presbyterians, we admit, are entitled to the first rank. Decidedly, they should not quote this text. The Philistines flattered themselves that they had achieved a glorious victory, when they took captive the Ark of Israel, and carried it in triumph to their own country; but when they beheld their god Dagon mutilated and their cities depopulated by the divine justice, they were even more eager to restore it than they had been to possess it. Presbyterians, perhaps, will be as eager hereafter to restore this text to its rightful owners, as the Philistines were the Ark.

The second text the Confession quotes against Catholic traditions is, “Be not soon shaken in mind, or be troubled, neither by spirit, nor by word, nor by letter, as from us, as that the day of Christ is at hand.” This is a singular text to prove that Scripture is sufficient, and that Catholic traditions are traditions of men, and to be discarded.

“Sharp optics has he, I ween,
Who sees what’s not to be seen.”

So sharp logicians are our Presbyterian divines, who find proofs where proofs there are none. St. Paul writes to the Thessalonians not to believe the *Millerites* of their time; therefore the Scriptures alone are the sole rule of faith and practice; therefore Catholic traditions are traditions of men, and to be discarded! There is no refuting such reasoning. But, seriously, if Presbyterians adduce this text as evidencing an instance of false tradition, how happens it they fail to perceive, that, in their haste to pluck out their neighbours’ eyes, they most effectually pluck out their own? St. Paul refers to tradition not only by *word*, but also by *letter*. If Presbyterians say, Therefore there have been false traditions, and therefore *all* traditions

are to be discarded ; we retort, Therefore there have been false Scriptures, and therefore all Scripture is to be discarded.

If the subject were not so serious, one could not help being amused with the zeal of Presbyterians against the traditions of men, when their own Confession and Constitution show us with what admirable docility and tameness they submit to doctrines and practices which have and can have no origin but in the pride of innovators ; when we are able to point out the very year of the birth of the founder of Presbyterianism, fifteen hundred years after our Saviour, the year in which he separated himself from the Church, the exact data of the Calvinistic inoculation of John Knox, the year and the month of the various enterprises of Calvinism in the several parts of Europe, and, in fact, of the origin of all their religious practices. Here we have unquestionably an example of traditions of men held as the pure word of God by Presbyterians themselves, although the year and day can be pointed out when they sprang from the head of Calvin and Calvinistic leaders. How, then, can they have the hardihood, nay, how can they be so suicidal as to speak against traditions of men ? What can be more supremely ridiculous than to discard as human tradition the celebration of Easter, the solemn commemoration of the death of Christ by a season of penance and fasting, when the death and resurrection of Christ are both mentioned in the New Testament, when the Old Testament abounds with festivals divinely instituted in commemoration of great events, and these two yearly commemorations are found to have been observed in the Church from the earliest ages, — and yet to admit as Scriptural a mode of ecclesiastical government by congregational, presbyterial, and synodical assemblies, of which there was no example at the time of Calvin's birth, and of which there never had been an example in the world ? What more undeniably a human tradition than the name, office, functions, and mode of election and ordination, of a Presbyterian *ruling elder* ? Surely, Presbyterians are the last people in the world to speak disrespectfully of human traditions, as we shall show, even more conclusively, when we reach the various questions which will come up under their Constitution and Plan of Government. Deprive them of human traditions, and they would be in the sad plight of the man of Mount Ephraim, who ran after the Danites with his piteous wail, and when asked why he cried, answered, " Ye have taken away my gods which I have made

me, and the priest, and all that I have, and do you say, What aileth thee ?” Judges xviii. 24.

After all, it is only in theory and by way of boasting, that Presbyterians assert the sufficiency of the Scriptures alone as the sole rule of faith and practice. They really hold the Bible alone to be quite inadequate to the formation of a system of religious doctrine, and are in this respect remarkable among all modern sects ; or else why the volume before us ? If the Scriptures alone be sufficient, if they are the sole rule of faith and practice, why the Westminster Confession of Faith, the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, the Directory, the Form of Government and Discipline, and other valuable appendages ? Is it not solely because Presbyterians fear that people will not find in the Bible this mode of government by ministers, ruling elders, and deacons, the three grades of the Presbyterian hierarchy ? Is it not because they have a suspicion that people will not, without the help of the Confession of Faith, the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, find out that God in the beginning made some men with the design of beatifying and glorifying them, and others with the design of making them the prey of eternal fire ? Is it not because they are afraid that the dogma, that God leaves sinners, and sometimes even just men, without the gracious assistance necessary to enable them to keep his law, will not be ferreted out by the reader of Scripture, unless it is propounded to them in the Confession and Catechisms, since Presbyterians or Calvinists are the only ones who find out that this and the other articles of the Calvinistic creed are clearly taught in Scripture ? They hold their Confession of Faith, their Directory, their plan of government, their catechisms, and their discipline to be *necessary* ; hence, they ordain that no one shall be licensed “ as an elder or a minister, unless he adopt the Confession of Faith, and approve of the government and discipline of the Presbyterian Church.” If these be necessary, and Scripture alone contains every thing necessary, how happens it that it does not contain these, and in the precise form in which they are to be adopted and approved by the candidates for license ? Did the Holy Ghost forget himself, and hence the necessity of the Westminster divines to supply his deficiency ?

There are some Protestant sects who are far from being guilty of the particular species of hypocrisy chargeable upon Presbyterians ; sects which do not uphold the sufficiency of Scripture with one hand, and demolish it with the other by impos-

ing creeds and confessions drawn up by men, which discard all creeds, even the Apostles' Creed, every discipline and directory as a curse, and hold up the Scriptures alone as sufficient, as the sole rule of faith, without gloss, note, or comment. In one sense these *do* admit the sufficiency of Scripture, for this is all they admit; since they do not agree on a single article taught by the Scriptures, as must be the case with all who assert the sufficiency of the Bible alone;—another and a conclusive proof to Catholics, that Scripture alone is not sufficient, and that Christ and the Apostles did not intend to write every thing necessary, but left every thing in the hands of a *living* body subsisting always unto the consummation of the world, always supernaturally assisted and able to transmit both what was written, with its true interpretation, and what was not written. Hence the command and the promise, — “Going, teach all nations, teaching them to observe all things *whatsoever* which I have commanded you; for, behold, I am with you all days unto the consummation of the world.” St. Matt. xxviii. 19, 20.

But we come now to another point in the Protestant creed, namely, the *clearness* of Scripture. Here the Presbyterians seem to surpass even themselves in mystification, and in that peculiar skill in deducing proofs from Scripture, which reminds us of the etymology of *lucus* from *non lucendo*. We quote the article entire, with its proofs.

“Art. VII. All things in Scripture are not alike plain in themselves, nor alike clear unto all; yet those things which are necessary to be known, believed, and observed, for salvation, are so clearly propounded and opened in some place of Scripture or other, that not only the learned, but the unlearned, in a due use of the ordinary means, may attain unto a sufficient understanding of them.

“2 Pet. iii. 16. As also in all *his* epistles, speaking in them of these things; in which are some things hard to be understood, which they that are unlearned and unstable wrest, as *they do* also the other Scriptures, unto their own destruction. Ps. cxix. [cxviii.] 105, 130. Thy word is a lamp unto my feet, and a light unto my path. — The entrance of thy words giveth light; it giveth understanding unto the simple.”

The hypothesis on which this article was framed is, since the Scripture contains every thing, is of itself sufficient, without tradition or any thing else, and the *sole* rule of faith and practice, it must, of course, be clear and open to all; but

there is an unlucky text of St. Peter which states boldly and uncompromisingly that there are things in the Scriptures hard to be understood, and Catholics do not fail to urge this text, with advantage, against us. We must, then, lay it down in our Confession, that in things not necessary Scripture is indeed obscure, but in things necessary it is clear even to the unlearned. This article opens a wide field of inquiry, but we must confine ourselves to a few points. What, we ask, are those things which are necessary, and about which Scripture is clear? The Presbyterians evidently mean their doctrines, as contained in the Confession of Faith, the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, &c. Be it so. But unhappily, as blind men seeking to avoid one danger fall into another, they assert this without proof, and may be met by stricter logic with the reply, that those things are necessary which are clear, and not the reverse; and then, that it is necessary for salvation to believe there once lived a man called Methusalem, — for this is so clearly stated in Scripture that no one, believing the Scriptures, ever did or ever can call it in question; and, on the contrary, that it is not necessary to believe in the divinity of our Lord, — for this is not clear in the Scriptures, since there were many who questioned it in the fourth century, and there are many who do not believe it now, and deny that it is taught in the Scriptures at all. But granting the necessary articles may be settled by some other process, let us look at the proofs which Presbyterians adduce to establish their position, that Scripture is obscure only on matters which are not necessary. These proofs are in the text from St. Peter. But this text proves the very reverse. It says there are things hard to be understood in the Scriptures, which some wrest *to their own destruction*. If they can wrest these things hard to be understood to their own destruction, they must be necessary to salvation; for if not, no misapprehension of their sense could involve destruction. The things, then, of which St. Peter speaks, are not unnecessary things, but necessary, and which it is necessary for salvation rightly to understand. The Presbyterians, therefore, prove on Scriptural authority the opposite in their notes of what they assert in the text, as is usual with them.

Nothing but pride and ignorance could ever induce any one to deny that there are things in the Bible obscure and hard to be understood. That the obscurities and difficulties pertain to things important and most essential is obvious from daily ex-

perience, and from St. Peter, who would not have spoken of them, if they concerned neither faith nor salvation. Suppose an ordinary reader, on finding in the Bible that the eyes of our first parents were opened, imagines that they were previously blind, or had an additional eyelid; that one commentator thinks the forbidden fruit was an apple, and another that it was an orange, and still another that it was a fig; that one believes that the whale which swallowed Jonas was a shark, and another that it was some other kind of fish, now extinct; that this one, when he reads St. Paul's declaration, "A night and a day I have been in the deep," concludes that he was on a plank *upon* the water, and another, that he was *under* the water; will it be necessary to conclude that one or the other of these wrests the Scriptures to his own destruction, and must necessarily be lost? Nobody can believe it. Then it cannot be of such interpretations as these, or the misapprehension of such matters as these, St. Peter speaks; but we must understand him to speak of such matters as Christians generally, and Presbyterians particularly, hold to be necessary. For instance, St. Paul tells us, "Abraham believed and it was reputed to him for justice"; are we, therefore, to hold ourselves secure, if we only believe, but are careless about every thing else? So of innumerable other questions which immediately concern religion and morality.

Presbyterians, then, evidently fail to make out that the obscurities of Scripture are confined to things which are not necessary; let us see if they succeed better in making out that it is clear in things necessary, — clear not for the learned only, but also for the unlearned, — and not by extraordinary means or helps from above, but by the due use of the ordinary means. Their whole proof of this rests on the texts from the Psalmist, "Thy word is a lamp unto my feet, and a light unto my path," "The entrance of thy words giveth light; it giveth understanding unto the simple." David, writing his Psalms under the influence of divine inspiration, says the word of God is a lamp to his feet, a light to his path, and therefore every Presbyterian, in case he has the written word, is to conclude that he is equally privileged! David says in the same Psalm, "I rose at midnight to give praise to Thee." Shall we, therefore, conclude, forthwith, that all Presbyterians rise at midnight to sing psalms? But admitting the text to be applicable to all Christians, nothing proves that David spoke of a word known to him by his own reading of the Bible, or even by the common tradition

of the Jews ; and consequently, the text proves merely that knowledge of the law of God, when once obtained, however obtained, whether by reading the Bible or from oral tradition, is a lamp and a light. It does not say this knowledge is obtained or obtainable from reading the Bible, much less does it say the Bible by the due use of ordinary means is clear even to the unlearned in all necessary things. Any man, knowing the true religion, might and would apply the words to himself, even though unable to read a syllable. The text, moreover, makes no reference to the distinction between things necessary and things unnecessary. If, then, it prove the necessary facts of the written word to be clear, it proves the unnecessary facts to be equally clear. Finally, it is presumable that St. Peter knew the psalms of the royal prophet, and the particular passage in question, at least as well as modern Presbyterians know them, and yet he expressly and solemnly asserts that there are things in the Scriptures "*hard to be understood*, which the unlearned and unstable wrest to their own destruction." But it is unnecessary to say more on such proofs as these. Presbyterians cannot be supposed to place any confidence in them themselves.

There is no need of dwelling longer on the fact that the Scriptures are not clear in every thing necessary. It is altogether silent on many points of great consequence, as we proved in our former article, and it barely alludes to others no less important. After what we have said, we may conclude the discussion of the clearness of Scripture with the remark, that Presbyterians must have an unenviable share of assurance to assert, as they do, and apparently without blushing, notwithstanding these words of Scripture, "If any man be sick among you, let him bring in the priests of the Church, and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil," &c., or these other words, "Take ye and eat, this is my body, Wherefore, whosoever shall eat this bread, or drink the chalice of the Lord unworthily, shall be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord," that it is clear there is no such thing as the Real Presence in the Eucharist, and that Extreme Unction is a Popish imposition ; or to assert, as they also do, in the face of the declaration of St. Paul, "He that is without a wife is solicitous for the things which belong to the Lord ; but he that is with a wife is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife ; and the unmarried woman thinketh on the things of the Lord, that she may be holy both in body and in spirit,"

1 Cor. vii, 32 – 34, that it is, nevertheless, clear from Scripture, that monastic vows of perpetual celibacy are superstitious and sinful snares. While they reject Catholic dogmas and practices so unequivocally expressed in the Scriptures, we can only smile at their simplicity, or grieve at their impudence, in asserting that they find clearly stated in Scripture all the rules enjoined for keeping Sunday, and all the impediments to marriage originating in consanguinity or affinity. They can quote long Scripture passages, upon these points, it is true; but these passages are from the law of Moses, which every body admits to have been abrogated by Christ, yet this is nothing to Presbyterians. They are bent upon finding Scripture authority for the practice they have determined to adopt, and they can hardly be expected not to succeed — in some way; especially since their people are blest with a plentiful share of ignorance and credulity. We would, however, since they insist on quoting the law of Moses, when it suits their predeterminations, recommend them to go the whole length of the thing; and, if they will quote the Old Testament for the keeping of Sunday, let them keep also the “Sabbath of years,” and leave their land fallow every seventh year, Lev. xxv. 4. Let them also keep all the laws of Moses on marriage; and in particular the law in Deuteronomy xxv. 6–10. They would then preserve, at least, some show of consistency. But enough on this branch of the subject.

We have now reached the eighth article, which will detain us a little longer.

“The Old Testament in Hebrew (which was the native language of the people of God of old) and the New Testament in Greek (which at the time of the writing of it was most generally known to the nations), being immediately inspired by God, and by his singular care and providence kept pure in all ages, are therefore authentic, so as in all controversies of religion the Church is finally to appeal unto them. But because these original tongues are not known to all the people of God, who have right unto and interest in the Scriptures, and are commanded in the fear of God to read and search them, therefore they are to be translated into the vulgar language of every nation unto which they come, that the word of God dwelling plentifully in all, they may worship him in an acceptable manner, and through patience and comfort of the Scriptures have hope.

“Matt. v. 18. For verily I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled. Isa. viii. 20. To the law and to the testimony, &c.

Acts xv. 15. John v. 46. John v. 39. Search the Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life; and they are they which testify of me. 1 Cor. xiv. 6-28. Col. iii. 16. Let the word of Christ dwell in you richly," &c. Rom. xv. 4.

Before proceeding to consider the real merits of the questions involved in this article, we must say a word or two on the marvellous appositeness of these Scriptural authorities. We have so often been compelled to notice the peculiar beauty and force of Presbyterian logic in the application of Scriptural texts, that our readers may be wellnigh surfeited, as we confess we are ourselves. Too much of a good thing, says the proverb, is good for nothing. Nevertheless, we must sit yet longer at the feast. Christ said, "One jot or one tittle shall not pass from the law till all be fulfilled"; *therefore* the Hebrew and Greek copies of the Scriptures which we now have are authentic, and have been kept pure in all ages! It is not easy to surpass this. But add, for the greater edification of pious Presbyterians, *therefore* the Bible of King James is authentic, correctly translated, and perfectly pure! The marvellous appositeness of this proof is in the well known fact, that St. Matthew, from whom it is taken, wrote his Gospel in Hebrew, and that Hebrew text is lost, and we have only a translation of it! Again. "To the law and to the testimony"; *therefore*, if we have a religious controversy to settle, we must run and learn Hebrew and Greek, for it is only by appealing to the Hebrew and Greek copies that we can have a reasonable hope of arriving at the truth. Wonderful logic! Who but Presbyterians could ever have compassed it? St. Paul found fault with certain primitive Christians, who, having received the gift of tongues, were eager to speak in the church in unknown languages. He wishes them to show more moderation, and to speak in them only where there is an interpreter. *Therefore* the Scriptures are to be translated into the vulgar tongues, distributed everywhere to all, and in every language! But, if so, why did not the Apostles themselves draw this conclusion, so "good and necessary" in the view of our learned and acute Presbyterian divines, and give us from their own hands a Latin, a Syriac, an Arabic, a Gallic New Testament? It is singular how much superior as logicians our Presbyterian divines are to the Apostles, and how inconsistent the neglect of the Apostles must appear to them. But the Presbyterians live in modern times, have the advantages of modern progress, and therefore must naturally be supposed to surpass the Apostles,

who lived a long time ago, and had only the lights of divine inspiration.

We shall restrict what we have to say on the article under consideration to three questions, namely : 1. Are the Hebrew copies of the Old Testament and the Greek copies of the New, *which we now possess*, more "authentic" than the Latin Vulgate ? 2. Is there a positive obligation upon all men to read the Scriptures ? And 3. Is the distribution of the Scriptures to all indiscriminately in the vulgar tongues an effectual way of making *the word of God dwell plentifully in all*, and of attaining the end for which it was given ?

1. The Latin Vulgate, put by the side of the Hebrew and Greek copies of the Scriptures we now have, will not suffer by the comparison ; and our Douay Bible, made from it with remarkable accuracy, is superior to the version of King James, though this last purports to be made from the original tongues, since the Latin Vulgate is at least as good a representative of the word of God as the modern copies in the original tongues now in our possession, and the English version made from it is a far better performance than that of the translators appointed by the royal theologian. If we possessed the autographs of Moses and the other Jewish writers in Hebrew, and those of the Apostles themselves in Greek, no one would be found, of course, to contest their superiority ; though, after all, they would be found to agree substantially with our modern Bible. But the autograph is lost, and the manuscripts or printed copies of Hebrew and Greek Bibles are only transcriptions of other copies which are also lost, and which themselves were only transcriptions. To tell the number of transcriptions there have been, in ascending from a modern Hebrew Bible to Moses, would puzzle greater men than even Westminster divines. This being understood, it will not be disputed that our present copies of the Hebrew Bible may and must have mistakes and errors, unless indeed it be contended that God has by a continual miracle directed the hand of every copyist. These errors and mistakes, it is true, do not affect the substance of the text, or prevent it from representing the substance of the dogmas, morals, and history recorded by the sacred penman ; but they are blemishes, and blemishes which place the Hebrew and Greek text as low as, and even lower than, an early translation, in which there must have been fewer chances of accidental variations, and in which such as did occur were more likely to be corrected. Such a translation is the Latin Vulgate, at least in the

view of Catholics, who respect, indeed, the Hebrew and Greek copies, but are far from considering them the only or even the most authentic monuments we now have of divine revelation.

Presbyterians seem, in their Scriptural quotations, to intimate that every thing, even to a single jot or comma, in the Hebrew and Greek copies is correct ; but this, it is well known, is not the fact. The several Hebrew and Greek manuscripts extant are known to differ from one another by something more than jots and commas. Which of these manuscripts is the one Presbyterians declare to be genuine, the one immediately inspired ? Open Griesbach's edition of the New Testament, and you shall find scarcely a page which does not present various readings, all of which are supported by Greek manuscripts, and with no possible means of determining in all cases which is the genuine reading. Who, in the face of this fact, can unblushingly assert that God by his providence has so watched over the Hebrew and Greek copies of the Bible, that they are absolutely pure, and in nothing differ from the autographs themselves ? Every one who can read a word of Hebrew and Greek, and compare editions, knows such an assertion to be false. The simple fact, then, that the Old Testament was written in Hebrew, and the New in Greek, is not, then, in itself a reason for preferring our present Hebrew and Greek copies to authentic versions, possessing the requisite qualities. The Latin Vulgate may, then, represent the word of God as well as the received Hebrew text, and we hesitate not to say that in many things it actually does represent it even better. Not to enter too far into Biblical criticism, we select a couple of examples from many others we might adduce. Genesis, iv. 8, we read in the Vulgate, " And Cain said to his brother Abel, Let us go forth abroad. And when they were in the field, Cain rose up against his brother Abel and slew him." In the Hebrew the words *let us go forth abroad*, are wanting, and hence the royal theologians in the Protestant version translate, " And Cain talked with Abel, his brother ; and it came to pass, when they were in the field, that Cain rose up against his brother and slew him." The Vulgate here is far preferable to the Hebrew, and Moses must have written as in the Vulgate, and not as in the modern Hebrew. The proof of this is in the fact that the Septuagint has these words, " Let us go forth abroad," the Targum of Jerusalem has them, and so has the Pentateuch of the Samaritans ; and this last must be for the learned high authority. Hence St. Jerome, who had the Samaritan Pentateuch under his eyes,

was induced to retain the reading which we have in the Vulgate. The context itself confirms this reading. The modern Hebrew says that Cain spoke to Abel, but, unless we add the words in the Vulgate, he is made to speak without saying anything. Moreover, if we admit that Cain said, "Let us go forth abroad," the following words, "And when they were in the field," &c., come in naturally, and with perfect propriety. Here are sufficient considerations for preferring the reading of the Vulgate to that of the modern Hebrew.

The other example we select is Ps. xxi. 17, "They have dug my hands and feet," said in reference to Christ on the cross. The modern Hebrew text, however, has, instead of "they have dug," the words "like a lion." But so untenable is this latter reading, that Protestants generally, and even the Westminster divines themselves, notwithstanding they found out that the Hebrew text is absolutely pure, because not a jot or a tittle of the law was to pass away, reject it and adopt that of the Vulgate and other versions. There is no need of multiplying examples in support of a point which no learned Protestant disputes. The rule to be laid down is, that the best reading is not always that of the Hebrew or Greek, but is to be determined by a cautious and judicious comparison of the texts of ancient manuscripts and versions.*

The merits of the Vulgate, as a translation, far exceed those of any modern version. It was chiefly the work of St. Jerome, whose reputation for learning and skill in the Oriental languages stands unrivalled, and who had far better opportunities than we now have of obtaining the best Hebrew and Greek manuscripts, since he lived at the time when the great Alexandrian library was still in its glory. Moreover, he was admirably well acquainted with the country, the usages, the laws, and the history of the Jews, and he spent a great portion of his life in the conscientious performance of his task. Hence his translation was soon adopted by the whole Church, and acquired from this fact a higher stamp of authenticity than could be obtained by the mere skill of a translator; because Divine Providence could not suffer any but an authentic copy of the precious deposite of divine revelation to become current in the Church. This consideration weighed with the Fathers of the Council of Trent, in declaring the Vulgate to be an authentic copy of the word of God, and their judgment has been confirmed by the most learned and impartial Protestants. English translations of the Bible, purport-

* See, for a fuller discussion of this point, the following article.

ing to be from the original tongues, are often wretched performances, and sometimes shameful corruptions of the word of God. The version of King James, though freed from many wilful corruptions and alterations, yet contains many unwarrantable errors, and pernicious additions and mutilations, as our authors easily establish. We refer the reader on this point to Ward's *Errata*, and also to Campbell's *Preliminary Dissertations*.

2. But we pass to our second question, namely, Is there a positive obligation upon all men to read the Bible? Our Presbyterian divines say authoritatively that there is, but without satisfying us that they are right. No obligation should be assumed to be binding on all men, unless established by irrefragable proofs, and, in the present case, unless established by clear and undeniable Scriptural authority. Presbyterians hold that the Scriptures alone are the sufficient and the sole rule of faith and practice, and that they clearly and sufficiently expound all the duties of Christians. Then they cannot assume that all men are bound to *read* the Scriptures, unless they can prove it by a clear and undisputable command from the Scriptures themselves. But where is the Scriptural text which declares it to be the *duty* of all men to read the Bible? The Confession of Faith relies on the passage from St. John, "Search the Scriptures; for in them ye think ye have eternal life; and they are they which testify of me"; but this in reality proves nothing to the purpose. By reading the chapter from which this text is taken, it will be seen that our Lord, by the cure of an infirm man at the pond Probatica, on the Sabbath day, incurred the displeasure of the Jews, who even thought of putting him to death. Against these Jews, against these envenomed enemies, he argues to prove the divinity of his mission, and refers them to the Scriptures, and bids them study them attentively, for they bear testimony for him. Now, how from this can it be inferred that it is positively obligatory upon Christians, and especially upon all men, to read the Bible? In the first place, the Presbyterian who reads this passage in the original tongue must find that the word *search* may be in the indicative mood, as well as in the imperative, and that the translation might have been, without any impropriety, "Ye search the Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life; now they are they which testify of me." St. Cyril, who was at least as good a Greek scholar as were King James's translators, so interprets it, and some modern Protestants do the same. In this case, the words of our Lord do not contain even the shadow of a command.

Now, a Presbyterian has no possible way to determine whether the inspired writer used the indicative mood or the imperative ; and here is a *clear* proof of the obscurity of Scripture on a duty which Presbyterians must hold to be of paramount importance.

But suppose the verb to be in the imperative mood, still no obligation upon all Christians to read the Bible can be deduced. The words quoted were addressed to the Jews, who denied the mission of Christ, — not to Christians at large, for the purpose of enjoining a precept ; they were said, moreover, only in reference to the Old Testament, the only Scriptures then in existence, and merely imply, that, if the Jews had attentively read the Old Testament, they would have been brought to a knowledge of Christ's authority. As much as to say, If ye were acquainted with the Scriptures, in which ye think ye have eternal life, ye would not reject me, for they bear witness to me. Suppose a Christian, arguing against a Mahometan, should say, Read attentively the Koran, and you will find a splendid testimony in favor of Jesus Christ ; who could thence conclude that he intended to assert that there is an obligation upon all Christians to read the Koran ? How, then, is it possible from the words in question to conclude that there is a positive obligation upon all men to read the Bible ? Presbyterians hold that all obligations are clearly expressed in Scripture. Then, on their own grounds, if all men are under obligation to read the Bible, it must be clearly expressed in the Scriptures, — say, as clearly as the obligations contained in the Ten Commandments. But it is not so expressed ; and therefore, on their own ground, we have the right to conclude the obligation does not exist.

We have here disposed of the only text which Presbyterians adduce in support of the obligation in question. Other texts might have been adduced, but none which prove any thing beyond the *utility* of reading the Scriptures, — a point which, when coupled with the proper preparation and disposition on the part of the reader, we by no means contest. The precept of St. Paul to Timothy, "Attend to reading," 1 Tim. iv. 13, might perhaps be alleged ; but it is obvious that St. Paul in that epistle is pointing out the duties of a clergyman, not of each individual Christian ; and we grant that reading in general, but especially the Scriptures, is not only useful, but necessary, for a clergyman.

What we have said is sufficient to disprove the positive obligation or *duty* of all men to read the Bible ; but we go further,

and say that the admission of such an obligation is altogether at variance with the conduct of the Apostles, and the paternal and merciful providence of God in the government of men. If it had been obligatory upon all men to read the Scriptures, the Apostles would have written them in, or at least translated them into, all languages, which they did not do; and we learn from St. Irenæus, that whole nations embraced Christianity, among whom not a copy of the Scriptures was to be found. The Apostles, indeed, composed a symbol or creed, and directed that every one should learn it by heart before baptism; but the creed is short, and to learn it is comparatively an easy task; whereas the Bible is a large volume, and it is no trifling labor to commit it all to memory. Moreover, for fifteen centuries, to obtain a Bible was not a little difficult, and few could go to the labor and expense of copying it. Who can calmly assert that there is a strict moral obligation upon all men even to learn reading? To admit the assertion, that to read the Bible is strictly obligatory upon all, would be to transform the great mass of men into a set of prevaricators, and to impeach the goodness of God, who for fifteen hundred years left the world without that easy means of producing and obtaining books at cheap rates which we now possess.

Finally, reading the Scriptures can be maintained to be obligatory upon all men, only on the supposition, that without them it is impossible to attain to a knowledge of Christian faith and morals. But this supposition is inadmissible. Universal experience, from the times of the Apostles who gave us the Creed, proves that men do and can come to a knowledge of the duties and the mysteries of faith more easily, and more surely, by learning their catechism and listening to their pastors, than by reading the Bible, which does not and never was intended to contain a clear and succinct summary of Christian doctrine. "There is," says St. Francis of Sales, "the same difference between the word of God as contained in the Scriptures, and the same word as contained in the Catechism and the instructions of the pastor, that there is between a nut covered with its hard shell, and the same nut broken and laid open before you." For the mass of mankind, at least, the nut must be broken and laid open, before they can perceive and eat its delicious contents. The real obligation, the real necessity, is to learn, not the Bible so called, but the Christian doctrine, which can be done, and effectually, without ever handling a book. Moreover, as a matter of fact,

what the various Protestant sects call Christian doctrine is not learned from reading the Bible. The Presbyterian child learns Presbyterianism, not from the Bible, but from his Sunday-school teacher, his manual, and the instructions of his parents and his pastor. Even Unitarians, who discard all creeds and confessions, have their catechisms and manuals, through which they indoctrinate their children in their dogmas against dogmas, their creed against creeds. No sect relies on reading the Bible alone as the means of obtaining or of imparting what it holds to be Christian doctrine. We say truly, then, universal experience is against the supposition in question, and the universal practice of all those who insist that reading the Bible is strictly obligatory on all Christians affords ample evidence, that, however convenient they may find it to make such a profession, they in reality believe no such thing.

3. We are now led to the third and last question, namely, Is the distribution of the Bible to all indiscriminately an effectual way of making the word of God dwell plentifully in all, and of attaining the end for which it was given? We unhesitatingly say that it is not, and that mankind have witnessed no greater folly, since the Reformation, than the rage which has obtained, more especially from the early part of the present century, for distributing Bibles everywhere, in all places, to all sorts of persons, and in all languages. This rage, this mania, is really an impeachment of our Lord and of his blessed Apostles. The Apostles, the heralds of evangelical doctrine, never dreamed of a distribution of Bibles as a means of establishing and propagating Christianity. We have a detailed account of the missions of St. Paul throughout nearly the whole known world, yet nowhere do we find that he was anxious to procure copies of the Bible, and that he distributed them at random. The same blessed Apostle in his Epistles enters into many minute details of Christian life, but never does a syllable escape him about copying and distributing Bibles. The Apostles taught and instructed the heathen and the faithful, not by books, but *vivâ voce*, or by preaching; because they had received from their Divine Master the solemn injunction to "*preach* the Gospel to every creature," and because the great work of the conversion and sanctification of men, in the ordinary state of things, can be successfully performed only by *living* men, and not by a dead book. Hence, the general maxim of St. Paul was, "*Faith comes by hearing*," — *fides ex auditu*, — not by reading. This is the process and econ-

omy of nature. It is little less than folly to suppose that science can be communicated and diffused without living teachers. The practice and common sense of mankind are opposed to the plan of learning without a teacher, from books alone; and if sometimes adopted by a few through necessity, it is only at great expense and trouble. Those who do adopt it never become thoroughly learned; their knowledge is never complete and exact; and they constantly expose themselves to disappointments and blunders, from which those who have had the benefit of the more usual and less defective methods are free. Only a few, again, can learn any thing by this method; the bulk of mankind can learn nothing by it. Yet the difficulty of learning any thing positive in religion from the study of a book, especially of a book never intended to be a summary of doctrine, or a clear and appropriate introduction to religious truth, is much greater.

If the whole secret of propagating Christian doctrine consisted in the multiplication and distribution of copies of the Bible, and not in the oral teaching of divinely appointed instructors, would the Apostle have ever referred us to these stages in the Christian ministry, — “And some Christ gave to be apostles, and some prophets, and others evangelists, and others pastors and teachers, for the perfection of the saints, for the work of the ministry,” Eph. iv. 11, 12? Would he not have said, And some Christ gave to be *colporteurs*, or distributors of Bibles, others buyers and sellers of Bibles, others transcribers or printers of Bibles, others paper or ink makers, others rag-merchants, and others rag-collectors? for in this strange system, these are all valuable and necessary members of the sacred hierarchy.

It is not the mere hearing or reading of the word of God that avails us, but the proper understanding of it, and especially the fruit we gather from it. Scripture itself asserts, “Not the hearers of the law, but the doers thereof, shall be blessed before God.” And there was more Christian virtue, piety, humility, disinterestedness, contempt of riches, Christian heroism, in those ages in which Bibles had not become as common as stones, than there is now. We read often reports of committees who congratulate themselves, that, within a year, or a shorter period, there have been more Bibles distributed than were ever transcribed or printed prior to the present century; but we find none to read which speak of a corresponding growth in the Christian virtues. Paper-makers, printers, and booksel-

lers may find cause of gratulation in this multiplication and distribution of Bibles, but the Christian none, unless he sees men in the same proportion becoming meek and humble, charitable and self-denying, rising above the world while in it, and living only for God and heaven. We regret to say that there is little reason for supposing that a moral reformation at all keeps pace with the multiplication and distribution of Bibles. There are too many who can subscribe to the moral of what we know in one instance to have occurred. A pious Protestant lady offered a Bible to a plain common-sense man. "Begone with your Bibles," was his indignant reply. "Before you began distributing them, the boys would jump over my fence and steal my peaches; now they break the fence down to steal more freely."

The Bible mania, indeed, makes "the word of God dwell more plentifully in all," but it is in the shape of dead letters, covered with ink, and buried in paper. If this be the "dwelling of the word" which the blessed Apostle meant, we have undoubtedly reached the last degree of perfection; but if he spoke of another dwelling of the word of God, we may, for aught that appears, have fallen back not a little. We do not find among these Bible maniacs any who seem inclined to renounce every thing on earth, to deny themselves, take up their cross, and follow Christ. We have not heard of many who have sold all they had, that they might buy the pearl of evangelical poverty. We read of St. Anthony, that, on hearing these words, "Go sell all thou hast, and give to the poor," he immediately put this lesson of evangelical perfection in practice. We have yet to learn of similar instances as the effect of the distribution of Bibles. One thing we know, that many there are who seldom or never take a Bible in their hand, who yet have constantly in their minds, in their hearts, and in their daily life the words of St. Paul, "Whether you eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all things for the glory of God"; and we hazard nothing in saying that these are they in whom the word of God dwells plentifully, even though they know not how to read; and we cannot be blamed for preferring these to the proud and worldly-minded, though able to boast of a house full of Bibles.

It were well if sterility of good works were the only consequence of the promiscuous distribution of the word of God. But this distribution is not only inadequate to the production of good, but it has been and cannot fail to be the occasion, if

not the direct cause, of serious and enormous evils. A thing may be in itself good and holy, and yet not be fitting for all, — may, even be most prejudicial to those who are only prepared to abuse it. Hence, the Church, while revering the word, and preserving it with an affection and fidelity of which Protestants can form no conception, has yet always protested against this Protestant mania, for mania it is. She obeys the words of Christ, “Give not that which is holy unto dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine”; and this distribution of Bibles indiscriminately to all sorts of persons, whether prepared to receive and read it with the proper dispositions, with due reverence for the word of God, or not, is a flagrant violation of the precept contained in these words of our Lord. The Scriptures are holy, a treasure of infinite value to the Christian Church; but they are profitable only to such as are initiated into and well grounded in Christianity; to others, they are in general poisonous and destructive. From the reading of the Bible by those not prepared to profit by it has resulted the wildest and maddest fanaticism; and the “thousand and one” sects which have afflicted the Christian world since Luther, and which every right-minded man must deeply deplore, owe their origin to no other cause. People reading the Bible have, as St. Paul complains, 1 Tim. i. 7, learned to assume the title of Doctors of the Law, though “understanding neither the things they say, nor whereof they affirm.” Many by this reading have lost their faith; and, indeed, if the apparent contradictions found in the Bible give no little trouble even to the learned, and have been the occasion of voluminous commentaries, what temptations must they not offer to a mere sciolist? Voltaire thought there was no more effectual way of spreading infidelity than by the Bible explained in his own way; and the grand means on which unbelievers of our day rely for spreading their creed of unbelief is the same. Deprive them of these *apparent* contradictions and inconsistencies, of the difficulties and objections which they find or suppose they find in the Scriptures themselves, and they would have very few arguments with which to perplex the unlearned and captivate the conceited and vain. And what shall we say of the imminent danger young persons particularly must run of shipwrecking their purity and chastity, when they read the impure actions related in the Old Testament in all the simplicity of primitive manners? Alas! they need not so much to inflame their passions, and it will be well if they escape with-

out approving even in theory some crimes which they find to have been committed by persons eminent, in general, for their good qualities and deeds! We could easily enlarge on this topic, but forbear, lest we fall into the very inconvenience we are speaking against. It is, however, a topic well worthy the serious consideration of those who affect to be so shocked with certain passages in Dens's *Theology*, not intended for general reading, but simply to prepare the moral physician for treating the moral diseases which, unhappily, he is but too sure to encounter in the practice of his profession. Looking to the little good and the enormous evils which result from this indiscriminate distribution of Bibles, to the character of the book itself, and its utter unfitness to serve as the summary of Christian doctrine or as the introduction to religious truth, its obscurities and acknowledged difficulties, many of which baffle the skill of the ablest and most learned commentators, and the ease and readiness with which the unlearned and unstable wrest it to their own destruction, we are forced to conclude that a more ineffectual and absurd way of making the word of God dwell plentifully in all, and to answer the end for which it was designed, than this proposed by Protestants, could not easily be devised.

But we come at length to the last two articles of the chapter on the Scriptures. We give them together, for they both mean the same thing, and together form a suitable keystone to the arch of Presbyterianism. They are as follows:—

“Art. IX. The infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself; and therefore, when there is a question about the true and full sense of any Scripture (which is not manifold, but one), it may be searched and known from other places that speak more clearly. X. The Supreme Judge, by whom all controversies of religion are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private spirits are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other than the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scriptures.

“Acts xv. 15. And to this agree the words of the prophets, as it is written. John v. 46. For had ye believed Moses ye would have believed me, for he wrote of me. Matt. xxii. 29, 31. Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures nor the power of God. Eph. iv. 20. Acts xxviii. 25.”

Singular articles these! Reduced to plain English, they are simply, Scripture interprets itself, and God is the supreme judge of religious controversies. The proofs in the notes are

in keeping with the assertions in the text. They have, however, the merit, if not of proving the assertions, at least that of disproving them. They show us our blessed Lord reasoning from the Scriptures against the Jews, and in his own person giving them an example and establishing the necessity of a living tribunal, a speaking judge, for the interpretation of Scripture and the determining of controversies of religion. So far as the example of our Lord and the occasion he found for correcting the Jews in their understanding of the Scriptures can count for any thing, they establish the contrary of what they were brought to prove. It is remarkable how difficult it is for Presbyterians to quote any Scriptural authority in their defence which does not make against them. There is a Providence in this, cheering to the faithful, but which should make Presbyterians fear and tremble.

But, in these articles, we have the secret arrived at by our Presbyterian divines as the result of their long and laborious researches. It is now laid open before us. Come, ye men of the Old School, of the New School, Cumberland and all other species of Presbyterians, ye Congregationalists, Baptists, Methodists, Unitarians, Universalists, and hearken to this lesson of profoundest wisdom! Why in vain dispute and quarrel, why worry and devour each other, about the various matters which separate you one from another? Let the Bible decide. Call forthwith a "world's convention" of all the sects; let them assemble; let the Bible be placed reverently on a stand; let all keep silence; the book will open its mouth, utter a sentence, and all your controversies will be settled, and ye will all bow down in meek and humble submission. How simple and easy! What a pity men should not have discovered this admirable method of settling controversies, before the Westminster divines! Alas! the controversy between sectarians is precisely as to what the decision of the Bible is!

Presbyterians, however, have been driven to adopt this rule by the necessity they were under of steering between two formidable sand-bars. If they acknowledged in the Church an always living and divinely instituted tribunal for the determination of controversies, it was all over with them; for that tribunal existed at the birth of Presbyterianism, and had condemned it; and on the other hand, they were ashamed to avow, in just so many words, that every one interprets the Bible as he thinks proper. If the first, they condemned themselves, and must, to be consistent, return to the Church; if

the second, then they must adopt an absurdity too gross even for them to swallow. What, then, could they do? Mystify themselves and others with high-sounding words, meaning nothing. They must say, Scripture interprets itself, and the Holy Ghost is the supreme judge of controversies. But as the Holy Ghost decides, according to them, only as *speaking in the Scriptures*, and as the Bible has never been heard to utter a single syllable, they gain nothing, but are ultimately reduced to the rule, Each one understands the Scriptures as he chooses, — the great fundamental principle of Protestantism, and nearly the only one in which all Protestants are able to agree. So, after all, in trying to avoid one sand-bar, they stick fast on the other, or as one of our former legislators would express it, “In keeping clear of *Skiller*, they run foul of *Charybogus*.”

We do not intend, on this occasion, to give the various and satisfactory proofs of the necessity or of the fact of a living tribunal in the Christian Church for determining religious controversies. But we may say, the tribunal alleged by Presbyterians is obviously no tribunal at all; and the fact, that they are ashamed to avow it, and seek in every possible way to disguise it, is a sufficient refutation of the principle of private interpretation, or, if not, it has already been several times and amply refuted in the pages of this journal, as well as elsewhere. It will suffice for our present purpose to adduce a couple of edifying commentaries on the Presbyterian rule, supplied by the very volume before us.

In the *Form of Government*, p. 364, we read, — “To the General Assembly belongs the power of deciding in all controversies respecting doctrine and discipline, of reproving, warning, or bearing testimony against error in doctrine, or immorality in practice, in any church, presbytery, or synod, of suppressing schismatical contentions and disputations”; and on page 378, that the Presbyterian minister who preaches at the ordination of a candidate is to propose to him the following questions: — “Do you believe the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments to be the word of God, the only infallible rule of faith and practice? Do you sincerely receive and adopt the Confession of Faith of this Church as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Scriptures? Do you promise *subjection to your brethren* in the Lord?” To all these questions the candidate answers in the affirmative.

Well done, O ye learned divines! These lessons of sub-

mission given to the candidate are admirable ; these enactments to enforce obedience to the decisions of the General Assembly are truly edifying ! But, dear friends, how could you so soon and so completely forget and abandon your cherished and favorite doctrine ? How could you write one thing in the beginning of your book, and give it such a flat denial in the end ? How could you establish one principle in the *Confession*, and a contrary principle in the *Form of Government* ? Indeed, most amiable doctors, you hardly treat us fairly. Which are we to believe, the *Confession* or the *Form of Government* ? In one place you tell us the Scripture and the Scripture alone can interpret itself ; and now in another, instead of the Scriptures, you give us the decisions of the General Assembly. You told us that the supreme judge in controversies can be none other than the Holy Spirit ; and now, when controversies arise among you, instead of having recourse to “the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scriptures,” you modestly invest the General Assembly with “the power of deciding all controversies.” In the *Confession* you solemnly assert that “the decrees of councils, the opinions of ancient writers, the doctrines of men, and private spirits,” are to be brought only before the bar of the supreme judge, “the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scriptures” ; and now you summon us before the bar of the General Assembly, that is to say, before a couple of hundred of Presbyterian ministers, and a like number of Presbyterian *elders* ! You were telling us, a moment ago, that the Holy Spirit speaks only through the Scriptures ; and now you tell us, that he speaks through the Presbyterian elders of the United States ! Really, gentlemen, this obliviousness on your part is too bad, altogether too bad. Alas for the poor candidate ! How deplorable is his fate ! After having received the assurance of having no other interpreter of Scripture than Scripture itself, and no other judge but the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scriptures, he now finds that all was a delusion, and that he must tamely promise subjection to his brethren, and follow their decision, or be ignominiously dismissed and branded for life.

Alas ! how many lies does that first lie render necessary ! Thus it is that error must necessarily stamp all its proceedings with contradiction and lie. *Mentita est iniquitas sibi.* Protestants, and Presbyterians in particular, were at first most obstreperous against all authority ; for this was necessary in order to be able to wrest a portion of the faithful from their

legitimate pastors. But having done this, and finding that no shadow of government or society was possible on the principles they at first set up, they turn round, and with admirable coolness deny and reject those very principles without which they had never existed, and institute in their novel and self-constituted tribunals the most intolerable tyranny, in the place of the paternal authority they threw off, and which had received the traditions of all Christian nations, and the promise of the Divine protection and guidance. But it was not to be supposed that such tribunals, such supreme judges, would command any respect, or much submission. Dissent breeds dissent. The first dissenters authorize by precept and example the new dissenters. What right had you to dissent from the authority to which you were born subject, which we have not to dissent from you? Hence, the decisions of these tribunals and judges are followed only so long as force, or self-interest, money, or social position are present to back them; when not supported by such or like considerations, they are mere cobwebs. Hence, Protestantism is everywhere cut up into divisions, sects, parties, and factions, too numerous to count, and which serve only to worry and devour each other, and to place in bold contrast the majestic and compact unity of the Catholic Church.

ART. III. — 1. *A New Version of the Four Gospels, with Notes Critical and Explanatory.* By a Catholic. London. 1836.

2. *The Four Gospels, translated from the Greek, with Preliminary Dissertations and Notes Critical and Explanatory.* By George Campbell, D. D., Principal of Marischal College, and one of the Ministers of Aberdeen. From the latest London Edition. Andover. 1837.

THE learned work of Dr. Campbell was first published in Scotland long before the appearance of the anonymous work "by a Catholic." The object of both writers has been to present a clear and fluent translation of the Gospels, divested of antiquated terms and ungrammatical phrases. It must be acknowledged that the received versions, Catholic as well as

Protestant,* admit of much improvement in phraseology and construction; on which account we should hail with pleasure any effort directed to this end, which may not endanger the fidelity of the rendering, or shock popular feeling by the appearance of bold innovation. Dr. Campbell's translation has been in part adopted, but in reality disfigured, by his namesake on this side of the Atlantic, whose edition of the New Testament, made up from different sources, is used as a text-book throughout the numerous congregations in the West that call him master. The anonymous writer has not been so successful, and although he may have escaped censure, which his assumption of the incognito leads us to believe he apprehended, he has not disturbed the possession of the Douay or Rheimish version, which, from long use and hallowed associations, has a strong hold on the affections and reverence of the Catholic community.

The first provincial council of Baltimore, having in view the acts of a preceding ecclesiastical assembly held by the founder of the American hierarchy, decreed that the Douay version should be retained; which regulation, we suppose, was directed to secure uniformity in quotations from the pulpit or the press. Had the measure which the prelates then contemplated been put in execution, and an accurate edition of that version been issued, we should be slow to favor essays at a new translation; but although episcopal approbation has been obtained for the several editions since issued in various cities of the Union, these present no evidence of extraordinary diligence on the part of the publishers, so that an accurate edition is still a *desideratum*. The want of an *authorized* version is often objected to us by controversial antagonists, who, however, may be well left to indulge self-gratulation on their possession of the translation published by the authority of his Majesty, King James. The Douay version, although not specially approved of by the Holy See, is authoritative, inasmuch as it has the express approval of very many bishops, as well as of the Baltimore council, and is in general use with Catholics throughout the countries in which the English language prevails. This, surely, is enough for all practical purposes, the faithful being thus assured of its soundness and fidelity. It is not desirable that any vernacular version should be solemnly adopted by the Church, so as to preclude improve-

* See Campbell, Diss. XI., Part II.

ment, which the changeableness of living languages might render necessary. The sanction given to the Douay version cannot preclude judicious efforts for its improvement. That it is imperfect may be acknowledged, without detracting from its authority as a safe guide in all that regards the substance of the sacred text, and without disrespect to the eminent men who prepared it, the English language having undergone considerable changes since their time. The Italian version of Martini is acknowledged to be excellent, and it was published with the approbation of Pope Pius the Sixth; yet in Italy no one hesitates to give a new rendering of any passage of the Vulgate, which alone is deemed a standard. In France and Spain, the same freedom is enjoyed, although the Bible de Venice, and the translation of P. Phelipe Scio de S. Michel, are in general use. We know not why the Douay version should enjoy a more exclusive authority. The attempts already made by several editors to modernize the style have, indeed, resulted in throwing doubt on the true reading; but this only shows the importance of having a revised version published by authority, for which measure the critical labors of learned individuals might be a useful preparation. All unnecessary changes should be avoided, so as to take away the appearance of fluctuation in a matter so grave; and no change, however advisable it might appear, should be introduced into the public reading of the Scriptures, until approved of by competent authority; but every respectful suggestion and judicious effort should meet with due consideration.

The ancient Latin version, called the Vulgate, was declared authentic by the Council of Trent. The New Testament not having been translated by St. Jerome, who contented himself with retouching the work of the ancient interpreter, the version of the Gospels is, in the main, that which was made, probably, in the first century, and which, by its own excellence, gained the ascendancy over all other Latin translations, and maintained its sway until the revolutionary struggle miscalled the Reformation. The fathers assembled at Trent did not invest the Vulgate with any adventitious authority; they declared that which it was entitled to from its intrinsic worth, and which immemorial and universal usage had given it. The many Latin translations of the Bible which were circulated at that period, and which were daily on the increase, in consequence of the doctrinal disputes which then raged, determined the prelates to point to the Vulgate as a faithful representation of

the original, made when no controversy had arisen, and commended by the approbation of the learned, and by general use during a long series of ages. The wisdom of this decree is acknowledged by Dr. Campbell, who observes, — “ If, instead of this measure, that council had ordered a translation to be made by men nominated by them, in opposition to those published by Protestants, the case would have been very different ; for we may justly say, that, amidst such a ferment as was then excited, there should have appeared in a version so prepared any thing like impartiality, candor, or discernment, would have been morally impossible.” * This remark applies to the Protestant translations with double force, since the Catholic interpreters, if under bias, could have been only influenced by doctrines received from immemorial antiquity, whilst the Protestant was seeking Scriptural support for new opinions broached in the midst of excitement and revolution. The Vulgate was declared authentic, that is, an authoritative standard, to which appeal could be safely made in all religious investigations. It was not declared faultless ; but, as it had been in general use for more than a thousand years, it was pronounced a faithful guide, on which full reliance might be placed in all that regards faith, and morals, and historic truth.

The prejudices of learned Protestants are in no respect more manifest than in the interpretation of this decree, since they infer from it that the slightest error cannot be admitted to exist in the Vulgate without derogating from its authority, and they triumph in the discrepancies observable in the authorized editions of Clement the Eighth and of Sixtus the Fifth. In attesting the general fidelity of the translation, the fathers of Trent had no idea of claiming inspiration for its author, much less of affirming that its editions were free from typographical errors. In John xxi. 22, the common reading is, “ *Sic eum volo manere,*” although some manuscripts have “ *Si,*” which is conformable to the Greek manuscripts generally. The Cambridge and some Latin manuscripts unite both readings. Maldonat, a learned Jesuit commentator of Scripture, prefers the common Greek reading to that of the Vulgate ; and Dr. Campbell is surprised at this instance of mental independence, not considering that the preference of a reading found in some Latin manuscripts, and adopted even in the public offices of the Church, does not militate against the decree by which the

* Dissertation, X. 7. Vol. I., p. 355.

Vulgate generally was sanctioned. "Not one passage in the Vulgate," he remarks, "can claim the authority of popes and councils, if this cannot." We beg to dispute this assertion. The sanction of the council, although embracing all the portions of that translation, could not be supposed to determine the genuine reading of passages which were different in various manuscripts. The popes, in sanctioning the several editions, meant only to give public authority to them, and prevent alterations being made by private individuals; but they did not affirm that they were free from imperfection, and consequently they did not preclude ulterior corrections, which learned men might suggest, after further collation of manuscripts. It was for this reason that Clement the Eighth did not hesitate to issue a new edition, in which several errors of the Sixtine edition were corrected. All the ridicule cast on Papal infallibility in consequence of these discrepancies is void of foundation.

The testimony which learned Protestants have borne to the fidelity and general excellence of the Vulgate is in the highest degree corroborative of the Tridentine declaration. Mill, the famous editor of the Greek text, speaking of the Gospel of St. John, remarks:—"In this, as well as in the other three Gospels, the Greek manuscript used by the Vulgate interpreter was very excellent and accurate." After noting a few passages in which he thinks that the manuscript was inexact, he observes:—"The remaining passages generally present the genuine reading, which differs from almost all our manuscripts and editions."* He says that not less than two hundred readings could be restored by aid of this ancient version. Bengel, a learned Lutheran critic of the last century, shows its value, as representing a manuscript seven, eight, or nine centuries, nay a thousand years, more ancient than any manuscript now extant.† A version of itself is not preferable to the text; but an ancient manuscript, as reflected in the version, is plainly of higher authority than a manuscript of a much later period.

The harmony of the Alexandrian manuscript, which dates from the fourth century, with the Vulgate adds no small weight to this version; and the occasional discrepancy does not lessen its authority. Impartial judges often award the prize of accuracy to the Latin interpreter, who is acknowledg-

* Prolegomena XLIV.

† *Introductio in Crisin N. T.*, p. 398.

ed to have taken the least liberty with the text, and studied to represent it most literally. We need not wonder, then, that "some Roman Catholic and even Protestant writers of eminence have contended, that, considering the present state of the Greek text, the Vulgate expresses more of the true reading of the originals or autographs of the sacred penmen than any Greek edition that has yet appeared or can now be framed." This observation of the learned author of the *Horæ Biblicæ* is quoted by Dr. Lingard in his tracts.* Gerard, a celebrated Scotch critic, observes, that the Vulgate "contains several readings which are preferable to the present readings, and supported by some of the best and oldest manuscripts; and that it is in general skilful and faithful, and often gives the sense of Scripture better than more modern versions."†

The notes of Campbell show that the Vulgate reading is generally conformable to the most valuable manuscripts and most ancient versions. We have marked down above twenty instances in the single Gospel of St. Matthew in which it is preferred by him to the common Greek. To refer to a well known passage, — the doxology subjoined to the Lord's prayer, and inserted in the text, Matt. vi. 13, is thus noticed by the Scotch critic: — "E. T. 'For thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory, for ever. Amen.' This doxology is wanting, not only in several ancient Greek manuscripts, but in the Vulgate, Coptic, Saxon, and Arabic versions. It was not in the Greek copies used by Origen, Gregory Nyssen, or Cyril. Cesarius quotes it, not as from the Scripture, but as from the liturgy used in the Greek churches, whence, in all human probability, according to the judgment of the most celebrated critics, it has first been taken." It must be gratifying to the Catholic to find the divine prayer, as used in the Church, vindicated by this acknowledgment from the encumbrance of a conclusion which ill accords with its simplicity. Bloomfield gives another instance. Speaking of the words, "that cometh in the name of the Lord," which occur in the Protestant version, Mark xi. 10, he observes: — "These words (which interrupt the construction) are omitted in many good manuscripts of different receptions, and in the opinion of almost all the critics are to be expunged." The boldness of Beza in changing the text on mere conjecture has led to sev-

* Page 39, American edition.

† *Institutes of Criticism*, ch. IV., § 4.

eral readings in the common editions, destitute of any support from manuscripts or versions. In John xviii. 20, there is a diversity of reading in the ancient manuscripts, *παντότε* appearing in several of them as well as in the Complutensian and other valuable editions, while "*πάντες*" is supported by the Alexandrian and several other manuscripts, some early editions, with the Vulgate, first Syriac, Coptic, Armenian, Saxon, and Ethiopic versions." The English translators have, in this instance, deserted the common Greek, which is plainly a corruption originating with Beza, and have adopted the Complutensian reading, leaving that of the Vulgate, which is supported by higher authority and offers a better meaning.

Many of the errors in the common Greek editions are to be traced to accident, or zeal not guided by sound judgment. From the similarity of terms in successive verses, omissions sometimes occurred in the manuscripts. On the other hand, many interpolations were made with a view to harmonize the statements of the Evangelists; the copyist taking on himself to supply from another writer what appeared to be wanting in the narrative before him. Uncouth phrases, involving solecisms, were often exchanged for purer phraseology; and the difficulties arising from an abrupt and abridged style were removed by introducing words which smoothed the asperity. The introductory or concluding phrases or sentences, in the public reading of the Scriptures as part of the liturgy, sometimes found their way into the sacred volume; which still more frequently was encumbered with explanatory terms, placed originally in the margin, and imperceptibly confounded with the text. We need not wonder, then, that editions made from manuscripts of no very remote antiquity should present many inaccuracies, from which the ancient version is exempt.

Although no decree was made by the Council of Trent concerning vernacular versions, the usage has uniformly been to make them from the Vulgate, as the only recognized standard. Yet the original text has been held in view to illustrate terms or passages that might otherwise be ambiguous, and to keep as closely as possible to the meaning of the sacred authors. Whether it be allowed by Catholic discipline to propose for general and public use a version not made on the Vulgate may be fairly questioned; but to present to the public an exact version of the text, for the satisfaction of those not able to have access to it, is not necessarily an attempt to set aside or

to disparage the authentic version, which it will be found in the main to support and illustrate. The version under review appears to be made chiefly from the Vulgate; the author, however, freely availing himself of the actual reading of the text, wherever he deems it more correct. Thus, in Matt. xx. 15, he has embodied in the text some words found in the common Greek, but wanting in the Vulgate: — “Have I not a right to do as I will *with mine own?*” In the note he remarks, “These words have been lost from the Vulgate.” Dr. Campbell does not speak with equal confidence, although he deems the words of manifest importance to the sense. “There is the same defect,” he says, “in the Saxon and Armenian versions, but not in any Greek manuscript that has yet appeared, nor in any other translation.” It may be as “the Catholic” conjectures; but it is no less possible that the words may have been added at a very early period, for the sake of illustration, and may have passed from the margin to the text, as is the opinion of the judicious Mill. Critics observe that additions were often made in this way to remove a difficulty; whilst omissions, by which the reading became embarrassed, did not easily pass unperceived. We think a note, marking that the words were found in the manuscripts generally, would have answered every purpose, without introducing them into the text on very questionable grounds.

“The Catholic” omits, in Mark i. 2, the name of the prophet Isaiah, which is given in the Vulgate, and follows the Greek text, which refers to “the prophets,” a reading which seems recommended by the fact, that quotations follow from Malachi as well as Isaiah. The critical observation above cited will, however, lead us to prefer the Vulgate reading; for if “the prophets” had been originally referred to, it is not likely that a transcriber or an interpreter would have named Isaiah, especially as the text which immediately follows is from Malachi. Griesbach* has not hesitated to restore the reading which the Vulgate represents; and Bloomfield remarks, — “The best critics (and especially the recent ones) seem agreed that the true reading is ἐν Ἠσαΐᾳ τῷ προφήτῃ, as being found in the most ancient manuscripts and versions, and confirmed by a passage of Porphyry, where he censures Mark, because in this passage he attributes to Isaiah what is found in another writer, namely, Malachi, in whom something similar

* *Novum Testamentum Græc.* Lipsiæ, 1805.

occurs."* We shall not attempt to unravel the knot which the Vulgate reading presents; but we think that the crucial rule of preferring the difficult reading should have great weight in this instance, especially since the authorities just quoted powerfully support its application. "The Catholic" might have safely followed the Vulgate, and marked in a note his preference of the common Greek.

"The Catholic" prefers the Greek reading of John xii. 47, and renders accordingly:—"Should any man hear my words and *believe* them not, I do not condemn him; for I came not to condemn the world, but to save the world." The Vulgate reads,— "If any man hear my words, and *keep* them not," &c. It is not necessary to show that this reading is the true one. To put it aside, the grounds should have been strong, since its antiquity forms a great presumption in its favor. Campbell, as well as Harwood, does not hesitate to adopt it as genuine, and gives the authorities by which he was determined:—"A considerable number of manuscripts, among which are the Alexandrian and the Cambridge, read *φυλάξῃ*; to which agree not only the Vulgate, which says, '*et non custodierit*,' but both the Syriac, the Coptic, Armenian, Ethiopic, Arabic, and Saxon versions, together with the paraphrase of Nonnus:—

Καὶ μὴ ἀσλητοῖο νόου σφρήγιδα φυλάξῃ."

This might have caused "the Catholic" to pause before he adopted the other reading, and to content himself with indicating his preference in a note, rather than change the text. Indeed, it will be difficult to find a single instance in which he can sustain the corrections on which he has ventured. In his improved translations of some words and passages, we are disposed to question his success, or at least to dispute the propriety of substituting them in the body of the text, rather than suggest them in the notes. The third verse of the seventh chapter of St. Mark is thus rendered by him:—"For the Pharisees and all the Jews eat not, unless they have washed their hands with the fist closed." In the note it is observed,— "The Latin translator, unable to understand washing with the fist, seems in despair to have rendered *πυγμῇ* by *crebro*." This is very modest! The author of the Vulgate, and the authors of other most ancient versions which harmonize with

* *A Critical Digest.* London, 1826.

it, in this instance, despaired of discovering the meaning of a Greek term expressing a Hebrew practice which was then recent, if not still in vigor ; and our learned contemporary fixes it beyond any manner of doubt ! Far from wishing that the efforts of the learned to illustrate obscure terms should be restricted, we view them with delight ; but we should be better pleased, were conjectures proposed as such, where, after all that has been said, the word remains a riddle.

The twenty-ninth verse of the twelfth chapter of Luke reads thus in the version of " The Catholic " : — " Seek ye not, therefore, after what ye may eat, or what ye may drink ; nor disquiet your minds with doubts for the future." As the Vulgate rendered the last member of the sentence " nolite in sublime tolli," the new interpreter thought fit to observe in a note, — " The Latin translator was at a loss for the real meaning of this verb, and therefore rendered it literally from the adjective *μετέωρος*, *sublimis*. But *μετέωρος* is said of him who is in suspense, and looks forward with anxiety to the result ; as in Josephus, *μετέωροι περὶ τῶν ὅλων ὄντες* (De Bel., IV. 9) ; whence there can be no doubt that *μετεωρίζομαι* means here to look forward with anxiety, to be solicitous for the future." To this interpretation of the word, which suits the context, we do not object ; but we think that the ancient translator is hardly dealt with, since he is supposed to have been at a loss for the real meaning, whilst he has rendered the term according to its primary signification,* which is not altogether unsuited to this place. " Be not lifted up on high," might be said after an exhortation not to seek with too great anxiety meat or drink, either with a view to caution us against the other extreme, of too great confidence, or to point out the danger of pride and ambition, in connection with worldly solicitude. As long as the ancient translation is grounded on the radical force of the term and its acknowledged use, we should hesitate to reject it, although a rendering apparently more suitable should present itself, which we would prefer noting at the bottom of the page. It is prudent to be slow in correcting a version made at so early a period, under advantageous circumstances, especially if what we offer in its stead be not decidedly clear and incontrovertible.

" Si quid melius nosti, candidus imperti :
Si non, istis utere mecum."

* See Bloomfield, *in loc.*

Even King James's translators paid homage, in several instances, to the excellence of the Vulgate, by adopting its readings in preference to the common Greek. In the eighteenth chapter of St. Luke, two instances occur of this involuntary tribute. On verse twenty-five, where the common reading means *to enter into*, Campbell says, — "I have here, with the English translators, preferred the reading of the Vulgate." He proceeds to quote the Alexandrian and Cambridge manuscripts, with some others, besides various versions, in support of it. The Protestant translation of verse thirty-one is likewise, as he remarks, "literally from the Vulgate," which is supported by the Cambridge and two or three manuscripts, and by both the Syriac versions. The common reading "has been deserted by most modern interpreters." In John xviii. 15, the common Greek has the definite article, which should be rendered "the other disciple"; but the Protestant version, as well as the Douay, has "another disciple." "This," says Campbell, "is another instance wherein our translators have preferred the reading of the Vulgate to that of the common Greek." "The only authorities from manuscripts for this reading are the Alexandrian, the Cambridge, and another of less note, all which omit the article. Wetstein mentions no versions which favor it, except the Vulgate and the Gothic. It is surprising that he does not mention the Syriac, which expresses exactly the sense of the Vulgate, in this manner, — 'and one of the other disciples.' It was impossible in that language, which has no articles, to show more explicitly, that, in their original, the expression was indefinite. The Saxon version also says 'another.' This renders it very probable that it was so in the old Italic. Nonnus, too, expresses it indefinitely."

Were the first verse of John xviii. literally rendered, according to the common Greek, Christ would be represented as going "over the brook of the cedars"; whereas, the Protestant version, conformably with the Vulgate, styles it "the brook Cedron," having no support for this reading but the Alexandrian manuscript. "The majority of modern critics," says Campbell, "agree with Jerome in thinking that this, which suits the Vulgate, 'trans torrentem Cedron,' is the genuine reading; a remarkable instance wherein the internal evidence is more than a counterbalance to numerous testimonies, or strong external evidence, on the opposite side. . . . This is one of the few passages in which the English translators have

preferred the reading of the Vulgate, though unsupported, to the almost universal reading of the Greek."

After such instances, our readers may not be disposed to think that the fathers of Trent set too high a value on the old Latin translation ; since even they who, under the influence of party views, studied to depart from it, whenever they could do so with plausibility, and held up the common Greek editions as the genuine word of inspiration, felt compelled, in many instances, to defer to its superior accuracy. We do not take on us to affirm, that, in every instance where there is discrepancy, the Vulgate is uniformly entitled to the preference ; but its claims, in the far greater number of cases, being acknowledged by its adversaries, the presumption in its favor is such as can be overruled only by strong internal evidence, or by positive authorities. Whoever proceeds by a contrary rule, and takes the Greek text as correct, on the principle that a text outweighs a version, mistakes an inaccurate edition of the text for the original, and unjustly depreciates a faithful representation of the text at a period when it had not yet suffered seriously from the temerity of copyists.

Translators on the continent of Europe have generally given a free version of the Vulgate, not deeming it necessary to adhere to the letter, provided they presented its meaning in clear language. English translators, Protestant as well as Catholic, have generally been servilely literal ; the Protestant rendering as closely as possible the text, except where sectarian bias guided his pen, — the Catholic giving an equally close version of the Vulgate. Much obscurity, and some barbarisms (we love to speak plainly), disfigure several passages of both versions in consequence of this tenacity, which may be said of the Vulgate itself, since the ancient interpreter studied to render the text, especially of the New Testament, word for word, sometimes with the sacrifice of perspicuity and grammar. This should be borne in mind by those who are scandalized at some unintelligible or ambiguous passages, of which the fault, however, is not in the translator, who cared not to gain the praise of clearness or elegance, at the cost of fidelity to his guide, or with the risk of misrepresenting his meaning. Where the text itself is clear, a literal version may present a false sense, in which case it is right to use a paraphrase, in order to convey the idea of the writer ; and this may be done with safety, wherever no controverted point can be affected by the freedom of the rendering. In all matters of controversy,

scrupulous adherence to the letter is necessary, lest the interpreter should incur the suspicion of party bias. In the notes he may advance whatever he deems proper to shed light on the text, for, in reading them, the reader is apprized that he is listening to an uninspired teacher; whilst he could not distinguish the interpreter from the sacred writer in a version which would give the author's ideas as reflected through a human medium.

To the unfortunate controversies of the sixteenth century we may trace the extreme closeness of the English versions, which at present may not easily be departed from, although the sacred text thus appears to the reader in no attractive garb. Dr. Campbell has ventured to modernize the phraseology, and "The Catholic" has taken a like liberty; but whilst they thus present a more agreeable picture, it may not prove equally useful, since the public ear being accustomed to the Scriptural phrases, the improved turns of speech will scarcely sound like the word of God. We shall take an instance at random, and present the various versions of a single text, Luke xii. 41. "And Peter said to him, Lord, dost thou speak this parable to us, or likewise to all?" The Protestant and Catholic versions are the same, with the exception of "even," substituted for "likewise," in the former. The rendering of Campbell runs freely:—"Then Peter said to him, Master, is this comparison directed to us alone, or to all present?" The term "parable," which is susceptible of different meanings, is here advantageously exchanged for an English word admitting of no ambiguity; but will the common reader be edified by the change? "The Catholic" has been careful to preserve it, although he has altered the form of the sentence:—"Then Peter said to him, Lord, is it about us that thou speakest this parable, or also about all?" We are by no means superstitiously attached to the Scriptural terms; but, having regard to public feeling, we think that a note pointing out the meaning of the term in the particular passage is preferable to its exchange for a word in common use. Whilst, then, we are pleased with a fluent version, such as that of "The Catholic," for private perusal, and for the illustration of the text, we should hesitate to displace the received Scriptural phraseology, or to study elegance of diction by departing from the letter, especially should there be danger of mistaking the meaning. We do not think it an improvement to cancel from the text words adopted into almost all languages, and with which all Christians are familiar,

although the substitution of others of more definite meaning may sometimes convey clearer views. "To be changed (in mind)" is not, in our view, a happy substitution for "converted." The term *scandal* is well understood, and strikes forcibly on the popular ear. The text as presented by "The Catholic" is more fluent, but not so effective: — "Woe to the world on account of the causes of sin. That the causes of sin should be, is necessary; nevertheless, woe to the man through whom such causes happen." Elsewhere we read, — "Happy is the man who findeth no cause of offence in me." "Doth this give you offence?" is the rendering of the question put by our Lord to his Apostles, when the promise of giving his flesh and blood had shocked and estranged many from his service. We think the common version quite intelligible, and more impressive.

It is generally admitted by the learned, that the Greek term ἡ οἰκουμένη, and the Latin *orbis terrarum*, are sometimes used to designate the Roman empire, or merely the land of Judea. We cannot, therefore, object to the rendering of it in this manner, wherever it is clearly limited by the context to either signification; but where interpreters are divided in opinion as to the force of the terms, we think it a duty of an unbiased translator to render them literally, and reserve to the note the expression of his own views. "The Catholic" has rendered Luke xxi. 26, — "Men will faint away through fear and expectation of what is about to come over the land." Campbell, on the contrary, adheres to the common rendering, "the earth," "the world," and argues from the context that it relates to the inhabitants of the earth generally. It is enough that it lies open to this interpretation, which is the most obvious one. "The Catholic" should not have rendered the text to suit his peculiar opinion.

Ever since the rise of the Lutheran errors, the Vulgate rendering of the Greek verb μετανοῶ, and the corresponding terms of the vernacular versions, displeased, extremely, reformed critics. *Agere penitentiam* was displaced by Beza to give room to *resipisco*, which, he contended, expressed more accurately the force of the original term. Those who were ashamed to accuse the ancient interpreter of misrepresenting the text contended that the Latin terms meant no more than regret for misconduct, whilst "to do penance" implied external austerities not at all embraced in the idea which the Greek word suggests. We are not disposed to deny that it essen-

tially regards the change of mind, and ordinarily means an improved state of mind, whereby sin is abandoned and virtue is embraced ; but we object to the attempt to determine the force of Greek terms by their etymology, or by their use among classic, that is, pagan writers, rather than by the usage of those Jews who spoke the Greek language, and the context of the places in which the words are employed. Campbell, Bloomfield, and critics generally, expose to ridicule those etymologists who are inattentive to usage, the great arbiter of language. According to etymology, *διακονίω* would signify *to bustle through the dust* ; whilst it is used to express any service rendered, whether by a domestic waiting on the table, or by a minister of religion sharing in the high functions of the ministry, or by angels ministering to incarnate Deity. *ἑσπεροκονίω* would literally signify *to stretch forth the hand*, whilst it is applied in Scripture to the imposition of hands, and even to the divine appointment ; as where Christ is said to have appeared not to the entire people, but to witnesses "preordained" by God.* Numberless other instances can be pointed to, wherein scarcely a trace of the radical meaning is discovered in the general acceptance of terms ; wherefore Campbell acknowledges, that "the plea from etymology, in a point which ought to be determined solely by use, where use can be discovered, is very weak." † Can it be denied that the Hellenistic use of the verb in question implied a change of mind, manifested by external acts of humiliation and self-punishment ? It was in sackcloth and ashes, fasting and weeping, that the Ninevites repented ; and in like manner Tyre and Sidon would have sought to propitiate Heaven, had they been witnesses of the wonders wrought in Corozain and Bethsaida. Campbell felt that "to repent" does not fully express the Scriptural idea ; wherefore he substituted "to reform." "The Catholic" objects that reformation does not always proceed from repentance, and prefers the favorite Protestant rendering. Our faith does not depend on the manner in which this term may be translated ; but we should hesitate to alter the received version, whilst we know that in its Scriptural application and ecclesiastical usage the term implies all that we mean by the words "do penance," as Bois, canon of Ely, has acknowledged. There are, doubtless, passages in which *repent* better represents the original, because the change of mind is specially insisted on ; as there

* Acts x. 41.

† In c. ix. 36 Matt. See also Diss. IV., 16.

are others in which external humiliation is more prominent. To vary the version, as the context demands, is no inconsistency, and is familiar to the Vulgate interpreter, who freely used "*pœnitementi*," and "*pœnitentiam agite*," as the occasion suggested, and sometimes indiscriminately. The same liberty is used by our English translators, which, we think, should abundantly satisfy critics and etymologists, without expunging from the sacred text all mention of "penance," in passages where it is most clearly implied.

In the salutation of the angel, addressed to the Virgin, a Greek participle of the perfect passive form is used, derived from a verb which signifies *to bestow favor*. The ancient interpreter rendered it "*gratia plena*," which is, literally, "full of grace." The Protestant version has, "highly favored"; Campbell, "favorite of heaven"; and "The Catholic" translates it, "thou favored (of God)." It is somewhat surprising that we should owe the vindication of the Latin translator to Protestant critics. Bloomfield remarks, — "This is not well rendered 'beloved,' or 'favorite of heaven,' as in Campbell's version. Better (as in the Vulgate) '*gratia plena*.' For, as Valckney observes, all verbs of this form, as *αἱματώω*, *θανυματώω*, &c., have a sense of *heaping up*, or *rendering full*."

Our readers, no doubt, are by this time well tired of our strictures on our Catholic brother; so, asking pardon for our tediousness, we hasten to conclude them, by adverting to the character of the notes, some of which have startled us. The writer seems familiar with the German Biblicists, and, although untainted with the impiety of the Rationalistic school, we fear that he may have adopted some views not altogether sound. What is said by our Lord of the demon leaving a possessed person, and, after much wandering through dry places, returning with other fiends, is thought by the Catholic to be a mere reference to popular persuasion. The cure which was effected by the waters of Bethsaida after the descent of the angel is only mentioned by the Evangelist as the belief of the Jews at the time. The penultimate chapter of St. John "looks very like the conclusion of the Gospel, and it is not improbable, that, when the Evangelist wrote it, he intended it as such." In the words of our Lord, by which the distinction between various forms of swearing is exploded, "The Catholic" discovers an absolute prohibition to swear, binding the Jewish converts, but not binding the churches of the Gen-

tiles to the same extent. He imagines "that John in prison became impatient for the establishment of the kingdom of the Messiah; that he wondered why our Saviour spent so much time in teaching and performing miracles in Galilee, instead of claiming the kingdom in Jerusalem; and that, to relieve himself from this perplexity, he sent to ask the question." He says of the blasphemy against the Spirit, — "The sin in question could only be committed by the contemporaries and eyewitnesses of the miracles of our Saviour"; and he confines to the destruction of Jerusalem the sublime and awful words of our Lord, which the fathers of the Church generally believe are to be eminently fulfilled at the close of time. What, however, scandalizes us above all is the note on Matthew xxiv. 36, wherein he says of our adorable Redeemer, — "In quality of man, his knowledge during his mortal life was limited, like his power, to the object of his mission. He had not then the power of granting the petition of the sons of Zebedee, but after his resurrection he possessed all power in heaven and on earth. He had not now the knowledge of the day or hour; after his resurrection undoubtedly he possessed it."

The wisdom of the Catholic church in reserving to her prelates the revision and approbation of vernacular versions is fully manifest from the work before us, written by a man of high literary qualifications and of sincere faith, but, as we apprehend, too bold in his critical corrections, and wanting in theological accuracy of expression. The clearness of his style, and its fluency, commend it, and the fewness of the notes, which are void of all controversial acrimony, enhance the value of his version in our estimation; nevertheless, its departure from the translation hitherto used is too wide to allow its substitution, were it otherwise free from the objections which we have urged against it. Any change in a book of such high authority, with whose terms and phraseology the faithful are familiar from their infancy, and which they have treasured up in their memory, should be necessary in order to be expedient, and should be cautiously attempted, to be successful. We have reviewed this work with no bias, unless, perchance, that which arises from Catholic sympathies for an unknown brother, and a delicacy grounded on popular rumor, which, incorrectly, as we presume, identifies "The Catholic" with England's historian.

The work of Dr. Campbell is of great value as a literary

effort of a high order, and is particularly acceptable to us inasmuch as it testifies to the excellence of our Vulgate translation, which it establishes by numerous authorities quoted in most of the places where its reading differs from the common translation. He denies, however, the correctness of some passages, but pronounces it, upon the whole, a good and faithful version.* The candor with which he points out the wilful perversion of the sacred text by Beza, and other Protestant translators, several of whose corruptions are retained in the common version, deserves our acknowledgment. In three verses of the fifth chapter of St. Matthew, 21, 27, 33, the words of our Lord, "You have heard that it was said to them of old," have been misrepresented by substituting *by*, as if the statement of doctrine which our Lord condemned had really been made by the ancients, and not rather falsely ascribed to them by the Pharisees at that time. This corruption, originating with Beza, is continued to this day in all the Protestant Bibles, circulated as the true word of God! "His words," says Campbell, "and the doctrine of the Pharisees, are alike misrepresented by this bold interpreter. I am sorry to add, that, in the instance we have been considering, Beza has been followed by most of the Protestant translators of his day, Italian, French, and English." †

The insertion of explanatory words in Italics, which is very general in the Protestant version, is a mode of determining the meaning of the text in a way to mislead the reader unawares. Thus, Matt. xx. 23, in the answer of our Lord to the sons of Zebedee, we read, — "To sit on my right hand and on my left is not mine to give; but *it shall be given to them* for whom it is prepared of my Father." The reader may easily conclude hence that Christ has no power whatever to assign to any one the high distinction in question; whereas, by reading the text in its simple form, unencumbered by this addition, it will be plain that Christ himself gives the places, not according to favor and caprice, but conformably to the counsels of his eternal Father. Hence Dr. Campbell correctly renders it, — "To sit at my right hand and at my left I cannot give, unless to those for whom it is prepared by my Father." Other instances of perversion are pointed out by the learned critic.

The general observation which he makes in regard to Prot-

* Dissertations. X. Part III., p. 10.
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† Ibid. Part IV., p. 6.

estant versions is fully applicable to that which was ushered into the world under the sanction of King James. "Some allowance is no doubt to be made for the influence of polemic theology, the epidemic disease of those times wherein most of the versions which I have been examining were composed. The imaginations of men were heated, and their spirits embittered with continual wranglings, not easily avoidable in their circumstances; and those who were daily accustomed to strain every expression of the sacred writers, in their debates one with another, were surely not the fittest for examining them with that temper and coolness which are necessary in persons who would approve themselves unbiased translators." *

The bias of the translators of "the authorized version" is apparent throughout the whole work; but as we desire to confine ourselves to the Gospels, we shall refer to an instance which might not strike every reader. In John i. 42, our Lord is represented as thus addressing Simon, when presented to him by Andrew, his brother:—"Thou shalt be called Cephias, which is by interpretation a stone." Dr. Campbell properly remarks that the Evangelist, writing in a Grecian city of Asia Minor, translated the Hebrew names of persons into the Greek language, that they might be known by the names which they then bore. Thus, in the preceding verse Andrew is related to have said to Simon,— "We have found the Messiah"; and immediately the Evangelist subjoins,— "which is, being interpreted, the Christ"; because his readers knew our Lord by this title. Consistency required that they should have rendered the following verse,— "Thou shalt be called Cephias, which is, being interpreted, Peter"; but they chose to keep the Apostle out of view, and to substitute a diminutive term which does not faithfully express the force of Cephias,— a rock. "If the sacred penman," Dr. Campbell remarks, "had more in view to acquaint us with the signification of the name, than to prevent our mistaking the person, he would probably have translated Cephias into Greek, *πέτρα*, not *Πέτρος*. The former is always used in the New Testament, and in the Septuagint, for a rock, and never the latter. I acknowledge that *πέτρος*, in Greek authors, and *πέτρα* are synonymous; but in the use of the sacred writers, *Πέτρος* is invariably, and *πέτρα* never, a proper name." He then refers to the famous pas-

* Dissertations. X. 15.

sage of Matthew xvi. 18, and shows that the change of terms was made for the sake of the gender, the feminine noun not being suitable for the name of a man. "Accordingly in the Syriac version there is no change of the word; Cephas, or rather Kepha, serving equally for both." This pitiful attempt to make every thing subservient to sectarian views shows how easily the mere English reader may mistake the perversions of the sacred text for the word of God.

The whole system of making one's faith by reading the Bible is professedly based on a text whose ambiguity the Protestant translators took upon them to remove. "Search the Scriptures." John v. 39. This is proclaimed to be a divine command of indispensable obligation; and yet it turns out to be no other than an artful turn given to what should have been rendered affirmatively, — "Ye search the Scriptures." "To me it is evident," says Dr. Campbell, "that nothing suits this [the connexion] so well as the indicative." We refer our readers to the note of the learned critic, in which he fully sustains this view. No terms of censure were found too severe to express the horror which most Protestant controvertists felt for the books styled by them Apocryphal. It is refreshing to find Dr. Campbell rising superior to this prejudice and tracing occasionally to those books the phraseology used by the Evangelists. The parable of the unjust judge importuned by an injured widow, by which our Lord recommended perseverance in prayer, is in striking contrast with the picture drawn of God, the righteous judge, by the pencil of Ecclesiasticus. "The Lord is judge, and there is not with him respect of persons. He will not despise the prayers of the fatherless, nor the widow, when she poureth out her complaint. Do not the widow's tears run down the cheek, and her cry against him that causeth them to fall? The Lord will not be slack, but will judge for the just, and will do judgment; and the Almighty will not have patience with them, that he may crush their back: And he will repay vengeance to the Gentiles, till he have taken away the multitude of the proud, and broken the sceptres of the unjust, till he have rendered to men according to their deeds."* The learned Grotius preceded Campbell in recurring to this ancient writer to determine the force of the terms used by our Lord in the parable; both of them recognizing the very remarkable contrast in the chief fea-

* Eccl. xxxv. 15-24.

tures of the description, as well as the similitude of the phrases and the identity of the terms. In both passages the verb *μακροθυμῶ* occurs, which is commonly rendered *to have patience*, but which, from the connection in which it stands, might be more clearly expressed by the term *to linger*, as Campbell suggests, or *to be slow*, as "The Catholic" renders it. "To me it appears very probable, considering the affinity of the subject, that the Evangelist had, in the expression he employed, an allusion to the words of the Jewish sage." This is the remark of Campbell, the force of which is infinitely increased, when it is considered that the words recorded by the Evangelist are of our Lord himself, and that the whole parable seems framed with special reference to the description of the divine judge given by the son of Sirach, and to illustrate the same principle. Let the conclusion drawn by our Lord be compared with the passages above quoted: — "Will not God revenge his elect who cry to him day and night; and will he have patience in their regard? I say to you that he will quickly revenge them."*

With equal candor the learned critic draws attention to the fact, that our Lord shared in the celebration of a festival whose institution is traced to the chieftain specially celebrated in the books of the Maccabees. "This festival," he remarks, "was instituted by Judas Maccabæus, 1 Mac. iv. 59, in memory of their pulling down the altar of burnt-offerings, which had been profaned by the pagans, and building a new one dedicated to the true God."† It will not be an easy matter to persuade unbiased readers that our Lord would have sanctioned, by his presence and participation, a festival originating from a source purely human. It is fairer to infer that Judas Maccabæus acted under a divine impulse in its institution, and that the book which records it is a sacred history, like those in which the Mosaic festivals were registered.

From all we have said, it is manifest that critical researches have contributed much to confirm the high authority of the Vulgate. It is truly a precious relic of Christian antiquity, — a painting drawn from life by a master, representing with great accuracy all the features of the original. If it has suffered in the course of ages, it must be retouched by no unskilful hand. Vernacular versions may need correction; but even this should be undertaken cautiously, lest the change detract from the rev-

* Luke xviii. 7.

† In John x. 22.

erence due to the divine writings. It is easier to find fault with the received version than to improve it ; yet we feel that the revision of it is greatly to be desired, to free it from all unnecessary solecisms, and present it to the common reader in as agreeable a style as may be found consistent with fidelity and simplicity.

ART. IV. — *An Oration delivered before the Authorities of the City of Boston in the Tremont Temple, July 4, 1846.*
By FLETCHER WEBSTER. Boston : Eastburn. 1846.
8vo. pp. 33.

OUR orators have invested the Fourth of July with so many disturbing associations, that our citizens are gradually becoming less and less disposed to greet its annual return with those festivities which it was the hope of our fathers would continue to mark it through all generations to come. Still, it is a day sacred in the affections of every American citizen, and it cannot come round without exciting lively emotions of gratitude and joy in every American heart. The birth of a nation is an event to be remembered, and the day on which it takes its rank in the family of independent nations is well deserving to be set apart by some service, at once joyous and solemn, recounting the glory which has been won, the blessings which have been received, and pointing to the high destiny and grave responsibilities to which the new people are called.

The orations ordinarily given on our national anniversary are of that peculiar sort which it is said neither gods nor men can tolerate. They are tawdry and turgid, full of stale declamation about liberty, fulsome and disgusting glorification of ourselves as a people, or uncalled-for denunciations of those states and empires that have not seen proper to adopt political institutions similar to our own. Yet we may, perhaps, be too fastidious in our taste, and too sweeping in our censures. Boys will be boys, and dulness will be dulness, and when either is installed " orator of the day," the performance must needs be boyish or dull. But when the number of orations annually called forth by our national jubilee, from all sorts of persons, throughout the length and breadth of the land, is

considered, we may rather wonder that so many are produced which do credit to their authors, and fall not far below the occasion, than that there are so few. All are not mere school-boy productions; all are not patriotism on tiptoe, nor eloquence on stilts. Every year sends out not a few, which, for their sound sense, deep thought, subdued passion, earnest spirit, manly tone, and chaste expression, deserve an honorable place in our national literature. There are — and perhaps as large a proportion as we ought to expect — Fourth of July orators, who, while they indulge in not unseemly exultations, forget to disgust us with untimely rant about self-government, the marvellous virtue and intelligence of the masses, and the industrial miracles they are daily performing; who show by their reserve, rather than by their noisy declamation, that they have American hearts, and confidence in American patriotism and American institutions. A people not factitiously great has no occasion to speak of its greatness; and true patriotism expresses itself in deeds, not words. The real American patriots are not those shallow brains and gizzard hearts which are always prating of the American spirit, American genius, American interests, American greatness, and calling for an American party; but those calm, quiet, self-possessed spirits who rarely think of asking themselves whether they are Americans or not, and who are too sincere and ardent in their patriotism to imagine it can be necessary to parade its titles. Their patriotism has no suspicions, no jealousies, no fears, no self-consciousness. It is too deep for words. It is silent, majestic. It is where the country is, does what she bids, and, though sacrificing all upon her altars, never dreams that it is doing any thing extraordinary. There is, perhaps, more of this genuine patriotism in the American people than strangers, or even we ourselves, commonly suppose. The foam floats on the surface, and is whirled hither and thither by each shifting breeze; but below are the sweet, silent, and deep waters.

Among the orations delivered on our great national festival, which we would not willingly forget, the one before us by Mr. Fletcher Webster, eldest son of the Hon. Daniel Webster, deserves a high rank. It is free from the principal faults to which we have alluded, simple and chaste in its style and language, bold and manly in its tone and spirit, and, in the main, sound and just in doctrine and sentiment. It frequently reminds us of the qualities which mark the productions of the author's distinguished father, and which have placed him at the

head of American orators ; and it bears ample evidence, that, with time, experience, and effort, the son need not be found unworthy of such a father.

Certainly, we do not subscribe to every sentiment, view, or argument of this eloquent oration ; but we like its frank and manly tone, its independent and earnest spirit, and we accept without reserve the leading doctrine it was designed to set forth. We are also grateful to Mr. Webster for having had the moral courage to assert great truths in a community where they can win little applause, and to administer a well merited rebuke to certain dangerous ultraisms when and where it was not uncalled for. He has proved that he is not unworthy to be reckoned a freeman and a patriot, and he deserves and will receive the approbation of all who can distinguish between words and things, and prefer sound sense and solid wisdom to mad fanaticism and hollow cant. It is cheering to find our young men rising above the tendencies of the age and country, and manifesting some respect for the wisdom and virtue of their ancestors, and indicating that they have some suspicion that all that is wise and just was not born with the new generation and possibly may not die with it. It permits us to hope things may not have gone quite so badly with us as we had feared ; that the people are less unsound at the core than we had dared believe ; that, after all, there is a redeeming spirit at work among them ; and that our noble experiment in behalf of popular institutions may not be destined to a speedy failure.

Our great danger lies in the radical tendency which has become so wide, deep, and active in the American people. We have, to a great extent, ceased to regard any thing as sacred or venerable ; we spurn what is old ; war against what is fixed ; and labor to set all religious, domestic, and social institutions afloat on the wild and tumultuous sea of speculation and experiment. Nothing has hitherto gone right ; nothing has been achieved that is worth retaining ; and man and Providence have thus far done nothing but commit one continued series of blunders. All things are to be reconstructed ; the world is to be recast, and by our own wisdom and strength. We must borrow no light from the past, adopt none of its maxims, and take no *data* from its experience. Even language itself, which only embodies the thoughts, convictions, sentiments, hopes, affections, and aspirations of the race, cannot serve as a medium of intercourse between man and man. It is not safe to affirm that black is black, for the word *black*

only names an idea which the past entertained, and most likely a false idea. With such a tendency, wide and deep, strong and active, we cannot but apprehend the most serious dangers. With it, there can be no permanent institutions, no government, no society, no virtue, no well-being.

There is much to strengthen this radical tendency. It is natural to the inexperienced, the conceited, and the vain ; and it can hardly fail to be powerful in a community where these have facilities for occupying prominent and commanding positions. Young enthusiasts, taught to "remember, when they are old, not to forget the dreams of their youth," that is, not to profit by experience, and not doubting that what they were ignorant of yesterday was known by no one, and that they must needs be as far in advance of all the world as they are of their own infancy, bring benevolent affection, disinterested zeal, and conscientiousness to its aid ; political aspirants, reckless of principle and greedy of place, appeal to it as their most facile means of success ; and the mass of the people, finding their passions flattered and their prejudices undisturbed, are thrown off their guard, presume all is right, and cherish unconsciously the enemy that is to destroy them. A factitious public opinion grows up, becomes supreme, to which whoever wishes for some consideration in the community in which he lives must offer incense, and which he must presume on no occasion to contradict. The majority of the people, indeed, may not be represented by this opinion, — may, it is true, not approve it ; but they are isolated one from another, minding each their own affairs, and ignorant of their numbers and strength ; while the few, by their union, mutual acquaintance, concert, and clamor, are able to silence any single voice not raised in adulation of their idol. Political parties conspire to the same end. One party to-day, ambitious of success, courts this factitious public opinion as a useful auxiliary, and succeeds ; the other must do so to-morrow, or abandon all hopes of succeeding. Then follows a strife of parties, which shall bid highest, and *outradical* the other. The radical tendency is thus daily exaggerated by those who in reality disapprove it, and in their feelings have no sympathy with it. Hence, the evil goes ever from bad to worse. Unhappily, this is no fancy sketch. We have seen it, and we see it daily pass under our own eyes, and not, we confess, without lively alarm for our beloved country and her popular institutions.

It is, therefore, with more than ordinary pleasure that we

see among our young men, in whose hands are the destinies of our country, whose views and passions and interests must be consulted by any party aspiring to power and place, some symptoms of an opposing tendency. Right glad are we that the young "sovereigns" show some signs of beginning to take sounder and more practical views, and to cherish a reaction against the ultraisms of the day. This oration, and some other indications, which have not escaped our notice, prove to us that there is a returning respect for the wisdom of experience, and that the reign of the Garrisons, the Parkers, the Sumners, the O'Sullivans, the Channings, the Abby Folsoms, *et id omne genus*, approaches its termination, and that henceforth practical sense and wise experience will at least dispute the throne with fanatic zeal, blind enthusiasm, and bloated conceit.

In preparing this oration, Mr. Webster must have been conscious that he was running athwart the views of many whom most of us have been accustomed to hold in high esteem, and that, in venturing to assert the lawfulness of war and the obligation of the citizen to obey the government, he would be attacking every class of fanatics in the land, and could not fail to incur the unmitigated wrath and hostility of the whole modern "Peace" party. Yet his courage did not fail him. He does not appear to have had any misgivings before even the awful shade of the late Noah Worcester, founder of the American Peace Society, and he has dared consult his relations as a man and a citizen, and to lay it down as his rule of action, that he is responsible, not to the self-created associations of the day, to the reigning cant of the time and place, but solely to his God and his country. For this, however much he may be condemned by fanatical reformers, we honor him, and for this every right-minded man will honor him; for in this he has asserted his independence, and set an example worthy of imitation.

The main topic of this oration is the lawfulness of war, and the duty of the citizen to obey the government, — a topic at all times interesting and important, and especially so at this time, when we are actually engaged in a war with a neighbouring republic, the necessity of which is questioned by many of our citizens; and when there is widely prevalent a notion that the citizen is under no moral obligation to obey the law, if it does not chance to coincide with his own private convictions of justice and expediency. We agree in the main with the view of this topic which the author takes, and gladly avail our-

selves of the occasion to make some additional remarks of our own, which may tend to illustrate and confirm it, though the readers of the oration may, perhaps, consider them quite superfluous.

The war of 1812, declared by this country against Great Britain, as is well known, was exceedingly unpopular in the New England States, — not, indeed, in consequence of any especial partiality for Great Britain herself, nor because they were less patriotic than the other members of the confederacy, but because the chief burdens of the war fell upon them, in the ruin it brought to their commerce and its dependent interests, then their principal interests. It is not for us to pronounce any opinion on the justice or expediency of that war ; but we cannot censure with extreme severity the New England people for being strongly opposed to it. Yet there can be no question, that, in the madness of the moment, the opposition was carried to wholly unjustifiable lengths, and, though we willingly acquit it of all treasonable intentions, it in reality stopped only this side of treason. Some weak-minded but well disposed New England ministers, incapable of taking comprehensive views and of seeking to remedy an evil by attacking it in its principle, seeing the danger to the union, to the stability of our institutions, occasioned by the opposition to the war, which they never thought of censuring or attempting to moderate, lamenting the very serious evils suffered by their friends and neighbours, and taking it for granted that the war was wholly unnecessary and unjust, made the grand discovery in moral theology that war is *malum in se*, is always unnecessary, and can never be lawful. They without much delay proceeded, *more suo*, to form an association against war, and to preach, lecture, and issue tracts in favor of universal peace. They appealed to the prejudices against the actual war, and to general philanthropy. New Englanders, especially Bostonians, are rarely insensible to the appeal to philanthropy. Since the softening down of some of the asperities of their primitive Puritanism, which took place in the latter half of the last century, they have been justly remarkable for their philanthropy, — no people in the world more so. Industrious, frugal, economical, they certainly are ; but mean, sordid, miserly, they are not, and are incapable of being. They are, in truth, open, frank, generous, and liberal, with a sort of passion for world reform, which is one of their foibles. The unpopularity of the war of 1812,

and the popularity of the appeal to philanthropy, gave to the peace movement a speedy and strong support, till peace became a sort of cant among us, and it was hazardous to one's reputation to intimate that war, terrible as may be its evils, is nevertheless sometimes just and necessary.

But the genuine Yankee is never satisfied with doing only one thing at a time. He is really in his glory only when he has some dozen or more irons all in the fire at once. The simple question of peace could by no means absorb his superabundant zeal and philanthropy, so he invented and set on foot antislavery and various other movements, all of which adopted the "peace principle"; for the chief actors in one were, for the most part, prominent actors in all. By means of agitation, froth and foam, declamation and rant, of conventions, agents, tracts, lectures, sermons, periodicals, a new code of morals has been gradually framed among us; all that was once regarded as settled is now called in question; what was approved by the generations which preceded us is now pronounced low, earthly, sensual, devilish; the fairest reputations are blackened; our own patriots and heroes are calumniated, and even Washington himself has been publicly branded as an "inhuman butcher." We are cast completely adrift. There was no true morality in the world before these modern societies sprung from the womb of night, and we are required to look to a few canting ministers, strolling spinsters, and beardless youths, as the sole authoritative expounders of the precepts of the divine law. We are unable to determine what it is safe to eat or to drink, when to rise up or sit down, unless some of these self-constituted guides condescend to inform us. Sin and death hover everywhere; poison lurks in every thing, even in the bread made from the finest wheat, and the purest water from the fountain; and there seems to be no possible means of living but to go naked and cease to eat or drink. It is a wonder how the world has contrived, for six thousand years, to get on, how men and women have contrived to be born, to live, to grow, and to persuade themselves that they enjoy a tolerable share of health and vigor, both of mind and body.

The joke, in fact, becomes serious. Many of the rising generation are beginning to take it, not as a dull jest, but as downright earnest. It interferes quite too much with the social and domestic business of life, and, if continued much longer, will reduce the great mass of us to mere automata. It is, therefore, high time for what sober sense, for what decency,

there may have been left in the community to speak out, send these fanatics back to their native inanity, and let it be known, that, though for a time we have suffered ourselves to be made fools of, after all, we are not quite so stupid, so vain or conceited, as to imagine that nobody understood or practised the moral virtues till our modern associations burst from darkness to teach them ; that we really have not sunk so low as to lose all respect for our ancestors, all reverence for the awful past, over which has flowed the tide of human joy and human sorrow, and to be wholly unable to serve our own generation without calumniating those which have placed us in the world and made us what we are. He is a foolish as well as a wicked son who curses the mother that bore him. There has been, from the first, a Providence that has watched over and ruled in the affairs of men ; our distant forefathers had eyes, ears, hands, intellects, hearts, as well as we, and knew how to use them, and did use them, not always ineffectually. How, indeed, would the hoary Past, were it not that experience has made it wise and taught it to make allowances for the follies and pranks of youth, laugh at our solemn airs and grave decisions ! How should we hang our heads and blush, even to the tips of our ears, could we but for one moment see ourselves as it sees us ! “ The son,” says the proverb, “ *thinks* his father a fool ; the father *knows* his son to be one.” The more we study what has been, the less disposed shall we be to exult in what is. Happily, we begin to discover some symptoms that there are those among us, who have, now and then, at least, a suspicion that change is not always progress, and that it is more creditable to be able to reverse wisdom than to contemn it.

War, against which nearly all our modern fanatics declaim so much, and which in the new moral code is utterly prohibited, is, of course, not a thing to be sought for its own sake. Its necessity must always be lamented, as we must always lament that there are crimes to be redressed, or criminals to be punished, or diseases to be cured. But because we must always lament that there are offenders to be punished, it does not follow that to punish them is never necessary, or that their punishment is an evil, and morally wrong ; or because it is to be regretted that there are diseases, that we must treat the physician and his drugs as a nuisance. The father weeps that he has occasion to chastise his child, but knows that “ to spare the rod is to spoil the child ” ; nor does it necessarily follow, because war involves terrible evils, and is to be avoided when-

ever it can be without sacrificing the public weal, that it is in itself wrong, and may never be resorted to without violating the law of God. Its necessity is an evil, but, as a remedy, it may be just and beneficial. Disease is an evil, but not, therefore, the medicine that restores to health. War is a violent remedy for a violent disease, and as such may, when all other remedies prove or must prove ineffectual, be resorted to without sin. We, therefore, venture to maintain, in the very face of our modern fanatics, that war declared by the sovereign authority of the state, for a just cause, and prosecuted with right intentions, is not morally wrong, and may be engaged in with a safe conscience.

That war is not morally wrong, in itself, is evident from the fact, that Almighty God has himself, on several occasions, as in the case of the ancient Israelites, actually commanded or approved it. But God cannot command or approve what is morally wrong, without doing wrong himself; which is absurd and impious to suppose. It cannot be in itself morally wrong, unless prohibited by some law; but there is no law which prohibits it. It is not prohibited by the law of nature. By the law of nature, the individual has the right to defend and avenge himself. Justice not only forbids wrong to be done, but requires that the wrong done be avenged. In a state of nature, where there is no established government, but each individual is left to his own sovereignty, each one has the right of defending and avenging himself in his own hands. If this be true of a private person, it must also be true of the state or nation; for nations have precisely the same rights in relation to one another that individuals have. They, then, who admit no law but the law of nature, must concede that war is not prohibited.

Nor is war prohibited by the divine law. This all will readily grant to be true, so far as concerns the old law, which nowhere condemns war, and not unfrequently presents us God himself as commanding or approving it. It is also true, so far as concerns the new law, or Christian law. "If Christian discipline," says St. Augustine, "condemned all wars, the Gospel would have given this counsel of salvation to the soldiers who asked what they should do, that they should throw away their arms and withdraw themselves from the military service altogether. But it says to them, 'Do violence to no man, calumniate no one, and be content with your wages.' St. Luke iii. 14. Surely it does not prohibit the military

service to those whom it commands to be contented with its wages." *

Our Lord, St. Matt. viii. 10, commends the faith of a centurion who had soldiers under his command, says he had not found so great faith in Israel, and yet does not order him to throw away his arms, or abandon the military service. Cornelius, Acts x. 2, "a centurion of the band which is called Italian," is commended as "a religious man, fearing God"; and the blessed Apostle Paul, Heb. xi. 32 - 34, praises Gideon, Barac, Samson, and others, "who through faith subdued kingdoms, became valiant in war, put to flight the armies of foreigners." These considerations show that war is not prohibited by the Christian law. Then it is prohibited by no law, and therefore is not necessarily sinful, but may be just and expedient.

But it is objected, that there are certain passages in the New Testament which, if not expressly, yet by implication, evidently deny the lawfulness of war. 1. "All that take the sword shall perish by the sword." St. Matt. xxvi. 52. But to take the sword is to use the sword without the order or consent of the proper authority. He who only *uses* the sword by order or consent of the proper authority, that is, of the political sovereign, if he be a private person, or of God, if he be a public person or sovereign prince, does not *take* the sword, but simply uses the sword committed to him. Nor are we to understand that all who take the sword on incompetent authority will be literally slain, but that they will perish by their own sword, that is, be punished eternally for their sin, if they do not repent. †

2. "I say unto you, not to resist evil; but if any man strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also." St. Matt. v. 39. War is resistance of evil; but this text forbids the resistance of evil; therefore it forbids war. But the precept refers to the interior disposition, and commands that preparation of the heart which does not resist evil by rendering evil for evil, but endures patiently whatever wrongs or injuries are necessary

* "Nam si Christiana disciplina omnia bella culparet, hoc potius militibus consilium salutis petentibus in Evangelio diceretur, ut abjicerent arma, seque omnino militiæ subtraherent. Dictum est autem eis, *Neminem concusseritis, nulli calumniam feceritis; sufficiat vobis stipendium vestrum*. Quibus proprium stipendium sufficere debere præcepit, militare utique non prohibuit." Epist. V., *Ad Marcellinum*, c. 2.

† See St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, lib. 22, c. 70, and St. Thomas, *Summa*, 2. 2, Q. 40, a. 1.

for the honor of God and the salvation of men. It is not to be understood to the letter, for our Lord, who fulfilled it, when struck in his face, did not turn the other cheek, but defended himself by reasoning. It commands patience under wrongs and insults, and forbids us to seek to avenge ourselves on our own authority ; but it does not prohibit the redress of wrongs by the proper authorities ; because we know from the testimony of St. Paul that the magistrate is " the minister of God, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil." Rom. xiii. 4. Wrongs, when redressed by the proper authority, may be redressed without any malignant feelings, and, indeed, with the most benevolent intentions towards the wrong-doer. Wrongs are not, in all cases, to go unavenged, otherwise God would not have appointed a ministry to avenge them. It is often the greatest of evils to suffer offences to go unpunished, and one of the most certain methods of preventing them is for the magistrate to let it be known and understood that they cannot be committed with impunity.*

3. " Revenge not yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place to wrath ; for it is written, Vengeance is mine, and I will repay, saith the Lord." Rom. xii. 19. This, though relied on by the peace party, is not to the purpose, for it speaks of private revenge, which every body admits is condemned by the Christian law. It is of the same import with the text we have just dismissed. It simply commands patience under injuries, forbearance towards those who do us wrong, and forbids to seek redress of wrongs done us in a resentful spirit, or by our own hands or authority. But it does not necessarily imply that the public authority, which is the minister of God, may not redress them, or that the commonwealth may not repel or vindicate attacks upon itself, whether they

* "Sunt ergo ista præcepta patientiæ semper in cordis præparatione retinenda, ipsaque benevolentia, ne reddatur malum pro malo, semper in voluntate complenda est. Agenda sunt autem multa, etiam cum invitis benigna quadam asperitate plectendis, quorum potius utilitati consulenda est quam voluntati. . . . Nam in corripiendo filio quamlibet asperere, nunquam amor paternus amittitur. Fit tamen quod nolit et doleat, qui etiam videtur dolore sanandus. Ac per hoc si terrena ista respublica præcepta Christiana custodiat, et ipsa bella sine benevolentia non gerentur, ut ad pietatis justitiæque pacatam societatem victis facilius consulatur. Nam cui licentia iniquitatis eripitur, utiliter vincitur ; quoniam nihil est infelicius felicitate peccantium, qua penalis nutritur impunitas, et mala voluntas velut hostis interior roboratur." S. Aug. *ubi sup.* et *De Serm. Domini*, lib. 1, c. 19, and also St. Thomas, *ubi sup.*

come from within or from without. To avenge wrongs is not in itself wrong, because it is said the Lord "will repay"; nor is it wrong for the magistrate to avenge them, for "he is the minister of God, an avenger," as we have seen, "to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil"; and it is wrong for the individual to do it only because in civil society his natural right to do so is taken away, and because it is made his duty to leave it to God or the minister he in his providence appoints.

4. "For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but powerful through God." 2 Cor. x. 4. But St. Paul is speaking, not of the sword which the magistrate bears, nor of that which the sovereign state, as the minister of God to execute wrath, may put into the hands of its servants, but of the weapons to be used in the conversion of infidels and sinners. These, indeed, are not carnal, but spiritual, and powerful through the virtue God confers on them. Carnal weapons are unlawful in the work of conversion, for conversion is not conversion unless voluntary. God says to the sinner, "Give me thy heart," that is, thy will; and this carnal weapons can force no man to give. It can be subdued only by spiritual arms, rendered effectual through divine grace. But this says nothing against the lawfulness of repelling or avenging injustice, whether from subjects or foreigners, by the proper authorities. These several texts, then, make nothing against our general conclusion, that war is not, in all cases, prohibited by the Christian law.

But we are told, still further, that war is opposed to peace; yet the Gospel is a Gospel of peace, commands peace, and pronounces a blessing on peacemakers. "*Beati pacifici, quoniam filii Dei vocabuntur.*" St. Matt. v. 9. War, undertaken for its own sake, looking to itself as the end, is opposed to peace, and unlawful, we grant; but war, undertaken for the sake of obtaining a just and lasting peace, is not opposed to peace, but may be the only means possible of restoring and securing it. Peace is then willed, the intentions are peaceful, and war, as a necessity, becomes itself a peacemaker, and as such is lawful, and its prosecutors are not necessarily deprived of the blessing pronounced on peacemakers. Hence, St. Augustine says, — "*Pacem habere debet voluntas, bellum necessitas, ut liberet Deus a necessitate, et conservet in pace. Non enim pax queritur ut bellum excitetur, sed bellum geritur ut pax acquiratur. Esto ergo etiam bellando pacificus, ut eos quos*

expugnas, ad pacis utilitatem vincendo perducas."* The peace is broken, not by the just war, but by the previous injustice which has rendered the war necessary. The war itself is, necessarily, no more repugnant to the virtue of peace than medicine is to health. The mission of our Saviour is not opposed to peace, because followed by certain evils of which he speaks, St. Matt. x. 34 – 36, and which were not the end for which he came into the world. The preaching of the Gospel is not inconsistent with the virtue of peace, because, through the depravity and wickedness of men, it often occasions discord, divisions, and even wars; nor do they who faithfully preach it any the less "follow after the things which make for peace."

In asserting that war is not necessarily unlawful, we are far from pretending that all wars are just, or that war may ever be waged for slight and trivial offences. The nation is bound studiously to avoid it, to forbear till forbearance ceases to be a virtue, and appeal to arms only as the last resort, after all other appeals have failed, or it is morally certain that they must fail. But when its rights are seriously invaded, when the offender will not listen to reason, and continues his injustice, the nation may appeal to arms, and commit its cause to the God of battles. The responsibility of the appeal rests on the offender whose injustice has provoked it.

It may be said that war is unjustifiable, because, if all would practise justice, there could be no war. Undoubtedly, if all men and nations were wise and just, wars would cease. We might then, in very deed, "beat our swords into ploughshares and our spears into pruning-hooks," and learn war no more. We should, not in vision only, but in reality, possess universal peace. So, if all individuals understood and practised the moral and Christian virtues in their perfection, there would be no occasion for penal codes, and a police to enforce them. If no wrongs or outrages were committed, there would be none to be repressed or punished. If there were no diseases, there would be none to cure. If the world were quite another world than it is, it — would be. But so long as the world is what it is, so long as man fails to respect the rights of man, the penal code and police will be necessary; so long as diseases obtain, the physician and his drugs, nauseous as they are, will be indispensable; and so long as nation continues to encroach

* Epist. 905, *Ad Bonifacium Comitem.*

on nation, the aggrieved party will have the right and be compelled to defend and avenge itself by an appeal to arms, terrible as that appeal may be, and deplorable as may be the necessity which demands it.

The evils of war are great, but not the greatest. It is a greater evil to lose national freedom, to become the tributaries or the slaves of the foreigner, to see the sanctity of our homes invaded, our altars desecrated, and our wives and children made the prey of the ruthless oppressor. These are evils which do not die with us, but may descend upon our posterity through all coming generations. The man who will look tamely on and see altars and home defiled, all that is sacred and dear wrested from him, and his country stricken from the roll of nations, has as little reason to applaud himself for his morals as for his manhood. No doubt, philanthropy may weep over the wounded and the dying; but it is no great evil to die. It is appointed unto all men to die, and, so far as the death itself is concerned, it matters not whether it comes a few months earlier or a few months later, on the battle-field or in our own bedchambers. The evil is not in dying, but in dying unprepared. If prepared, — and the soldier, fighting by command of his country in her cause, *may* be prepared, — it is of little consequence whether the death come in the shape of sabre-cut or leaden bullet, or in that of disease or old age. The tears of the sentimentalist are lost upon him who is conscious of his responsibilities, that he is commanded to place duty before death, and to weigh no danger against fidelity to his God and his country. Physical pain is not worth counting. Accumulate all that you can imagine, the Christian greets it with joy when it lies in the pathway of his duty. He who cannot take his life in his hand, and, pausing not for an instant before the accumulated tortures of years, rush in, at the call of duty, where “blows fall thickest, and blows fall heaviest,” deserves rebuke for his moral weakness, rather than commendation for his “peaceable dispositions.”

Wars, we have been told, cost money; and we have among us men piquing themselves on their lofty spiritual views, accusing the age of being low and utilitarian, and setting themselves up as moral and religious reformers, who can sit calmly down and cast up in dollars and cents the expenses of war, and point to the amount as an unanswerable argument against its lawfulness. War unquestionably costs money, and so do food and clothing. But the sums expended in war would, if

applied to that purpose, found so many schools and universities, and educate so many children ! The amount expended for food and clothing would found a larger number of schools and universities, and educate a larger number of children. You should ask, not, Will it cost money ? but, Is it necessary, is it just ? Would you weigh gold in the balance with duty, justice, patriotism, heroism ? If so, slink back to your tribe, and never aspire to the dignity of being contemptible.

But having established that war may be necessary and just, the question comes up, What is the duty of the citizen or subject, when his government is actually engaged in war ? This is a question of some moment, especially at the present time, when there are so many among us who entertain very loose notions of allegiance, and hardly admit that loyalty is or can be a virtue. We may answer, in general terms, that, when a nation declares war, the war is a law of the land, and binds the subject to the same extent and for the same reason as any other law of the land. The whole question is simply a question of the obligation of the citizen to obey the law. So far as the subject is bound to obey the law, so far he is bound to render all the aid in prosecuting the war the government commands him to render, and in the form in which it commands it.

If the government leaves it optional with the citizen whether to take an active part in the war or not, he is unquestionably bound to remain passive, if he believes the war to be unjust. Consequently, no foreigner, owing no allegiance to the sovereign making the war, can volunteer his services, if he entertains any scruples about its justice. But the subject, though entertaining doubts about the justice of a given war in its incipient stages, believing his government too hasty in its proceedings, and not so forbearing as it might and should have been, yet after the war has been declared, after his country is involved in it, can retreat only by suffering grievous wrongs, and seeks now to advance only for the purpose of securing a just and lasting peace, may, no doubt, even volunteer his active services, if he honestly believes them to be necessary ; for the war now has changed its original character, has ceased to be aggressive, and become defensive and just. In such a case, love of country, and the general duty of each citizen to defend his country, to preserve its freedom and independence, override the scruples he felt with regard to the war in its incipient stages, and enable him to take part in it with a safe con-

science. But, however this may be, it is clear, that, when the government has actually declared war, and actually commands the services of the subject, he is bound in conscience, whatever may be his private convictions of the justice of the war, to render them, on the ground that he is bound in conscience to obey the law. If he takes part in obedience to the command of the government, he takes part, even though his private conviction is against the war, with a good conscience ; because the motive from which he acts is not to prosecute a war he does not regard as just, but to obey his sovereign, which he is not at liberty not to do, and which he must do for conscience' sake.

The law binds in conscience, because all legitimate government exists by divine appointment, and has a divine right to make laws. For the same reason, then, that we are bound in conscience to obey God, we are bound in conscience to obey the law. The sovereignty resides in the nation, but is derived from God. *Per me reges regnant, et legum conditores justa decernunt.* "By me kings reign and lawgivers decree just things." Prov. viii. 15. "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers ; for there is no power but from God ; and the powers that are, are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist purchase damnation to themselves." Rom. xiii. 1, 2. Since, then, the nation is sovereign by divine appointment, it follows necessarily, that, when the sovereign authority of the nation declares war, and commands the services of the subject, he is held, on his allegiance to God, who is the King of kings and Sovereign of sovereigns, to render them, and cannot refuse without purchasing damnation to himself.

The nation is not constituted sovereign by the assent of the individuals of which it is composed, for it must be a sovereign nation before individuals have or can have the right of assenting or dissenting. The error of Rousseau and of some of our own politicians is in assuming that the sovereignty, the authority to institute government, to make and execute laws, inheres primarily in the people distributively, as equal, independent individuals, and is subsequently possessed by the people collectively, as a political organism or person, by virtue of the assent of the people taken distributively. The motive for advocating this view is twofold : the first is, to make the basis of sovereignty purely human ; and the second, to take from actually existing governments all claims to inviolability,

and thus establish a sort of legal right on the part of subjects to rebel against the constituted authorities, whenever they judge it to be expedient. The doctrine is the offspring of an age disposed to revolt from both God and the state, and can be regarded only with horror by the Christian and the patriot. The true doctrine is, that every nation, that is, every people taken collectively, as a moral unity, as a collective individual, is, by the fact that it is a nation, sovereign, and sovereign by the ordinance of God. Being thus invested by the divine will with the political sovereignty, the nation acting in its sovereign capacity has, saving the divine law, the right to institute such forms of government, or to adopt such methods for the expression of its sovereign will, as it in its prudence judges best. It may institute a monarchy, an aristocracy, or a pure democracy; it may combine these three forms, or any two of them, in any proportion and degree, and establish such mixed governments as it pleases; or it may reject all these forms, and, as with us, establish representative government, to be carried on through the medium of popular election. Which is wisest and best is for each nation to decide for itself. In point of fact, we suppose all are best where they fit, and worst where they do not fit. But however individuals may speculate, and whatever preferences as simple individuals they may have, the nation acting in its sovereign capacity is the sovereign arbiter, and alone decides which shall be adopted, and having once decided, that form which it adopts is legitimate, exists by divine right, and its legitimate acts are laws, and bind in the interior as well as in the exterior court.

This is as true of the actual American governments as of any others. The American people were created by their colonial governments, established by legitimate authority, bodies corporate and politic subject to the crown of Great Britain. But the charters granted by the crown, creating the colonial governments, and reserving the allegiance of the colonies, expressed or necessarily implied reciprocal obligations. There was an express or implied contract between the crown and the colonies. When the crown, on its part, broke the contract, as we alleged it did, it forfeited its rights, and the colonies were *ipso facto* absolved from their allegiance, and necessarily became *ipso facto* free and independent states or nations, as Great Britain herself subsequently acknowledged them to be. As independent nations, they possessed by the ordinance of God, who makes every nation, in that it is a nation, sovereign,

the right of self-government, and were free to devise and adopt such forms of government, not repugnant to the divine law, as they in the exercise of their sovereign wisdom judged to be most expedient. They, in the exercise of the right given them by Almighty God, established the representative form of government, under a federal head. This form of government, therefore, exists with us by divine right, is an ordinance of God. As such it is sovereign and inviolable; as such it has from God authority to enact laws for the common good. Then, since we are all bound in conscience to obey God, we are bound to obey the government, and when it enacts war, just the same as when it enacts any thing else.

Ignorant, conceited, and unbelieving politicians, who would be free to rule, but not bound to obey, may affect to be startled, whenever there is speech of the divine right of government; but we really say nothing that militates in the least conceivable degree against popular sovereignty. Our real offence consists, not in denying the popular sovereignty, but in asserting for it a divine sanction. What, indeed, is it we say? Simply, that the nation, that is, the people as a moral unity, or collective individual, as distinguished from the people taken distributively, is sovereign by the ordinance of God; from which it follows, that the people taken distributively owe allegiance to the nation, and are bound to obey all the sovereign enactments of the government, not merely because it is human government, but because it is human government governing by divine right. This abridges no right of the sovereign people, but confirms its rights by the highest of all possible sanctions. It leaves the nation free to adopt, if it chooses, a pure democracy, and commands us, even though individually disapproving that form of government, to obey it for conscience' sake. In a word, the doctrine we lay down makes the nation—that is, the whole people taken collectively—sovereign and inviolable, and the form of government it adopts, legitimate and sacred, as the ordinance of God. It no doubt, therefore, stamps with the divine as well as the national displeasure what by a strange perversion is termed sometimes “the sacred right of insurrection,” and utterly condemns all attempts at rebellion or resistance to established government, in the legitimate exercise of its legitimate functions, as so many attacks on the inviolability of the nation, and therefore on the inviolability of God himself, who ordains that every nation, in that it is a nation, shall be sovereign and inviolable. It can tolerate no efforts of any

portion of the people to change by violence any established form of government for the sake of establishing another form which they may believe to be more for the common good. But it leaves individuals perfectly free to labor through legal forms, in an orderly manner, for the amelioration of the laws and institutions of the country, and the nation itself, when acting in its sovereign capacity, as we did at the epoch of what we call our Revolution, or as we do through the legal conventions of the people, to change even the form of the government, and to ordain such new methods for the expression of its sovereign will as it may believe to be most for the common good.* It leaves the people as the commonwealth and the people as individuals all the freedom there is this side of license, and forbids nothing that is compatible with national sovereignty and inviolability. It can be objected to, then, by none who are not prepared to object to all government, all law, and all order.

The duty of obedience to law is precisely the same under a republican government as under any other form of government. For though the people make the law, yet it is not in the same sense as that in which they are held to obey it. They make the law in their collective sense, as a moral unity, or public person; they are held to obey in their distributive capacity, as simple individuals. In their quality of electors, acting through legal forms prescribed by sovereign authority, the people with us make the law, but it is only when so acting that they make it, have any voice in making it, or incur any responsibility, be the law what it may. As individuals acting in any other capacity, they are subjects, and in the same sense and to the same extent as they would be in case they enjoyed no elective franchise at all. The law is as imperative with us as it is under any other form of government, and can no more be resisted with a safe conscience than elsewhere.

This assumed, the individual in his quality of subject stands here in relation to the law precisely as he does in those countries where there is no elective franchise. He incurs, indeed, as elector, a responsibility for the law, and cannot be exempted from blame, if he have not done all in his power to make the law just and useful; but when the proper authorities have enacted and promulgated the law, he in his quality of subject

* See St. Th., *Summa*, 1. 2, Q. 97, a. 1, and St. Aug., *De Libero Arbitrio*, I., c. 6.

incurs no responsibility by obeying it, in consequence of his responsibility as an elector in making it. The act of making the law was not his individual act, and he is responsible for it, providing he acted with proper motives, only so far as he went to make up the collective unity that enacted it. But the act of obedience or of disobedience is purely his individual act, and is unaffected, as obedience or disobedience, by any act of his performed in another capacity, in which he acts not as an individual, but as a part of a whole. Suppose, then, I look upon the war declared by my government as unjust or uncalled for. This may be a good reason why I should exert myself in my quality of elector to get the law declaring it repealed, but it leaves me in my quality of subject precisely where I should be in case I had no elective franchise. I am just as much bound to obey the law declaring the war, and incur no more blame for aiding in prosecuting it. The citizen, when he believes a law unjust, is doubtless bound as an elector to seek its repeal; but till repealed, he is as much bound to obey as he would be if he were no elector, and only a simple subject; and being so bound, incurs no blame in obeying it, that he would not then also incur.

But is there no limit to this obedience to law? Have I not the right to judge the acts of authority, and decide for myself whether they are such as I ought or ought not to obey? That is, Does or does not the law depend on the assent of the governed for its validity? It is a sort of maxim with us Americans, that no man can be justly held to obey a law to which he has not assented. This, taken absolutely, is not admissible. The sovereign authority resides in the people as a whole, taken collectively, not in the people distributively, and is derived not from the people as individuals, as Rousseau dreamed, but from God, as we have before proved from the Holy Scriptures. Moreover, to make the law depend on the assent of the governed, that is, on the assent of the subject, is to deny that the law is law, that the subject is a subject, and to assert that one is bound by no law, but free to do as he pleases. There can be no legitimate government unless it have the right to govern, and there can be no right to govern where there is not a correlative obligation to obey. If the law cannot bind the subject till he gives his assent, and he is free to give or withhold his assent, he is, and can be, under no obligation to obey unless he chooses, and then there is no right on the part of the government to enforce obedience;

then no right to govern ; and then no government. To make the law depend for its validity on the assent of the governed is, then, the denial of all government. But government exists by divine right. It has from God the right to command. Then it is not under the necessity of entreating or requesting the subject to be so complacent as to obey. The law, then, is complete, the moment it is enacted and promulgated by the proper authority. If the law is then complete, the subject has no assent to give or withhold, no judgment to form, no decision to take, but that to obey.

Nevertheless, there is a sense, in this country, and perhaps in all countries, in which it is true that the assent of the governed is essential to the validity of the law ; but this is the assent they give in their quality of electors, through the medium of their representatives in enacting the law, not an assent which they give as subjects to the law after it is enacted and promulgated. The distinction is obvious and important. It is only in our quality of electors, through the medium of our representatives, that we have any legislative authority, any assent, to give or to withhold. But in this quality we have already assented to the law, otherwise it could not have been enacted, since there is no power with us but the people in this quality and through this medium that does or can make the law. Having thus assented, nay, enacted the law, we have no more assent to give, and it would be absurd to seek, after this, the assent of the people in their capacity of simple individuals, in which they are simply subjects, and have no legislative voice whatever. Having spoken once in our legislative capacity, as electors, through our representatives, we must obey, till, by speaking again in the same capacity and through the same medium, we repeal the law. That is, when the people have made the law, they must obey it, till they, through the forms through which they made it, repeal it.

But laws may undoubtedly be unjust. Am I bound to obey unjust laws ? We will let St. Thomas answer this question for us. "Laws imposed by human authority may be either just or unjust. If they are indeed just, they bind in conscience, by the eternal law from which they are derived, according to Prov. viii. 15, — '*Per me reges regnant, et legum conditores justa decernunt.*' They are just when they ordain what is for the common good, when enacted by an authority which does not exceed its powers, and when they distribute in equal proportions the burdens they impose upon the subjects for the

common good. For, since each man is a part of the multitude, every man belongs to the multitude in that which he is and in that which he has, in like manner as the part belongs in what it is to the whole, and hence nature allows a certain detriment to the part that the whole may be saved. Consequently, laws of this kind, which proportion equally the burdens imposed, are just, bind in conscience, and are legal laws. But laws may be unjust in two senses. 1. By contrariety to human good, in the respects just mentioned. They are unjust, when a prince imposes burdens on his subjects, not for the common good, but rather for his own glory or cupidity, when they exceed the commission or the authority which ordains them, and when the burdens they impose, even though for the common good, are not equally proportioned. Such acts are violences rather than laws, as St. Augustine says, *De Lib. Arb.*, I., c. 5, — ‘*Lex esse non videtur, quæ justa non fuerit.*’ Laws of this kind do not bind in conscience, unless, perchance, for the avoiding of scandal or disorder, for which a man must forego his own rights, according to St. Matt. v. 40, 41, — ‘*Qui angariaverit te mille passus, vade cum eo alia duo ; et qui abstulerit tibi tunicam, da ei et pallium.*’ 2. Laws may be unjust by contrariety to divine good, as the edicts of tyrants commanding idolatry or other things forbidden by the divine law. Such laws are to be observed in no sense whatever, since, Acts iv., it is necessary to obey God rather than men.”*

The principle is, that all just laws bind in conscience ; but, with regard to unjust laws, we must distinguish between those which are unjust because they ordain what is repugnant to human good, and those which are unjust because they ordain what is repugnant to the divine law. The latter do not bind, but we are bound in conscience to refuse to obey them at all hazards ; the former, when they only require us to suffer wrong, — and if they go farther and command us to do wrong, they are identical with the latter, — we may obey, and are bound to obey, when our disobedience would cause scandal or breed disturbance in the state.

But who is to determine whether the laws are just or unjust ? Not absolutely in all cases the state, for that would make the distinction between just and unjust laws nugatory, since the state, in enacting a law, decides that it is just ; not the individual, for that would make the law depend on the as-

* *Summa*, I. 2, Ques. 96, a. 4.

sent of the subject for its legality, which we have seen is not the fact, and cannot be the fact, if we are to have government at all. There is here, to many minds, no doubt, a serious difficulty ; but, without considering it in a light which would involve a controversy foreign to our present purpose, we may answer the question by laying down the principle, that authority is always *presumptively* in the right, and the law *primâ facie* evidence of justice. The *onus probandi* rests on the shoulders of the subject, who must prove the law to be unjust, before he can have the right to refuse it obedience. For this his own private judgment or conviction can never suffice. If he can allege nothing against the law but his own individual persuasion of its injustice, he is bound, by his general obligation to obey the laws, to obey it. No one, then, can ever be justified in disobeying on his own private authority. He must sustain his refusal to obey by an authority higher than his own, higher than that of the state, or else he will be guilty of resisting the ordinance of God, and, therefore, purchase damnation to himself. Hence, where there is no infallible authority to decide, the subject must always presume the law to be just, unless it manifestly and undeniably ordains what is wrong in itself, and prohibited by the law of God.

This rule may strike some as too stringent, but, if examined closely, it will be found to allow all the liberty to the subject compatible with the existence of government. If, for instance, the government should command me to lie, to steal, to rob, to bear false witness, or any thing else manifestly against the law of nature or the law of God, I should hold myself bound to disobey, and to take the consequences of my disobedience. So, also, if my government should declare war against an unoffending state, for the purpose of stripping it of its territory, destroying its independence, and reducing its people to slavery, or for the purpose of overthrowing the Christian religion and substituting a false religion, and should command me to aid it in its nefarious designs, I should hold myself bound in conscience to refuse at all hazards ; for such a war would be manifestly and palpably unjust, not in my judgment only, but in that of all sound-minded men. Such a case would be clear, and duty would be so plain that no question could arise. But in a case less clear and manifest, in a case where there was room for doubt, for an honest difference of opinion, I should hold myself bound to obey the orders of the government, for conscience' sake, leaving the responsibility with it, sure of incurring no blame myself.

In conclusion, we say, that, though we have defended the lawfulness of war, when declared by the sovereign authority, for a just cause, and prosecuted with right intentions, we have no sympathy with that restless and ambitious spirit that craves war for the sake of excitement or glory. Only a stern necessity can ever justify the resort to arms, and that necessity does not in reality often exist. In most cases, the war, with a little prudence, a little forbearance, a little use of reason, might be avoided; and a terrible responsibility rests upon rulers when they unnecessarily plunge two nations in the horrors of war. Yet it belongs to the sovereign authority to judge of the necessity of the war, no less than to declare it; and when not manifestly and undeniably for that which is wrong in itself, the subject is bound to obey, and give his life, if need be, for his country. But the subject can, with a good conscience, fight only under the national banner. He can never justly fight under the blood-red flag of the factionist or of the revolutionist. The loyal subject hears no call to the battle-field but that of his sovereign. This sovereign he hears, by him he stands, for him he is ready to fight against any enemies, from within or from without. But there he stops. He can join with no faction, with no party, against the legitimate authorities of his country. No dreams of free institutions, of popular government, of an earthly paradise, can make him raise the parricidal hand, and seek by violence to overthrow legitimate government, and introduce a new political order. No, dearly as we love liberal institutions, and as ready as we are to spill our heart's blood in their defence where they are the legal order, we would rush to the side of authority, and spill the same blood against them, if there were an attempt by violence to introduce them. True freedom is only where the law is supreme, and the law is supreme only where the people reverence it, and feel themselves bound by their duty to God to obey it.

We are not unaware that we have, in the latter part of this article, given utterance to views not precisely in harmony with those commonly set forth by the American newspaper press; yet we are sure that we have only uttered the sentiments of the sound portion of the American people. At bottom the American people are loyal, and, though of late perverted and carried away by a senseless clamor about liberty, and democracy, and the rights of the individual, they have naturally a deep reverence for law, and the disposition to obey it when it is against them as well as when it is in their favor. The cloud which

has been gathering and rolling its dark and massy folds over us, we trust, will yet break and disperse, and permit us to joy as we behold once more the clear blue sky. The strong current of good sense which belongs to our national character will succeed, we trust, in carrying away the froth and foam which have collected on its surface, here and there in the eddies, and leave the waters clear and limpid as our fathers wished them. For the last twenty years we have been indulging in speculations foreign to our national character, and have lost sight of the real nature of our institutions. The fathers, one after one, disappeared, and left us to a new generation, ardent, ignorant, conceited, and headstrong, full of sound and fury, who hurried us on nearly to the edge of the precipice. But this new generation is now older than it was, has profited somewhat by experience, and what remains of it becomes more sober, and seeks to repair the mischief it has done; and, after a few more rash experiments and failures, we trust, under a favoring Providence, we shall be able to exhibit an example of a loyal people, free because loyal, and prosperous because free. If we have spoken severely, it has not been in bitterness nor in despair.

Of the actual war in which we are engaged with Mexico we have purposely refrained from expressing any opinion. We will now only add, that, whatever may be our own private convictions of the justice or expediency of that war, or of the wisdom or energy displayed by the War Department in its prosecution, it does not come within the category of those wars which are manifestly repugnant to the law of God. Ostensibly, at least, it is undertaken for a justifiable cause, and prosecuted only for the sake of a just and lasting peace. We may wish for the speedy return of peace, but we are bound to render the government, in carrying on the war, all the services it commands; and no citizen can refuse to do so, without failing in his obedience to law, and his duty to his country. Yet we may be permitted to express the hope, that our government, in adjusting the terms of peace, will remember the distracted state and weakness of Mexico, and show its moderation. It may, undoubtedly, demand indemnification for wrongs received and for expenses incurred, but let it be generous, forbearing. We have territory enough, and it is more for our interest as a nation to sustain Mexico in her independence and nationality than to absorb her, if we could, in the Union.

However this may be, let us never forget that there is a

Sovereign Arbitrator of nations, as of individuals, and that wars are never accidents, never take place but by divine permission, and unless He who rules over all has some purpose of mercy or of vengeance to accomplish by them. Nations are but his instruments, and he uses them as he pleases. Nations may sin, as well as individuals; and when they do, he punishes them here, for they have no hereafter. Mexico has offended God. She rebelled against her king, and, without any cause of complaint, from a mere love of change and novelty, threw off her legitimate sovereign. She has oppressed the pastors whom the Holy Ghost had placed over her to rule her, and to feed her with the bread of life; she has forgotten her ancient faith, neglected her religion, and sought greatness and glory in infidelity and licentiousness, and Almighty God is angry with her, and uses us as his instruments for her chastisement, that he may one day remember her in mercy. Let us beware. Let us not boast, and say, "Mine own arm has gotten me the victory." He knows well how to humble us, and when he has accomplished his purpose with us, when the cup of our iniquity is full, he will visit us with a sevenfold vengeance. It is no proof that he is satisfied with us, that he has thus far given success to our arms. In the hour of success is the time to humble ourselves, to remember *non nobis*, and to pray that we may have the grace to return to God, and to avert his displeasure. Alas! we, too, have forgotten God, and put our trust in ourselves, in our own stout hearts and strong right arms. We have prospered beyond all example, and we have ascribed our prosperity to ourselves, and forgotten to remember whose it is to give or withhold. For this wonderful prosperity of ours, we shall one day, as a nation, be called to render a strict account. May that be a day, not of vengeance, but of approbation and reward!

ART. V. — *The Right Reverend Benedict Joseph Fenwick, second Bishop of the Diocese of Boston.*

FEW who had the honor of personally knowing the late eminent Bishop of Boston but looked upon him as a great and good man, and upon themselves as highly privileged in being

permitted to love and revere him. Especially was this the case with those who were in habits of daily intercourse with him, who sat familiarly at his table, and shared his intimacy. To them he was a pleasant companion, a faithful and affectionate friend, a wise and prudent counsellor, a watchful and loving father. They have no words to say how much they loved and venerated him, or to express how deeply they feel their bereavement. They never met, and they have no hope of meeting, his equal in another ; and their grief would be more than they could bear, did they not find consolation in reflecting that it has been theirs to know familiarly one who gave them, by his virtues, a higher conception of the capacities of our common nature, and of the power and riches of divine grace ; that they have felt the influence, enjoyed the friendship, and received the paternal counsels and blessing of one whose labors and example were a precious gift from heaven to the community in which he lived ; and that he is removed from them only to enter upon the rewards of his fidelity and life of self-sacrifice, and to be able to serve more effectually the children he so tenderly loved, by his more intimate union with the common Father of us all.

It would give us great pleasure to be able to write the life and portray the character of this eminent divine, and model of Christian prelates ; but that is an honor to which it is not ours to aspire. That honor is reserved for others, who are less recent members of the flock over which he was set by the Holy Ghost, who have known him longer and better, and can speak more worthily of the events of his active life and his invaluable services to religion in this country, and who are more entitled to the consolation of delineating, for the edification of the faithful, those traits of his character which so quickened their love of virtue, and so endeared him to their hearts. We can presume only to recall for our readers a few impressions we personally received in our short but frequent intercourse with him during the last two years of his life, — an intercourse, we need not say, we regard as one of the richest of the many blessings which a kind Providence has ever scattered with a liberal hand along our pathway in life.

We saw Bishop Fenwick for the first time in the spring of 1843. During the preceding winter our religious views had undergone several important modifications, and we began to suspect that the Catholic Church might prove to be less corrupt than we had supposed, — might, perhaps, after all, turn out to

be the Church of God. Our attention was called more particularly to this point by seeing some of our essays copied with commendation into one or two Catholic journals. We had had, strictly speaking, no acquaintance with Catholics ; we had never read, hardly even seen, a single book written by a Catholic in exposition and defence of Catholic doctrines ; and we thought it singular that we should be able to write any thing acceptable to Catholics. Were we in very deed approaching the Church ? Had we unconsciously adopted principles which, if followed out, would require us to abandon our position in the Protestant world ? The question was worth settling, and we knew not how to settle it without applying to some living Catholic teacher. Accordingly, with many misgivings, after much internal conflict, and summoning up all our courage, we sought an interview with Bishop Fenwick. A young friend, who had been introduced to him, called with us ; we were shown into his room, our friend told him our name, and in a moment we were perfectly at our ease. A lively conversation instantly ensued, on one subject and another, but with no direct reference to the point on which we wished to consult him. It was Holy Week ; his time was much taken up, and we forbore to prolong our interview beyond fifteen or twenty minutes. Requesting permission to call and see him again, when he should be more at leisure, we took our leave.

Certainly, nothing remarkable occurred in this interview ; nothing remarkable was said ; and yet we were strangely affected, and had a strong inclination, on taking our leave, to kneel and beg the Bishop's blessing. What affected us we could not have told, can hardly tell even now, and yet affected we were, and went out from his presence feeling that we were a different man from what we were on entering. We had remarked no extraordinary ability or acquirement, and what had been said on either side had been said in a lively and half-sportive strain. If one thing struck us more than another in the Bishop's character, it was his ease and agreeableness of manner, and his ready humor and pleasant wit. Yet there was, withal, so much tenderness, so much sweetness and simplicity of spirit, so much paternal sensibility, that he took instant possession of us, and we were never able afterwards to dismiss him from our mind or heart. Assuredly, on entering his room, we had no serious thought of becoming a Catholic ; but we left him with the full determination to return, as soon as he should be more at leisure, and solicit his instructions.

Certainly, we did not leave Bishop Fenwick with the impression that he was personally that remarkable man we subsequently found him. Indeed, while we were conversing with him, though he related an anecdote of himself, our thoughts were not fixed on him personally. He was not occupied with himself, and he did not permit you to be occupied with him. Persons were out of the question, and forgotten. He entered into no argument with us, and said nothing to flatter our vanity or self-love, and we went out humbled, not exalted, in our estimation. What, then, was the secret of his influence? It was hard to say. But, in fact, the influence of the truly great man is always a puzzle, for you rarely see or suspect, at the moment, his real greatness. The men who strike us suddenly as great are, in general, men who are so only in this or that particular, and who, though calling forth our admiration, exert very little influence on our minds or hearts. They have certain prominences of character which arrest attention; but on familiar acquaintance, they are almost always found to be wanting in many of the requisites of true greatness. The truly great man presents always, so to speak, an even surface, and fails, by his very greatness, to impress us at first sight with a sense of his superiority. One feels this in studying the character of Washington. His is a character of admirable proportions, remarkable for its completeness and integrity. Nothing projects from the rest, and it is only after long study and comparison that its real superiority begins to dawn upon us. It was so with Bishop Fenwick, in a remarkable degree. His character was admirably balanced; the proportions were preserved throughout, and you were unconscious of its real superiority till you had measured the scale on which it was constructed. In company with him and others, you would often feel that he counted for the least present, till gradually you discovered that he was the life and soul of all that had been going on, and that, without intending it, without being conscious that he was doing it, he had moved each according to the operations of his own mind. Perfectly unassuming, void of all pretension, and anxious to make himself of no account, he was ever the master-spirit, and would have been, place him where or with whom you might. We have known intimately some of the most distinguished among those our countrymen delight to honor, but in this respect we have never seen him surpassed, or even equalled.

It was over a year before we saw Bishop Fenwick for the

second time. Immediately after Easter, he left Boston to attend the Provincial Council at Baltimore, and to spend some weeks on a visit to his friends in Maryland, his native State. Before he returned, we were engrossed with a new question. We could accept the Church, but hesitated to abjure Protestantism. We regretted that the Reformers, in the sixteenth century, had broken away from the Church, and set up rival and hostile communions of their own ; and we should have rejoiced, if it had been our lot to have been born and brought up in her communion. But when we came to reflect seriously on the matter, we found we could not join her communion, without saying, by our act, that we believed Protestantism to be an unsafe way of salvation. If salvation was attainable out of the Church, there could be no solid reason for joining her ; if not, what was to be said of the whole Protestant world, and of those eminent Protestants whom we had been accustomed to love and honor as the glory of their age and race ? To assume that all these must be finally lost, if dying out of the pale of the Roman Catholic Church, was altogether more than we were prepared for. Could not an alternative be found ? Is there not some ground on which we may accept the Church, without abandoning our hope for our Protestant friends ? We spent a whole year in trying to discover some such ground ; but without any satisfactory success. Meanwhile, the matter began to assume a serious aspect, — began to come home to our own conscience. We had no lease of life ; we might, at any moment, be summoned to our last account ; and, if dying where we were, could we hope to see God ? There was no blinking the question ; and why, after all, should we peril our own salvation in debating whether our Protestant friends could or could not safely remain where they were ? Perhaps the greatest charity to them would be for us to obey God in his Church. Thus questioning with ourselves, but unable to come to any final decision, we thought we would once more call on Bishop Fenwick, propose to him the difficulty, and ascertain how he would meet it.

This time we called alone. He received us in a frank and cordial manner, said he read our Review with attention, perceived that we were making some progress towards the Church ; but he was surprised that we objected to the Pope. “ What can be your objections to the Pope ? ” “ I do not object to the Pope. Some time ago I was foolish enough to say, that the problem of the age is *Catholicism without Pa-*

pany; but I no longer entertain that notion. I have no objections to the Church, and the Church without the Pope would be to me no church at all." "Why, then, are you not a Catholic?" "I could be, were it not for these Protestants. I do not like to say they are all wrong, and out of the way of salvation; and if I could discover some ground on which I could be a Catholic without saying so, I should have no difficulty." "So that is your difficulty. But why should that affect you? If our Lord has established his Church, and given her authority to teach, why should you refuse to obey him, till you satisfy yourself that you may disobey him with safety? God is just, and you may leave your Protestant friends in his hands; for he will not punish them, unless they deserve it. If they break the order he has established, obstinately refuse to obey their lawful pastors, and preach from their own head instead of his word, that is no good reason for you to remain where you are, and neglect to make sure for yourself." "True. But I am not willing to believe that all who live and die out of the pale of the Roman Catholic Church must be finally lost. I wish to be able to find some justification, at least some excuse, for the Protestant movement; and it is this which has kept me back." "The inquiry is no doubt an interesting one, but you find it, probably, somewhat difficult. Have you thus far met with much success?" "I cannot say that I have, and I am almost afraid that I shall not succeed." "It is not best to be hasty. The question is serious, and you will do well to inquire further and longer. Perhaps you will find some excuse for the Protestant Reformation. If you do, you will not fail to let me know it."

After some more conversation on the same topic, and on general subjects, and his assuring us that it would give him pleasure to have us call and see him when we found it convenient, we took our leave. A week later, we called again, and he lent us some books; a fortnight later still, we called once more, and requested him to place us in charge of some one who would take the trouble to instruct and prepare us for admission into the Church. He immediately introduced us to his coadjutor, now his successor, who readily charged himself with that task, and performed it with a patience and uniform kindness of which it does not become us to speak. The feelings of the convert towards the spiritual father who has poured on his head the regenerating waters, or heard the story of his

life, and in God's stead pronounced over him the words of absolution and reconciliation, are too sacred to be displayed.

What most impressed us, in this second interview with Bishop Fenwick, was the firm and uncompromising character of his Catholicity. He used not a single unkind word, in speaking of Protestants; but with all our art, — and we did our best, — we could not extract from him the least conceivable concession. He saw clearly what held us back, and that we believed we were prepared to join the Church, if we could only have some assurance that individuals dying out of the pale of her communion need not necessarily be despaired of; but neither by word nor tone did he indicate that he had any such assurance to give. He was a Catholic, heart and soul; he had learned the Church as the way of salvation, but he had learned no other. What he had received, that could he give; but nothing else. He was not the author of the conditions of salvation, and he would not take the responsibility of enlarging or contracting them. It was well for us that he was thus stern and uncompromising in his Catholicity. A man brought up a Protestant is apt to distrust the sincerity of another's faith, and, in general, looks upon a well educated and intelligent Catholic priest or bishop as acting a part, or merely speaking from his brief, without any firm conviction of what he professes. He also understands, in advance, that Catholicity is exclusive, and boldly asserts that salvation out of the pale of the Church is not possible. If, then, we had found him less uncompromising; if we had perceived in him the least disposition to soften what seemed to us the severity of the Catholic doctrine, or to conceal or explain it away, we should have distrusted the sincerity of his faith, have failed to give him our confidence, and have lost what we had in his Church.

No man living better understood or appreciated the difference between charity and that spurious liberality which sometimes usurps its name, than Bishop Fenwick. His own heart was full of tenderness, literally overflowed with love to all men, and his charity knew no bounds. There was nothing severe in his disposition. If he had a fault, it was in his inability to think ill of another. You could not make him believe ill of any one, especially of one who had done wrong to him. No matter how strong were the appearances, undeniable the facts, he would always find some excuse, and prove to you that you were doing the man injustice. But he had, nevertheless, no sympathy with that false liberality which fears to shock an-

other's principles or cross his wishes. He knew that charity must often shock in order to save. In proportion to his tenderness, in proportion to the depth and fervor of his charity, did he feel it necessary to hold up the stern and naked truth, and to be studiously on his guard against dropping a single word which, through misapprehension, might tend to inspire a false confidence or induce an ungrounded hope. Wherever, then, he appeared stern and unbending, it was not from severity of temper, but from his ardent charity, his fidelity to God, and his earnest desire to save souls.

Naturally, Bishop Fenwick was of a lively and playful disposition. He had an exhaustless fund of wit and humor, and his social qualities and conversational powers were unrivalled. He relished a good joke, and could give and receive one with inimitable grace and delicacy. Yet his wit never left a sting; no one enjoyed it more heartily than its victim, as we had often occasion ourselves to experience. His memory was stocked with a world of stories and anecdotes, which he would, in his moments of relaxation, relate with a grace and a charm which it would be as vain to attempt to describe as to imitate. We have listened with the intensest pleasure, for the hour together, and heard him relate anecdotes and stories with which we were perfectly familiar, and which we had ourselves previously related, perhaps a hundred times; and we have heard him relate the same anecdote the twentieth time with as much pleasure as the first. He had the rare faculty of investing the familiar with novel charms, and he threw the hues of his own mind over whatever he touched. He was a great favorite with children, and it was difficult to determine whether he found the most pleasure in their society or they in his. It was beautiful to see the perfect sympathy between them. His own spirit was as playful, as light, as sunny, as guileless, as theirs, and he could at once touch their young hearts and gain their entire confidence. We were with him most of the afternoon of the Friday preceding his death. He was then all but dying, yet he was as cheerful, as playful, as we had known him when in perfect health; and we sat for a long time and admired his sportiveness with a little girl, some four or five years old, who came with her mother to see him. At first he frightened her, made her tremble and cling closer to her mother; then gradually he relaxed her fears, made her face brighten, and then laugh outright, — and all by his simple conversation. It was the last conversation of his to which we listened.

This playfulness at first deceived us, and made us draw inferences unfavorable to the depth and earnestness of his piety. We had not then learned that Catholics suppose our Lord meant what he said, when he told his disciples not to be as the hypocrites, who love to pray standing in the synagogues and the corners of the streets, and when they fasted, not to disfigure their faces, but to anoint their heads and wash their faces, so as not to appear unto men to be fasting, but to their Father in heaven. St. Matt. vi. 1-18. We have since learned that they do not regard the downcast look, the long face, and the sepulchral tone, to which we had been accustomed, as the peculiar marks of piety, and that they associate with religion ideas of cheerfulness and joy, not of sadness and gloom. A more really pious and devout man than Bishop Fenwick never lived, but he took as much pains to conceal his piety and devotion as Protestants do to display theirs. He, in fact, led a truly mortified life, but it was only by accident you were led to suspect it, and he would have been grieved to have had you suspect it at all.

Of Bishop Fenwick as an intellectual man and a scholar we are not well qualified to speak. He was averse to all display, and was always so modest and unassuming that you were perpetually in danger of underrating him. Yet one was always sure to find his natural ability and his learning equal to the occasion, whatever it might be. His mind was evidently of a practical, rather than of a speculative cast. He had no special fondness for metaphysical studies and scholastic subtleties, but he was always at home in any speculative question which came up, and familiar with all the nice and subtle distinctions it might involve. His memory was remarkably tenacious, and was rarely at fault. He seemed to have read every thing, and to have retained all he read. We never, in our intercourse with him, knew a subject to be broached of which he was ignorant. He spoke several languages with ease and fluency, was an eminent classical scholar, and apparently familiar with the whole range of modern literature and science. No matter what the subject, however obscure or remote from his professional studies, on which you sought information, he could either give it or direct you at once to the source whence you could obtain it. That he was a sound divine, well read in dogmatic and moral theology, we suppose there can be no question; but his favorite studies seemed to us to be history and geography, in both of which, whether general or particular, he excelled.

He had studied them extensively and profoundly. He seemed to have been present in all countries of the globe, and in all ages of the world. In history, he would not only give you the outlines of the history of a particular country, or of all countries, ancient or modern, but he would give you universal history, as a whole and in its details, in its causes, connections, and dependencies. He had been behind the curtain, in the secret cabinet-council, and had seen and mastered all the secret springs of events, great and small, and was able to trace those events out into all their ramifications and in their remotest consequences. Nothing had escaped him. In the history of his own country, which he loved as a Christian and a patriot, that is, with the affection of a son, without being blind to the merits of others, he was, as may be supposed, well versed ; and he possessed a comprehensive and minute knowledge of all that concerned it, together with a multitude of details and anecdotes of its eminent men, from the earliest colonization down to the present moment, that would have made him an invaluable acquaintance to the learned and eloquent historian of the United States, who lately filled, with credit to himself, a seat in the national cabinet. He was, moreover, preëminently a business man, remarkable for his practical talents, as he evinced so clearly in the administration of his diocese, and which would have fitted him to govern a nation with equal ease and success. Upon the whole, he left on us the impression of a man of rare natural powers, of varied and profound learning, and of being the best informed man we had ever had the honor of meeting, although his native modesty and his humility concealed the fact that such was the case, as much as possible.

Bishop Fenwick could be, when he chose, a keen and subtile disputant, and he delighted to set those who were gathered round him to disputing ; but, for himself, he rarely argued, especially with the opponents of the faith. He was, of course, a perfect master of the controversy between Catholics and Protestants, but he was convinced that the best way to reach the understanding is through the heart. It is not precisely argument the enemies of the Church most need, for their objections are less in the understanding than in the will. Their moral state is wrong ; their affections are misplaced, and it is therefore that their minds are darkened. To do them good, it is necessary to touch their hearts, and win their reason through love. Hence, he rarely resorted to argument with them. He heard them patiently, but generally replied by some appeal to

the heart and conscience. He consequently discouraged controversial preaching, and enjoined it upon his clergy to be plain and practical in their instructions, and to study first of all to make their own people earnest and devout Catholics. This is not only the best way of maintaining peace and harmony in a community where there are conflicting religious views, but really the best way of propagating the truth; and it was his opinion that those sermons which are best adapted to send Catholics to their duties are the best to affect favorably the hearts of those who, unhappily, are out of the Church. Those of his own sermons which we had the happiness of hearing were plain and practical expositions of duty, or earnest and affectionate addresses of a loving father to the hearts and consciences of his children. They were marked by no display of learning, or even of eloquence; and yet he could have been, if he had chosen, the first pulpit orator of the age. He had every requisite of the orator, the eye, the voice, the figure, and the manner, — a clear, rich, forcible, and elevated style, a ready command of language, extensive knowledge, an exhaustless fund of varied and felicitous illustration, a free, bold, earnest, and dignified delivery, appropriate and graceful action. But his natural modesty, his deep humility, his abiding sense of his responsibility as a shepherd of souls, made him shrink from whatever could look like display, and study to feed his flock rather than distinguish himself, and lead them to love and obey their Saviour rather than to lose themselves in admiration of their pastor.

We have spoken of Bishop Fenwick's humility. This was, perhaps, the most striking trait in his character. It gave to his whole character that placid beauty, and that inexpressible charm, which made his society so delightful, and which so endeared him to our hearts. He rarely spoke of himself, and when he did, it was always evident that his mind was not preoccupied with himself. He spoke of the transactions in which he had taken part, nay, in which he had been the sole actor, as if he had had no connection with them. He held no prominent place in his own eyes. He was not merely indifferent to praise, but seemed to have risen to that sublime degree of humility which takes pleasure in being contemned. He was happy in opportunities to humble himself the deeper before God. Through grace his spirit had become as sweet, as gentle, as docile, as that of the little child, of whom our Saviour said, — "Of such is the kingdom of heaven." He had long

ceased to live for himself, and he was incapable of thinking how this or that would or would not affect his own reputation. He chose always the lowest seat, and was anxious only to draw out and encourage others. He made himself nothing for Christ's sake, and was free and strong for whatever there was for him to do. It was a lesson and a blessing to contemplate one so truly eminent for his abilities and acquirements, able to rank with the greatest men and most learned scholars of the age, making himself of no account, completely annihilating himself, for the love of God and the good of souls, and emulous only of serving the lowest and assisting those who were most in need of being assisted. It abashed one's pride, made him ashamed of arrogating any thing to himself, and feel that nothing is truly estimable, save so far as consecrated to the greater glory of God.

It is hardly necessary to speak of this good father's tender solicitude for the flock committed to his charge. Every member was dear to him, and he took a lively interest in each one's concerns, temporal as well as spiritual. They were all his children, and no father's heart ever warmed with more generous affection, or overflowed with more tender solicitude. He lived only to serve them, and he brought all his energies to bear in devising ways and means to benefit them, both here and hereafter. Their joy was his joy, their sorrow was his sorrow. Especially was he the father of the poor. He gave every thing he had, even the very considerable estate he had inherited, and, if all were not amply provided for, it was only because his purse was not so large as his heart. He carried his kindness and paternal love even to those who did not always make a suitable return; and possessed, preëminently, the power of rendering good for evil. No ingratitude ever discouraged him; no unworthy recipients of his bounty ever induced him to abandon or reproach them. If, as rarely happened, some rude or violent member of his flock forgot what was due to their father, he felt no resentment, but melted in compassion for the offender. All who had any real or fancied grievances were permitted to tell their story in their own way, were listened to with patience, and dismissed with gentleness and the paternal blessing. Yet his remarkable patience and gentleness, so obvious to all who were in the way of observing his intercourse with all sorts of people, were the work of grace; for we are inclined to think he was, naturally, somewhat impatient and irascible. This trait in his character was,

therefore, all the more beautiful, for it proved the victory of grace over nature. The victory was complete; if nature showed sometimes a disposition to rebel, she was instantly suppressed, and nothing was seen but the meekness, gentleness, and forbearance of divine grace.

Bishop Fenwick's consideration for the feelings of others was another beautiful trait in his character. He could not bear to give the least pain to another, and he studied to hide his excessive tenderness under an affectation of harshness and severity, which, however, only made it the more apparent. He delighted to have his children, especially his clergy, around him, and was never happier than when they shared freely his boundless hospitality. Nothing could be more delightful than to mark his kindness to them and their love and veneration for him. Nothing was constrained, nothing was cold or distant. It was truly the reunion of the father and his children. No one was overlooked, no one was unwelcome; and we have often admired the unaffected, the apparently unconscious, consideration shown to the feelings of each one present. If one had been longer absent than usual, without any sufficient reason, or seemed to show that he doubted whether he was perfectly welcome or not, the conversation was always sure to take such a turn, and without any one's being able to perceive when or how, as to make him certain that his absence had been regretted, and that, if any thing had occurred to wound his sensibility, it was unintended, and would be atoned for at any sacrifice. All this was done so naturally, so spontaneously, so unconsciously, so from the heart, that none but a very nice and practised observer could detect or suspect it.

He ever studied to make others happy, and his joy was always to see himself surrounded by glad hearts and smiling faces. He had had his trials, and trials of no ordinary severity; he had met with many things, in the administration of his diocese, to grieve his paternal heart; but he never permitted his own afflictions to cloud his brow, or that of another. With him all was smooth and sunny, and you imagined that he was free from all solicitude, and that no care ever oppressed him. This trait in his character was strikingly displayed all through his long and painful illness. He had naturally a vigorous constitution, and had always enjoyed robust health. In 1844, he assured us that he knew sickness only by seeing it in others. When, therefore, he was taken down in the early part of the last winter, we all felt, and he must himself have felt, that it

would most likely go hard with him, and that his recovery was, at best, extremely doubtful. But his habitual cheerfulness never for a moment deserted him. He knew how much we all loved him, and how painful it would be to his flock to feel that he was suffering, and that there was danger that he would be removed from them ; and he made light of his disease, continued as playful as ever, compelling us to forget, when with him, that he was ill and dying. He rarely alluded to his illness ; answered to our inquiries, that he was well or very nearly well ; talked of matters and things in general, and of his plans for the Church, for his people, as if nothing ailed him, and really made one feel that his sufferings were but trifling. He would have no one afflicted on his account ; and up to the Saturday previous to his death sat in his usual place, talked in his usual lively and brilliant strain, and the stranger admitted to his table would not have dreamed that he was not in his usual health. And yet, none of this time was he free from suffering. For nine months he had not lain down, and had no means of resting himself but in changing from one chair to another.

They who knew him were not surprised that he bore his long, tedious, and painful illness without a single complaint, a single murmur, and that he manifested never the least impatience, but exhibited throughout the whole the most perfect gentleness and resignation ; for they expected no less. He felt that suffering was good for him, and he was thankful for it. If needed as a purgatory, it was better to have it here than hereafter ; if not so needed, it would only afford the opportunity of acquiring a larger stock of merit. Death had and could have no terrors for him. To our remark, in the early stages of his sickness, that we were unable to look upon death as a thing to be dreaded, he mildly rebuked us, and replied, " It is a great thing to die " ; but when the opinion of the physicians was communicated to him, that his disease must prove fatal, he exhibited not the least emotion, not the slightest change of look, tone, or manner. He said his own opinion was different, but it was best to act as if it were not. He subsequently rallied, and many thought he would recover ; those who saw him daily, and knew the nature of his disease, thought otherwise. But when he was taken down for the last time, on Saturday previous to the Tuesday on which he died, — when it was evident to all that his departure was at hand, and Bishop Fitzpatrick told him that hope was gone, and he must die, he

exhibited no more emotion than on the former occasion. He simply replied, calmly and in his usual tone, "In the name of God, then, let us prepare." He recollected himself for a few moments, and then made his confession and received the last sacraments. From that time till Tuesday forenoon, his sufferings were great and almost unremitted, but he bore them without a murmur, without a groan; was cheerful as usual, and consoled those of his children around him as long as the power of speech remained.

Of his truly edifying death we cannot speak in detail. It was what was to have been expected from his life. He retained his faculties and his recollection to the last moment. He knew the change that was taking place, but it did not take him by surprise. All his life had been but a preparation for it, yet he made all the acts and preparations the time and the occasion required. He who had never left him, who, through all his sickness, had nursed him with the tender affection of the son and the tenderer charity of the Christian, stood by him, whispering suitable aspirations in his ear, which he repeated after him. His last words were, "*In te, Domine, speravi, non confundar in æternum.*" As he repeated the words, half formed, the agony seized him; he stretched forth his hands as if for absolution and the last indulgence, which were given; some one thought they heard him respond, "*Amen*"; the agony was over; the spirit was emancipated, and its joy was reflected on that countenance which had been so dear to us all.

We have nothing more to add. His monument is in the grateful recollections of his people, whom he fed with the bread of life, and governed with equal affection and wisdom for over twenty years. Everywhere in his diocese we may read the proofs of his paternal solicitude, his wisdom and energy, his devotion to the people of his charge, and of his having lived and labored with no thought but for the greater glory of God, and the advancement of the Church. He has stamped his character on his diocese, and his influence will continue to be felt till that day comes when the elements shall melt with fervent heat, and the heavens and the earth be dissolved. He found his diocese with only three small churches, and one priest; he leaves it with nearly fifty churches, and as many priests. His flock was poor, small, and scattered; his means, saving his paternal inheritance, all of which he expended for the Church, were to be created. Yet he succeeded in creating them, and, to no small extent, in providing for the wants

of his diocese. He relieved the poor, paid especial attention to the education and training of the young, and finally crowned his well-spent life with the erection of that noble monument to his love of learning and his zeal for his people, the College of the Holy Cross, at Worcester, destined to be, if the youngest, yet the first, of the noble literary institutions of New England, and where the grateful student long shall kneel at his tomb, and pray that he may be like him, and his last end like his.

His remains, on the Thursday after his death, were carried in procession, an immense concourse of people following, from the Cathedral of the Holy Cross to the railroad depot, from there on the cars to the College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, where they were deposited agreeably to his wish and his special request. *Requiescat in pace.* Take him all in all he was such a man as Heaven seldom vouchsafes us. It will be long before we look upon his like again. But he has been ours ; he has left his light along our pathways ; he has blessed us all by his pure example and his labors of love, and we are thankful. We bless God that he gave him to us ; we bless God that he has seen fit to remove him from his labors to his rest.

Not Catholics alone wept his removal. Our whole city seemed to feel that one of her firmest supports was taken away. Religious differences and prejudices for the moment were hushed, for it was felt that God was speaking. The conduct of our citizens during his sickness and the funeral obsequies was what we expected from Bostonians, and induced many a regret that they are not more generally members of that Church which alone can exalt their proverbial philanthropy into charity, and give to their benevolence and energy a direction safe for themselves and glorious for humanity.

Bishop Fenwick is succeeded by his former coadjutor, the Right Reverend John Bernard Fitzpatrick, a native Bostonian, born November 1, 1812. He received his early education in the public schools of this city ; he made his humanities and philosophy at Montreal, Canada, and his theology at the Seminary of St. Sulpice, Paris. He was selected by Bishop Fenwick to succeed him, and we may be permitted to trust that not all of the father we have lost will disappear in the one we have found. Long may his life be spared to us, and, when called to the reward of his labors, may he be followed by the tears and benedictions of his people ! The Church is now firmly established in this diocese ; the principal obstacles have

been overcome ; and its course will be constantly onward, if Catholics are only careful to practise the requirements of their holy religion.

ART. VI. — *Thornberry Abbey : a Tale of the Times.* New York : Dunigan. 1846. 18mo. pp. 244.

THIS makes the fourth number of *Dunigan's Home Library*, and, as a literary production, is the most finished of any number of the series which has yet appeared. It is reprinted from an English work, founded on incidents supplied by the recent extraordinary movement in the Anglican Establishment. Though we take a deep interest in our own literature, and are ready to welcome any work of merit from an American author, we think Mr. Dunigan has done well to depart from his original intention, of confining himself to domestic productions, and to include this interesting tale in his series of works for popular reading. Mr. Dunigan is one of our most liberal and enterprising publishers, and he has a laudable desire to encourage native talent, and to call forth a domestic literature for the Catholic public ; but we are inclined to think his attempt somewhat premature. For the present, better works, works far better adapted to nourish and strengthen the Catholic life, may be obtained from Ireland and England, or by translation from the French and German, Italian and Spanish, than we can ourselves produce.

The time is not distant when we may engage in the work of producing a national literature in earnest and with success. There is to be an American literature which will compare favorably, and more than favorably, with the most admired literatures of the world, and this literature is to be the product of Catholic America. The present national literature is virtually infidel, and must be short-lived ; Protestantism, which is a reaction against Christianity, must soon burst and vanish in thin air, with its works ; modern civilization, as distinguished from the ancient Greek and Roman, is Christian, has been the work of the Church, and is informed with the Catholic spirit, and will not assimilate to itself what is not Catholic. It may receive it as an indigestible mass for a time, but must, sooner or later, expel it as a foreign substance. The heathen and the utmost parts of the earth are given to our Lord for his inheritance and possession, and no attempt to wrest them from him will succeed. They must all come under his law. Catholicity is the only living or life-giving principle in the world, and no national

literature not Catholic can really flourish, and attain a permanent growth, or a respectable rank among the living literatures of the world. There need be no question, then, as to the fact that Catholic America will be the author of our national literature. This we look upon as settled.

But, at present, we are not in the condition to make any important contributions to this national literature. National literature is the expression of the national life, and follows the formation of the national character. The Greek character preceded Greek literature, and the Roman character was fixed centuries before there was a Roman literature. Our national character is not yet formed. What we term our national character is merely provisional, and will disappear, or be essentially modified, when the mass of our people cease to be Protestants and infidels, and place themselves in harmony with Christian civilization. The real American character is yet to be formed, and to be formed under Catholic influences. It is to Catholic America we are to look ; for it alone is living and has the promise of the future ; and Catholic America as yet hardly exists. Our Catholic population is not yet homogeneous, has no common national character. It is Irish, French, German, and each division retains the national peculiarities of the country from which it has emigrated. There has been, as yet, no time to melt down the mass, and combine its separate elements in a new national character, neither Irish, nor French, nor German, but composed of the real excellences of each. The portion descended from the early American settlers are themselves as far as either of the others from possessing what is to be, ultimately, the American character ; for, as to their social habits, literary tastes, their general culture, as to all, in fact, not strictly of faith, they are Protestant rather than Catholic. Now, till this fusion takes place, till national diversities and peculiarities lose themselves in one common national character, with common habits, views, tastes, and feelings, we have not the indispensable conditions of a national literature. The native American portion demand a literature which smacks of the provisional national character ; the Irish require their national tastes and peculiarities to be addressed ; and the French and Germans cannot be pleased to have theirs neglected. All this is natural and inevitable. It implies no reproach to one or to another. Nobody can blame the German because his affections cluster around his fatherland, and his heart is moved by the songs of the Rhine, as it cannot be by those of the Ohio and the Mississippi ; the Irishman is not censurable because his heart turns to " the Green Isle of the Ocean," — all the dearer from the memory of her wrongs, — and because no strains can touch him like those to which he listened in his childhood ; nor any more the native American for finding dearest to him those accents which soothed him in the caresses of his mother. Cold is the heart that does not beat quicker at the men-

tion of its native land, and that does not linger with its sweetest affections around its early home, the only home it ever finds in this wide world. Dear to us is that home of our childhood, and fresh are the breezes which come freely over the green hills which skirt it. No sky is so serene as that which bends over it ; no sun so bright as that which shines on it ; no air so pure as that we breathed when in it, before the wanderings, the turmoils, and cares of life began. We love that mountain home ; we love its very look, its tone, and its simple manners, and we find elsewhere nothing to compensate for their loss. We complain not that the emigrant turns fondly to his fatherland, and clings to the life he received from it. No people ever becomes great which is not thoroughly national, and which cannot more easily part with life than with its nationality. All we say, or mean to say, is, that our Catholic population is collected from different nations, with diverse national characters ; and while they are so, before they become homogeneous in their character, we cannot find in them the *public* requisite for the creation and growth of a national literature. This, however, is only a temporary obstacle, and will soon disappear. But while it remains, we cannot do much for a *national* literature, and must content ourselves with such works as address themselves to the intellect alone, or to those sentiments and affections which are common to all men, whatever the diversity of their national origin or breeding.

But even if we had the public, we have not the authors. This is yet a missionary country, and the clergy, on whom the literature of every country mainly depends, are so few in proportion to the number of the faithful who need their services, their professional duties are so great, so pressing, and so arduous, that they have little leisure for purely literary pursuits. The field of their labors is in the obscure courts, the dark lanes, the damp cellars, the unventilated garrets, in the hut of poverty, by the side of wretchedness and grief, administering to the sick and dying, fathers to the fatherless, friends to the friendless, pouring the oil and wine into the broken heart, and binding up the bruised spirit ; and we would not see them abandoning this field for the low and comparatively unimportant calls of literature and science. They have the learning, the genius, the ability, for a rich and living literature ; but they have a higher vocation, more glorious duties, and too deep a love for souls to neglect them.

After the clergy, where are our authors ? The literary portion of the nations which have furnished us our Catholic population do not emigrate. The mass of emigrants are from the poorer and less educated classes, with some individual exceptions, surely ; and their motive for emigrating is, not to call forth an American literature, but to better their worldly condition, and to leave a richer worldly inheritance to their children. The laity born among ourselves, whether of later or earlier emigrants, educated as they

are in a Protestant atmosphere, with literary habits and tastes formed on Protestant models, are but poorly qualified to give tone and character to Catholic literature. They may be able to write well in exposition and defence of the faith, if they take the pains to inform themselves, and do not feel themselves too proud to submit what they write, before going to press, to the criticism and revision of the authorized teacher ; but the moment they attempt to go beyond what is set down for them, aspire to be original, and to speak out from their own spontaneous life, as every man must do if he is to attain to any literary excellence, they betray their Protestant tastes and associations, and exert an influence altogether unfavorable to the growth and purity of Catholic life. Our own schools and colleges will, in time, correct this evil ; but as yet they have not corrected it. Most of them are of too recent origin to have exerted much influence, and none of them have sent out many *Catholic* scholars who have remained in the ranks of the laity. But few Catholic parents have been able to educate their children abroad, and it cannot be denied that the education of our laity, thus far, has been but partially Catholic. Even our schools have been for Protestants as much as for ourselves, and, through a real or supposed necessity, we have had to submit to all the evils of a mixed education, alike unfavorable to Catholics and Protestants. Hence, those among our laity who are educated have more or less of a Protestant incrustation, and, when it comes to pure literature, write as much in the Protestant as in the Catholic spirit.

We speak of literature proper, of works intended for popular reading. These are the works which need the most to be looked after. The most influential writers, whether for good or for evil, are those who are taken from the ranks of the people, and who write for the people. They may exert an influence wholly repugnant to our holy religion, and do immense harm, without departing in a single instance from the strict letter of the faith. We have ourselves had frequent occasion to examine books professedly Catholic, and designed for popular reading, which, though we could not lay our finger on a passage absolutely heterodox, breathed a purely Protestant tone and spirit, wholly offensive to the Catholic instinct. The tone and spirit of a book intended for the people is the main thing. The distinct and formal statements of a popular book are not what produces its effects on the mass of readers. It is the unconscious life of the author diffused through the work, and which he could not avoid diffusing through it, if he would, that determines its influence for good or for evil. Hence the reason why the Church is so strict in her discipline, and shows so little mercy especially to the purely literary works of heretics. She knows that a literary work of any worth, in a literary point of view, must be, to a considerable extent, the expression of the life of its author,

and therefore, if the author be a heretic, it must contain a secret poison which will prove at least hurtful to the purity and strength of the Catholic life. This same poison may be imbibed by a Catholic who lives and breathes in an heretical atmosphere, and be diffused through his works as well as through those of a Protestant, and will be none the less dangerous because he is a Catholic.

We all know that Protestantism at present predominates in this country. Those of our laity most likely to write for the people are those among us who are most exposed to its influence, and the most likely to be affected by it. They are not exactly scholars by profession; they have not received a thoroughly Catholic training; they are persons of general information and of general reading; but they are readers of modern, and chiefly Protestant, literature. They are, no doubt, firm Catholics, and would sooner die than knowingly depart from the faith; but, half Protestantized in their views of things in general, and taking it for granted that all the difference between Catholics and Protestants lies in the formal differences between their respective creeds, they write in a tone and spirit which can do no good, and which can hardly fail to do immense harm. We are not censuring them. They cannot make themselves other than they are, and they cannot write without writing themselves. No man can. We only say, they cannot write books which it is always safe to circulate among the people, and cannot create and build up a *Catholic* national literature. Their works have a natural tendency to lower the Catholic tone, to relax the Catholic spirit, and to sully, if not corrupt, the virgin purity of the Catholic soul. Hence, where their works circulate, we miss the high and lofty, stern and uncompromising, Catholic public sentiment which is needed, both for our own sakes and for the sake of those who are without. A low and half-compromising tone among Catholics is of the greatest disadvantage to Protestants, for it tends to confirm them in their fatal errors. When we were ourselves Protestant, we were accustomed to hear our friends remark on the character and spirit of Catholics in this country. "Catholics, here," they were accustomed to say, "live and breathe in a Protestant atmosphere. They may retain the forms of their faith and worship, but they soon lose the Catholic spirit. They become assimilated to us in tone and sentiment, and their grandchildren are sure to be absorbed in the Protestant community." Protestants are thus led to think only of seeing Catholics assimilating to them, and not at all of the necessity of their becoming Catholics. There is more foundation for their remarks than there should be, and our grandchildren will be more likely to be Protestants or infidels than Catholics, unless Catholics are on their guard against the fatal influences in the midst of which they live, and, for the present, must live. Their best protection, after placing themselves under that of God and his Holy Mother, is to dare be Catholics, and to assert and

maintain a free, high, and uncompromising Catholic spirit, to refuse all assimilation with Protestantism, to derive their ideas on all subjects from Catholic sources alone, and to distrust every thing, however harmless it may appear, that has an heretical origin. The truer, firmer, more devoted, more *exclusive* Catholics we are, the more influential we shall be, the more respect shall we command, and the more agreeable will be our social position. No man need lose caste in this country by being a Catholic. Let him be true to his Church, and no harm can befall him, even in his temporal life.

We shall not be misunderstood. We do not contend that Catholics should, on all occasions and in all companies, obtrude their faith and Church. There is a time for all things. There are the common courtesies of civilized life, there are the reciprocal obligations and the kind offices of good neighbourhood, which, of course, are never to be neglected, — a respect for the rights and the honorable feelings of others, which are always to be scrupulously observed. But what we urge is, that we remember always that the Church holds the first place in every Catholic's affections, and that all in life is to be subordinated to the one great end of pleasing God and gaining heaven. This should always be present to our souls, and influence or determine the spirit of all we do or say. In regard to literature, we do not ask that the Catholic always wield the tomahawk and battle-axe of controversy, that he be ever formally stating the claims of his Church, and denouncing all who are not within its pale. There is enough of all this in our literature as it is. But what we do want is the Catholic soul, the Catholic spirit, which shall unconsciously pervade all we write, and inform every sentence and word, so that whoever takes up one of our works, at whatever page he opens, shall feel that its author could have been none other than a Catholic. It is this which gives such power and unction to the writers of the ages of faith. They say little of the Church, little of religion, unless treating it professedly, make no professions of faith or piety, but every word betrays them, and the very servant-girls take notice that they have been with Jesus, and must have been genuine Catholics. It is this which makes them so precious and edifying to the Catholic, and so insipid or offensive to the Protestant. We would see this revived. Would that forty years of heresy had not forbidden us, personally, to hope to be able, before dying, to write, as a Catholic should write, out from a life that had never been sullied by a single Protestant association! But, alas! this cannot be. We can only stand as a beacon of warning to others. We can see and feel what should be; the power to produce it has been thrown away, and, for our punishment, is not to be recovered. But, how much so ever of our former Protestant life we may yet retain, we can clearly see that the Protestant life and the Catholic are of two distinct orders, and cannot and will not assimilate; that what is agreeable to the one will be of-

fensive to the other ; and that the man who makes up his mind to be a Catholic must make it up to be not a Protestant, and to take his stand in the Catholic world alone, for life and for death.

With these views of the present condition of the Catholic population in this country, of the influences to which we are necessarily exposed, the sort of literature we are able to produce, and of that which we need, or which alone could do us any good, we confess that any direct efforts to call forth a domestic literature, a popular literature, we mean, strike us as premature, and not at all desirable. When our colleges have got fairly into operation, and become colleges chiefly, if not exclusively, for Catholics, and have sent out one or two generations of scholars, trained from childhood under strict Catholic discipline, then we may do something ; but till then, the most we can do to advantage will be to guard ourselves and others against fatal tendencies, to set forth and defend our faith, and prepare the way for the complete triumph of the Church. Other nations will supply us with books, and better books than we can write for ourselves.

But we have forgotten the little book before us. It is, we have said, a reprint of a recent English work. When we had read only a few pages, we thought it must belong to the category of books we have been censuring, and be written by some Puseyite, who, through mistake, had got into the Church without stopping to doff his Puseyism at the door ; but as we read on, we became interested, and finally laid the book down with an impression much in its favor. In fact, though it reminded us, now and then, of Father Dominick's rhapsody in the *London Tablet*, on Littlemore, in which he exhorts the English Catholics to aspire to the *sanctity* of that heterodox establishment, or, at best, parody on a Catholic monastery, we were forced to like it, and we cheerfully commend it to our readers. It has one or two literary faults, common to most productions of the kind, such as efforts at fine writing, and wearisome descriptions of natural scenery and external objects, which are uncalled for, and only interrupt the narrative, and one or two opinions incidentally expressed, which are very questionable, and which might have been left unexpressed ; yet it is one of the best little works, treating important matters in a popular manner, we have recently met. It is written with fair artistic skill, the characters are well sustained, and the controversy is managed with adroitness, delicacy, and success. The tone of the book is mild, gentle, but firm and uncompromising. The author writes without any fear of the English Establishment before his eyes. He does not allow it the merit even of being schismatic ; for he does not allow it any church character at all. It has no orders, no altar, no sacrifice, no sacraments, but that of baptism, which may be validly administered even by a pagan. It is an empty form, and has no worth, no vitality, no connection with the Church of God. We like this ; and,

after Charles Butler and Dr. Lingard's *History of England*, it is refreshing, and proves that the spirit of good Bishop Milner is not all extinct. It is such language as this in the mouth of English Catholics that leads us in very deed to hope for England's conversion. English Catholics have been proverbially timid and compromising, and, in more instances than one, have shown that they preferred their king or their queen to their God. If they had had a little of the old uncompromising Catholic spirit of their Irish brethren, England would have been converted long ago, nay, would have never ceased to be Catholic. But, God be praised, a better spirit is beginning to manifest itself among them ; they are beginning to rise from the dust in which they have so long slumbered, to assume a bolder and a more truly Catholic tone, and there is clear evidence that Almighty God is visiting them in mercy. It does one's heart good to hear them tell the Establishment to her face that she is no church, no reality, — that she is, as Carlyle would say, a mere *sham* ; for it is the truth, and the sooner the Anglicans are told it, and told it in tones that ring through their very souls, the better will it be for them, and for all who speak the English tongue. There is joy in heaven when our good old Anglo-Saxon is made once more the language of Christians, and lends its rough energy to give force to truth and holy religion. Shame is it that so noble a tongue should ever have been spoken by the enemies of God and his Church !

The work before us is controversial, but it confines itself to the few, yet all-important, points of difference between us and the Anglo-Catholics, as they call themselves. It treats these deluded individuals with great tenderness, handles them softly, as though it felt they were made of frail materials ; but, while recognizing frankly their Catholic tendencies, tells them plainly that they are less consistent than their Evangelical brethren, and place themselves in the most untenable of all conceivable positions. They are condemned by their own communion, while professing to love and obey it ; they are condemned by the Church, because they refuse to enter her fold ; are, indeed, condemned by all parties, can find support nowhere, and must balance themselves on nothing. Yet they are to be compassionated, not upbraided. They really see that there should be, somewhere, a reality ; feel that *sham* will suffice neither for soul nor for body ; and regret, deeply regret, that their fathers cast away the reality for the *sham*. This is something, and with the stronger of them it is not without result, as the large number of converts from their ranks who have so gladdened our hearts fully proves. But, having inherited the sham from their fathers, although they see and admit it to be a sham, they fancy that by one means or another it may be made a reality. Alas ! their task is more hopeless than that which St. Anthony imposed upon his disciple, Paul. Sooner shall one plant dry sticks,

and, by watering, make them sprout and grow, than Anglicanism ever be made any thing but a miserable sham.

After all, we do not think the controversy with the Oxford party very important. Anglicanism itself is hardly worth opposing. Those of its members who awake to the importance of living a religious life soon discover that it is an empty form, and enter the Church or seek refuge with the Evangelicals. The real enemy, the only enemy in a religious guise, worth fighting, is Calvinism. It has, in some of its forms, a hold on the people, and sustains itself by the adhesive power of hatred. We should like to see our controversialists turning their attention more generally to this enemy of truth and justice, and attempting to rescue its followers from their fatal delusion. We know they are far gone; we know they are bound in terrible thralldom by their ministers; but we do not believe that they are wholly beyond the reach of truth. Calvinism demolished, Anglicanism is no more.

The author of the work before us, we have said, confines his controversy to the differences between us and the recent Oxford divines. He has the appearance of regarding the concessions made by these divines as concessions made by Protestants generally; but we cannot so regard them. They abridge the controversy between Catholics and Protestants only in the case of those who make them. Protestants are not one body bound together by common principles, which all feel themselves alike under obligation to maintain. Each fights on his own hook, like the tall Yankee at the battle of Yorktown, and will acknowledge no concessions which he does not personally make. Tell him other Protestants have conceded the point, and he replies, "What then? *I* have not conceded it; and you must defeat *me* personally before I yield you the victory." Protestants are a heterogeneous mass of individuals, without any common principles or bond of unity. The refutation of one amounts to little, so long as there remains one who has not been personally refuted. The refutation of Jonathan will not be taken as the refutation of Obadiah, though both adopt precisely the same views. There is not a point in Protestantism which some eminent Protestant has not conceded, nor an article of the Church which some eminent Protestant has not defended; and yet the controversy goes on as ever, and over the same ground. If we drive Protestants from one principle, they fly to another; and if we drive them from that, they return without shame to the first. Refutation does not silence them, —

"For e'en though vanquished they can argue still."

They are not fair and honorable opponents, and it were to be generous at the expense of justice to treat them as such. They disdain all the ordinary rules of controversy, and to adopt them in our controversy with them would be like the European generals


employing their science and tactics in a warfare with North American Indians. Their method of warfare is their own. It consists in making false charges, and in *ignoring* their refutation. They have no principles of their own at stake. They are not obliged to stop and inquire what principles their charges involve, and they are free to make charges which imply contradictory principles. If we show them their charges refute one another, it is to no purpose; they pay no attention to us, but go right on and reaffirm the same charges, as if nothing had been said. They know their charges are false, but by throwing them out they hope to create prejudice against us, and to screen themselves. Surely Catholics must be horrible creatures, or so much would not and could not be said against them; and by keeping Catholics employed in repelling these charges, they can keep them from exploring and exposing the weakness and wickedness of Protestantism. They can keep us on the defensive, and thus escape our attacks.

Now we do not think Catholics are bound to treat Protestantism with any indulgence, or to give it any advantage. It is, as all Catholics know, the enemy of God and men, the contemner of God's Church and the reviler of his saints, and charity, even common humanity, forbids us to show it any favor. We have no right to stand merely on the defensive. We cannot consent to let our neighbour rush into the flames without making an effort to hold him back, merely because he does not try to drag us in with him. We are bound to love our neighbour as ourselves, and to be ready at any moment to die to save him. All who persist in adhering to Protestantism are out of the way of salvation. Can we see them destroy themselves without doing all in our power to save them? These millions of obstinate Protestants are our brethren; Christ died for them as well as for us; they are our neighbours,—many of them our near and dear friends,—and must not their perilous state touch our hearts and compel us to do all in our power to overthrow this Protestantism which deludes them, and is leading them down to everlasting perdition? We are bound, then, to attack Protestantism with all the ardor of Christian zeal, and with all the weapons to be found in the armory of the Gospel.

We have no occasion to stop to defend ourselves or our Church. She is immaculate, lives a divine life, is under divine protection, and has Almighty God for her defender. Whatever she teaches is the infallible word of God, and whatever discipline she approves must be pure, holy, and salutary. Neither her doctrines nor her discipline stand in any need of human defence. Let the world rage, she is proof against all the wrath of man and the malice of hell. The false charges against Catholics can do us no harm, unless we suffer them to frighten us and induce us to stop and repel them. "Blessed are you when men shall revile you, and persecute you, and say all manner of evil against you falsely, because

great is your reward in heaven." We may turn a deaf ear to all these revilings, or rather rejoice in them and be exceeding glad. They should pass us by as the idle wind, and never engage a moment of our time or attention. The enemy only seeks to divert us, by their means, from exposing his own weakness and wickedness. We must not suffer ourselves to be caught in his snare. We must leave the defensive to God and his saints, think not of ourselves, but of the precious souls Protestantism is destroying. We must attack the enemy's camp, and arraign Protestantism herself. She, not the Church, is in question; she, not the Church, must be put on the defensive. We must demand of her by what right she pretends to be a religion, by what right she assumes the name of Christ to take away her reproach, and by what right she dares to seduce souls from their allegiance to God, and peril their salvation. She must be made to stand forth and show cause why judgment shall not be executed against her. We must drag her from her covert, force her into the light, and compel her to stand and make her defence. Strip her of her disguises, tear off her meretricious ornaments, and show her to her deluded followers for what she is. What is she? What has she? What can she give these millions of famishing souls, trying in vain to draw nourishment from her dry and withered breasts? Answer, thou who art no mother. O the cry, the shriek, of the souls thou hast damned! We have thy answer; that we hear, and with that ringing in our ears and rending our hearts, we care not for thy revilings, thy calumnies; we have but one thought, one wish, one firm resolve, which is to do what man may do with the help of God to save the precious souls for whom our God has died from thy delusions.

Protestantism has been treated too tenderly; she has been allowed advantages to which she had no claim, and the world suffers from the indulgence. Protestants are dear to us; we love them as we do ourselves, and we cannot, in common humanity to them, forbear to do all we can to deliver them from the destroyer. We cannot stop to ward off attacks. Our duty calls us to act on the offensive, to expose the sorceress, to show what it is that has bewitched our brethren and holds them spellbound. Protestantism is strong only when she is suffered to attack and keep Catholics on their defence. Attacked herself, she is as tow at the touch of fire. What we ask of our controversialists is that they carry the war into her camp, and employ against her every spiritual weapon Almighty God has furnished us. Heed not her clamors, heed not her revilings, heed not her calumnies, — they are harmless, — but press home upon her with the sword of truth, and her days are soon over, and the places which have known her shall know her no more for ever.







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