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THE ELEMENTS

OF

LOGIC.

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Since Locke was the expounder of a new system of opinions on a difficult subject, he was led to enforce them by repetition, and to illustrate them by more examples, and with greater diffuseness of language, than he would probably have thought necessary, if he had been writing at the present time. For the same reason, it is not surprising that some of his statements have been controverted by subsequent writers, and shewn to be erroneous or defective.

Although therefore the substance of many of the following Articles is derived from his Essay on the Human Understanding, yet, to suit the purpose for which this compendium of Logic has been made, it was necessary to omit many parts of that Essay, and to abridge the language of those parts that are retained: also, some things are here advanced which are not supported by the authority of Locke; but where this is done in any matter of importance, a note of it is annexed, lest the reader should be misled to ascribe opinions to Locke, which more recent writers have maintained in opposition to him.

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THE ELEMENTS

OF

LOGIC.

Art. 1. THE term *Logic* is here used to denote the science which treats of the operations of the mind in acquiring ideas, and of the exercise of it by proper methods of reasoning.

The mind acquires ideas, first, by SENSATION. Our senses, being acted upon by external objects, convey ideas of those objects to the mind. Thus by sensation we acquire the ideas of colours, sounds, and of all those which are usually called the *sensible* qualities of matter.

Secondly, the mind acquires ideas by REFLECTION. Reflection is *the notice which the mind takes of its own operations,* such as thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing. The mind, being conscious of these operations and reflecting on them, is furnished by them with ideas which could not be obtained from external objects.

2. Although the mind has no *innate* ideas, i. e. none which are coeval with the mind and perceived by it before the senses begin to operate, yet it has ideas which may be said to be *connatural:* i. e. the constitution of man is such that when he is grown up to the possession and exercise of his reasoning powers, certain ideas will inevitably and necessarily spring up in him. Such are those of *existence, personal identity, time, number.* The mind is endowed

with faculties, the exercise of which is necessarily accompanied by such ideas, and also by the acknowledgement of certain moral truths and practical principles of conduct. These ideas are not the *immediate objects* of sensation and reflection, though the senses may furnish the *first occasions* on which they occur to the mind. For example, the moment that a sensation is excited, we learn two facts at once;—the existence of the sensation, and our own existence as sentient beings: thus, the first exercise of consciousness necessarily implies a belief of the present existence not only of that which is felt, but also of that which feels and thinks. But it is the belief of the former alone that can properly be said to be obtained by sensation. The latter is obtained by a suggestion of the understanding *consequent* on the sensation, but so intimately *connected* with it that the belief of both is generally referred to the same origin.[a]

3. Some ideas are *simple*, and some *complex*. A simple idea, (as of *light*, of *heat*, of *hardness*,) exists in the mind under one uniform appearance, and is not distinguishable into more than one idea. A complex idea is made up of several simple ones: thus the idea of *man* is complex, in which are united several simple ideas, such as of figure, extension, solidity, thinking, life.

4. By the *quality* of an object is meant whatever in that object is the cause of ideas. The qualities that affect our senses are in the things themselves united and blended, yet the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses simple and unmixed. Thus the qualities of the same piece of wax may cause, by the touch, the ideas both

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[a] Stewart, Elem. of Phil. ch. i. §. 4. and Phil. Es. I. ch. i. Sup. Encyc. Brit. Diss. vol. V. p. 30.

of softness and of warmth: yet the simple ideas, thus caused by the same object and conveyed to the mind by the same organ of sense, are as distinct as those that come in by different senses, as distinct as the smell and whiteness of a rose, or as the smell of a rose and the taste of sugar.

5. When the mind is stored with simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them so as to make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it cannot acquire one new *simple* idea except by the ways above-mentioned: (Art. 1. 2.) nor can it *destroy* those which it has already acquired, though it may lose them by forgetfulness. As in the visible material world, the power of man reaches no farther than to compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand, but cannot make the least particle of new matter, or destroy an atom of what is already in being; so in the mind new simple ideas cannot be formed at pleasure; as any one may learn, who will endeavour to acquire the idea of a taste which has never affected his palate, or of a colour which he has never seen. A person born destitute of any one sense, is destitute of all the ideas which belong to that sense: if he be born deaf, he has no idea of sound; if blind, he has no idea of light and colours. Also, though he may possess any sense in its utmost perfection, yet he cannot, except by actual experience, have any particular idea belonging to that sense. A person shut up all his life in a dark room could have no idea of light; if allowed to see no other colours than black or white, he could have no ideas of scarlet or green: he who has never tasted a pine-apple, can have no idea of its peculiar flavour.

6. Some simple ideas enter the mind *by one sense only*; as those of *colour* by the eye, and of *sound* by the ear.

Other simple ideas are acquired by more senses than one; as those of *extension, figure, rest, motion,* both by the sight and touch.

Others are acquired by reflection only; as those of *thinking, knowing, willing.*

Others are acquired by all the ways of sensation and reflection; such as the ideas of *pleasure* or *pain,* which are excited by almost every affection of our senses from without, and every thought of our mind within.

7. The qualities that are in bodies are of two sorts: (1) *Primary* qualities, such as solidity, figure, hardness, softness, fluidity; these exist in bodies, whether we perceive them or not. (2) *Secondary* qualities. These are of two kinds; first, the powers that bodies have, by operating *immediately* on our senses, to produce in us such ideas as those of colour, sound, taste, smell, heat, cold; secondly, the powers that are in any body to cause such a change in the primary qualities of another body, as to make it affect our senses differently from what it did before. Thus fire, acting *immediately* upon us, gives us the idea of heat;—acting on lead, it so changes it as to make it fluid.

8. *Solidity* is that quality of a body by which it excludes all other bodies from occupying the same place with it at the same time. Of the primary qualities of bodies, none affects our senses more frequently than solidity. Whether we move or rest, we feel something under us that supports us and hinders our farther sinking downwards; and the bodies which we daily handle, make us perceive that while they remain between our hands, they prevent by an insurmountable force the approach of those parts of our hands that press them. Solidity differs from *hardness* in this respect, that hardness consists in a firm

cohesion of the parts of a body, so as to make it difficult to change the place of those parts as they respect one another; whereas solidity respects the whole mass, and is as essential a quality of water or air as of adamant. A drop of water, indeed, placed between two plane surfaces of marble, will not, like adamant, prevent their contact; because the parts of a drop of water, cohering loosely to one another, give way to the pressure, and escape in a lateral direction. But if this be prevented, and a drop of water be confined on all sides, as in a globe of gold, it is known by experiment that no force will bring the sides of the globe together without forcing the water through the pores of the metal.

Our idea of solidity is also distinguished from that of *pure space,* which is capable neither of resistance nor motion. We may conceive two bodies approach one another, without touching or displacing any solid thing, till their surfaces meet; and hence we obtain a clear idea of space without solidity. Whether there be such a thing as pure space is a different question; but that we are able to form an idea of it, cannot be doubted. For since the idea of motion in one body does not include the idea of motion in another;—if we suppose one body to move while others remain at rest, then the place deserted by that body gives us the idea of *pure space,* into which another body may enter, without meeting with resistance from any thing.

9. When it is said that *fire is hot,* that *snow is cold and white,* these expressions, strictly understood, must mean that there is in fire and snow such a configuration of their insensible particles as to have the power of producing in us the ideas of heat, and of cold and whiteness. But as bodies exist which are not capable, as lead is, of

being made fluid by the action of fire, in like manner there is need of a certain formation of our organs of sense, and a certain texture of the insensible particles of our bodies conformable in some unknown manner to the insensible particles of fire and snow, in order that the ideas of heat, cold, and whiteness, may be produced in us.

Our knowledge therefore of *secondary* qualities is gained solely by observing the effects of one body on another; whereas *primary* qualities are inherent in bodies, independently of our sensation, or of any relation to other bodies. Of primary qualities, we have by our senses a distinct notion; but secondary qualities are conceived only as the *unknown causes* of certain sensations and of certain *known effects*.[b]

If we had senses acute enough to discern the minute particles of bodies and the real constitution on which their secondary qualities depend, they would produce quite different ideas in us; and that which is now the yellow colour of gold would disappear, and instead of it we should see the texture of the minute parts, of a certain size and figure. But our present organs of sense are adapted to the nature of things around us; and if they were altered, while external things remained the same, it cannot be doubted that our well-being would be affected by the change, greatly to our disadvantage.

10. Perception is that act of the mind by which it acquires ideas of the qualities of bodies. In *sensation*, there is no object distinct from that act of the mind by which the sensation is felt; as, in smelling a rose, the mind is affected by the sensation in a certain way, and

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[b] Reid, Es. II. ch. xvii.

this affection of the mind may be conceived without thinking of the rose or of any other object. But *perception* has always an external object; and the *object* of perception, in the case here stated, is that quality in the rose which is discerned by the sense of smell. Observing that the sensation is excited when the rose is near, and ceases when it is removed, we are led to conclude that there is some quality in the rose which is the cause of this sensation. This quality in the rose is the object perceived; and that act of the mind by which we acquire the idea of this quality, is called *perception.*

11. The senses therefore have a double province; to make us feel, and to make us perceive. They furnish us with a variety of sensations, and at the same time they give us a conception of the objects by which those sensations are caused. As the perception and its corresponding sensation are produced at the same time, and are never found disjoined in our experience, we are led improperly to consider them as one thing, and, through the imperfection of language, to give them the same name. If the sensation be such as to cause neither pleasure nor pain, and therefore, being indifferent, draw no attention;—of which kind are the sensations caused by all primary qualities;—in speaking of those qualities, it is usual to say that they are *perceived,* not that they are *felt.* On the other hand, taste, and smell, heat, and cold, have sensations that are often agreeable or disagreeable in such a degree as to draw our attention; they are therefore commonly said to be *felt,* not to be *perceived:* and when disorders of the body cause acute pain, so that the painful sensation engrosses the attention, they are always said to be felt, not to be perceived.

12. The secondary qualities of bodies, not less than the primary, are objects of perception: observing their effects, the mind is led to form a conception of some unknown cause that has produced them. The effect is obvious to our senses; but the quality or power is latent. And in such cases, i. e. where the cause is not observed by the senses, it is common to express in language, by *active* verbs, effects on bodies wherein they are merely *passive*. Thus we say that a ship *sails;* though it is certain that a ship has no inherent power of motion, but is impelled by external force. In like manner, when it is said that planets *gravitate* towards the sun, no more is meant than that by some unknown power they are impelled in that direction. This gravitation is not a power inherent in bodies, which they exert of themselves; it is a force impressed upon them to which they must necessarily yield. The effect may be observed, but the nature of the force which has caused the effect is unknown. And the same is true of *all* the powers of matter: our perception of them is *relative;* relative, i. e. to the effects which the powers are known to produce.

13. Perception is often fallacious, and requires correction by experience and judgment. A man who has had a limb cut off, many years after feels pain apparently affecting the limb which he no longer possesses. The sensation is real; but he is misled, by his perception, as to the locality of the disorder. Our perception of external objects is connected with certain sensations. If the sensation is produced, the corresponding perception follows even when there is no object, and in that case deceives us. In like manner, our sensations are connected with certain impressions made upon the nerves and brain: and when the impression is made, from whatever cause,—the corres-

ponding sensation and perception immediately follow. Thus, in the case above supposed, a part of the nerve that went to the limb was cut off along with it, and upon the remaining part the same impression is made, which, according to his experience in the natural state of his body, was caused by a disorder of the limb: and this impression continues to be followed by the sensation and perception which had been previously connected with it. It is probable that repeated convictions, impressed by a new experience, might correct the erroneous perception.[c]

14. In particular, perception, *by the eye,* of the size, distance and figure of bodies, is wholly determined by experience. A man born blind, who should suddenly be made to see, would not at first have any idea of *distance* by sight, but would think all bodies equally near to him. When, however, by the aid of the *touch* and by constant experience it is found that different sensations, occasioned by different degrees of liveliness in the colours or by different dispositions of the pupils of the eyes, correspond to different degrees of distance in the object, an habitual connection is formed in the mind between those sensations and the notions of greater or less distance.

Our perception of *figure* is acquired in the same manner. Having experienced by the sense of touch that one surface is a square and another a circle, that one body is a cube and another a sphere; and finding our sense of sight differently affected by the square and the circle, by the cube and the sphere; these different affections become so closely connected in our minds with the figures of the respective bodies, that when the affection is felt the

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[c] Reid, Es. II. ch. xviii.

idea of the corresponding figure is suggested to us at the same moment.[d] Nor need we be surprised that this is done with so little notice, if we consider how *quick* the actions of the mind are, and how the facility of doing things, which is acquired by habit, comes at length to produce actions in us that escape our observation.

15. Impressions are made on the organs of sense, either by the immediate application of the object itself, or by some medium which passes between the object and the organ. In two of our senses, viz. *touch* and *taste,* there must be an immediate application of the object to the organ. In the other three the impression is made by means of a medium; as, in vision, by the rays of light; in smelling, by the effluvia proceeding from the object; and in hearing, by the vibrations of the air. The impression made on the organ of sense, being communicated to the nerves and brain, rouses the mind; and the united action of the mind and of the object produces sensation. And since we know by experience that the mind alone cannot, by any effort of its own, produce sensation, and are intuitively certain that nothing can begin to exist without a cause, we infer from the existence of any new sensation, the existence of some external cause from which that sensation proceeds, and thus we are led by experience to a *perception* of the external object.

But while we are thus taught by experience that certain impressions, produced on our organs of sense by external objects, are followed by sensations, and these again by corresponding perceptions, yet the *manner* in which these effects are accomplished is unknown; and

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[d] Encyc. Brit. Art. *Metaphysics.*

must remain so, unless we can discover what the mind is, and by what laws it is united to matter, so that they are qualified to act on one another. In the mean time we are ignorant of the *essence* both of mind and of matter, and are merely acquainted with a few of their properties; on which account, in observing their operations, we must often remain satisfied with knowing that certain things are connected with one another, without being able to discover the chain that goes between them. It is to such connections that we give the name of the *laws of nature;* and when it is said that one thing produces another by a law of nature, no more is meant than that one thing, which in popular language is termed *the cause,* is invariably followed by another which is termed *the effect;* but *how* they are connected is unknown.[e]

16. MEMORY is that faculty of the mind which enables us to retain ideas already acquired, and to recall them to our contemplation without the aid of the objects by which they were originally excited. Sometimes ideas recur to us spontaneously; in other cases they are recalled by some incident, or by an effort of the will. In the last case, i. e. when the mind makes an effort in search of any idea and after some labour recalls it, the operation is commonly distinguished by the term *recollection.*

Memory is of so great moment, that where it is defective, the rest of our faculties are in a great measure useless. If an idea be wholly lost, so far there is perfect ignorance; nor is the evil much less, if the memory retrieve ideas *slowly,* so that they are not at hand when occasion calls for them.

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[e] Stewart, Elem. of Phil. ch. i. §. 3.

How the mind possesses this faculty, cannot be explained, any more than we can explain the *causes* of sensation and perception. If it be supposed, according to the ancient theory of ideas, that they are imprinted on the brain by means of the organs of sense, and that, when they are so imprinted as not to be destroyed by time, the preservation of them is called memory; it may be objected, first, that there is no evidence that the impressions made upon the brain *remain* after the object is removed; secondly, that, supposing them to remain, all that can be inferred is, that by the laws of nature there is a *connection* established between these impressions and the remembrance of the object: but *how* the impressions contribute to this remembrance is unknown; it being impossible to discover how *thought* of any kind can be produced by impressions made upon the brain or upon any part of the body.

When the memory is described as a *repository* in which ideas are stored; or when ideas are said to be *engraven* on the memory, such expressions are not rightly used, unless they be understood in a figurative sense; since they do not afford any real explanation of the operations to which they refer.

It is probable, however, that the memory is *dependent* in some manner on the temperament of the brain, since it is observed that diseases of the brain impair or destroy it, and that its vigour returns with the return of health. But if it should ever be discovered what temperament is favourable to the memory, and by what remedies the disorders of it may be removed, though the advantage of such a discovery would be great, it would not in any degree enable us to understand *why* one state of the brain is favourable to the memory more than another.

The powers of this faculty are different in different persons; and in the same person they may be greatly improved by exercise; by attention; and by a proper arrangement of the subjects which he wishes to remember. The effects of *exercise* in strengthening all the faculties are known by every one's experience. It is equally known that those ideas are easily remembered on which the *attention* of the mind was at first strongly fixed, either from its natural vigour or from some casual association with the passions. Hence, those who are able to connect feelings of pleasure with the pursuit of knowledge, have little difficulty in retaining what they have acquired; while many who complain of the weakness of memory ought rather to ascribe the evil to a defect either of apprehension or of curiosity.

The great advantage that may be derived from a proper *arrangement* of the subjects of knowledge, is worthy of particular notice. A number of ideas may be connected by some mutual relation, and referred to one general principle. The mind therefore is relieved from the necessity of dwelling on detached facts, and by means of a small number of general principles, it can recall, as occasions may require, a great variety of particulars associated with them; each of which, considered separately, would have been as burdensome to the memory as the principle on which they are all dependent. In the common business of life, in what confusion would the merchant be involved if he were to deposit *promiscuously*, in his cabinet, the various documents which pass through his hands! whereas, by a proper distribution of them, and by referring them to a few general titles, an ordinary memory is able to effect what the most retentive would fail in, if unassisted by method. The advantages of *arrangement* in treasuring up our ideas in the mind, are

perfectly similar to the good effects of it in the instance which has been stated.

But since, with every aid, the powers of the memory must be limited, we shall do well to discriminate the subjects of knowledge according to their importance, and confine our aim to the acquisition of useful and connected truths; instead of grasping at every thing by desultory efforts, and distracting our attention by many detached and insignificant objects.[f]

17. The mind, having gained ideas, has the faculty of *discerning;* i. e. of distinguishing one from another. If in having our ideas in the memory ready at hand, consists quickness of parts; in having them unconfused and being able to distinguish one thing from another where there is the least difference, consists the exactness of judgment. And hence there appears to be some ground for the common remark, that men of great wit and prompt memory have seldom the clearest judgment, or deepest reason. For *wit* consists in assembling ideas, and putting together with quickness and variety those wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, so as to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy; in doing which, no regard is paid to truth and right reason, by whose severe rules, therefore, it will not bear to be examined: *judgment,* on the contrary, consists in separating ideas wherein can be found the least difference, so that no confusion may arise from their apparent similitude.

18. Every object which affects our senses is an individual object; but we perceive that two or more objects which affect *some* of our senses differently, affect others of them in precisely the same way. Thus paper, snow, and

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[f] Reid, Es. III. Stewart, El. Phil. c. vi.

milk, affect the senses of touch and taste differently, but they present the same appearance to the eye. The *difference* we believe to proceed from different qualities in the several objects; and their *sameness* of appearance we ascribe to the possession of some similar qualities. To the similar qualities one common name is given; and every thing which presents the same appearance to the eye that snow does, is called *white;* where the word *white* is the *sign* of a quality inherent in each of numerous objects.

If it were necessary to give a distinct name to each individual object, it is manifest that a complete language could never be formed, adequate to the vast variety of objects. The mind, therefore, comparing several individuals with each other, and discovering in them many qualities in which they agree, combines them into one class or species, and includes them all under a common name. Thus, observing that many individuals agree in having an erect form, and in being endowed with reason, (omitting all those properties in which they disagree, such as size, height, or complexion), we combine them into one species, to which we give the name of *man.* Again, observing that other objects have certain qualities which belong to man,—laying aside the ideas of *reason, speech,* and other differences, and retaining only the ideas of *organized body, sensation,* and *spontaneous motion,* we comprise all these, along with man, under the common name of *animal.* By a similar process we comprehend animals, plants, and other objects under the name of *body,* and lastly of *substance;* having omitted, successively, the peculiar qualities by which the several classes of objects are distinguished from one another.

This power of considering certain qualities of an object apart from the rest is called ABSTRACTION, and it is of so great importance as to have been considered by

some philosophers the characteristical attribute of a *rational* nature.

It was long disputed whether the mind is able to form abstract ideas; whether, for example, it can form the abstract idea of *man*, without attaching to the conceived object some particular size, height, complexion;—which particulars are not necessary attributes of man, but distinguish one man from another. It is now generally admitted that the mind has no such power; that it cannot form the idea of any thing, without ascribing to it some particular modification. In what manner then is it able, from the consideration of these particular ideas, to make its conclusions general? By considering the particular ideas to be *signs* or *representatives* of all other ideas of the same class. If the subject of our thoughts be *man*, and we attempt to form the idea of an object corresponding to this word, that idea must be *particular*; but our reasonings will not on that account be the less correct, if they do not in the least involve or depend upon those particular qualities which distinguish individuals from each other, and are not common to the species. When Euclid is proving the method of dividing a line into two equal parts, he draws a line, we may suppose, of an inch in length: this, which in itself is a particular line, is nevertheless, with regard to its signification, general; since it is a *sign* or *representative* of all particular lines, so that what is proved of it is proved of all. And as that particular line becomes general by being made a sign, so the *name* line, and the *idea* of a line, either of which taken absolutely is particular, by being signs are made general likewise.

When it is affirmed that *the whole is equal to the sum of all its parts*, if, in order to comprehend this, we recur to ideas, all that we can do is to form a notion of some individual whole, divided into a certain number of parts of

which it is constituted; as of the year, divided into the four seasons. From this instance we can discern nothing more than the relation of equality between this particular whole and its component parts. If we take another example, we only perceive another particular truth. The same holds of a third and of a fourth. But the perception of ten thousand instances would not give us a knowledge of the universal truth, if the mind had not the power of considering things as signs, and particular ideas as representing an infinity of others, resembling one another in those circumstances which are the subject of consideration, though dissimilar in every other. And hence it is that some ideas are particular in their nature, but general in their representation.

It may be observed also that the attention of the mind is frequently extended no farther than to words; which are the arbitrary signs of ideas. Our habits of thinking and speaking have gradually established in the mind such relations among the words we employ, as to enable us to carry on processes of reasoning by means of them, without attending in every instance to their particular signification. In talking, for example, of *government, church, negotiation, conquest,* we seldom present to our minds all the simple ideas of which these complex ones are composed: but all the common applications of these terms having become familiar to us, any unusual application of them is immediately detected; this detection induces doubt, and the mind is thereby led to have recourse to the ideas themselves, and to its knowledge of the things which the words signify. Thus if, instead of saying *that in war the weaker have always recourse to negotiation,* we should say *that they have always recourse to conquest,* our familiarity with these words and with the relation of the ideas signified by them, makes us immediately perceive the absurdity of that proposition.

But in matters that are not familiar to us, or are treated in an uncommon manner, and in such as are of an abstruse nature, the case is different; and we shall be continually liable to be imposed upon by words, unless we fully apprehend their meaning, and attend to the ideas which they are employed to represent.[g]

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19. The objects of COMPLEX ideas may be classed under three heads; *substances, modes,* and *relations.*

The ideas of *substances* are such combinations of simple ideas as represent things that subsist by themselves; in which combination, the idea of *substance,* such as we are able to form of it, is always the first and chief. Thus, if to the idea of substance be joined that of a certain colour, with certain degrees of weight, hardness, ductility, and fusibility, we gain the idea of *lead;* and the ideas of spontaneous motion, thought, and of a certain figure, joined to substance, form the idea of *man.*

Our knowledge of bodies is acquired solely by our perception of their qualities; but since we cannot conceive how these qualities should subsist alone, we suppose them to exist in, and be supported by some common subject; which support we denote by the name *substance,* though it is certain that of the nature of it we have in reality no distinct conception. And the same is true of the operations of the mind, such as *thinking, knowing, doubting:* since we are not able to apprehend how they can subsist

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[g] Encyc. Brit. Art. Metaph. Campbell's Phil. of Rhet. vol. II, ch. vii. Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, Part I. §. vii.

of themselves or be produced by mere matter, we conclude that they are the actions of some other substance, which we call *mind* or *spirit*. So that, as we have no other idea of matter than as being *something* wherein the qualities which affect our senses subsist, if we suppose a substance wherein *thinking, knowing, doubting* and other powers subsist, we have as clear an idea of the substance of spirit, as we have of matter; the one being supposed to be (without knowing what it is) the *substratum* to those simple ideas we have from without, and the other supposed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the *substratum* to those operations which we experience in ourselves within. It appears then that our idea of material substance is not more distinct than that of the substance of spirit; and therefore from our not having a distinct knowledge of the substance of spirit, we can no more conclude its non-existence than we can, for the same reason, deny the existence of matter. Some of the *qualities* or *properties* of both are known to us from observation and experience; but all attempts to explain the *manner* in which these qualities exist together, and what is the *cause,* ground, or reason of their union, have hitherto, with regard both to matter and spirit, been made equally in vain.

The things then immediately perceived by us and of which we have an adequate idea, are only *qualities,* which must belong to a subject; and all that we know about this subject is, that it is that to which such qualities belong. In this the philosopher has no advantage above the vulgar: for as they perceive colour, figure, and motion by their senses, as well as he does; and as both are equally certain that these qualities must have a *subject* in which they inhere, so the notions which both have of this subject are equally obscure. When the philosopher calls it a *substance,* a *substratum,* or a *subject of inhesion,* these words

convey no further meaning than what is understood and expressed by saying, in common language, that it is a *thing extended, solid,* and *moveable.* It is therefore about *qualities* alone that we can reason with certainty, and it is sufficient for the purposes of life that we have of *them* an adequate knowledge. For as the *substratum* of all bodies seems to be the same, though we know not what it is; and as one body is distinguished from another only by its *qualities* or *powers,* a knowledge of these is all that can be necessary to direct us in our use of the objects with which we are surrounded.[h]

20. *Modes* do not subsist by themselves, but are the *adjuncts* or *affections* of things to which they are referred. Thus inches and feet are modes of SPACE; hours and days of DURATION; units of NUMBER. Also *beauty, gratitude, theft, murder* are modes; being the adjuncts of bodies or substances, on which they are dependent. There are two kinds of modes: (1) *simple* modes, our ideas of which are merely combinations of the *same* simple idea, as of a *dozen,* a *score,* which are only so many units added together: (2) *mixed* modes, such as *beauty, theft;* our ideas of which are formed by the combination of simple ideas *of several kinds.*

21. SPACE is conceived as having three dimensions, length, breadth, and thickness, which are generally called the three simple modes of space. In this respect it agrees with body: but the agreement proceeds no farther; for *space* is destitute of solidity, without which the existence of *body* is inconceivable. Our idea of space is gained by the sight and touch; and it is so closely associated with every visible and tangible object, that we cannot see nor feel, without conceiving that the objects seen or felt

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[h] Reid, Es. II. ch. xix.

occupy so much of space. Had we never possessed the senses of sight and touch, we could not have supposed the existence of space to be necessary to the existence of every thing. Our other senses as well as our internal powers of thought would have given us a knowledge of our own existence and of the existence of other things, but no object of those senses or of thought would have been conceived as occupying space.

Space may properly be called the *privation* of body; since it has itself no positive or actual existence. We have indeed a positive idea of it, as we have of silence, darkness, and other privations; but it cannot be inferred from our having such an idea of space, that space itself is something real, any more than it can be inferred that *darkness, silence, absence* are real things, and have as positive an existence as *light, sound,* and *body.*

Each different distance is a different mode of space. Men fix in their minds, for the use of measuring, the ideas of certain lengths, such as an inch, a yard, a mile; and when these stated lengths are become familiar to their thoughts, they can without difficulty repeat them, and by adding them together enlarge their idea of space as much as they please. This power of repeating the idea of any distance and adding it to the former, without being ever able to come to a limit, gives us the idea of *infinity.*

22. Our idea of the *place* of a body is gained by observing the relation of its distance from any two or more points, which, being considered as at rest, keep the same distance one from another. Thus, when we observe a thing to be at the same distance now, at which it was yesterday, from two or more points with which it was then compared, and which have not, since the comparison was made, changed their position with respect to each other, the thing is said to be in the *same place;* and to have

changed its place, if it have altered its distance from those points. The *place* of any thing is therefore determined by reference to the objects with which it is compared; and on that account a thing may have remained in the same place with regard to some objects, and at the same time have changed its place with regard to others. Thus in the cabin of a ship, different articles may have continued in the same place with regard to each other, while all of them, by the motion of the ship, may have changed their place with regard to the neighbouring land. But this modification of distance which is called *place,* being made by men for their common use, in order that they may designate the particular position of objects where they have occasion for such designation, they determine the *place* of an object by reference to such adjacent things as best serve their present purpose, without regarding other things which, for a different purpose, might better determine the place of the same object. Thus in a chess-board, the use of the *designation of the place* of each chessman being determined only within that checquered piece of wood, to designate it by reference to any thing else, would be useless; but if these chessmen were put up in a box, and it were asked where any particular chessman is, it would be proper to determine its place by reference to something else than the chess-board, such as the part of the room or closet which contains the box.

That *place* is nothing but the *relative* position of things, will be readily admitted, when it is considered that we can have no idea of the place of the *universe.* Every *part* of the universe has place; because it can be referred to other parts which we may suppose to be fixed. Thus every planet of our system has a place, which may be determined by ascertaining its distance from the Sun and from the orbits of the other planets; and the place of the

system itself may be ascertained by referring it to two or more fixed stars: but all the systems taken as *one whole* can have no *place;* because there is nothing else to which the position of that *whole* can be referred. It is true that the word *place* is sometimes used to denote that portion of space which any particular body occupies; and the universe has *place* in this sense, but not in the other and proper sense of the word.

23. Hours, days, years, time, eternity, are modes of DURATION. Our idea of duration, as well as our belief of it, is acquired by the faculty of memory. It is essential to every thing remembered that it be something which is past; and we cannot conceive a thing to be past, without conceiving some duration between it and the present. As soon therefore as we remember any thing, we acquire both an idea and belief of duration.[i]

Having gained the idea of duration, the next thing to be done is to get some *measure* of it, whereby we may judge of its different lengths, and consider the distinct order wherein things exist; without which our knowledge would be confused, and History in particular would be rendered useless. This consideration of duration, as marked out by certain measures or periods, gives us the idea of *time.*

In measuring *extension,* nothing more is required than the application of some standard or measure to the thing whose extension we wish to ascertain; but in measuring *duration* this cannot be done, because no two different parts of duration can be put together to measure one another, and therefore no standard of it can be kept at hand, ready to be applied. Nothing then could serve properly for a measure of time, but what has

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[i] Reid, Es. III. ch. iii.

divided the whole length of its duration into equal portions by constantly repeated periods. On which account, the diurnal and annual *revolutions of the Sun,* as having been from the beginning of nature equal, regular, and observable by all mankind, have been with reason made use of for the measure of duration. But the distinction of days and years having depended on the *motion* of the Sun, men are apt to suppose that without motion there could be no measure of time; as if there were some necessary connection between them: whereas any periodical appearance, if universally observable, would have distinguished the intervals of time as well as those that have been made use of. If the Sun, for instance, had been lighted up as a fire, after the same intervals of time which now pass between its successive arrivals at the same meridian, and had been extinguished twelve hours after; —and if in the time of an annual revolution it had sensibly increased in brightness and heat, and so decreased again; such regular appearances would have served to measure the periods of duration as well without motion, as with it.

The idea of *time* is preparatory to that of *eternity:* for having got the ideas of certain lengths of duration, we can in our thoughts add them to one another as often as we please, and apply them, so added, to duration past or future; and this we can continue to do without limit, and suppose a duration exceeding the periods we can reckon, add as many as we will.

25. The idea of NUMBER is originally acquired by observing the union of similar qualities in two or more objects, and referring those objects, by abstraction, to the *same* class, and giving them a common name. Thus observing a cow, a sheep, and a horse, we say that there are *three animals;* but if the cow, sheep, and horse had no common properties, so that we could not reduce them to

some common species, we should never gain from them the idea of number. It is necessary to have observed that two objects are in some respects of the *same kind,* before we can number them, or make such a comparison of one with the other as to gain a knowledge of the relations of *one* and *two.* If a child saw a cow, a sheep, and a horse, his senses would no doubt enable him to distinguish them from one another; and if he were asked the number of them, he might probably, from having learnt the *names* of number as signs, without affixing to them any idea of the things signified, readily answer *three;* but if he were further asked *three what?* his answer would not be so ready. They are not three cows, three sheep, or three horses. When he has learnt that, from having some common properties, they may be classed under the same species, then, and not before, he will be able to answer that they are three *animals.*

In arithmetic, *figures,* which are combinations of units, are used merely as symbols; and it is not necessary that the mind should concern itself with the things signified; and it is observable that, whatever difficulty we may have had originally in acquiring the idea of number, the simple modes of it are of all others the most distinct. Every the least variation makes each combination as clearly different from that which approaches nearest to it, as from the most remote; *two* being as distinct from *one* as from a hundred, and the *idea* of two as distinct from that of one, as the idea of the magnitude of the earth is from that of one of its particles. This is not the case in other simple modes; in which it is not easy to distinguish between two modes that approach one another and yet are really different. For who will undertake to discern accurately the various shades of colour, or form distinct ideas of every the least difference in extension?

Since numeration consists in adding units together, and these combinations of units have no variety or difference except as being more or less; *names* or *marks* for each distinct combination are more necessary than in any other sort of ideas. For without such names, we could not make use of numbers in reckoning; especially where the combination is made up of a great multitude of units, which, if put together without a name to distinguish each precise sum, would form only a heap in confusion. Hence, it has been observed that uncivilized tribes cannot reckon far, on account of the scantiness of their language, and when they wish to express greater numbers, they point to the hairs of the head, to denote a great multitude which they cannot number:—and also that children, for want of names to mark the several progressions of numbers, and from not having yet the faculty to arrange them in regular order and retain them in their memories, do not begin to number very early, or proceed in it far, till after they are well furnished with a stock of other ideas; and they are often known to reason well, and have clear conceptions of other things, before they can reckon *twenty*. For before they can have a clear idea of that number, they must know the distinct names of all the preceding numbers as they stand in order; and wherever this fails, the chain is broken, and the progress in numbering can go no farther. So that to reckon right, it is required that the mind distinguish ideas which differ only by an unit, and also that it remember in their exact order the names of the several combinations from an unit to the number which is to be reckoned: in either of which if it fails, the process of numbering will be disturbed, and there will remain only the confused idea of *multitude;* but the ideas necessary to distinct numeration will not be attained.

26. By means of *number* we are furnished with the most distinct idea of infinity that we are capable of acquiring. For even in space and duration, when the mind pursues the idea of infinity, it makes use of the repetitions of number;—as of millions of miles or years; which are so many distinct terms, kept best by *number* from running into confusion; and when we have added together as many millions as we please of known lengths of space or duration, the clearest idea we can get of infinity is given us by the incomprehensible remainder of numbers that may still be added, affording no prospect of termination. Hence, our idea of infinity is in a great measure *negative*. For when we endeavour to form an idea of infinite space or duration, we usually at first take some large idea as, perhaps, of millions of miles or years, which possibly we multiply several times. All that we thus amass in our thoughts is positive, and is the assemblage of a great number of positive ideas of space or duration. But of what remains beyond this, we have no more a distinct positive notion than a mariner has of the depth of the sea, who having let down a large portion of his line reaches no bottom: whereby he knows the depth to be so many fathoms and more; but *how many* more, remains unknown. And if he could always supply new line, and find the plummet sink without ever stopping, he would be in a situation similar to ours when we are endeavouring to gain a complete and positive idea of infinity. So much as the mind comprehends of any space or duration, it has a positive idea of; but in endeavouring to make it infinite, it being always enlarging, always advancing, the idea is still imperfect and incomplete. For which reason it is not an unmeaning subtlety to say that we ought to distinguish between the idea of the infinity of space, and the idea of a space infinite; the first being nothing but the idea of a

supposed endless progression of lengths of space repeated as often as we please; but to have in the mind the idea of a space infinite, is to suppose that the mind has already passed over, and actually has in view the complete series of the repeated lengths of space; which series must therefore be *terminated,* in the mind's conception; but to be infinite, and at the same time terminated, involves a manifest contradiction.

If our idea of infinity be gained from the power we have of repeating without end our own ideas, it may be asked, why we do not attribute infinity to other ideas as well as to those of space and duration; since they may be as easily repeated as the other, and yet no one ever thinks of infinite sweetness or infinite whiteness, though he can repeat the ideas of sweet or white, as frequently as those of a yard, or a day. The answer is, that an idea of infinity cannot be gained by the repetition of any ideas except those which may be considered as having parts, and as capable of increase by the addition of other parts; because by the repetition of such ideas alone, there is a continued enlargement without end. To the largest idea of extension or duration that we at present have, the addition of any the least part makes an increase; but if to our idea of whiteness we add another of equal whiteness, they become as it were embodied, and the idea is not at all increased. Those ideas therefore that consist not of parts, cannot be augmented: but space, duration, and number, being capable of increase by repetition and of progression without end, lead our minds to the thought of infinity.

27. There is no limit to the variety of ideas which may be classed under the head of *modes:* and few of them, comparatively, have distinct names. *Walking, running, leaping,* and many others are modes of *motion;* and in like manner, of colours, sounds, tastes, smells, there is an

endless variety of modes, a few of which are distinguished by names, to serve the purposes of language; and under each name a large class of modes is comprehended, not distinguished from one another by separate names. Thus the term *whiteness* is applied to many shades of colour; and *bitterness* comprehends modes of taste affecting the palate with many gradations of unpleasantness. Also of *pleasure* and *pain* there are various modes, such as joy, hope, fear, envy, shame. Reverie, attention, study, are modes of *thinking*, corresponding to the degrees of remission or intention with which the powers of the mind are exerted; the term *reverie* being applied, when ideas float in the mind without reflection or regard; *attention*, when the ideas that offer themselves are taken notice of, and, as it were, registered in the memory; and *study*, when the mind with great earnestness fixes its view on any subject, considers it on all sides, and will not be called off by the ordinary solicitation of other ideas. Which different degrees of intention and remission, of which the mind is capable, lead us to conclude that *thinking is the action, not the essence of the soul*, since the *operations* of agents easily admit of intention and remission; but the *essences* of things are not conceived capable of such variation.

28. *Mixed* modes are combinations of simple ideas of *several kinds;* and they are made for convenience, and dispatch in language. Thus we express the whole ceremony of crowning a king by the word *coronation*, without making an enumeration of every particular belonging to it. Thus also the use of such words as *revenge*, *reprieve*, *appeal*, facilitates our communication with one another, by rendering unnecessary the mention of all the passions and forms which are included in the complex ideas severally expressed by those words. Mixed modes are therefore made by the arbitrary combination of several ideas,

whenever it becomes convenient to comprehend them under one name; although, naturally, those ideas may have no more connection with one another, than others have, which have not been formed into similar combinations. Thus *parricide* is used to denote the killing of a father; but no word is in use to denote the killing of a son or a neighbour; though the idea of *killing* has no more connection in nature with the idea of the former relation, than it has with that of the other relations. It is the having a name therefore that gives unity to a mixed mode; no combination of ideas being generally considered as one complex idea, unless it have an appropriate word to express it. Hence the act of killing a son or neighbour, having no name affixed to it, is not taken for a particular complex idea, nor as a distinct species of action from that of killing any other person.

Our ideas of mixed modes are acquired 1. by *observation* of things themselves:—as by seeing men wrestle and fence, we gain the idea of wrestling and fencing; by seeing a king crowned, we gain the idea of coronation. 2. By *invention,* or the voluntary combination of several simple ideas in our own minds:—thus he that invented printing or etching, had formed the complex idea of it in his own mind, before it existed. 3. By *explanation* or *definition,* that is, by enumerating the several ideas of which the mixed mode is composed; whereby clear ideas of modes such as *sacrilege* or *murder* may be conveyed to the minds of men who never saw those acts committed.

Since mixed modes are made by men for the purpose of readily communicating their thoughts to one another, they usually make such collections of ideas into complex modes, and affix names to them, as they have frequent use of in their business and conversation; leaving others, which they have seldom occasion to mention, uncombined

and without names. And if we examine which of our simple ideas have had most mixed modes made out of them and distinguished by names, we shall find that they are those of *thinking, motion,* and *power;* for these comprehend all actions both of body and mind, and as our conversation and laws principally respect human actions, it is necessary we should have *modes* relative to them, that we may be able to express our thoughts concerning them with convenience and expedition.

The purpose for which such modes are formed affords a reason also why in every language many particular words are in use, to which there are none that exactly correspond in other languages. For peculiar customs exist in every country and give rise to peculiar *modes,* with names annexed to them; but in other countries, where the same customs do not prevail, those peculiar *modes* have not been made, and consequently they have no words to express them. Thus ὀστρακισμὸς being a punishment peculiar to the Greeks, there is not in any other language a word corresponding to it: and it is manifest that such terms as *jury, artillery,* and the names of all modern inventions, cannot be expressed in translation by any single words of Greek or Latin. Moreover, customs are continually changing, so that while some combinations of ideas fall into disuse, others are formed, and new names are introduced to express them; by which means a continual and gradual change takes place in the vocabulary of every language.

29. Under the term RELATIONS those ideas are comprehended which arise from observing the *relation* or comparison of things, one with another. Thus the idea of *Nobility* is relative; since no one can be *Noble,* except by comparison with others. When two terms as *father* and *child* correspond to each other, so that the idea of one

naturally introduces that of the other, they are called *correlative* terms: and where a correlative term is not in use, the relation, though equally real, is often not perceived. Thus the idea of a *Dictator* is relative, since the word denotes a person exercising authority over others; but this relation is not so obvious as that implied in the word *King*, which has the term *subject* correlative to it. Also there are many words which seem to be absolute and to stand for positive ideas, and yet imply a tacit relation. *Old, young, great, little, strong, weak,* are of this sort; which appear to denote positive ideas, and yet in reality imply a tacit reference to certain standards settled in the mind. Thus some animals are called *old,* at an age at which others are *young,* and a horse, which in one country would be called *large,* might be thought *small* in other countries; because reference is made to different ideas of duration and size settled in the mind as belonging in the course of nature to the several sorts of animals.

In order to have an adequate idea of the relation of two things, it is not necessary that we know *all* the qualities that belong to the things related, but such of them only as form the grounds of the relation. These may consist in a few simple ideas; whereas to have a perfect knowledge of the substances related, we must know *all* the qualities belonging to them. Thus, in comparing two men in reference to a common parent, it is easy to form the idea of *brothers,* without having a perfect idea of *man,* in which are united the ideas of substance, figure, thinking, willing, and others; an accurate perception of which is not necessary to an adequate idea of this relation. And hence, persons may agree as to the grounds of relation, who disagree in their ideas of the things related.

The ideas which may be classed under the head of Relations are of almost infinite variety, since there is no

simple idea which is not capable of a great number of considerations in reference to other ideas; for example, in the same person may be included the relations of father, son, brother, friend, enemy, master, subject, and many others; on account of which variety, it is difficult to comprehend them all under a few general classes. Many have reference to time or place, and are expressed by such words as old, young, above, below, near, distant. The relations of *cause* and *effect* are also numerous; as when we observe that fluidity, which did not exist in *lead*, is produced in it by the application of heat, we call heat the *cause*, and fluidity the *effect*; and in like manner the idea of this relation is always presented to the mind, whenever we consider one thing operating so as to produce another which did not previously exist.

Other relations may be called *proportional*, which arise from observing different degrees of the same simple idea, and are expressed by such words as *whiter, sweeter, less, equal, more*: others are *natural* relations, such as those of *father, brothers, countrymen*, founded upon the consideration of their consanguinity or origin, and which being unalterable, make the relations depending upon them as lasting as the subjects to which they belong: others are *instituted* relations, as those of a *subject*, a *general*, a *patron*; which differ from *natural* relations by being alterable, and separable from the persons to whom they have belonged, though the persons themselves, between whom the relation has ceased, may still exist; as a general may resign the command of an army, or a subject withdraw from his country and pay allegiance to another king.—Lastly, *moral* relations have reference to the conduct of men, and arise from observing whether that conduct is conformable or not to certain Rules or Laws by which our judgment is formed of it. The Laws by which we thus judge of the

rectitude of human conduct, are (1) the *Divine* Law; (2) the *Civil* Law; (3) the Law of *opinion* or *reputation*; all of which are accompanied with necessary enforcements of rewards and punishments. Of these the Divine Law is the most perfect and comprehensive, and is the only true test by which men ought to judge of their own actions, whether they be morally good or evil; that is, whether as *duties*, or *sins*, they are likely to be followed by happiness or misery, awarded to them by the Almighty. But since it is not the object of this Law to prescribe minute regulations respecting many transactions of men among one another which are subjects not for moral precept but conventional agreement, and, still more, since the penalties annexed to the breach of God's Laws are reserved for a future state, and it is often found that men disregard consequences which are not immediate;—on both these accounts the *Civil Law* is necessary, that the commonwealth may be able to protect the lives, liberties, and possessions, of those who live according to it, and may visit violations of it with ready punishment.—Thirdly, the Law of *opinion* or *reputation* is that which greatly influences men, not only as it pertains to many things of which the other Laws do not take cognizance, but in more important cases in which it is at variance with them. And though many are able to banish reflection as to the consequences which will follow the violation of the Divine Law, and flatter themselves with the hope of escaping punishments due from the Civil Law, yet of those who offend against the Law of fashion and opinion, few are so insensible as to disregard public censure, or be happy while they are the objects of dislike with their own particular society.

30. The *Association of ideas* is that connection of them in the mind, by means of which the presence of one naturally introduces others, which have been joined with it

by some kind of relation. The principles on which the association of ideas depends appear to be chiefly *resemblance, contrast, contiguity of time or place, cause and effect,* and *habit:* but as there is no possible relation among the objects of our knowledge which may not serve to connect them together in the mind, every enumeration of the principles of this association must be incomplete. It may also be remarked that the *association of ideas* is an expression which has been applied in a sense much more extensive than the words themselves strictly justify; being made to comprehend not *ideas* only, but every passion and affection of which the mind is susceptible:— the memory also, the judgment, in a word every internal operation of the mind is regulated in some degree by the influence of this principle.

The effect of *resemblance* in directing the train of our ideas is brought to our notice by instances of continual occurrence. When we read of any event, we are naturally led to think of other events which have occurred similar to it: if we meet a stranger who resembles one of our friends, the conception of that friend is immediately suggested: the view of a landscape recalls the idea of similar scenes which are familiar to us. To this principle we must ascribe the use of *similies, metaphors,* and all the *figurative* language of poetry. When the zephyrs *laugh,* or the forest *frowns,* it is to the suggestion of objects by *analogous* objects, that figurative expressions of this sort owe their origin. Words also suggest other words of similar sound; and hence, from the accidental agreement of their verbal signs, ideas are excited and trains of thought, which otherwise would not have arisen. On this account, our thoughts which usually *govern* our language, are themselves in some measure *governed* by that very language over which they seem to exercise unlimited

command. In *rhyme*, one sound suggests another, and to this recurrence of sounds it is evident that the train of thought in the poet must be in a great degree subservient. *Alliteration* also, or a similarity in the *initial* sounds of words, has an influence on the succession of our thoughts similar to that which is exercised by the *concluding syllables* of verse.

The effects of *contrast*, as an associating principle, are equally obvious. Intense cold makes us think of heat, and wish for it; the thoughts of a traveller in the desert, suffering from hunger and thirst, naturally recur to the abundance which he has formerly enjoyed, but which is now beyond his reach. The *palace* and the *cottage*, the *cradle* and the *grave*, *poverty* and *wealth*, severally suggest one another in ready succession. Of moral reflections, none are so common as those which are founded on the instability of mortal greatness, the frailty of beauty, the precariousness of life;—all which reflections are evidently the result of that principle of suggestion by *contrast*, which we are considering. The Roman, who saw the imperial victor move along in the splendour of conquest, must have thought of disaster, before he was led to moralize on the briefness of earthly triumph. And if a feeling of melancholy has ever arisen at the sight of youth and health, it can only have been suggested by the opposite ideas of age and sickness which are destined to follow. This transition, in our trains of thought, from *one extreme* to its *opposite*, has the happy effect of tempering our emotions; so that while salutary reflections are excited in some men, others are supplied, from the very excess of misery, with internal sources of hope.

Contiguity of time or place is, of all the principles of association, the most frequent and extensive in its operation. Contiguity of time forms the whole calendar of the

great multitude of mankind, who pay little attention to æras of chronology, but date events by each other, and speak of what happened in the time of some *rebellion,* or *great Election,* or *frost,* or *famine.* Even with those who are more accustomed to use, on great occasions, the stricter dates of months and years, this association of events, as *near to each other,* forms the bond for uniting in the memory a multitude of scattered facts, which it would have been impossible to remember by the separate relation of each to an insulated point of time.—It is the same with contiguity of *place.* To think of one part of a familiar landscape, is to recall the rest in immediate succession. On this species of relation have been founded systems of artificial memory, which prove, by the facilities of remembrance which they afford, the influence that is exercised on the train of our thoughts by local association. From the same cause arises the pleasure we enjoy in visiting classical ground; in beholding the scenes of great events, or places which have been dignified by the residence of men whom we are accustomed to revere. "I know not" (says Cicero, speaking of his visit to the academy at Athens) "whether it be a natural feeling, or an illusion of the imagination founded on habit, that we are more powerfully affected by the sight of those places which have been much frequented by illustrious men, than when we either listen to the recital, or read the detail, of their great actions. At this moment, I feel strongly that emotion which I speak of. I see before me the form of Plato, who was wont to dispute in this place: these gardens not only recall him to my memory, but seem to present his very person to my senses. I fancy to myself, that here stood Speusippus; there Xenocrates, and here, on this bench, sat his disciple Polemo. To me, our antient Senate-House seems peopled with the like visionary

forms; for, often, when I enter it, the shades of Scipio, of Cato, and of Lælius, rise to my imagination."[k]—In Sparta, an oration was every year pronounced at the tomb of Leonidas. In such a scene, and with such an object before them, we cannot doubt that deeper emotions were felt by the orator and by the assembled nation who listened to him, than would have been felt, if the same language had been addressed from any other place, unconnected with so sacred a remembrance.

The connection between *cause* and *effect* is so intimate that it is scarcely possible to direct our thoughts to either of them singly. When we hear of extraordinary conduct in any person, we naturally conjecture the reasons of it, and the probable consequences: when we see a wound, we think of the accident that caused it, and of the pain that follows;—when we hear of a battle, our thoughts are turned to the causes which have preceded, and to its probable effects.

Lastly, ideas that have been often joined together in the mind, though they have no natural connection, become so associated that one of them will naturally introduce the others, from the influence of *habit*. In language spoken or written, the mind passes imperceptibly from the words heard or the characters seen to the things signified. Habit gives to those who have long been practised in extemporary elocution the command not of words merely, but of thoughts and judgments which appear like the calculations of long reflection. All the divisions of a subject present themselves to the orator at once; image after image arises to illustrate it; and proper words in proper places embody his sentiments, without any apparent effort

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[k] De Finibus, Lib. V. ad init.

of his own. Other proofs of the power of habit may be observed in the feats of the circus, and in playing upon instruments of music. The musician must direct innumerable motions of the fingers in one particular succession. There is only one arrangement of those motions that is right, while there are thousands that are wrong and would spoil the music. Yet the arrangement of those motions gives him no trouble of thought: having a distinct idea of the tune, and a will to play it, the motions of the fingers appear to arrange themselves, so as to answer his intention.

31. Since the moral characters of men as well as their intellectual attainments depend greatly on the trains of thought which are allowed to occupy the mind, it is of the highest importance to give them a right direction, as far as the direction of them is in our power. For though ideas are connected with one another by the laws of association, and often take their own course without check or direction, yet by an active effort of the mind the connection may be broken, and particular objects be fixed upon for its attention in preference to others. Those whose minds are occupied with a train of low and base thoughts, or with visionary speculations, are not likely to become qualified for any noble or active employment; while others gain the command over their thoughts, regulate them in the pursuit of right objects, and arrive at excellence in morality and knowledge.

32. When any ideas occur in connection with one another, it is important to inquire whether there be any real ground for the connection, in reason or nature. If there be, it is the office of our reason to keep them united; for such associations constitute the greatest part of useful truths, and the mind possesses them ever ready for application. But other connections, formed by caprice or custom,

are often the sources of error, superstition and misery; and if such associations have been long formed, they become too strong to be broken. Thus, if children be frightened with stories of ghosts appearing in the dark, the idea of ghosts becomes in time so associated with the idea of darkness, that it is often not in their power to separate them after they have become men; and it is difficult for them to retain perfect composure when they are alone in darkness, though they are fully convinced in their judgments of the absurdity of the tales which originally frightened them. In like manner, many remarkable antipathies may be observed in men, some of which appear to be natural, and to depend on original constitution, but the greater part of them may be traced to some accidental association: and it is probable that of those which are accounted natural, many have arisen from early impressions which would have been acknowledged to be the causes of them, if they had been noticed and remembered. A grown person, surfeited with honey, cannot think of it afterwards without dislike and sickness; had this happened to him when a child, the same effects would have followed, but the cause would have been mistaken, and the antipathy accounted natural.

A person who has been injured, or fancies that he has been injured, by another, sometimes ruminates upon it so much that the idea of the aggressor never afterwards occurs without being accompanied by an idea of the injury, even though it has been repaired, and its effects, otherwise, have long ceased to be felt. Hence hatreds exist, and quarrels are propagated and continued, often from slight occasions.

When a painful combination of ideas is settled in the mind, it is frequently beyond the power of reason to relieve us from the effects of it. The Mother, who has lost her child, receives no consolation from intimations of

the uselessness of sorrow: reason cannot prevail over it, however apt she may be to hearken to it in other cases; time alone can wear away by disuse the sense of former enjoyment of the child's presence, and at length separate in her memory the idea of pain for its loss from the idea of the child.

33. The effects of a wrong and groundless association of ideas are perceived in matters even more important than those which have been mentioned. What evils have accrued to mankind from the idea of *infallibility* having become annexed to persons or societies!—whose doctrines, through the influence of that idea, demanded assent without inquiry, and held the world for many centuries in ignorance and bondage.

In the schools, no philosophy was tolerated in opposition to that of Aristotle; insomuch that decrees were issued, prohibiting all persons, under pain of death, from teaching any maxim *contrary to Aristotle, and other ancient authors received and approved.* A similar dread of inquiry, with worse effects, prevailed with respect to religion. Hence, in a long period of darkness, Christianity was corrupted by the mixture of human opinions claiming equal authority with the word of God. And the evil of such debasement of truth is far from being confined to the mischief of the error while it continues: if ever, by any means, that part which is erroneous be detected, those who have weakly and passively derived their most important opinions from habit or authority, are apt to lose their reverence for the truth itself on which the error has been grafted, and rashly fall a prey to that sceptical philosophy, which teaches that all opinions and all principles of action rest on authority alone, and owe their influence to education and example.

Again, in political controversies, what effect is frequently produced by a *name,* which, without any just or ascertained grounds, has become associated with particular opinions!—a name originally affixed by the invention of enemies, or perhaps from accident. Many, who are unable to understand the distinctions which may have given rise to opposite names, and though the dispute be on subjects which neither they nor their opponents comprehend, yet are impelled to mutual dislike;—many, who, but for the invention of the *names,* would scarcely have known that their opinions differed. That which thus captivates the reasons of men is the association of ideas which have no real or natural alliance to one another, but which, by education, custom, and the clamour of party, have become so united in their minds that they appear to be *one* idea, and have the force of an established and certain truth. This wrong association, whilst they are under the influence of it, makes them incapable of conviction, and they applaud themselves as champions for truth, while they are contending for error; their reasonings are perverted by it, and their minds disturbed by groundless animosities.[1]

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34. *Words* are the arbitrary signs of ideas. Since the communication of thought can only be made by external signs, and men are furnished with organs fitted to frame articulate sounds, these are used by them as the means of

[1] On the subject of the *association of ideas,* see Professor Brown's Lectures, vol. II. p. 196 .... 456. Reid on the train of thought in the mind, Es. iv., ch. iv. Stewart's Elem. Phil. ch. v.

communication, and are the best that could be used for that purpose, on account of their quickness and variety. There is therefore no natural connection between words and ideas, for, in that case, all nations would speak the same language: the connection is arbitrary, and arises from the people of a country agreeing to express, as nearly as possible, the same idea by the same word, which by constant use become so linked together that the word instantly brings the idea to the mind.

Words are properly the signs of ideas in the mind of the speaker. The purpose of language requires that they should be so; for when a man speaks to another, it is with the intention of communicating his own ideas, and not other ideas of which he has no knowledge. Hence the same word is sometimes used by different persons with different ideas annexed to it. A child, having noticed nothing in gold but a yellow colour, applies the word *gold* to the colour only, and therefore applies it to all objects which have that colour: another observes great weight in gold, and understands, by the word, a heavy, yellow substance: a third adds fusibility and malleability to these qualities, and understands, by the word, a heavy, yellow, fusible, and malleable substance. Each of these uses the word to express the exact idea which he has applied to it, and no other.

But though words can properly signify nothing but ideas that are in the mind of the speaker, yet in their thoughts men give them a tacit reference to two other things. First, they suppose their words to be marks of the same ideas in the minds of those with whom they communicate, otherwise the purpose of language would be defeated; and, in truth, many disputes have arisen in consequence of the hearer and speaker attaching different ideas to the same word. Secondly, they suppose that the

ideas, expressed by their words, correspond to the reality of things; as, when the word *sun* is used, they suppose that a real object exists, which has excited the idea denoted by that word.

35. It is evident that the purpose of language cannot be gained, unless the same word stand for the same idea in the minds of the speaker and hearer. To effect this, it is necessary that words, for the most part, be general terms, so that one name may comprehend a great number of individual objects. If every object had a distinct name applied to it, it would not only be impossible for the human mind to retain the innumerable names that must be framed, but, if it were possible, it would be useless; for no two persons would have the same idea in their minds, with the same name annexed, of any particular thing which was known only to one of them; so that a great part of their knowledge would not be communicable to each other. Particular things are therefore not distinguished by names, except where convenience requires it; as, in their own species, men make use of proper names, because they have perpetual occasion to distinguish one person from another: countries also, cities, rivers, and other the like distinctions of place have usually, for the same reason, peculiar names; they being things which men have often occasion to mark particularly, in their discourses with one another.

36. Since there is no natural connection between words and ideas, it is often necessary to have the meaning of words explained. This may be done in four ways, which are severally taken according to the nature of the word, or as the occasion requires. 1. A word may be explained by another word synonimous with it; thus, if a person wished to learn the meaning of the word *albus,* he might be told that it meant *white.* 2. By naming the ob-

ject, to the idea of which the word is annexed; thus he might be told that *albus* denoted the colour of snow or milk. 3. By presenting to his senses the object itself; as by shewing him snow or milk, and saying that *albus* denoted their colour. 4. By definition, that is, explaining the meaning of one word by the use of several other words not synonimous with it. The word *albus,* being the sign of a simple idea, cannot be explained by this method, because the several terms of a definition signify distinct ideas, and therefore cannot represent together an idea which has no composition.

Words denoting complex ideas may be defined, by enumerating the simple ideas of which they are composed. Thus the idea of a *rainbow* may be communicated to a person who has never seen one, by describing its figure and the arrangement of its colours; but this cannot be done, unless he be able to conceive the several simple ideas corresponding to the particular parts of the description. If, being born blind, he has never gained the idea of colour, it is evident that no description could communicate to him a complex idea of which the idea of colour is necessarily a component part.

37. Though language furnishes the best means that we possess for the communication of our thoughts, its representation of them is in many respects imperfect; and besides the unavoidable imperfections attached to it, men are guilty of several faults and neglects, by which words are rendered less clear in their meaning than naturally they need be.

One fault is the use of words without any distinct meaning at all, though perhaps, properly, very important meanings belong to them. Such words as *liberty, glory, enthusiasm,* are in frequent use; but if many of those who use them were asked what they mean by them, they would be

at a loss for an answer. This insignificancy in their words makes the discourse of men often unintelligible, especially in moral matters, where the words for the most part stand for arbitrary collections of ideas not regularly and permanently united in nature, and are therefore frequently used without any thought of their meaning, or at least with very obscure and uncertain ideas annexed to them. Hence, in disputation with men who use words without a fixed meaning, it is impossible ever to convince them that they are in the wrong; it being as difficult to draw those men out of their mistakes, who have no settled notions, as it would be to dispossess a vagrant of his habitation, who has no settled abode.

Another fault is *inconstancy* in the use of words. In many books, especially of controversy, we may observe the same words used sometimes for one collection of ideas, and sometimes for another; the effect of which is a perplexity similar to that which would take place if men, in their *accompts* with one another, made the characters of *numbers* stand sometimes for one, and sometimes for another collection of units.

A third abuse of language is an *affected obscurity,* by either applying old words to new and unusual significations, or introducing new terms without need, or, where there is need, introducing them without explanation. Since words are no man's private possession, but are designed to be the means of common intercourse, it is not for any one, at his pleasure, to change their meaning; or at least, if there be a necessity of using any word in a new sense, he is bound to give notice of it. Propriety of speech chiefly consists in adherence to the common use of words; it is that which makes our thoughts communicable with the greatest ease and advantage, and therefore deserves some part of our attention and study.

The use of figurative language in subjects which require to be treated with accuracy and plainness, is a great cause of obscurity. If the aim of a speaker or writer be to give delight rather than information and improvement, such ornaments can scarcely be condemned: but where truth is concerned, and in all discourses which profess to convey accurate knowledge, figurative expressions tend to mislead the judgment, and ought to be avoided, as being unsuitable to such subjects.

38. A knowledge of these and other abuses of language implies a knowledge also of the remedies which may be applied to them; and a powerful motive will not be wanting to apply the obvious remedies, if we consider what evils have arisen from such abuses, what bitter and frivolous contests owe their origin to them, and how the prevalence of real knowledge and truth has been thereby impeded. Most disputes are merely verbal. If the terms used in them were defined, and the same meaning affixed to them by both parties, disputes would generally end of themselves, and the way to knowledge as well as peace be more open than it is. In the mean time, where shall we find any, either controversial debate, or familiar discourse, concerning *government*, *liberty*, *faith*, *justice*, and the like, without observing the different ideas which the disputants have annexed to these words? Hence in the interpretation of laws, human or divine, there is no conclusion; comments have furnished matter for other comments: and this evil is chiefly owing to caprice or negligence in limiting, distinguishing, and varying the signification of words.

39. Knowledge consists chiefly in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas. When we know that *white* is not *black*, we perceive that these two ideas do not agree; when we know that the three angles

of a triangle are equal to two right angles, we perceive that equality to two right angles has a necessary agreement with the three angles of a triangle.

Knowledge is of two kinds, *actual* and *habitual.* Actual knowledge is the perception which the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, from its *present* view of them, without the assistance of memory. Habitual knowledge is that which is lodged in the memory, and is such that whenever it is recalled, the mind apprehends and assents to it without hesitation. Thus a man may be said to know all those truths which are lodged in his memory; having been acquired by a foregoing clear perception, and of which the mind is fully assured, as often as it has occasion to reflect on them. For our finite understandings being able to think distinctly but on one thing at a time, if men had no more knowledge than what actually occupied their thoughts, they would all be very ignorant, since he that knew most would know but one truth.

Habitual knowledge is of two kinds: the first is of such truths laid up in the memory as the mind actually and fully perceives, whenever they occur to it; and this is the case with all truths of which we have an immediate knowledge, such as *that the whole is greater than its part,* where a view of the ideas immediately discovers their agreement. The other kind of knowledge is, when having once been convinced of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, we retain the memory of the conviction, without the proofs. Thus a man, to whom it has once been proved that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, still knows this to be true, though he may have forgotten the proof. And, if reliance can be placed upon the memory, this kind of knowledge is as certain as the other. For the immutability of the same

relations between the same immutable things, makes it certain that what was once known to be true must always be true.

39. Knowledge, considered with respect to its evidence, is *intuitive, demonstrative,* or *sensitive.* Intuitive knowledge is when the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other. Thus we have an intuitive knowledge that two straight lines cannot inclose a space, and that the whole is greater than any of its parts. Such truths the mind perceives at first sight, and this kind of knowledge is the clearest and most certain of which we are capable.

Demonstrative knowledge is that perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, which is acquired by the help of intermediate ideas. Thus, we cannot immediately perceive that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, because they cannot be brought to an immediate comparison by the application of one to another, or juxta-position; but finding some other angles which are equal to the three angles of a triangle and at the same time to two right angles, we thus gain a proof of the proposition that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.

Demonstrative knowledge is dependent on intuitive; for in the above process it is necessary that the perception of the agreement between the three angles of a triangle and the other angles, and of these with two right angles, should be gained by several successive steps, the knowledge of each of which is intuitive. Hence demonstrative knowledge is not so easily gained as intuitive; for there are often many steps in a demonstration; all of which it is necessary to remember, that we may at last perceive the agreement or disagreement of the ideas in

question: whereas intuitive knowledge contains only one self-evident step. And for this reason also, demonstrative knowledge is not always so clear as intuitive; for since the intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate ideas, in every step of the demonstration, must be carried exactly in the mind, and we must be careful that no part is left out, which, in long deductions and the use of many proofs, we cannot be certain that the memory will always exactly accomplish, therefore it comes to pass that this is not so clear as intuitive knowledge, and men sometimes embrace error for demonstration.

Lastly, *sensitive* knowledge is derived from the perception of external objects, which correspond to ideas formed of them in the mind. Since perception by the senses is sometimes fallacious, and misleads men to think that objects affect their senses when no such objects exist, this kind of knowledge is, in particular cases, less certain than the former. But when the evidence of one sense is confirmed by other senses, and when we have the accumulated evidence of all men, agreeing that their senses are affected in the same manner by particular objects, our knowledge of the existence of such objects amounts to certainty, if we are capable of arriving at certainty in any thing.

40. If knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, it follows that our knowledge may be less extensive than our ideas, since the perception of their agreement or disagreement is also necessary. Our *intuitive* knowledge is evidently very limited, there being few things whose agreement or disagreement we can see without the help of intermediate ideas. Nor does our *demonstrative* knowledge reach to the whole extent of our ideas; because the intermediate ideas, necessary to form the connection between any two ideas which we wish to compare, cannot always be found. We

cannot, for example, find intermediate ideas to prove why thought in the mind should produce bodily motion; of which therefore we should have no knowledge, were it not proved by experience. *Sensitive* knowledge, reaching no farther than to the actual existence of things present to the senses, is more limited than either of the former.

41. The causes therefore of the narrow extent of our knowledge appear to be chiefly three; *the want of ideas; the want of a discoverable connection between the ideas we have;* and *the want of tracing and examining our ideas, to see whether they agree or not.*

First, we are ignorant of many things from the *want of ideas.* Our senses, which are the chief inlets of knowledge, are disproportionate to the vast extent of things; some of which are hid from us by being too remote, and others by being too minute. When we consider the distance of the known visible parts of the world, and the reasons we have to think that what lies within our view is but a small part of the universe, we become sensible to what a point, in comparison with the rest, our knowledge of external objects is limited. Even if we confine our contemplation to this system of our Sun and the bodies that move around it, what innumerable vegetables, animals, and intellectual beings, different from those of our earth, probably exist in other planets, from the knowledge of which we are who ly excluded! And if numerous objects in the universe are so remote as to escape our notice, others are no less concealed from us by being minute. Our want of precise and distinct ideas of the primary qualities of bodies, keeps us in ignorance of their powers and operations. If we could discover the figure, size, texture, and motion of the constituent particles of bodies, we should know, without trial, their operations upon one another as well as we know the properties of a watch or a steam-engine. Thus,

if we knew the mechanical affections of the particles of *hemlock* and *opium*, we should be able to say beforehand that hemlock will kill, and opium cause sleep, as well as a watchmaker can say that, if certain parts of a watch be filed off, it will lose its motion and be useless, or that if any thing be laid on the balance, it will prevent the watch from going, as long as it remains there. It would then also be no more difficult to understand why silver and gold are dissolved by particular fluids, than it is for a smith to understand why the turning of one key, and not the turning of another, will open a lock. But while we are destitute of senses acute enough to discover the minute particles of bodies, and to give us ideas of their mechanical affections, we can have no knowledge of their properties and ways of operation beyond that which is acquired by slow and limited experience.

And if our knowledge is thus imperfect with regard to material things, it is still more so with regard to the existence and nature of spirits. By reflecting on the operations of our own minds, we are able to form a few superficial ideas of *spirit*, and thence, the best we can collect, of God the eternal author of all Spirits; but we have no certain information even of the *existence* of other Spirits, except by Revelation; much less have we distinct ideas of their several powers and conditions, wherein they differ from one another and from us.

Secondly, another cause of ignorance is the *want of a discoverable connection between the ideas we have.* In some of our ideas, there are certain relations and connections so implied in the nature of the ideas themselves, that we cannot conceive them separable by any power whatever. Thus the equality of the angles of a triangle to two right angles is known to be an immutable relation, not depend-

ent on any arbitrary power which of choice made it so, or could make it otherwise. But the case is different with respect to many of our ideas. We have ideas of the bulk, figure, and motion of several objects around us, and we have also, by sensation, the ideas of colours, sounds, tastes, smells, pleasure and pain, excited by those objects; but we cannot discover any affinity between these mechanical affections of bodies and the ideas which they produce in us; there being no conceivable connection between any impulse of a body and the perception in our minds corresponding to it. And the action of *thought* on *matter* is to us equally inexplicable. We are so far therefore from being able to comprehend the whole nature of the universe, that we cannot attain a perfect knowledge of the bodies that are about us and make a part of us: concerning their secondary qualities and operations we have no universal certainty. For though several effects produced by them are daily presented to our notice, and by analogy we conjecture what effects similar bodies are, upon other trials, likely to produce, yet the causes, manner, and certainty of their production cannot be ascertained. We observe many things proceed regularly, as if by certain laws; we observe causes act, and effects constantly flow from them; but the nature of these connections not being discoverable by human faculties, we have only an experimental, and therefore very limited knowledge even of bodies with which we are most acquainted.

Thirdly, where we have adequate ideas, and where there is a certain and discoverable connection between them, yet we are often ignorant, *for want of tracing those ideas which we have, or may have,* and for want of searching out those intermediate ideas which may shew us what agreement or disagreement they have with one another. Thus many are ignorant of mathematical truths, not from

any imperfection of their faculties, but from disinclination, and other causes.

42. Since our knowledge is gained by the intervention of ideas, and is therefore *real* only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things, it may be asked, what shall be the criterion? How shall the mind know, that its ideas agree with things themselves? The answer is, first, that all knowledge must ultimately rest on some self-evident principles; one of which is, that when ideas of external objects are received by the senses, and the testimony of one sense is confirmed by the other senses with innumerable repetitions, those ideas must be the product of objects which exist, operating on our minds, and producing therein those perceptions which the will of our Maker has ordained and adapted them to produce. It follows that our *simple* ideas, gained by the senses, are not fictions of the fancy, but are the natural productions of things without us, and have therefore all the conformity which our state requires; for they represent things to us under those appearances which they are fitted to produce, whereby we are enabled to distinguish the particular sorts of substances, to discern their qualities, and so apply them to our use.

Secondly, all our *complex* ideas, except those of *substances*, being made by the mind itself and not intended to be the copies of any thing, nor referred to the existence of any thing as their original, cannot but have all the conformity that is necessary to real knowledge. They are combinations of ideas which the mind puts together by its free choice, without requiring that they have any connection in nature. Hence such ideas are not referred to things; but things are referred to them, and their conformity is thence admitted or denied. Thus if a man have formed in his mind a certain idea of *justice,* he includes no

acts under that name, except those that agree with the idea which he has previously affixed to it.

Thirdly, our complex ideas of *substances*, consisting of simple ideas that are supposed to be taken from objects actually existing, may, it is true, vary from them, by having more or different ideas united in them than are united in the things themselves: and so, our knowledge may, and often does fail of being exactly conformable to things themselves. The *reality* of our knowledge of substances requires that our complex ideas of them be such and such only as are made up of simple ideas which have been discovered to co-exist in nature. And if our ideas be thus *true,* though not *perfect* copies, they are the subjects of knowledge; which, in comparison with the extent of things, is very limited, but so far as it does reach, it is *real* knowledge.

43. Every man has an intuitive knowledge of his own existence, and he is convinced of the existence of external objects by a species of evidence equally certain.

These things being admitted, a knowledge of the existence of God may be acquired by demonstration.

If any thing exists *now,* something must have *always* existed; otherwise that thing which now exists must either have been created by *nothing,* or it must have *created itself,* acting before it existed; both which suppositions are absurd. We must therefore admit, either that there is some *independent* being which now exists, and always has existed, or that the things which we know to exist at present were produced by *something* which had its existence from *something* else, and so on in an infinite series of successive beings. But this last supposition is as absurd as the two former. For of this infinite series, either *some one* part has not been successive to any other, or else *all* the several parts of it have been successive. If *some*

one part of it was not successive, then that was the *first* part; which is contrary to the supposition of the infinity of the series. If *all* the several parts of it have been successive, then have they all once been *future;* and if so, a time may be conceived when none of them had existence, from which it would follow that all the *parts,* and consequently the *whole* of this infinite series must have arisen from *nothing;* which is absurd. From the impossibility therefore of such an infinite series of successive beings, we conclude that there must have existed from eternity some *independent* Being; *independent,* because that which never had a *beginning* of existence cannot possibly have any *cause* of that existence, or in any manner depend upon any other being, but must be *independent* and *self-existent.*

This Being must also be *omnipotent.* That such a Being has power *in some degree,* is proved by the same means that we prove his existence; and since he depends upon no cause for his existence or his power, he cannot depend upon any for the exertion of that power, and therefore no *limits* can be applied to it. Limitation is an effect of some *superior cause,* which in the present case there cannot be: consequently to suppose *limits* where there can be no *limiter,* is to suppose an effect without a cause. For a Being to be *limited* or *deficient* in any respect is to be *dependent* in that respect on some *other* Being, which gave it just so much and no more: therefore that Being which in *no respect* depends upon any other is in *no respect* limited or deficient. In a Being *naturally capable of perfection or infinity,* all *imperfection,* or *finiteness,* as it cannot flow from the *nature* of that Being, seems to require some *ground* or *reason;* which reason, as it is foreign from the Being itself, must be the effect of some other external cause, and consequently cannot have place in the *first cause.* That the self-existent Being is

capable of perfection or infinity must be granted; since he is evidently the subject of one infinite attribute, viz. *eternity*. His other attributes must therefore also be infinite; for to suppose them finite, when they are *capable* of infinity, would involve the forementioned absurdity of positive limitation without a cause. As therefore it is evident that a Being which is the fountain of all power, must itself have power *in some degree;* we conclude farther, from the argument above stated, that this power must be *unlimited* or infinite.[m]

The *omniscience* of the Deity may be proved in the same manner. We know that we possess *thought* and *intelligence,* and we also know that we have not had them from eternity. They must therefore have had a *beginning* and consequently some *cause,* for the same reason that a *Being* beginning to exist must have a cause. This cause, as it is necessarily superior to its effect, must have superior *thought* and *intelligence*; and if it be the *first cause,* it must have them in an *unlimited* degree, since *limitation* without a *limiter,* would, as was shewn before, be an effect without a cause.

It is indeed manifest that, as all things *depend* upon the Supreme Being, and have received their existence and all their powers and faculties from him, he must know not only all things that are, but all the possibilities of things, that is, all effects that *can be.* For having given to all things all their powers and faculties, he must know perfectly what those powers and faculties, *derived wholly from himself,* can produce. And seeing at one view all the possible changes, circumstances, and dependencies of things, all their possible relations one to another, and their fitnesses to certain ends, he must know what is best in

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[m] King's Origin of Evil: *remarks*, ed. 1731, p. 62.

every possible method of disposing things, and understand perfectly how to order *means,* so as to effect what he knows to be, on the whole, the best and fittest *end.* This is what is meant by *infinite wisdom* or *omniscience;* and it is the attribute of the eternal Being, the creator and ruler of all things.[n]

Thus, from the consideration of the existence of ourselves and of other things, Reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain truth, *that there is a* God; an eternal, omnipotent, and omniscient Being. That such a Being must be incomprehensible by us, is self-evident; for if we do not understand the operations of our own finite minds, we must be much less able to comprehend the operations of that infinite mind on which, as their Author and Preserver, all other existences, material and spiritual, depend.

44. The truths that fall within human knowledge may be reduced to two classes. They are either *necessary* and immutable truths, whose contrary is impossible; or they are *contingent* and mutable, being the effect of some will and power, which caused them to have a beginning, and may cause them to have an end. The axioms in Euclid, and all the conclusions drawn from them, are *necessary* truths. They are immutably true, and depend not upon the will and power of any being. *That the Sun is the centre about which the Earth revolves,* is a *contingent* truth; for it depends upon the power and will of the Being, who has so ordained it.

It is impossible to establish any either contingent or necessary truth without assuming some self-evident principles as the foundation of our reasoning. If doubt

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[n] Encyc. Brit. Met. Part III, ch. vi. Clarke on the Being and Attributes of God, Prop. 11.

arise with regard to any principle, whether it is self-evident or not;—still more, if one or two sceptical persons deny that a principle is self-evident which the rest of mankind have always thought to be so, it behoves them to take care that the principles which they assume as the foundation of their own reasoning be at least equally evident.

As one of many principles which are generally allowed to be self-evident, the following is selected, both as an instance, and also because the remarks upon it may serve as an illustration of the argument stated in the preceding article. This principle is, *That design and intelligence in the cause, may be inferred, with certainty, from marks of them in the effect.* Intelligence is not an object of the senses; it can only be discerned by the effects which it produces. A man's wisdom is known only by the marks of it in his conduct; his courage, and all his virtues and talents are estimated in the same manner. From the conduct of one person, we are sure of his folly and ignorance; from that of another, we are sure that he possesses great attainments and understanding. It is no less a part of the human constitution to judge of men's characters, and of their intellectual powers, from the marks of them in their actions and discourse, than it is to judge of external objects by our senses. Such judgments are absolutely necessary in the conduct of life; and every judgment so made is only a particular application of the general principle, that intelligence in the cause may be inferred from marks of it in the effect. As this inference is unavoidable, and is made with perfect security by all men, it has therefore the strongest marks of being a self-evident principle. And, agreeably to it, the evidence of wisdom and power in the constitution of the world as an argument for the being and providence of the Deity, is that which has in all ages

made a stronger impression than any other, and been allowed by most men to be conclusive. The notices which God has given us of himself,—in the order, beauty, and harmony of the several parts of the world; in the structure of our own bodies, and in the powers of our minds,—are so forcible and obvious, that an acknowledgment of Him appears to be unavoidable. Metaphysical demonstrations of the Being and Attributes of God must fail in impressing conviction on the minds of those who are unable to comprehend them; but, for the same reason, men are bound not to suffer themselves to be unsettled by the sophistries of sceptical men, which they cannot perhaps answer, because they cannot understand: they are bound to adhere to those plain evidences and reasons of which they are able to form a judgment; and these are sufficient to guide the opinions and practice of considerate men.[o]

45. In *demonstrative* reasoning, the *inference* is *necessary,* and we perceive it to be impossible that it should not follow from the premises. Hence this kind of reasoning has no degrees; nor can one demonstration be stronger than another, though, in relation to *our* faculties, one may be more easily comprehended than another. On the other hand, *probable* evidence has all degrees, from the highest moral certainty to the very lowest presumption. In common language, this is often considered as an inferior degree of evidence, and is opposed to certainty; but, properly, it is a *species* of evidence opposed, not to certainty, but to another *species* of evidence called demonstration.

Demonstrative reasoning can be applied only to *necessary* truths; these are sometimes capable also of probable

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[o] Reid, Es. VI. ch. vi. Clarke; conclusion of the Demonstration.

evidence; and *contingent* truths are capable of probable evidence alone.

Probable reasoning, for the most part, depends not upon any one argument, but upon many, which unite their force, and lead to the same conclusion. Any one of them by itself might be insufficient to convince; but the whole taken together may have a force that is irresistible, so that to desire more evidence would be absurd. Sometimes the judgment may be in suspense between two contradictory opinions, when there is no evidence for either, or equal evidence for both. The least preponderance on one side inclines the judgment in proportion. Belief is mixed with doubt, more or less, until we come to the highest degree of evidence, when all doubt vanishes, and the belief is immoveable. This degree of evidence, the highest the human faculties can attain, amounts to certainty.

46. Since in many speculations, and in all the concerns of life, men cannot arrive at demonstrative knowledge, it is necessary for them to be guided by probability; and the *ground* of probability is experience. *If the question relate to a matter of fact*, the first thing to be considered is the *previous* probability of the fact, which will vary according to our *experience* of the like having, more or less frequently, taken place under the like circumstances. For in order to establish the *same* probability, it is manifest that stronger evidence is necessary for one kind of fact, than for another. When the *previous* probability has been determined, we proceed to estimate the testimony which is given respecting the fact in question; and the probability, thence arising, will vary according to our experience of the like testimony having, more or less frequently, been found accurate in other cases.

First, therefore, if the previous probability be very great, and the testimony also unimpeachable, the resulting

probability is the highest possible. Thus if a number of credible persons testify that there was frost in England last winter, our belief so grounded arises to certainty. *Secondly*, if the fact be indifferent, that is, if in the nature of the thing there be nothing either for or against it, yet when it is vouched by the concurrent testimony of unsuspected witnesses, our assent is unavoidable. Thus, that there is such a city as Rome; that there once lived in it a man called Julius Cæsar; that he was a General, and conquered Pompey; these or the like facts being related by many Historians, and never contradicted, our belief of them, as in the first case, amounts to certainty. *Thirdly*, if the fact agree with our *general* experience, and it be attested by many undoubted witnesses, the probability is extremely great. Thus, if experience has taught us that the authors of civil commotions are *generally* profligate and wicked men, and if all Historians, who write of Catiline, say that he and his associates were of that character, our assent arises to a high degree of confidence.

In these cases, probability carries so much evidence with it, that there is little or no room for doubt. The difficulty is, when testimonies contradict common experience, and the reports of history and witnesses clash with the ordinary course of nature, or with one another; these are the cases in which diligence and exactness are required to form a right judgment, and to proportion the assent to the probability of the thing, which rises or falls according as common observation in like cases, and particular testimonies in that particular instance, favour or contradict it.

47. In estimating the *previous* probability of a fact which has reference to the conduct of men, we are guided by our experience of the general principles of human action, or by our knowledge of the individuals. If men be of sound mind, we depend upon a certain degree of regu-

larity in their conduct; and could imagine a thousand different cases, wherein we should feel the utmost confidence that they will act in a particular way, and not in the contrary. If men had no confidence in one another that they will act such a part in such circumstances, it would be impossible for them to live in society: for that which makes men capable of living in society, and uniting in a political body under government, is the assurance that their actions will always be regulated in a great measure by the common principles of human nature. It may always be expected that they will regard their own interest and reputation, and that of their families and friends; that they will repel injuries, and have some sense of good offices; and that they will have some regard to truth and justice, so far at least as not to swerve from them without temptation. It is upon such principles as these, that all political reasoning is grounded. Such reasoning is never demonstrative; but it may have a very high degree of probability, *especially when applied to great bodies of intelligent men.*[p]

48. Probability, so far as it rests on uncontradicted human testimony, varies according to the number of the witnesses, their known integrity, their apparent motives, their power of judging, and the consistency of the parts of their narration.

As a reason for distinguishing between the general integrity of witnesses and their apparent motives in any particular case, it may be observed that the belief we give to testimony in many cases is not solely grounded upon the general veracity of the testifier. In a particular testimony,

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[p] See Reid's Essays *on the first principles of truths*, and *on probable reasoning*.

we consider the motives a man might have to falsify. If there be no appearance of any such motive, much more if there be motives on the other side, his testimony has weight independent of his moral character.

If the testimony be circumstantial, we consider how far the circumstances agree with each other, and with things that are known. It is so difficult to fabricate a story which cannot be detected by a careful comparison of the circumstances, that it acquires probability, by being able to bear such a trial. And when there is an agreement of many witnesses, in a great variety of circumstances, without the possibility of previous concert, the evidence is equal to that of demonstration.

49. In *traditional* testimony, each transmission weakens the force of the proof. It is evident that no probability grounded on testimony can rise higher than its first original. What has no other evidence than the testimony of one witness, must stand or fall by his testimony alone; and though cited afterwards by a multitude of others, it is so far from receiving strength that it is only the weaker. Passion, interest, inadvertency, and a number of other supposeable reasons may make one man misquote the words of another. Hence, what in one age was affirmed upon slight grounds, instead of becoming more valid in future ages by being often repeated, becomes less so, the farther it is removed from the original source. And this shews the great value of numerous, independent, and *early* documents in which important events are recorded.

50. *If the question relate to a matter of speculative opinion,* which is not capable of human testimony, our belief is directed by *analogy.* Thus, knowing that the whole earth abounds with animated beings, we think it probable that other bodies in the universe are similarly

inhabited. Also, if all nature, from a plant to a man, is filled with diverse kinds of creatures rising one above another by so easy an ascent that the transitions from one to another are almost insensible, if the scale of beings rises by such a regular progress as high as man, we may, by analogy, suppose that it still proceeds gradually through beings of a superior nature to him; since there is an infinitely greater space for different degrees of perfection between the Supreme Being and man, than between man and the lowest insect. In these and similar cases it is not likely that men will ever arrive at certain knowledge, and therefore our inferences from analogy are limited to *conjecture;* but in subjects also which are proper for experiment, and in which certain knowledge may at length be attained, analogy is the best guide; and cautious reasoning from it has led to the discovery of many truths which would otherwise have lain concealed.[q]

51. Error is sometimes unavoidable, because it is often necessary to form opinions on uncertain grounds. In many cases the probabilities on opposite sides are so nearly balanced, that the preponderance either way is not easily determined, and the danger of deciding wrong must be greatly increased if the judgment be biassed by any previous inclination. Error does not therefore necessarily imply a defect of the understanding, since the *means* of forming a right decision may be beyond the reach even of those who have both the will and leisure to seek, and the ability to apply them. Errors are unavoidable where *proof* no where exists, and therefore cannot be procured; they are also unavoidable, where men, bound to the necessity of gaining their subsistence by manual labour, have not the opportunity of observation, nor leisure to search for the

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[q] Addison, Spec. N°. 519.

proofs which are necessary to establish right opinions. But, when every allowance has been made for *unavoidable* errors, many will remain to be otherwise accounted for, and which must be imputed to some disorder of the understanding.

52. To every bias of the mind by which it may be drawn into error, Lord Bacon gives the name of an *idol.* The mind, in its sound and best state, pays homage to truth only. The causes of error are therefore considered by him as so many false deities, who receive the homage which is due only to truth. Without attempting to give an enumeration of errors, which would be impossible from their almost infinite diversity, he refers them all to four classes, to which he gives the names of *idola tribûs, idola specûs, idola fori, idola theatri.*

The *first* are such as beset the whole human species; so that every man is in danger from them. They arise from principles of the human constitution which are useful and necessary in our present state; but by their excess or defect, or wrong direction, may lead us into error. As instances of this we may take the following:

1. Men are prone to fix their opinions *too much* by authority. In the early part of life we have no other guide; and without a disposition to receive what we are taught, we should be incapable of instruction. Also, when the faculties are matured, there are many things in which we must be incompetent to judge. In such cases, it is reasonable to rely upon the judgment of others whom we believe to be competent and disinterested.

Authority ought to have more or less weight in any case, according to the evidence on which our own judgment rests, and the opinion we have previously formed, on good grounds, of the judgment and integrity of those who differ from us, or agree with us. Those who have a

strong sense of their own fallibility in judging, are in danger of yielding too much to authority; others more arrogant are in danger of yielding too little. As therefore our regard to authority may be either too great or too small, the bias of human nature seems to incline to the first of these extremes; and it is certainly good for men that it has that inclination rather than the other. Much respect is due to authority in matters of opinion: but there is a tendency to pay it in excess. Of a great part of mankind it can hardly be said that they form any judgment of their own, except in things which concern their immediate temporal interest; in other important matters, we may conjecture, with a near approach to certainty, what their opinions are, when we know where they were born, how they have been educated, and in what society they have lived.

2. Men are *too much* disposed to estimate things less known and less familiar, by those that are better known and more familiar. In this instance as in the former, the principle is correct to a certain degree, but there is a tendency to *excess* in the application of it. As it forms the foundation of all analogical reasoning, to which we owe a great part of our knowledge, it would be absurd to lay it aside altogether; the difficulty is in determining how far we may venture upon it. The bias of our nature seems to lead us to trust too much to it, and to decide from too slight analogies. For example, the objects of sense having engrossed our thoughts in the first part of life and been most familiar through the whole of it, men in all ages have been prone to attribute the *human figure* to superior intelligences, and even to the Supreme Being. Again, for the same reason, there is a disposition in men to *materialize* every thing; that is, to apply the notions we have of material objects to things of a different

nature. Hence *thought* is considered as analogous to *motion in a body;* and as bodies are put in motion by impulses, we are apt to conclude that the mind is made to think in the same manner.

The mistakes in common life, which arise from the erroneous application of this principle, are innumerable. Men judge too hastily of others by themselves, or by the small circle of their acquaintance. The selfish man ascribes all professions of benevolence and public spirit to hypocrisy or self-deceit. The generous and honest believe plausible pretences too readily, and are apt to think men better than they really are. The profligate can hardly be persuaded that there is any such thing as real virtue. The rustic forms his notions of the characters of men from those of his own village, and is easily deceived on his first arrival in a great city.

3. In avoiding one extreme, men are apt to rush into the opposite. Thus, in rude ages, they ascribe every uncommon appearance to the immediate interposition of invisible beings; but when philosophy has discovered natural causes of many events which, in the days of ignorance, were ascribed to the immediate operation of gods or dæmons, they are apt to think that all the phænomena of nature may be accounted for in the same way, and that there is no need of an invisible Maker and Governor of the world. In this manner, by an immediate transition they pass from the extreme of superstition to that of atheism. And in general, when men abandon opinions which they have held on weak grounds, they are seldom seen to take a moderate course, but hasten to maintain, with equal earnestness, and on grounds perhaps equally insufficient, opinions directly opposite to those which they held before.

53. By the *idola specûs* are meant causes of error not

arising from the constitution of human nature, but from something peculiar to the individual. As in a *cave*, objects vary in their appearance according to the form of the cave and the manner in which it receives the light, and, from these circumstances, often assume a delusive appearance; so, in the mind, errors arise from the particular way in which a man has been trained, or from his particular profession, or from something singular in the turn of his mind. One whose thoughts have been confined to a certain track, is apt to judge wrong when he ventures out of that track. He is apt to refer every thing to the maxims of his own profession, and to judge, by them, of things that have no relation to it. It is a common remark that those who have been much accustomed to demonstrative reasoning, often require it in subjects to which it is not applicable. And, from a like reason, men who are warmly devoted to a particular pursuit, are apt to hold all other pursuits in undue contempt.

Some men have a great admiration of antiquity, and contempt of whatever is modern; others go into the contrary extreme. Some are afraid to venture a step out of the beaten track, and think it safest to go with the multitude; others are fond of singularities and paradox. Some are changeable in their opinions; others obstinate. These things shew how important it is for every man to examine the tendencies of his own mind, and not cherish peculiarities which must vitiate his judgment.

54. The *idola fori* are fallacies which arise from the imperfections and the abuse of language. On this subject, little need be added to the remarks which have been already made.

As language was not made by philosophers, but was gradually formed by popular use, it has some imperfections which might be avoided if it were possible to bring

it to a new beginning; but to others no remedy could be applied, while our knowledge itself is imperfect. In the mean time these imperfections are the manifest cause of many errors. For language is an instrument of thought as well as of the communication of our thoughts, and we find it impossible to pursue a train of thought without the use of it: the bad effects therefore of ambiguous and indefinite language are not confined to our communications with others, but extend to our private speculations. The signs are so associated with the things signified, that the last can hardly present themselves to the mind without drawing the other along with them. Hence, that which was intended to assist and minister to the understanding frequently assumes the mastery: we cannot shake it off, and therefore must direct our course, in some degree, as it permits.

55. The last class of idols in Lord Bacon's division are the *idola theatri*, by which he meant *hypothetical* systems, in which we have been trained, or which we have adopted. Before his time, the slow method of *induction* from observation and experiment was little understood, and men of genius had long been occupied, to little purpose, in framing *hypotheses* to account for the phænomena of nature. These were considered by Bacon as worthy of no more regard than fictitious representations produced in a theatre. The world had been so long deceived by hypotheses in all parts of philosophy, that he renounced them as the fictions of fanciful men, who thought themselves able to unfold the mysteries of nature by the mere force of their genius. When men first began to inquire into the causes of things, it was natural for them to indulge conjecture; and accordingly, the most ancient systems of philosophy were nothing but the conjectures of men famous for their wisdom, whose name gave authority to

their opinions. Some conjectured that this Earth is a vast plain, surrounded by a boundless ocean;—that from this ocean, the Sun, Moon, and stars emerge at their rising, and plunge into it again at their setting. Others in more recent times have conjectured that the heavenly bodies are carried round by a vortex of subtle matter, as straws are carried round in a vessel of water. Thus, the experience of all ages has shewn how prone men are to invent hypotheses founded on slight probabilities, and how eager they are, by a kind of anticipation, to discover the secrets of nature. This tendency, it is true, has been at length checked by perpetual failures. The rule laid down by Newton is acknowledged and followed, *that no causes of natural things ought to be assigned but such as can be proved to have a real existence;* and that the proper method of philosophy is, to collect the laws of nature by just induction from ascertained facts, and to apply the laws so discovered to the explanation of phænomena. It may be expected that men will persevere in this course, in which happy progress has been already made;—that in all inquiries into the constitution of nature, they will be content to act a subordinate part; to combine, not to fabricate; to collect evidence, and not to supply the want of it by conjecture.

Lord Bacon, having explained the nature of these *idols,* and shewn what delusions are caused by the respect which is paid to them, exhorts men, resolutely to abandon them; to free their minds from prejudice; and to seek truth with the docility of children.[r]

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[r] Bacon de augmentis scientiarum, lib. 5, cap. iv. Novum Organum, Aph. xxxix. Reid on Hypotheses, Es. II. ch. iii. and on Prejudices, Es. VI. ch. viii. See also Stewart. Elem. Phil. vol. II. ch. iv. §. 1. on the difference between *gratuitous* and *legitimate* hypotheses.

56. THAT PART OF LOGIC which treats of the exercise of the mind according to practical rules, and by proper methods of reasoning, is called DIALECTICS.

In explaining this Art, the operations of the mind are commonly classed under three divisions, *simple apprehension, judgment,* and *reasoning.*

The *simple apprehension* of an object means the same as *having a notion, an idea,* or *a conception* of it. It is expressed by a word, or by a part of a proposition, not making a complete sentence; as *a king, the king of a faithful people.* Such words, taken alone, denote simple apprehensions: they neither affirm nor deny; they imply no opinion of the thing signified by them, and therefore cannot be said to be either true or false.

By the operation of *judgment* the mind compares any two objects of thought, and determines their agreement or disagreement. This operation is expressed by a proposition, in which the agreement of the things compared is affirmed or denied: as when we say, *God is omnipotent; man is not perfect.*

The third operation is *reasoning;* in which, from two or more judgments, which are called *premises,* we deduce a new and distinct judgment, which is called the *conclusion.* Reasoning may consist of many steps; the first conclusion being a premise to a second, that to a third, and so on. Hence, separate judgments may be compared to separate stones prepared for the purposes of the builder; upon each of which, while lying on the ground, a person may raise himself to a small elevation. The same judgments, when combined into a train of reasoning, resemble the formerly unconnected stones when converted into the steps of a staircase, leading to a summit which would be otherwise inaccessible.

57. Since a judgment includes two ideas, the proposition which expresses a judgment must have terms cor-

responding to them. The term expressing the idea of which we affirm or deny, is called the *subject* of the proposition. The term expressing the idea affirmed or denied, is called the *predicate*. Thus in the proposition, *God is omnipotent; God* is the *subject,* it being of Him that we affirm omnipotence; and *omnipotent* is the *predicate,* because we affirm that the idea, expressed by that word, belongs to God.

That word in a proposition which connects two ideas together, is called the *copula;* and if a negative particle be annexed, we thereby understand that the ideas are disjoined. The *substantive verb* is made use of for the copula; as in the proposition, *God is omnipotent;* where *is* represents the copula, and signifies the agreement of the ideas of *God* and *omnipotence*. In the proposition, *man is not perfect,* the negative particle is inserted after the copula, to signify the disagreement between the ideas expressed by the subject and predicate. In popular language, propositions do not always appear in the logical form above stated, but they may be reduced to it by the substitution of equivalent terms. The copula and predicate are often included in the same word; as *he comes,* which is the same as *he is coming:* and in Latin, one word, as *venit,* sometimes includes the whole proposition. For whenever two ideas are joined or disjoined, though the expression be only a single word, it may be resolved into an equivalent expression containing a subject, predicate, and copula, according to the logical form of a proposition.[s]

58. A proposition is called *affirmative,* when the ideas expressed by the subject and predicate are affirmed to agree; and *negative,* when they are affirmed to disagree.

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[s] The substance of this and of some of the following articles is taken from DUNCAN'S Elements of Logic.

Thus of the propositions, *God is omnipotent,* and, *man is not perfect,* the first is *affirmative,* the second *negative.*

A proposition is *universal,* when the subject is a general term without any limitation, and the predicate agrees or disagrees with each of the things comprehended under the subject. Thus, *men are mortal,* is an universal proposition; for mortality is affirmed of every individual of the species *man.*

A proposition is *particular,* when the subject is a general term, but with a mark of limitation added, to denote that the predicate agrees only with some of the things comprehended under the subject, Thus, *some men are virtuous,* is a particular proposition; for the idea expressed by the predicate agrees with only a part of the general idea of the subject.

A proposition is *singular,* when the subject signifies one thing only; as when we say *Aristides was just.* Some logicians have classed these among universal, and others among particular propositions. They may be reckoned universal, when the predicate agrees with the *whole* of the subject in its fullest extent; as when we say, *Cæsar was a Roman:* but if some qualifying word be inserted, to denote that we are not speaking of the whole of the subject, as when we say, *Cæsar was not wholly a tyrant,* the proposition may be reckoned particular. Since therefore every proposition must be either affirmative or negative; universal or particular; hence has arisen the fourfold division of them into *universal affirmative,* and *universal negative; particular affirmative,* and *particular negative;* which includes all their varieties.

59. Some qualities in bodies are *essential,* that is, inseparable from them; others are *accidental.* Thus *weight* is an essential quality of a stone, as it is of all matter; but *heat* is accidental. From this distinction arises the divi-

sion of propositions into *absolute* and *conditional.* A proposition is absolute, when the predicate is affirmed to agree *always* with the subject, as being essential to it; and conditional, when the agreement of the predicate with the subject is not essential, but depends on some condition. Thus, *a stone has weight,* is an absolute proposition; *if a stone be exposed to the rays of the Sun, it will contract heat,* is conditional.

60. A *simple* proposition is that which has only one subject and one predicate. A *compound* proposition has more than one subject, or more than one predicate, or more than one of both. Thus in the proposition, *God is infinitely wise and infinitely powerful,* there are two predicates, both affirmed of the same subject; and the proposition may be resolved into two others, affirming these predicates severally. In like manner in the proposition, *neither kings nor people are exempt from death,* the predicate is denied of both subjects, and may be denied of them separately, in distinct propositions. If we say, *riches and honours are apt to elate the mind, and increase the number of our desires,* as there are two subjects and two predicates, the proposition may be resolved into four: *riches are apt to elate the mind: riches are apt to increase the number of our desires.* And so of *honours.*

61. Some compound propositions are called *copulative,* others *disjunctive.* A proposition is copulative, when the subjects and predicates are so linked together that they may be all severally affirmed or denied one of another. Of this nature are the examples given above. *Riches and honours are apt to elate the mind, and increase the number of our desires. Neither kings nor people are exempt from death.* In the first of these, the two predicates may be affirmed severally of each subject; in the other, the same

predicate being denied of two subjects may be also denied of them in separate propositions.

A proposition is disjunctive, when, comparing several predicates with the same subject, we affirm that one of them necessarily belongs to it, but leave the particular predicate undetermined. Thus if we say, *the world is either self-existent, or is the work of some wise and powerful cause,* the proposition is disjunctive. In all propositions of this sort, if we determine the particular predicate, the rest are of course removed; or if we remove all the predicates except one, that one is necessarily established. As in the example just given, if we allow that the world is the work of some wise and powerful cause, we of course deny it to be self-existent; or if we deny it to be self-existent, we must necessarily allow that it is the work of some wise and powerful cause. These propositions take their name from the *disjunctive* particles which it is necessary to use in stating them.

62. *Reasoning* has been defined above to be that operation of the mind by which, from two or more judgments, a new and distinct judgment is deduced.

In comparing ideas together, it often happens that their agreement or disagreement cannot be discerned at the first view. When, for instance, we wish to determine the equality or inequality of two figures of a different form, it is evident that by merely considering the figures themselves we cannot arrive at an exact determination, because it is impossible to apply them to one another so that their several parts shall coincide. But as all right-lined figures are reducible to squares, we may, by means of *them,* measure the areas of such figures, and compare them exactly in respect to magnitude. Thus if we find that one figure is exactly equal to some square, and that another is

less than the same square by a square-inch, we conclude that the area of the first figure is a square-inch greater than that of the second.

Every act of reasoning necessarily includes three distinct judgments; two, wherein the ideas, whose relation we want to discover, are severally compared with the middle idea, and a third, wherein they are themselves joined or disjoined according to the result of that comparison. And as our judgments, when expressed in words, are called propositions, so the expressions of our reasonings are called *syllogisms*.

63. If the question be proposed *whether man is accountable for his actions,* since the relation between the ideas of *man* and *accountableness* comes not within the immediate view of the mind, it is necessary to find some third idea that will enable us to discover the relation. First, therefore, on considering *what kind* of beings are accountable for their actions, we determine that all are accountable who possess *reason* to distinguish right from wrong, and *liberty* to pursue the one and avoid the other. Secondly, we know from experience that *reason* and *liberty* belong to man. Having thus formed two judgments, viz. *that man is possessed of reason and liberty,* and *that reason and liberty imply accountableness,* a third necessarily follows, viz. *that man is accountable for his actions.* And these propositions, placed in due order, form the following *syllogism :*

Every creature possessed of reason and liberty is accountable for his actions :

Man is a creature possessed of reason and liberty :

Therefore man is accountable for his actions.

64. The two first propositions in a syllogism are called the *premises,* and the third proposition is called the *conclusion.* Also, the two terms expressing the two ideas

whose relation we are tracing (as, in the above syllogism, *man* and *accountableness*) are called the *extremes:* and that which expresses the intermediate idea (viz. *the possession of reason and liberty*) is called the *middle term.* That extreme which is the *predicate* of the conclusion, is called the *major* term: the other extreme, which is the *subject* of the conclusion, is called the *minor* term. And from this distinction of the extremes, arises a distinction between the *premises* in which the extremes are severally compared with the middle term. That proposition which compares the *major* extreme, or predicate of the conclusion, with the middle term, is called the *major proposition:* the other, wherein the *minor* extreme, or subject of the conclusion, is compared with the middle term, is called the *minor proposition.* When a syllogism is proposed in due form, the major proposition is placed first, the minor next, and the conclusion last.

65. A syllogism is called *conditional,* when the major proposition is conditional: thus

If God is infinitely wise and powerful, he does nothing but what is best:

But God is infinitely wise and powerful:

Therefore he does nothing but what is best.

In every conditional proposition there are two parts, viz. the *antecedent* and *consequent,* the first being that in which the *condition* is stated, and the other making a *consequent* assertion. As in the instance above given; *if God is infinitely wise and powerful,* is the antecedent; and, *he does nothing but what is best,* is the consequent. In syllogisms of this kind, it is evident that if we admit the antecedent we must admit the consequent, and if we reject the consequent we must reject the antecedent. But the reverse process of reasoning is not legitimate; that is, we cannot argue from the rejection of the antecedent to the rejection

of the consequent, or from the admission of the consequent to the admission of the antecedent. For although the antecedent always expresses some cause or condition which, if admitted, necessarily implies the consequent, yet it does not follow that there is no other cause or condition; and if there be, then after rejecting the antecedent, the consequent may still remain. Thus when we say: *if a stone is exposed to the rays of the Sun, it will contract heat;* the proposition is true, and admitting the antecedent, we must also admit the consequent. But as there are other ways by which a stone may contract heat, it will not follow, from the removal of the above-mentioned condition, that therefore the consequent cannot take place: we cannot argue, *but the stone has not been exposed to the rays of the Sun; therefore neither has it any degree of heat;* inasmuch as there are many other ways in which heat may have been communicated to it.

And if we cannot argue from the removal of the antecedent to the removal of the consequent, no more can we from the admission of the consequent to the admission of the antecedent. For the consequent may arise from any one of a great variety of causes, and therefore the admission of it does not determine the precise cause, but only that some one of them must take place. Thus in the foregoing proposition, admitting the consequent, viz. *that the stone has contracted heat,* we are not therefore bound to admit the antecedent, *that it has been exposed to the rays of the Sun;* because there are many other causes whence that heat may have proceeded.

These two modes of arguing therefore are not correct, unless the antecedent expresses the *only* condition on which the consequent can take place; in which particular instance, they may be applied without error.

66. A syllogism is called *disjunctive,* when the major proposition is disjunctive, as in the following example:

The world is either self-existent, or the work of some finite, or of some infinite Being:

But it is not self-existent, nor the work of a finite Being:

Therefore it is the work of an infinite Being.

In a disjunctive proposition, we affirm that one of several predicates necessarily belongs to the subject, to the exclusion of all the rest. Hence, as soon as the particular predicate is determined, all the rest are of course to be rejected; or if we reject all the predicates except one, that one necessarily takes place. When therefore, in a disjunctive syllogism, the several predicates are enumerated in the *major* proposition, if in the *minor* any one of these predicates is established, the *conclusion* ought to reject all the rest; or if in the *minor* all the predicates, except one, are rejected, the conclusion must necessarily establish that one. Thus in the syllogism given above, the *major* affirms that one of three predicates belongs to the earth, viz. *self-existence,* or that it is the *work of a finite,* or that it is *the work of an infinite Being.* Two of these predicates are rejected in the *minor,* viz. *self-existence,* and *the work of a finite Being.* Hence the *conclusion* necessarily ascribes to it the third predicate, and affirms that it is *the work of an infinite Being.* If the *minor* had established one of the predicates, by affirming the Earth to be *the work of an infinite Being,* then the *conclusion* must have rejected the other two, by affirming it to be neither *self-existent,* nor *the work of a finite Being.*

67. It often happens that one of the premises of a syllogism contains an evident and familiar truth; in which

case it is sometimes omitted, and the syllogism, having only two propositions, is, in respect to its form, incomplete. Thus if we say: *all tyrants deserve death; therefore Nero deserved death:* the *minor (Nero was a tyrant)* is omitted, as being a truth so well known that it need not be expressed. Syllogisms of this abridged form are called *enthymemes.*

68. The *sorites* is a compendious mode of reasoning, in which a number of propositions are so linked together that the predicate of one becomes continually the subject of the next following, until at last a conclusion is formed by bringing together the subject of the first proposition and the predicate of the last. Of this kind is the following argument: *The son of Themistocles governs his mother; his mother governs Themistocles; Themistocles governs Greece; Greece governs the world; therefore the son of Themistocles governs the world.*

This sorites may be resolved into three syllogisms; and in general, a sorites may be resolved into as many syllogisms as there are middle terms in it; and if such resolution be made, it will always be found that the conclusion of the last syllogism is the same as the conclusion of the sorites. This kind of argument therefore stands on the same foundation with the syllogisms of which it consists, and may be continued to any length, without weakening the ground on which the conclusion rests.

A series of *conditional* syllogisms may be condensed in the same manner. If a number of conditional propositions be joined together so that the consequent of one becomes continually the antecedent of the next following;—by establishing the antecedent of the first proposition we shall establish the consequent of the last, or by rejecting the last consequent, we shall reject also the first antecedent. The following is an example of this kind of argument:

If the dead rise not, then is Christ not raised; if Christ is not raised, our faith is vain; if our faith is vain, our hope is confined to the present life; if our hope is confined to the present life, we are of all men most miserable: therefore, if the dead rise not, we are of all men most miserable. It is evident that this sorites, as well as the former, may be resolved into a series of distinct syllogisms, and that the conclusion of the last syllogism in the series will be the same as the conclusion of the sorites.

69. A *dilemma* is a conditional syllogism, by which we prove the absurdity of some assertion. In order to this, we assume a conditional proposition, the antecedent of which involves the assertion which we wish to disprove, and the consequent is a disjunctive proposition enumerating all the possible suppositions upon which the assertion can take place. If then it appears that all these suppositions ought to be rejected, it is evident that the antecedent, or the assertion itself, must also be rejected. Euclid furnishes many examples of this kind of argument. When he is about to show that two figures are equal, or, which is the same thing, to prove the absurdity of asserting them to be unequal, it is very common with him to assume, *that if the one is not equal to the other, it must be either greater or less;* and having destroyed both these suppositions, upon which alone the assertion of their inequality can stand, he concludes that the assertion itself is false. The following is a *dilemma,* in syllogistic form:

If the world be not the work of an infinite Being, it must be either self-existent, or the work of a finite Being.

But it is not self-existent, nor the work of a finite Being.

Therefore it is the work of an infinite Being.

Here, the *major* is a conditional proposition, whose consequent contains all the suppositions upon which the antecedent can take place; and as all these suppositions are

rejected in the *minor,* it is evident that the antecedent must be rejected in the *conclusion.*

By comparing this example of the *dilemma* with that given above of the *disjunctive* syllogism, it appears that they may easily be reduced to the same form.

70. Argument by *induction* is the derivation of a general proposition from a number of particular instances. It is evident that this kind of argument will amount to demonstration, if it be founded on an enumeration of *all* the instances which the general proposition comprehends: but it is also evident that in this case the value of the *induction* would cease, considered as a means of gaining knowledge *beyond that* which is intuitive or demonstrative. For to predicate of *the whole* what has been already predicated of *all the parts* conveys no additional information. Thus, if we suppose the whole tribe of animals to be divided into men, birds, beasts, fishes and insects, and then argue in this manner: *all men have the power of motion; all birds, beasts, fishes and insects, have the power of motion; therefore all animals have the power of motion:* the argument is just, but it adds nothing to our knowledge. Induction therefore is generally and properly understood to be *a process of reasoning by which, from observation of certain known instances, we draw an inference with respect to others that are unknown.* By means of this, we are enabled to supply in some degree, *by probability,* the defects of our *certain knowledge,* and to conjecture truths, which have not been certified, and perhaps cannot be certified by actual experiment.

An induction in which every individual case is enumerated, is a perfect demonstration. And in general, the more nearly we approach to the entire enumeration, the higher is the degree of probability attained by the induction.

The common error is, too great haste in drawing a conclusion, without having premised a sufficient number of individual cases. Thus, many are apt too hastily to form an opinion of a whole nation, from the characters of a few who have fallen within their imperfect observation. Thus also, the medicine of an empiric becomes popular, by induction drawn from a few cures; which, even if the report of them were *true,* ought not to have much weight, especially if it be considered how many cases, in which trial has been made of it, are not *published;* the majority of which, it is reasonable to suppose, were failures. On the contrary, where experiment is the only test that can be applied of the utility of any art, it ought to be established by a great number of instances of success, proper account also being taken of instances of failure. And when the proportion of failures to the successful cases has been ascertained with the utmost care, and found to be small, the beneficial effects of the art are far more undeniably established, than they could be by vague assertions of its universal and unerring efficacy.

Argument by induction is the same as a syllogism in which the major proposition is suppressed. And in all arguments by induction, the suppressed proposition is substantially the same, viz. *that what belongs to the individuals we have examined, belongs to the whole class to which they are referred.* The argument therefore, placed in the form of a complete syllogism would be this:

What belongs to the individuals we have examined belongs to the whole class:

But *a certain quality* belongs to the individuals we have examined:

Therefore *the same quality* belongs to the whole class.

Induction therefore, so far as it is an *argument,* may be stated syllogistically; but so far as it is a *process of*

inquiry with a view to obtain the *premises* of an argument, it comes not within the province of syllogistic reasoning. The difficulty consists in determining whether the major proposition is duly established. Whether the induction has been drawn from a sufficient number of individual cases,—whether the character of those cases has been correctly ascertained,—and how far the individuals we have examined *are likely to resemble* the rest of the class, are points that require judgment; but this judgment cannot be assisted by syllogistic rules, because it is employed in deciding whether or not it is allowable *to lay down certain premises;* and syllogistic rules have no concern with the truth or falsity of the premises, but merely teach us to determine whether from *given* premises the conclusion is rightly inferred.[t]

71. Some arguments are called *direct,* others *indirect.* A direct argument is, when, setting out from self-evident truths and definitions, we proceed till we arrive at the proposition which we wish to prove. The argument is indirect, when we assume a proposition contrary to that which is to be proved, and proceed till we arrive at a conclusion from which we are able to infer that the assumed proposition is false, and the contrary true. Of this kind is the argument *ab impossibili,* or *reductio ad absurdum.* This mode of arguing depends on two principles; first, that we never can arrive at an absurdity by reasoning justly from true principles; secondly, that when two propositions are directly contrary to one another, and one of them is proved to be false, the other must be true.

One mode of argument is said to be *a priori;* another *a posteriori.* The former is, when we argue from causes

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[t] Encyc. Metr. Art. *Logic.* Artis Logicæ Rudimenta. Oxford ed. 1823, p. 175.

to effects; as from a man's disposition to his actions; from a writer's known style and ability, that he is, or is not, the author of a certain book: from the existence of a God with certain attributes, some have argued that the world would be formed in this or that manner. The argument *a posteriori* is directly the reverse: by it, we argue from effects to causes; from a man's actions to his motives; from the existence of the world and marks of power and wisdom in it, to the existence and attributes of God.

This mode of argument necessarily precedes the other. For, in arguing from cause to effect, as from a man's disposition to his actions, the question occurs, *how is a man's disposition to be known?* It can only be known *from some previous actions*; but when these have furnished sufficient ground for determining his disposition, we are then able to draw an inference from it *as to his future actions*, and the argument *a priori* becomes both legitimate and useful.

72. *Sophisms* are fallacious arguments, disguised under the appearance of truth. Some of them may be refuted by the application of syllogistic rules; others arise from the ambiguity of language, and cannot be detected except by definition, and careful regard to the meaning of words.

One common error in argument is, to infer the falsity of a conclusion from the falsity of certain premises; and, reversely, to infer the truth of certain premises from the truth of the conclusion.

This is the same as to argue from the removal of the antecedent to the removal of the consequent, or from the admission of the consequent to the admission of the antecedent: both which modes of argument have been already shewn to be fallacious. If we attempt to establish any

conclusion by arguments which are proved to be fallacious, nothing farther ought to be inferred than that this conclusion cannot be established by those particular arguments: the detection of the fallacy of one argument ought not to invalidate other better arguments which may be fully sufficient to warrant the conclusion. Yet it may be observed that this is generally the effect of such detection. The guilty often escape by having *too much* laid to their charge, or by the production of a witness against them who is discovered to be unworthy of credit; though perhaps if that part of the evidence had been omitted, the rest would have been sufficient for conviction.

73. That sophism which is called *ignoratio elenchi,* or mistake of the question, is also of frequent occurrence. It consists in advancing arguments which, even if admitted to be just, are not applicable to the matter in dispute. This sophism is often practised in cases in which the question relates to the choice between two evils, or to the comparison of two plans either of which is likely to produce some good effects. The sophist dwells on the magnitude of one of the evils, or the excellence of one of the plans, and takes little or no notice of the *comparison,* which forms the *essential* part of the question. Hence, when any plan is proposed, he brings into exercise this fallacy, which may be called the *fallacy of objections;* that is, he shews that there are objections against the plan, and thence infers that it ought to be rejected; when the proper question is, whether there are *more* and *stronger* objections against the adoption of the plan than against the rejection of it. This fallacy is commonly resorted to by the enemies of Revelation; a belief in which, they say, is attended with great difficulties. But even if this be admitted to be true, the inference is fallacious; for the proper question is, *which* is attended with *greater* difficulties,

the supposition of the truth of Revelation, or the supposition of its falsehood?—The same fallacy is adopted by two other classes of men, very opposite to one another; one composed of those who are for overthrowing whatever is established, as soon as they can prove an objection against it, without considering whether more and weightier objections may not lie against their own schemes: the other composed of men who oppose all alterations indiscriminately; not reflecting that their statement even of real objections ought not to be conclusive, since it is scarcely possible to propose any plan, however excellent, against which strong and even unanswerable objections may not be urged; so that unless the opposite objections be allowed their due weight, no improvement could ever be made.

74. The sophisms called *petitio principii* and *reasoning in a circle* are, for the most part, easily detected. The first consists in taking for granted the proposition which we undertake to prove, disguised perhaps under some different form of words: as when, in order to prove that the soul always thinks, we assume that thinking is essential to the soul; which is the same in reality as the original proposition, and equally difficult to be proved. The other sophism is nearly similar, and consists in making two propositions serve mutually as proofs of each other. Men are most likely to be misled into these sophisms when they attempt to prove things which are scarcely capable of proof; such as their own existence, the existence of matter, and other like truths which are generally allowed to be self-evident.

75. The sophism called *non-causa pro causâ* consists in assigning a false cause; that is, in referring any effect to a cause which either does not exist at all, or does not exist as a cause in the case in question. To this class

belong the false theories that have been formed respecting the constitution of mind and matter; such, for instance, as the ancient method of explaining the operations of the mind by supposing the existence of *substantial forms,* and the modern theory of vibrations, and many others which have been assumed without sufficient ground for the principles on which they are founded. The same fallacy is often introduced also into moral reasonings, and misleads men to consider as a cause what is merely accidental and adventitious. Through this error, Christianity has sometimes been decried as the *cause* of persecutions and other great evils; whereas it ought to have been called the *pretext;* and the same or greater evils would probably have been wrought on some other pretext. For the real cause of such calamities is the wickedness of the authors of them, and wickedness will seldom be at a loss for *some* pretext, more or less plausible, to disguise its operations. In like manner the opponents of the Reformation assumed that it was the cause of the troubles which took place at that period, and thence inferred that it was an evil. But the reply was twofold: first, the *fact* was denied, that the Reformation was at all the cause of those troubles; and secondly, that even if it were the cause, the evil was less than that which the Reformation had removed.

In determining therefore the causes of events, it is a very necessary caution not to assume too hastily that one thing is the *cause* of another, when perhaps it is only an *accidental concomitant.*[u]

76. The ambiguity of language furnishes numerous opportunities for sophistical reasoning. Many fallacies of

[u] Butler's Analogy, Part II. ch. i. Encyc. Metr. Art. *Logic*, ch. v.

this class are founded on the supposition that words *derived from the same root* have a precisely correspondent meaning: which is by no means universally the case, as will appear from observing the meanings which custom has annexed to such words as *project* and *projectors, presume* and *presumption, design* and *designing, art* and *artful.* The sophist proceeds on the supposition that he who forms a *project* must be a *projector,* and argues thus: *projectors* are unfit to be trusted: this man has formed a *project;* therefore he is unfit to be trusted: whereas the bad sense of one of these words is not at all implied in the other. Again he argues: to be acquainted with the guilty is a *presumption* of guilt; this man is so acquainted; therefore we may *presume* that he is guilty. This argument proceeds on the supposition of an exact correspondence between *presume* and *presumption,* which however does not exist; for *presumption* is commonly used to express a *slight supicion;* whereas *to presume* amounts to *absolute belief.* In this manner, the sophist will often be able to misinterpret the propositions which his opponent admits or maintains, and employ them, so misinterpreted, against him.

Nearly allied to this fallacy is another, which arises from supposing that the meaning of every word ought to be determined by its etymological derivation. Thus the sophist, assuming that the right meaning of the noun, *representative,* must correspond exactly with the original sense of the verb, *represent,* argues that a representative ought to be guided in all points by the opinion of his constituents, and to be merely their *deputy;* whereas law and custom, which in this case ought to be considered as fixing the meaning of the term, require no such thing, but enjoin the representative to act according to *his own* judg-

ment, and on his own responsibility. Custom, which is generally the arbiter of language, is variable; and therefore there can be no authority competent to pronounce that the meaning of a word, now and for ever, must be that which it originally bore.

77. There are some other modes of argument, which often have effect in disputation, but are not conclusive for the determination of truth. One of these is to appeal to common opinion, or allege the decisions of men whose learning has gained a name, and invested them with a kind of authority. When opinions are recommended by such high sanction, it is thought presumptuous to question them; and the disputant, who is able to support his tenets by such authorities, is inclined to charge with a breach of modesty the adversary who refuses to yield to them. This is called *argumentum ad verecundiam.* All that can be said against it is, that it is not *conclusive:* it must be allowed that there is a strong *presumption* in favour of any opinion which has received the consent of learned men for many ages; but this presumption may be overcome by stronger reasons on the contrary side.

Another mode of argument, by which men endeavour to gain assent to their opinions, is to require the adversary either to assent to them, or to assign others more satisfactory. This is called *argumentum ad ignorantiam;* and is of little value; for the ignorance of one person affords no presumption in favour of the accuracy of another person's knowledge.

A third way is to press a man with consequences drawn from his own principles or concessions. This is called *argumentum ad hominem;* and is sometimes an allowable expedient for silencing those who will not yield to fair argument.

That which is called *argumentum ad judicium* is different from all these; being derived from the proper foundations of knowledge or probability. This alone brings true instruction with it, and advances us in our way to knowledge. It argues not that one man's opinion is right, because others, from respect, or from any other consideration, will not contradict him. Nor does it prove that one man is in the right way, because others know not a better, or have been shewn to be in the wrong. But it appeals to just proofs and arguments, and to evidence derived from the nature of things themselves; not to the modesty, ignorance, or errors of those to whom it is addressed.

78. *Method* is the arrangement of the thoughts, so that their mutual relation and dependence may be most easily seen. The chief objects of method are, the *investigation* of truth, and the *communication* of it. There are accordingly two species of method, the *analytic* and the *synthetic,* respectively adapted to these two objects: the *analytic* being usually the method of *invention,* and the *synthetic* the method of *instruction.*

In Geometry, every proposition consists of two parts; one, in which certain suppositions are made; and another, in which a certain consequence is affirmed to follow from those suppositions. If the particulars stated in the hypothetical part of the enunciation be assumed as the principles of our reasoning, and from these principles a series of consequences be deduced, till we at last arrive at the conclusion which the proposition affirmed, the demonstration is called *synthetic.* If the steps of this reasoning be arranged in the reverse order, we assume hypothetically the truth of the proposition which we wish to demonstrate, and proceed to deduce from this assumption the consequences to which it leads. If, in this deduction, we arrive

at a consequence which we already know to be true, we conclude that the principle from which it was deduced is also true. But if, on the other hand, we arrive at a consequence which we know to be false, we conclude that the assumption on which the reasoning has proceeded is false also.—Such a demonstration of the truth or falsity of a proposition is called *analytic*.

The meaning of the terms *analysis* and *synthesis*, when applied to Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics, has little resemblance to that in which they are are applied to Geometry; except that in those sciences, as in Geometry, *analysis* is usually the method of discovery, and *synthesis* the method of instruction. In them, the *analytic* method begins with those things which are most known; examines their properties and relations; proceeds from effects to causes; and from particular causes to the most general. The *synthetic* method proceeds from general to particular truths, from causes to effects. In acquiring the knowledge of any physical science, we may adopt either of these methods: we may either examine all the particular things to which the science relates; ascertain their various properties; classify them by placing together those in which there exists a striking similarity; review the classes, and re-arrange them according to more comprehensive similarities; and so on repeatedly, until we have formed classes of the most general nature:—*or*, we may begin by learning the most general classes, with their divisions and subdivisions, and the distinguishing properties of each, till we descend to the lowest species, and thence to individuals. This is the *synthetic*, the former is the *analytic* process. The original discoverer of the science must proceed by analysis. But in communicating the science to others, the synthetic mode is

generally adopted, as it displays the whole science at one view; and the general arrangement, seen from the beginning, greatly assists the mind in apprehending and remembering the several parts.[x]



[x] Artis Logicæ Rudimenta. *de methodo.* Stewart's Elements of Philosophy, vol. II. ch. iv. §. 3.

NOTES.

Art. 1. THERE are two meanings of the word *idea*, a popular and philosophical. In popular language, an *idea* is the same as a *thought*, or a *notion*. But according to the meaning of the word, as it was formerly used by philosophical writers, an *idea* is some *object* of thought.

Aristotle taught that all the objects of thought enter at first by the senses; and since the sense cannot receive external material objects themselves, it receives their images or forms without the matter; as wax receives the *form* of a seal without any of the *matter* of it. In like manner, many modern philosophers conceived that, since external objects cannot be the *immediate* objects of thought, there must be some image of them in the mind itself, in which, as in a mirror, they are seen. And the name *idea*, in the philosophical sense of it, is given to those internal and immediate objects of our thoughts. The external thing is the *remote* or *mediate* object; but the idea, or image of that object in the mind, is the *immediate* object, without which we could have no perception of the other.

This opinion seems to have been held by Locke; but it was confuted by Reid, and is now generally abandoned. Reid expresses his belief that no man is able to explain *how* we perceive external objects, any more than *how* we are conscious of those that are internal. For this reason, after having shewn that the theories of former philosophers on this subject are ill-grounded and insufficient, he does not attempt to substitute any other theory in their place. (See Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 1, 2.)

Some writers have made a distinction between *ideas* and *notions*; and, as a reason for it, they appeal to the derivation of the words; the root of one being εἴδω to *see*, and the other γινώσκω to *know* or *understand*. In their primary sense, therefore, *notion* is more com-

prehensive than *idea*, because we *know* many things which cannot be *seen*. It is probable that, at first, the word *idea* was used to denote only those images of external objects which are received through the sense of *sight*. Its signification was afterwards extended to impressions produced through the other senses; and, finally, it was confounded with *notion*, which denotes the apprehension of whatever may be known. We are told that Dr. Johnson was indignant at the use of the word *idea* in this last sense, when, properly, it can only signify something of which an image may be formed in the mind. "We may have an *idea* or *image* of a mountain, a tree, or a building; but not of an argument or proposition." (Encyc. Brit. Art. *Metaph.* and Boswell's Life of Johnson, vol. III. p. 406.) There is however little probability that this distinction will ever be generally attended to, in popular use.

The term *Logic* also is used by some writers in a sense much more extensive than by others. It is by some defined to be an art, which treats of practical rules for the exercise of the mind in reasoning. In this sense, it is called an *art*, not a *science*, because it relates to something which is *to be done*, not to any thing which is *merely to be known;* to *practice*, not to *theory*. By others it is made to contain a description of the mental faculties, as well as the rules abovementioned. Others extend it so far as to comprehend all that relates to the philosophy of the mind. When there exists such a variance in the meaning of a word, it is proper for every writer who uses it, to explain the meaning which he himself intends to annex to it.

Art. 2. Though Locke has written at great length against the doctrine of *innate* ideas, it is not easy to determine in what sense the word *innate* was understood by him. If by *innate* be meant *coeval with our birth,* it can hardly be supposed that any person ever held the doctrine which he controverts; but if, in denying that man has innate ideas, he meant that the mind is not so framed as that certain ideas will necessarily accompany the exercise of its faculties, and certain principles be approved by it in preference to others, he is not only opposed to almost all other philosophers, but is inconsistent with himself. "The First Book (says Dr. Beattie) of the *Essay on the Human Understanding* tends to establish this dangerous doctrine, that the human mind, previous to education and habit, is as susceptible of any one impression as of any other :—a doctrine which, if true, would go near to prove, that truth and virtue are no better than human contrivances; or, at least, that they have nothing permanent in their nature; but may be as changeable as the inclinations and capacities of men. Surely this is not the doctrine that Locke *meant* to establish; but his zeal against innate ideas and innate principles, put him off his

guard, and made him allow too little for instinct, for fear of allowing too much."

The word *connatural,* as proper to denote certain of our ideas, is given by Lord Shaftesbury. "*Innate* (he observes) is a word which Locke poorly plays upon: the right word, though less used, is *connatural.* For what has *birth* to do in this case?—the question is not about the *time* the ideas entered; but whether the constitution of man be such, that, being adult and grown up, at such a time, sooner or later (no matter when) the idea and sense of *order, administration,* and a GOD, will not infallibly, inevitably, necessarily spring up in him."

That Locke was far from holding such opinions as his language respecting innate ideas might lead us to attribute to him, appears from his distinct disavowal of them in different parts of his Essay. "There is a great deal of difference (he says) between an *innate* law, and a *law of nature;* between something imprinted on our minds in their very original, and something that we, being ignorant of, may attain to the knowledge of, by the use and due application of our natural faculties." (Book I. ch. iii. §. 13.) Again (Book IV. ch. iii. §. 20.) he speaks "of the candle of the Lord being set up by himself in men's minds, which it is impossible for the breath or power of man wholly to extinguish." (For an account of Locke's opinions on this subject and the discussions which they have excited, see Stewart's First Dissertation prefixed to the Supplement of the Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. V. p. 30.)

Locke refers the origin of all our ideas to two sources, *sensation* and *reflection:* some writers have referred them to sensation alone. *Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu,* was the maxim of these writers; and many of them have so far misinterpreted Locke as to ascribe to him the credit of having established it. This maxim, extended by Leibnitz, became: nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu, *nisi ipse intellectus;* which conveys, in a concise form, the substance of Locke's doctrine.

But, taken in its most extensive sense, this account of the origin of our ideas falls short of the truth. There are many ideas which cannot be directly referred either to sensation or reflection; and all that can be said of them is, that the exercise of some particular faculty furnishes the *occasion* on which, by the laws of our constitution, they are presented to the mind; nor does it seem possible for us to trace the origin of them any farther than to ascertain what the nature of the *occasion* was, which, in the first instance, introduced them to our notice. The feelings of pleasure and pain, of desire and passion, are born with us, and necessarily exist in a percipient mind. Thus, we are not only fur-

nished by the constitution of our nature with capabilities of knowledge, and proper organs for the attainment of it, but the principles which impel us to the acquisition of knowledge, viz. the desire of pleasure and the consciousness of enjoyment, are implanted in us, and exist in the mind before it is excited by external objects. (See Stewart's Elements of Philosophy, vol. I. ch. i. §. 4. and Philosophical Essays, I. ch. ii. also the Edinburgh Encyclopedia, Art. *Logic.*)

Art. 7. *Extension* and *figure* are classed by Locke, along with hardness, softness, roughness, and other similar qualities, under the general title of the *primary* qualities of matter. The propriety of making some distinction between them has been pointed out by Professor Stewart, who gives to *extension* and *figure* the title of *the mathematical affections of matter;* restricting the phrase *primary qualities* to hardness, softness, and other properties of the same description. "And (he adds) the line which I would draw between these *primary* qualities and *secondary* is this; that the former necessarily involve the notion of *extension*, and consequently of *externality* or *outness;* whereas the latter are only conceived as the unknown causes of known sensations, and, when *first apprehended by the mind*, do not imply the existence of any thing locally distinct from the subjects of its own consciousness." (Philosophical Essays, II. ch. ii.)

Art. 9. The name of every secondary quality signifies two things, a sensation in the mind, and the unknown quality which excites that sensation. When therefore a question is made whether fire is hot, or grass green, the answer is given by explaining the meaning of the words *heat* and *colour.* If we understand by them some unknown disposition or motion of the insensible particles of bodies, by which the perception of heat or colour is caused in us, then fire *is* hot, and grass green. But if we understand by those words, *what we feel* by fire, or *what we see* in grass,—in that sense, fire *is not* hot, nor grass green; for the heat we feel, and the colours we see, are only in the soul.

Art. 10. It is remarked by Professor Stewart, that there is an inseparable connection in every person's mind between the notions of *colour* and of *extension.* The former of these words expresses a sensation in the mind; the latter denotes a quality of an external object; so that there is no more natural connection between the two notions, than between pain and solidity; and yet, in consequence of our always perceiving extension at the same time at which the sensation of colour is excited in the mind, we find it impossible to think of that sensation, without conceiving extension along with it.

Similar to this misconception, by which we refer the sensation of colour to an external object, is the reference which we always make of

the sensations of *touch* to those parts of the body, where the exciting *causes* of the sensations exist. If the hand be struck against a hard object, we naturally say that we feel pain *in the hand;* though the truth is, that we merely perceive the *cause* of the pain to be applied to that part of the body. The sensation itself cannot be referred *in point of place* to the hand, unless it be supposed that the soul is spread over the body by diffusion. The misconception is still more remarkable, when sensations of touch are referred to a place *beyond the limits* of the body; as in the case of pain which seems to be felt in an amputated limb. (Elements of Philosophy, Part II. ch. v. §.1. and Note P. Professor Brown's Lectures, 25.)

The difference between *perception* and *sensation* (briefly stated in Articles 10, 11.) is explained at great length by Dr. Reid; whose opinions on this subject, as on every other of which he treats, have the recommendation, not only of their great intrinsic worth, but also of being expressed in a plain and direct manner, and the most perspicuous language.

Art. 16. Since it is impossible for us to understand *how* the mind acquires the *first perception* of ideas, it must be equally impossible to understand *how* it *retains* them. What Locke's opinions were on this subject cannot be ascertained with certainty, for he expresses them in metaphorical language, and he has not clearly explained whether he intended the metaphors which he uses to be understood as merely illustrative, or as representing literally the mental operations to which they are referred. He speaks of ideas as *pictures* drawn in our minds, and laid in fading colours; and of the brain retaining the characters drawn on it, in some cases like marble, in others like freestone, and in others little better than sand;—which expressions are sufficiently accordant with the opinion held by him and by many other philosophers, that we perceive external objects by means of *images* of them conveyed to the brain.

It has always been the common opinion that sensation, perception, and all the other operations of the mind are produced by impressions made on it by external objects. This opinion could only take its rise from observing the constant *connection* which exists between certain impressions made upon our senses, and our perception of the objects by which the impression is made; from which it is inferred, that those impressions were the proper efficient causes of the corresponding sensation. But because two things are always conjoined, it is by no means a necessary consequence that one must be the *cause* of the other. Day and night are joined in constant succession, but we do not conclude from this, that day is the cause of night, or night the

cause of day. Therefore it is not only impossible to conceive, but also there is no real ground for supposing, that *matter*, by any motion or modification, produces *thought*.

And if the nature of perception be thus inexplicable, we have equal reason to make the same acknowledgement with respect to memory. It is an original faculty given us by the Author of our being, of which we can give no account but that we are so made. We are told by Locke "that laying up our ideas in the repository of the memory signifies no more than this, that the mind has a power to revive perceptions which it once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them before; and in this sense it is, that our ideas are said to be in our memories, when indeed they are actually nowhere." But when a thing is *nowhere*, the *same* thing cannot be again produced; though another thing similar to it may. Hence, an ability to revive our ideas, after they have ceased to be, can signify no more but an ability to create new ideas similar to those we had before. Again, he says, "that the mind, as it were, paints the ideas anew upon itself." This expression must imply that the mind, which paints the things that have ceased to exist, has the memory of what they were; as a painter must have a copy, either before his eye or in his imagination and memory. On the whole, Locke's chapter on memory, though containing some fine remarks on the importance and the varieties of this faculty, does not, in the least degree, enable us to understand *how* we retain ideas by it. (See Reid, Essay II. ch. iv. and Essay III. ch. vii.)

Art. 18. Since it was the prevailing opinion among ancient philosophers that the qualities of external objects are perceived by means of *images* transmitted to the mind by the organs of sense, and that these images are the objects about which our thoughts are employed, it naturally became a question, what is the nature of the *idea* or *image* corresponding to a *general* term. When we think of any particular object such as a particular man, tree, or mountain, we can understand what is meant by an *image* of such objects. But what account can we give, upon the principles of this theory, of the objects of our thoughts, when we use the words, man, tree, mountain, as *general* terms? For all the things we have ever perceived are individuals; and therefore the ideas denoted by general words, cannot be copied from any originals that have fallen under our observation. In answer to this question, it was taught for many ages, by the followers of Plato and Aristotle, that, although these general ideas are not copied from any objects perceivable by sense, yet, as all the individuals which compose a genus must possess something in common, this common thing forms the essence of

each, and is the object of thought, when we reason concerning the genus. Plato held that of every *species* of things there is one idea or form, which existed from eternity, before any individual of the species was formed: that this idea is the exemplar or pattern, according to which the Deity formed the individuals of the species: that every individual of the species partakes of this idea, which constitutes its essence; and that this idea is an object of thought, when, by due abstraction, we discern it to be one in all the individuals of the species. In this manner, according to Plato, we form *universal* or *abstract* ideas.

In the eleventh century a new doctrine was introduced, that these *abstract* ideas have no existence; that words or names are *universal* signs, but that every idea must be particular. The advocates of this new opinion were called *Nominalists*, to distinguish them from the *Realists*, who adhered to the ancient opinion that universal ideas exist, corresponding to the universal words which are used to denote them. A few formed themselves into a third sect called *conceptualists*, who seem to have agreed with the Nominalists in denying the existence of universal *things*, but to have thought in opposition to them, that, by means of its *conceptions*, the mind has the power of reasoning concerning *genera*, without the use of *words*, as signs of those conceptions. The dispute among these sects was carried on with the greatest animosity, not by arguments only, but by bloody affrays, until the Reformation turned the attention of men to more important subjects.

Dr. Reid has classed Locke among the *conceptualists;* as having maintained, not that there are *things* universal, but that we have general or universal *ideas*, which we form by abstraction. In speaking of these abstract ideas, Locke says that it is not so easy to form *them*, as it is to form *particular* ideas. "For example, does it not require some skill to form the *general* idea of a triangle? For it must be neither oblique, nor right-angled, neither equilateral, nor scalene; but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot exist, an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together." Surely (to use the words of Campbell) the bare *mention* of this hypothesis is equivalent to a confutation of it. (Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, vol. II. p. 110. Locke, Book IV. ch. vii. Reid, Essay V. ch. vi. Stewart. Elem. of Phil. vol. I. ch. iv.)

Art. 39. It is stated in this Article that our knowledge *chiefly* consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas: and perhaps it would have been proper to make even a stronger modification of Locke's doctrine, who refers *all* our knowledge to the

perception of such agreement or disagreement. The accuracy of this proposition depends on the sense in which the word *idea* is to be taken. Sometimes it is used by Locke as synonymous with *thought;* in one place he defines it to be whatever is the *object* of thought;—a definition which would comprehend both things which have a real existence, and things which we either believe never existed, or which we think of without regard to their existence; and in this sense it is undoubtedly true that all knowledge consists in perceiving the agreement or disagreement of ideas. But we have a knowledge of external objects; and there is no reason to suppose that Locke held the opinion, which was subsequently professed by Berkeley, that external objects are nothing but *thoughts* or *ideas.* We must conclude therefore that, in this proposition, he understood the word in a third sense, in which he frequently takes it, viz. as the *image* or *representative* of an object, by means of which image the object is perceived. But in this sense of the word, the proposition is untenable; for if these ideas or images be the only objects of knowledge, we could have no knowledge of the existence either of ourselves, or of external objects, or of the Supreme Being.

The illustrations given by him of this proposition are borrowed chiefly from mathematics, and the relations about which that science is conversant. When applied to these relations, it is possible to annex some meaning to such expressions as *comparing ideas, the juxta-position of ideas, the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas;* but in most other branches of knowledge, this language will be found to be without meaning. (Reid, Essay VI. ch. iii. Stewart, vol. II. ch. ii. §. 1.)

Art. 43. This Article contains a very brief example of the metaphysical arguments which Clarke and others have advanced as a proof of the existence of God. As the summary of them is here given, it agrees in substance with the proof given by Locke, but is not placed in the same form nor expressed in the same language.

Locke comprises his proof, at first, in a few sentences, and then restates and amplifies it. As it appears in its first form, it has little force; and in its second form, it is diffuse and ill-arranged, and some parts of it inconclusive. For example, towards the conclusion of it, he professes to prove that matter is not coeternal with an eternal mind; but his proof amounts only to this, that the contrary proposition cannot be proved.

These remarks,—and others which precede, directing the reader's attention to some of Locke's opinions which are now generally deemed erroneous,—are made because they seem to be required by the occa-

sion; and are certainly not offered with any disposition to disparage the fame of that great Author. Any attempt of that sort, if such a disposition should exist, must be fruitless. For those errors are pointed out with proper freedom by Reid, Stewart, Campbell, and other eminent philosophers; but their animadversions are accompanied with such strong expressions of their general admiration of him, that we may conclude, from the ample testimony rendered by men so capable of forming a correct judgment, that the fame of Locke, as one of the greatest ornaments of our nation, rests upon grounds which cannot be shaken.

Art. 63. By the syllogistic art, we are taught how to draw just conclusions from *given* premises. But the chief opportunity for the exercise of judgment, is in determining whether the premises ought to be granted or not; and in this difficulty, the art of syllogizing affords little assistance. In many examples which are given of syllogisms, the *premises* contain affirmations which are not more evident or more easy to be established than the *conclusion* which is deduced from them. Frequently the major-premise expresses a general truth, and the conclusion expresses merely a particular instance of it. But those who admit the general truth, will probably admit the particular instance, without being impelled to it by the force of a syllogism. For example, when it is said: *All tyrants deserve death; Nero was a tyrant; therefore Nero deserved death:* if we suppose the three propositions of this syllogism each to require proof, it is probable that the greatest difficulty would be found in proving the first; which, in the syllogism, is assumed without proof. Hence, the common remark appears to be well-grounded, that the syllogistic art, however useful it may be in enabling us to detect error, cannot assist us to the discovery of any new truth. And so great has been the change of opinion as to the utility of this art that, after having been for a long period considered the bulwark of reasoning, it is now generally neglected; the authority of Bacon, of Locke, of Reid, of Stewart having been sufficient to shake the credit of a system which had been founded by Aristotle, and adopted by all learned men, during many centuries, as the only test of just reasoning and of truth.

Stewart, having expressed his opinion of the real value of the syllogistic art, concludes with observing that he wishes it not to be supposed, that he considers a general acquaintance with it as of no value, even in these times. "The technical language connected with it is now so incorporated with all the higher departments of learning that, independently of any consideration of its practical applications, some knowledge of its peculiar phraseology may be regarded as an

indispensable preparation both for scientific and for literary pursuits." He then quotes, with approbation, the following passage from the Introduction to the Compendium of Logic used in the University of Dublin: Utrum hæcce ars per se revera aliquem præstet usum, quidam dubitavere. Quoniam verò in Auctorum insigniorum scriptis sæpe occurrant termini Logici, hos terminos explicatos habere, ideoque et ipsius artis partes præcipuas, omnino necessarium videtur. (Stewart, Elem. Phil. vol. II. ch. iii. §. 3. Ed. Encyc. Art. *Logic*.)

Untch II

HOMERI ODYSSEA:

LIBER XI.

WITH

COPIOUS ENGLISH NOTES,

ORIGINAL AND SELECTED,

FROM

HEYNE, LÖWE, &c. &c.

CAMBRIDGE:
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Argument of the Eleventh Book.

Ulysses relates to Alcinous his voyage to the infernal regions, his conference there with the prophet Tiresias concerning his return to Ithaca, & gives him an account of the heroes, heroines, & others whom he saw there.

[illegible] Homer is supposed [illegible] about B.C. [illegible] or 1.[illegible]

Smyrna, Rhodos, Colophon, Salamis, Chios, Argos, Athenae,

Orbis de patria certat, Homere, tua

[illegible] Greek Epigram of Antipater [illegible] gives them differently.

[illegible] Σμυρνα, Χιος, Κολοφων, Ιθακη, Πυλος, Αργος, Αθηναι,

[illegible] Επτα πολεις μαρναντο σοφην δια ριζαν Ομηρου

ΟΔΥΣΣΕΙΑΣ Λ.

ΝΕΚΥΊΑ.

Αὐτὰρ ἐπεί ῥ' ἐπὶ νῆα κατήλθομεν ἠδὲ θάλασσαν,
νῆα μὲν ἂρ πάμπρωτον ἐρύσσαμεν εἰς ἅλα δῖαν,
ἐν δ' ἱστὸν τιθέμεσθα καὶ ἱστία νηῒ μελαίνῃ·
ἐν δὲ τὰ μῆλα λαβόντες ἐβήσαμεν, ἂν δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ
βαίνομεν ἀχνύμενοι, θαλερὸν κατὰ δάκρυ χέοντες. 5
ἡμῖν δ' αὖ μετόπισθε νεὸς κυανοπρώροιο

2. *δῖαν.* This epithet is frequently given to the sea both in the Iliad and the Odyssey, and signifies, "great and terrible," from *δίω*, "to fear." If derived from *Δίος*, the genitive of Ζεὺς, it has the signification of "godlike, excellent, to be reverenced or feared as a god." But Clarke thinks that it means nothing more than "vast, wide sea."

3. *ἱστὸν*, "the mast." Every ship had several masts; but we are told by Aristotle, that at first there was only one mast, which being fixed in the middle of the ship, the hole into which the foot of it was inserted, was named *μεσοδόμη*, in Latin, *modius*. When they landed, the mast was taken down, as appears everywhere in Homer, and placed on a thing called *ἱστοδόκη*, which, according to Suidas, was a case, wherein the mast was reposited; but Eustathius will have it to be nothing but a piece of wood, against which it was reared. Potter's Archæol. B. 3. ch. xvi.

4. *ἐβήσαμεν*, "we put them on board." Βαίνω, *βῆμι*, 2nd aor. *ἔβην*, perf. *βέβηκα*, plusquam-perf. *ἐβεβήκειν*, are all used as neuters, "I go, &c.;" but *ἔβησα* is always active, "I made to go."

5. *ἀχνύμενοι*, "grieved," because instead of sailing direct home, they had to go to the infernal regions, according to Circe's directions, to consult the spirit of Tiresias, the famous Theban seer.

6. *κυανοπρώροιο νεὸς*, "the ship with dark-blue prow." It was customary to beautify the prow with gold and various sorts of paint and colours. In the primitive times, red was most in use; whence Homer's

ἴκμενον οὖρον ἵει πλησίστιον, ἐσθλὸν ἑταῖρον,
Κίρκη ἐϋπλόκαμος, δεινὴ θεὸς, αὐδήεσσα.
ἡμεῖς δ' ὅπλα ἕκαστα πονησάμενοι κατὰ νῆα
ἥμεθα· τὴν δ' ἄνεμός τε κυβερνήτης τ' ἴθυνεν. 10
τῆς δὲ πανημερίης τέταθ' ἱστία ποντοπορούσης·
δύσετό τ' ἠέλιος, σκιόωντό τε πᾶσαι ἀγυιαί.
Ἡ δ' ἐς πείραθ' ἵκανε βαθυῤῥόου Ὠκεανοῖο.
ἔνθα δὲ Κιμμερίων ἀνδρῶν δῆμός τε πόλις τε,
ἠέρι καὶ νεφέλῃ κεκαλυμμένοι· οὐδέ ποτ' αὐτοὺς 15
Ἠέλιος φαέθων καταδέρκεται ἀκτίνεσσιν,
οὔθ' ὁπότ' ἂν στείχῃσι πρὸς οὐρανὸν ἀστερόεντα,

ships were commonly dignified with the titles of μιλτοπάρῃοι and φοινικοπάρῃοι, or *red-faced*. The blue likewise, or sky-colour, was frequently made use of, as bearing a near resemblance to the colour of the sea, whence we find ships called by Homer κυανόπρωροι, and by Aristophanes, κυανέμβολοι.—Potter Arch. B. 3, ch. xv.

7. ἴκμενον οὖρον ἵει πλησίστιον, "sends a favourable fresh breeze, filling the sails." Ἵημι, imperf. ἵεε or ἵει.

8. δεινὴ, "formidable," because she turned into swine those sailors who were shipwrecked on her coast. She dwelt on a promontory of Italy, called "the cape of Circe."

αὐδήεσσα. This difficult word, on the meaning of which commentators have been so much divided, is translated by Clarke, Dunbar, Cowper and others, by "melodiously, sweetly singing." But Loewe and Damm have shown that it is an epithet of mankind in general, because speech is peculiar to man and distinguishes him from the other animals. Applied to Circe, it means "using the language of men," (for the other deities conversed with men by omens, prodigies, dreams, &c.) and shows that though she was immortal, and therefore θεὸς, though she had power over those who fell into her hands and was therefore δεινὴ, yet she was not an inhabitant of heaven; but living upon the earth she conversed with men and used the language of men.

9. ὅπλα κ. τ. λ. "having carefully adjusted all the tackle of the ship."

11. τέταθ', for τετατο, which is for ἐτέτατο, the pluperf. pass. of τείνω, were expanded and filled with the wind.

15. ἠέρι καὶ νεφέλῃ, "with darkness and clouds," for "with dark clouds," by the figure Hendiadys; ἠὴρ, ἠέρος Ionic for ἀὴρ, ἀέρος.

17. Compare with this passage Virg. Georg. iii. 357. Tum sol pallentes haud unquam discutit umbras; Nec cùm in-

αὐδηεις — αὐδη the human voice.

ἰκμενος — ἰκμας moisture — mild moist breeze.

πανημεριος thro' the whole of the day.

ἀγυια way. track. ἀγω.

πειρας for περας.

ἀκτιν, a ray. a flash; ἀγνυμι, ἀϊσσω.

στειχησι — climbs.

δειλος timid, wretched. ὄλοος ὄλλυμι.

παλυνω I strew, whiten; παλασσω to sollen.
ἄλφιτον barley-flour: ἀλφος white; ἀλφω invenio.
ἀμενηνος; ἀ μενος;

οὔθ' ὅτ' ἂν ἂψ ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἀπ' οὐρανόθεν προτράπηται·
ἀλλ' ἐπὶ νὺξ ὀλοὴ πέταται δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσιν.
νῆα μὲν ἔνθ' ἐλθόντες ἐκέλσαμεν· ἐκ δὲ τὰ μῆλα 20
εἱλόμεθ'· αὐτοὶ δ' αὖτε παρὰ ῥόον Ὠκεανοῖο
ᾔομεν, ὄφρ' ἐς χῶρον ἀφικόμεθ', ὃν φράσε Κίρκη.
Ἔνθ' ἱερήϊα μὲν Περιμήδης Εὐρύλοχός τε
ἔσχον· ἐγὼ δ' ἄορ ὀξὺ ἐρυσσάμενος παρὰ μηροῦ
βόθρον ὄρυξ', ὅσσον τε πυγούσιον ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα· 25
ἀμφ' αὐτῷ δὲ χοὴν χεόμην πᾶσιν νεκύεσσιν,
πρῶτα μελικρήτῳ, μετέπειτα δὲ ἡδέϊ οἴνῳ,
τὸ τρίτον αὖθ' ὕδατι· ἐπὶ δ' ἄλφιτα λευκὰ πάλυνον.
πολλὰ δὲ γουνούμην νεκύων ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα,

vectus equis altum petit æthera, nec cùm Præcipitem Oceani rubro lavat æquore currum. And Ovid, Metamorph. xi. 592. Est prope Cimmerios longo spelunca recessu Mons cavus, ignavi domus et penetralia somni; Quò nunquam radiis oriens mediusve cadensve Phœbus adire potest. Nebulæ caligine mixtæ Exhalantur humo, dubiæque crepuscula lucis.

18. *ἀπ' οὐρανόθεν*, "from heaven." In Homer *οὐρανόθεν* is very frequently joined with *ἀπὸ*, as here; so that *ἀπ' οὐρανόθεν* is the same as *ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ*.

19. *νὺξ ὀλοὴ*, "sad night." It is to be observed, says Eustathius, that the night is here called *ὀλοὴ*, because it was an unnatural one. To the proper night Homer generally gives the epithet of *ἀμβροσίη*.

21. *παρὰ ῥόον Ὠκεανοῖο*, "along, by the side of Ocean's stream."

24. *ἄορ ὀξὺ ἐρυσσάμενος παρὰ μηροῦ*, "having drawn my sharp sword from my thigh;" *ἄορ, ἄορος*, neuter, "a sword," from *ἀείρω*, "to lift up," because the sword is "lifted up," when used.

25. *ὅσσον κ. τ. λ.* "as far as an ell on this side and that," *i. e.* "an ell square." *Πυγούσιον* is "the space from the elbow to the knuckles of the clenched fist."

26. *χοὴν χεόμην*, "I poured a libation." The libations to the gods above were called *σπονδαὶ*, or *λοιβαί*; those to the gods below *χοαί*. A verb is very frequently followed by an accusative of the same derivation, or of kindred signification; as Il. *ο*. 673. *παρὰ νηυσὶ μάχην ἐμάχοντο.*—Plato Protag. p. 117. *ἐπιμελοῦνται πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν.* See Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 415.

27. *μελικρήτῳ*, "a mixture of wine and honey."

29. *γουνούμην*. The verb *γουνοόμαι* means both to "pray to,"

ἐλθὼν εἰς Ἰθάκην στεῖραν βοῦν, ἥτις ἀρίστη, 30
ῥέξειν ἐν μεγάροισι πυρήν τ' ἐμπλησέμεν ἐσθλῶν·
Τειρεσίῃ δ' ἀπάνευθεν ὄϊν ἱερευσέμεν οἴῳ
παμμέλαν', ὃς μήλοισι μεταπρέπει ἡμετέροισιν.
τοὺς δ' ἐπεὶ εὐχωλῇσι λιτῇσί τε, ἔθνεα νεκρῶν,
ἐλλισάμην, τὰ δὲ μῆλα λαβὼν ἀπεδειροτόμησα 35
ἐς βόθρον, ῥέε δ' αἷμα κελαινεφές· αἱ δ' ἀγέροντο
ψυχαὶ ὑπὲξ Ἐρέβευς νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων.
[νύμφαι τ' ἠΐθεοί τε πολύτλητοί τε γέροντες
παρθενικαί τ' ἀταλαὶ, νεοπενθέα θυμὸν ἔχουσαι·

and "to vow;" in this place the two meanings are joined together; "I prayed to many empty shades, and vowed that when I had come, &c."

Κάρηνα νεκύων for νέκυες is a very frequent circumlocution, Il. ι. 407. κτητοὶ δὲ τρίποδές τε καὶ ἵππων ξανθὰ κάρηνα. Hesiod. Sc. H. 104. τιμᾷ σὴν κεφαλήν. Soph. Œd. Tyr. 950. ὦ φίλτατον γυναικὸς Ἰοκάστης κάρα. Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 430—6.

30. ἐλθὼν ῥέξειν, "that when I had come .... I would sacrifice." Here ἐλθὼν is in the nominative case, according to the Greek idiom. If the infinitive has a subject of its own, it is put in the accusative; but if this is the same with the object which stood in the preceding sentence, upon which the infinitive depended, the subject is put in the same case as in the preceding instance. But when the subject is the subject also of the preceding *finite* verb, then it is omitted with the infinitive, except when an emphasis is laid upon it; e. g. *dicebat se esse ducem*, means ἔφη εἶναι στρατηγός, but *dicebat se esse ducem, non illos*, ἔφη αὐτὸς εἶναι στρατηγὸς, οὐκ ἐκείνους. Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 535. 5. d. See. v. 236.

31. ῥέξειν, fut. from ῥέζω, facere. With ἱερὰ understood, it comes to signify, rem sacram facere, sacrificare.

ἐμπλησέμεν, for ἐμπλήσειν, a form of the infinitive very common in Homer. Instead of the form -ειν and -εῖν the termination -μεναι and short -μεν, was frequently used in the old language (in Homer and Hesiod,) and in the Æolic and Doric dialect. Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 196. 8. b.

35. ἐλλισάμην, for ἐλισάμην, first aor. mid. from λίσσομαι; "and when I had called upon these, the tribes of the dead," &c.

37. Ἐρέβευς, Ionic for Ἐρέβους, from Ἔρεβος, -εος, τὸ.

38. ἠΐθεοι, "young, unmarried men." It is from the same root as αἰζηὸς (ζ and θ being often interchanged) from ἀεὶ and ζέειν, "always ardent," influenced by the fire of youth.

ἄνευθεν without; afar. : οἶος the lonely, alone, sole

μετατρέπει.

ελισσαμην — had implored, invoked, &c.

ἀγέροντο. Ion. for ἠγείροντο

ἀταλος, απαλος tender.

οὐτάμενος, οὐτασμένος, οὐτάζω — hit, wound.
Ἀρηϊ. Ion. for Ἄρει. — ἀράω.
βρότος gore, ῥότος, ῥέω. β Æol: for aspirate.

ἴφθιμος ἶφι adv: dat: poet: of ἴς vis.
εἴων contr: for εἴαον, (ε. as aug.) imperf of ἐάω.

πολλοὶ δ' οὐτάμενοι χαλκήρεσιν ἐγχείῃσιν, 40
ἄνδρες Ἀρηΐφατοι, βεβροτωμένα τεύχε' ἔχοντες·
οἳ πολλοὶ περὶ βόθρον ἐφοίτων ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος
θεσπεσίῃ ἰαχῇ· ἐμὲ δὲ χλωρὸν δέος ᾕρει.]
δὴ τότ' ἔπειθ' ἑτάροισιν ἐποτρύνας ἐκέλευσα
μῆλα, τὰ δὴ κατέκειτ' ἐσφαγμένα νηλέϊ χαλκῷ, 45
δείραντας κατακεῖαι, ἐπεύξασθαι δὲ θεοῖσιν,
ἰφθίμῳ τ' Ἀΐδῃ καὶ ἐπαινῇ Περσεφονείῃ·
αὐτὸς δὲ ξίφος ὀξὺ ἐρυσσάμενος παρὰ μηροῦ
ἥμην, οὐδ' εἴων νεκύων ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα
αἵματος ἆσσον ἴμεν, πρὶν Τειρεσίαο πυθέσθαι. 50
Πρώτη δὲ ψυχὴ Ἐλπήνορος ἦλθεν ἑταίρου·

41. *ἄνδρες Ἀρηΐφ.* "heroes slain in war." *Ἄνθρωπος* means "a man, *i.e.* one of the human race, of any age or of either sex;" but *ἀνὴρ* is a "man, a hero," in opposition to a woman, or child, or feeble person; in the Latin there is the same distinction between homo and vir; homo corresponds to *ἄνθρωπος*, and vir to *ἀνήρ*.

42. *ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος*, "from different parts, one from one part and another from another;" *ἄλλοθεν, πάντοθεν, ὄικοθεν*, are the only exceptions to the rule, that *words ending in οθεν have the acute accent on the penultima, as κυπρόθεν, οὐρανόθεν.*

43. *θεσπεσίῃ ἰαχῇ*, "with immense clamour, with such as a god might raise."

44. *δὴ τότ' ἔπειθ'*. These words are to be referred to v. 34. *τοὺς δ' ἐπεὶ κ. τ. λ.* when ......then. In Homer, if the protasis contains a determination of time, *δὴ* often stands at the very beginning of the apodosis, as in this passage. It is only in Homer and Pindar that *δὴ* stands at the beginning of a proposition or clause. Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 603.

46. *κατακεῖαι*, "to burn," 1 aor. act. inf. fl. *κατακαίω*. *Καίω*, fut. *καυσω*, 1 aor. pass. *ἐκαύθην*, perf. pass. *κέκαυμαι*. The aorists *ἔκηα* and *ἐκάην* indicate another form of the fut. *καῶ*. From *ἔκηα* a new present *κήω*, Od. i. 553. appears to have arisen. For *κήας* in the part. the Attics said also *κέας*, Æschyl. Again, 858, and this was lengthened into *κείας, κειαμενος, κείαντο*. Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 239.

47. *ἐπαινῇ*, "relentless, severe, cruel," from *ἐπὶ* intensive, and *αἰνὸς*, which is derived from *ἂι, ἄι*.

49. *ἥμην*, "I sat." *Ἧμαι*, "I sit," and *ἥμην*, "I sat," are properly the perf. and pluperf. pass. from *ἕω*, "I set, or place." Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 235.

οὐ γάρ πω ἐτέθαπτο ὑπὸ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης·
σῶμα γὰρ ἐν Κίρκης μεγάρῳ κατελείπομεν ἡμεῖς
ἄκλαυτον καὶ ἄθαπτον· ἐπεὶ πόνος ἄλλος ἔπειγεν.
τὸν μὲν ἐγὼ δάκρυσα ἰδὼν ἐλέησά τε θυμῷ 55
καί μιν φωνήσας ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδων·
Ἐλπῆνορ, πῶς ἦλθες ὑπὸ ζόφον ἠερόεντα;
ἔφθης πεζὸς ἐὼν ἢ ἐγὼ σὺν νηῒ μελαίνῃ;
Ὣς ἐφάμην· ὁ δέ μ' οἰμώξας ἠμείβετο μύθῳ·
[Διογενὲς Λαερτιάδη, πολυμήχαν' Ὀδυσσεῦ,] 60
ἆσέ με δαίμονος αἶσα κακὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος οἶνος·
Κίρκης δ' ἐν μεγάρῳ καταλέγμενος οὐκ ἐνόησα

52. The ancients were very solicitous about the interment of the dead, since they were strongly possessed with the opinion, that their souls could not be admitted into the Elysian shades, but were forced to wander desolate and without company, till their bodies were committed to the earth; and if they never had the good fortune to obtain human burial, the time of their exclusion from the common receptacle of the ghosts was no less than a hundred years; whence, in most of the poets, we meet with passionate requests of dying men, or of their ghosts after death, for this favour. Potter's Archæol. B. 4. ch. i.

53. *σῶμα*, "his corpse." Homer always calls the body of a living creature *δέμας*, but the body, after life has departed, he always calls *σῶμα*. Dionysius Halicarn.

58. *ἔφθης*. The verb *φθάνω* has always a signification of anticipation, of doing or suffering something before hand, or of celerity or of ease. It is commonly joined with a participle in place of an infinitive. Sometimes the part. with *φθάνω* is followed by *ἢ* signifying *before*, with an infin. In Hom. Odyss. λ. 58, where *φθάνειν* signifies *to get to a place before another person*, it is followed by *ἢ* without an infinitive, *ἔφθης πεζὸς ἐὼν ἢ ἐγὼ σὺν νηΐ μελαίνῃ*; "have you got hither by land, sooner than I by sea?" Seager's Viger. ch. v. §. xiv. R. ii. (iv).

61. *ἆσε*, "deceived, misled." Ἀάω, fut. *ἀάσω*, 1 aor. *ἤασα*, *ἦσα*, or *ἆσα*.

62. *καταλέγμενος* for *καταλεγόμενος*; "sleeping in the house of Circe, coming to the long flight of steps, I did not think that I was coming down again, and I fell headlong from the roof." Elpenor, on the night before Ulysses left the island of Circe, had gone to sleep on the house-top, in a state of intoxication; hearing in

ζοφον darkness.

ἆισα δαιω : ἀθεσ. grievous in its Effects.

ἀψ. ῥέω.

ἀστραγαλος a vertibre; small bones of the neck.

νοσφι like χωρις,

κακκεῖαι Epic, poet: for κατακεῖαι. 1 aor. inf.

ἄψοῤῥον καταβῆναι, ἰὼν ἐς κλίμακα μακρὴν,
ἀλλὰ καταντικρὺ τέγεος πέσον· ἐκ δέ μοι αὐχὴν
ἀστραγάλων ἐάγη, ψυχὴ δ' Ἄϊδόσδε κατῆλθεν. 65
νῦν δέ σε τῶν ὄπιθεν γουνάζομαι, οὐ παρεόντων,
πρός τ' ἀλόχου καὶ πατρὸς, ὅ σ' ἔτρεφε τυτθὸν ἐόντα,
Τηλεμάχου θ', ὃν μοῦνον ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἔλειπες·
οἶδα γὰρ, ὡς ἐνθένδε κιὼν δόμου ἐξ Ἀΐδαο
νῆσον ἐς Αἰαίην σχήσεις εὐεργέα νῆα· 70
ἔνθα σ' ἔπειτα, ἄναξ, κέλομαι μνήσασθαι ἐμεῖο·
μή μ' ἄκλαυτον, ἄθαπτον, ἰὼν ὄπιθεν καταλείπειν,
νοσφισθεὶς, μή τοί τι θεῶν μήνιμα γένωμαι·
ἀλλά με κακκεῖαι σὺν τεύχεσιν, ἅσσα μοί ἐστιν,

the night the noise of his companions departing, he started up, forgetting where he was, and fell over the roof. Od. χ. 555.

65. *ἀστραγαλων εαγη*, "was broken out of joint;" *ἐάγη*, 2 aor. pass. from *ἄγω*, "I break," for which in the present only *ἄγνυμι, ἄγνυμαι* is used. It takes the syllabic instead of the temporal augment, to distinguish its tenses from those of *ἄγω*, "I carry." Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 161 and 221.

66. *τῶν ὄπιθεν*, (*i.e.* *πρὸς τῶν ὄπιθεν ὄντων*,) "by those whom you have left at home behind you." The article with a substantive (either expressed or to be understood from the context) is often joined to adverbs, to which it gives the signification of adjectives; as, *ἡ ἄνω πόλις*, "the upper city;" *οἱ τότε ἄνθρωποι*, or merely, *οἱ τότε*, "the men of that day;" *οἱ ὄπιθεν*, "those behind." Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 270. *a.*

τῶν ὄπιθεν. When a preposition should stand twice with two different nouns, it is often put only once by the poets, and that too with the second noun. Od. μ. 27. *ἢ ἁλὸς ἢ ἐπὶ γῆς.* Eurip. Hec. 143. *ἀλλ' ἴθι ναοὺς, ἴθι πρὸς βωμους.* Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 595.

70. *νῆσον Αἰαίην*, the island of Ææa, where Circe dwelt, and where Elpenor's corpse lay still unburied.

72. *καταλείπειν* for *κατάλειπε*, "leave." The infinitive is sometimes put for the imperative in supplications; as, *θεοὶ πολῖται, μή με δουλείας τυχεῖν.* Æsch. Suppl. 255. Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 545.

73. *μή τοί τι θεῶν μήνιμα γένωμαι*, "lest I become to you the anger of the gods," *i. e.* lest I be the cause of their anger coming upon you. The same phrase occurs Il. χ. 358. *φράζεο νῦν, μή τοί τι θεῶν μήνιμα γένωμαι.*

σῆμά τέ μοι χεῦαι πολιῆς ἐπὶ θινὶ θαλάσσης, 75
ἀνδρὸς δυστήνοιο, καὶ ἐσσομένοισι πυθέσθαι·
ταῦτά τέ μοι τελέσαι πῆξαί τ' ἐπὶ τύμβῳ ἐρετμὸν,
τῷ καὶ ζωὸς ἔρεσσον, ἐὼν μετ' ἐμοῖς ἑτάροισιν.
Ὣς ἔφατ'· αὐτὰρ ἐγώ μιν ἀμειβόμενος προσέειπον·
ταῦτά τοι, ὦ δύστηνε, τελευτήσω τε καὶ ἔρξω. 80
Νῶϊ μὲν ὣς ἐπέεσσιν ἀμειβομένω στυγεροῖσιν
ἥμεθ'· ἐγὼ μὲν ἄνευθεν ἐφ' αἵματι φάσγανον ἴσχων,
εἴδωλον δ' ἑτέρωθεν ἑταίρου πόλλ' ἀγόρευεν.
Ηλθε δ' ἐπὶ ψυχὴ μητρὸς κατατεθνηυίης,
Αὐτολύκου θυγάτηρ μεγαλήτορος, Ἀντίκλεια, 85
τὴν ζωὴν κατέλειπον, ἰὼν εἰς Ἴλιον ἱρήν.
τὴν μὲν ἐγὼ δάκρυσα ἰδὼν ἐλέησά τε θυμῷ·
ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὣς εἴων προτέρην πυκινόν περ ἀχεύων
αἵματος ἆσσον ἴμεν, πρὶν Τειρεσίαο πυθέσθαι.
Ἦλθε δ' ἐπὶ ψυχή Θηβαίου Τειρεσίαο, 90
χρύσεον σκῆπτρον ἔχων, ἐμὲ δ' ἔγνω καὶ προσέειπεν·
[Διογενὲς Λαερτιάδη, πολυμήχαν' Ὀδυσσεῦ,]
τίπτ' αὖτ', ὦ δύστηνε, λιπὼν φάος ἠελίοιο
ἤλυθες, ὄφρα ἴδῃ νέκυας καὶ ἀτερπέα χῶρον;

76. *ἀνδρὸς δυστήνοιο*, (*ἐμοῦ ὄντος*,) the genitive absolute, where we might rather have expected *ἀνδρὶ δυστήνῳ* in apposition with *μοι*.

καὶ ἐσσομένοισι πυθέσθαι, "a monument for posterity also to hear of and to know."

82. *ἄνευθεν .... ἑτέρωθεν*, "I on the one side ...... and the shade of my companion on the other side. ...."

85. *Ἀντίκλεια*, the nominat. case, as if *ἦλθε μήτηρ* had preceded instead of *ἦλθε μητρὸς ψυχή*. So in line 91, *εχων* is used, as if he had said, in verse 90, *ἦλθε Τειρεσίας*.

88. *ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὣς*, but not even under these circumstances did I permit her .... before that I had enquired of Tiresias."

91. The *σκῆπτρον* seems to have been a thick staff or sceptre, carried only by kings, prophets, and heralds. See Loewe on Odyss. ii. 37, and Koppen on Il. i. 13.

πολιος White-foam.

απο χαζω to stand open. — retire.

νη ἁμαρτάνω. ἧλος a nail.

α. μῶμος.

διζημαι seek.

ἀργάλεος ἀλγάλεος

ἐρύκω to draw:– keep off.

ἀλλ' ἀποχάζεο βόθρου, ἄπισχε δὲ φάσγανον ὀξύ, 95
αἵματος ὄφρα πίω καί τοι νημερτέα εἴπω.
῟Ως φάτ'· ἐγὼ δ' ἀναχασσάμενος ξίφος ἀργυρόηλον
κουλεῷ ἐγκατέπηξ'· ὁ δ' ἐπεὶ πίεν αἷμα κελαινὸν,
καὶ τότε δή μ' ἐπέεσσι προσηύδα μάντις ἀμύμων·
Νόστον δίζηαι μελιηδέα, φαίδιμ' Ὀδυσσεῦ· 100
τὸν δέ τοι ἀργαλέον θήσει θεός· οὐ γὰρ ὀΐω
λήσειν Ἐννοσίγαιον, ὅ τοι κότον ἔνθετο θυμῷ,
χωόμενος ὅτι οἱ υἱὸν φίλον ἐξαλάωσας.
ἀλλ' ἔτι μέν κε καὶ ὣς κακά περ πάσχοντες ἵκοισθε,
αἴ κ' ἐθέλῃς σὸν θυμὸν ἐρυκακέειν καὶ ἑταίρων, 105

96. *αἵματος ὄφρα πίω*, "that I may drink *some* of the blood." The genitive is put with verbs of all kinds, even with those which govern the accusative, when the action does not refer to the whole object, but to a part only. In English this is expressed by the omission of the article in the singular, or by the word "some." Il. ι. 214. *πάσσε δ' ἁλὸς θειόιο*, "he sprinkled salt over it." Od. ο. 98. *ὀπτῆσαι κρεῶν*, "to roast some of the flesh." Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 356.

99. *καὶ τότε δὴ*, "then at length." !!!!

102. *Ἐννοσίγαιος*, "the shaker of the earth," an epithet of Neptune; *ὁ ἐνώθων τὴν γάιαν*; "who shakes the earth," *i. e.* by earthquakes; for earthquakes were always thought by the ancients to be caused by the sea; several other epithets are applied to Neptune, of the same signification; as *ἐνοσίχθων, σεισίχθων, γακίνας*, from *γῆν* and *κινέω*, &c.

103. *οἱ υἱὸν φίλον ἐξαλάωσας*, "you blinded his dear son," *i. e.* Polyphemus. He was son of Neptune and Thoosa and king of the Cyclopes. He, like the other Cyclopes, had but one eye, and that in the middle of his forehead; he fed on human flesh, and when Ulysses and his companions were driven on his coast, he seized them, and having confined them in his cave, daily devoured two of them. Ulysses would have shared the fate of his companions, had he not intoxicated Polyphemus, and put out his eye with a firebrand while he was asleep. Polyphemus, awakened by the sudden pain, stopped up the mouth of his cave; but Ulysses made his escape by creeping between the legs of the rams of the Cyclops, as they were led out to feed on the mountains. See the whole account in b. ix.

ὁππότε κε πρῶτον πελάσῃς εὐεργέα νῆα
Θρινακίῃ νήσῳ, προφυγὼν ἰοειδέα πόντον·
βοσκομένας δ' εὕρητε βόας καὶ ἴφια μῆλα
Ἠελίου, ὃς πάντ' ἐφορᾷ καὶ πάντ' ἐπακούει.
τὰς εἰ μέν κ' ἀσινέας ἐάᾳς νόστου τε μέδηαι, 110
καί κεν ἔτ' εἰς Ἰθάκην κακά περ πάσχοντες ἵκοισθε·
εἰ δέ κε σίνηαι, τότε τοι τεκμαίρομ' ὄλεθρον
νηΐ τε καὶ ἑτάροις· αὐτὸς δ' εἴπερ κεν ἀλύξῃς,
ὀψὲ κακῶς νεῖαι, ὀλέσας ἄπο πάντας ἑταίρους,

106. *ὁππότε κ. τ. λ.* "when first you shall have brought your ships to the island of Sicily;" *i.e.* as soon as you have arrived with your ship at the island. *πελάσῃς*, 1 aor. subj. from *πελάζω*, "to make to come near," which is derived from *πέλας* "near."

107. *Θρινακίῃ*, Sicily, commonly called Trinacria, but *euphonice*, by Homer, Thrinacia. It took its name from (*τρεῖς ἄκραι*) its three promontories, Pelorus, Pachynus and Lilybæum.

108. *εὕρητε*, "and shall have found." From having *ἐθέλῃς* and *πελάσῃς* in the preceding lines, we might have expected *εὕρῃς*; but, as Ernesti remarks, such a change of number, where the sense permits, is elegant, and not unfrequent in the poets.

109. *Ἠελίου.* "Serranus," says the learned Riccius, in his dissertations on Homer, p. 447, "has expended much time and labour in seeking out the cause, why these flocks were assigned to Phœbus. But, setting aside his remarks altogether, I think that the sheep and oxen were consecrated by the inhabitants of Sicily to Phœbus, because he once, in the guise of a shepherd, fed the flocks of Admetus, king of Thessaly."

110. Dionysius Halicarn. and others have brought forward this passage to show that Homer, notwithstanding he says more than once *Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή*, and notwithstanding he frequently speaks of *Μοῖρα* and *Αἶσα* being absolute and irresistible, yet was not in the strict sense of the word a fatalist, but understood man to be a free agent, and to have an option respecting all those points of his conduct with which his future happiness or misery was connected.

112. *τεκμαίρομαι*, "I determine, or appoint;" here, "I denounce." It is only in later authors that it is used to signify, "I conjecture."

114. *ὀψέ.* After the companions of Ulysses had slain the herds of Phœbus, Ulysses was detained seven years in the island of Calypso, and after that was shipwrecked and cast on the shore of the Phæacians.

ἴφιος sturdy

ἀσινης uninjured. μεδέω. μέδω, μήδομαι.

ἀλύσκω escape, ἀλύω wander: ἀλύσσω to be in-
=sane occurs but once; Il. 22.70.

μνωομαι μναομαι — to woo.

ἕδνον ἔεδνον Ion. a suitor's present. ἑδανός, ἡδυς.

ἄμφαθον, ἀνάφαδος, ἀνάφανδος, φαίνω.

εἶδαρ food. in general.

ἀθης a beard of corn; — the ear; &c.

φαίδιμος. shining.

νηὸς ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίης· δήεις δ' ἐν πήματα οἴκῳ, 115
ἄνδρας ὑπερφιάλους, οἵ τοι βίοτον κατέδουσιν,
μνώμενοι ἀντιθέην ἄλοχον καὶ ἕδνα διδόντες·
ἀλλ' ἤτοι κείνων γε βίας ἀποτίσεαι ἐλθών.
αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν μνηστῆρας ἐνὶ μεγάροισι τεοῖσιν
κτείνῃς, ἠὲ δόλῳ ἢ ἀμφαδὸν ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ, 120
ἔρχεσθαι δὴ ἔπειτα, λαβὼν εὐῆρες ἐρετμὸν,
εἰσόκε τοὺς ἀφίκηαι, οἳ οὐκ ἴσασι θάλασσαν
ἀνέρες, οὐδέ θ' ἅλεσσι μεμιγμένον εἶδαρ ἔδουσιν·
οὐδ' ἄρα τοίγ' ἴσασι νέας φοινικοπαρήους,
οὐδ' εὐήρε' ἐρετμὰ, τάτε πτερὰ νηυσὶ πέλονται. 125
σῆμα δέ τοι ἐρέω μάλ' ἀριφραδὲς, οὐδέ σε λήσει·
ὁππότε κεν δή τοι ξυμβλημένος ἄλλος ὁδίτης
φήῃ ἀθηρηλοιγὸν ἔχειν ἀνὰ φαιδίμῳ ὤμῳ,

115. δήεις δ' ἐν πήματα οἴκῳ, ανδρας ὑπερφιάλους, "and at home you will find calamities, viz. proud and insolent men who devour your substance." δήω, "to find," seems to be always used by Homer in a future signification. Compare Il. ι. 418, 681, ν. 260. Od. δ. 544, ζ. 291, ν. 407, π. 44. It was from this word that Ceres derived her name ἡ Δηὼ, for when she was seeking her lost daughter Proserpine, she asked all that she met, whether they had seen her; and they perceiving that she was in great distress of mind, comforted her with saying δήεις, "you will certainly find her."

121. ἔρχεσθαι, the infinitive mood for the imperative, as above v. 72.

123. ἀνέρες, put in the relative, instead of in the antecedent clauses; εἰσόκε τοὺς ἀνέρας ἀφίκηαι, ὃι ἀνέρες οὐκ ἴσασι θάλασσαν. Thus in Virgil, Urbem quam statuo, vestra est, (Æn. i. 577) for, urbs, quam urbem statuo, vestra est.

124. φοινικοπαρήους, "red-faced." See note v. 6.

125. τάτε πτερὰ, "which are the wings of the ships."

127. ξυμβλημένος, "meeting you;" the pres. middle, from ξυμβλῆμαι, one of the forms of ξυμβάλλω. This form (ξυμβλῆμαι, "to meet,") is very frequent in Homer.

128. φήῃ, Ionic for φαίη, pres. optat. of φημί.

ἀθηρηλοιγὸν (for ἀθερηλοιγὸν, on account of the metre,) "a fan for winnowing corn." The traveller's mistaking the oar which Ulysses was carrying on his shoulder, was a sure indication of his ignorance in

καὶ τότε δὴ γαίῃ πήξας εὐῆρες ἐρετμὸν,
ῥέξας ἱερὰ καλὰ Ποσειδάωνι ἄνακτι 130
ἀρνειὸν ταῦρόν τε συῶν τ' ἐπιβήτορα κάπρον,
οἴκαδ' ἀποστείχειν ἔρδειν θ' ἱερὰς ἑκατόμβας
ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι, τοὶ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχουσιν,
πᾶσι μάλ' ἑξείης· θάνατος δέ τοι ἐξ ἁλὸς αὐτῷ
ἀβληχρὸς μάλα τοῖος ἐλεύσεται, ὅς κέ σε πέφνῃ 135
γήρα' ὕπο λιπαρῷ ἀρημένον· ἀμφὶ δὲ λαοὶ
ὄλβιοι ἔσσονται· τάδε τοι νημερτέα εἴπω.
  Ὣς ἔφατ'· αὐτὰρ ἐγώ μιν ἀμειβόμενος προσέειπον·
Τειρεσίη, τὰ μὲν ἄρ που ἐπέκλωσαν θεοὶ αὐτοί.
ἀλλ' ἄγε μοι τόδε εἰπὲ καὶ ἀτρεκέως κατάλεξον· 140
μητρὸς τήνδ' ὁρόω ψυχὴν κατατεθνηυίης·
ἡ δ' ἀκέουσ' ἧσται σχεδὸν αἵματος, οὐδ' ἑὸν υἱὸν
ἔτλη ἔσαντα ἰδεῖν οὐδὲ προτιμυθήσασθαι.
εἰπὲ, ἄναξ, πῶς κέν με ἀναγνοίη τὸν ἐόντα.
  Ὣς ἐφάμην· ὁ δέ μ' αὐτίκ' ἀμειβόμενος προσέειπεν· 145

maritime concerns; and therefore Ulysses instructing a nation, which before had been altogether ignorant of the sea and of naval affairs, and thereby inducing them to worship Neptune, would propitiate that god, who was still angry with him for blinding Polyphemus. v. 103.

134. ἐξ ἁλὸς, for ἔξω ἁλὸς, "remote from the sea," *i. e.* you shall not die in the sea, though you meet with great dangers therein. Some however suppose that θάνατος ἐξ ἁλὸς signifies a death which should come from the sea to him, or by means of the sea; and they say that Ulysses was slain by his son Telegonus, whom he had by Circe. He had wandered far in quest of his father, when arriving at Ithaca, and not being permitted to land, he fought with his opposers, who knew him not, and killed Ulysses. But this interpretation but very ill accords with the epithet, ἀβληχρὸς, *gentle, peaceful,* more like *sleep* than *death.*

144. πῶς κέν με ἀναγνοίη τὸν ἐόντα; "how will she recognise me and know that it is truly myself?" Thus in Od. ω. 158. οὐδέ τις ἡμείων δύνατο γνῶναί τὸν ἐόντα, "nor could any of us know that it was he himself."

ἄβληχρος. α euphonic. βληχρος — easy as a mode of death. βλαζω to render weak. βλαξ flaccid. ποταμοι βληχροι. Pind.

πεφνω, πεφενω, φενω, to kill.

ἀρημενος wearied, exhausted &c from ἀρχόμαι

λιπαρον γηρας a vigorous old age. λιπ. fat.

ἐς ἀντα adv. against.

προτιμυθέομαι. Dor. for προσμυθέομαι

κελλω — call, order, decree; fut. κελσω m. [illegible]

ἐνίσπω.

εἶμι εἶς εἶσι.

ἀλοφύρομαι — ὀλοπτω to pluck out the hair.

ζοφος, γνοφος, δνοφος, κνεφας, νεφος.

ῥηΐδιόν τοι ἔπος ἐρέω καὶ ἐνὶ φρεσὶ θήσω·
ὅντινα μέν κεν ἐᾷς νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων
αἵματος ἆσσον ἴμεν, ὅδε τοι νημερτὲς ἐνίψει·
ᾧ δέ κ' ἐπιφθονέοις, ὅδε τοι πάλιν εἶσιν ὀπίσσω.
Ὣς φαμένη ψυχὴ μὲν ἔβη δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω 150
Τειρεσίαο ἄνακτος, ἐπεὶ κατὰ θέσφατ' ἔλεξεν.
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν αὐτοῦ μένον ἔμπεδον, ὄφρ' ἐπὶ μήτηρ
ἤλυθε καὶ πίεν αἷμα κελαινεφές· αὐτίκα δ' ἔγνω
καί μ' ὀλοφυρομένη ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα·
Τέκνον ἐμὸν, πῶς ἦλθες ὑπὸ ζόφον ἠερόεντα, 155
ζωὸς ἐών; χαλεπὸν δὲ τάδε ζωοῖσιν ὁρᾶσθαι.
[μέσσῳ γὰρ μεγάλοι ποταμοὶ καὶ δεινὰ ῥέεθρα,
Ὠκεανὸς μὲν πρῶτα, τὸν οὔπως ἔστι περῆσαι
πεζὸν ἐόντ', ἢν μήτις ἔχῃ εὐεργέα νῆα.]
ἦ νῦν δὴ Τροίηθεν ἀλώμενος ἐνθάδ' ἱκάνεις 160
νηΐ τε καὶ ἑτάροισι, πολὺν χρόνον; οὐδέ πω ἦλθες
εἰς Ἰθάκην; οὐδ' εἶδες ἐνὶ μεγάροισι γυναῖκα;
Ὣς ἔφατ'· αὐτὰρ ἐγώ μιν ἀμειβόμενος προσέειπον·
μῆτερ ἐμὴ, χρειώ με κατήγαγεν εἰς Ἀΐδαο,
ψυχῇ χρησόμενον Θηβαίου Τειρεσίαο. 165

155. Compare Virg. Æn. vi. 531. "Sed te qui vivum casus, age, fare vicissim, Attulerint; pelagine venis erroribus actus, An monitu Divûm? an quæ te fortuna fatigat, Ut tristes sine sole domos, loca turbida, adires?" And indeed, if the whole account of the descent of Æneas into Hades were read and compared with this descent of Ulysses, they would throw great light upon each other.

158. *πρῶτα*, "especially, above all."

165 *χρησόμενον*, "to consult." The middle voice often signifies, "to get any thing done for one's self." Thus in Il. I. it is said of Chryses, *λυσόμενος θύγατρα*, "to get his daughter released by Agamemnon, on the payment of a ransom," *i.e.* "to ransom his daughter." Whereas, of Agamemnon it is said, *Οὐδ' ἀπέλυσε θύγατρα*, sc. *τῷ Χρύσῃ*. So *διδάσκειν τὸν υἱὸν*, "to instruct one's son," *διδάσκεσθαι*, "to get him instructed by others;"

οὐ γάρ πω σχεδὸν ἦλθον Ἀχαιΐδος, οὐδέ πω ἀμῆς
γῆς ἐπέβην, ἀλλ' αἰὲν ἔχων ἀλάλημαι ὀϊζὺν,
ἐξ οὗ τὰ πρώτισθ' ἑπόμην Ἀγαμέμνονι δίῳ
Ἴλιον εἰς εὔπωλον, ἵνα Τρώεσσι μαχοίμην.
ἀλλ' ἄγε μοι τόδε εἰπὲ καὶ ἀτρεκέως κατάλεξον· 170
τίς νύ σε Κὴρ ἐδάμασσε τανηλεγέος θανάτοιο;
ἦ δολιχὴ νοῦσος; ἦ Ἄρτεμις ἰοχέαιρα
οἷς ἀγανοῖς βελέεσσιν ἐποιχομένη κατέπεφνεν;
εἰπὲ δέ μοι πατρός τε καὶ υἱέος, ὃν κατέλειπον,
ἢ ἔτι πὰρ κείνοισιν ἐμὸν γέρας, ἦέ τις ἤδη 175
ἀνδρῶν ἄλλος ἔχει, ἐμὲ δ' οὐκέτι φασὶ νέεσθαι.
εἰπὲ δέ μοι μνηστῆς ἀλόχου βουλήν τε νόον τε,
ἠὲ μένει παρὰ παιδὶ καὶ ἔμπεδα πάντα φυλάσσει
ἦ ἤδη μιν ἔγημεν Ἀχαιῶν ὅστις ἄριστος.

χρῆσαι, "to utter a response," χρήσασθαι, "to get a response uttered, *i. e.* to consult an oracle or a prophet." See Theatre of the Greeks, on the principal usages of the middle voice of the Greek verb.

171. τίς Κήρ, "what kind of fate." That τίς is here used in the signification of ποῖος, "what kind of fate?" appears evident from what follows. It occurs in the same sense and in the same expression, v. 398 of this book.

172. Ἄρτεμις, "Diana." Homer attributes the sudden deaths of men to Apollo—of women to Diana.

174. εἰπὲ δέ μοι πατρός, "and tell me of my father." The genitive is sometimes put with substantives and verbs absolutely, where otherwise περὶ with the genitive is used. Thus Thucyd. viii. 15. ἀγγελία τῆς Χίου, "the report *concerning* Chios." Soph. Œd. Col. 307. κλύων σου δεῦρ' ἀφίξεται ταχύ: "hearing of, about, or concerning you, he will come hither quickly." Matth. Gr. Gr. §. cccxx. 2.

176. ἐμὲ δ' οὐκέτι φασὶ νέεσθαι, "and they say that I shall no more return." It is to be carefully observed that the negative belongs to νέεσθαι, not to φασί: and οὐ φημὶ with an infinitive mood, means, "*I say that I will not do it,*" and never, "I do not say that I will not do it."

179. ἦ ἤδη, κ. τ. λ. "or has he, whoever is noblest of the Achæans, already married her." The active voice γαμεῖν is used when speaking of a man, the middle voice γαμεῖσθαι, of a woman. The difference is very

ἀλάλημαι ἀλάλησθαι ἀλαλήμενος — wander. defect.

εὔπωλος famed for its colts.

πανηγυρις, ταναος, τεινω; λεγω.

ἴος, χαίρω.

ἀ euph. γάνος splendor, pleasure. causing easy death.

ἕκων ἕκηλος a termination. unmolested.

τέμενος (τό) the section of land belong.g to a chief, warrior, &c

ἀλεγυνεῖν to take care of, & prepare. – fr. ἀλεγεινος. ἀλγεινος – [illegible]

δέμνιον a bed.

χλαῖνα – a man's garment: χλαινς common to

ἄλεκεν – dif. from τρίβων in Aristoph. Vesp. 1132,

synon: with ἱμάτιον in do. 408. ἦλανος dor

for λῆνος wool; χ the aspirate of γ: – so λήμη

rheum from the eye, γλήμη; λιαρος, χλιαρος tepid.

ῥῆγος a seat, cushion, &c from ῥάκος a shred,

βρέχω, – whence ῥέγμα dye, paint, &c.

σιγαλόεις bright – σίαλος a fat-hog; hog's lard.

κόνι Ion for κονι κόνις ashes properly, fr

κέω, κείω, καίω.

ὀπώρα the season of the dog-days. – ὄπις wrath dia.

ἀχέων dor for ἠχέων – moaning

ἀέξω dif. form of αὔξω.

πάντη, entirely, always.

Ὣς ἐφάμην· ἡ δ' αὐτίκ' ἀμείβετο πότνια μήτηρ· 180
καὶ λίην κείνη γε μένει τετληότι θυμῷ
σοῖσιν ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν· ὀϊζυραὶ δέ οἱ αἰεὶ
φθίνουσιν νύκτες τε καὶ ἤματα δακρυχεούσῃ.
σὸν δ' οὔπω τις ἔχει καλὸν γέρας· ἀλλὰ ἕκηλος
Τηλέμαχος τεμένη νέμεται καὶ δαῖτας ἐΐσας 185
δαίνυται, ἃς ἐπέοικε δικασπόλον ἄνδρ' ἀλεγύνειν·
πάντες γὰρ καλέουσι. πατὴρ δὲ σὸς αὐτόθι μίμνει
ἀγρῷ, οὐδὲ πόλινδε κατέρχεται· οὐδέ οἱ εὐναὶ
δέμνια καὶ χλαῖναι καὶ ῥήγεα σιγαλόεντα·
ἀλλ' ὅγε χεῖμα μὲν εὕδει ὅθι δμῶες ἐνὶ οἴκῳ 190
ἐν κόνι ἄγχι πυρὸς, κακὰ δὲ χροῒ εἵματα εἷται·
αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν ἔλθῃσι θέρος τεθαλυῖά τ' ὀπώρη,
πάντῃ οἱ κατὰ γουνὸν ἀλωῆς οἰνοπέδοιο
φύλλων κεκλιμένων χθαμαλαὶ βεβλήαται εὐναί·
ἔνθ' ὅγε κεῖτ' ἀχέων, μέγα δὲ φρεσὶ πένθος ἀέξει, 195
σὸν πότμον γοόων· χαλεπὸν δ' ἐπὶ γῆρας ἱκάνει.

clearly shown in verses 272, 273, of this book. There was no name in the time of Homer which comprehended all the inhabitants of Greece: under the title of Ἀχάιοι, or Achæans, were included only the people of the southern part of Greece.

181. κείνη, "she," *i.e.* your wife Penelope.

184. ἀλλὰ ἕκηλος Τηλ. κ. τ. λ. "But Telemachus possesses his lands in peace, and feasts upon equal feasts, with which it is fitting to entertain a judge and a prince." ἃς is governed by κατὰ understood, and ἄνδρα is the accusative case *after* ἀλεγύνειν; and the passage alludes to the custom of the ancients of inviting their princes and judges to all their public entertainments. The death of Anticlea seems to have happened prior to the intrusion of the suitors, and the havoc they made of the substance of Ulysses.

194. κεκλιμένων, "strewed upon the ground," perf. pass. part. from κλίνω.

βεβλήαται, 3rd. pers. plur. of the perf. pass. of βάλλω, for βεβληνται, which is for βεβλημέναι εἰσί. Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 198.

οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἐγὼν ὀλόμην καὶ πότμον ἐπέσπον·
οὔτε μέ γ' ἐν μεγάροισιν ἐΰσκοπος Ἰοχέαιρα
οἷς ἀγανοῖς βελέεσσιν ἐποιχομένη κατέπεφνεν·
οὔτε τις οὖν μοι νοῦσος ἐπήλυθεν, ἥτε μάλιστα 200
τηκεδόνι στυγερῇ μελέων ἐξείλετο θυμόν·
ἀλλά με σός τε πόθος σά τε μήδεα, φαίδιμ' Ὀδυσσεῦ,
σή τ' ἀγανοφροσύνη μελιηδέα θυμὸν ἀπηύρα. +
Ὣς ἔφατ'· αὐτὰρ ἔγωγ' ἔθελον φρεσὶ μερμηρίξας
μητρὸς ἐμῆς ψυχὴν ἑλέειν κατατεθνηυίης· 205
τρίς μὲν ἐφωρμήθην, ἑλέειν τέ με θυμὸς ἀνώγει,
τρὶς δέ μοι ἐκ χειρῶν σκιῇ εἴκελον ἢ καὶ ὀνείρῳ
ἔπτατ'· ἐμοὶ δ' ἄχος ὀξὺ γενέσκετο κηρόθι μᾶλλον·
καί μιν φωνήσας ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδων·
Μήτηρ *ἐμὴ, τί νύ μ' οὐ μίμνεις ἑλέειν μεμαῶτα,* 210
ὄφρα καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο, φίλας περὶ χεῖρε βαλόντε
ἀμφοτέρω κρυεροῖο τεταρπώμεσθα γόοιο;
ἤ τί μοι εἴδωλον τόδ' ἀγαυὴ Περσεφόνεια

197. "And thus," *i.e.* through grief on your account. The comparison is between her grief and that of Laertes, not between the effects of it. His grief enfeebles and wears him out gradually; hers impelled her at once to an act of desperation. She is silent, however, concerning the manner of her death, on account of the guilty nature of it, which would have shocked her son, had she owned it. She had hanged herself in consequence of hearing a false report of the death of Ulysses.

202. The genitive frequently expresses the *object* of an action or feeling expressed in another noun, and is used *objectively*, as in Latin—a relation which in English is sometimes expressed by prepositions; as *πόθος υἱοῦ*, *desiderium filii*, not, "thy son's regret," *i.e.* which the son feels, but "regret for the son." In a similar manner, the pronouns possessive are put *objectively*, though rarely, in the same sense; as *σὸς πόθος*, Od. λ. 201. not "thy regret," but "my regret for thee." Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 213 and 466, ii.

208. *γενέσκετο*, Ionic for *ἐγένετο*, "arose."

μᾶλλον, "more (than I can speak.)"

ἴπεσπον ἐφέπω [illegible] — brought on.
τήκω, melt, waste away; — consumption.

tender affection for thee.
ἀγανοφροσύνη gentleness of disposition.
ἀπηύρα 3rd imperf. from ἀπαυράω wh does not occur.
Mostly with acc of person & thing; sometimes dat, & sometimes
gen of person. — some say Aol: for ἀφαιρέω.
μερμ. intrans: acc. μερίζω — [illegible]
ἄνωγει prompted me. [illegible] 2 aor. mid. [illegible]
μήρυω from μέρα as [illegible] from [illegible]
μάω, desire ardently.
κρυερός cold, chilling, κρύος frost.
τέρπομαι to be delighted by some external circumstance
ἥδομαι to feel an internal satisfaction. — Hemsterhuis
ἀγανός, ἀγαυὸς — illustrious. amiable.

κακάμορος or κακόμορος unfortunate.

ἀπαφίσκω ἀπαφάω to delude, dupe; — ἅπτω, ἁφή.

ς — a sinew, strength. — spirits ?

ἠΰτε adv: Ion: & Epic poet: for εὖτε so as, as, &c de=
rived from ἠ, εὖτε as ὡς ὅτε.

ρόως φως. λα, λι, λιαν, cognate aug. particles.

ἀριστῆες Ion from ἀριστεύς as ἄριστος.

ολλης — ἅμα, εἴλω.

μελαινος a dialectic variation of μελας, μελαινα.

ἀποπταμαι πτημι — the flitting dream.

ποταομαι to fly. πετομαι.

ταρυηκης. long-pointed. ταρυω, τεινω, ακη.

πηχυς — my stuck thigh.

ιμηϊσαν. imperf. ἵημι, εἶμι to.

ὤτρυν', ὄφρ' ἔτι μᾶλλον ὀδυρόμενος στεναχίζω;
"Ὣς ἐφάμην· ἡ δ' αὐτίκ' ἀμείβετο πότνια μήτηρ· 215
ὤ μοι, τέκνον ἐμὸν, περὶ πάντων κάμμορε φωτῶν,
οὔτι σε Περσεφόνεια, Διὸς θυγάτηρ, ἀπαφίσκει,
ἀλλ' αὕτη δίκη ἐστὶ βροτῶν, ὅτε κέν τε θάνωσιν·
οὐ γὰρ ἔτι σάρκας τε καὶ ὀστέα ἶνες ἔχουσιν,
ἀλλὰ τὰ μέν τε πυρὸς κρατερὸν μένος αἰθομένοιο 220
δαμνᾷ, ἐπεί κε πρῶτα λίπῃ λεύκ' ὀστέα θυμός·
ψυχὴ δ' ἠΰτ' ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται·
ἀλλὰ φόωσδε τάχιστα λιλαίεο· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα
ἴσθ', ἵνα καὶ μετόπισθε τεῇ εἴπῃσθα γυναικί.
Νῶϊ μὲν ὣς ἐπέεσσιν ἀμειβόμεθ'· αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες 225
ἤλυθον—ὤτρυνεν γὰρ ἀγαυὴ Περσεφόνεια—
ὅσσαι ἀριστήων ἄλοχοι ἔσαν ἠδὲ θύγατρες·
αἱ δ' ἀμφ' αἷμα κελαινὸν ἀολλέες ἠγερέθοντο.
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ βούλευον, ὅπως ἐρέοιμι ἑκάστην·
ἥδε δέ μοι κατὰ θυμὸν ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή· 230
σπασσάμενος τανύηκες ἄορ παχέος παρὰ μηροῦ
οὐκ εἴων πιέειν ἅμα πάσας αἷμα κελαινόν.
αἱ δὲ προμνηστῖναι ἐπήϊσαν, ἠδὲ ἑκάστη

216. *κάμμορε*, for *κακόμορε*, *i. e.* *κακόμοιρε*, "ill-fated, unfortunate;" *περὶ* "beyond, above all men."

218. *ἀλλ' αὕτη δίκη ἐστί*, "but this is the lot of mortals, when, &c." *Δίκη* is used in the same sense. Od. xiv. 59. where Eumæus says, "I have but little to give to you; *ἡ γὰρ δμώων δίκη ἐστί*, for this (viz. to have but little,) is the lot of servants."

220. *τὰ μὲν* "these," *i. e.* *σάρκας, τε καὶ ὀστέα*, opposed to *ψυχὴ δ'* in v. 222. When the particle *μὲν* in one clause, has *δὲ* corresponding to it in another, it is not to be translated into English; *τὰ μὲν*, "these," (not "these indeed,") .... *ψυχὴ δὲ*, "but the soul."

223. *λιλαίεο*, (for *λιλαίου*, imperat. of *λιλαίομαι*,) "desire, *i. e.* strive *to come* to the light;" *ἱκέσθαι* is understood.

233. *προμνηστῖναι*, "one after another;" the Greek scholiast says, *προμενετῖνοι, οἱ προμένοντες ἀλλήλους, καὶ μὴ ἅμα πάντες προϊόντες*; "those who wait for one another, and

ὃν γόνον ἐξαγόρευεν· ἐγὼ δ' ἐρέεινον ἁπάσας·
"Ἔνθ' ἤτοι πρώτην Τυρὼ ἴδον εὐπατέρειαν, 235
ἣ φάτο Σαλμωνῆος ἀμύμονος ἔκγονος εἶναι,
φῆ δὲ Κρηθῆος γυνὴ ἔμμεναι Αἰολίδαο·
ἣ Ποταμοῦ ἠράσσατ', Ἐνιπῆος θείοιο,
ὃς πολὺ κάλλιστος ποταμῶν ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἵησιν·
καί ῥ' ἐπ' Ἐνιπῆος πωλέσκετο καλὰ ῥέεθρα· 240
τῷ δ' ἄρ' ἐεισάμενος γαιήοχος Ἐννοσίγαιος
ἐν προχοῇς ποταμοῦ παρελέξατο δινήεντος·
πορφύρεον δ' ἄρα κῦμα περιστάθη, οὔρεϊ ἶσον,
κυρτωθέν· κρύψεν δὲ θεὸν θνητήν τε γυναῖκα.
[λῦσε δὲ παρθενίην ζώνην, κατὰ δ' ὕπνον ἔχευεν.] 245
αὐτὰρ ἐπεί ῥ' ἐτέλεσσε θεὸς φιλοτήσια ἔργα,
ἔν τ' ἄρα οἱ φῦ χειρὶ ἔπος τ' ἔφατ' ἔκ τ' ὀνόμαζεν.
Χαῖρε, γύναι, φιλότητι, περιπλομένου δ' ἐνιαυτοῦ
τέξεις ἀγλαὰ τέκνα· ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἀποφώλιοι εὐναὶ
ἀθανάτων· σὺ δὲ τοὺς κομέειν ἀτιταλλέμεναί τε. 250
νῦν δ' ἔρχευ πρὸς δῶμα καὶ ἴσχεο, μηδ' ὀνομήνῃς·

go not all at once, but one after another;" from *προμένω*, or *προμενέω*, f. *νέσω*, and *νήσω*; from which last form comes *προμενηστῖνος*, and by syncope, *προμνηστῖνος*.

234. *ὃν γόνον ἐξαγ.* "told me accurately of her family," *i.e.* of what family she was born; *γόνος*, which in general signifies "a son, a descendant," here means, "a race, or family;" as in Od. xix. 166. *οὐκ ἔτ' ἀπολλήξεις τὸν ἐμὸν γόνον ἐξερέουσα*; "will you not yet cease asking me of my birth, or parentage?"

236. *ἣ φάτο .... ἔκγονος εἶναι*, "who said that she was the daughter ......" Here *ἔκγονος* is the nominative case, according to the rule given v. 30; if Ulysses had said, "she told me that some one else was the daughter ...." it would have been *ἔκγονον*.

239. *ἵησιν*, sc. *ὕδωρ*, "sends forth its water," *i.e.* "flows."

244. *κυρτωθὲν*, "curled over them, like an *arched* or vaulted bridal chamber."

247. *ἔν τ' ἄρα οἱ φῦ χειρί*, "and he grew to her hand," *i.e.* "his hand grew, as it were, to hers, so heartily did he clasp it." *Ἐνεφῦ*, imperf. from *ἔμφυμι*.

ἐν πατης.

πωλεσκομαι πολεομαι to frequent.

προχοη the mouth of a river.

κυρτος bent, convex.

ἀπο, ὀφελος — or ἀπο φωλεος, a cave, so hidden, ineffective

κομεω to take care of.

ἀτιταλλω to rear delicately, fondly, &c ἀταλος tender

Tyro, d. of Salmoneus, king of Elis.
There were 3 rivers called Enipeus — 1. Macedonia, 2. in Thessaly, 3. in Elis.

ὑποκυσω — having become pregnant.

πολυς ἀρην — rich in sheep.

ἱππος χαρμη battle.

ἰαυω to sleep.

ἀγκοινη as ἀγκων the elbow.

θρασυς μενω — the patient. Coeur de lion.

ἀτειρης indefatigable. τειρω.

αὐτὰρ ἐγώ τοί εἰμι Ποσειδάων ἐνοσίχθων.
῝Ως εἰπὼν ὑπὸ πόντον ἐδύσατο κυμαίνοντα.
ἡ δ' ὑποκυσαμένη Πελίην τέκε καὶ Νηλῆα·
τὼ κρατερὼ θεράποντε Διὸς μεγάλοιο γενέσθην 255
ἀμφοτέρω· Πελίης μὲν ἐν εὐρυχόρῳ Ἰαωλκῷ
ναῖε πολύῤῥηνος· ὁ δ' ἄρ' ἐν Πύλῳ ἠμαθόεντι.
τοὺς δ' ἑτέρους Κρηθῆϊ τέκεν βασίλεια γυναικῶν,
Αἴσονά τ' ἠδὲ Φέρητ' Ἀμυθάονά θ' ἱππιοχάρμην.
Τὴν δὲ μέτ' Ἀντιόπην ἴδον, Ἀσωποῖο θύγατρα, 260
ἣ δὴ καὶ Διὸς εὔχετ' ἐν ἀγκοίνῃσιν ἰαῦσαι·
καὶ ῥ' ἔτεκεν δύο παῖδ', Ἀμφίονά τε Ζῆθόν τε,
οἳ πρῶτοι Θήβης ἕδος ἔκτισαν ἑπταπύλοιο,
πύργωσάν τ'· ἐπεὶ οὐ μὲν ἀπύργωτόν γ' ἐδύναντο
ναιέμεν εὐρύχορον Θήβην, κρατερώ περ ἐόντε. 265
Τὴν δὲ μέτ' Ἀλκμήνην ἴδον, Ἀμφιτρύωνος ἄκοιτιν,
ἥ ῥ' Ἡρακλῆα θρασυμέμνονα, θυμολέοντα,
γείνατ', ἐν ἀγκοίνῃσι Διὸς μεγάλοιο μιγεῖσα·
καὶ Μεγάρην, Κρείοντος ὑπερθύμοιο θύγατρα,
τὴν ἔχεν Ἀμφιτρύωνος υἱός, μένος αἰὲν ἀτειρής. 270

254. Πελίης. After the death of Cretheus, Pelias unjustly took possession of the kingdom of Iolchos, which by right belonged to Æson, the son of Cretheus. When afterwards Jason, Æson's son, came to Iolchos and asserted his right to the crown, Pelias, conscious that his claims were well founded, and wishing therefore to divert his attention, told him that he would voluntarily resign the crown to him, if he would go to Colchis to avenge the death of Phryxus, the son of Athænas, whom Æetes had cruelly murdered; and this gave rise to the celebrated expedition of the Argonauts.

269. Μεγάρην. Megara was the daughter of Creon king of Thebes, given in marriage to Hercules, because he had delivered the Thebans from the tyranny of the Orchomenians. Some years afterwards, Hercules being rendered delirious by Juno, who was displeased with him on account of the murder of Lycas, killed Megara and the three children he had by her in a fit of madness, thinking them to be wild beasts.

Μητέρα τ' Οἰδιπόδαο ἴδον, καλὴν Ἐπικάστην,
ἣ μέγα ἔργον ἔρεξεν ἀϊδρείῃσι νόοιο,
γημαμένη ᾧ υἱεῖ· ὁ δ' ὃν πατέρ' ἐξεναρίξας
γῆμεν. ἄφαρ δ' ἀνάπυστα θεοὶ θέσαν ἀνθρώποισιν.
ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἐν Θήβῃ πολυηράτῳ ἄλγεα πάσχων 275
Καδμείων ἤνασσε θεῶν ὀλοὰς διὰ βουλάς·
ἡ δ' ἔβη εἰς Ἀΐδαο πυλάρταο κρατεροῖο,
ἁψαμένη βρόχον αἰπὺν ἀφ' ὑψηλοῖο μελάθρου,
ᾧ ἄχεϊ σχομένη· τῷ δ' ἄλγεα κάλλιπ' ὀπίσσω
πολλὰ μάλ', ὅσσα τε μητρὸς Ἐρινύες ἐκτελέουσιν. 280
Καὶ Χλῶριν, εἶδον περικαλλέα· τήν ποτε Νηλεὺς
γῆμεν ἑὸν διὰ κάλλος, ἐπεὶ πόρε μυρία ἕδνα,
ὁπλοτάτην κούρην Ἀμφίονος Ἰασίδαο,

272. *ἣ μέγα ἔργον ἔρεξεν*, "who committed a heinous crime." *Ἔργον* is used in the same sense book xii. 373, where Ulysses says, *οἱ δ' ἕταροι μέγα ἔργον ἐμητίσαντο*, "but my companions have perpetrated a great crime," viz. in slaying the oxen which were consecrated to Phœbus. Epicasta is more generally known by the name of Jocasta.

273—4. *γημαμένη .... γῆμεν*. The distinction between the active and middle voices of *γαμέω* is very clearly marked in these two lines. See note on v. 179.

275. *πολυηράτῳ* (from *πολὺ* and *εραω*) "very lovely," or (from *πολὺ* and *ἀρὰ*) "very much to be prayed for, very desirable." But *ἀρὰ* signifies "a curse," and "a misfortune," as well as "a prayer;" and Damm thinks that the context requires *πολυηράτῳ* here to mean *τῇ πολλὰς ἀρὰς*, i. e. *βλάβας, θεόθεν ὑπομεινάσῃ*, "which has suffered many curses or misfortunes from the gods."

277. *εἰς Ἀΐδαο*, sc. *δόμον*, "to Pluto's abode." The word which governs the genitive is often wanting. These words are, besides *υἱὸς*, e. g. *Θουκυδίδης ὁ Ὀλόρου*, especially *οἶκος* or *δῶμα*, ex. gr. Od. ii. 195. *μητέρα ἣν ἐς πατρὸς ἀνωγέτω ἀπονέεσθαι*, "let him bid his mother return to her father's." Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 379.

278. *ἁψαμένη βρόχον αἰπὺν*, "having fastened a noose on high." Euripides, in his tragedy of the Phœnician Virgins, says that Jocasta went out of the city of Thebes with the intention of preventing her sons Eteocles and Polynices from fighting; but coming too late, and finding that they had slain each other, in a paroxysm of grief she seized the sword of one of them and killed herself.

ἀίδρεια ἀ ἴδρις ἀ εἴδω — ignorance.

ἐξεναρίζω to kill — to strip. to spoil.

ἀνάπυστος publicly investigated, known, &c.

ὄλοος ὄλλυμι.

πύλη ἄρω — the gate-fastener.— the safe-keeper.

αἰπυς altus ἀπό?

μυρίος manifold: in plural ῡ. myriad.

ὅπλος obs, but exists in ὑπέροπλος, ὑπεροπλία, from ἕπω

youngest.

ἶφι bravely: occurs frequently in proper names;— probably an old dat. of ἴς.— or neut. of obs. ἶφις.

ἀγέρωχος pre-eminent; ἀ aug. γερας. or ἀγερω grego.

ἐπὶ δ' and besides, in addn. to these.

περι ναιῶ — the neighboring "gentry."

οὐδέ τι but never a jot.

ἀργαλέος vexatious; from ἄλγος λ in ρ mutato.
ἀλγάλεος not in use.

θόωκος i.q. θῶκος.

φυσίζοος creative.

Minyae the people of Orchomenos in Beotia, so called from Minyas a king of the country. There was another Orchomenos in Arcadia.

ὅς ποτ' ἐν Ὀρχομενῷ Μινυηΐῳ ἶφι ἄνασσεν·
ἡ δὲ Πύλου βασίλευε, τέκεν δέ οἱ ἀγλαὰ τέκνα, 285
Νέστορά τε Χρομίον τε Περικλύμενόν τ' ἀγέρωχον.
τοῖσι δ' ἐπ' ἰφθίμην Πηρὼ τέκε, θαῦμα βροτοῖσιν,
τὴν πάντες μνώοντο περικτίται· οὐδέ τι Νηλεὺς
τῷ ἐδίδου, ὃς μὴ ἕλικας βόας εὐρυμετώπους
ἐκ Φυλάκης ἐλάσειε βίης Ἰφικληείης 290
ἀργαλέας· τὰς δ' οἶος ὑπέσχετο μάντις ἀμύμων
ἐξελάαν· χαλεπὴ δὲ θεοῦ κατὰ Μοῖρ' ἐπέδησεν,
δεσμοί τ' ἀργαλέοι καὶ βουκόλοι ἀγροιῶται.
ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ μῆνές τε καὶ ἡμέραι ἐξετελεῦντο,
ἂψ περιτελλομένου ἔτεος καὶ ἐπήλυθον ὧραι, 295
καὶ τότε δή μιν ἔλυσε βίη Ἰφικληείη,
θέσφατα πάντ' εἰπόντα· Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή.
Καὶ Λήδην εἶδον, τὴν Τυνδαρέου παράκοιτιν,
ἥ ῥ' ὑπὸ Τυνδαρέῳ κρατερόφρονε γείνατο παῖδε,
Κάστορά θ' ἱππόδαμον καὶ πὺξ ἀγαθὸν Πολυδεύκεα· 300
τοὺς ἄμφω ζωοὺς κατέχει φυσίζοος αἶα·

290. *βίης Ἰφικληείης*, "of the powerful Iphiclus." The substantives *βιά*, *ἴς*, *μένος*, are very frequently used in circumlocution; as *βιή Ἡρακληείη*, *Αἰνειάο βιή*, *ἴς Τηλεμάχοιο*, *κ. τ. λ.* for *Ἡρακλῆς*, *Αἰνείας*, *Τηλέμαχος*, but with the collateral idea of "strength" or "power," as in Latin; Perrupit Acheronta Herculeus labor. Hor. Od. i. 3. 36. Narratur et prisci Catonis sæpe mero caluisse virtus. Id. Od. iii. 21. 11. See Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 430. 6.

291. *μάντις ἀμύμων*, Melampus. His brother Bias, who was one of the suitors of Pero, engaged him to steal the oxen of Iphiclus and deliver them to him. Melampus was caught in the attempt and imprisoned, and nothing but his services as a soothsayer and a physician to Iphiclus, would have saved him from death. However, after a year he so much pleased Iphiclus by explaining to him certain mysterious oracles, (*θέσφασα πάντ' εἰπόντα*,) that he not only obtained his liberty, but the oxen also, and with them he compelled Neleus to give Pero in marriage to Bias.

οἳ καὶ νέρθεν γῆς τιμὴν πρὸς Ζηνὸς ἔχοντες
ἄλλοτε μὲν ζώουσ' ἑτερήμεροι, ἄλλοτε δ' αὖτε
τεθνᾶσιν· τιμὴν δὲ λελόγχασ' ἶσα θεοῖσιν.
Τὴν δὲ μέτ' Ἰφιμέδειαν, Ἀλωῆος παράκοιτιν, 305
εἴσιδον, ἣ δὴ φάσκε Ποσειδάωνι μιγῆναι·
καί ῥ' ἔτεκεν δύο παῖδε, μινυνθαδίω δὲ γενέσθην,
Ὦτόν τ' ἀντίθεον, τηλεκλειτόν τ' Ἐφιάλτην·
οὓς δὴ μηκίστους θρέψε ζείδωρος Ἄρουρα
καὶ πολὺ καλλίστους, μετά γε κλυτὸν Ὠρίωνα. 310
ἐννέωροι γὰρ τοίγε καὶ ἐννεαπήχεες ἦσαν

303. *ἄλλοτε μὲν ζώουσ' ἑτερήμεροι*, "at one time live, and again at another time are dead, on alternate days." Castor having been slain by Idas, Pollux avenged his death by killing Idas; and, as he was immortal and tenderly attached to his brother, he entreated Jupiter to restore Castor to life, or to be deprived himself of immortality. Jupiter permitted Castor to share the immortality of his brother; and consequently, as long as the one was upon earth, so long was the other in the infernal regions, and they alternately lived and died every day. Thus the mythologist allegorized the alternate appearance and disappearance of the two stars called Castor and Pollux, one of which declines into the southern hemisphere, while the other is seen in ours.

305. *Ἰφιμέδειαν*, Iphimedia, the daughter of Triopas, and wife of the giant Aloeus, was the mother of Otus and Ephialtes. These two formed the scheme of dethroning Jupiter, and to attain their object placed Ossa and Pelion upon Olympus. From thence they menaced the gods of heaven; presumed to demand the company of Juno and Diana; and bound Mars for thirteen months with chains, in a prison of brass, for having resisted their proceedings. The gods finding it impossible to overcome them by force, Diana changed herself into a dog, and bounded upon them, while in the act of driving their chariot. This expedient had the desired effect; for Otus and Ephialtes, in attempting to discharge their arrows at the supposed dog, killed each other, and were precipitated by Apollo into Tartarus.

310. *μετά γε κλυτὸν Ὠρίωνα*, "at least next to the celebrated Orion." Orion, the son of Neptune and Euryale, daughter of Minos, was famous for his beauty and gigantic stature. With an accusative *μετὰ* frequently signifies "after, next to." *οἱ νόμοι μετὰ τοὺς θεοὺς σώζουσι πόλιν*, "the laws after the gods preserve the state."

λαγχάνω, εἴληχα, dor. & ion. λέλογχα, so also ἔλαχον.

μίνυνθα, adv. from μινὺς, q.d. μικρός. –
brief – short – lived.

ζείδωρος bestower of ζεία, ζέα, corn. triticum
speltam some say "rye." μῆκος height.
ἐννέωρος at the age of nine.

ὀργυια a fathom; space between the extended hands.
ὀρέγω.

ἀπειλήσετην 3. dual Ion. & by syncope for ἠπειλη=
=σάτην; from ἀπειλέω to threaten; some read
here ἀπειλείτην, Ion. & poet. imperf.

φύλοπις φυλον a band ὄψ as βοη, – war – war-cry.
πολυς, ἀίσσω, – here gen. of πολυαιξ.

[illegible]ια, desire.

κροταφος the temple, from κροτεω, [illegible] throbbing.
ἴουλος the first down on the cheek, – also a sheaf
of corn; εἴλω volvo.

λαχνη wool, woolly hair; γενυς chin.

εὖρος, ἀτὰρ μῆκός γε γενέσθην ἐννεόργυιοι.
οἵ ῥα καὶ ἀθανάτοισιν ἀπειλήτην ἐν Ὀλύμπῳ
φυλόπιδα στήσειν πολυάϊκος πολέμοιο·
Ὄσσαν ἐπ' Οὐλύμπῳ μέμασαν θέμεν, αὐτὰρ ἐπ' Ὄσσῃ 315
Πήλιον εἰνοσίφυλλον, ἵν' οὐρανὸς ἀμβατὸς εἴη.
καὶ νύ κεν ἐξετέλεσσαν, εἰ ἥβης μέτρον ἵκοντο·
ἀλλ' ὄλεσεν Διὸς υἱὸς, ὃν ἠΰκομος τέκε Λητὼ,
ἀμφοτέρω, πρίν σφωϊν ὑπὸ κροτάφοισιν ἰούλους
ἀνθῆσαι πυκάσαι τε γένυς εὐανθέϊ λάχνῃ. 320

Φαίδρην τε Πρόκριν τε ἴδον καλήν τ' Ἀριάδνην,
κούρην Μίνωος ὀλοόφρονος, ἥν ποτε Θησεὺς
ἐκ Κρήτης ἐς γουνὸν Ἀθηνάων ἱεράων

315. *ὄσσαν ἐπ' Οὐλύμπῳ.* Strabo takes notice of this judgment of Homer in placing the mountains in this order: they all stand in Macedonia; Olympus is the largest, and therefore he makes it the basis on which Ossa stands, that being next to Olympus in magnitude; and Pelion being the least, is placed above Ossa; and thus they rise pyramidically. Virgil follows a different regulation. See Æn. vi. 784. Pope.

316. *εἰνοσίφυλλον*, literally, "shaking its leaves," which may either imply "leafy, woody," or "lofty and exposed to the wind which shakes the leaves." The latter is the interpretation given by Damm.

317. *εἰ ἥβης μέτρον,* "to manhood." On these words Ernesti says: *μέτρον ἥβης* est ipsa *pubertas*, ut *μέτρα θαλάσσης*, ipsum mare.

321. *Φαίδρην.* Phædra, daughter of Minos and Pasiphae, and wife of Theseus. Her attachment to Hippolytus has been a favourite subject...... which she effected by hanging herself, p. 323. line 6—17.

Πρόκριν. Procris, daughter of Erectheus, king of Athens, and wife of Cephalus, king of Thessaly. She ultimately fell a victim to the jealousy excited by her fondness for her husband, who, she had been informed, was in the habit of visiting .... (Ovid's Met. b. vii. p. 323, line 37—44.)

Ἀριάδνην. Ariadne, daughter of Minos and Pasiphae, and sister of Phædra, became enamoured of Theseus, when he visited that country for the purpose of destroying the Minotaur, and, by some ingenious contrivance with a clue of thread, enabled him, after killing that monster, to extricate himself from the labyrinth. Theseus married Ariadne, and then, accompanied by her, left Crete for Athens. Their ship

ἦγε μὲν, οὐδ' ἀπόνητο· πάρος δέ μιν Ἄρτεμις ἔκτα
Δίῃ ἐν ἀμφιρύτῃ, Διονύσου μαρτυρίῃσιν, 325
Μαῖράν τε Κλυμένην τε ἴδον στυγερήν τ' Ἐριφύλην,
ἣ χρυσὸν φίλου ἀνδρὸς ἐδέξατο τιμήεντα.
πάσας δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὐδ' ὀνομήνω,
ὅσσας ἡρώων ἀλόχους ἴδον ἠδὲ θύγατρας·
πρὶν γάρ κεν καὶ νὺξ φθῖτ' ἄμβροτος· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥρη 330
εὕδειν, ἢ ἐπὶ νῆα θοὴν ἐλθόντ' ἐς ἑταίρους
ἢ αὐτοῦ· πομπὴ δὲ θεοῖς ὑμῖν τε μελήσει.
Ὣς ἔφατ'· οἱ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ·
κηληθμῷ δ' ἔσχοντο κατὰ μέγαρα σκιόεντα.

however was driven to Dia, an island near Crete, afterwards called Naxos, which was sacred to Bacchus. Bacchus accused Ariadne to Diana of having received the embraces of Theseus in his temple there, and the goddess punished her with death.

324. ἦγε μὲν, "he was taking her, he attempted to take her." The imperfect is very frequently used in the sense of a wish or attempt to do any thing.

326. Μαῖράν. Mera was daughter of Prætus and the nymph Ausia, and one of the companions of Diana. While she was attending the goddess in the chase, she was carried off by Jupiter under the form of Minerva; whereupon Diana being irritated by the circumstance, shot the nymph with her arrows, and changed her into a dog.

Κλυμένην. Clymene was daughter of Minyas, and mother of the famous Atalanta, who distinguished herself so much at the chase of the Calydonian boar, which had been sent to Diana to ravage the dominions of Œneus, king of Calydon in Ætolia.

Ἐριφύλην. Eriphyle, sister of Adrastus, king of Argos, married Amphiaraus. When her husband concealed himself that he might not accompany the Argives in their expedition against Thebes, where he knew he was to perish, Eriphyle suffered herself to be bribed by Polynices with a golden necklace, and discovered where Amphiaraus was. This treachery of Eriphyle compelled him to go to the war; but before he departed, he charged his son Alcmæon to murder his mother as soon as he was informed of his death. Amphiaraus perished in the expedition, and his death was no sooner known than his last injunctions were obeyed, and Eriphyle was murdered by the hands of her son.

ἀπονήσο for ἀπων. 2 aor. mid. from ἀπονίνημι — a similar use of the word in Odys. 17. 293. κύνα κυνός ἔθρεψε μέν, οὐδ' ἀπόνητο, he did himself indeed rear up the dog, but never had any satisfaction from him.

ἀμφιρ. an epithet for an island.

ἀκὴν still, quietly. — α, χάω.

κηλήθμος delight, κηλέω to quiet.

ἐπείγω, to push, ... accelerate.

κολούω, to mutilate.

ἰοτης will, command. fr. ἴς or ἴω, εἶμι, I go.

τοῖσιν δ' Ἀρήτη λευκώλενος ἤρχετο μύθων· 335
Φαίηκες, πῶς ὔμμιν ἀνὴρ ὅδε φαίνεται εἶναι
εἶδός τε μέγεθός τε ἰδὲ φρένας ἔνδον ἐΐσας;
ξεῖνος δ' αὖτ' ἐμός ἐστιν· ἕκαστος δ' ἔμμορε τιμῆς·
τῷ μὴ ἐπειγόμενοι ἀποπέμπετε, μηδὲ τὰ δῶρα
οὕτω χρηΐζοντι κολούετε· πολλὰ γὰρ ὔμμιν 340
κτήματ' ἐνὶ μεγάροισι θεῶν ἰότητι κέονται.
Τοῖσι δὲ καὶ μετέειπε γέρων ἥρως Ἐχένηος·
[ὃς δὴ Φαιήκων ἀνδρῶν προγενέστερος ἦεν·]
Ὦ φίλοι, οὐ μὰν ἧμιν ἀπὸ σκοποῦ οὐδ' ἀπὸ δόξης

337. φρένας ἔνδον ἐΐσας, "his mind within him equal, or corresponding to his personal appearance."

338. ἕκαστος δ' ἔμμορε τιμῆς, "and each of you has a share in the honour of having so noble a guest;" or, "each of you has a share in the honour of being able to relieve him;" for this is τιμὴ βασιληΐς, *royal dignity*, when a prince is able to relieve the distresses of others. Μείρω, f. μερῶ, 1. aor. εμειρα, perf. act. μεμαρκα, perf. m. μέμορα, and Attic ἔμμορα. In the active voice, "to divide, to allot, to share;" in the middle, "to have a share or allotment to one's self, to be a partaker of."

339. τῷ, "therefore." Il. ii. 250. τῷ νῦν Ἀτρείδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι ποίμενι λαῶν, ἧσαι ὀνειδίζων.

340. μηδὲ κολούετε, "and do not abridge your gifts, do not give by halves, to a man so much needing them." "Do not withhold your gifts" would have been κωλύετε, not κολούετε.

In prohibitions with μὴ, the present imperative only is used. If the aorist is used, the conjunctive must be put. Porson on Eurip. Hec. 1166, says, "It is right to say μὴ μέμφου, (pres. imper.) μὴ μέμψῃ, (aor. conjunct.), but not right to say μὴ μέμφῃ (pres. subj.); with regard to μὴ μέμψαι, (aor. imper.) it is not decidedly a solecism, but of such rare occurrence, that Grammarians have noticed few similar instances, and those as very remarkable."

344. οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ, οὐδ' ἀπὸ δόξης, "not far from the mark, nor from our opinion of her character." He is said to speak ἀπὸ σκοποῦ, who spoke what was foreign to the subject, and he ἀπὸ δόξης, who spoke what might hardly be expected from him. Ἀπὸ frequently signifies, *incongruity, unsuitableness, distance, disagreement, &c.* as ἀπὸ καιροῦ, "unseasonable." ἀπὸ τρόπου, "absurd, preposterous," ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰκότος, "at variance with probability," ἀπὸ θυμοῦ, "unacceptable," &c. See Viger's Gr. Idioms, c. ix. §. ii. R. 17, and Il. iv. 26. v.

μυθεῖται βασίλεια περίφρων· ἀλλὰ πίθεσθε· 345
Ἀλκινόου δ' ἐκ τοῦδ' ἔχεται ἔργον τε ἔπος τε.
Τὸν δ' αὖτ' Ἀλκίνοος ἀπαμείβετο φώνησέν τε·
τοῦτο μὲν οὕτω δὴ ἔσται ἔπος, αἴ κεν ἔγωγε
ζωὸς Φαιήκεσσι φιληρέτμοισιν ἀνάσσω.
ξεῖνος δὲ τλήτω, μάλα περ νόστοιο χατίζων, 350
ἔμπης οὖν ἐπιμεῖναι ἐς αὔριον, εἰσόκε πᾶσαν
δωτίνην τελέσω· πομπὴ δ' ἄνδρεσσι μελήσει
πᾶσι, μάλιστα δ' ἐμοί· τοῦ γὰρ κράτος ἔστ' ἐνὶ δήμῳ.
Τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη πολύμητις Ὀδυσσεύς·
Ἀλκίνοε κρεῖον, πάντων ἀριδείκετε λαῶν, 355
εἴ με καὶ εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν ἀνώγοιτ' αὐτόθι μίμνειν
πομπήν τ' ὀτρύνοιτε καὶ ἀγλαὰ δῶρα διδοῖτε,
καί κε τὸ βουλοίμην, καί κεν πολὺ κέρδιον εἴη,
πλειοτέρῃ σὺν χειρὶ φίλην ἐς πατρίδ' ἱκέσθαι·
καί κ' αἰδοιότερος καὶ φίλτερος ἀνδράσιν εἴην 360

18. x. 324. Σκοπὸς is "the mark at which a person aims or shoots."

346. ἐκ τοῦδ' ἔχεται, for 'ξέχεται τοῦδε, "depends on Alcinous *here*." This is a very common meaning of the pronoun ὁδὲ, especially in the tragedians. Thus Eurip. Alcestis 24. ἤδη δὲ τόνδε Θάνατον εἰσορῶ πέλας, "but now I see death *here* at hand."

353. τοῦ ἔστι, "belongs to this man," *i. e.* to myself. The pronoun is here used δεικτικῶς, as the Grammarians term it, that is, *pointing* to the person referred to. Eurip. Alc. 690. μὴ θνῆσχ' ὑπὲρ τοῦδ' ἀνδρός· οὐδ' ἐγὼ πρὸ σοῦ (for ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ) "for, this man," *pointing* to himself. Plat. Gorg. p. 92. οὑτοσὶ ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν, εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ, κ. τ. λ., (for σὺ οὐ παύσει;) "this man," *pointing* to Socrates, whom he is addressing. See Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 471. 6.

356. Telemachus, in the fourth book, pays a similar compliment to Menelaus, when invited by him to remain some time at his court: καὶ γάρ κ' εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν ἐγὼ παρὰ σοίγ' ἀνεχοίμην ἥμενος, οὐδέ κέ μ' ἵκου ἕλοι πόθος, οὐδὲ τοκήων, v. 595.

360. αἰδοιότερος, "more worthy of reverence." Thus Hesiod says, πλούτῳ δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ: and Theog-

[illegible] [illegible] — [illegible].

χατίζω to long after; χάω.

ἔμπης Ion. for ἔμπας. as πάντως.

εἴσοκε until.

ὀτρύνοιτε — prepare, equip.

ἠπεροπευς, ἀπάω ἀπατάω Ernesti — οἴεται ἄπερος

and cp. — Ameis: ἔπος; ἀπύω, ἠπύω, to call upon ....?

ἠίορδος, subst.

making up the lies, [illegible] from what sources. —

ἀθέσφατος ... excessively long.

θεος, ἴσχω.

πᾶσιν, ὅσοι μ' Ἰθάκηνδε ἰδοίατο νοστήσαντα.
Τὸν δ' αὖτ' Ἀλκίνοος ἀπαμείβετο φώνησέν τε·
ὦ Ὀδυσεῦ, τὸ μὲν οὔτι σ' ἐΐσκομεν εἰσορόωντες
ἠπεροπῆά τ' ἔμεν καὶ ἐπίκλοπον, οἷά τε πολλοὺς
βόσκει γαῖα μέλαινα πολυσπερέας ἀνθρώπους 365
ψεύδεά τ' ἀρτύνοντας, ὅθεν κέ τις οὐδὲ ἴδοιτο·
σοὶ δ' ἔπι μὲν μορφὴ ἐπέων, ἔνι δὲ φρένες ἐσθλαί·
μῦθον δ' ὡς ὅτ' ἀοιδὸς ἐπισταμένως κατέλεξας,
πάντων τ' Ἀργείων σέο τ' αὐτοῦ κήδεα λυγρά.
ἀλλ' ἄγε μοι τόδε εἰπὲ καὶ ἀτρεκέως κατάλεξον, 370
εἴ τινας ἀντιθέων ἑτάρων ἴδες, οἵ τοι ἅμ' αὐτῷ
Ἴλιον εἰς ἅμ' ἕποντο καὶ αὐτοῦ πότμον ἐπέσπον.
νὺξ δ' ἥδε μάλα μακρὴ, ἀθέσφατος· οὐδέ πω ὥρη
εὕδειν ἐν μεγάρῳ· σὺ δέ μοι λέγε θέσκελα ἔργα.
καὶ κεν ἐς ἠῶ δῖαν ἀνασχοίμην, ὅτε μοι σὺ 375
τλαίης ἐν μεγάρῳ τὰ σὰ κήδεα μυθήσασθαι.
Τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη πολύμητις Ὀδυσσεύς·

nis, Gnom. v. 621. πᾶς τις πλούσιον ἄνδρα τίει, ἀτίει δὲ πένιχρον. So likewise Ovid, de Art. Amator. II. 277. Plurimus auro venit honos.

364. ἔμεν infin. for εἶναι. "We do not suppose you to be a hypocrite and a dissembler." Ἐπίκλοπος from ἐπὶ and κλέπτω, "to steal, to deceive."

367. ἔπι and ἔνι, for ἔπεστι and ἔνεστι, "there is to or in you," *i. e.* "you have;" μορφὴ is here rightly explained by the Scholiast to mean εὐπρέπεια, "elegance;" exactly corresponding to the sense in which *species* is used by Cicero. See Ernest. Clav. Cicer.

368. ὡς ὅτε ἀοιδὸς κατάλεγει, "thou hast skilfully related the tale, as when a bard relates," *i. e.* as skilfully as a bard.

371. ἅμ' αὐτῷ—εἰς ἅμ' ἕποντο, "went to Troy together with you at the same time." The first ἅμα, says Ernesti, τοπικὸν, refers to place—the other, χρονικὸν, refers to time.

373. νὺξ μάλα μακρὴ, ἀθέσφατος. This circumstance, according to Eustathius, is mentioned by the poet in order to ascertain the time of the year, which must have been in the winter, for at the end of the fourteenth book it is evidently a winter's night which Ulysses spends with Eumæus.

Ἀλκίνοε κρεῖον, πάντων ἀριδείκετε λαῶν,
ὥρη μὲν πολέων μύθων, ὥρη δὲ καὶ ὕπνου·
εἰ δ' ἔτ' ἀκουέμεναί γε λιλαίεαι, οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγε 380
τούτων σοι φθονέοιμι καὶ οἰκτρότερ' ἄλλ' ἀγορεῦσαι,
κήδε' ἐμῶν ἑτάρων, οἳ δὴ μετόπισθεν ὄλοντο·
οἳ Τρώων μὲν ὑπεξέφυγον στονόεσσαν ἀϋτὴν,
ἐν νόστῳ δ' ἀπόλοντο, κακῆς ἰότητι γυναικός.
Αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ ψυχὰς μὲν ἀπεσκέδασ' ἄλλυδις ἄλλῃ 385
ἁγνὴ Περσεφόνεια γυναικῶν θηλυτεράων,
ἦλθε δ' ἐπὶ ψυχὴ Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἀτρεΐδαο
ἀχνυμένη· περὶ δ' ἄλλαι ἀγηγέραθ', ὅσσαι ἅμ' αὐτῷ
οἴκῳ ἐν Αἰγίσθοιο θάνον καὶ πότμον ἐπέσπον.
ἔγνω δ' αἶψ' ἐμὲ κεῖνος, ἐπεὶ πίεν αἷμα κελαινόν· 390
κλαῖε δ' ὅγε λιγέως, θαλερὸν κατὰ δάκρυον εἴβων,
πιτνὰς εἰς ἐμὲ χεῖρας, ὀρέξασθαι μενεαίνων·

383. *ἀϋτὴ*, properly, "the shout of battle, the war cry," and hence it came to signify the battle itself.

384. *κακῆς ἰότητι γυναικός*, "by the counsel of a base woman." Here may be meant either Helen, who was the cause of the death of all the Greeks, or it may refer to Clytemnestra, who killed Agamemnon and his companions on their return. The latter seems more probable.

385. *ἄλλυδις ἄλλῃ*, "in different directions, one this way, and another that."

386. *ψυχὰς γυναικῶν θηλυτεράων*, "the souls of the female women." The comparative is often used for the positive; *θηλύτερος* for *θῆλυς*, *νεώτερος* for *νέος*, &c.; and because the name *γυνὴ* is applied to any weak or timid person, the poet adds the epithet *θηλυτεράων*, to show that he is speaking of the sex, and not, metaphorically, of weak persons in general.

388. *ἀγηρέραθ'* for *ἀγηγέρατο*, plusquam perf. pass. from *ἀγείρω*, with the Attic reduplication, and the Ionic and Attic termination for *ἤγερντο*, and that for *ἠγερμέναι ἦσαν*. See Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 198.

392. *πιτνὰς* "expanding," pres. part. from *πίτνημι*, another form of *πετάννυμι* from *πετάω*, which appears to have arisen from *πέτομαι*, by which was expressed "the spreading of the wings in flying," and afterwards merely "spreading." See Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 245.

στονοεις, στενος.

λιγέως, λίγα, λίγυ, shrilly, λίγυρος, λίζω, λίγγω, to ta

μινεαινω – long earnestly.

Some wd. have κικυς to mean the same as ἰκμας moisture, juice, &c. — so used in Aeschylus.

τάναος long; λέγω sleep.

Note the sonorousness of the 400th line.

ἀνάρσιος, ἄρω or ἀρέσκω; some annoying fellow.

πῶϋ, εος το. herd - πάω pasco.

ἀλλ' οὐ γάρ οἱ ἔτ' ἦν ἲς ἔμπεδος οὐδέ τι κίκυς.
οἵη περ πάρος ἔσκεν ἐνὶ γναμπτοῖσι μέλεσσιν.
τὸν μὲν ἐγὼ δάκρυσα ἰδὼν ἐλέησά τε θυμῷ 395
καί μιν φωνήσας ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδων·
"Ἀτρείδη κύδιστε, ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, Ἀγάμεμνον,
τίς νύ σε Κὴρ ἐδάμασσε τανηλεγέος θανάτοιο;
ἠέ σέγ' ἐν νήεσσι Ποσειδάων ἐδάμασσεν,
ὄρσας ἀργαλέων ἀνέμων ἀμέγαρτον ἀϋτμήν; 400
ἠέ σ' ἀνάρσιοι ἄνδρες ἐδηλήσαντ' ἐπὶ χέρσου,
βοῦς περιταμνόμενον ἠδ' οἰῶν πώεα καλὰ,
ἠὲ περὶ πτόλιος μαχεούμενον ἠδὲ γυναικῶν;
Ὣς ἐφάμην· ὁ δέ μ' αὐτίκ' ἀμειβόμενος προσέειπεν·
Διογενὲς Λαερτιάδη, πολυμήχαν' Ὀδυσσεῦ, 405
οὔτε μέ γ' ἐν νήεσσι Ποσειδάων ἐδάμασσεν,
ὄρσας ἀργαλέων ἀνέμων ἀμέγαρτον ἀϋτμὴν,
οὔτε μ' ἀνάρσιοι ἄνδρες ἐδηλήσαντ' ἐπὶ χέρσου·
ἀλλά μοι Αἴγισθος τεύξας θάνατόν τε μόρον τε
ἔκτα σὺν οὐλομένῃ ἀλόχῳ, οἶκόνδε καλέσσας, 410

393. ἲς is "the strength which is derived from nerves;" κίκυς (from κίω) "the force which moves a body."

394. ἐνί γναμπτοῖσι μέλεσσιν, "in his flexible limbs," *i.e.* when he was alive; for the limbs of the dead are not flexible, but stiff and rigid.

400. ἀμέγαρτον, "great." From α privitive, and μεγαιρω *invideo*: it signifies literally, "given without sparing, without grudging," and therefore "abundant, great." Ἄφθονος is of similar derivation and bears the same meaning.

402. βοῦς περιταμνόμενον, *i. e.* says Eustathius, περιξ τῆς ἀλλοτρίας γῆς τέμνοντα, "slaying oxen in others' lands." Ulysses having himself attempted at Ismarus to seize the flocks and herds, but unsuccessfully, and with the loss of many of his companions, naturally suspects that Agamemnon might have fallen in a similar enterprise.

410. οὐλομένῃ. The word οὐλόμενος has generally been translated, "destructive, pernicious;" but it is in fact passive, not active, and answers to our English expression, "cursed."

δειπνίσσας, ὥς τίς τε κατέκτανε βοῦν ἐπὶ φάτνῃ.
ὣς θάνον οἰκτίστῳ θανάτῳ· περὶ δ' ἄλλοι ἑταῖροι
νωλεμέως κτείνοντο σύες ὣς ἀργιόδοντες,
οἵ ῥά τ' ἐν ἀφνειοῦ ἀνδρὸς μέγα δυναμένοιο
ἢ γάμῳ ἢ ἐράνῳ ἢ εἰλαπίνῃ τεθαλυίῃ. 415
ἤδη μὲν πολέων φόνῳ ἀνδρῶν ἀντεβόλησας,
μουνὰξ κτεινομένων καὶ ἐνὶ κρατερῇ ὑσμίνῃ·
ἀλλά κε κεῖνα μάλιστα ἰδὼν ὀλοφύραο θυμῷ,
ὡς ἀμφὶ κρητῆρα τραπέζας τε πληθούσας
κείμεθ' ἐνὶ μεγάρῳ δάπεδον δ' ἅπαν αἵματι θῦεν. 420
οἰκτροτάτην δ' ἤκουσα ὄπα Πριάμοιο θυγατρος,

411. *ὥς τίς, κ. τ. λ.* See book iv. 535. The sense is—Ægisthus killed me, off my guard, expecting no danger, in the same way as you may easily slay oxen which were feeding in the stall, expecting and fearing no evil.

414. *οἵ ρα—κτείνοντα* understood.

415. *ἔρανος* was a feast in which every guest contributed a share; *εἰλαπίνη* was a great and splendid banquet, in which, *κατὰ εἴλας ἔπινον*, they made merry, dividing themselves into a number of small parties.

417. *μουνάξ κτεινομένων*, slain one by one.

419. *ἀμφὶ κρητῆρα*, "around the bowl." *Κρητὴρ* was a large and capacious bowl, from which they drew the wine in cups or goblets for the guests; it was placed at the top of the banqueting room; and by it they placed those guests whom they wished to distinguish by some particular token of respect. The words, then, *ἀμφὶ κρητῆρα* in this line imply—"He treated me with every outward demonstration of respect; he placed me in the most honourable seat, so that I could not doubt of his affection and loyalty; and that seat which is generally considered the place of honour, was to me the place of death."

420. *αἵματι θῦεν*, "ran with blood." *Θύω*, from *θέω to run*, has its primary signification "to run, to move quickly, to flow." Then used actively in the sense of "to make to run or flow," it came to signify, "to pour out" wine in libations, and thence it was transferred to sacrifice in general.

421. *οἰκτροτάτην, κ. τ. λ.* These words admit of a double construction. They may either mean, "I heard the sad voice of Cassandra," or, "I heard a sad voice or speech *περὶ Κασσάνδρης*, about Cassandra," namely, the voice of Clytemnestra upbraiding and triumphing over her.

φάτνη, a manger, crib, fr. πάω. sometimes πάθνη.
νωλεμής, -ές, λείπω. continually, without exception.
ἄφνειος, ἄφενος wealth; ἀφ' ἔνος, one year's income.
ἔρανος — as a pic-nic; in a political sense, a trades-unio[n] common in the Grecian republics: εἴλη? a crowd. — γάμος & ἔρανος imply a smaller no. of guests; εἰλ[απίνη] is any kind of entertainment.
ἀνεμβολέω — hast been present at.
ὑσμῖν, ὑσμίνη; th.? battle.

ποτὶ dor. for πρός.

ἐρείδω, to fasten.

κουρίδιος from κοῦρος, κόρος; — married young, lawfully married, opposed to the state of being a concubine.

ἡ δ' ἔξοχα λυγρ' εἰδυῖα — she supereminently skilled in wickedness. — I had said to myself, "Sh.d return beloved by — —

ἔῃσιν ion. for ᾖ 3rd p. s. of pres. subj. εἰμί.

Κασσάνδρης, τὴν κτεῖνε Κλυταιμνήστρη δολόμητις
ἀμφ' ἐμοί· αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ ποτὶ γαίῃ χεῖρας ἀείρων
βάλλον ἀποθνήσκων περὶ φασγάνῳ· ἡ δὲ κυνῶπις
νοσφίσατ' οὐδέ μοι ἔτλη ἰόντι περ εἰς Ἀΐδαο 425
χερσὶ κατ' ὀφθαλμοὺς ἑλέειν σύν τε στόμ' ἐρεῖσαι.
ὣς οὐκ αἰνότερον καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο γυναικὸς,
ἥτις δὴ τοιαῦτα μετὰ φρεσὶν ἔργα βάληται·
οἷον δὴ καὶ κείνη ἐμήσατο ἔργον ἀεικὲς,
κουριδίῳ τεύξασα πόσει φόνον· ἤτοι ἔφην γε 430
ἀσπάσιος παίδεσσιν ἰδὲ δμώεσσιν ἐμοῖσιν
οἴκαδ' ἐλεύσεσθαι· ἡ δ' ἔξοχα λύγρ' εἰδυῖα
οἷ τε κατ' αἶσχος ἔχευε καὶ ἐσσομένῃσιν ὀπίσσω
θηλυτέρῃσι γυναιξὶ, καὶ ἥ κ' εὐεργὸς ἔῃσιν.
Ὣς ἔφατ'· αὐτὰρ ἐγώ μιν ἀμειβόμενος προσέειπον· 435

425. *νοσφίσατ'*, "drew back." *Νοσφίζω*, "to separate," in the active voice; *νοσφίζομαι*, in the middle, "to separate myself from others, to leave, to depart."

426. *κατ' ὀφθάλμοὺς ἑλέειν*, by Tmesis, for *οφθαλμους καθελεῖν*, from *καθαιρέω*, "to compress." "As soon as any person expired, they closed his eyes; this they termed *καθαιρεῖν*, *συναρμόττειν*, *συγκλείειν τοὺς ὀφθάλμους*. Hence *καταμύειν* came to be used for *θνήσκειν*. The design of this custom seems to have been not only to prevent that horror which the eyes of dead men, when uncovered, are accustomed to strike into the living, but also for the satisfaction of dying persons, who are usually desirous of dying in a decent posture. See Eurip. Hec. 568. For the same reasons the mouth of the dead person was closed; and when this was done, his face was covered. Almost all the offices about the dead were performed by their nearest relations, nor could a greater misfortune befall any person than to want these last respects; Electra in Sophocles seems to prefer death itself before it. Hence the ghost of Agamemnon, in Homer, complains that his wife Clytemnestra had neglected to perform this ceremony. Potter's Archæol. b. iv. c. 3.

433. *οἷ τε κατ' αἶσχος ἔχευεν*, "she hath poured shame and disgrace both upon herself and .... Homer uses the dative after *καταχευω*, later writers the genitive. See Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 376. Obs. 2.

ὢ πόποι, ἦ μάλα δὴ γόνον Ἀτρέος εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς
ἐκπάγλως ἤχθηρε γυναικείας διὰ βουλὰς
ἐξ ἀρχῆς· Ἑλένης μὲν ἀπωλόμεθ' εἵνεκα πολλοί·
σοὶ δὲ Κλυταιμνήστρη δόλον ἤρτυε τηλόθ' ἐόντι.
Ὣς ἐφάμην· ὁ δέ μ' αὐτίκ' ἀμειβόμενος προσέειπεν 440
τῷ νῦν μήποτε καὶ σὺ γυναικί περ ἤπιος εἶναι,
μηδ' οἱ μῦθον ἅπαντα πιφαυσκέμεν, ὅν κ' εὖ εἰδῇς,
ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν φάσθαι, τὸ δὲ καὶ κεκρυμμένον εἶναι.
ἀλλ' οὐ σοίγ', Ὀδυσεῦ, φόνος ἔσσεται ἔκ γε γυναικός·
λίην γὰρ πινυτή τε καὶ εὖ φρεσὶ μήδεα οἶδεν 445
κούρη Ἰκαρίοιο, περίφρων Πηνελόπεια.
ἦ μέν μιν νύμφην γε νέην κατελείπομεν ἡμεῖς,
ἐρχόμενοι πόλεμόνδε· πάϊς δέ οἱ ἦν ἐπὶ μαζῷ
νήπιος, ὅς που νῦν γε μετ' ἀνδρῶν ἵζει ἀριθμῷ,
ὄλβιος· ἦ γὰρ τόνγε πατὴρ φίλος ὄψεται ἐλθὼν, 450
καὶ κεῖνος πατέρα προσπτύξεται, ἣ θέμις ἐστίν.
ἡ δ' ἐμὴ οὐδέ περ υἷος ἐνιπλησθῆναι ἄκοιτις

437. *γυναικείας διὰ βουλὰς*, "by the counsels of women." Though only Helen and Clytemnestra are mentioned, yet Ulysses may have intended a further reference to Aerope, the wife of Atreus, Agamemnon's grandfather, from whose unfaithfulness to her husband's bed sprung many of the woes which afterwards fell on the family of Atreus.

441. *τῷ* "therefore." *εἶναι*, the infinitive for the imperative. "And yet, not because she was a woman, but because she was a wicked one, Clytemnestra thus dealt with her husband, and woman is not on her account to be deemed less worthy of trust than man. But it is natural to look with a suspicious eye to the quarter whence came the mischief, by which we ourselves have suffered, and to caution others against it."—Dio, Orat. 74.

449. *μετ' ἀνδρῶν ἵζει ἀριθμῷ*, "sits among the number of grown up men," *i. e.* is now grown up.

452. *ἡ δ' ἐμὴ οὐδέ, κ. τ. λ.* "but my wife did not even allow my eyes to be satiated, *i. e.* delighted with *beholding* my son." *Υἷος* is contracted for *υἵεος*, the genitive case of *υἵευς*, and is governed by the verb *ἐνιπλησθῆναι*, which is for *ἐμπλησθῆναι*, 1 aor. infin. from

ἐκπαγλως fearfully — ἐκπλήσσω.

ἤπιος indulgent — ἕπω, or ἔπω.

πιφάσκω, πιφαύσκω, φαω, φασκω —

πίνυτος for πνύτος prudent; πνέω, breathe.

προσπτύσσω fold in an embrace.

κατίσχομαι κατέχομαι.

ἠμαθοεις Ion. for ἀμαθοεις, ἄμαθος sand.

ἀνεμώλιος, ἄνεμος; — for ἀνεμωνιος, λ and ν are frequently interchanged in good MSS. -ωνιος, and ωλιος are adjectival terminations. unprofitable talk. [illegible]

δέμας a living body; σωμα a corpse, in Homer.

ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἔασε· πάρος δέ με πέφνε καὶ αὐτόν.
ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω, σὺ δ' ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῇσιν·
κρύβδην, μηδ' ἀναφανδά, φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν 455
νῆα κατισχέμεναι· ἐπεὶ οὐκέτι πιστὰ γυναιξίν.
ἀλλ' ἄγε μοι τόδε εἰπὲ καὶ ἀτρεκέως κατάλεξον,
εἴ που ἔτι ζώοντος ἀκούετε παιδὸς ἐμοῖο,
ἤ που ἐν Ὀρχομενῷ, ἢ ἐν Πύλῳ ἠμαθόεντι,
ἤ που πὰρ Μενελάῳ ἐνὶ Σπάρτῃ εὐρείῃ· 460
οὐ γάρ πω τέθνηκεν ἐπὶ χθονὶ δῖος Ὀρέστης.
Ὣς ἔφατ'· αὐτὰρ ἐγώ μιν ἀμειβόμενος προσέειπον·
Ἀτρείδη, τί με ταῦτα διείρεαι; οὐδέ τι οἶδα,
ζώει ὅγ' ἢ τέθνηκε· κακὸν δ' ἀνεμώλια βάζειν.
Νῶϊ μὲν ὣς ἐπέεσσιν ἀμειβομένω στυγεροῖσιν 465
ἕσταμεν ἀχνύμενοι, θαλερὸν κατὰ δάκρυ χέοντες.
Ἦλθε δ' ἐπὶ ψυχὴ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος
καὶ Πατροκλῆος καὶ ἀμύμονος Ἀντιλόχοιο
Αἴαντός θ', ὃς ἄριστος ἔην εἶδός τε δέμας τε

ἐμπλήθω, "to fill, to satiate." Words which indicate "fulness, defect, emptiness," are followed by a genitive. See Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 329, 330.

453. *καὶ αὐτόν*, not, "and him," *i.e.* my son, but, "even myself;" as is evident, both from history and from v. 458.

456. *οὐκέτι πιστὰ γυναιξίν*, "women are no longer to be trusted." Commentators in general say that this expression is elliptical for *οὐκέτι πιστὰ τὰ τῶν γυναικῶν*, but it seems much more natural to refer it to that blending of two constructions into one, of which the Greek poets, and especially the Attics, were so fond. The two constructions here blended together are *πιστὰ τὰ τῶν γυναικῶν* and *πιστευτέον γυναιξί*: the poet having begun with the former, and then, as if forgetting himself, he completes the sentence, as if he had used the latter construction. Euripides has the same sentiment as is here expressed, in Iphig. in Taur. 1298, *ἄπιστον ὡς γυναικεῖον γένος.*

459. *Ὀρχομενῷ*, "in Orchomenus;" a city of Bœotia, very rich and well fortified, and proverbial both for its wealth and its safety as an asylum. Agamemnon expected that Orestes would either be at Sparta, in the court of Menelaus, or in Pylus, with Nestor, who had always been so faithful

τῶν ἄλλων Δαναῶν μετ' ἀμύμονα Πηλείωνα. 470
ἔγνω δὲ ψυχή με ποδώκεος Αἰακίδαο,
καί ῥ' ὀλοφυρομένη ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα·
Διογενὲς Λαερτιάδη, πολυμήχαν' Ὀδυσσεῦ,
σχέτλιε, τίπτ' ἔτι μεῖζον ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μήσεαι ἔργον;
πῶς ἔτλης Ἄϊδόσδε κατελθέμεν, ἔνθα τε νεκροὶ 475
ἀφραδέες ναίουσι, βροτῶν εἴδωλα καμόντων;
Ὣς ἔφατ'· αὐτὰρ ἐγώ μιν ἀμειβόμενος προσέειπον.
ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ, Πηλέος υἱὲ, μέγα φέρτατ' Ἀχαιῶν,
ἦλθον Τειρεσίαο κατὰ χρέος, εἴ τινα βουλὴν
εἴποι, ὅπως Ἰθάκην ἐς παιπαλόεσσαν ἱκοίμην· 480
οὐ γάρ πω σχεδὸν ἦλθον Ἀχαιΐδος, οὐδέ πω ἀμῆς
γῆς ἐπέβην, ἀλλ' αἰὲν ἔχω κακά· σεῖο δ', Ἀχιλλεῦ,

a friend and ally, or in some secure asylum, such as Orchomenus.

470. *μετ' ἀμύμονα Πηλείωνα*, "after, next to the noble son of Peleus."

471. *Αἰακίδαο.* Achilles was the son of Peleus, and grandson of Æacus, who was king of the island of Œnopia, and a man of such integrity that the ancients have made him one of the judges of hell, with Minos and Rhadamanthus.

475. *Ἄϊδόσδε, εἰς τὸν δόμον Ἄϊδος*, "to the house of Hades."

476. *ἀφραδέες*, "without intellect." This is plainly the import of the word, since none of them knew Ulysses, or could articulate, till they had drunk at the trench; after which they were inspired by Proserpine and enabled to converse with him.

476. *καμόντων*, "dead." Literally "who have laboured," *i.e.* who do not now labour, whose labours are past; in the same way as *Troja fuit* means "Troy once was, but now is not."

478. *μέγα φέρτατε*, "far the best," *κατὰ μέγα διάστημα* "the best by a great distance." In the Ionic poets, *ὄχα, ἔξοχα, μέγα*, are often joined with the superlative to strengthen its signification, as *ὄχ' ἄριστος*, Il. i. 69. *ἔξοχ' ἄριστοι.* Od. iv. 629. *μέγα φέρτατε.* Od. xi. 478." Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 461.

479. *κατὰ* "on account of" is often put with verbs of motion, in order to show the object of them. As Herod. II. 152. *Κᾶρας, κατὰ ληΐην ἐκπλώσαντας*, "the Carians having sailed out in order to collect plunder." Aristoph. Nub. 240. *ἦλθες κατὰ τί*, "for what purpose are you come?" *Χρεὸς* means either "need, want," or "an oracle;" so that the ex-

ἀφραδης – α, φρην φράζω.

who rest from their labours – [illegible]

παιπαλοεις, rough as δυσπαλης, difficult; παλη a wres

θητεύω to work for hire. θης one that has not pro=
perty in land. At Athens, the lowest class of free-
men, the 4th class, whose property did not equal
that of the 3rd, the ζευγῖται, who were by law
excluded from all honorable places, & hired their
services as servants & like slaves; yet in some
emergencies, they were employed as light-armed
troops & sailors.

ἄγανος ἀγάνομαι as ἄγαμαι – my noble boy.

πρόμος the foremost: πρό, or πρόμαχος.

ἐπίκουρος, ἐπικουρη succor: ἐπί, ἀρήγω, to aid.

οὕνεκα because old age deprived him, his hands & feet.

οὔτις ἀνὴρ προπάροιθε μακάρτατος οὔτ' ἄρ' ὀπίσσω.
πρὶν μὲν γάρ σε ζωὸν ἐτίομεν ἶσα θεοῖσιν
Ἀργεῖοι, νῦν αὖτε μέγα κρατέεις νεκύεσσιν, 485
ἐνθάδ' ἐών· τῷ μήτι θανὼν ἀκαχίζευ, Ἀχιλλεῦ.
Ὣς ἐφάμην· ὁ δέ μ' αὐτίκ' ἀμειβόμενος προσέειπεν·
μὴ δή μοι θάνατόν γε παραύδα, φαίδιμ' Ὀδυσσεῦ·
βουλοίμην κ' ἐπάρουρος ἐὼν θητευέμεν ἄλλῳ,
ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ, ᾧ μὴ βίοτος πολὺς εἴη, 490
ἢ πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσειν.
ἀλλ' ἄγε μοι τοῦ παιδὸς ἀγαυοῦ μῦθον ἔνισπε,
ἢ ἕπετ' ἐς πόλεμον πρόμος ἔμμεναι ἠὲ καὶ οὐκί.
εἰπὲ δέ μοι, Πηλῆος ἀμύμονος εἴ τι πέπυσσαι,
ἢ ἔτ' ἔχει τιμὴν πολέσιν μετὰ Μυρμιδόνεσσιν, 495
ἤ μιν ἀτιμάζουσιν ἀν' Ἑλλάδα τε Φθίην τε,
οὕνεκά μιν κατὰ γῆρας ἔχει χεῖράς τε πόδας τε.
οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼν ἐπαρωγὸς ὑπ' αὐγὰς Ἠελίοιο,

pression in this line may either mean, "I come on account of my need of Tiresias," or, "I come for the oracle, the oracular directions of Tiresias."

483. *μακάρτατος* for *μακάρτερος*, "happier." The superlative is sometimes put for the comparative. Aristoph. Av. 823. *λῷστον, ἢ τὸ Φλέγρας πεδίον*, "better than the plain of Phlegra." Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 464. In these constructions, however, the superlative always retains something of its own signification, and is stronger than the mere comparative; thus, *σεῖο οὔτις ἀνηρ μακάρτατος* implies, "no man was ever happier than thou art; if he were, he would be indeed most happy;" or, "no man, even though superlatively happy, was ever happier than thou."

486. *τῷ μήτι, κ. τ. λ.* "therefore grieve not that you are dead." *Ἀκαχίζευ*, Ionic for *ἀκαχίζου*, imperat. from *ἀκαχίζομαι*. "Verbs which indicate any emotion of the mind, as, to rejoice, to be indignant, vexed, ashamed, to repent, &c. take in the participle the object or operative cause, which in Latin is expressed by *quòd*, or by the accus. with the infinitive. Soph. Phil. 673. *οὐκ ἄχθομαί σ' ἰδών τε καὶ λαβὼν φίλον*. 1021. *σὺ μὲν γέγηθας ζῶν*." Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 551.

491. *ἢ* for *μᾶλλον ἤ*, "rather than." The adverb *μᾶλλον* is often omitted, especially after verbs of wishing, as *βούλομαί*

τοῖος ἐὼν, οἷός ποτ' ἐνὶ Τροίῃ εὐρείῃ
πέφνον λαὸν ἄριστον, ἀμύνων Ἀργείοισιν. 500
εἰ τοιόσδ' ἔλθοιμι μίνυνθά περ ἐς πατέρος δῶ,
τῷ κέ τεῳ στύξαιμι μένος καὶ χεῖρας ἀάπτους,
οἳ κεῖνον βιόωνται ἐέργουσίν τ' ἀπὸ τιμῆς.
Ὣς ἔφατ'· αὐτὰρ ἐγώ μιν ἀμειβόμενος προσέειπον·
ἤτοι μὲν Πηλῆος ἀμύμονος οὔτι πέπυσμαι· 505
αὐτάρ τοι παιδός γε Νεοπτολέμοιο φίλοιο
πᾶσαν ἀληθείην μυθήσομαι, ὥς με κελεύεις·
αὐτὸς γάρ μιν ἐγὼ κοίλης ἐπὶ νηὸς ἐΐσης
ἤγαγον ἐκ Σκύρου μετ' ἐϋκνήμιδας Ἀχαιούς.
ἤτοι ὅτ' ἀμφὶ πόλιν Τροίην φραζοίμεθα βουλὰς, 510
αἰεὶ πρῶτος ἔβαζε καὶ οὐχ ἡμάρτανε μύθων·
Νέστωρ τ' ἀντίθεος καὶ ἐγὼ νικάσκομεν οἴω.
αὐτὰρ ὅτ' ἐν πεδίῳ Τρώων μαρνοίμεθα χαλκῷ,

σε ἀπιέναι, ἢ παρόντα ῥαθυμεῖν, "I wish you to depart rather than, &c." Andoc. Or. de Myster. p. 62. τεθνᾶναι νομίζουσα λυσιτελεῖν ἢ ζῆν, "thinking that to die was profitable more than to live," *i.e.* that death was better than life. "It seems plain, and so the answer of Achilles was understood by Dionysius Halicarnassensis, that the abhorrence in which he holds the state of the dead, and the emphatical preference he gives to life when compared with it, arose from his desire of still greater glory, and from his inability to endure the wearisomeness of a condition so inactive. Therefore it is, that, always consistent with himself, he had rather toil for lean wages and eat scanty bread, than be the supreme in authority over all below. In the same style of complaint he adds in the sequel—

Οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼν ἐπαρωγὸς, &c.
"For help is none in me, the glorious Sun
No longer sees me such——"

What advantage have we, says the critic above mentioned, from the possession of virtue, where we have no room to exert it?"

499. τοῖος ἐὼν οἷος πέφνον, "being such, as being I slew," *i.e.* being such as I was when I slew.

501. δῶ by apocope for δῶμα. Il. i. 426. εἶμι Διὸς ποτὶ (πρὸς) χαλκοβατὲς δῶ.

506. Νεοπτολέμοιο, "of Neoptolemus." Neoptolemus, or Pyrrhus, was Achilles' son by Deidamia. He was brought

μινυνθα χρον: properly an acc. of μινυς, μινυνθος.

σεύζω to be terrified: to make appear frightful.

μενος their strength, violence.

ἄαπτος irresistible, not to be approached within arm's length.

ἐΐσος a lengthened form of ἴσος — often used with δαις —; with νηες, ships evenly constructed, so as to sail steadily; — with ἀσπις a round shield; — with φρενες, mens aequa.

κνημις, boot, buskin, gaiter — the κνημις was worn with the ὑποδήματα, & κρηπῖδες. — see Polyb. 10. 9.

ἴλη a throng, group, &c. εἰλέω.

δηϊοτῆς the turmoil; the mêlé, the fray. δηιος hostile

κατετηήξατο 3 pers. sing. of κατεταίρομαι, to str

οὔποτ' ἐνὶ πληθυῖ μένεν ἀνδρῶν οὐδ' ἐν ὁμίλῳ,
ἀλλὰ πολὺ προθέεσκε, τὸ ὃν μένος οὐδενὶ εἴκων· 515
πολλοὺς δ' ἄνδρας ἔπεφνεν ἐν αἰνῇ δηϊοτῆτι.
πάντας δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὐδ' ὀνομήνω,
ὅσσον λαὸν ἔπεφνεν, ἀμύνων Ἀργείοισιν·
ἀλλ' οἷον τὸν Τηλεφίδην κατενήρατο χαλκῷ,
ἥρω' Εὐρύπυλον· πολλοὶ δ' ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἑταῖροι 520
Κήτειοι κτείνοντο, γυναίων εἵνεκα δώρων.

up, and remained, at the court of his maternal grandfather Lycomedes, until after the death of his father. The Greeks then, according to an oracle which had declared that Troy could not be taken unless one of the descendants of Æacus were among the besiegers, dispatched Ulysses and Phœnix to Scyros for the young prince. He had no sooner arrived before Troy than, having paid a visit to the tomb of Achilles, he was appointed to accompany Ulysses in his expedition to Lemnos, for the purpose of prevailing on Philoctetes (see Philoctetes) to repair with the arrows of Hercules to the scene of action. Pyrrhus greatly signalized himself during the siege, and was the first that, according to some accounts, entered the wooden horse.

520. Eurypylus was one of the most considerable of the Trojan allies, and was equally remarkable for valour, and for the strength and beauty of his person. He was the son of Telephus, the son of Hercules, and of Astyochia, the sister of king Priam, and was killed in the last year of the war by Pyrrhus the son of Achilles. He was king of Mysia. The Cetæans were a people of Mysia, so called from the river Cetium, which runs through their country and empties itself into the Caicus.

521. *γυναίων εἵνεκα δώρων*, "on account of women's gifts." There is some difficulty in this expression. Some (says Eustathius) understand the expression as applied to Neoptolemus, and not Eurypylus; namely, Eurypylus and his soldiers fell by means of the *gifts of women*; that is, Neoptolemus was led to the war by the promise of having Hermione in marriage, the daughter of Menelaus, which promise occasioned the death of Eurypylus, by bringing Neoptolemus to the siege of Troy. Others understand it to be spoken of a golden vine, sent by Priam to his sister Astyoche, the mother of Eurypylus, to induce her to persuade her son to undertake this expedition to Troy, where he was slain by the son of Achilles: this vine was said to be given to Tros, the father of Priam, by Jupiter, as a recompense for his carrying away his son Ganymedes to be his cup-bearer; but this

κεῖνον δὴ κάλλιστον ἴδον μετὰ Μέμνονα δῖον.
αὐτὰρ ὅτ' εἰς ἵππον κατεβαίνομεν, ὃν κάμ' Ἐπειὸς,
Ἀργείων οἱ ἄριστοι, ἐμοὶ δ' ἐπὶ πάντ' ἐτέταλτο·
[ἠμὲν ἀνακλῖναι πυκινὸν λόχον ἠδ' ἐπιθεῖναι·] 525
ἔνθ' ἄλλοι Δαναῶν ἡγήτορες ἠδὲ μέδοντες
δάκρυά τ' ὠμόργνυντο τρέμον θ' ὑπὸ γυῖα ἑκάστου·
κεῖνον δ' οὔποτε πάμπαν ἐγὼν ἴδον ὀφθαλμοῖσιν
οὔτ' ὠχρήσαντα χρόα κάλλιμον οὔτε παρειῶν
δάκρυ' ὀμορξάμενον· ὁ δέ με μάλα πόλλ' ἱκέτευεν 530
ἱππόθεν ἐξίμεναι, ξίφεος δ' ἐπεμαίετο κώπην
καὶ δόρυ χαλκοβαρὲς, κακὰ δὲ Τρώεσσι μενοίνα.
ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ Πριάμοιο πόλιν διεπέρσαμεν αἰπὴν,
μοῖραν καὶ γέρας ἐσθλὸν ἔχων ἐπὶ νηὸς ἔβαινεν
ἀσκηθὴς, οὔτ' ἂρ βεβλημένος ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ 535
οὔτ' αὐτοσχεδίην οὐτασμένος· οἷά τε πολλὰ
γίγνεται ἐν πολέμῳ· ἐπιμὶξ δέ τε μαίνεται Ἄρης.
Ὣς ἐφάμην· ψυχὴ δὲ ποδώκεος Αἰακίδαο
φοίτα μακρὰ βιβῶσα κατ' ἀσφοδελὸν λειμῶνα,
γηθοσύνη, ὅ οἱ υἱὸν ἔφην ἀριδείκετον εἶναι. 540
Αἱ δ' ἄλλαι ψυχαὶ νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων
ἔστασαν ἀχνύμεναι, εἴροντο δὲ κήδε' ἑκάστη·

is too much a fable to be followed. Others, more probably, assert that Priam had promised one of his daughters to Eurypylus, to engage his assistance in the war; and this agrees very well with Homer's manner of writing in many places of the Iliad; and there is a great resemblance between Eurypylus in the Odyssey and Othryoneus in the Iliad, lib. xiii. 461.
'Cassandra's love he sought, with boasts of power, And promis'd conquest was the proffer'd dower.'

539. *ἀσφοδελὸν*, "of asphodel." Asphodel was planted on the graves, and round the tombs of the deceased, and hence the supposition that the Stygian plain was clothed with asphodel.

542. *ἔστασαν* by syncope for *εἱστήκεισαν*, plusquam perf. from *ἵστημι*. The imperf. is *ἔστησαν*, not *ἔστᾰσαν*.

κάμ', ἔκαμε, κάμνω.

τέλλω.

λόχος an ambuscade, because it consisted of pick men, from λέγω. μεδω to rule. γυιον limb.

ὀμοργνυμι ὀμοργω — to wipe off:- a primitive.

ὠχράω to grow yellow, pale; ὠχρος yellow, — ochre.

ἐπιμάομαι handle, grasp.

μενοινάω purpose, desire — μενος.

αἰπος αἰπυς altus; ἀπο.

ἀσκηθης — unscathed — ἀσκεω to take pains, — σκευη

οὐταζω to hit, with a weapon held in the hand. the Homeric distinction between οὐταζω and βάλλω, not observed by later writers.

ἐπιμιξ pell-mell, at random, &c.

ἀσφοδελος — king's spear; day-lily; σφαζω to slay

γηθοσυνος — from γηθος, γηθέω. — mirth; glad, &c.

!

τευχος implements, arms. μητηρ Thetis.

μειλιχιος conciliatory; μειλίσσω; μελι.

διάμπερες in prose διαμπερέως. thro' & thro'; continually.

ἐκπαγλως, ἐκπλήσσω. terrifically, vehemently.

τεΐν Dor. for σοι.

οἴη δ᾽ Αἴαντος ψυχὴ Τελαμωνιάδαο
νόσφιν ἀφεστήκει, κεχολωμένη εἵνεκα νίκης,
τήν μιν ἐγὼ νίκησα δικαζόμενος παρὰ νηυσὶν 545
τεύχεσιν ἀμφ᾽ Ἀχιλῆος· ἔθηκε δὲ πότνια μήτηρ.
[παῖδες δὲ Τρώων δίκασαν καὶ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη.]
ὡς δὴ μὴ ὄφελον νικᾶν τοιῷδ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀέθλῳ·
τοίην γὰρ κεφαλὴν ἕνεκ᾽ αὐτῶν γαῖα κατέσχεν,
Αἴανθ᾽, ὃς πέρι μὲν εἶδος, πέρι δ᾽ ἔργα τέτυκτο 550
τῶν ἄλλων Δαναῶν, μετ᾽ ἀμύμονα Πηλείωνα.
τὸν μὲν ἐγὼν ἐπέεσσι προσηύδων μειλιχίοισιν·
Αἶαν, παῖ Τελαμῶνος ἀμύμονος, οὐκ ἄρ᾽ ἔμελλες
οὐδὲ θανὼν λήσεσθαι ἐμοὶ χόλου, εἵνεκα τευχέων
οὐλομένων; τὰ δὲ πῆμα θεοὶ θέσαν Ἀργείοισιν. 555
τοῖος γάρ σφιν πύργος ἀπώλεο· σεῖο δ᾽ Ἀχαιοὶ
ἶσον Ἀχιλλῆος κεφαλῇ Πηληϊάδαο,
ἀχνύμεθα φθιμένοιο διαμπερές· οὐδέ τις ἄλλος
αἴτιος, ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς Δαναῶν στρατὸν αἰχμητάων
ἐκπάγλως ἤχθηρε· τεῒν δ᾽ ἐπὶ μοῖραν ἔθηκεν. 560
ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε δεῦρο, ἄναξ, ἵν᾽ ἔπος καὶ μῦθον ἀκούσῃς
ἡμέτερον· δάμασον δὲ μένος καὶ ἀγήνορα θυμόν.

547. παῖδες, κ. τ. λ. At the death of Achilles, his armour was to be given to the best of the Greeks, and Ajax and Ulysses were the two candidates for them. Agamemnon, desirous not to seem partial to either of them, assembled the Trojan captives, and asked them whether Ajax or Ulysses had occasioned most lamentation in their city. They replied that their city had suffered most by Ulysses. When, taking that as a just criterion of their respective merits, to Ulysses he gave the armour.—B. & C. The consequence to Ajax was such insupportable disappointment and mortification, that he slew himself.

548. ὡς μὴ ὄφελον, "I wish that I had not." Ὡς ὄφελον, I wish that I; ὡς ὄφελες, I wish that you; ὡς ὄφελε, I wish that he.

550. τέτυκτο κατὰ εἶδος περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, "was in form and in actions superior to the other Greeks."

῝Ως ἐφάμην· ὁ δέ μ' οὐδὲν ἀμείβετο, βῆ δὲ μετ' ἄλλας
ψυχὰς εἰς ῎Ερεβος νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων.
ἔνθα χ' ὁμῶς προσέφη κεχολωμένος, ἤ κεν ἐγὼ τόν, 565
ἀλλά μοι ἤθελε θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλοισιν
τῶν ἄλλων ψυχὰς ἰδέειν κατατεθνηώτων.
῎Ενθ' ἤτοι Μίνωα ἴδον, Διὸς ἀγλαὸν υἱόν,
χρύσεον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσσιν,
ἥμενον· οἱ δέ μιν ἀμφὶ δίκας εἴροντο ἄνακτα, 570
ἥμενοι ἑσταότες τε, κατ' εὐρυπυλὲς ῎Αϊδος δῶ.
Τὸν δὲ μετ' ᾽Ωρίωνα πελώριον εἰσενόησα,

568. *Μίνωα*, Minos, a king of Crete, son of Jupiter and Europa, who gave laws to his subjects B. C. 1406, which still remained in full force in the age of the philosopher Plato. His justice and moderation procured him the appellations of, 'the favourite of the gods,' 'the confidant of Jupiter,' 'the wise legislator,' in every part of Greece; and, according to the poets, he was rewarded for his equity, after death, with the office of supreme and absolute judge in the infernal regions. In this capacity he is represented sitting in the middle of the shades, and holding a sceptre in his hand. The dead plead their different causes before him, and the impartial judge shakes the fatal urn, which is filled with the destinies of mankind. In order to give greater authority to his laws, he is said to have retired into a cave in Crete, where he feigned that Jupiter his father dictated them to him; and every time he returned from the cave, he announced some new law. The poets say, that in the lower world, Minos, as chief president of the court, decided all differences that arose between the other two judges, Æacus and Rhadamanthus, of whom the former judged the Europeans—the latter the Asiatics.

572. *Τὸν δὲ μέτ'* "and after him."

᾽Ωρίωνα, Orion. He was son of Neptune and Euryale, daughter of Minos, according to Homer: some authors assert that his mother was Terra. He was celebrated for his love of astronomy, and of the chase, and for his beauty and gigantic stature. He married Side, and was also a suitor of Merope, or Hero, daughter of Œnopion, king of Chios. This monarch promised to accede to the suit of Orion, if he would rid the island of the numerous wild beasts by which it was infested. When Orion had discharged this task, the treacherous Œnopion intoxicated his guest, and put out his eyes. Orion recovered his sight by directing his

Ἔρεβος, τό. Etym akin to ἐρεμνος gloomy, ἐρέφω, tego.

εἴρομαι [illegible] questioning [illegible]. — [illegible] pleading causes.

πελώριος, monstrous; πέλωρ, prim.

ελέω, roll, drive.

οιόπολος — lonely; — οἶς, ὁ & ἡ shepherd — fed upon by sheep.

ρόπαλον, ῥέμβω to turn round. — a club, &c:

ἀγής, infrangible.

ερι, κῦδος.

ν. πέλεθρον πλέθρον, πλεθρίσμα. ⅙ of a stadium, viz

feet. — improperly translated by jugerum, this being

the times as great. — acre πλέω, πλήθω. —

ερτρον the caul covering the entrails — δέρω, δέρμα, &c:

ρδρος, κῦδος.

Panopeus a town of Phocis.

Pytho a name of Delphi.

θῆρας ὁμοῦ εἰλεῦντα κατ' ἀσφοδελὸν λειμῶνα,
τοὺς αὐτὸς κατέπεφνεν ἐν οἰοπόλοισιν ὄρεσσιν,
χερσὶν ἔχων ῥόπαλον παγχάλκεον, αἰὲν ἀαγές. 575
Καὶ Τιτυὸν εἶδον, Γαίης ἐρικυδέος υἱόν,
κείμενον ἐν δαπέδῳ· ὁ δ' ἐπ' ἐννέα κεῖτο πέλεθρα·
γῦπε δέ μιν ἑκάτερθε παρημένω ἧπαρ ἔκειρον,
δέρτρον ἔσω δύνοντες· ὁ δ' οὐκ ἀπαμύνετο χερσίν·
Λητὼ γὰρ ἥλκησε, Διὸς κυδρὴν παράκοιτιν, 580
Πυθώδ' ἐρχομένην διὰ καλλιχόρου Πανοπῆος.
Καὶ μὴν Τάνταλον εἰσεῖδον, χαλέπ' ἄλγε' ἔχοντα,

face towards the rising sun, and instantly proceeded to punish the perfidy of Œnopion. Orion was so eminent for his workmanship in iron, that even Vulcan, when building for himself a subterraneous palace, did not scruple to avail himself of his skill and labour. Orion is said by Apollodorus to have constructed a palace for Neptune. He was so devoted to the pleasures of the chase, that the poets represent him as pursuing the same occupation in the lower world.

576. Τιτυὸν, Tityus, son of Jupiter and Terra, or of Jupiter and Elara, daughter of king Orchomenos; a giant of such enormous dimensions as, according to some, when his body was extended, to cover nine acres of ground. According to Homer, he was killed by the arrows of Apollo for offering violence to Latona, and was precipitated into Tartarus where an insatiable vulture continually preyed on his heart or liver. (See Æn. vi. 804, &c. and Horace, Ode 14. b. ii.) By this fable is implied, according to some, that Tityus was a tower or pharos, erected on a conical mount of earth, which stood in an inclosure of nine acres, that he was immersed in worldly cares, and therefore styled the son of Earth; that he was concealed in a cavern of the earth by his mother Elara, who dreaded the jealousy of Juno; or that he was a covetous person, who starved amidst plenty, and that the fiction of his covering nine acres, arose from the inclosure of such a space of ground for the place of his burial.

582. Τάνταλον, Tantalus, the father of Niobe, Pelops, &c. His sufferings in the infernal regions are a favourite theme with the poets, though they agree neither in the nature nor in the cause of them. Some, with Homer, say that he was punished with insatiable thirst, and placed up to the chin in the midst of a pool of water, which flows away as soon as he attempts to taste it; and that there hangs above his head

ἑσταότ' ἐν λίμνῃ· ἡ δὲ προσέπλαζε γενείῳ·
στεῦτο δὲ διψάων, πιέειν δ' οὐκ εἶχεν ἑλέσθαι.
ὁσσάκι γὰρ κύψει' ὁ γέρων, πιέειν μενεαίνων, 585
τοσσάχ' ὕδωρ ἀπολέσκετ' ἀναβροχέν· ἀμφὶ δὲ ποσσὶν
γαῖα μέλαινα φάνεσκε, καταζήνασκε δὲ δαίμων.
δένδρεα δ' ὑψιπέτηλα κατάκρηθεν χέε καρπὸν,
ὄγχναι καὶ ῥοιαὶ καὶ μηλέαι ἀγλαόκαρποε
συκαῖ τε γλυκεραὶ καὶ ἐλαῖαι τηλεθόωσαι· 590
τῶν ὁπότ' ἰθύσει ὁ γέρων ἐπὶ χερσὶ μάσασθαι,
τὰς δ' ἄνεμος ῥίπτασκε ποτὶ νέφεα σκιόεντα.
Καὶ μὴν Σίσυφον εἰσεῖδον, κρατέρ' ἄλγε' ἔχοντα,
λᾶαν βαστάζοντα πελώριον ἀμφοτέρῃσιν.
ἤτοι ὁ μὲν σκηριπτόμενος χερσίν τε ποσίν τε 595
λᾶαν ἄνω ὤθεσκε ποτὶ λόφον· ἀλλ' ὅτε μέλλοι

a bough richly laden with delicious fruits, which, as soon as he attempts to seize it, is carried away from his reach by a sudden blast of wind. Others say, his punishment is to sit under a huge stone, hung at some distance over his head, and as it seems every moment ready to fall, he is kept under continual alarms. The causes assigned for this punishment are—his stealing a favourite dog that belonged to Jupiter; or, his stealing the nectar and ambrosia from the tables of the gods and giving them to men; or, his revealing the mysteries of the worship of the gods; or, his killing his own son Pelops, and serving his limbs as food before the gods, whose divinity and power he wished to try, when they had stopped at his house as they passed over Phrygia.

593. *Σίσυφον*, Sisyphus, a descendant of Æolus, the most crafty prince of the heroic ages. On his death-bed he entreated his wife to leave his body unburied; and when he came into Pluto's kingdom, he received permission to return upon earth to punish this seeming negligence of his wife, on promise of immediately returning. But he was no sooner out of the infernal regions than he violated his promise; and when he was at last brought back to hell by Mars, Pluto, to punish his want of fidelity and honour, condemned him to roll to the top of a mountain a huge stone, which, as soon as it had reached the summit, fell back to the plain with impetuosity, and thus rendered his punishment eternal.

στευομαι Ion. as ἵσταμαι.

ἀναβρόχω to absorb.

καταζηνάσκω Ion. for καταζαίνω, ἀζαίνω, dry up

πέτηλον, πέταλον. leaf. καταχρηθεν – bending their head

ἄχνη & ὄχνη the pear. ῥοια, ῥοα, the pomegranite. μ. αἰγ

τηλεθάω, poet. for θάλλω.

ἴθυω push forward. εὐθυς.

μαστιχάω to eat, to chew.

σκηρίπτω – σκήπτω. – leaning, struggling against

λοφος – part of neck where the mane grows – the summit of a hill; – λέπω.

ιταινω, i.q. τεινω.

ἱδρως sweat from ἰδος id., as ὑδος, ὑδωρ, from ὑω. plus.

σφυρον ankle. πεδιλον, sandal.

τεύχω perplex, terrify. — "swarm'd turbulent." Cowp.

σμερδαλεος terrible, σμερδος, force, power, violence;

ζωστηρ belt, ἀειρω.

τελαμων, belt, στελλω, or τλάω. – band.

θεοειδος godlike, noble. θεος ἰσκω.

χαροπος – χαρα, ὠψ — fair, ruddy, tawny.

ὑσμινη, ὑσμιν, conflict — theme ? —

ἄκρον ὑπερβαλέειν, τότ' ἀποστρέψασκε κραταιΐς
αὖτις· ἔπειτα πέδονδε κυλίνδετο λᾶας ἀναιδής.
αὐτὰρ ὅγ' ἂψ ὤσασκε τιταινόμενος· κατὰ δ' ἱδρὼς
ἔῤῥεεν ἐκ μελέων, κονίη δ' ἐκ κρατὸς ὀρώρει. 600
Τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσενόησα βίην Ἡρακληείην,
εἴδωλον· αὐτὸς δὲ μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν
τέρπεται ἐν θαλίῃς καὶ ἔχει καλλίσφυρον Ἥβην.
[παῖδα Διὸς μεγάλοιο καὶ Ἥρης χρυσοπεδίλου.]
ἀμφὶ δέ μιν κλαγγὴ νεκύων ἦν οἰωνῶν ὥς, 605
πάντοσ' ἀτυζομένων· ὁ δ', ἐρεμνῇ νυκτὶ ἐοικὼς,
γυμνὸν τόξον ἔχων καὶ ἐπὶ νευρῆφιν ὀϊστὸν,
δεινὸν παπταίνων, αἰεὶ βαλέοντι ἐοικώς.
σμερδαλέος δέ οἱ ἀμφὶ περὶ στήθεσσιν ἀορτὴρ,
χρύσεος ἦν τελαμών· ἵνα θέσκελα ἔργα νέτυκτο, 610
ἄρκτοι τ' ἀγρότεροί τε σύες χαροποί τε λέοντες
ὑσμῖναί τε μάχαι τε φόνοι τ' ἀνδροκτασίαι τε.
μὴ τεχνησάμενος μηδ' ἄλλο τι τεχνήσαιτο,
ὃς κεῖνον τελαμῶνα ἑῇ ἐγκάτθετο τέχνῃ.
ἔγνω δ' αὐτίκα κεῖνος, ἐπεὶ ἴδεν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν 615

597. κραταιΐς is the proper name of a goddess, as appears from book xii. 124. Κραταιΐν, μητέρα τῆς Σκύλλης, and signifies "force." If however it be read, κραταί' ἴς, for κρατᾶια ἴς, it means "a strong power."

598. ἀναιδής, "obstinate." Homer often applies to inanimate things, terms and epithets which properly belong only to those which are animate. Aristotl. Rhetor. iii. 11.

613. μὴ τεχνησάμενος, κ. τ. λ. "He who had worked that belt by his art, having contrived it, would never contrive any other *equal to it.*" The two negatives μὴ and μηδὲ belong both to τεχνήσαιτο, and strengthen the negation; so in book iv. 684; μὴ μνηστεύσαντες μηδ' ἄλλοθ' ὁμιλήσαντες, ὕστατα καὶ πύματα νῦν ἐνθάδε δειπνήσειαν. "Having become suitors, may they now dine for the last time, never meeting together elsewhere;" μὴ and μηδὲ being both joined to ὁμιλήσαντες.

καί μ' ὀλοφυρόμενος ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα·
Διογενὲς Λαερτιάδη, πολυμήχαν' Ὀδυσσεῦ,
ἆ δείλ', ἦ τινὰ καὶ σὺ κακὸν μόρον ἡγηλάζεις,
ὅνπερ ἐγὼν ὀχέεσκον ὑπ' αὐγὰς Ἠελίοιο.
Ζηνὸς μὲν παῖς ἦα Κρονίονος, αὐτὰρ ὀϊζὺν 620
εἶχον ἀπειρεσίην· μάλα γὰρ πολὺ χείρονι φωτὶ
δεδμήμην, ὁ δέ μοι χαλεποὺς ἐπετέλλετ' ἀέθλους·
καί ποτέ μ' ἐνθάδ' ἔπεμψε κύν' ἄξοντ'· οὐ γὰρ ἔτ' ἄλλον
φράζετο τοῦδέ τί μοι χαλεπώτερον εἶναι ἄεθλον.
τὸν μὲν ἐγὼν ἀνένεικα καὶ ἤγαγον ἐξ Ἀΐδαο· 625
Ἑρμείας δέ μ' ἔπεμψεν ἰδὲ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη.
Ὣς εἰπὼν. ὁ μὲν αὖτις ἔβη δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω.
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν αὐτοῦ μένον ἔμπεδον, εἴ τις ἔτ' ἔλθοι
ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων, οἳ δὴ τὸ πρόσθεν ὄλοντο.
καί νύ κ' ἔτι προτέρους ἴδον ἀνέρας, οὓς ἔθελόν περ· 630
[Θησέα Πειρίθοόν τε, θεῶν ἐρικυδέα τέκνα·]
ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἐπὶ ἔθνε' ἀγείρετο μυρία νεκρῶν,
ἠχῇ θεσπεσίῃ· ἐμὲ δὲ χλωρὸν δέος ᾕρει,
μή μοι Γοργείην κεφαλὴν δεινοῖο πελώρου

621. *πολὺ χείρονι φωτὶ*, "to a much inferior man," *i.e.* Eurystheus. Hercules was subjected to Eurystheus, the son of Sthenelus, king of Argos; who, at the instigation of Juno, imposed on him those hardships, so well known by the name of the twelve labours of Hercules.

623. *κύνα*, Cerberus, the three-headed dog, which guarded the entrance of the infernal regions, as well as the palace of Pluto. To bring this dog upon earth was the twelfth labour imposed upon Hercules by Eurystheus. The following description of Cerberus is given in Carey's translation of the Italian poet Dante—
"Cerberus, cruel monster, fierce and strange, Through his wide threefold throat, barks as a dog Over the multitude immersed beneath. His eyes glare crimson, black his unctuous beard, His belly large, and claw'd the hands with which He tears the spirits, flays them, and their limbs Piecemeal disparts."

634. *Γοργείην κεφαλὴν δεινοῖο πελώρου*, "the Gorgon of horrid figure." *Γοργείην κεφαλὴν* for *Γοργόνα*, as *βίην Ἡρακληείην*, for *Ἡρακλέα*. v.

ἠγηλάζω – epic. poet. conduct, endure. ἄγω.

ὀχέω – sustained; had to sustain.

ἀπειρέσιος immense, insuperable. ἀ. πέρας.

ἄξοντα, fut. part.

ἀναγείκω not in use in the present, serves

as ἀναφέρω – fetch up Cerberus.

ἄγανος, ἀγάνομαι, ἄγαμαι, admirable, renowned.

εἰρεσίη Rowing; οὖρος ventus.

The two first lines of the following book seem to certain the true meaning of the conclusion of this, & to prove sufficiently that by Ὠκεανος here Homer could not possibly intend any other than a river. In those lines he tells us that "the ship left the stream of the river Oceanus, & arrived in the open sea."

ἐξ Ἄϊδος πέμψειεν ἀγαυὴ Περσεφόνεια. 635
αὐτίκ' ἔπειτ' ἐπὶ νῆα κιὼν ἐκέλευον ἑταίρους
αὐτούς τ' ἀμβαίνειν ἀνά τε πρυμνήσια λῦσαι·
οἱ δ' αἶψ' εἴσβαινον καὶ ἐπὶ κληῗσι κάθιζον.
τὴν δὲ κατ' Ὠκεανὸν ποταμὸν φέρε κῦμα ῥόοιο·
πρῶτα μὲν εἰρεσίη, μετέπειτα δὲ κάλλιμος οὖρος. 640

601. Whoever looked upon one of the Gorgons was immediately turned into stone. There were three of them, Medusa, Itheno, and Euryale.

639. Ὠκεανὸν ποταμὸν "the river Oceanus." The Nile is called by this name. — See Diodorus Siculus, & Clarke.

A NEW AND LITERAL TRANSLATION

OF THE

TENTH BOOK

OF

QUINCTILIAN,

WITH ENGLISH NOTES.

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But our design is not here to give instructions for the manner of training up an orator. We have done that sufficiently, at least to the utmost of our abilities,[1] already. But as a candidate in the games, who has already thoroughly learnt all things from his master, viz. by what kind of exercise he is to be prepared for the contest; so let us instruct him, who shall know how to invert and dispose things and have learnt the method of choosing and arranging words, *let us instruct him* by what means he may, in the best and easiest manner possible, be able to execute what he has learned. It cannot then be doubted, but that he must acquire a certain stock of wealth, in order to have it ready for use whenever wanting; and this stock of wealth consists in a plentiful provision of things and words.

II. But things are peculiar to each cause, or common to few; words must be provided for all subjects. If each word was precisely significative of each thing: they would require less care, as then words would immediately present themselves with things; but since some are more proper than others, or more ornamental, or more emphatical, or more harmonious; all ought, not only to be known, but kept ready, and (so to say) in sight, that when they shew themselves to the orator's judgment, he may easily make a choice of the best.

I know that some make a practice of classing together all synonymous words, and getting them by heart,

1. In the first and second books.

that one might the easier occur out of many ; and when they have used a word, if shortly after they should want it again, to avoid repetition, they take another of the same signification. A pains-taking of this sort, must be childish, wretched, and of little or no utility ; for it only collects a crowd, out of which *the orator* seizes indiscriminately the first at hand ; but copiousness of language must be acquired with judgment by us, looking (who look) to the force of eloquence, and not to the volubility of strolling players or mountebanks. But this we shall obtain by hearing and reading the best things ; and it is by our attention herein, that we shall not only know the appellation of things, but what is fittest for every place. For there is room in an oration for nearly all words, except a few, which savour of immodesty ; for *though* the writers of iambics and of the old comedy were frequently praised even in these, yet we orators are to look to ourselves and guard against all reproach. So that all words, those excepted which I spoke of, are somewhere as good as need be, for there is sometimes an occasion for the low and vulgar, and those which seem mean in a more elegant part *of the discourse*, are said with propriety, where the subject requires.

To know how to distinguish them, and to become acquainted not only with their signification, but the various forms and measures of their declensions and conjugations, so that wherever they are placed, they may be suitable, we cannot attain to, but by frequent reading and hearing, because all our language we first

receive by our ears. For which reason [1]infants brought up by order of kings in desert places by mute nurses, though said to have uttered some words, yet remained destitute of the faculty of speaking.

There are some of this nature, that they express the same thing by different words ; so that there is no difference in signification, which you use in preference, as "ensis" and "gladius." There are others, which though serving to express two different things, yet by a trope present the same idea to the mind, as "ferrum" and "mucro ;" and it is also by a catachresis that we call "sicarii" all those who have committed a murder by any sort of weapon. Some things we express by circumlocution as "[2]pressi copia lactis ;" and we make others figurative by a change in the manner of expressing them. Thus for "scio," we say "non ignoro" "non me fugit," "non me præterit," "quis nescit ?" "Nemini dubium est." But we may borrow from a word of nearly the same import ; for "intelligo" and "sentio" and "video" often mean the same as "scio." Reading will abundantly supply us with a diversity of such ways of speaking, that we may use them, not merely as they occur, but when they seem most proper, for it is not always that they directly signify the same thing, nor, as

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1. Psammetichus, king of Egypt, according to Herodotus, in the beginning of his second book, procured mute nurses to take care of some infants whom he had ordered to be brought up in a desert. After two years old when hungry, they perhaps pronounced the word *beccos*, which signifies in the Phrygian tongue *bread* or *food.*

2. Eclog. iii. 82.

I may rightly say "video," *when speaking* of the understanding of the mind, may I likewise *say* "intelligo," of the sight of the eye, neither as "mucro" indicates "gladius", so does "gladius" indicate "mucro."

But as copiousness of language is thus acquired, so we must not read or hear for the sake of the words only; for examples of all things that we teach, are in this respect more efficacious than the arts themselves which are taught, when the learner has proceeded so far, as to be capable of understanding them without a teacher, and can follow by his own strength; because what the teacher delivers precepts for, the orator shews.

Now some compositions assist more the readers, others the hearers. The speaker excites us by the very spirit *with which he speaks,* and animates us not by the image and exterior of things, but by the things themselves. All is life and motion, and with solicitude for his success, we favourably receive all he says, as recommended by the charms of novelty. Nor are we interested only in the success of the trial, but also in the danger of those who plead. Besides these, a good voice, a graceful and suitable action, according as each topic shall demand, a method of pronunciation, which in speaking is most powerful, and, in a word, all things equally are becoming.

In reading our judgment is surer; because frequently one's own good wishes *for the speaker,* or the shouts of applauders, extort *praise* from the hearer. We are ashamed to differ *from others* and we are restrained as it were by a certain tacit bashfulness from trusting ourselves

more *than the rest;* though sometimes things *that are* faulty please the majority, and even those which do not please, are applauded by persons hired *to do so;* but on the contrary also it happens that bad judgments do not make a proper requital even for the best sayings. Reading is besides free and does not escape us by the rapidity which accompanies action; and we may often go over the same things, whether we doubt of their accuracy, or are willing to fix them in our memories. Repeating and reviewing will therefore be highly necessary; for as meats are chewed, and in some measure humected, before they descend into the stomach in order to facilitate their digestion; so let reading be laid up in the memory and be an object of imitation when it is not in a crude state, but rather softened and elaborated by long meditation.

None, however, but the best authors, and such as we are least liable to be deceived in, should be read for a long time together, but *they should be read* with diligence and almost to the pains of transcribing them; nor ought all to be examined only by parts, but the book, after having been fully perused, must be taken up afresh and especially an oration, the perfections of which are often designedly kept concealed. The orator indeed often prepares, dissembles, lies in wait, and says things in the first part of the pleading, which he avails himself of in the last. They may therefore be less pleasing in their place, whilst we still remain ignorant of the design for their being said, and therefore they should be read over again, when all the particulars are known.

But the greatest utility would be in studying those causes, on which we have written pleadings; and in reading, when it shall so happen, such as have been pronounced on both sides of the question; as for and against Ctesiphon, those of Demosthenes and Æschines; of Servius Sulpitius and Messala, for and against Aufidia; of Pollio and Cassius, when Aspernas was defendant, and many others. Here too if the oratorial abilities do not seem to be upon an equality, we may consult some for becoming acquainted with the state of the question, as in opposition to Cicero, Tubero' oration against Ligarius, and that of Hortensius for Verres.

It will also be of service to know, how two orators handled the same cause, on the side of the defence, Callidius pleaded for the restoration of Cicero to his house; and Brutus, for exercise sake, wrote an oration for Milo, though Celsus mistakenly says, he had pronounced it. Pollio and Messala defended the same persons, and when we were boys, the speeches of Domitius, Afer, Crispus, Passienus and Decimus Lælius were spoken of as excellent.[1]

In reading these authors, how renowned soever, we must not immediately imagine that all is perfect in them; for they sometimes make a false step, or sink under their burden, or indulge the will of their genius, and sometimes relax their attention, and occasionally are fatigued; since Demosthenes sometimes seems to Cicero to be nodding, and Homer to Horace.[2] They are great

1. Orat. 104.
2. Hor. de Art. Poet. 359. bonus dormitat Homerus.

men, and it happens to them who think that whatever they find in their writings is a rule of eloquence, that they imitate their defects for this is more easy than to imitate their perfections and think themselves abundantly like them, when they have copied only their faults.

That judgment, however, which is passed on the merit of such great men, ought to be with singular modesty and circumspection, lest, as it generally happens, they condemn what they do not understand. But if there be no avoiding a mistake on either side, I would rather that all their expressions pleased than that many displeased the readers.

III. Theophrastus says, that the reading of poets is of vast service to the orator. Many, and with good reason, are of the same opinion, as from them may be derived sprightliness in thought, sublimity in expression, every excitement in the affections and propriety in character, and especially minds which have been worn and harassed by daily pleading in the forum, are best recruited by the delightful gratification of such things. Therefore, Cicero thinks[1] relaxation should be sought for amidst the pleasure of poetic reading.

Let us, however, remember, that poets are not in all things to be imitated by the orator, neither in the liberty of words, nor licence of figures; and that all that kind of studies is calculated for ostentation; besides that it seeks pleasure alone, and pursues it not only by fictions of what is false, but of some things that are incredible, That it is assisted also by some patronage, because the

1 De Orat. II. n. 14. and pro Arch. n. 6.

poets bound down to a certain necessity of feet, cannot always use proper words, and being driven out of the strait road, must turn into some bye ways of speaking, and be compelled not only to change some words, but also to lengthen, shorten, transpose, and divide them, but that we stand armed in order of battle, and contend for matters of the greatest consequence, and strive for victory.

Neither would I wish their arms to be squalid with rust or canker, but retain rather a brightness that dismays, such as of polished steel, striking both the mind and eyes with awe; and not the splendour of gold and silver, a weak safeguard indeed, and rather dangerous to the bearer.

History likewise by its mild and grateful sap, may afford kind nutriment to an oratorial composition. Yet should the orator so read history, as to be convinced that most of its perfections ought to be avoided by him. It nearly borders upon poetry, and in a certain manner is a poem, unrestrained *by the laws of verse*. Its object is to narrate, and not to prove, and the whole work is composed not for the present pleading or contending of the matter, but for the memory of posterity and the fame of the abilities *of the writer.* Therefore, by a freer manner of expression, and bolder figures, it avoids the tediousness of narratives.

But, as I before mentioned, neither Sallust's conciseness, than which nothing can be so exquisite charming to attentive and learned ears, should be aime at by us, before a Judge, whose mind is taken up wit

a multiplicity of affairs, and who often is likewise illiterate; nor will the sweetness and abundance of Livy sufficiently instruct him, who seeks not the beauty of narration, but the assurance of proof. Add to this, that Cicero does not[1] think, that even Thucydides or Xenophon are of any real service to the orator, though he says the one animates by the alarm he sounds, and the muses speak by the mouth of the other.

We may, nevertheless, be allowed to use sometimes in digressions, the lustre of history, but in those points, on which there will be a debate, let us remember, that we do not want the supple exertions of an athletes' muscles, but the nervous branishings of the soldier's arm; and where also the versi-colour robe, which Demetrius Phalereus is said to have worn, will ill become the dust of the bar.

There is another utility in reading of history, and indeed the greatest, but not relative to the present matter, proceeding from the knowledge of things and examples, which the orator ought to be well versed in, that he may not seek all his testimonies from the parties, but may take most of them, well known to himself from antiquity; *testimonies* more powerful in this respect, that they alone are exempt from the charge of prejudice and partiality.

But that many things must be sought by us by reading the *works of the* philosophers, has been the

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1. Orat. 30, 39. 32.

fault of orators who have[1] given up to them the best part of their work, disputations on the nature of justice, honesty, utility, and their contraries ; as also on divine things ; and the Socratic arguments by induction, are very proper to prepare the future orator for altercations and interrogatories. But this reading requires not less discernment than the former ; that when we are engaged in the same subject, we may know that there is a difference in the condition of a cause and disputation, the bar and a school, mere precepts and an affair brought to trial.

Since we judge that there is so much utility in reading, I suppose that many will require us to add this also to our work, viz. who should be read, and what is the especial excellency in each author. But to mention every one would be an endless work ; for when Cicero in his Brutus speaks in so many thousand verses of the Roman orators only, and yet kept silence respecting all of his own age, and those with whom he lived, except Cæsar and Marcellus, what bounds would there be, if I would give an account of them, their successors, and all the Greeks, with philosophers and poets ? That brevity which is set forth in Livy, in his letter to his son will undoubtedly be the safest : that Demosthenes and Cicero were first to be read ; then each author, as he was most like these.

The conclusion, however, of my own judgment also is not to be concealed ; for I think that few, or rather that scarcely any can be found of those who have stood

1. Literally, have departed from the best part yielding to them.

the test of time, who will not bring some profit to those who use their judgment, since Cicero himself confesses, that he had received great helps from old authors, who are indeed, very ingenious but wanted art. I pass nearly the same judgment on the merit of our moderns. How few of them are so mad as to have hoped for the memory of posterity,[1] without even the least portion certainly of some art. Who (if there is any *such*) will be found immediately among the first few verses, and will dismiss us sooner than that our trial of him should cost us much loss of time (i. e. too soon for our trial of him to cost us.) But for an author to have something good, something to our purpose, it does not follow, that he is quite proper for creating that copiousness of language we here speak of.

43 But before I speak of the respective merit of authors, I must make in a few words some general reflections on the diversity of taste in regard to matters of eloquence. Some think that the ancients only deserve to be read, persuaded that none else have distinguished themselves by natural eloquence, and that strength of language, so becoming men. Others are captivated with the flowery profusion of the orators of the present age, with their delicate turns, and with all the blandishments they curiously invent to charm the ears of an ignorant multitude. Some choose to follow the plain and direct way

1. In this difficult passage, I have followed the reading of Ingram's edition ; qui ne minima quidem alicujus certe fiducia artis memoriam posteritatis speraverit. Here alicujus certe fiducia artis is opposed to arte carentibus, above.

of speaking. Others take to be sound and truly attic, whatever is close, acute, and departs but little from ordinary conversation. Some are delighted with a more elevated, more impetuous, and more fiery force of genius. Others, and not a few, are fond of a smooth, elegant, and polite manner. About which difference I shall speak more carefully when we must enquire[1] about the style of speaking.

V. In the mean time I shall summarily mention what advantage from what reading they may obtain, who desire to improve their talent of speaking ; and for this purpose shall cull out a few authors, who have been truly eminent. It will be an easy matter for the studious, to judge which are most like these, that no one complain of my omitting, perhaps, any of those, whom he greatly approves of; for indeed many more than I shall name, well deserve to be read. But I shall now mention those kinds of reading which I think to be most suitable to those that desire to become orators.

1. Therefore as Aratus in his phenomena, thinks he should begin by[2] Jupiter, so we may seem to begin properly from Homer. He it is that gave birth to, and set the example, of all parts of eloquence, just as himself says, the[3] course of rivers and springs of fountains owe their origin to the ocean. No one, in great sub-

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1. Book XII. c. 10.

2. Aratus so begins his Astrological dispensations. Ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχμέσθα. Ab. Jove Principium.

3. Il. l. xxi. v. 195.

jects, has excelled him in elevation; nor in small by propriety. He is florid and close, grave and agreeable, admirable for his concise as well as copious manner, aud not only eminent for poetical, but likewise oratorial abilities.

For to say nothing of his eulogiums, of his hortative and consolatory speeches, does not even the ninth book, which contains the embassy to Achilles; or the contention between the chieftains related in the first, or their deliberations recorded in the second, explain all the art of pleadings and counsels? no one will be so ignorant as not to confess that this author had in his own power *to move* both the milder and the more impetuous passions.

Again, in the beginning of both his poems, has he not in a few verses not only observed, but established the rule of an exordium? He makes the auditor benevolent, by the invocation of the Goddesses, which are supposed to preside over poets; attentive, by the importance of the matter he proposes; and docile, by giving him a full view of it. Who made ever a more concise oration than the person who relates[1] the death of Patroclus; or one more exact, and to the life, than him who gives an[2] exact account of the battle of the Caretes and Ætolians? And his similitudes, amplifications, digressions, signs of things and arguments and all the other particulars of proving and refuting are so numerous that even they

1. Il. l. xvi. v. 18—21. 2. Il. l. ix. v. 525, &c.

who have written of arts cite most illustrations of these matters from that poet. Besides, in the way of epilogue, what has ever been found to equal the moving prayer of Priam, entreating Achilles to restore to him his son's body?

In short, if we look to the force of his words, the beauty of his thoughts, the figures he adopts, the disposition of this whole work, we cannot help observing, but that they exceed the bounds of human wit. So that it is the work of a great man to follow his excellencies not by imitation (which is impossible) but by understanding them. He has undoubtedly left far behind him all others, in all kinds of eloquence, especially the heroic Poets, because in a like manner the comparison contrast may seem more conspicuous.

Hesiod seldom rises, and a great part of his works is occupied in *finding* names *for things*; yet his sentiments *mixed* among his precepts are useful, and the sweetness of his expression and composition is praiseworthy and to him is given the palm in the middle kind of eloquence.

Antimachus, on the contrary, has force and solidity, and his style by being out of the road of what is common, has its due share of praise. But though the almost unanimous assent of grammarians places him in the second rank after Hesiod; yet is he so deficient in the management of passions, in agreeableness, in disposition, and in art, that it plainly appears, how[1] to be near a man is one thing and to be second to him another.

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1. That is, how different being near is from being second.

Panyasis is thought to contain a mixture of both these poets, but equals neither in the powers of elocution. He surpasses, however, Hesiod by the choice of his matter, and Antimachus by order and disposition.

Appollonius[1] does not come into the catalogue *of poets* given by the grammarians, because Aristarchus and Aristophanes the critics of the poets, placed no one of their own age in the number. Yet he published a work, commendable for a certain mediocrity which is well supported.

The matter of Aratus is motionless, and without variety and sentiment; neither in it is any person introduced speaking. But his abilities fall not short of the work he thought himself equal to.

Theocritus is admirable in his kind; but his rustic and pastoral muse not only dreads the bar, but even to make its appearance in the city.

Here I imagine several busied in crowding in the names of many other poets. Has not Pisander, says one, worthily sung the achievements of Hercules; Have Macer and Virgil followed, without reason,[2] Nicander, says another; and shall we pass by Euphorion, of whom had not Virgil approved, he certainly would

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1. Apollonius the Rhodian, wrote the Expedition of the Argonauts. He lived in the time of the grammarians, Aristarchus and Aristophanes of Byzantium, who, in the reign of Ptolemy, Philometor, had passed a severe criticism on Authors.

2. A poet of Colophon, who among other things, wrote Georgics.

not have made mention in his Bucolics, of poetry composed in Chalcidian verse and says another, has Horace,[1] to no purpose, named Tyrteus immediately after Homer.

I answer, that there is no one so little versed in the knowledge of authors, that he is not able to copy at least into his book a list taken from a library. I am not unacquainted with those I pass by, neither do I condemn them on that account, having before declared that all have their utility ; but we shall return to them when, our eloquence has attained a proper degree of consistence. So it often happens in grand entertainments, when after having satisfied ourselves with the best meats, the most common have their turn, and please at least by their variety.

Then we shall have also leisure to take into our hands elegy, in which Callimachus is reported to hold the first rank, and Philætes the second, which is generally given up to him. But whilst we are endeavouring, as I said, to acquire that substantial facility, we should contract a familiarity with the best authors, and strengthen our conceptions, and lay deep the colouring of eloquence, rather by the well-digested reading of some good books, than by the reading of many.

Therefore out of the three writers of iambics, who have received the approbation of Aristarchus, Archilochus is the only that will contribute most to the facility we ought to acquire. We find in him an extraordinary force of expression, bold, short and lively sentiments,

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1. Art. Poet. 502.

much vigor and nerve ; so that *the circumstance* that he is inferior to any other, may appear to some to be the fault of his subject, not of his genius.

There are nine lyric poets, and Pindar far excells all of them, by the magnificence of his enthusiasm, the sublimity of his thoughts, the beauty of figures, the happy copiousness of things and words, and a flood, as it were, of eloquence: upon which account, Horace[1] justly believes him inimitable. The subjects Stesichorus has treated, afford also a sufficient demonstration of the strength of his genius, having sung the greatest wars and the most illustrious captains, and having supported all the weight of epic poetry on his lyre. For he gives his characters a proper dignity both in acting and speaking ; and if he had kept to a just moderation, no other would have come nearer to Homer ; but he is redundant and overflows, a vice undoubtedly deserving reprehension, but it is a vice of abundance.

Alceus[2] is deservedly presented with the golden lute in one part of his work, because he inveighs against tyrants ; he contributes much also to morals ; in style also he is concise, magnificent, correct, and in many respects he resembles Homer ; but he descends sometimes to sportive trifles and amours, though indeed more fit for greater subjects.

Simonides, neat and plain, is mostly commendable for a propriety and sweetness of diction. His chief talent, however, lies in softening the heart by sentiments of pity, and some in this respect prefer him to all the other lyric poets.*

1. Horat. II. 1. 4. 2. Horat. Od. XIII. 1, 2.

The ancient comedy is almost the only that preserves unadulterated the native graces of the Attic language. It is, besides, remarkable for a liberty which is very eloquent; and though it particularly excels in the ridicule of human follies and indiscretions, yet its force and energy in other parts, is very considerable. For it is grand, and elegant, and beautiful, and I know not, if any other thing, next to Homer, (whom we must always, except, as he himself excepts Achilles) be more proper to form orators, or comes nearer to their manner. Its authors are many, but Aristophanes, Cratinus, and Eupolis, are the chief.

Æschylus is the first that brought tragedies to light; sublime, dignified, and pompous, often even to a fault, but mostly unpolished and immethodical, for which reason the Athenians permitted the poets, who came after him, to correct his pieces, and fit them for the stage; and by this means many of these poets had the honour of being crowned.

But Sophocles and Euripides made this work (sc. tragedy) shine forth far more brightly; of whom it is a question amongst very many, which is the better poet in their different way of writing. For my part, I shall leave the matter undecided, as making nothing to my present purpose. It must nevertheless, be confessed, that Euripides will be of much greater utility for those who design themselves for the bar; for besides that his style (and this is what is found fault with by those to whom the buskin, and majesty and tone of Sophocles seem to have something more elevated) comes nearer

the oratorical kind; he likewise abounds with fine thoughts, and in philosophic maxims, is almost upon equality with philosophers, and in his dialogue may be compared with the best speakers at the bar. He is again wonderful for his masterly strokes in all the passions, and more especially for exciting commiseration.

Menander, as he often testifies himself, was a great admirer of Euripides, and also an imitator of him, though in a different kind of writing. This comic poet, if read well, may alone, in my opinion, be sufficient for procuring all the advantages proposed from my precepts; so exactly expressed by him is the picture he has given us of human life, so fruitful is his wit in invention, so beautiful his elocution, so proper his characters, passions, and manners. I must undoubtedly deem those to be persons of some penetration who think the orations which are published with the name of Charisius to have been written by Menander. But he appears to me a greater orator in his comedies; unless, perhaps, it may be said that his Nomotheton, Epiclerus, Hypobolimæum, and some other pieces, are not natural representations of what is transacted in judicial causes, or rather not accurate examples of oratorial abilities.

I likewise think, that he may be of still greater service to declaimers, because, according to the nature of controversies, they are obliged to assume many different characters; as of fathers, sons, husbands, military men, farmers; the rich, the poor, the angry person, the suppliant, the mild tempered and the ill natured. In allwhich,

decorum has been admirably observed by this poet, who has truly surpassed all other writers in comedy, and eclipsed them by the splendour of his name and reputation.

There are other comic poets, among whom something good for our purpose may be selected, if read with a mind disposed to overlook their faults. Of these, Philemon is the principal, who deserves the second rank with as much justice after Menander, as he was unjustly preferred to him by the corrupt taste of his age.

2. There have been many famous writers of history, but all agree in giving the preference to two, whose perfections, though different, have acquired an almost equal degree of praise. Thucydides is close, concise, and ever going on. Herodotus is sweet, natural, and copious. The one is remarkable for his animated expression of the more impetuous passions, the other for gentle persuasion in the milder: the former succeeds in harangues and has more force; the other in speeches of familiar intercourse, and givesmore pleasure.

Theopompus, who follows them, has less of the historian in him, and more of the orator, having been of that profession a considerable time, before he engaged in the writing of history. Philistus deserves to be distinguished from among the crowd of the historians that next followed after these three. He imitated Thucydides, weaker, it is true, than his original, but somewhat more clear.

Ephorus, so Isocrates thinks, has not fire enough,

and wants rousing by a spur. Clitarchus has a great share of wit, but his veracity, as an historian, is much doubted. Timagenes, who was not born till long after, is commendable for having repaired with new lustre the care of writing history, which had been laid aside. I have not forgot Xenophon, but he is better classed with philosophers.

3. A numerous band of orators follows, for Athens produced ten of them, contemporary with one another. Demosthenes was by far the chief of them, and held to be in a manner the only model for eloquence; so great is his force; so close are all things in him, and tended with certain nerves; so great is his accuracy in not adopting any idle expression, and so just his precision, that you can neither find out what is wanting in him nor what is redundant. Æschines is more full, more diffusive, and appears the more grand, as his parts spread wider; he has more flesh, but not so many sinews. Hyperides is exceeding sweet, acute, and neat; but he is fitter, not to say more useful, for causes of lesser importance.

Lysias, elder than these, is subtile and elegant, and if it was enough for the orator to instruct, one than whom you could find nothing more perfect. There is nothing idle, nothing far-fetched in him; yet is he more like a clear brook, than a great river. Isocrates in a different kind of eloquence, is fine and polished, and better adapted for engaging in a mock than a real battle. He was studious of all the beauties of discourse, and had his reasons for it, having calculated his eloquence for

schools, and not for contentions at the bar. His invention was easy, he was fond of the beautiful and so nice was he in his composition, that his extreme care is not without reprehension.

These I take to be the principal, but not the only perfections, in the just mentioned orators. There are others who, I am sensible, are not without their degree of merit ; and I even acknowledge Demetrius Phalereus to be possessed of great wit and oratorial abilities, though said to be the first that had warped eloquence. He deserves to be remembered, if for no other reason, than being the last of the Attics, who can properly be styled an orator ; and Cicero[1] prefers him to all others in the middle kind of eloquence.

4. Among philosophers from whom Cicero confesses that he derived very much of eloquence, who doubts of Plato's being the chief, whether we consider the acuteness of his dissertations, or his divine Homerical faculty of elocution? He soars high above prose, and that common style which the Greeks call pedestrian ; and he seems to me not so much endowed with the wit of a man, as inspired by a sort of Delphic oracle.

What shall I say of Xenophon's unaffected agreeableness, so unattainable by any imitation, that the Graces themselves seemed to have composed his language ? The testimony of the ancient comedy concerning Pericles, is very justly applicable to him " That the Goddess of Persuasion had seated herself on his lips !"

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1. Orat. 92.

And what shall I say of the elegance of the other disciples of Socrates? What of Aristotle? whom I know not whether to consider more illustrious for his great knowledge of things, or for the abundanee of his writings or the sweetness of his eloquence, or the pointed wit of his inventions or the variety of his works. And, as to Theophrastus[1], his elocution has something so noble and so divine, that it may be said his name has been hence derived.

The ancient stoics were less studious about eloquence, but their lessons of virtue are very notable; their reasonings are just, and they prove well what they inculcate. They were, in fine, more acute in discussing the nature of things, than curious in the display of fine language, which they did not in the least affect.

VI. I think of following the same order in regard to our Roman authors.

1. As therefore speaking of the Greeks we began with Homer, so of the Latins, we cannot more happily begin than with Virgil, who of all their poets and ours in the epic style, is without all doubt the only that comes nearest to Homer. I shall here use the same words which in my youthage I heard from Domitius Afer, who on my asking him, what poet he believed approached nearest Homer, said, Virgil is the second, but nearer

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1. Tyrtamus, was a scholar and successor of Aristotle; his master called him Theophrastus, *διὰ τὸ θεῖα φράζειν*. "because he spoke like a god." By a similar metonymy, Chrysostom (*χρύσεον στόμα*) and many others received their names.

the first, than a third." and indeed, though obliged to give way to Homer's heavenly and immortal genius, yet in Virgil are discoverable a greater exactness and care, even on this account, because he had to take more pains: so that what we lose on the side of the eminency of qualities, we perhaps gain on that of justness and equability.

All our other poets will follow at a great distance. Macer and Lucretius may indeed be read, but not in order to that copious language for constituting the body of eloquence we here speak of. Both have elegantly treated their subject, but the one is rather low and the other difficult. Varro Attacinus,[1] in those, works, by which he has gained a name, as being the interpreter of another's work, does not deserve to be rejected, but he is not rich enough in expression for improving the requisites of oratory. Ennius we revere as groves sacred for their antiquity, in which huge old oaks affect us less by their beauty, than by the religious awe they inspire us with.

Other poets, as nearer our time, will contribute more to the copiousness of expression we speak of. Ovid, though wanton even in his heroic poetry, and too great an admirer of his own wit, yet in some parts is praise-

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1. Varro Attacinus lived in the time of Ovid, and translated into Latin verse, the expedition of the Argonauts, written by Apollonius the Rhodian. He was called Attacinus from Attax, a village of the Narbonensian Gaul according to Eusebius; or according to others, from the river Attax.

worthy. If Cornelius Severus, though a better versifier than poet, had gone through his Sicilian war, as he had executed the first book, he would with reason have claimed for himself the second place.

But an untimely death hindered his putting the finishing hand to his work. His juvenile productions, however, show him to be of great genius, and of admirable taste for one of his years.

We lately have had a great loss in Valerius Flaccus, Saleius Bassus had so vehement and poetic a genius, that even old age could not bring it to a just maturity. Rabirius and Pedo are not unworthy of being known by those who have leisure time enough on their hands. Lucan is hot, impetuous, and much famed for his bright thoughts; but to speak my real sentiments of him, I think he should be rather classed with orators than with poets.

To these we have given the title of poets, because the care of governing the world has taken off[1] Germanicus Augustus from the pursuit of his favourite studies, the gods having thought it but little to have made him the greatest of poets. Still what can be more sublime, more learned, and more perfect in all respects, than the works which he began when first he bore a part in the

1. Some commentators understand this of Germanicus the son of Drusus, but they are much mistaken; and it is evident that Quintilian means the Emperor Domitian, who assumed this title, as if he had conquered Germany, as also that of the son of Pallas, both which may appear from his medals: and to the latter alludes what is said in the Latin text, *cui magis suas artes aperiret familiare numen Minervæ.*

government? Who should sing wars better than him, who so nobly achieves them? Who else could so favourably be heard by the muses? Upon whom should Minerva shower down her accomplishments more willingly, than upon a prince who had always made this goddess his deity? Future ages shall make more ample eulogiums of this rare talent; for now the merit of the poet is eclipsed in him by the splendour of his other more illustrious qualities. Yet suffer, Cæsar, that we who cultivate letters, pass by not in silence so heavenly a gift as this, and that we teach posterity at least by this[1] verse of Virgil, that to crown your august forehead

————the ivy wreath
Might creep intermingled with thy conquering bays.

TRAPP.

We dispute it with the Greeks also in elegy, and Tibullus herein seems to me to have distinguished himself by his elegance and purity. Some prefer Propertius to him. Ovid is more lascivious than either, and Gallus harsher.

Satire is entirely of our invention, and Lucilius is the first among us who has been much celebrated for his taste in that way. He still has such fond admirers, that they make no scruple of preferring him not only to all satirists, but even to all other poets. For my part, as far as I dissent from their opinion, so far do I also from that of Horace, who says, "Lucilius runs muddy,

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1. Eclog. viii. v. 13.

yet has something worth notice." For there is in him a wonderful erudition, and freedom of speech and *arising*, thence, a tartness of raillery and abundance of wit.

Horace is more correct and pure, and has succeeded admirably in exposing the ridiculous humours of men. Persius, though he wrote but one book, has deserved great praise. There are famous satirists now living, who hereafter will have honourable mention made of them.

There is another sort of satire, and more ancient, which mixed with several varieties of verse, Terentius Varro, the most learned of the Romans, composed. This same person has distinguished himself by a diversity of other compositions. He had a profound knowledge of the Latin tongue, and of all antiquity, and of the Greek history, and of our own transactions. He is however likely to contribute to knowledge more than to eloquence.

None of our poets have ever seemed so fond of the iambic verse as to confine themselves entirely to its use. Some have placed it between other verses, and its tartness adopted by Catullus, Bibaculus and Horace, though in the last an epode[1] is found to follow it.

But of our lyric poets, Horace is almost the only

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1. An epode is called a shorter verse, subjoined to a longer, and as it were, chiming in with it; from ἐπῳδω, *accino*. Horace in the book, thence called *Epodon* often subjoins dimeters to trimeter iambic verses.

that deserves to be read; for he rises at times, abounds with sweetness and grace, and happily hazards a variety of figures and words. If one should be desirous of reading any other, I would recommend Cæsius Bassus, whom I not long since had some knowledge of; but there are persons now living who, by far excel him.

Our most famous tragic writers were Accius and Pacuvius, both remarkable for the weight of their thoughts and expressions, and the dignity of their characters. But that polish and last touch in finishing works may seem to be wanting to the age generally more than Accius and Pacuvius themselves. Accius is said to have more force, and they who affect to appear more learned, find more art and learning in Pacuvius. The Thyestes of Varius may stand in competition with any Greek tragedy; and the Medea of Ovid shews what he was capable of, if he had chosen a curb a little, and not indulge so much his genius. Of those whom I have seen Pomponius Secundus is by far the first; whom they that are now old (i. e. the last generation) thought to be deficient in Tragic fire, but acknowledged that he excelled in erudition and eloquence.

In comedy we fail most, though Varro on the authority of Ælius Stolo, says that, "The Muses would have spoke the language of Plautus, if they had a mind to speak Latin;" though the ancients are lavish in their praises of Cæcilius; and though the comedies of Terence are ascribed to Scipio Africanus, which undoubtedly are extremely elegant, and would have been far more graceful, if the measure of verses were confined to

trimeter iambics.[1] We scarce can delineate a faint shadow of the beauties of Greek comedy; for the Latin seems to me so little susceptible of the graces peculiar to the Attic language, that the Greeks themselves retain no more of them, the moment they speak in another dialect. Afranius excelled in comedies built entirely on a Latin plan[2]. I wish he had not sullied his subject with infamous love-intrigues, exposing thereby his own moral character.

2. But in history[3] I would not yield to the Greeks, for I should not be afraid to oppose Sallust to Thucydides, neither would Herodotus be displeased at Livy's being compared with him; *Livy*, both of wonderful sweetness in his narrations, and unspeakably eloquent in his harangues, so great is the propriety of all he says, as well in regard to circumstances as to persons. As to passions, especially those of the softer kind, no historian, to speak modestly, has expressed them in more natural colours. His different perfections may, therefore, be held as a just equivalent to Sallust's immortal conciseness, according to the judicious remark of Servilius Novianus, who said they were more equal than alike. This same person I had once the honor to be a pupil to

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1. Terence, as was customary with comic poets, makes use of iambics of all sorts of measure, that is, of tetrameters, which have eight feet. Quintilian wishes he had used only trimeters, which consist of six feet.

2. *Togatæ Comediæ* are those which were entirely Latin, that is, conformable to the manners and customs of the Romans; as *palliatæ* were called such as had been composed in imitation of the Greeks.

3. Read " cesserim, not cesserit.

He too, was an historian of great genius and reputation He is sententious, but less close than the importance of history requires. Bassus Aufidius, who had wrote before him, seems to have supported the character of historian better in his books of the German war. He is undoubtedly estimable in all respects, yet in some things short of his own abilities.

An historian[1], now living, adorns the glory of our age, and deserves to live for ever in the memory of future ones. His name, now only guessed at, will be famous hereafter. He has many admirers, but few imitators, inasmuch as his *bold* freedom was hurtful to him, although what he had written was much curtailed. But you may sufficiently discover his lofty spirit and bold thoughts in those *of his writings* which still remain. There are several other good historiographers ; but it is our business to point out the kind of reading that is fittest for the orator, and not pass in review whole libraries.

3. But our orators in an especial manner, may put the Roman eloquence upon a par with the Grecian. Cicero I would strenuously oppose to any of them, though conscious of the quarrel I should bring upon myself, by comparing him with Demosthenes, in a time so critical as this ; especially as my subject does not

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1. Some think Pliny is here hinted at ; but most that he means Tacitus, and this is more probable. Perhaps he then, through fear of the times, curtailed his writings of many things which were afterwasds restored.

oblige me to it, neither is it of any consequence, when it is my real opinion that Demosthenes ought to be particularly read, or rather got by heart.

I must say, notwithstanding, that I judge them to be alike in most of the great qualities they possessed; alike in design, disposition, the manner of dividing, of preparing minds, of proving, in short, in every thing belonging to invention. In elocution, there is some difference. The one is more compact, the other more copious; the one closes in with his adversary, the other allows him more ground to fight in; the one is always subtile and keen in argument, the other is perhaps less so, but has often more weight; from the one nothing can be retrenched, neither can any thing be added to the other; the one has more study, the other more nature.

As to raillery, and exciting commisseration, two very powerful things, the advantage lies on our side; and perhaps the [1] custom of Athens was the cause of our not finding in Demosthenes the pathos of perorations. But the genius of our language does not permit us the beauties the Attics were wont to admire in him. However, in the epistolary style, though we have letters of both, there is no comparison.

But, however we must yield in this point, because Demosthenes lived first, and in a great degree made Cicero so great as he is. For it seems to me that

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1. It was not allowed at Athens to move the passions; consequently the peroration was inadmissible.

Cicero, having bent all his thoughts on the Greeks towards forming himself on their model, had copied the force of Demosthenes, the abundance of Plato, and the sweetness of Isocrates. Neither did he only, by his application, extract what was best in these great originals, but by the happy fruitfulness of his immortal genius, produce himself the greater part, or rather all of these same perfections. And to make use of an expression of Pindar, he does not "collect the water of rains to remedy a natural dryness", but flows continually himself from a source of living waters, and seems to have existed by a peculiar gift of providence, that in him eloquence might make trial of her whole strength, and her most powerful exertions.

For who can instruct with more exactness, and move with more vehemency? What orator ever possessed so pleasing a manner, that the very things he forcibly wrests from you, you fancy you grant him; and when by his violence he carries off the judge, yet does the judge seem to himself to obey his own motion, and not to be hurried away by that of another? Besides, in all he says, there is so much authority and weight, that you are ashamed to differ from him in opinion; and it is not the zeal of an advocate you find in him, but rather the faith and sincerity of a witness or judge. And what at the same time is more admirable, all these particulars, any one of which might not be attainable by another without infinite pains, seem to flow from him naturally; so that his discourses, the most charming the most harmonious, which possibly can be heard,

retain notwithstanding so great an air of happy ease, that they seem to have cost him nothing.

With good reason therefore is he said by his contemporaries to reign at the bar; and he has so far gained the good graces of posterity, that Cicero is now less the name of a man, than the name of eloquence itself. Let us then keep him in view; let him be our model, and let that orator think he has made a considerable progress, when he once has conceived a love and taste for Cicero.

Asinius Pollio is remarkable for his great invention, and for his exactness, which some think to be upon the extreme; his design besides is well formed, and his manner seems spirited enough. But his style is so distant in sweetness and purity from that of Cicero, that he may seem to have existed an age before him.

But Messala is neat and elegant, and in some degree openly exhibits in his speeches the nobility of his birth; *but* in strength he is deficient.

If Cæsar had made the bar his principal occupation, no other of our orators could have better disputed the prize of eloquence with Cicero. So great is his force, so sharp his wit, so active his fire, that it plainly appears, he spoke with as much spirit, as he fought. A wonderful elegance and purity of language, which he made his particular study, was a further embellishment of all these his talents for eloquence.

Cælius was master of great natural parts, and there was a singular prettiness in his way of forming an accu-

sation, and he was a man worthy[1] of having allotted to him a sounder judgment and a longer life.

I have met with persons, who preferred Calvus to all our orators; and others, who were of opinion, that the too great rigour he had exercised upon himself in point of precision, had debilitated his oratorial talents. However his speeches are chaste and grave, correct, and frequently also vehement. His taste of writing was Attic, and his untimely death was so far an injury to him, if he designed to add to, but not to retrench any thing from his compositions.

Servius Sulpitius is most worthy of the great reputation he acquired by his three pleadings. Cassius Severus, if read with judgment, will afford many things worthy of imitation; and if with his other perfections, he had laid on a finer colouring, and added more body to his style, he might have had a place in the first rank. For there was in him very much talent, a surprising tartness *of raillery*, and pleasantry, and very great force; but he followed more his passion than judgment, and his jokes having been rather bitter and taunting, could not therefore escape appearing frequently ridiculous.

There have been many other good speakers, whom it would be too tedious to mention. Of those I have seen, Domitius Afer and Julius Africanus were the most eminent. The first claims the preference by his elegant composition, and the whole manner of his elo-

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1. Cui after dignus, for et ei; worthy that to him should have been adopted.

quence, which deservedly give him a right to a place among the ancients. The second has more fire, but is over-nice in words, is sometimes rather long in his composition, and little reserved in the use of metaphors.

We lately could boast of several fine wits, Trachallus was for the most part sublime, was plain enough, and you might say he aimed at perfection in all respects. By hearing him speak, you might think him still greater; for his voice was so fine, that I never heard any thing like it; and his pronunciation and aspect were so graceful, that they could even charm on a theatre. In short, he possessed in a great degree all external advantages. Vibius Crispus was neat in his composition, and his manner quite pleasing; but he was better at managing private than public causes.

If Julius Secundus had lived longer, he would undoubtedly have left a great name to posterity. He would have added, and he constantly added to his other rare qualities, all that was deficient in him; I mean, a want of duly exerting himself in contestation, and a greater attention to things than words. But though cut off by death, he deserves a considerable place among orators; so great in the main is his eloquence; so delectable are the graces, with which he explains every thing; so clear, sweet, and beautiful is his style; so proper are his expressions, those even which may seem to be far-fetched; and so strong in signification and emphatical are some, which are boldly hazarded.

Those, who may write after me on orators, will have ample matter for truly praising those who now live; for

the talents, with which the bar is adorned at the present day, are very great. We have some old advocates of consummate merit, illustrious rivals of the ancients; and our young ones tend to perfection by an industrious imitation of their talents.

4. There remains only to speak of those, who have written on subjects of philosophy. Hitherto we have had but few eloquent in this kind. Cicero, as in all other respects, so also in this, was a worthy rival of Plato. Brutus has written some excellent treatises, the merit of which is far superior to that of his orations. He supports admirably well the weight of his matter, and seems to feel what he says. Cornelius Celsus, in the manner of the Sceptics, has written a good many tracts, which are not without elegance and perspicuity. Plancus among the Stoics, may be read with profit, for being acquainted with the things he discusses. Catius, an Epicurean, has some levity in his way, but in the main, is not an unpleasing author.

I have designedly hitherto omitted speaking of Seneca, who was conversant in all kinds of eloquence, upon account of the opinion persons falsely entertained, by which I am believed to condemn him, and also to hate him. I drew this aspersion upon me, by my endeavour to bring over eloquence to a more austere taste, which had been corrupted and enervated by very many softnesses and delicacies. Then it was that Seneca was almost the only author young persons read with pleasure. I did not indeed strive to exclude him absolutely, but could not bear he should be preferred to others much

better,[1] whom he took all possible pains to cry down; because, as conscious to himself that he had taken to a different route from their way of writing, he could not otherwise expect to please those who had a taste for them. It was, however, Seneca's lot to be more loved than imitated, and his partisans run as wide from him, as much as himself had fallen from the ancients. Yet it were to be wished that they had proved themselves like to, or had come near him. But they were fond of nothing in him but his faults, and every one strove to copy from him those he could. Then when he boasted that he spoke in the same way as he (i. e. Seneca,) he brought Seneca into disgrace.

His perfections, abstractedly from this corrupt taste he had given occasion to, were many and great. His wit was easy and fruitful, his erudition considerable, his knowledge extensive, in which last point he had been sometimes led into mistakes, probably by those whom he had charged to make researches for him. There is hardly a branch of study but he has written something upon; for his orations, his poems, epistles and dialogues are much extolled. In philosophic matters, he was not so accurate, but was admirable for his invectives against vice.

He has many bright thoughts, and many things are well worth reading in him for the improvement of the moral character; but his elocution is for the most part

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1. Gellius, lib. xii. says, that Seneca endeavoured to discredit Cicero and Virgil, and to find fault with them in many places.

corrupt, and the more dangerous, as its vices are of a sweet and alluring nature. One could wish he had written with his own genius, and another's judgment. For if he had rejected some things, if he had less studiously affected some engaging beauties, if he had not been over-fond of all his productions, if he had not weakened the importance of his matter by frivolous thoughts, he would have been honoured, rather by the approbation of the learned, than the love of striplings.

However, such as he is, he may be read when the taste is formed, and strengthened by a more austere kind of eloquence, if for no other reason than because he can exercise the judgment on both sides. For, as I said, many things in him are worthy even of admiration, if a proper choice has been made, which I wish he had made himself; as indeed, that nature was deserving of an inclination to embrace what was better, which had abilities to effect whatever it inclined to.

CHAPTER II.

OF IMITATION.

I. That it is useful and necessary.—We must not content ourselves with the inventions of others, but strive to invent something ourselves.—Also, to excell those we imitate. II. We must well consider whom, and what we imitate in them.—Every one in imitation ought to consult his own abilities. III. Decorum is to be preserved in the matter we treat of.—We must be careful, not to devote ourselves to any one kind;—nor to any one author. IV. Imitation should be, not in words only, but much more in things.

1. It is from the above-mentioned, and other authors, worthy of being read, that we ought to borrow the copiousness of language, the variety of figures, and the manner of composition; then our mind must be directed to the imitation of all their perfections, as it cannot be doubted, but that a great part of art is contained in imitation. For as invention first took place, and is a principal concern; so it is useful to imitate what has been well invented. The whole habit of life consists in our being willing to do ourselves what we approve of in others. So children, to acquire the practice of writing, study to form the characters marked out before them; so one learning music accompanies the voice of his teacher; painters keep an eye upon the works of

former masters in the art ; and farmers upon a mode of cultivation approved by experience, for a copy. We observe, in fine, that the beginnings of every discipline are formed according to some proposed model. We must, indeed, be either like or unlike that which is good; and to be like is rarely the effect of nature, though often the fruit of imitation.

But this very thing, which makes much easier to us the knowledge of all matters, than could be compassed by those who had no prescript to follow, is injurious, unless it is used with caution and judgment. Therefore imitation will not be sufficient of itself, in the first place, because it is the mark of an indolent mind to rest satisfied with the inventions of others ; and what would have been the case in those times that were without an example, if men were supposed to do or think of nothing, but merely what they had already known ? This ; viz. that no invention would ever have taken place. Why then should we decline the inventing of a thing, which did not exist before us ? The ancients in their rough and unpolished state, could, by the force of genius only, give birth to many things, and shall we not be excited to make inquiries, well knowing that they have found who had taken the trouble to seek ? And as they, who had not a teacher in any one particular, could, notwithstanding, oblige posterity with several discoveries, shall not the experience of these things avail us for exploring others ; or shall we have nothing but that for which we are indebted to another? As some painters study

this alone ; to be able to copy pictures in the proportions and lines *of the original.*

It is also unseemly, to be contented with fully coming up to that which you imitate ; for again, what improvement could be made, if no one effected more than his model ? We should have nothing more excellent in poetry than Livius Andronicus, nor any thing in history superior to the Annals of our Pontiffs. We should still sail on planks, and all our painting would consist in tracing the extremities of the shadow bodies make, when opposed to light. Take a cursory view of all the arts, and you will not find one, which has remained such as it was invented ; not one, circumscribed by the bounds of its origin ; unless, perhaps, we condemn our time for being so unhappy as to give growth to nothing ; for indeed nothing grows by imitation only. If we were not allowed to make an addition to what went before us, how should we ever hope to find perfection in any orator, it being evident that among the best of those we have hitherto had any knowledge of, there has not been found one, in whom there is no deficiency or no faults ?

Even they, who do not tend to the greatest perfection, ought to strive to exceed, rather than merely follow others ; for he that contends to be first, though he may not surpass, will at least equal ; whereas he who thinks he must tread in another's footsteps, will never be able to come up with him, because the follower will be always behind.

Add to this, that it is commonly easier to do more

than the same thing; for similitude has so great difficulty, that not even nature herself was so powerful in this respect, as that things which appear most similar, should not be clearly distinguished by some sensible difference.[1]

Again, every thing like another, cannot equal in exactness that which it imitates; a shadow is weaker than a body, an image falls short of reality; and the action of a stage-player is faintly expressive of the true emotions of the mind. The same happens likewise in oratorial compositions. Those we copy after are endowed with nature, and innate force; whereas every imitation is a counterfeit, or at best a servile subjecting of ourselves to the manner of another, and hence declamations retain little of the animating spirit of orations, the subject being here real, and there fictitious.

Besides, the greatest accomplishments of an orator, his genius, invention, force, ease, and whatever is not taught by art cannot be imitated. Therefore many, when they have selected a certain manner of expression, or a certain measure in composition, which they have remarked in an orator, vainly imagine, that what they have chosen is cleverly imitated by them; although some words become obsolete and others in vogue in process of time; (since the surest rule of them is in custom) and these are not in their own nature either good or bad (being themselves mere sounds) but only

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1. i. e, that not even nature herself is able to make things so perfectly similar, as not to exhibit some sensible difference.

as they are opportunely and properly, or otherwise, applied; and the composition thence resulting, will then appear, as much adapted to things, as delectable by its variety.

II. The most accurate judgment is, therefore, required for examining into this part of the orator's study. First, who ought to be imitated, as a great many take for models very bad originals. Secondly, what good quality there is even in those whom we have chosen, which we should set ourselves to obtain; for the best authors are not without their faults, and the learned are liberal in their criticisms upon one another. And I wish that *orators* spoke as much better by imitating the good, as they speak worse *by imitating* the bad.

At least, let not those who are endowed with a competent judgment for avoiding what is bad, think it enough to have copied in themselves an image of perfection, and only, as I may say, the skin of eloquence, or rather those[1] figures of Epicurus, which he says are continually flying off from the surface of bodies. This is the fate of those, who, by not having sounded the depths of what may be supposed oratorial perfection, fit themselves to what appears on a slight inspection; and though they may be very successful in imitation, as not much different in the choice of expression and harmony

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1. Epicurus says, that images and representations, after the manner of external appearances, are continually flying off from bodies, and by striking upon the eye, so cause vision. However, he says this only according to the opinion of Democritus.

of cadence, yet are they far from attaining the force and invention of their original: most commonly, they degenerate into what is worse, and laying hold of such vices as lie in the proximity of perfections, for grand, they become bombastic; for close, thin; for strong, rash; for florid, profusely adorned; for harmonious in composition, bounding amidst the wantonness of number; and for simple, graceless through negligence.

Again, in another point of view, if, in the roughness of a barbaraus style they have produced any cold and empty conceit, they fancy themselves upon an equality with the ancients; if they want the lustre of ornaments and thoughts, they are quite in the Attic taste; if they affect conciseness to the degree of becoming obscure, they surpass Sallust and Thucydides; if dry and hungry, they rival Pollio; if careless and flat by circumlocution, they swear Cicero would have so expressed himself. Nay, have I known some elate with the notion of having perfectly acquired that great orator's manner, if they could only end a period by "esse videatur." Therefore the first consideration ought to be, what we design to imitate, and to know upon what account it deserves to be imitated.

The next consideration should be to consult with ourselves, whether our abilities are equal to the task. For some things are inimitable, either that nature, for that purpose, may be too weak in her efforts, or that there may be a repugnancy in the genius. One of a slender and delicate genius, ought not to attempt subjects which are strong and violent; neither ought that

which is strong, and at the same time ungovernable waste its strength through a love for refinement, and so fall short of the desired elegance. For nothing is so unbecoming as to clothe with roughness that which is soft and tender.

And yet I told the master, whom I had instructed in the second book, that not only those things were to be taught, to which he might see each of his scholars adapted by nature. For he ought also to help in each of them whatever he finds good, and, as much as possible, to add what is deficient, and to correct and alter some things; for he is the guide and fashioner of others geniuses, though it is difficult to mould one's own nature into that of others: yet not even this teacher, though he may wish all perfections to be as abundant as possible in his scholars, should spend his labour on him whom he sees that nature hinders.

III. There is another thing to be equally avoided, a fault common to many, which is imitating in oratory poets and historians, and orators or declaimers in history or poetry. These compositions have all their laws and properties. Comedy does not strut in buskins, neither does tragedy trip along in slippers. Yet has every species of eloquence something common to other species, and it is this something common to all, which we should endeavour to imitate.

There is too this inconveniency attending on being addicted to any one particular quality, that if the satyrical strain of an orator should hit the fancy of some, they cannot divest themselves of it, even in causes, where

mildness of temper and moderation must prevail; in grave and important causes, they are not equal to the weight of the subject. There is certainly then a difference in the condition of causes, not only amongst themselves, but amongst the parts of each cause; and some things require to be expressed mildly, others roughly, others impetuously, others gently, others for the sake of instructing, and others for moving; of all which it is manifest the ways are unlike and different.

I therefore would not advise so close and intimate an adhesion to any one, as to imitate him unreservedly in all respects. Demosthenes was by far the most unexceptionable of the Greeks, yet others on some occasions might have said something better. He had, indeed, many excellencies, but being highly worthy of our imitation, it does not follow that he is the only that ought to be imitated. But would it not be enough to speak upon all things, as Cicero did? It certainly would, if we were possessed of his abilities: yet what should hinder our occasionally adopting the force of Cæsar, the asperity of Cælius, the accuracy of Pollio, and the judgment of Calvus? For besides that it argues prudence to convert into our own substance, if possible, what is best in every one; it should be considered, that if amidst the great difficulties imitation intangles us in, we only form ourselves on one original, we shall scarce be able to retain a part. Therefore, when in a manner it is unattainable by human powers, to express the entire resemblance of him you make choice of, let us place before our eyes the excellencies of many, and

having copied one perfection from one, and another from another, let us make them coalesce for use, wherever they may suit our subject.

IV. Imitation also (for I shall often repeat the same) must not be in words only. Rather ought our thoughts aim at knowing how well the just-mentioned great orators maintained dignity and propriety in things and persons, how well they managed their designs, how they conducted their disposition, and how far even every thing, which seemed calculated for pleasing, tended to gain their point: how they behaved in the exordium, how they ordered and diversified the narration, what strength of argument they used in proving and refuting, how powerful they were in exciting all sorts of passions, and how far popular praise may be made conducive to the good of the cause, which indeed is a fine thing, when it comes spontaneously, and not when it is courted. If we previously weigh all these matters, we then shall truly fit ourselves for imitation.

Now he, who to these can superadd his own excellencies, for supplying what has been deficient, and retrenching what may be redundant, will be the perfect orator we seek for; and it is now incumbent on him to render himself consummate in eloquence, so much the more, as he has a far greater number of examples for imitation, than they, who are still reputed masters, had. For this also will be their glory; to be said to have surpassed their predecessors and to have instructed posterity.

CHAPTER III.

OF WRITING.

I. Its great utility. II. we must write as accurately as possible; and this care is necessary in the beginning. III. He blames the hateful peevishness of some in writing, of which he produces an example.—Despatch in writing is much facilitated by a previous attentive consideration of the matter.—He reproves the carelessness of some. IV. He condemns the custom of dictating.—A private place, and not groves and woods, are fittest for writing. V. How far night-lucubration is useful. VI. Which is better to write on waxen tablets, or parchment; and how this should be done.

I. The helps we borrow from imitation are foreign, but of those which we must acquire ourselves, as writing costs us more labour, so also it is of much greater utility. It is with good reason Cicero calls this the true artist and the best master of eloquence, and by assigning to this opinion the person of [1]Lucius Crassus in those disputations which are "On the qualities of an Orator," he has joined his own jugdment to that great man's authority.

We must write, therefore, with all possible care, and

1. Cicero de Orat. i. 150, represents L. Crassus making the remark, that writing is the true artist, and best master of eloquence.

write much; for as the earth by being deeply digged up, becomes more fertile, and in a better condition for nurturing and fructifying the seeds committed to her bosom; so the advantage of writing, if it be not superficially cultivated, will pour out the fruits of study more plentifully, and preserve them more faithfully. And unless one is conscious to himself of having taken much pains in writing, that readiness at extempore speaking will afford only a vain loquacity, being productive of words that are born and die instantly on the lips. Here are the roots, here are the foundations of eloquence; here wealth is stored up as in a sacred repository, to be drawn out for use on any sudden emergency. Above all things therefore, let us create for ourselves a stock of strength, sufficient for making us stand firm in every glorious strife, and not to be exhausted by spending. Nature herself was not willing that any thing great should be perfected in a short time; she has annexed difficulties to each noble work, and has even established this law in births, that the greater the animal is to be, the longer it is to remain shut up in its parent's womb.

II. But as two questions here present themselves for discussion, how, and upon what we should exercise ourselves in writing, I shall follow that[1] order, and in this chapter speak of the first.—In the beginning our

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1. In this chapter, he treats of the first question, relating to the manner and order of writing; in the fifth chapter, he discusses the second question, which concerns the subjects on which principally the orator ought to exercise his style.

composition may even be slow, so it be exact. Let us seek after what is best, and not be pleased with what immediately occurs: let judgment decide the merit of our inventions, and disposition direct the order of them when approved of. A choice too must be made of things and words, and a scrutiny passed upon the goodness of each. Next, let the way of placing be attended to, by turning and transposing words, in order to judge of their harmony, and not to place them at hazard, and as they occur. To do this with more exactness, the last lines of what has been written are often to be repeated; for besides, that what goes before and follows, will be better connected; the heat also of thought, which has cooled by the delay of writing, will resume new strength, and, as it were, a new degree of velocity by going back: just so, in a match of jumping, the stretch bounds farther, by taking a run to the mark that is to be jumped from; and in throwing a javelin, we draw back our arm; and to shoot an arrow, we pull back the bow-string.

Yet if a brisk gale blows, we may suffer it to swell our sails, so that favour does not lead us into a deception. For all our thoughts please us at the time of their birth, otherwise we should not have written them. Still let us consult our judgment, and revise that suspected facility. So we learn Sallust wrote; and indeed the pains he took appear evidently from his laboured composition. Virgil[1] too, as Varus tells us, wrote but very few verses in a day.

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1. See Gell. l. xvii. c. 10.

The circumstances indeed of the orator are different, I therefore require this delay and care in the beginning. To write as well as we possibly can, must be our principal aim, and we must exact it from ourselves. Practice will create expedition. Things gradually will present themselves with more facility, words will correspond with them, composition will follow, every thing, in fine, as in a well regulated family, will be ready in its department. This is the sum of the matter ; by writing quickly it does not come to pass that we write well ; but by writing well, it comes to pass that we write quickly.

But having acquired this facility, then it is that we are to stop short, and look before us, and check, as with a curb, our impetuosity, like that of a mettlesome horse striving to run away with his rider. This care, far from retarding, will supply us with new vigour to proceed.

III. On the other hand, I would not have those, whose style is arrived at a certain degree, of maturity, harass themselves with the trouble of perpetually finding fault with their compositions. And indeed, how shall that orator acquit himself of his duty to the public, who should waste so much time on each part of a pleading? There are some, who are never satisfied with what they do. They would alter, and say every thing otherwise than it occurs : mistrustful indeed, and deserving ill of their abilities, who think that to make to themselves difficulty of writing is exactness. I cannot well say, which I think more in the wrong, they who are pleased

with every thing in their productions, or they who like nothing in them. For it happens, that even some young persons of pregnant parts, suffer themselves to be consumed by a useless labour, and at length sink into silence from an excessive desire of speaking well.

With respect to which I remember that Julius Secundus, a man of my own age and, as is well known, an intimate acquaintance, an orator of surprising eloquence, and of infinite exactness, told me what had been said to him by his uncle. He was Julius Florus, the most eloquent man in the province of Gaul, (for it was there that at length he practised it); otherwise having few equals in elegance and worthy of his high family. When by chance he had seen Secundus, who was still working at school, sad and melancholy, he asked the reason of his being so dejected. The youth did not conceal from him, that for three days together he had ineffectually wreaked his invention to hit upon an exordium to a speech given him to be composed, which not only afflicted him for the present, but made him even despair for the time to come. At which Florus smiling said: "What, child! will you do better than you can?" This is the very thing I had to recommend. We must indeed strive to do as well as we can, but this must be according to the measure of our abilities; for it is study and application that will make us proficients, and not discontent and vexation.

Besides practice, which certainly goes a great way, there is a method to be observed for acquiring a readiness in writing. In order to this, we may be

advised to decline the indolent posture we assume by looking up at the ceiling, and exciting thoughts by muttering, as if chance should throw in our way something to our purpose. We might rather in a manner more becoming men apply ourselves to write and meditate, examining what the subject requires, what decorum ought to be kept in regard to the persons interested, what are the circumstances of time, and how the judge is likely to be disposed: thus nature herself will suggest what ought to begin and what ought to follow. The greater part of our matter is plain and flashes in our eyes, unless we shut them against it; and if the illiterate and peasants are not long at a loss how to begin, what a shame must it be that learning should create difficulties in doing the same? Then let us not think, that what lies hid, is always best: if so, it were better to be silent, if nothing seemed proper to be said, but what we do not find.

Others give into a fault different from this, by slightly running over their matter, and writing down extempore whatever may occur amidst the sallies of a heated imagination. This they call a rough copy; then they revise and bring into order what they had thus poured forth; but it is the words they correct, and the harmony of the periods they strive to adjust, whilst the same levity remains in the things they had so precipitately heaped together. It will, be therefore much more advisable so to order the work from the beginning, that it may not require to be fabricated anew, but only to be filed and polished. Sometimes, however, we may let the mind indulge its fancy and sensibility in

things, in which heat is commonly happier in its effect, than care and exactness.]

IV. From my disapprobation of this carelessness in writing, one may judge what I think of the fancy of dictating which some are so taken with. To writing indeed, how swift soever it may be, the hand which cannot keep up with the celerity of thought, must give some delay; but are not the inconveniencies of dictating greater? He, to whom we dictate, urges us to proceed; and we are ashamed at times even to doubt, or stop short, or make any alteration, as if afraid of one privy to our incapacity. Whence it comes to pass, that intent chiefly upon connecting one sense with another, we let escape us several things, not only fortuitous and shapeless, but sometimes improper, which neither come up to the exactness of those who write, nor to the fire of those that speak. Besides, if the amanuensis be slow in writing, or commit some error in reading what has been dictated, then is the flow of thought retarded by this intervening obstruction, and sometimes the whole attention is unhinged by it, as well as by anger, which is natural enough on these occasions.

There are also many things accompanying, and in some measure exciting the transports and heat of composition, as tossing of the hands, distorting of the features of the face, turning from one side to the other, and sometimes finding fault, together with other particulars noted by Persius[1], where he speaks of the inanity of

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1. Satire i. 106. Nec pluteum cædit, nec demorsos sapit ungues

some authors, as banging the writing-desk, biting the nails, and the like, all which are ridiculous, unless we are alone.

In fine, to speak once for all, what is of most consequence, no one will doubt that privacy which is lost by dictating, and aplace free from the intrusion of witnesses, and the profoundest silence, suit best the reflection that is necessary for him who writes.

It does not, however, follow, that we should immediately abide by the counsel of those, who believe that woods and groves are the properest places for recollection and study, because the freshness of air and the many engaging charms that reign in these parts, beget an elevation of mind, and a more happy turn of thought. Such a retreat seems indeed to me, rather conducive to pleasure, than an incentive to study ; as the very things that delight, must necessarily divert us from attending to what we are about. In reality, the mind cannot be intent upon many things together, and wherever it looks to, it must at that instant at least lose sight of its main point of view. Wherefore the amenity of woods, and the course of rivers, and the breezes blowing about the branches of trees, and the song of birds, and the freedom of prospect, are all so many attractions, that the pleasure conceived from them, seems to me rather to slacken thought, than keep it stretched. Demosthenes was quite right, when in order to study, he shut himself up in a place, where he could neither hear nor see any thing to distract him. Thus it was that his eyes could not compel his mind to attend to other matters.

V. And therefore the silence of night, a shut up chamber and one light, may in an especial manner keep as it were protected those who sit up late to study. But both in all kinds of study and especially in this, good health is necessary and also a sparing use of it; since otherwise we encroach upon nature, by allotting to hard labour a time, which she has granted to us for the rest of our body, and the recruiting of our strength. To which labour however more time must not be given than what is superfluous or unnecessary for sleep; for even fatigue is a great obstacle to the keenness of study; and the day is more than sufficient for him, who is master of his time. It is the multiplicity of business that obliges us to study by night; yet is lucubration best calculated for study, when we set about it fresh, in good health, and in a good flow of spirits.

But silence, retreat, and a mind disencumbered of care, though greatly to be wished for, cannot always fall to our lot. For which reason, if any noise or disturbance might happen, we should not immediately throw aside our books and deplore the time as lost. Rather let us strive against inconveniences, and contract a habit of conquering all obstacles by the dint of application, which if we unreservedly direct to what we are about, nothing of what affects the eyes or ears, will have access to the mind. And if a chance thought so often fixes the attention, that we do not see those we meet, and miss our way, will not the same happen when we proceed to think with a deliberate intention?

We must not tamper with the causes of sloth ; for if we think we ought not to study, but when fresh for it, but when cheerful, and devoid of all other care, we shall never want a reason for self-indulgence. Wherefore in the midst of a crowd, on a journey, at a banquet, and even in a tumultuous assembly of the people, let our thought make for itself a solitude. Otherwise, what should become of us, when, in the midst of the Forum, amidst the hearing of so many causes, amidst broils, contentions, and unexpected clamours, we are often to make extempore speeches, if we could find only in solitude the notes we take down in writing. It was for being prepared at all events, that Demosthenes, who had been so great a lover of privacy studying his speeches near that part of the sea shore, where the waves dashed with the greatest noise, accustomed himself not to be dismayed by the uproars which often happened in the assemblies of the Athenian people.

VI. Every thing regarding studies should seem of some importance, and therefore I shall not omit giving directions about a small concern, which is, that it is best to write on waxen tablets, because we can more easily deface what has been written ; unless weakness of sight should rather require the use of parchment. It helps indeed the sight, but it retards the hand, by the frequent moving *of it to the inkstand,* while the pen is being dipped in the ink and breaks the flow of thought.

Both should have blank pages left in them, to make room for adding whatever might be thought necessary;

for a want of room sometimes makes us loath to correct or at least confounds the former matter by the interlining of new.

I would not advise procuring wide pages in the tablets, having known a young gentleman accustomed to make long discourses, because he measured them by the number of lines. His friends had often endeavoured to correct this fault in him, but to no purpose, till the size of his tablets was changed.

There ought also a space or margin to be left for noting the things that present themselves out of their rank, such I mean, as do not belong to the parts we are actually composing. For sometimes we chance to hit upon excellent thoughts, which it is neither proper to insert for the present, nor safe to postpone taking a memorandum of; because they sometimes escape us, and sometimes divert us, while intent upon remembering them, from other thought. It is therefore best to keep them upon record.

CHAP. IV.

OF EMENDATION, OR CORRECTION.

CORRECTION follows, a very useful part of study, it being believed, and not without reason, that the [1]pen does as much service in defacing as writing. The business of correcting is to add, retrench, and alter. Adding and retrenching are effected with greater ease, but to keep down what swells, to raise what is low, to restrain what is luxuriant, to dispose what is not in order, to make compact what is loose, to circumscribe within its just bounds what is otherwise extravagant, imply something of a more than ordinary labour and sagacity; as we must condemn the things that pleased, and find others that escaped us. The best way, undoubtedly, of correcting our compositions, is to lay them up for some time, and afterwards to return to them as something new, and executed by another, to prevent our being possessed with that parental fondness,

1. One extremity of the stylus was pointed, with which they wrote; the other blunt and flat, with which they expunged; as may appear from Horace; *sæpe stylum vertas, iterum quæ digna legi sint scripturus.*

which is so natural in regard to every newly born offspring.

But this counsel cannot be always followed, more especially by an orator, who, to satisfy the duties of his profession, is obliged to write oftener than another. The manner of correcting ought likewise to have certain bounds fixed to it; for some return to all they have written as faulty, and as if nothing was allowed to be right which is first, they deem any thing else better; and this they do as often as they take in hand their compositions, not unlike surgeons, cutting away even sound parts. Thus do their works remain replete with scars, and bloodless, and much the worse for all this accuracy. Let there be then some time or other something that may please, or at least be sufficient, that the file may polish the work, and not wear it down.

The time also to be taken up in correcting should have its bounds. For, that we have heard that the Smyrna of Cinna[1] was written nine years *before it was published*, and that they, who speak most moderately, say that the panegyric of Isocrates was the result of ten years labour; does not at all affect the orator, whose help would be of no value, if it were so slow.

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1. A piece, so called he had written for the stage, as we find by this distich of Catullus,

Smyrna mei Cinnæ nonam post denique messem,
Scripta fuit, nonamque edita post hyemem.

CHAP. V.

WHAT SUBJECTS OUGHT TO BE PRINCIPALLY WRITTEN UPON.

I. In the beginning it will be of service to translate Greek into Latin.—Also to change the words in Latin authors. —Cicero is refuted.—We should go over and treat our own compositions in a variety of ways. II. The simpler the matter is, the better for acquiring a facility in writing. —Theses. Proving and refuting of opinions. Common places.—Declamations.—History. Dialogues. Poems.— Youth should not spend much time in declamations.— They should treat on both sides of the question, the causes which they have heard pleaded, or others.—He speaks again of declamations.

The next thing that [2]remains for consideration, are the subjects to be made choice of for writing ; and here it does not seem necessary to point out, which ought to begin and follow, having already in my first book, prescribed the order for conducting the studies of children, and in my second, of more advanced years. But as to the point, of which we are now treating, viz. whence to acquire best a copiousness and facility of expression,

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1. In the third chapter he proposed two heads; "How's and what things ought to be written." He now discusse the second part.

our ancient orators thought it best to translate Greek into Latin, which our ancient orators thought to be a good exercise for that purpose. Lucius Crassus says in Cicero's books of the[1] Orator, that he made it a common practice, and Cicero frequently recommends it in his own character; moreover he published books of Plato and Xenophon translated in this way. Messala too, was fond of this exercise, and wrote many orations translated from the Greek, and all of them of such remarkable elegance, that he may be said to vie with that of Hyperides for Phryne, in all the delicacies of the Attic style, so difficult to be imitated by the Latins.

The advantages of this exercise are manifest, so much the more, as the Greek authors abound with excellent things, and have much improved eloquence, by rules of art; and as by translating them we may use the choicest expressions, and all our own may serve. As to figures, the principal ornament of a discourse, we have been under a necessity of imagining several quite different, the genius of both languages not equally admitting the same.

To turn Latin into other words, may also be of great service. No one, I believe, will doubt of this in regard to poetry, which is said to have been the only exercise of Sulpitius. For the sublime spirit of poetry naturally raises the style, and words boldly hazarded by poetical licence[2] hold out to us the power of ex-

1. De Orat. i. 155.

2. i. e. the liberty which the poets use in some bold words, shews that the same things may be expressed by orators in suitable language.

pressing the same with propriety; and indeed we may lend an oratorial energy to the substance of the thought, supply what the poet has omitted, and curtail his diffusiveness. And I would not have this paraphrase to be merely an interpretation, but rather a sort of emulation and strife to express the same thoughts with equal dignity, though in a different manner.

I therefore differ in opinion from those, who dislike any attempt made for turning in the same way our Latin orations, because, as fancying the best expressions to have been already adopted, whatever is otherwise said, must of consequence be worse. But we must not always despair of our not being able to find any thing better than what has been said; neither has nature made eloquence so jejune and barren, as to imply an impossibility of expressing well more than once the same thing; unless it be said, that the gestures of Comedians may be expressive of words in a variety of ways, but the power of delivering an oration is less, so that any thing is said, besides which nothing can be said on the same subject. But supposing that what we invent is neither better nor equal; it may at least come near it. Do not we ourselves express twice and oftener the same thing differently, and do not thoughts upon thoughts sometimes occur in regard to it? Unless perhaps we can contend with ourselves, and not with others. If there was only one way of saying a thing well, we might think, indeed, that they who had passed before in it, had shut it up against us. But there are now innumerable ways, and many of them lead to the same

point of destination. Conciseness has its charms, so also has copiousness. There is sometimes more force and beauty in the use of a metaphorical word, and sometimes of one that is proper. One thing pleases, because expressed naturally, another because figuratively, In short, the difficulty this exercise is attended with, may itself be of singular utility.

Moreover the greatest authors are thus more accurately known. We do not read them superficially, but examine into and discuss every particular; and we judge and are sensible of their perfections, if by no other way, than by not being able to imitate them.

Besides exercising ourselves in the writings of others, we may profit much by variously treating our own; as perhaps in pitching upon some passages, which we may strive to transform into a diversity of ways, as the same lump of wax may be made to assume many different shapes.

II. The most simple matters, I think, are best calculated for making us expert in these exercises; for in such as are complex from the multiplicity of persons, motives, times, places, sayings, facts, our inability may lie concealed, more especially amidst so many things presenting themselves on all sides, from which you may choose any. So that it may seem rather to be an indication of tendency to oratorial perfection, to be able to extend the bounds of what is naturally contracted, to make much of what is little and inconsiderable, to diversify similarities; to set off with agreeableness what is plain and obvious, and to throw into many

lights a subject, on which seemingly but little can be said.

In order hereto, the indefinite questions, called Theses, will be of much service; a thing, we find, which Cicero, though a supreme magistrate in the republic, and in the height of his reputation for eloquence was wont to exercise himself in. Common places will likewise render good service, and we know that many of the kind have been written by orators. He, therefore, who can copiously treat such plain matters, which do not run into any intricacies, will succeed afterwards better in the more complicated, and at length will be capable of being ready at all sorts of causes, all which consist of general questions. For it little matters—in regard to the point to be decided, whether Milo had justice on his side in killing Clodius; or, whether it is lawful to kill one who lies in wait to attempt our life, or a bad member of the community, even though not intent on perpetrating so treacherous a deed? Whether Cato acted honestly in disposing of his wife Martia in marriage to Hortensius: or, whether such an act is consistent with the character of a good and upright man? Judgment here falls upon the persons, but the debate is concerning the things.

As to declamations, I mean those that are executed in schools of rhetoric, if they have truth or probability for their foundation, and are conducted like pleadings at the bar, they may not only be very useful for the training up of an orator, as serving both to exercise invention and disposition; but also for such as have

made a far greater progress, and have already distinguished themselves at the bar. And indeed, eloquence by the use of declamation, is nurtured, and appears more florid and fair, as from a nicer sort of diet, and is refreshed and renewed after the fatigues it hath undergone amidst the constant asperities of pleading.

Wherefore the copiousness of history is sometimes to be copied (literally, written) in some part of exercising the style; and we should become gay in the freeness of dialogues. Nay even, nothing amiss would follow from the amusement of poetic composition. Just so Athletes, interrupting the course at stated times of their regimen in diet and exercises, indulge themselves with ease and a more pleasing sort of food. Cicero likewise seems to me to have distinguished himself by so lively and bright a manner of eloquence, from having sought the recreation of such delectable studies. For if we were, conversant in nothing but law-suits, the brightness of our style would insensibly contract dimness, and its flexibility grow callous, and the edge of the wit would run blunt from being engaged in a constant round of battles.

But as the pampered manner of eloquence, which is borrowed from declamation, refreshes and recruits those who come exercised to it by actual service at the bar; so our young candidates for oratory ought not to be familiarized over-much to these false images and vain phantoms of things, at least not so much, as that it should be difficult for them, when they have left these, to accustom themselves coming from that shade in which

they have nearly grown old, not to dread real dangers as the dazzling sun. We have an instance of this as it is said in the person of Porcius Latro, the first eminent professor of rhetoric at Rome, who presuming, in consequence of his great reputation for eloquence in his school, that he might undertake to plead at the bar, and being accordingly about to speak, found himself obliged to intreat the audience that the benches might be transplanted into the [1] town hall; so disconcerted was he, and so new did the sky appear to him, that one should think his eloquence was contained within the precinct of a roof and walls.

I would therefore counsel the youth, who has been carefully taught the method of invention and elocution by his masters, (the labour attending which is not very great, so these masters know how to teach); and who has acquired some facility by exercise, to choose for himself some orator, which was customary with our ancestors, to make him his guide and model. I would likewise counsel him to frequent regularly the bar, and be a constant spectator of the warfare he destines himself for. It might not be amiss too, if he composed himself the causes he heard pleaded, and even others, on both sides of the question, so they were real causes: and as we see that gladiators practice with foils to prepare themselves for fighting in the amphitheatre, so let

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1. *Basilica*, a town-hall, as resembling perhaps his school more than the forum or bar; and from this passage, it is probable that the Roman bar was an uncovered place.

him practise with causes that have been already decided to prepare himself for pleading at the bar. In this manner it was, that Brutus, as before mentioned, exercised himself in the cause of Milo; and doing so is much better, than answering the pleadings of the ancients, as Sestius has done in refutation of Cicero's oration for the same, though from that defence he could not have had an exact knowledge of the other side of the question.

The youth, then, will be sooner fitted for bar-pleadings, whom his master shall oblige to compose his declamations as like truth as possible, and to work up equally all parts of them, because they now content themselves with what is easiest and most specious in the subject. The chief hindrance to this, as I remarked in the second book, is commonly the too great number of pupils, the custom of making them declaim publicly on certain days, and in some measure the opinion of parents counting the number rather than weighing the merits of their declamations. But according to what I said, as I think, in the first book, the good master will not encumber himself with a greater number than he is well able to teach; and he will retrench their excessive loquacity, so that all things be spoken, which belong to the subject in dispute, not (as some wish) all things that belong to the whole system of nature. Again, he will do well in allowing a longer time for their studying and writing the whole matter of the declamation, or producing only a part of it within a limited time. For they will profit more from one part well worked up, than

from many begun, or merely sketched out. It happens otherwise, that a thing is not put in its place, neither does that which is to begin, keep its rank ; because they curiously collect the flowerets of all parts, and heap them promiscuously into that they intend to pronounce ; whence, under an apprehension of losing the beautiful passages that should follow in course, they throw into confusion the foregoing matter.

CHAP. VI.

OF THINKING, OR MEDITATION.

MEDITATION borders upon the nature of writing, receives its strength from it, and is a something lying between the labour of composition, and the hazard of extempore speaking, and is, I think, of very frequent use. For we cannot always write, nor every where; but meditation is of most times and places. In few hours it takes a comprehensive view even of great and important causes. If our sleep is interrupted at night, darkness makes it more active. During the day, in the midst of our occupations, it finds some leisure time for contemplating its objects, and seldom or ever remains idle; and not only assigns to things their due order, which is doing a great deal, but also joins words, and so frames the adhesion of all parts of the discourse, that nothing but writing it out seems wanting. And thus likewise, for the most part, it remains more tenaciously rivetted in the memory, as it cannot be let to slip away by the security of writing.

But we cannot attain suddenly nor soon to that force of thought which is required for profound meditation. For first, by much writing, a style is to be formed, which may follow us even in our thoughts, then practice

must be added by degrees, so that at first we may embrace in our mind a few things, which it can easily return to us; then this style is to be enlarged by such moderate degrees of increase that the labour may seem to itself in no way painful, and to be kept together by practice and much exercise; and as this depends in a great measure on memory, I therefore say here but a part of what I should, reserving the rest for that [1]place. From what has been said, it may, however, appear, that when there is no deficiency or obstacle in point of genius, one may, by the assiduity of application, attain so much, that the things which he has conceived in his mind, as well as what he has written and committed to memory, will stand faithful[2] to him when speaking. Cicero acquaints us, that among the Greeks, Metrodorus, Scepsius, and Eryphylus the Rhodian, and among the Latins, Hortensius could repeat word for word in pleading, all that they had before meditated.

Supposing now that something bright, some new idea should spring up in the midst of our pronouncing a discourse, we should not so scrupulously adhere to what we have written as not to make room for it? An oration, though ever so elaborately composed, is not to be so highly prized, as to give no admission even to a gift of fortune; though the contrary is evident by our often inserting a sudden after thought in what we have written. This whole kind of exercise should therefore

1. Book xi. c. 2.
2. Will keep their faith, will not treacherously leave his memory.

be so ordered, that we easily might digress from, and return to it at pleasure: for if on one side, our principal care ought to be to come prepared from home, in order to speak in public; on the other, it would be a notable piece of folly to reject a present which the circumstance of time offers for our service. Let then our thoughts and meditation be so far prepared, that fortune may have it in her power not to frustrate, but to help us.

But it will be by the strength of the memory that whatever we have meditated upon, flow from us with an air of security, and do not prevent us from looking forward *to what we are going to say,* by anxiety, embarassment, and dependence on the hope of memory alone; and if this should be the case, I would prefer an extempore rashness to the incoherency and suspension of thought. Nothing has a worse effect than an unseasonable recollection; because eager to recall the ideas which fly from us, we lose those that present themselves, and seek things rather from memory than our subject. But if we must look on both sides of a question, the things which can be found are more numerous than those which are found.

CHAP. VII.

OF THE TALENT OF EXTEMPORE SPEAKING.

I. How useful and necessary it is. II. How it is acquired. III. And how preserved.

The talent of speaking extempore is the greatest emolument we receive from our studies; and, as it were, a very ample reward for our long and painful labours; and he that has not acquired it, will do well in my opinion by renouncing the functions of the bar, and employing the talent of writing that remains to him rather upon something else. For it is hardly consistent with a man of integrity to promise assistance to the public, which *assistance* will be wanting in the most pressing dangers. Such behaviour would be not unlike that of a pilot, who should shew a weather-beaten ship a harbour at a distance, where it could not enter but with a gentle breeze. There are, indeed, very many and pressing occasions for pleading without preparation, either before magistrates, or when a cause is brought to trial before the day fixed for it; and if any of these should happen I will not say to any innocent citizen, but any of his friends or relations, shall he stand mute

and, while they, on the point of perishing unless they be assisted, are imploring him[1] to speak for their safety, shall he ask for time and retreat and silence, until his speech be fabricated and fixed upon his memory, and his voice and lungs be prepared? But what reason allows this, that an orator should be unprepared on any emergency?

How must it fare with him, when he is to answer an adversary? For often what we have supposed to be the adversary's state of the matter, and against which we have calculated our speech, we find ourselves much mistaken in, and suddenly the whole cause is changed. As therefore a navigator shifts his manner of steering according as the winds set in upon his ship, so an orator must shift about according to the diversity of causes he has to plead. Of what effect would so much practice in writing be, so much reading, and so long a course of study, if the same difficulty remained that occurred in the beginning? That man indeed must be thought to have lost all his past labours who is constantly obliged to put himself to the same pains. But I do not make these reflections, that the orator should prefer extempore speaking, but that he occasionally might speak so.

II. We shall acquire this talent chiefly in this manner. Let us first be acquainted with the way of speaking, which may be compared to the running of a race, which cannot be performed, unless we know whence, and

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1. Literally, imploring his saving voice.

where we are to run. So in this respect, it is not enough not to be ignorant of the parts of judicial causes, or of the disposing of questions in proper order, though these make a principal consideration; but also, of what is first, and what follows in a place, which are so linked by nature, that they cannot be altered, or taken asunder withour causing confusion. Now he that is learning the way he is to walk in, will no doubt suffer himself to be guided by the order of things as they occur, for which reason, persons even of slender practice will easily observe how a narration is to be conducted. Next, they will know what questions arise on every point, neither will they hesitate in regard to what they are to say, nor be distracted by thoughts foreign to their matter, nor confound this matter by jumbling things together, jumping, as it were, here and there, and stopping no where. Lastly, they must keep within certain bounds, which cannot be done without division. Thus having, to the best of their abilities, effected whatever they proposed to themselves, they may think they are come to the end.

And these last we may obtain from art; but let us attain the former, as well as a copiousness of the best expressions, from study, as directions have been already given, and let our manner of speaking be so formed by much and accurate composition, that what we even give utterance to suddenly, might appear as if it was written. In short, when we have written much, we shall be able to speak much; for custom and exercise contribute most to acquire facility, and if there be an intermission

in them, though but short, that readiness will not only be retarded, but the mouth itself also becomes contracted.

Though we stand in need of a certain natural mobility of mind, that whilst we express what is next to our thoughts, we may be able to construct what lies further off, and keep our voice always provided with a succession of formed thoughts; yet scarce can either nature or art divide the mind on so manifold a business as to attend at once to invention, disposition, elocution, the order of words and things, and what is to be said on the present occasion, the next, and the following, together with the particular attention that is to be paid to voice, pronunciation, and gesture. A sort of intuitive and anticipating view, is, therefore, quite necessary for these purposes, and the matter should be made to act previously to itself, by surveying the further parts, according as the foregoing are pronounced, that, till we come to the end, we may proceed as much by looking before us, as by stepping forward. This forecast then must be thought highly necessary, if we would not, hesitating and faltering utter short and broken sentences, like persons interrupted by sobs.

There is, then, a certain habit, for which we are all indebted to reason, which the Greeks call *ἄλογος τριβή*, by which the hand runs in writing, and the eyes see in reading several lines at once, with their stops and breaks; and they have sooner read what follows, than the tongue has articulated what goes before. By which those wonders are performed in the exhibitions of jug-

glers, so that the things which they cast away from them, seem again to come into their hands, and fly off where they command them.

But we shall not profit by this habit, but so far as the art I spoke of, has paved the way for it, that that for which no reason can be assigned, may, notwithstanding, appear as grounded upon reason. For none, indeed, shall seem to me to make a speech, unless they do it with order, ornament, and elocution; and for this reason, I shall never be an admirer of the connection of a tumultuary or fortuitous harangue, which I have taken notice to have been extremely well performed, even amidst the fierce objurgations of women. Heat and spirit may be productive of a speech, attended with better success than a studied one; and on these occasions, as Cicero relates, the ancients were wont to say, that a god spoke from the mouths of men.

But the reason is plain; for passions strongly impressed on the mind, and images, when recent, manifest themselves by lively and rapid expressions, which sometimes cool in the slowness of composition, and by being put off for any time, may not return. But when an unhappy scrupulous care about words, stops us short at every step we take, the forced violence is intolerable; but though the choice of single expressions be very good, yet it is not fluent, but laboured. We must, therefore, endeavour to have a clear conception of things by means of the images before spoken of, placing all that we have to say concerning persons and questions before our eyes, and entering into all the passions our

subject can well admit of. For it is the sensibility of the heart, and perturbation of the mind, that makes us eloquent; and therefore the illiterate do not want words, when stimulated to speak through passion or interest. We must strive also to lend the attention of the mind, not to any object singly, but to many together; as, if we direct our sight along any straight line, we behold at the same time all the objects which are in and about it, and see not the last only, but as far as the last.

The shame, likewise, of stopping short, and the desire of being applauded, are wonderful incitements for the orator's acquitting himself to advantage; and it may seem wonderful, when writing delights in privacy, and cannot abide a witness, how extempore speaking feels itself animated by a full auditory as a soldier is animated to battle, by seeing the [1]standards of the army ranged and mustered together. For how difficult soever thoughts may occur, the necessity of speaking compels the finding of them, and the desire of pleasing seconds and increases the efforts. So much do all things look to a reward, that even eloquence, though containing much pleasure in itself, is vastly taken with the present fruits of praise and reputation.

But no person ought to be so confident of his abilities, as to hope, that immediately on the first trial he shall acquire this talent. What I inculcated concerning meditation, may be here applicable, that the talent of extempore speaking should proceed gradually from

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1. The military standards among the Romans were placed together in the front of battle, as a signal of an intention to give battle.

small beginnings to its greatest perfection, to which nothing can contribute so much as practice. It ought besides to be perfected to such a degree, that meditation, though safer, might not exceed it in goodness, because many have attained to this facility, not only in prose, but even in verse, as Antipater Sidonius, and Licinius Archias, if herein we believe the authority of [1]Cicero. This talent of extempore versification has been, and may still be remarked in some of our contemporaries; but as more specious than useful and necessary, if I speak of it, it is not so much for commending it, as to shew that it is a useful example towards encouraging those who fit themselves for the bar.

Again, I never would have so much confidence placed in this facility, as to exclude at least a short time which is scarce ever wanting, and which is always allowed in trials and pleadings at the bar, for reflecting on what we are to say. It should seem, indeed, that no one can, plead a cause he knows nothing of; yet do we see some declaimers so perversely vain, as to pride themselves in being able to speak on a controversy by only learning what it is upon; and what is more nugatory and buffoon-like, they will ask you by what word you would choose they should begin. But eloquence in her turn derides those who are thus indolent toward her; and they who wish to appear learned to fools, appear fools to the learned.

But if it so happened, that we were obliged to speak

1. De Orat. iii. 194. pro Arch. 18.

in public without any preparation, then would we have an occasion for an extraordinary presence of mind, and our whole attention being engrossed by things, we should, for the present, remit something in the care of words, if it was not practicable to attend to both. Then also a slower pronunciation, and a manner of keeping our words, as it were, in suspense, would afford time for reflection; but this must be so managed, that we may seem to think, and not to hesitate: and this we do, whilst we are sailing out of port, if the wind drives us forward, and our rigging is not yet quite fitted to: afterwards, as we proceed, we shall lay our cables in order, hoist our sails, and display them for receiving the favourable gale. Doing so is more eligible, then to deliver ourselves up at once to a torrent of useless words, and suffer ourselves to be swept away as it were by a storm.

III. But this talent is preserved with no less pains than it is acquired. An art once learned, is not forgot: but it does not follow, that expertness will continue after the disuse of it: writing, when neglected for some time, will lose something of its former readiness: so with the talent of extempore-speaking: it is acquired by exercise, and can be retained only by exercise. Now the best way of exercising ourselves, is to speak daily upon some subject or other, in the presence of many persons whose judgment and opinion we pay a deference to; for it seldom happens that one sufficiently respects himself; or we should speak alone, rather than not speak at all.

There is another exercise for thought, which is to meditate upon our subject, and treat it mentally from the beginning to the end. This is practicable at all times, and in all places, so we have nothing else to do ; and is in some measure of greater utility than the foregoing ; because, in the one, things are disposed with more accuracy ; whereas, in the other, our whole solicitude is to continue the thread of the discourse. Again, the former is of more service by strengthening the voice, forming the pronunciation and gesture ; and the motions and attitudes the orator puts himself into, by the tossing about of his hands, and stamping of his foot, must give life and spirit to this his action, just as a lion is said to rouse his courage by striking his flanks with his tail.

But we should study always and every where. For there is scarce a day so taken up with business, but may afford something to be gained from it for the sake of study ; or as [1]Cicero says of Brutus, but may have some moment snatchedfrom it, for the purpose of writing, reading, or speaking. [2]C. Carbo, even in his tent, and amidst the horrors of war, was wont to exercise himself in thetalent of speaking. I should not forget also, that Cicero upon all occasions advises us, not to neglect our manner of speaking, that what we say, may, in regard to the subject, be as proper, as correct, and as accurate as possible.

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1. Orat. xxxiv.

2. He embraced the party of Marius against Sylla.

But we must never write more than we are to speak much extempore. Thus weight will be preserved in what we say, and that light facility, floating as it were on the surface, will thereby become heavier and run deeper. Just so vine-dressers cut of the nearest roots of a vine, which may draw it to the surface of the ground, that the lower roots may gain strength by striking deep. And for aught I know, both exercises, under the direction of care and study, may be a mutual help to each other; so that by writing, we may speak with more exactness; and by speaking, write with more ease. We ought therefore write as often as we can, and if not at leisure for so doing, we should meditate: but if neither can take place, the orator must use his best endeavours to guard against surprize, and to keep his client from appearing to be destitute of assistance.

Some orators, who have had much business on their hands, most commonly wrote little more than the principal heads, and the exordium: other points they fixed in their memory by meditation only; and any sudden occurrence they replied to extempore. This was a practice of Cicero, as appears by his [1]Notes. There are likewise extant some notes of others, and these perhaps were invented, as the orators wrote them down in order to speak upon them, and were afterwards digested into books, as the notes of all the causes pleaded by Servius Sulpitius, of whom we have three orations perfect. But

1. Commentarii, notes, were books that contained the heads of things. They were written by orators for the disposition of the cause, and as helps to memory.

these notes are so exact, that they seem to me to be composed by him for the service of posterity. As for Cicero's, he made them only for his own use; but his freedman Tyro has given us an abridgment of them, which I do not mention by way of disparagement, but rather to commend their merit.

In this way, I greatly approve of those short annotations and memorandum-books, which may be held in the hand, and which it is allowed now and then to cast an eye upon. I cannot say that I like what Lænas recommends, which is to note down all the heads of whatever we are to speak to. This security begets a remissness of thought during the action, and tears asunder, and deforms the discourse. I think, indeed, that nothing ought to be written when we design to speak extempore. For it happens, that thought, by calling us back to that which we have set down in writing, will hinder us to try our present fortune; and so the mind fluctuating between both, when it loses sight of what is written, cannot well recover itself by seeking after something new.—A place is assigned for memory in the next book, but cannot be subjoined to this article, because previous to it some other matters require to be considered.

The corpse of Caesar was placed in a gil[t]
pavilion, like a small temple (aurata aede[s])
with the robe in which he had been slain
suspended on a pole or trophy, Suet. Caes.
& his image exposed on a moveable
machine with the marks of all the wo[unds]
he had received; for the body itself was
not seen Appian. B. C. ii. p. 521., but
Dio says the contrary, 44. 4. p. 443.

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AN

INTRODUCTION

TO

The Study

OF THE

HOLY SCRIPTURES.

BY THE

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This Introduction to the Study of the Holy Scriptures has been prepared for the use of the Students of St. John's College, and is intended to occupy them only for a small part of one Term, during which other subjects require their attention. I have thought it necessary therefore to confine it within narrow limits, from regard to the purpose for which it is designed.

In the course of the work, references have been made to the Authors from whom the materials of it have been chiefly derived. Recourse may be had to them for further information, on subjects which the nature of my design has obliged me to treat with great brevity.

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CHAPTER I.

A SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE JEWS.

1. Of the history of the human race before the deluge, and during many centuries subsequent to it, no knowledge can be obtained by us, beyond that which is given in the Holy Scriptures. For such knowledge we must have recourse to the writings of Moses, who was enabled by divine inspiration to relate many important circumstances affecting the early generations of mankind, with which we must otherwise have been unacquainted. From those writings alone, we derive an authentic account of the creation of the world, and of the introduction of sin and misery into it in consequence of the disobedience of our first parents to the command of their Maker. Respecting these great events, and all that befel the nations of the earth during a long succession of ages, profane history is either altogether silent, or is so mingled with manifest fable as to be entitled to no credit. In forming therefore a summary of the history of the Jews, we shall be occupied during a large period of it in making a statement of the most important circumstances, the authority for which is that of the Bible alone.

2. The Jews derive their name from Judah, one of the sons of Jacob: Judah being also the name of that tribe to which, in the division that was made of the

Holy Land, the largest and best portion was allotted, and of which Jerusalem became the capital. They were sometimes called Hebrews, probably from Heber one of the ancestors of Abraham; and Israelites from Israel, a name which was given to Jacob. Although the history of them as a nation begins properly at the time when they departed from Egypt to take possession of Canaan, it may be useful to make a brief mention of some circumstances which are recorded in the Bible prior to that period.

To Adam and Eve were born sons and daughters; but the number of them is not stated. The only three whose names are mentioned are Cain, Abel and Seth; and of these three the sacred historian has chiefly confined himself to the posterity of Seth, probably because he was the progenitor of Noah, and therefore in his line the Messiah was to be born. In the time of Noah, who was the ninth in descent from Adam, God destroyed by a deluge all the inhabitants of the earth, except Noah and his wife, and his three sons and their wives, and two, male and female, of every species of animals. This judgment was inflicted upon mankind 2348 years before the birth of Christ. When Noah descended from the ark, he offered sacrifice as a thanksgiving for his preservation, and God made a covenant with him that there should not be any more a flood to destroy the earth.

3. The descendants of Noah soon multiplied so greatly that a separation became necessary, and a part of them journeyed from the east, and settled in the land of Shinar, which is generally believed to be the same as Chaldæa, of which Babylon was afterwards the capital. Here they said, "Let us build us a city and a tower whose top may reach unto heaven, and let us make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad

upon the face of the whole earth." Whatever the object of this work might be, it was displeasing to God, who by confounding their language so that they could not understand each other, compelled them to abandon the work, and to disperse themselves over the earth.

Call of Abraham. Abraham, the tenth in descent from Noah, has always been regarded by the Jews as their great progenitor. His father Terah went forth with his family from Ur of the Chaldees, to go into the land of Canaan; but he did not proceed further than Haran or Charran, in Mesopotamia, where he died. "Now the Lord had said unto Abraham, Get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and from thy father's house, unto a land that I will shew thee; and I will make of thee a great nation, and in thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed." In compliance with this command, Abraham departed from Haran and went into the land of Canaan, accompanied by Sarah his wife, Lot his brother's son, and all their substance. This removal took place 1921 years before the birth of Christ. "And the Lord appeared unto Abram, and said, Unto thy seed will I give this land;"—a promise which was fulfilled 476 years after it was given, when the Israelites took possession of Canaan under the command of Joshua.

4. The Bible records many interesting particulars of the life of this patriarch, and also of Isaac and Jacob; but the statement of them is not necessary here. When Jacob went to live with his son Joseph in Egypt, his whole family consisted of 70 persons. They were placed near the head of the Delta on the eastern side of the Nile in the district of Rameses or Goshen, a fertile country, and well suited to their occupation as shepherds. Here they and their descendants "increased abundantly, and the land was filled with them. But at length

there arose a new king over Egypt, which knew not Joseph." About 60 years after the death of Joseph, this new king, afraid lest the Israelites might soon be able to seize the whole kingdom, determined to check their progress by cruel exactions and labour. He also ordered the Hebrew midwives to put all the male infants to death as soon as they were born, and when this was not executed, he ordered that every male child of the Hebrews should be cast into the river. But the designs of the Almighty were now hastening to their accomplishment, and he began to interfere in behalf of his chosen people. And he called unto Moses out of the midst of a flaming bush and said, "The cry of the children of Israel is come unto me: I will send thee therefore unto Pharaoh, that thou mayest bring forth my people out of Egypt." Being now increased to 600,000 men capable of bearing arms, they with their families and great possessions of flocks, herds, and other property, departed from Egypt 1491 years before the birth of Christ.

Departure of the Israelites from Egypt.

A direct journey would have led them to Canaan in a short time, but it pleased God to punish them for repeated acts of distrust and disobedience, by causing them to wander in the wilderness of Arabia for 40 years. Moses has recorded the transactions of only three years, viz. the two first and the last, but he has mentioned all the places where they pitched their tents during the whole time they were in the wilderness. In the first year they were conducted to Mount Sinai, from which God delivered to them those commandments, statutes and ordinances, which are generally called the law of Moses, or the Mosaic Dispensation. When they arrived at Kadesh Barnea, not far from the south border of Canaan, Moses sent twelve men, a ruler from every tribe, to

ascertain the quality of the land, the strength of the inhabitants, and the state of the cities. They brought back a favourable report of the fertility of the land, but described the cities and people as so strong, that the Israelites refused to attempt the proposed conquest. Joshua and Caleb, two of the twelve spies, endeavoured in vain to convince them that their fears were unreasonable, and on account of their rebellion on this occasion, God commanded that they should turn back and wander in the wilderness 40 years, telling them also that, of all who had reached the twentieth year of their age, not one, except Joshua and Caleb, should ever enter the promised land. Many memorable events occurred during their subsequent wanderings, especially the rebellion of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, in the second year, and in the fortieth year, the visitation of fiery serpents, by which great multitudes perished. In this last year Aaron died at mount Hor; and soon afterwards Moses, having viewed the promised inheritance from Pisgah the top of mount Nebo, died at the age of 120, when none of his faculties were impaired: "his eye was not dim, nor his natural force abated."

5. Joshua, having now assumed the command, proceeded without delay to the conquest of Canaan. In seven years he subdued 31 kings; the term *king* being sometimes applied to a prince who reigned over a small number of subjects within a narrow territory, and consequently possessed little wealth or power. When the conquest was nearly completed, the land was divided by lot. To the tribes of Reuben and Gad, and to one half of the tribe of Manasseh, Moses had already allotted some conquered lands on the eastern side of the river Jordan, upon condition that they should assist their brethren to subdue the country on the western side of

that river, and having fulfilled the condition, they were confirmed in the possession of those lands by Joshua. No allotment, except 48 cities to dwell in, was made to the tribe of Levi, because they were appointed to the services of religion, and received the tithes of the whole country for a maintenance; but the whole country was divided into 12 parts, the descendants of Joseph being separated into two tribes, which from his two sons were called the tribe of Ephraim, and the tribe of Manasseh. Thus the great work was completed, "according to all that the Lord sware unto their fathers. There failed not aught of any good thing, which the Lord had spoken unto the house of Israel: all came to pass."

6. After the death of Joshua, the tribes were no longer united under one command. They soon fell into apostacy; for, having begun to make the conquered nations tributary, instead of utterly destroying them as God commanded, they intermarried with the inhabitants, and took a part in the worship of idols. On account of their impiety, they were allowed to fall at different times under the yoke of neighbouring nations. Cushan king of Mesopotamia held them in subjection for more than eight years, till Othniel, a son-in-law and nephew of Caleb, raised an army against the oppressor, and having effected a permanent deliverance for the Israelites judged them in peace 40 years. In the person of Othniel began a series of such deliverers called JUDGES, who were raised at intervals, as public exigency required, to rescue their nation from the tyranny of neighbouring powers. This mode of government continued a little more than 300 years. The most eminent of the Judges were Deborah the prophetess, Gideon, Jephthah, Eli, Samuel. In the time of Samuel, a complete change was made in the form of government. When he was old

he appointed his two sons to a share of his authority, and on account of their misconduct all the elders gathered themselves together, and petitioned that like other nations they might have a king. Samuel, by the command of God, protested against their proceedings, and represented the evils which would follow the establishment of regal authority, but they persevered in their request, and Samuel was therefore directed to anoint SAUL, of the tribe of Benjamin, to be king of Israel.

7. SAUL began to reign 1095 years before the birth of Christ. His distempered mind brought him into great troubles, and the termination of his life was disastrous; for he died by his own hand, after being defeated by the Philistines. His reign continued 40 years, which was also the period of David's reign, and of that of Solomon. David experienced great variety of fortune, but the final result was prosperous, and he terminated his life in glory, having greatly extended the Israelitish power. The reign of Solomon was peaceful and glorious, being particularly distinguished by the building of the temple, for which great preparations had already been made by his father. He laid the foundation of it in the fourth year of his reign, and completed it in the eleventh. In the latter years of his life, he tarnished his great name by resigning himself to concubines, many of them taken from idolatrous nations whose superstitions he adopted; and he built high places near to Jerusalem for all his strange wives, "which burnt incense, and sacrificed unto their gods." This conduct drew upon him the indignation of the Almighty, who told him that his kingdom should be rent, and the largest portion pass away from his family.

Separation of ten tribes from the kingdom of Judah.

8. This leads us to one of the most important events in the Jewish history, the departure of ten tribes from their allegi-

ance to the house of David, and the consequent establishment of the separate kingdoms of Judah and Israel. As soon as Rehoboam the son of Solomon ascended the throne, the people intreated him to lighten the yoke with which they had been burthened by his father, but he replied to their prayer, saying, "My father made your yoke heavy, and I will add to your yoke: my father also chastised you with whips, but I will chastise you with scorpions." On receiving this answer, ten of the tribes revolted and chose Jeroboam to be their king, while the tribes of Judah and Benjamin remained faithful to the son of Solomon. Thus originated a schism which was never healed, and was terminated only by the overthrow of the kingdom of Israel about 250 years after it was established, when the ten tribes were carried captive by Shalmaneser king of Assyria, and so scattered through his vast empire, that they seem never afterwards to have regained a separate and independent existence. This period of 250 years was occupied with frequent wars between the kings of Judah and Israel, and between them and the neighbouring kings, and is marked in general by a series of murderous usurpations of the throne, idolatries, and oppressions of the people. This is chiefly observable of the kings of Israel, of whom there were 19, and it is said of them all, "that they did evil in the sight of the Lord, and made Israel to sin." Of these kings, the most conspicuous in the history are, (1) Omri, who built Samaria (923 B. C.) and made it his capital; (2) Ahab his son and successor, who married Jezebel daughter of the king of Sidon, and in whose time Elijah and Elisha announced the divine judgments, and wrought many remarkable miracles; (3) Jehu, who was raised by God as an instrument of his vengeance on the house of Ahab; (4) Hoshea the last king, who was carried by Shalmaneser into captivity.

During this same period, some of the kings of Judah were remarkable for their obedience to the law of God. The most worthy of mention are Jehoshaphat (contemporary with Ahab,) who was eminent alike for regard to religion and success in arms; and Hezekiah, in the sixth year of whose reign Shalmaneser put an end to the Israelitish monarchy.

9. Thus the kingdom of Judah remained alone. An attack was made upon it about ten years after the captivity of the ten tribes, while Hezekiah was yet king, by Sennacherib who had succeeded Shalmaneser on the throne of Assyria. When he was threatening to destroy Jerusalem, "an angel of the Lord went forth, and smote in the camp of the Assyrians 185,000 men" in a single night. Sennacherib was compelled to retreat, and was soon afterwards put to death at Nineveh by two of his own sons. The reign of Hezekiah is further memorable for his miraculous recovery from sickness, and for the intimation made to him by the prophet Isaiah of the approaching Babylonian Captivity;—an intimation given for the purpose of checking the pride which he had exhibited in displaying the treasures of his house to a Babylonian embassy. The kings who succeeded Hezekiah, with the single exception of Josiah his great grandson, concurred in filling up the measure of Judah's crimes by their wickedness and folly. "And the Lord said, I will remove Judah also out of my sight, as I have removed Israel; and will cast off this city Jerusalem which I have chosen, and the house of which I said, My name shall be there." Accordingly, Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon invaded Judæa and took Jerusalem. On this occasion the children of the royal family and many of the people were sent captives to Babylon, and from this time, (606 years B. C.) is to be dated the com-

mencement of the Babylonian Captivity, which, according to the prediction of Jeremiah, was to continue 70 years. 18 years after this first capture of Jerusalem, the Jewish monarchy was finally terminated, in the reign of Zedekiah, who was sent in chains to Babylon. The walls of Jerusalem, the temple and all the buildings were destroyed; and the inhabitants were carried away captive, except the poor of the land who were left to be vine-dressers and husbandmen. Thus ended the sovereignty of the house of David.

Return of the Jews after the Babylonian Captivity.

10. When Cyrus the Great, having conquered Babylon, issued his decree for the restoration of the Jews, about 42,000 of them and 7000 servants placed themselves under the conduct of Zerubbabel, and returned to their country. In the beginning of the second year after their return they began to rebuild the temple upon the old foundations, and finished it in 18 years, having met with great interruption from the Samaritans. These Samaritans were descended from a mixed race which had been drawn from various parts of the east, and planted by Shalmaneser in the country previously occupied by the ten tribes. They received the Mosaic law; but united with the observance of it the idolatrous rites of their own countries. Being informed that the Jews were preparing to build a temple, they expressed a desire to take a part in the work, as being worshippers of the same God; but the offer was refused, and thereby that enmity between the two nations was inflamed, which had taken its origin in the schism of the ten tribes and was never afterwards extinguished.

Many of the sacred vessels and treasures of the temple were carried back from Babylon by Zerubbabel, and the rest a few years afterwards by Ezra, to whom

the Jews were chiefly indebted for the re-establishment of their worship and of civil order. To him also we owe the revision of the sacred writings and the arrangement of them in the order which they yet retain. Ezra was succeeded by Nehemiah, who obtained authority from the king of Persia to rebuild the walls of Jerusalem, which he completed in 52 days. He also exerted great diligence in completing the reformation of the State; and people having been brought from other parts of the land to re-occupy the city, it was seen again in something like its ancient splendour.

11. It is probable that, after Nehemiah, no separate governor of Judæa was appointed, its affairs being administered by the high priests under the control of the prefects of Syria. In this state it continued till the overthrow of the Persian empire by Alexander the Great, who treated the Jews with great lenity, allowing them to live under their own laws, and in the free exercise of their religion. From the time of his death, (323 B. C.) to the time when they were made tributary to the Romans by Pompey, (63 B. C.) they underwent a great variety of fortune, being sometimes favourably treated, at other times oppressed by the kings of Egypt and Syria, who held them successively in subjection. Ptolemy Lagus, (Alexander's general, and first of the family of the Ptolemies who were kings of Egypt,) having gained possession of Jerusalem by a stratagem, carried above 100,000 of the Jews captives into Egypt; where however they were treated with great kindness both by himself, and afterwards by his son who permitted many of them to return to their own country. This son was Ptolemy Philadelphus; a prince endowed with excellent qualities, and eminent, above all, for the translation of the Holy Scriptures into Greek, which was made at Alexandria

under his patronage by 72 learned Jews. This work was finished about the year 277 B. C., and from the number of translators has been ever since called the Septuagint.

The family of the Ptolemies retained authority over Judæa about a hundred years, and were then compelled to resign it to Antiochus the Great, king of Syria. To him succeeded, first, his eldest son Seleucus, and then another son, Antiochus Epiphanes; from whose tyranny, for three years and a half, the Jews underwent dreadful sufferings. During the reign of this oppressor (about 166 years B. C.) arose the Maccabees, a family of brave men whose struggle with him and his successors ended in the complete liberation of their country from the Syrian yoke. This was effected about 129 years B. C.; after which time the Maccabees held supreme authority, uniting in themselves the dignities of king and high priest, till the year 63 B. C. A contest having then arisen between two brothers, Hyrcanus and Aristobulus, respecting the succession, and application for support being made by both parties to Pompey, he ended the dispute by leading his army into Judæa and making it tributary to the Romans. Hyrcanus was made high priest and honoured with the title of prince; but he possessed little more than nominal power, and willingly allowed the government of the country to be conducted by Antipater, who was an Idumæan by birth, but had become a Jewish proselyte.

Aristobulus and his sons made repeated efforts to displace their opponents, and gained temporary successes; but in the end they were wholly discomfited. After the death of Antipater, the contest was carried on between his son Herod (generally distinguished by the name of Herod the Great) and Antigonus one of the sons of

Aristobulus; and though the greatest part of the Jewish nation was attached to the latter, probably from respect to him as being of the Maccabæan family, yet the fortune of Herod prevailed. Having fled to Rome and gained from the Senate, chiefly through the influence of Mark Antony, the title of king of Judæa, he returned to the contest: at the end of three years, Jerusalem was taken: Antigonus having been made prisoner was ordered by Mark Antony to be put to death: the Maccabæan dynasty after having continued nearly 130 years was thus finally overthrown, and Herod (37 B. C.) was established in full exercise of the power which his new title denoted.

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13. As Herod is a name that occurs frequently in the New Testament, and is applied to different persons of the same family, it is necessary that care be taken to distinguish them one from another. Herod the Great was approaching to the close of his reign, when our Saviour was born. Expecting that the Messiah was to be a temporal prince who might wrest the sovereignty from himself or his family, he determined to destroy him, and with that view ordered that all the children at Bethlehem, of two years old and under, should be put to death; but his design was frustrated by the flight of Joseph with the young child and his mother into Egypt. In the second year after the birth of our Saviour, Herod the Great died. He is represented by historians as having possessed great abilities and courage, splendid in every exhibition of royalty, and especially in the magnificence of his buildings. Samaria which he rebuilt, and called Sebaste in honour of Augustus; the port and city of Cæsarea on the coast of Phœnicia which he greatly improved and adorned; superb palaces; and, above all, the rebuilding of the

temple at Jerusalem, are proofs of his grandeur in this respect. But these good qualities were more than counterbalanced by extreme inhumanity. His disposition, naturally bold and ferocious, seems to have been irritated into frenzy by domestic troubles, and the difficulties which beset his throne. His wife Mariamne, an excellent princess, and once greatly beloved by him, was led to a public execution; the most powerful of his subjects, many of his friends, and even the greatest part of his own family fell victims to his cruel jealousy. When he was suffering by a painful disease, and saw that death was at hand, expecting that it would be hailed by his subjects with joy, he determined to leave them some cause for mourning. Having summoned all the chief men of his kingdom, and caused them to be surrounded with troops, he ordered that as soon as he expired they should be put to death. His successor however declined to execute this barbarity.

14. Three sons of Herod the Great are mentioned in the New Testament, between whom by his will he divided his dominions, viz. (1) Archelaus, to whom he gave the kingdom of Judæa, together with Idumæa and Samaria; (2) Herod Antipas; whom he appointed tetrarch or governor of Galilee and Peræa; (3) Philip; whom he also made tetrarch of Ituræa, Trachonitis and some other small districts situated beyond Jordan.

Archelaus was acknowledged king by the people with loud acclamations, but their joy seems to have been of short continuance, for when he went to Rome shortly afterwards for the purpose of soliciting from Augustus a confirmation of his regal title, a deputation of Jews arrived to oppose his application, requesting that their country might be annexed to the province of Syria, and that they might be allowed the exercise of their own

religion and laws under Roman governors. Augustus however thought fit to ratify Herod's will, except that he withheld from Archelaus the regal title, and gave him that of tetrarch, with a promise that the other should be granted when he had proved himself worthy of it. Having however after his return continued to act with great cruelty and injustice, at length, in the tenth year of his government, such complaints were made against him by the chief men among his subjects, that Augustus banished him to Vienne in Gaul, where he died. Judæa, with Samaria and Idumæa, was made a Roman province and governed by Roman magistrates called Procurators, who were subordinate to the president of Syria. Coponius was the first procurator of Judæa, and the president of Syria at that time was Quirinus, (called by St. Luke Cyrenius) who, by the order of Augustus, made a taxing in Judæa and Syria.

In the mean while, Herod Antipas and Philip remained in possession of their Tetrarchies. Herod Antipas is chiefly memorable for having put to death John the Baptist, and for having taken a part in questioning and mocking our Saviour before his condemnation. Having deserted his wife the daughter of Aretas king of Arabia, he married Herodias the wife of his brother Philip; and this marriage was the cause of his ruin. For when the emperor Caligula had given the title of king to Agrippa, who was the nephew of Antipas, Herodias not being able to bear that Antipas should remain contented with the inferior dignity of tetrarch, urged him to go to Rome and solicit the title of king. But Agrippa countermined him, by giving Caligula just reason for suspecting his loyalty; so that instead of making him king, he banished him to Lyons, and afterwards to Spain, after he had held his tetrarchy 43 years.

Of his brother Philip, who was tetrarch of Ituræa and Trachonitis, little mention is made in the New Testament. Josephus commends him as a mild and just prince. He died in possession of his tetrarchy, having held it 37 years.

15. The next Herod of this family, is the Agrippa above-mentioned, sometimes called Agrippa the Great; who is spoken of in the Acts as having stretched forth his hands to vex certain of the Church, and as having killed James the brother of John with the sword, and cast Peter into prison. He was grandson of Herod the Great; being son of Aristobulus, who was one of those children of Herod the Great before alluded to as having fallen victims to their father's cruelty. To this Agrippa, Caligula gave, first, the title of king with the tetrarchy which had been held by Philip, and afterwards added the tetrarchy from which Herod Antipas was deposed. The emperor Claudius, who succeeded Caligula, further gave him Abilene, Judæa, and Samaria; so that his dominions became nearly the same as those of his grandfather Herod the Great. Like him, he delighted in great and magnificent buildings. Josephus represents him also as liberal, courteous, merciful: with which character however, his zealous persecution of the Christians cannot easily be reconciled. It is admitted by the historian, that some of his subjects retained little respect for his memory; and in the Acts of the Apostles, we find his death specially ascribed to the displeasure of God. In the fourth year after he had obtained from Claudius the kingdom of Judæa, when he was attending a public spectacle at Cæsarea, and had made an oration to certain deputies, "the people gave a shout, saying, It is the voice of a god, and not of a man." For accepting this impious adulation, he was immediately smitten with a dreadful disease, which in a few days terminated his life.

16. The last of the family of Herod, whose name occurs in the New Testament, is Agrippa the younger, son of Agrippa the Great. As he was only seventeen years old when Agrippa the Great died, the emperor Claudius did not consider him competent to undertake the government of his father's dominions, but soon afterwards made him king of Chalcis, a small territory situated in the mountainous district by which the northern part of Judæa is separated from Syria. His government was afterwards extended over a part of Galilee; and in Judæa his influence was great, though he was never invested with the supreme authority. The appointment of the high priest belonged to him, and he had the care of the temple and of the sacred treasure. In what year he died is uncertain; but it is known that he survived his country, having in vain endeavoured to prevent the fall of it by his prudent counsels. It was before this Agrippa, attended by Bernice and Festus, that St. Paul made his defence, before he was carried prisoner to Rome.

On reviewing that part of the Jewish history which brings before us the family of Herod, and which is most interesting to us, as comprising the period of our Saviour's life, it appears, (1) that, during the infancy of Christ, Herod the Great was ruler both in Judæa and Galilee; (2) that, during all the remaining part of the life of Christ, Herod Antipas was ruler in Galilee; (2) that, in Judæa, after the death of Herod the Great, Archelaus held the chief power nearly ten years; and that afterwards it was governed by Roman procurators; except during the short reign of Agrippa the Great, whose government of Judæa commenced about eight years after the crucifixion of Christ.

17. The corruption and wickedness of the Jews

became general and excessive in the times which immediately preceded their final overthrow. The severe rebukes addressed to them by our Saviour are in perfect accordance with the representations given by Josephus. He speaks of it "as a time fruitful of all sorts of wickedness, so that no evil was left unpractised. All were corrupt both in their private and public characters. They strove to exceed each other in impiety toward God, and injustice toward their neighbour; the chiefs oppressed the people, and the people strove to ruin the chiefs. The former were ambitious of dominion and power; the latter had an insatiable thirst of violence and plunder." When they had filled up the measure of their iniquity by putting to death the Messiah, their dreadful imprecation that his blood should be upon them and upon their children did not tarry long for its completion.

Many intimations are given in the New Testament of the impatience with which they bore the Roman yoke. To a people so proud and licentious any regular authority would have been galling: but the rapacity of some of the Roman governors was unbounded, and their injustice and cruelty so wanton, that the most virtuous and patient subjects must have been excited to resistance. Many local tumults, in which great numbers perished, preceded the general revolt. The country for several years was in a state bordering upon anarchy; pillaged by robbers, and agitated by false prophets, who fanned the flames of discontent. The last of the Roman governors was Gessius Florus, in comparison with whose tyranny the conduct of all preceding oppressors appeared merciful. When Cestius Gallus the president of Syria visited Jerusalem, above 300,000 of the Jews went out to meet him, imploring him to succour their afflicted country, and banish Florus who

was the very pest of their nation. Being exhorted to continue in obedience to the Romans, they cried out that they meant not to take arms against the Romans and Cæsar, but against Florus who had used them so cruelly.

Destruction of Jerusalem.

18. The war began in the twelfth year of the reign of Nero. The Roman garrison at Jerusalem was put to the sword, and the revolt soon became general throughout Judæa. Cestius Gallus, roused by the rapid progress of the insurgents, assembled an army of 25,000 men, and advanced to the walls of Jerusalem; but, having hesitated to make the assault, he thought fit suddenly to retreat, and being pursued by the Jews he sustained great loss. When intelligence of these events reached Rome, Nero perceived that the most vigorous measures must be adopted to reduce the rebellious province to submission; and he appointed Vespasian, who had been long distinguished in the wars of Germany and Britain, to the command of the army of Syria. Vespasian repaired thither without delay, and led into Judæa an army of 60,000 men. More than two years were spent in reducing cities and fortresses, before the way was open to Jerusalem; the Jews every where fighting with obstinate bravery, and in many cases preferring a voluntary death to submission, when all hope of successful resistance was at an end. In the mean time Vespasian, having been elected Emperor, returned to Rome to secure his new dignity and left his son Titus to finish the contest. In the beginning of April (A. D. 70) it being now the fourth year of the war, Titus began the siege of Jerusalem, at a time when great numbers were collected there to celebrate the Passover. Three separate factions occupied the city, and fought with more bitter hostility against each other than against the common enemy. Famine also and disease aggravated the misery of the besieged:

yet, though repeated efforts were made by Titus to induce them to save the city and themselves by submission, they replied only with threats and insult. At length on the eighth of September, the Romans were in possession of every part of the city. Thousands of the Jews perished in the flames, and still more by the sword of the enemy, who spared neither sex nor age, nor desisted till their hands were fatigued with slaughter. Of those who escaped death, some were sent into Egypt to be employed in the public works, others were dispersed through the provinces of the empire, to fight as gladiators or with wild beasts in the Theatres. The whole city was levelled with the ground, so that those who had not seen it before could not suppose that it had been ever inhabited: nothing was left standing except a part of the wall and three towers; which were intended partly as a defence for the garrison that remained there, and partly as monuments of the Roman valour which had mastered a city so strongly fortified. Such was the end of the Jewish nation.

From the statements given by Josephus it has been computed that nearly a million and a half of the Jews perished in this war, the greater part of them in Jerusalem itself; and it is probable that the miseries which they underwent during this period have not been paralleled in any age of the world.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

	B. C.
Creation	4004
The Deluge	2348
Building of Babel	2247
Call of Abraham	1921
Arrival of Jacob in Egypt	1706
Departure of the Israelites from Egypt	1491
Saul, the first king of the Jews, began to reign	1095
Revolt of the ten tribes	975
The ten tribes carried away captive by Shalmaneser	721
The Jews carried captive to Babylon	606
Restoration of the Jews by Cyrus	536
Alexander the Great went to Jerusalem	332
Rise of the Maccabees	166
Invasion of Judæa by Pompey	63
Herod the Great began to reign	37
Our Saviour born four years before the vulgar æra	4

	A. D.
Christ's first visit to the Temple, in his 12th year	8
John the Baptist began his ministry "in the 15th year of Tiberius."	26
Christ began his ministry	28
Death of Christ	31
Beginning of the Jewish war	67
Jerusalem taken by Titus	70

These dates are given according to the vulgar æra, by which the birth of Christ is placed four years too late. Unless notice be taken of this, the reader may be led into error. For example, it is stated in the table that Herod the Great began to reign 37 B. C. and since it is agreed that he lived one year at least after Christ was born, it might be inferred that his reign continued at least 38 years, whereas it did not continue more than 34.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AMONG THE JEWS.

1. THE maintenance of the worship of one God was a fundamental principle of the Mosaic legislation. In order to secure attention to this principle in the minds of the Jews, Moses engaged them by a solemn covenant to accept God as their KING; so that every act of idolatry was not only an apostacy from true religion, but a direct crime against the State. For this reason it was ordered that the *idolater*, having incurred the guilt of high treason, should be punished with death. Their commonwealth therefore was at first a *theocracy;* for God was the founder of it, and had been acknowledged by them in a solemn covenant, not merely as the Sovereign of the universe, but as their own special Ruler, to whose protection they committed their national as well as individual prosperity. Accordingly they are often represented in Scripture as a chosen generation, a peculiar people, a holy nation, the portion of God. In the time of Moses, He vouchsafed to indicate his presence as their Ruler by the most conspicuous tokens. When the Law was delivered from Sinai, the Lord descended upon it in fire, the whole mount quaked greatly, and God answered Moses by a voice. He was visible also in the pillars of cloud and fire; He decided questions of justice by oracles, and inflicted punishments,

not according to the secret procedure of Providence, but with immediate and the most ostensible manifestation of his power. And in subsequent times he continued to issue his decrees, and to signify his will from the tabernacle.

As the sovereignty was thus assigned to God himself, the form of government established by Moses did not prescribe the appointment of an *earthly* king. The governor of the nation admitted of change as to the name and nature of his office, it being of inferior moment whether he was called a general, or a judge, or a king; and it appears that at certain times the tribes which composed the nation had no common ruler. They adhered to the patriarchal mode of life, as far as was compatible with the circumstances of a nation; living according to their tribes and families; every tribe forming a lesser commonwealth, with its own peculiar interests, and all of them united in one great State. Every tribe had its own chief; and as we do not find that Moses appointed them, it is probable that this institution had existed among them in Egypt. The tribes were sub-divided into families; the heads of which are probably the same as the *elders* who are mentioned in the book of Exodus, as being gathered together by Moses and Aaron, and informed of their approaching release from bondage. These families were again sub-divided into households; so that a regular subordination was established in their civil and religious polity, all the degrees of which were alike subject to divine laws, and to the especial government of God. Hence it will appear how the State might subsist, not only without a king, but even occasionally without that magistrate who was denominated a Judge, and without any supreme council of the nation. Every tribe had always its own chief

magistrate, subordinate to whom were the heads of families; and if there was no general ruler of the whole people, there were yet twelve lesser commonwealths, which upon great emergencies united together, and in their general convention would take measures for the common interest. And all these separate bodies were maintained in unity, by their respect for the same object and ceremonies of worship, and also by their regard to God as having separated them from the rest of mankind, and exercising over them a peculiar sovereignty.

In conformity with this theocratic principle of government, we find that Moses and Joshua, and many of the leaders who succeeded them under the name of Judges, were appointed to their office, not by the people but by the nomination and authority of God. These Judges were not invested with legislative power, but acted as magistrates in peace or, as commanders, they led out the people in the divine strength to war, professing to exercise a delegated authority and guided in their steps by the immediate dictation of the divine Spirit. They held their office for life: but it was not hereditary, nor were they appointed in regular succession; there being intervals of several years in which there were no such governors. It is also probable, that their authority did not in every case extend over all, but merely over particular tribes. Thus the Gileadites chose Jephthah as Judge and general, without waiting for the concurrence of the other tribes[a]: and on many important occasions, even in the conduct of wars, particular tribes seem to have acted independently and distinctly from the rest.

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[a] Judges xi. 6.

2. When this mode of government had continued more than 300 years, the Israelites, perceiving that Samuel was broken with age and being dissatisfied with the administration of his sons, had the boldness to require a king like all other nations. Samuel expressed his displeasure at this demand, as it seemed to declare that they would no longer have God for their king; and he represented in strong terms the oppressions and the mischiefs they should suffer under the kingly government. "Nevertheless, the people refused to obey the voice of Samuel; and the Lord said, Hearken unto their voice, and make them a king." They did not, however, attempt to elect a king themselves, but waited for the divine appointment, so that care was taken to preserve in its full force the theocracy originally established. Although therefore the administration of the government was committed to the hands of kings, yet they were only the vicegerents of God, who was still looked upon as the supreme director, and reserved to himself the chief legislative authority. In one view this change was beneficial, as it secured an uninterrupted succession of governors, so that the nation after this period was never without a common head: but in other respects, it appears to have been a change in the *name* of the first magistrate, rather than in the functions of the office, and the kings, at the beginning at least, had little more power than the Judges who had preceded. It is difficult, however, to collect from the Old Testament what were the precise powers with which the kings were intrusted, nor indeed is it likely that the Israelites were anxious to guard their liberties by stipulations of any sort. In their first eagerness to have a king like all the other nations, they would probably have been satisfied with a kingly despotism;

that being the most prevalent form of government among the oriental nations. There is some ground for supposing that Samuel was more provident than themselves for the well-being of their State. For when Saul was appointed king, it is said that Samuel told the people the manner of the kingdom, and wrote it in a book, and laid it up before the Lord[b]. But the purport of the articles contained in this writing is no where stated.

Order of succession to the throne.

As to the order of succession to the throne, there was considerable irregularity: Saul was made king by divine appointment, and by the same authority David succeeded him; Saul's family being excluded from the succession by the express command of God, as a punishment for his disobedience. Afterwards the succession was hereditary, but not necessarily by the right of primogeniture; for David caused Solomon, who was not his eldest son, to be anointed as his successor, and the people confirmed the king's will, though Adonijah, the eldest son, was supported by Joab the commander of the army. But it is plain from the history of David's reign, that this arbitrary right of selecting a successor, instead of appointing him according to an invariable law, was dangerous to his own security, as well as to the peace of the State: and since we do not find that any of the following kings acted upon this right, it is probable that they abstained or were prohibited from the exercise of it, on account of the experience which had been felt of its mischievous effects.

Power of the kings.

The power of the kings, estimated from their practice, was unsettled and precarious;—very limited on some occasions, whether by express

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[b] 1 Sam. x. 25.

compact or by the dread of popular resistance; while at other times, it is certain that they acted in an absolute and very tyrannical manner. On the one hand, they were checked by a fear of the army and of its commanders, and also by the chiefs of the tribes, which, even under the kings, exercised the right of making war, independently one of another and without the king's sanction. Thus, Saul was prevented by his army from inflicting death upon Jonathan as he had threatened[c]: and David, unable to punish Joab his nephew for the murders committed by him, lamented that he was weak although anointed king, and that his nephews "the sons of Zeruiah were too hard for him[d]." On the other hand, as proofs of the power which they sometimes assumed, we find that Saul, at the very beginning of his reign, without any consultation of his subjects made war upon the Ammonites and commanded his whole people to appear in arms, under a threat of severe punishment if they disobeyed[e]. And acts of summary and even tyrannical judicial procedure were committed by him, and also by David and Solomon; such acts as betoken the possession and the harsh exercise of unrestrained authority. From these opposite indications we may infer that the power of the Jewish kings was not defined by stipulated forms, such as have been devised by the precautions of modern legislation, and of which long experience has taught mankind the utility; and therefore, *theoretically*, the Jewish monarch might consider himself invested with power little less than absolute. But on the other hand, *practically*, he would in most cases be restrained from a capricious abuse of it by reverence for the laws of Moses, which enjoin upon all men the

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[c] 1 Sam. xiv. 45. [d] 2 Sam. iii. 39. [e] 1 Sam. xi. 7.

observance of equity; by regard to the ancient usages of the nation; and, lastly, by respect for that sense of justice which has force among men, and which warns rulers that the excesses of uncontrolled power must at length be fatal to themselves.

3. After the Babylonian captivity, while the Jews were subject to Persia, their kingly government was extinct. When the reformation of the State had been accomplished by Ezra and Nehemiah, the chief conduct of affairs was committed to the high priests, and the payment of tribute was the only token of subjection. Never probably did the Jews enjoy so long a course of prosperity as under the mild rule of Persia; governed by their own magistrates, according to their own laws, and allowed to observe their own forms of worship. Under their Egyptian and Syrian rulers they were less fortunate; but their forms of government underwent no material change, till Antiochus Epiphanes attempted to deprive them of every vestige of liberty. The princes of the Maccabæan family, who had rescued them from this oppressor, were allowed to unite in their own persons the regal and pontifical dignity. They were next made subject to the dominion of Rome, under which they experienced many changes of condition. Rome itself during this period was submitted to rule in different forms and to masters of various character; the effects of which variety would extend in some degree to the provinces. And whatever be the uniformity of the government at home, the fortune of distant provinces must necessarily be much influenced by the particular conduct of the individual who has been deputed to be their governor. In general, however, under the procurators, the Jews enjoyed a large measure of liberty. Except in a very few instances, no offence was given to their religious scruples: they worshipped in the

temple and in their synagogues, followed their own customs, and lived according to their own laws. The procurators dwelt principally at Cæsarea, but on the great festivals or when any commotion was apprehended, they repaired to Jerusalem that they might maintain order. It was their duty to collect the imperial revenue, and to repress tumults; they also took cognizance of all capital causes. For the purpose of supporting their authority, a considerable Roman garrison was always stationed in the province. These were the chief circumstances in which the presence of foreign power was felt, and the Jews reminded of their loss of independence.

Courts of judicature.

4. Moses delivered a multiplicity of laws which were so sacred as to be unalterable; nothing was to be added to the word which had been commanded, nor aught diminished from it: but he did not prescribe as unalterable any order of judges or courts of judicature by which the law was to be administered. He seems to have left to the people a discretionary power of altering these, and adapting them to the varying circumstances of the nation. We are left therefore to form our opinion upon the constitution of the Jewish magistracy and courts of justice from facts incidentally mentioned, rather than from any detailed description of them given either in the Holy Scriptures, or by any writer of sufficient authority.

Moses himself was for some time the sole judge of the Israelites. But the duty was greater than he was able to perform; and therefore at the suggestion of Jethro his father-in-law, "he chose able men out of all Israel, and made them heads over the people, rulers of thousands, rulers of hundreds, rulers of fifties, and rulers of tens. And they judged the people at all seasons: the great matters they brought unto Moses,

but every small matter they judged themselves[f]." The appointment of judges according to this precise arithmetical principle was suited to the military system under which they lived in the wilderness, but could not be applied so well to their condition when they should become settled in the country; he therefore ordered that they should appoint judges and officers, seven in every city throughout the tribes[g]. Some Jewish writers assert that there was a *court of twenty-three* judges in every town that had 120 inhabitants, and a *court of three* in every place where there were fewer than that number. The first decided all affairs of justice arising within their respective cities, but an appeal was open from them to the great Council or Sanhedrim, which sat in Jerusalem. *The court of three* was for the determination of disputes respecting sales, contracts, and other such matters of common right between man and man. Neither in the Scriptures nor by Josephus is any mention made of either of these courts.

The highest tribunal of the Jews, at least after the Babylonian captivity, was the SANHEDRIM above-mentioned. It consisted of 71 members, of whom the high priest was generally president. Some have referred the origin of this assembly to the time of Moses, who instituted a council of 70 persons, to assist him in the government at a time when he was harassed by a rebellion of the Israelites in the wilderness: but from the death of Moses to the Babylonian captivity there is no trace of this council, even in great commotions of the State, when it must naturally have interposed.

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[f] Exod. xviii. 25, 26.

[g] Deut. xvi. 18. Josephus, Ant. Book IV. Chap. viii.

had it been in existence. It is probable therefore that the council instituted by Moses during a rebellion, and intended for his own particular service and security, did not remain a permanent judicial body, but ended with the occasion for which it had been formed.



The Sanhedrim, as it existed in the time of our Saviour, possessed great power. It presided over the affairs of the whole nation, received appeals from the inferior courts, interpreted the laws, and regulated the execution of them. Most of the members were priests and Levites; some were scribes; but any one was admissible into it, provided he was of a good family and unblameable life. This is the council by which our Saviour was arraigned before Pilate. The authority of the governor was necessary to pronounce His condemnation, for the Sanhedrim had been deprived of the power of deciding in capital causes; and their authority, though still great, was in many respects much reduced after Judæa became a province of the Roman empire.

CHAPTER III.

ON THE SECTS AND OTHER ORDERS OF MEN AMONG THE JEWS.

Prophets.

1. As the Mosaic dispensation was in many of its parts figurative of the Christian and preparatory to it, so especially it was the office of the PROPHETS to excite in men an expectation of the Messiah, and to give intimations of the approach of him who was to be the Saviour of the world. But the duty with which the prophets were charged did not necessarily imply, and certainly was not confined to, the prediction of future events. They were sometimes commissioned by God to be the messengers of his rebukes and threatenings, sometimes of his commands and exhortations to particular individuals, to nations, or to mankind. He sent them to teach, or to reprove, or to foretell things to come, and sometimes empowered them to confirm the prophecies they delivered, and to afford manifest proofs of their divine mission, by the working of miracles. The title therefore of *Prophet* is given in the Holy Scriptures to men possessing the gift of inspiration in various degrees, according to the various occasions to which the supernatural communication was to be applied. Abraham is the first to whom the name is given in the Old Testament. But Adam, Noah, and others had been favoured with extraordinary intimations of the divine will, so that the name might be properly applied to

them, in the same extensive sense in which it was given to many others after the time of Moses.

Mention is made in the Old Testament of companies of prophets[a]. These were probably assembled in schools, in which the truths of religion were particularly taught and the study of the divine law formed the chief occupation. It is not certain that *all* who were in these schools had the power of predicting future events, or were endued with any supernatural knowledge. But it is certain that to *many* individuals during a long series of years, from Moses to Malachi, peculiar communications were vouchsafed by the Almighty, in furtherance of the great scheme of his dispensations to mankind. Individuals were selected to execute important commissions, and foretelling events which were beyond the reach of human penetration they gave thereby the strongest proof that the dispensation of which they were the ministers proceeded from God.

Some of the prophets, as Elijah, Elisha, and others, committed nothing to writing: their predictions, being chiefly of a temporary nature, are inserted in the *historical* books together with an account of their fulfilment. But those who were appointed to deliver prophecies the accomplishment of which was far distant, were directed to commit them to writing. The prophetic books of sixteen of these yet remain, and form a part of the sacred canon. They are usually divided into two classes, the greater and the minor prophets; not from any supposed difference in their authority, but because the writings of one class are of greater length than those of the other. Jonah, the earliest of them, lived about 800 years B. C.; and Malachi the latest, with

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[a] 1 Sam. x. 5. and xix. 20.

whose work the Old Testament is closed, lived about 400 years after him.

Sadducees.

2. It is remarkable that so long as there were prophets among the Jews, there arose no sects among them; the reason of which probably is, that the prophets learnt God's will immediately from himself, and therefore the people must either obey them and receive from them the interpretation of the law, or no longer acknowledge the God who inspired them. But when the law of God came to be explained by fallible men who disagreed in their opinions, a separation into sects was the unavoidable consequence. The most ancient sect was that of the Sadducees, whose founder Sadoc lived about 250 years B. C. He was a disciple of Antigonus Sochæus president of the Sanhedrim, who taught that men ought to serve God disinterestedly, from love and reverence, and not from servile fear of punishment or hope of reward. Sadoc, misapplying these instructions, inferred that there was no future state of rewards or punishments, thus far agreeing with the doctrine of Epicurus: but he admitted that God made the world, and governs it by his providence, and that, for the support of this government, he has ordained rewards and punishments in the present life. For this reason he enjoined the worship of God, and obedience to his laws. Whatever were the opinions of Sadoc himself, it appears from the New Testament that his followers in the time of our Saviour maintained that there is no resurrection, neither angel nor spirit[b]. They rejected all traditions, acknowledging the authority of the written law alone. It has been argued by some writers that they also rejected all the Scriptures except

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[b] Acts xxiii. 8.

the five books of Moses, while others suppose that they did not wholly reject them, but preferred the books of Moses to the rest: for these opinions however there does not appear to be sufficient ground. On the subject of free-will and predestination they held, in opposition to other sects, that man is absolute master of his own actions, and perfectly free to do either good or evil according to his own choice. Thus thinking that every man has full power in himself to avoid whatever the law of God forbids, and to do what it commands, it was remarked of them that they were always inclined to severity when they sat in judgment upon criminals. The members of this sect were few in number, but they were in general eminent for wealth and dignity. Several of them were appointed to the high priesthood. Josephus, however, says that they had not much power, for when they were in the magistracy they were obliged to conform to the measures proposed by the Pharisees, who were supported by a great majority of the common people[c].

Pharisees.

3. The Pharisees derive their name from *Pharas*, a Hebrew word which signifies *separated* or *set apart*, because they separated themselves from the rest of the Jews, and affected a peculiar degree of holiness. Most of the common people were on their side; but the title of Pharisee seems to have been almost entirely appropriated to men of leisure and substance, the rest being considered rather an appendage than a part of the sect, and always called plainly *the people, the multitude*, and the like. The time of their origin cannot be accurately determined. Their rise was probably very gradual, as they do not appear to have acknowledged any particular founder. The earliest account of them

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[c] Jos. Ant. Book XVIII. Chap. ii.

is in Josephus, who says that they were a considerable sect at the time when John Hyrcanus the high priest forsook them and became a Sadducee, that is, about 110 years B. C[d]. The distinguishing character of this sect was a zealous adherence to the traditions of the elders, to which they ascribed even greater authority than to the written law. They pretended that Moses received from God two laws, one written, the other oral; that this oral law had been handed down uncorrupted from generation to generation, and was to be taken as a supplement and explanation of the written law, which they represented to be in many places obscure and defective. But from the frequent reproaches addressed to them on this point by our Saviour, it is evident that under pretence of *explaining* the law by their traditions, they had in reality made it of none effect. Their religion consisted chiefly in the observance of external ceremonies; in ablutions and purifications; in frequent fasting, and long prayers which they made ostentatiously in public places; in avoidance of all communication with reputed sinners; in scrupulous payment of tithe of the least thing; and in rigorous observance of the sabbath, so as to reckon it unlawful to pluck a few ears of corn, or to heal the sick on that day. In order to attract attention, they made broad their phylacteries[e], and enlarged the fringes of their garments. By this outward appearance of sanctity they gained the esteem and veneration of the multitude: but omitting the weightier matters

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[d] Jos. Ant. Book XIII. Chap. xviii.

[e] *Phylactery* (derived from φυλάττω) signifies a *memorial* or a *preservative*. *Phylacteries* were long and narrow pieces of parchment, on which were written passages out of Exodus and Deuteronomy. These they bound to their foreheads and left-arms, in memory of the law.

of the law, judgment, mercy, and faith, and veiling pride, malice, and impurity under the garb of extraordinary piety, they were frequently rebuked by Christ in the most severe language as a generation of hypocrites.

Their doctrines, though more pure than their practice, were mingled with much error. On the subject of predestination and free will they were opposed to the Sadducees, but their own opinions are no where clearly stated so as to be intelligible. According to Josephus, they ascribed all things to God and fate, and yet left to man in many things the freedom of his will[f]. How they made one part of this doctrine compatible with the other is not explained. The Holy Scripture testifies that they believed in the resurrection, and in the existence of angels and spirits[g]. But from the account given by Josephus, it seems probable that their opinion respecting these matters was derived not from the Holy Scriptures but from the philosophy of Pythagoras, and that the resurrection meant by them was the transmigration of the souls of good men into other bodies[h]. This notion had become prevalent in Judæa in the time of Christ, and according to it, his disciples asked him in the case of the man that was born blind, "who did sin, this man (that is, this man in some antecedent state of being) or his parents, that he was born blind?" And when the Jews were forming conjectures on the character of our Saviour, some said that he was Elias, others Jeremias, or one of the prophets: that is, they thought that the soul of one of these had re-appeared in him. It remained for Christ himself, who brought life and immortality to light, to teach the true resurrection of the body and soul together.

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[f] Jos. de Bell. Jud. Book II. Chap. vii. [g] Acts xxiii. 8.
[h] Jos. ibid.

Essenes. 3. A third sect among the Jews was that of the Essenes. Of these there is a full account in Josephus and Philo, who are very copious in praising them; but they are no where mentioned in Scripture, probably because, living chiefly in solitude and taking no part in public affairs, they did not fall under our Saviour's notice. Their number also was small: Philo says that there were about 4000 of them in Syria and Palestine. It is supposed that they had their origin in the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, by whose tyranny great numbers of the Jews were driven into the wilderness, and became inured to a temperate and laborious mode of life. Philo divides them into two classes, the *practical,* who lived in Judæa and Syria, and the *contemplative,* who were dispersed through many parts of the world, but were most numerous in Egypt. The practical Essenes did not altogether abandon the society of the rest of mankind, and in some respects were less rigid than the contemplative; substantially, however, their maxims were the same. They believed in the immortality of the soul, and held the Scriptures in the highest reverence, but considered them as mystic writings and expounded them allegorically. It does not appear that they placed any reliance upon tradition. They sent gifts to the temple, but offered no sacrifices. They held the doctrine of absolute predestination, not allowing that man has freedom of will in any of his actions. In the regulations of their society they observed the greatest strictness. None gained full admission among them till after a probation of three years. In their mode of living they were extremely temperate; they attended to no secular occupation except agriculture, and held all things in common. All were considered equal; yet great order was maintained among them, by means of the voluntary respect which they paid to the elders.

Although no express mention is made of this sect in the New Testament, it is supposed that they are alluded to both by our Saviour and St. Paul[i]. If this supposition be correct, they are spoken of, by the apostle at least, with disapprobation. It is clear indeed, even from the favourable description of them given by Josephus and Philo, that they were led into many superstitious usages, and indulged in fanciful and enthusiastic speculations. It is remarked by Prideaux that almost all their peculiar tenets are condemned by the spirit of Christianity[k]. Such were their "voluntary humility" and "neglecting the body," their superstitious washings, their abstinence from meats which God created for man's use, and other like usages which God never required of them. And, in maintaining that men are bound down in all their actions by irresistible fate and necessity, they destroyed the very foundations of religion and virtue.

4. These are the three sects into which the Jews were divided. There were among them other classes of men not distinguished by peculiar religious tenets, but either professional, as the scribes and publicans, or political, as the Herodians and Galileans.

Scribes. *Scribes, doctors of the law*, and *lawyers*, appear to have been different names for the same class of persons. The scribes are mentioned very early in the Sacred History[l]. Their occupation originally was to transcribe copies of the law, as their name imports; but, from the knowledge thus acquired, they soon became instructors of the people, and were made judges in their sanhedrims, or teachers in their schools and synagogues. Most of them were attached to the sect of the Phari-

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i Matt. xix. 12. Col. ii. 18—23. k Prideaux, Part II. Book 5.
l 2 Sam. viii. 17.

sees, for they were the authors of those numberless comments and opinions which the Pharisees received as traditions transmitted by Moses; and the learning and skill of the scribes were chiefly exercised in explaining the oral law which they had themselves fabricated.

Publicans. 5. The *publicans* were employed by the Romans to collect the taxes and customs. The Roman publicans are mentioned by Cicero as being the flower of the equestrian order[m]; but those were probably men who farmed the revenues of whole provinces, and certainly very different from the class so often introduced under the title of publicans in the New Testament. These were inferior agents, generally Jews of low condition, whose office was accounted disreputable. The people bore with extreme impatience the taxes imposed by the Romans, and therefore all who were engaged in collecting them were viewed with hatred, especially their own countrymen, whom they regarded as traitors that were conspiring with the Romans to enslave their nation. And this feeling was aggravated by the extortions practised, and by the rigorous manner in which the taxes were usually exacted. Hence the whole body was held in detestation, insomuch that the Pharisees imputed it as a great crime to our Saviour that he sat at meat with Publicans, whom they themselves avoided with abhorrence.

Herodians. 6. Respecting the Herodians, whom we find mentioned in the gospels as having gone with the Pharisees to ensnare Christ[n], we have no means of determining by what peculiar opinions they were distinguished. Some have thought that they were so called because they believed Herod to be the Messiah; others, with more probability, that they were a set of men attached

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[m] Orat. pro. Plancio. [n] Matt. xxii. 16. Mark xii. 13.

to the family of Herod, and followers of his policy. It is probable that like him they advocated submission to the Romans, by whose support Herod was made and continued king, and also were inclined to conform to the Roman customs and the forms of heathen worship in particulars which the Jewish law would not allow. It is further probable that they were chiefly of the sect of the Sadducees, since that which is called in one gospel the leaven of the Sadducees, is called in another the leaven of Herod[o].

Galilæans. 7. The Galilæans were a political faction which had its origin at the time when Cyrenius, after the expulsion of Archelaus, first laid a tax upon Judæa. They were distinguished by an extreme zeal for liberty, but in all their principles they accorded entirely with the Pharisees. Their chief was one Judas of Galilee who laboured to excite the people to rebellion, alleging that submission to the tax would be an acknowledgement of slavery and inconsistent with their duty to God, who was their only sovereign. Topics of this sort operated upon the Jews with peculiar force at this time, when their expectation of a Messiah, or triumphant deliverer, inspired them with disdain as well as hatred of the Roman yoke. Judas perished, and his followers were for a time dispersed[p]: but he may be considered as one of the earliest and chief movers of that spirit of turbulence which became general among the people and was not extinguished till it had wrought the ruin of the Jewish nation.

Proselytes. 8. Frequent mention is made in the New Testament of *proselytes*. These were Gentiles who embraced the Jewish religion either in whole or in

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[o] Matt. xvi. 6. Mark viii. 15. [p] Acts v. 36.

part; for they are usually divided into two sorts, Proselytes of the gate, and Proselytes of righteousness. The former were permitted by the Jews to live within their gates, without being bound to the whole law, but only to comply with the seven precepts, which, as the Jewish writers pretend, God gave to Adam and afterwards to Noah, who transmitted them to posterity. These precepts were (1) To abstain from idolatry; (2) from blasphemy; (3) from murder; (4) from adultery; (5) from theft; (6) to appoint upright judges; (7) not to eat the flesh cut off from any animal while it retained life. They were allowed to worship in the temple, but were forbidden to enter farther than into the outer court, which was called the court of the Gentiles. It does not appear that any ceremony was performed on the admission of Proselytes of this order.

The Proselytes of righteousness, or, as they are sometimes called, Proselytes of the covenant, undertook the observance of the whole law, and were initiated with three ceremonies, circumcision, baptism, and a sacrifice: after which they were admitted as adopted children to all the ceremonies and religious privileges used by the Jews. But though they were thus adopted, and though great zeal was shewn, especially by the Pharisees, in making proselytes, yet they were considered inferior to those who were Jews by birth and descent, were admitted to no office, and were treated in general with great contempt.

It must be added that this distinction of the proselytes into two classes rests upon the authority of ancient Jewish writers, but in the Scriptures there does not appear to be any foundation for it. Hence, some are of opinion that proselytes were those, and those only, who took upon themselves the obligation of the whole

Mosaic law. Gentiles were allowed to worship in the outer court of the temple, and some of them probably renounced idolatry without embracing the Mosaic law; but such persons do not appear to be called proselytes, in Scripture or in any ancient Christian writer[q].



[q] Lardner, vol. VI. p. 522. Tomline, vol. I. p. 266.

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE JEWISH PRIESTHOOD.

1. It has been already stated that when the promised land was divided among the tribes, no allotment was made to the tribe of Levi, because the Levites were appointed to the service of religion, and a peculiar kind of provision was made for them. In the earliest times the priesthood appears to have belonged to the first-born of every family; and when God smote all the first-born of the Egyptians but spared those of the Israelites, he was pleased to ordain that for the future all the first-born males should be set apart unto himself, that the memory of the miracle and of their deliverance from bondage might thereby be preserved. But when the tribe of Levi on a remarkable occasion discovered great zeal against idolatry, he appointed that whole tribe, instead of the first-born of Israel, to the honour of attending his immediate service[a]. On their first institution in the wilderness, their chief duty consisted in taking down the tabernacle, carrying it about with all the instruments and sacred vessels belonging to it as the Israelites removed from place to place, and setting it up again when they pitched their tents. But when the Israelites were settled in Canaan, and the tabernacle was no longer carried about as before, the service of the Levites was

[a] Exod. xxxii. 26.

changed, and required less bodily labour. On which account, from the time of David, they entered on the discharge of their duty at an earlier age, and continued in it later, than according to the original appointment of Moses. They were from the beginning divided into three classes, Gershonites, Kohathites, and Merarites, so called from Gershon, Kohath and Merari who were the sons of Levi. Each of these classes had its peculiar duties. When David had fixed the tabernacle at Jerusalem, he added several regulations respecting their different employments, and made a new division of them. The tribe was numbered by his order, and (without including the priests) was found to contain 38,000 men, from the age of 30 years and upward[b]. 6000 of these were made officers and judges. The rest were divided into three equal classes. To one class (containing 24,000) he assigned the duty of assisting the priests by preparing flour, wine and oil for the sacrifice, and other services of that kind; the second class (containing 4000) had to perform the music prescribed in the divine service; and the third (containing 4000) had to keep a constant guard about the temple. Each of these classes was divided into 24 courses, which in successive weeks attended to the duty. While one course was attending to the service of the temple, the rest were dispersed among the tribes, in the 48 cities which were allotted for their residence. They were then occupied in teaching the people, and explaining to them the law: they also kept the public records and the genealogies of the several tribes.

Nethinim. Those who were on duty at the temple had under them some persons called *Nethinim*, that

[b] 1 Chron. xxiii. 3.

is, *given;* because they were given to them as servants. Their business was to carry the water and wood, and whatever else was wanted in the temple. The Gibeonites were at first employed in this work, as a punishment for the artifice by which they obtained a league of peace with the Israelites[c]; and those who in subsequent times continued to be condemned to this servitude were probably the descendants of these, along with some of the captives from other nations.

Priests.

2. The *priests,* who were to be taken from a particular family of the tribe of Levi, viz. that of Aaron, were appointed to an office more sacred and of higher dignity than the common Levites. They also were divided into 24 courses, which performed the divine service weekly by turns. Each of them had a president; and it is probable that these presidents were the same as the chief priests so often mentioned in the New Testament. The order in which the courses were to serve was determined by lot; and each course was, in all succeeding ages, called by the name of him who was its president at the time of the first division. Thus Zacharias is said by St. Luke to be of the course of Abia, because Abia was president of the course in the time of David. The whole number of Priests in David's time was probably about 5000, but when Josephus wrote, there were not less than four times that number[d]. Since the law enjoined that they should belong to a particular family, all who aspired to the office were required to establish their descent from that family; on which account the genealogies of the priests were inscribed in the public registers and preserved in the temple. It was necessary also, before they were admitted to the office, that they

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[c] Josh. ix.

[d] Jos. contr. Ap. cap. 2.

should be declared free from bodily blemish, and be purified from any legal pollutions which they might have contracted. Celibacy was not enjoined upon any of the sacerdotal order, but the law respecting marriage was in some particulars more strict to them than to the common people.

The duties which they had to perform were of great variety, and were assigned by lot four times every day to those whose turn it was to be in attendance. It was their business to serve immediately at the altar and offer the sacrifices; to guard the inner part of the temple; to light the lamps in the sanctuary; to burn the incense; to keep a continual fire upon the altar of burnt-offerings, and to offer the loaves of shew-bread, which were changed every sabbath. Other important parts of the priestly office were: to preserve the volumes of the law, and pronounce a blessing on the people in the name of God; to instruct the people; to judge of controversies, of leprosy and other pollutions, and of the fitness or unfitness of victims; to fix the price of redemption for the persons and things that were devoted to God; to proclaim the sabbath and solemn feasts; to call assemblies, and in war to animate the people. These and other duties were assigned to them and specified with great minuteness.

High Priest.

3. There were among them several degrees of distinction and subordination. At the head was the *high priest*, who had great authority, being accounted next in rank to the king or prince, and sometimes uniting the regal and pontifical dignities in his own person. After the institution of the Sanhedrim, he was generally the president of it. Aaron was the first person appointed to the high priesthood. From him it passed to Eleazar his eldest son, whose descendants held it through several

successions till the time of Eli, who was of the family of Ithamar, Aaron's second son, and was the first in that line who was made high priest. In the reign of Solomon, it returned into the family of Eleazar in the person of Zadok, and remained in it until the Babylonian captivity. During this period the high priest was usually elected by the other priests, or by an assembly consisting chiefly of priests; but sometimes by the king. Thus Zadok was appointed by Solomon in the room of Abiathar, whom Solomon had deposed[e]. After the captivity, they were generally appointed by the kings of the countries to which Judæa was subject. According to law, the office was held for life. But under the Roman government this was disregarded, and the dignity and authority of the high priest were greatly reduced. The office was now frequently transferred from one to another according to the caprice or interest of those who held the supreme power, and was given or sold to young, illiterate, and obscure persons, sometimes even to men who were not of the sacerdotal race. Very different from this was the care taken in earlier times to support the honour of this sacred office. According to the Law of Moses, if any one, not of the family of Aaron, attempted to execute the duties of the high priest, he was put to death. It was necessary also that he should be of an honourable family, and that he himself should be perfectly without blemish. The strictest injunctions were given by Moses with regard to the purity both of him and of his family.

He was consecrated, on his institution to the office, with a solemnity suited to his sacred character. (1) He was presented to the Lord at the door of the tabernacle, in the presence of all the people: (2) he was purified

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e. 1 Kings ii. 35.

with water; (3) he was invested with the pontifical garments, which were of great splendour, and different from those of the other priests; (4) he offered various sacrifices; lastly, he was anointed with the sacred oil, the composition of which was prescribed by God, and was not to be used for any other purpose. These ceremonies were repeated seven days successively. The other priests and even the common Levites were also consecrated, on their admission to office, with particular ceremonies. The Levites were distinguished from the rest of the Israelites by a robe of white linen; but all ranks of the sacerdotal order put off the vestments peculiar to them, when they were not engaged in the divine service.

The high priest could perform any of the functions of the other priests, but that which *peculiarly* pertained to him was to make expiation for the people; which he did once a year with great solemnity in the Holy of Holies. It was also granted to him alone to consult the oracle of God in the sanctuary; but in the second temple this mode of declaring the divine will was discontinued. When he was incapable of attending the service through sickness or any legal pollution, a deputy called *Sagan* was appointed to supply his place. Some think that the office of the Sagan was not occasional but permanent, and that it was his business to assist the high priest generally, in superintending the service and the affairs of the temple. The title of high priest seems to have been sometimes given to this officer; which will explain an expression of St. Luke who mentions Annas and Caiaphas as being high priests at the same time[f]. Annas was probably the Sagan. It is probable also that when the office was

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[f] Luke iii. 2.

transferred from one to another, those who had once held it retained the title after they had resigned the power.

The Jewish writers mention other sorts of sacerdotal officers superior to common priests, but inferior to the high priest and Sagan. It was the business of the *priest of the camp* to exhort the army. There were two, called *Catholics,* who were assistants or substitutes for the Sagan, and were next to him in station and honour; and seven, who kept the keys of the court of the priests. To others were committed the sacred vessels and vestments, the treasures of the temple, and the revenues arising from the oblations: regulations of this sort being absolutely necessary in a service of such great length and variety. Mention is made of another sort of ecclesiastical persons called *stationary men:* these were chosen out of the several tribes as representatives to attend at the sacrifices offered for all Israel; the Law requiring that the persons for whom sacrifices were offered should be present at the offering. But it being impossible that all the people should be present, representatives were chosen for the whole body, who were divided, like the priests and Levites, into twenty-four courses, and attended by rotation.

Levites.

4. As the tribe of Levi was to be interspersed among the other tribes, and was prevented by an express law from having any share in the division of the country, it remains to be stated in what places they dwelt, and what provision was made for their subsistence. Forty-eight cities, with their suburbs, were assigned to them: of which thirteen belonged to the priests and were all situated near Jerusalem, one belonging to the tribe of Simeon, four to Benjamin, and eight to Judah. Some of the cities of the Levites were fixed among each of the other tribes, in order that being dispersed they might more conveniently perform the duties to which they were

appointed. Around the cities a small portion of land was given them for gardens, fields and vineyards, from the produce of which arose part of their subsistence, when they were not attending at the temple: but their chief support was derived from the tithes which the Law allotted to them;—a tenth of all the vegetable produce of the earth and also of the cattle. The Levites collected these tithes and gave a tenth of them to the priests. There were many other sources of revenue for the support of the national worship. The first-born of living creatures and the first-fruits of all kinds of corn and fruit were consecrated to God. A price of redemption was paid for the first-born of men and of unclean animals. To the priests were assigned also certain parts of many of the victims that were offered in sacrifice. It must be remarked, however, that some portion of the payments above-mentioned was applied not directly as a provision for the priests and Levites, but for the building, the ornaments, and other public expences of the temple. Nor can it be doubted, that the revenues prescribed by the divine Law were adequate both to support the dignity of the service, and to relieve its ministers from all secular employment, that they might devote themselves wholly to the discharge of their sacred duties.

Of the cities assigned to the Levites, three on each side of Jordan were appointed to be cities of refuge for those who had committed involuntary homicide. When a person who had caused the death of another fled to one of these, the judges proceeded to examine whether the act had been committed designedly or not. If designedly, he was condemned to death; if not, he remained in the city of refuge till the death of the high priest, when he was at liberty to return home.

5. These regulations with regard to the tribe of

Levi afford a striking proof of the divine wisdom of their author, and certainly have no parallel in any system of heathen legislation. It is true, soothsayers and diviners and ministers of religion were found in every State; but they attempted nothing beyond the performance of religious ceremonies, or employing the influence which their sacred functions gave them to promote private gain or the schemes of political parties: to instruct the people, they seem not to have considered any part of their duty. But the Jewish legislator set apart the entire tribe of Levi, one-twelfth of the nation, not merely to perform the rites and sacrifices which the ritual enjoined, but to diffuse among the people religious and moral instruction. For this purpose the peculiar situation and privileges of the tribe of Levi admirably fitted them. Possessing no landed property, but supported by tithes and offerings, they were little occupied with labour or secular care: they were also deeply interested in the support of the worship and laws of God, since if these were neglected, the sources of their maintenance would necessarily fail. Their cities being dispersed through all the tribes, they were every where at hand to admonish and instruct: exclusively possessed of all religious offices, taking a large part in the administration of justice, and guardians of the cities of refuge to which those who were guilty of homicide fled for an asylum, they must have acquired such influence as could not fail to secure attention to their instructions. Thus circumstanced, they were assuredly well calculated to answer the purpose of their institution, to preserve the union of all the other tribes, and to promote their improvement in knowledge, virtue, and piety. Considering indeed the rank of the priests and Levites, as ministers of religion, as the men of best understanding and knowledge in the laws, as of

great interest in the nation, and influence in the administration of justice, an apprehension might arise that the power committed to them was too great to be possessed by a single tribe. But this danger was effectually guarded against by the manner in which they were dispersed among the other tribes. They were so separated from one another, that they could not prosecute in concert any ambitious design: and it was in the power of the people, on suspicion of any ill designs of the Levites, to put a stop to their means of subsistence, and seize on all their persons at once. Hence, whatever power the Constitution gave them to do good, the same carefully provided to put it out of their power to do harm, either in disturbing the peace or endangering the liberties of their country[g].

[g] Graves, Vol. I. p. 294. Lowman, ch. vi.

CHAPTER V.

ON THE JEWISH SACRIFICES.

It cannot be determined with *certainty* that sacrifice was offered originally by the command of God; this being a point on which the Scriptures are silent. But that it was so, may *reasonably be inferred* from the strong attestation which God gave of his acceptance of sacrifice in the case of Abel, again in that of Noah, afterwards in that of Abraham, and above all, from the systematic establishment of it by divine authority in the dispensation of Moses. We are warranted by Scripture in concluding that the sacrifices prescribed in the Mosaic law, were ordained by God as a type of the sacrifice of Christ[a]; this being a true and effective sacrifice, whilst those of the law were but faint representations intended for its introduction. It is probable, therefore, that the rite was *at the beginning* ordained by God, as a type of that great sacrifice in which all others were to have their consummation[b]. The object of the Mosaic sacrifices was principally *typical;* but the institution of them comprehended other excellent uses, besides that for which we have authority to believe that they were principally designed.

It is not however intended to treat, in this chapter, of the *origin* or design of sacrifice;—subjects which admit

[a] Heb. ix. and x.

[b] Magee, Vol. I. p. 46.

of much discussion; but to give a brief account of the principal offerings and sacrifices prescribed by Moses, what they were and on what occasions presented. They may be classed under two general heads, *bloody* offerings, or sacrifices strictly so called; and *unbloody* offerings, as of corn, wine, and perfumes.

1. Bloody offerings were subdivided into three sorts: (1) whole burnt-offerings, (2) sin or trespass-offerings, (3) peace-offerings. A *whole burnt-offering*, was the most excellent of all the sacrifices, since it was all consecrated to God, the victim being wholly consumed upon the altar; whereas some parts of the others belonged to the priests, and to those who offered the victims. Of this kind was the daily sacrifice: four lambs, all of the first year, were offered every day, two in the morning, and two in the evening. The *whole burnt-offering* seems to have been the most ancient kind of sacrifice, since we find that it was offered by Noah, Abraham, and other patriarchs[c]. It is not stated in the Bible what was the peculiar design of it: but as we are taught by St. Paul that the sacrifices under the law were typical of the great sacrifice of Christ, the *whole burnt-offering* appears to be a type particularly expressive, since nothing less than the full and perfect sacrifice of the Son of God could atone for the sins of the world.

Between *sin-offerings* and *trespass-offerings*, there seems to have been little difference. Some suppose that sin-offerings were for acts which were admitted to be against the law, but had been done undesignedly; and that trespass-offerings were for acts respecting which there was reason to doubt whether they were sinful or

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[c] Gen. viii. 10. and xxii. 13. Job i. 5.

not. Others think that sin-offerings were made for sins of commission; and trespass-offerings for sins of omission[d]. In both of them, the person who offered the sacrifice placed his hands on the victim's head, and confessed his sin or trespass over it, saying, "I have sinned, I have trespassed, and do return by repentance before thee, and with this I make atonement." The victim was then considered as bearing the sins of the person by whom it was offered, who received forgiveness from God upon condition of repentance, without which there could be no remission. The appointed occasions for these offerings were not only for acts of sin or trespass, but also on account of certain legal pollutions, as at the purification of a leper, of a woman after child-birth, and others which the law specified. There were also sin-offerings of a more solemn nature offered on extraordinary occasions, not on the altar but without the camp. Such was the sacrifice of the red heifer, whose ashes mixed with water, served to purify those who had been polluted by touching a dead body[e]. The heifer was to be carried out of the camp, where the high priest killed it, and sprinkled of the blood seven times towards the sanctuary: it was then burnt, and the ashes were gathered and laid up for use. Whoever had touched a dead body was to be sprinkled with water, with which some of these ashes had been mixed. As Jerusalem became afterwards to the Jews, what the camp had been during their abode in the wilderness, those victims which were ordered to be burnt without the camp, were, after the building of the temple, to be burnt beyond the walls of the city. Wherefore Jesus

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[d] Mich. on the Laws of Moses, Art. 187.

[e] Numb. xix.

also, says the Apostle, suffered without the gate, that he might sanctify the people with his own blood[f].

Peace-offerings were so called, because they were offered in token of peace between God and man. Whole burnt-offerings and sin or trespass-offerings were made under the notion of some guilt having been contracted, which they were the means of removing; but in peace-offerings, the offerer was supposed to be at peace with God, and they were made either as an acknowledgement for mercies received, or as joined with supplication for further blessings.

With respect to all the three kinds of sacrifices, it may be observed that there were only five sorts of animals which could be offered, viz. oxen, sheep, goats; and among birds, pigeons and turtle-doves. In the selection of victims, the utmost care was taken to choose such as were free from blemish. Sacrifices at first were offered at the door of the tabernacle; but after the temple was built, it was unlawful to sacrifice any where but in it, except in one or two specified cases[g]. (It seems however that this command was frequently transgressed, even under the best of the Jewish kings[h].) The law required that all the victims should be sprinkled with salt before they were laid on the altar, and that the priest should sprinkle the blood upon the altar, which was the most essential part of the sacrifice; for the blood is the life, and by the sprinkling of it the atonement was made. In common sin-offerings and in peace-offerings the fat alone was burnt: in sin-offerings all the flesh belonged to the priest; in peace-offerings the

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[f] Heb. xiii. 12.

[g] Deut. xii. 3—14. Levit. xiv. 49. Deut. xxi. Numb. xix. 2.

[h] 1 Kings xxii. 43. 2 Kings xii. 3. xiv. 4. xv. 4. Mich. Art. 188.

breast and right-shoulder belonged to the priest, and the rest to the person who made the offering.

2. *Unbloody offerings*, which are called in the Bible *meat-offerings*, consisted of meal, bread, cakes, ears of corn, and parched grain, accompanied with libations of wine and sometimes mixed with oil and frankincense. They were offered along with the bloody sacrifices; a certain quantity of flour, wine, and oil, being presented with every animal that was sacrificed. The wine was partly poured upon the brow of the victim to consecrate it, and part of it was allotted to the priests. Some of these offerings were also presented singly and apart, as (1) those which were offered as sin-offerings by the poor, whose means were not sufficient to provide two turtle-doves or two young pigeons; (2) incense, consisting of several spices which are specified in the law[i]: this was offered in the sanctuary every morning and evening by the priests, and once a year by the high priest in the Holy of Holies; (3) the shew-bread, twelve loaves of which were placed every sabbath on the golden table in the sanctuary; (4) the sheaf of the first-fruits of the harvest, offered at the celebration of the passover; (5) two loaves of leavened bread offered at the feast of pentecost.

Various oblations which the law prescribed may be classed under the head of unbloody offerings. The first-fruits of corn, wine, and oil, were consecrated to God for the use of the priests. They had also the first of the fleece of sheep[k]. The Law did not fix the quantity of these first-fruits: the liberal gave a fortieth and even a thirtieth, others a sixtieth part. After the first-fruits were offered, every one paid the tenth of his produce to the Levites, who gave a tenth of what they received to

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[i] Exod. xxx. 34. [k] Deut. xviii. 4.

the priests. Besides this tithe which the people paid to the Levites, they set apart another tenth, which was carried to Jerusalem and consumed with festivity in the temple, as a token of thankfulness to God. To these feasts they were required to invite the Levites, widows, orphans, strangers, the poor, and their own servants, and thus give them a day of rejoicing. But every third year, instead of carrying this tithe to Jerusalem, the owner kept the feast at home, in order that such of the poor as were aged and infirm might not be wholly excluded from this feast of thanksgiving.

Synagogues. The laws relative to sacrifices and offerings were delivered by Moses with great minuteness, and in the observance of them consisted the national worship of the Jews. If it should be thought that the multiplicity of them must have formed a system exceedingly burdensome to the people, let it be remembered that it was administered by a body of men set apart for the duty, and that it was a ritual of national, not of personal worship, limited to one temple and one altar at the place which God had chosen. It was not established in towns and cities throughout the land, and therefore could not be designed to be a system of individual or of family devotion for the whole Jewish people. In regard to this, it is necessary to make a distinction between the worship in the *temple* and that which was performed in the *synagogues.* These were instituted at a much later period, and probably originated in the public reading of the Law after the sacred writings had been collected by Ezra. Conscious that the calamities which had befallen the people arose from their wickedness, and that this was greatly owing to their ignorance of the Scriptures, they were led to the institution of synagogues, one

in every place where there were ten persons of sufficient age and leisure, that the people might meet for prayer, and hear the Scriptures read and explained. The synagogues were opened three days in the week, and thrice on each of those days. The Pentateuch was divided into sections, and the reading of them so arranged that the whole was finished at the end of the year. The other sacred writings were not all read, but at every meeting such parts were selected as had relation to what had been previously read from the books of Moses. The ministration of this service was not confined to the sacerdotal order, but was committed to any one of competent learning. But, that order might be preserved, elders were appointed in every synagogue, who were solemnly admitted to their office by the imposition of hands. In the New Testament these are called rulers of the synagogue. Next to them was the minister, whose office it was to offer up public prayers to God for the congregation. There were other inferior ministers, who had the care of the sacred books, and of the building and all things belonging to it. The service consisted of prayers, reading and expounding the Scriptures, and preaching. For the prayers they had public liturgies. When the time came for reading the Scriptures, the rulers of the synagogue called out some one to officiate; a priest first, and then a Levite, if such were present, and then any other of the people, till the number *seven* was completed. Hence every section of the law was divided into seven parts, each reader having his assigned portion. As Hebrew had ceased to be the common language, an interpreter was appointed, whose duty consisted in interpreting the lessons into Chaldee, as they were read to the congregation in Hebrew. It does not appear that any fixed ministers were appointed for ex-

pounding the Scriptures and for preaching: this duty was done by the scribes or any learned men, authorized by the rulers of the synagogue without any permanent appointment.

It is remarkable that after the Babylonian captivity the Jews were strongly averse to idolatry, though they had been very prone to it before that event: the probable reason of which appears to be that after the captivity a greater knowledge of the Holy Scriptures was diffused among them by means of the institutions above-mentioned. While they had no places for public worship or instruction, except the temple at Jerusalem or the cities of the Levites, the laws of God were imperfectly known, and on that account the people were easily misled to adopt the usages of neighbouring nations. But when in every city synagogues were erected in which the Holy Scriptures were read, and the people regularly instructed in their duty and exhorted to the performance of it, an abiding dread of God's displeasure was impressed upon their minds, and the seductions of idolatry were opposed by an effectual barrier[1].

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[1] Graves, Vol. I. p. 328. Prideaux, Part I. Book 6.

CHAPTER VI.

ON THE JEWISH FESTIVALS.

1. The year was distinguished by the Jews into the *civil* and the *ecclesiastical* year. The civil year began with the month *Tisri,* about the middle of our September; there being an ancient tradition among them that the world was created at that time. All contracts were dated and the Jubilees computed according to this year. The ecclesiastical year began with the month *Nisan* or *Abib,* about the middle of our March; that being the time of the year when the Israelites came out of Egypt.

The beginnings of their months were not determined by astronomical rules, but by the *phasis* or actual appearance of the new moon; and their ordinary year consisted of twelve of these lunar months. But since the sum of them fell short of the solar year by eleven days, it was necessary to intercalate an additional month in the third year, or sometimes in the second, in order that their months, and consequently their festivals, might always fall *nearly* at the same season. It has not been ascertained with certainty what rule they had for determining *which* new moon should mark the beginning of the year; but, whatever the rule was, they could not make their festivals always fall *exactly* at the same season, according to their method of reckoning by lunar months.

The Jews had two sorts of weeks, the ordinary one of seven days, and another of seven years which occurs in the prophetic writings and is called a *week of years.*

Their days were also distinguished into *natural,* reckoned from one sun-set to another; and *artificial* or *civil,* reckoned from the rising to the setting of the sun. The civil day was divided into four parts, each of which consisted of three hours, and therefore, since one of these hours was a twelfth part of the time which the sun continued above the horizon, their hours in summer were longer than in winter. The night was also divided into four parts called *watches,* each consisting of three hours. The first began at sun-set and was called the *beginning of the watches* or the *evening;* the second was called the *middle watch* or *midnight;* the third the *cock-crowing;* the fourth the *morning watch.*

2. The Jewish *Sabbath* began at sun-set in the evening of Friday, and ended the next day at the same time. It was a festival instituted by God in memory of the creation of the world, and also as a day of rest for men and their cattle, that they might not be exhausted by uninterrupted labour. In the first view, it was calculated to prevent idolatry and the worshipping of creatures, by setting one day apart for the service of the one true God, the Creator of all things. As a day of rest, it was observed with the utmost strictness: they were forbidden to gather the manna which had fallen from heaven, to kindle a fire, and to sow or reap[a]. It was commanded that "no man should go out of his place on the sabbath-day[b];" that is, according to the interpretation given by the Jewish doctors, that no man should go above 2000 cubits (about two-thirds of a mile); which in Scripture is called a sabbath-day's journey. Many regulations were introduced for which there was no authority in the laws of Moses. They were taught that it was not lawful to

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[a] Exod. xvi. 22. xxxv. 3. xxxiv. 21. [b] Exod. xvi. 29.

fight, even in self-defence, on that day. For this notion they suffered severely in the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, and afterwards from Pompey, who taking advantage of their superstition carried forward his works against the city on the sabbath without opposition. Our Saviour taught us the true meaning of the Law of God concerning rest on the sabbath, when he said "The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath;" that is, it was intended for man's benefit, for his rest and religious improvement, and not as a yoke of bondage restraining him from works of necessity or mercy.

The law enjoined that the sabbath-day should be kept holy. It is not stated in what way, further than by cessation from labour, this should be done, except that a sacrifice of two lambs was to be offered on that day in addition to the morning and evening sacrifices. But reason alone taught men that God having reserved this one day for his service, it ought to be spent in religious exercises and meditation. That the command was understood in this sense by the Jews of every age, may be inferred from various parts of the Sacred History [c].

The *sabbatical year,* which was every seventh year, was first celebrated by the Jews in the fourteenth year after their entrance into Canaan; seven years having been spent in conquering and dividing the country, and six in the cultivation of it. They were commanded by Moses to sow their fields and prune their vineyards, and gather the fruit thereof for six years successively, and to let the land rest on the seventh [d]. During the sabbatical year there was a total cessation from agriculture, and the spontaneous products of the ground were enjoyed

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[c] 2 Kings iv. 23. Luke iv. 16. Acts xiii. 14. & xv. 21. Jennings' Jewish Antiquities, Book 3. ch. iii.

[d] Levit. xxv. 3, 4.

in common, by the proprietor of the ground, his servants, the stranger that was sojourning with him, and the cattle. This then being a year of leisure, Moses commanded the priests the sons of Levi and the elders of Israel, that in the solemnity of the *year of release* in the feast of tabernacles the Law should be read before all Israel in their hearing, that they might learn to fear the Lord their God, and observe to do all the words of his law[e]. The observance of this year further consisted in the remission of all debts from one Israelite to another; and, according to some writers, in the release of all Hebrew servants; but it is more probable that masters were obliged to release their servants at the end of the seventh year, whether it happened to be the sabbatical year or not; unless they renounced their liberty, and made a formal declaration before the judges that they voluntarily embraced a continuance of servitude. As there was little produce from the land during the sabbatical year, it was necessary to make provision for it in the six preceding years, and God was pleased to promise that he would command his blessing upon the land in the sixth year, and that it should bring forth fruit for three years[f]. But the Jews frequently violated the laws regarding this institution, which was one among their national sins that caused them to be led into captivity, that the land might enjoy the sabbaths of which it had been defrauded. After they had been thus punished for their disobedience, they became scrupulous in observing the law on this subject; but it does not appear that God renewed the extraordinary blessing which he first promised, and on that account the sabbatical year was always a year of scarcity. There-

[e] Deut. xxxi. 10.

[f] Levit. xxv. 21.

fore when Christ told his disciples, *Pray ye that your flight be not on the Sabbath,* some have supposed him to allude to the sabbatical year, when sustenance could not easily be procured, and thence the necessity of quitting their habitations would be attended with aggravated suffering.

The *jubilee* was celebrated every fiftieth year, and was similar to the sabbatical year in many of its observances. Debts were cancelled, and slaves and prisoners set at liberty. Even those mentioned above as having submitted to a continuance of servitude, were yet made free at the jubilee; for then liberty was to be proclaimed throughout all the land to all the inhabitants[g]. Lands which had been sold returned to their original proprietors, so that an estate could not be alienated for more than fifty years, and therefore no family could be sunk in perpetual poverty. From this law, however, houses in walled towns were excepted: these were to be redeemed within a year, otherwise they belonged to the purchaser and could never be reclaimed. The effect of the institution of the jubilee was favourable to the poor, since it prevented perpetual slavery, and tended to preserve an equality of possessions. Being also a year of rest from labour, since all cultivation of the ground was forbidden, its commencement was proclaimed with public tokens of joy, and hailed, by the poor at least, with great delight.

3. Of the other Jewish festivals some were of divine, and others of human institution. The most solemn of those that had been instituted by God were the *passover,* the *pentecost,* and the *feast of tabernacles;* each of which was to be celebrated every year at the place which the

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[g] Levit. xxv. 10.

Lord should choose, that is, at Jerusalem after the sanctuary had been fixed there; and all the Israelites were obliged to attend, unless they had good reason for being absent. Women were exempt from this obligation, and also, it may be presumed, children and old men; but Scripture is silent with regard to any fixed limitation of age.

Passover. The *passover* derived its name from God's *passing over* the houses of the Israelites, and sparing their first-born, when those of the Egyptians were put to death. The name of *passover* was given to the *lamb* slain in memory of that deliverance; and sometimes to the *feast-day* on which the paschal lamb was slain, or lastly, to the *entire continuance of the festival,* which commenced with the slaying of the lamb and continued for seven days. On the fourteenth day of the month Nisan, in the evening, the festival began with killing the lamb, which was to be a male of the first year, and without blemish. If one family was not large enough to eat the whole lamb, two or more were united. The victims were slain by persons belonging to these several families, and the blood was poured by the priests at the bottom of the altar. The fat was consumed on the altar, after which the lamb was returned to the person by whom it had been offered. It was to be roasted whole, without a bone being broken, and was to be eaten with unleavened bread and bitter herbs. None of it was to remain till the morning: if it were not all eaten, that which remained was consumed with fire. Those who were prevented by illness or by any legal pollution from celebrating the passover on the day appointed, were commanded to do it on the fourteenth day of the next month[h]. During the whole continuance of this festival it was not lawful to eat any

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[h] Numb. ix. 11.

leavened bread, nor even to have it in their houses; and on that account it is sometimes called in Scripture the feast of unleavened bread. In general the fifteenth day of the month (but in one or two places the fourteenth, in the evening of which the paschal lamb was killed) is called the first day of the feast[i]. On the sixteenth was offered the sheaf of the first-fruits of the barley-harvest, which in Judæa was usually ripe at that season. This was done in acknowledgement of the goodness of God "who gives rain, both the former and latter rain, in its season, and reserves to men the appointed weeks of harvest[k]." On all the days of the festival peculiar sacrifices were offered in behalf of all the people: but the first and last days (the fifteenth and twenty-first) were solemnized above the rest by abstaining from servile work, and by holding a holy convocation. That the passover had a typical reference to our Saviour is intimated both by St. John and St. Paul[l]. Christ is our passover: his blood was shed to protect mankind from the divine justice, like as that of the paschal lamb, sprinkled on the door-posts of the Israelites, saved their first-born, while those of the Egyptians were destroyed.

Feast of Pentecost. The feast of *pentecost* (πεντηκοστή) was so called because it was kept on the *fiftieth* day after the feast of unleavened bread, that is, after the fifteenth of the month Nisan. It was sometimes called the *feast of weeks,* because it was celebrated seven weeks after the passover; and also the *feast of harvest* or *of the first-fruits,* because on it the first-fruits of the wheat-harvest, viz. two loaves of leavened bread made of the new corn, were offered as a token of thankfulness to God for the

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[i] Numb. xxviii. 17. Matt. xxvi. 17. Mark xiv. 12.

[k] Jerem. v. 24.

[l] John xix. 36. 1 Cor. v. 7.

bounties of harvest[m]. This offering was accompanied with a number of animal sacrifices and with several other offerings and libations. The festival continued but one day, and was kept with great rejoicing. The chief design which Moses had in the institution of it seems to have been that they might acknowledge the goodness of God in giving the fruits of the earth; but it was celebrated by the Jews with a further view, viz. in commemoration of the Law having been given from mount Sinai on that day. And in either view it appears to have had a typical reference to the first-fruits of the Holy Spirit, which descended upon the Apostles on the day of Pentecost, and enabled them to be effectual ministers of the new law of the gospel, which its divine Author had recently given for the salvation of the world[n].

Feast of Tabernacles. The feast of *tabernacles* began on the fifteenth of the month Tisri and lasted seven days. It was instituted for a memorial of the Israelites having dwelt in *tents* or *tabernacles* while they were wandering in the desert. The design of it was also to return thanks to God for the fruits of the trees, especially of the vine, which were gathered about this time, and to beg a blessing on those of the ensuing year. On this account it was called the feast of in-gathering; and an eighth day was added, to which their rejoicings for the fruit-harvest appear to have been chiefly appropriated. It is probable indeed that the feast of tabernacles was wholly distinct from the feast of in-gathering, but as they were kept in a continued succession of days, they are mentioned as one festival, and the name of either of them is applied indifferently to both[o]. The principal ceremonies observed

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[m] Exod. xxiii. 16. Lev. xxiii. 15—21. Numb. xxviii. 26—31.
[n] Acts. ii. [o] Jennings' Antiquities, Book III. Chap. vi.

were the following: (1) during the festival they dwelt in tents, which were placed on the flat roofs of their houses; (2) numerous sacrifices were offered peculiar to each day of the festival; (3) they carried in their hands branches of palm-trees, olives, myrtles, and willows, and with these they walked in procession round the altar, singing some words of an appropriate hymn, in which they prayed for the coming of the Messiah[p]; (4) a remarkable libation (not commanded in the law of Moses but introduced at some later period) was offered every day of the feast, at the time of the morning sacrifice. Water drawn from the pool of Siloam, was mixed with wine and poured upon the sacrifice as it lay on the altar, the people singing in the mean time these words of Isaiah, *with joy shall ye draw water out of the wells of salvation*[q]. Our Saviour is supposed to allude to this ceremony, when on the last day, the great day of the feast of tabernacles, he stood and cried saying, *If any man thirst let him come unto me and drink*[r].

No festival was attended with greater rejoicings than this: and as it happened to take place at the time of vintage, some ancient authors were led to believe that it was celebrated in honour of Bacchus[s].

Fast of Expiation.

4. The *fast of expiation* or day of atonement began in the evening of the ninth day of the month Tisri and lasted till the evening of the tenth. It differed from the festivals above-mentioned, in that they were days of joy and thanksgiving, but this was a day of fasting, humiliation, and confession of sins; and it was the only one, of that kind, of divine appointment. It was to be kept with all the religious regard of a sabbath, and

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[p] Psal. cxviii. 25. [q] Isai. xii. 3. [r] John vii. 37.
[s] Plutarch. Sympos. Lib. IV. quæst. 5. Tacit. Hist. Lib. V. c. 5.

with the offering of sacrifices, first for the high priest and his family, and then for the people. Of the numerous victims offered on this day the most remarkable were the two goats which the high priest was to receive from the congregation, and to present before the Lord at the door of the tabernacle; casting lots which of the two should be sacrificed as a sin-offering, and which should be sent as a *scape-goat* into the wilderness. The service of this day was chiefly performed by the high-priest; it being his duty to kill and offer the sacrifices, and sprinkle their blood with his own hands. This was the only day in the year in which he was permitted to enter into the Holy of Holies; and therefore he was obliged to prepare himself for that great solemnity several days beforehand with particular care. On the day of the fast, he first entered with a large quantity of incense, that the smoke of it might fill the place so as to cover the mercy-seat from sight: he then came out and dipped his fingers in the blood of the bullock which he had offered for himself, and went and sprinkled it towards the mercy-seat seven times. This done, he killed the goat as a sin-offering for the people, and went and sprinkled the mercy-seat with the blood of it as he had done with that of the bullock, and by these aspersions the tabernacle was purified from the pollution of the people's sins and transgressions. Next, the scape-goat was brought to him, and having confessed his own sins and those of the whole nation, and laid them as it were upon its head, he sent it into the wilderness[t].

The whole of this ceremony had a typical reference to the atonement made for the sins of the world by Jesus Christ. The expiatory sacrifices were typical of the true expiation made by Him; and the high priest's confessing

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[t] Levit. xvi.

the sins of the people and laying them upon the head of the scape-goat was figurative of the imputation of sin to Christ, "who was made sin for us" and "on whom is laid the iniquity of us all[u]." The entering of the high priest into the Holy of Holies with the blood of the sacrifice, is interpreted by St. Paul to be typical of Christ's ascension to heaven, and of his intercession for mankind in virtue of the sacrifice of his death[x].

Moses appointed other festivals, which were observed with less solemnity than the preceding; and it was not required that all the Israelites should be assembled to celebrate them at the place of the sanctuary. The *new moons,* that is, the first days of the several months, were regarded as holy, yet so that work on them was not forbidden. The celebration of them consisted in certain additional sacrifices and offerings[y]. But one particular new moon was distinguished from the rest and ordered to be kept as a sabbath, by the intermission of all manner of work. This was the new moon of Tisri, the first month of the civil year. It was called the *feast of trumpets;* for besides sounding the trumpets over the sacrifices as on other new moons and festivals, this was to be "a day of blowing the trumpets," that is, as the ancient Jewish writers understand it, they were to be blown from morning to evening, or at least more on this day than on any other[z]. The reason of this festival is no where given in Scripture. Some have conjectured that it was to commemorate the creation of the world, which was supposed to have taken place at this season; others, that it was to render the beginning of the civil year more

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[u] 2 Cor. v. 21. Isai. liii. 6. [x] Heb. ix.

[y] Numb. xxviii. 11. [z] Levit. xxiii. 23. Numb. xxix. 1.

observable, since by it were regulated all their contracts as well as their sabbatic years and jubilees[a].

3. Besides the festivals instituted by Moses, many were introduced by the Jews in later times. The following chiefly deserve notice: (1) the *feast of lots,* called in Hebrew *Purim,* celebrated on the fourteenth and fifteenth of the month Adar* in commemoration of the deliverance of the Jews from the cruel designs of Haman[b], who had procured an edict from the king of Persia to destroy them; and had inquired by *lot* what time would be fittest for carrying his designs into effect[c]. (2) The *feast of dedication,* instituted by Judas Maccabeus as a grateful memorial of the purifying of the temple and altar, after they had been profaned by Antiochus Epiphanes. It continued eight days, beginning on the twenty-fifth of the month Chisleu,* and was spent in singing hymns, offering sacrifices, and in all kinds of rejoicing. (3) The *fasts* of the fourth, fifth, seventh, and tenth months, kept respectively in memory of the taking of Jerusalem by the Babylonians; of their burning the temple and city; of the murder of Gedaliah, who had been appointed ruler over those Jews that remained in the country when the rest were carried captive to Babylon, and had gained their esteem by his benevolent government; of the commencement of the siege of Jerusalem, which was begun by Nebuchadnezzar on the tenth day of the tenth month[d].

Benevolent design of the festivals.

The celebration of the *passover* and of the *feast of tabernacles* continued several days; but

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* *Adar* corresponds to part of our February and March; *Chisleu* to part of November and December.

[a] Univ. Hist. Vol. I. p. 609.
[b] About 500 years B. C.
[c] Esth. vii.
[d] 2 Kings xxv.

the law did not command that all of them should be observed with equal strictness. The first and last were sabbaths on which there was to be no work; yet the prohibition, even with regard to them, was less rigorous than with regard to the weekly sabbath. On the intermediate days labour was not prohibited, and it is thought by some writers that the great yearly fairs of the nation were held on these days, when there was so great an assemblage of people from all parts of the country [e]. There can be no doubt that they were celebrated with mirth and festivity. In a former chapter it was stated that a second tithe and the first-fruits were to be appropriated for offerings, and since these could only be made at the sanctuary, the Israelites were obliged to go thither and set on foot offering-feasts, in order to consume the tithe and first-fruits. In this way the festivals were days of pleasure; and entertainments were given or received, in the joys of which the poor and the slaves were entitled to participate. The benevolent design of these festivals is apparent, and their influence on the community was in many respects most salutary. By means of them the people of the different tribes became more closely connected; they learnt to regard each other as fellow-citizens, and were less likely to be separated into a number of small States. As each tribe was regulated by its own laws and had its own peculiar interests, there was danger lest jealousies should arise, which in process of time might completely alienate them from one another. The yearly festivals were calculated to have a great effect, for the prevention of this calamity. While the tribes frequently assembled for the purposes of religious worship and social enjoyment, they became more intimately acquainted with each other; intermar-

[e] Mich. Art. 197.

riages took place, whereby the interests of families belonging to different tribes became intermixed, and thus the twelve petty States were united into one powerful people. Jeroboam was well aware of this, when he was appointed king of the ten tribes which had separated from the tribe of Judah. Sensible that the separation could not be permanent if the people continued to pay their annual visits to Jerusalem, he issued a prohibition of them, and, contrary to the law of Moses, appointed two places for divine service within his own territories.

It may be further remarked of these festivals, and particularly of the sabbatical year and the jubilee, that in the very institution of them is implied a strong argument of their divine origin[f]. When all the Israelites were assembled, as they were three times every year, in Jerusalem, what defence was left in the country against foreign invasion? And when cultivation of the ground was forbidden every seventh year, whence were the people in that year to procure subsistence? God had promised "that no man should desire their land when they should go up to appear before the Lord their God thrice in the year[g];" and it is remarkable that no such evil ever befel them on these occasions: he had also promised with regard to their subsistence that "he would command his blessing upon them in the sixth year, and that the land should bring forth fruit for three years[h]." But no legislator would have ventured to propose such institutions, except in consequence of the fullest conviction, on the part both of himself and the people, that God had really so promised, and that they were under the protection of his peculiar providence.

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[f] Graves, Vol. I. p. 170. [g] Exod. xxxiv. 24. [h] Lev. xxv. 21.

CHAPTER VII.

ON THE PLACES ACCOUNTED HOLY BY THE JEWS.

From the earliest ages of the world, particular places have been appropriated to the exercise of religious worship. In ancient times it was usual to seek for that purpose the retirement of groves and mountains. Thus it is said of Abraham, when he dwelt at Beer-sheba, that he planted a *grove* there, and called upon the name of the everlasting God[a]. And it was upon one of the *mountains* in the land of Moriah, that God ordered him to offer in sacrifice his son Isaac. But when the worship of false gods had become prevalent among men, the solitude of such places was found to be favourable for the practice of dreadful crimes and impurities, with which idolatry has been ever associated. And the strong tendency which the Israelites had to adopt the idolatrous customs of heathen nations is amply testified in the sacred history. It is recorded of them that they set up images and groves in every high hill and under every green tree, and there burnt incense in all the high places, and wrought wickedness to provoke the Lord, as did the heathen[b]. It was with the view therefore of preserving them from idolatry that they were prohibited from offer-

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a Gen. xxi. 33.

b 2 Kings xvii. 11.

ing worship in groves or in high places, and were commanded to make sacrifices and oblations *in that place only which God should choose.*

1. In the first year after the departure from Egypt, Moses received orders respecting the construction of the *tabernacle.* It was built in the form of an oblong, thirty cubits in length, and ten in height and breadth*. The interior of it was divided by a veil into two parts, one of which was called the *Sanctuary* or *Holy Place,* and the other the *Holy of Holies.* The sanctuary contained the table of shew-bread, the golden candlestick, and the altar of incense. The Holy of Holies contained the *ark of the covenant.* This ark was a small chest, in which were placed the two tables of stone, having the ten commandments engraven upon them by the finger of God. In the time of Solomon it contained nothing besides, but St. Paul seems to speak of it as containing also the golden pot that had manna and Aaron's rod that budded: probably the contents of it were not always the same; or his expression may be interpreted to signify that those articles were *near,* not *within* the ark[c]. The lid of the ark was called the *Mercy-Seat,* at the extremities of which were two cherubim with their faces looking towards each other, and their wings expanded. It was between them that the cloud used to appear, which was a visible token of the *shechinah* or divine presence; and hence God is frequently represented in Scripture as dwelling between the cherubim[d].

A court of one hundred cubits in length and fifty in breadth surrounded the tabernacle. In this court

* A cubit was nearly equal to twenty-two inches.

[c] Exod. xvi. 33. Numb. xvii. 10. 1 Kings viii. 9. Heb. ix. 4.

[d] Psal. lxxx. 1. xcix. 1.

stood the altar for burnt-offerings, and the brazen laver in which the priests washed their hands and feet whenever they were about to offer sacrifice or to enter the tabernacle. When Aaron presented his first burnt-sacrifice for himself and the people, the fire was kindled from heaven in token of acceptance, and God commanded that it should be kept continually burning on the altar, without ever going out[e].

The tabernacle was carried about by the Israelites in all their marches until they arrived at the land of Canaan. It was then fixed first at Gilgal, where it remained seven years, and afterwards in Shiloh. In the reign of David and at the beginning of Solomon's reign, it was at Gibeon in the tribe of Benjamin; after which time the Scriptures are silent respecting it. The ark of the covenant had been separated from it at the time when Eli was judge, and was probably never replaced in it. Having been brought from the tabernacle into the camp, it was taken by the Philistines, and was afterwards removed from place to place till David prepared a tent for it at Jerusalem. Lastly, it was placed in the temple of Solomon and was probably consumed along with it, when Jerusalem was destroyed by Nebuchadnezzar[f].

2. The *temple* was built by Solomon on Moriah, a part of mount Sion, which was the general name of a range of hills near Jerusalem. The plan of it was formed after that of the tabernacle, but it was of much larger dimensions. The temple itself, strictly so called, formed only a small part of the sacred building, for it was surrounded with spacious courts, making a square of half a mile in circumference. The first court, which encompassed the temple and the other courts, was called the

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[e] Lev. vi. 13. [f] Horne's Introduction, Part III. Chap. i.

Court of the Gentiles, because the Gentiles were allowed to come into it, but were prohibited from advancing further. It was surrounded with porticoes or cloisters; the eastern side of which was called *Solomon's Porch,* because it stood upon a vast terrace which Solomon built up from the valley beneath, in order to enlarge the area on the top of the mount, and make it equal to his intended building. Within the court of the Gentiles on higher ground was the *court of the women,* so called because women were not allowed to proceed beyond it. From this there was an ascent to the inner or men's court, within which again was the court of the priests, separated from the former by a low wall, one cubit in height. This wall inclosed the altar for burnt-offerings, and to it the people brought their oblations and sacrifices, but the priests alone were allowed to enter the inclosure. From the court of the priests they ascended by twelve steps to the temple properly so called. This consisted of a *portico,* the *sanctuary,* and the *Holy of Holies.* The portico was adorned with several valuable offerings made by kings and princes, and with spoils and trophies taken in war. The sanctuary and Holy of Holies in the temple were furnished in the same manner as in the tabernacle. They were separated one from the other by a double veil, which is supposed to have been the veil that was rent during our Saviour's crucifixion. Into the Holy of Holies no person was ever admitted except the high priest, who entered it once a year on the great day of atonement.

This temple, built by Solomon, retained its original magnificence only for a short period. During the reign of Rehoboam, Shishak king of Egypt carried away its treasures, and it was finally plundered and burnt by the king of Babylon. The second temple, built under the

direction of Zerubbabel, was greatly inferior to the first, as appears from the questions put by the prophet Haggai: "Who is left among you, that saw this house in its first glory? and how do you see it now? is it not in your eyes, in comparison of it, as nothing[g]?" It is said to have wanted five remarkable things which were the chief glory of the first temple, viz. the ark of the covenant, the shechinah, the holy fire on the altar which had been kindled from heaven, the urim and thummim*, and the spirit of prophecy. In the eighteenth year of his reign, Herod the Great undertook to repair this second temple or rather gradually to rebuild it, and vast labour was expended in adding to its magnitude and splendour. Josephus says, that he finished it in nine years, which must be understood of the main body of the building; for, long after Herod's death, the Jews continued to enlarge and adorn it, and the workmen were not dismissed till the time of Agrippa the younger, Herod's grandson, about sixty years after the birth of Christ. The Jews therefore might say to our Saviour with perfect truth that the temple was forty and six years in building, exactly so many having elapsed since Herod commenced the work. Tacitus says that it was a temple of immense opulence, and Josephus represents it as the most astonishing structure he had ever seen or heard of, as well on account of its architecture as its magnitude and likewise the richness of its various parts and the reputation of its

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[g] Haggai ii. 3.

* These were contained in the breast-plate of the high priest, but no explanation respecting them is given in Scripture. The opinion most generally received is, that they were twelve precious stones on which were engraven the names of the twelve tribes of Israel, and that the oracle was delivered by causing such letters as formed the answer to shine with a superior lustre, or to appear prominent above the rest. See Jennings, Book I. Chap. v. Graves, vol. I. p. 318.

sanctity[h]. When the disciples of our Lord shewed him the grandeur of its buildings, he warned them of its approaching downfall, and not many years passed away before the foundations of it were ploughed up by the Roman soldiers.

3. Jerusalem is frequently called in the Scriptures the *holy city,* as being hallowed in a peculiar manner by the presence of God in the temple. It was formerly called Jebus from one of the sons of Canaan[i], and some authors suppose, without any certain authority, that it was the ancient Salem, of which Melchizedek was king. After it had been taken by Joshua, it was inhabited both by Jews and Jebusites till the time of David; who, having driven the Jebusites out of it, greatly enlarged it, and built a palace there, in which he fixed his residence. On this account it is sometimes called the *city of David.* It was divided into the *upper* and the *lower* city: the *upper* (according to the general opinion) being towards the south on mount Sion, the *lower* to the North on the hill Acra. Eastward from Acra was the site of the temple; at one corner of which stood Fort Antonia, which overlooked the courts of the temple, and communicated with them by passages, so that the Roman garrison could readily descend to quell any tumult which might arise during the festivals. The circumference of the city in the time of Josephus was thirty-three stadia, or nearly four miles and a half; and Hecatæus, who wrote about three centuries earlier, says, that the number of its inhabitants in his time was 120,000[k].

The mount of Olives, from which Christ ascended to heaven, was on the east side of Jerusalem, fronting the

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[h] Tacit. Hist. Lib. V. c. viii. Jos. de Bell. Jud. Lib. VI. c. iv.

[i] 1 Chron. xi. 4.

[k] Jos. contr. Ap.

temple, and was about a mile distant from it. The village Gethsemane was at the bottom of the mount; and on the further side were Bethphage and Bethany. Between the mount of Olives and Jerusalem there was a valley, through which ran the brook Kedron. Mount Calvary or Golgotha, the scene of our Saviour's crucifixion, was on the western side of the city at a short distance beyond the walls; to which the Apostle alludes when he says that "Jesus also suffered *without the gate.*"

4. All Judæa was accounted holy, as being the inheritance of God's chosen people, and specially appointed for the performance of his worship. In modern times also, it has obtained the name of the Holy Land, on account of its having been the abode of the holy Patriarchs, Prophets, and Apostles, and consecrated above all by the presence and sufferings of Jesus Christ. Anciently it was called the *land of Canaan*, from Canaan, the youngest son of Ham, who settled here after the dispersion from Babel, and divided the country among his eleven children: and *Palestine* from the Philistines, who, having migrated from Egypt, settled on the borders of the Mediterranean and gave their name to the whole country, though they never possessed more than a small part of it. In Scripture it is frequently distinguished by other names, such as the *Land of Promise,* the *Land of God,* the *Land of Israel.*

It is impossible to give, within the necessary limits of this work, any satisfactory description of the boundaries and provinces of Judæa, or of its numerous cities, and many circumstances pertaining to it which are worthy of notice: the few remarks therefore which follow, will relate merely to its general aspect and the productiveness of its soil.

It is described by Moses as "a good land, a land of

brooks of water, of fountains and depths, that spring out of valleys and hills; a land of wheat and barley, and vines, and fig-trees, and pomegranates, a land of oil-olive, and honey[l]." It even exceeded the land of Egypt, so much celebrated for its fertility by ancient writers; especially in the number of cattle which it produced, and in the quantity and excellence of its wine, oil, and fruits. Those parts of it which in Scripture are called *deserts* or *wildernesses* were not desolate, as the words appear to imply: many of them, though unfit for tillage, were inhabited, and afforded pasturage for cattle. Some districts are mountainous and rocky, but the industry of the Jews, whose attention was occupied chiefly with agriculture, made the most barren places yield some kind of produce. The very rocks which now appear quite bare and naked, were made fruitful, being covered by the ancient proprietors with earth, which has been since washed away; and there were few spots in the whole land that were not improved, to the production of something or other ministering to the support of human life[m]. Besides therefore supporting its own great population, it was able to supply other countries with large quantities of corn and fruits[n]. Such is the description of the ancient fruitfulness of Judæa, given in the Scriptures, and also by many profane writers[o]. Nor, even in its present decayed and neglected state, are indications wanting of its natural richness and fertility, sufficient to show that want of cultivation is the chief if not the only cause of the comparative poverty in which it is now seen. This poverty is not owing

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[l] Deut. viii. 7, 8.

[m] Maundrell, p. 65.

[n] 1 Sam. xxiv. 1 Kings v. 11. Acts xii. 20.

[o] Hecat. apud. Joseph. contr. Ap. Tacit. Hist. Lib. V. c. vi. Plin. Lib. V. c. xiv, xv.

to the unfruitfulness of the soil, but to the want of inhabitants, and the aversion to industry in those few who possess it. Otherwise, were it as well peopled and cultivated as in former times, it would still be capable of supplying its neighbours with corn and other products, as it did in the time of Solomon[p]. Its present state, so far from affording ground for calling in question the accounts of its fertility given in the sacred writings, confirms their authority; for all these evils were predicted and denounced against the Israelites, if they should forsake the covenant which God made with their fathers when he brought them out of Egypt[q]. And the exact accomplishment of these prophecies verifies the declaration of the Psalmist, *that God turneth a fruitful field into barrenness, for the wickedness of them that dwell therein*[r]. "The Lord rooted them out of their land in anger and in wrath, and in great indignation, and cast them into another land, as it is this day. *The secret things belong unto the Lord our God: but those things which are revealed belong unto us and to our children for ever, that we may do all the words of his law*[s]."

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[p] Shaw's Travels, p. 336. quarto.
[q] Levit. xxvi. 32.
[r] Psal. cvii. 34,
[s] Deut. xxix. 28, 29.

On the subjects of this and the preceding chapters, see Beausobre's Introduction to the New Testament, and Reland's Antiquitates Hebræorum.

A NEW ART

TEACHING HOW TO BE PLUCKED,

BEING

A TREATISE

AFTER THE

FASHION OF ARISTOTLE;

WRIT FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS IN THE UNIVERSITIES.

TO WHICH IS ADDED,
A SYNOPSIS OF DRINKING.

Ridiculum acri
Fortius ac melius magnas plerumque secat res. HOR. SAT.

Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος ἀγαθοῦ
τινος ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ. ARIST. ETH. Lib. 1.

Thus have I described and opened those peccant humours which have given impediment to the proficience of learning, wherein if I have been too plain, it must be remembered "Fidelia vulnera amantis, sed dolosa oscula malignantis."
BACON'S ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

BY

SCRIBLERUS REDIVIVUS.

THIRD EDITION.

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ADVERTISEMENT TO THE THIRD EDITION.

Whereas in my former Prefaces I addressed the students of Oxford, so here I desire further the Students of Cambridge to understand, that this book may be turned to their own account also, if they will be pleased to consider not so much the form of it as the matter. Thus as in other studies there hath ever been a generous rivalry between Cambridge and Oxford, so let it be hoped that in pursuit of Plucks also, these two Universities shall each by aid of this book, mutually strive to supersede the other, that there be no disparity left betwixt them.

PREFACE.

This Preface divideth itself into three parts; whereof first, the usefulness of the art;* second, the history of it; third, the derivation of the word. To begin then with each in its own order. First, for the usefulness of the art, which indeed wanteth no proof for persons unprejudiced, but whereas the generality is not of this sort, I think best to say thus much upon it. For it is a thing not to be denied, that every art is good in proportion as it assisteth in producing some end, whereat mankind do aim in common. Now of this kind is the Art of Pluck; for upon looking about this University, who doth not see that to be plucked is an end pursued by many persons, yea and these persons, such as from their age cannot be said not to have judgments. To these then and the like, this art teacheth an easy way to this their end, by a collection of subtle rules long practised at random, but till now never brought down to the axioms of true philosophy. Whereat let people wonder if they please, yet was the same the case with all arts at the beginning, as hath been acutely said of Logic by a learned man yet albeit not wise. Let so much have been said about the usefulness of this art, which indeed deserveth rather the name of a science, inasmuch as it not only serveth for an instrument, but likewise discusseth, as will be seen, the principles of Pluck. Nevertheless as it is still in its infant condition, content we with the term art, and so to proceed with what cometh next in order.

Now it may seem strange to the learned, that whereas I have said the Art of Pluck is new, I come next to a history of it.†

* Vide Aristot. Rhet. lib. i. cap. 1.
† Vide Whately's Introduction to the Art of Logic.

For history is of things past, and therefore old for the most part. Yet though the art be new, true it is, the thing itself hath existed a long while, yea, even from the days of Cheops, who was the first to found a college. Niebuhr * indeed hath it, that the custom of Pluck was brought to this college twenty-five years after the death of Cheops, in the Egyptian month Pilko by an Ethiopian priest surnamed Hushmug; against which disputeth Müller in four volumes, that the name was not Hushmug but Hugmush. Yet after all this disputation, still do I keep to my old opinion, for if Cheops builded a college, needs must he have founded Plucks at the same time; since in our own days no college existeth a year without a Pluck; whence it followeth that a college without Plucks is no real college. Yet was the college of Cheops a real college, and therefore needs must it have had Plucks. But to proceed with the history. It seemeth, that after the days of Cheops, Plucks spread abroad exceedingly, till they reached even to the Pelasgi, by which people were they carried into Greece. For that the descent of the Pelasgi was about this time, Herodotus doth amply testify, nor is it to be doubted that they brought wisdom into Greece and therefore Plucks. Yet at this time were Plucks of but a simple kind, without distinction of Little-go and Great-go, which waited for the wisdom of later ages. But as science grew and books were writ, so did Plucks increase in the gradual progression of things. For it is a truth not yet noted by philosophy, that as the circle of knowledge extendeth, so also extendeth the circle of not knowing, whereby was Euclid of great use to Plucks even in that age. Thus may it be said that Plucks went on hand in hand with wisdom in all Greece but most in Athens, where was most wisdom, till at the last after the conquest of Corinth, they were carried to Rome there to flourish till the dark ages. Yet was Athens not deprived of Plucks by this conquest, for being the University of the world, thither did flock all such as loved wisdom; yea of Ci-

* Vide the Frankfort edition, which was published in 1829.

cero himself it is said, that he was plucked twice by reason that he could not pass the asses bridge. As for the dark ages, Plucks had been lost to the world in those times, but for the monasteries, wherein were they preserved, together with other wise institutions, till these modern times, in the which by slow degrees our Universities have brought them to perfection. For now beside the new distinction of Little-go and Great-go, a man may be plucked for different kinds of ignorance, each of which possesseth its own discriminations, to be detailed hereafter.

For the derivation of the word Pluck, to which I now proceed, it hath ever been a matter of great dubiousness. One person of no small wisdom saith, that a man is said to be plucked by contraries, that is to say, because at such a time he loseth all Pluck. The which argument I would allow to be true, but that the premiss is false. For many there be, who by being plucked, grow yet more plucky, as was the case with Sir Giles C * * * * * * of ******, which gentleman, after being plucked, gave a party the same evening, declaring that he minded it not at all, yea rather gloried therein. So falleth this first argument to the ground, to which followeth this other. For indeed it was an ancient custom in Oxford, whereof there be still remains, that when a man was turned in his examination, a person should pluck the Proctor's gown, whereby as he proceeded to give him a degree he was stopped in the midst. Hence, as the antiquarians do say, it came to pass that the man so losing his degree, was said to be plucked. Yet in this argument also is there no small flaw, which the love of truth compelleth me to make plain, after the example of Aristotle, albeit against my inclination. For verily it is the man who is said to be plucked nowadays, not the Proctor, the which thing differeth not a little. Many other arguments there be on this matter, but I proceed to my own opinion, as being what seemeth to me the best. For first, what meaneth Pluck? Doth it not signify to lose one's feathers? the which is suffered metaphorically by every man turned in his examination. To me then it seemeth that a man is said to be plucked from ana-

logy to a bird; but what that bird be, whether big or little, land or water bird, I pretend not to say. The like analogy as a further proof is to be noted betwixt a man and a bird, not only at his Pluck, but also before and after; for he is said to be crammed first, and to have been well roasted by the examiner afterward.

And now to conclude this Preface with one thing more in praise of this Art of Pluck; let it be known that it shareth with Analytics and Rhetoric alone of all arts, in being an art of contraries. For as it teacheth a person how best to be plucked, so also by the addition of *not* to each rule, it teacheth a person how not to be plucked, if there be any such. But on this and the rest enough hath been said for Preface, so proceed we to the art with all attention.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

Learned reader, Aristotle saith that "time is a fellow-worker with philosophers in producing the perfection of science," the which thing is to be observed not a little in mine own case. For it being six days since this Art was first published to the world, in that time have many new lights appeared to me concerning it. For being at present concealed, I do hear myself praised and blamed daily before my face. Nay mine own friends at such times as they have nothing else to talk about, tell me their opinion of this new Art, giving likewise the name of the author, with no small assurance. In this second Preface, I would have thee understand that I put into thy hands the same Art indeed as before, but with certain additions, especially from the examinations just finished. These additions, if thou art really and truly studious in ignorance and idleness, thou wilt find out of thyself in the reading of this book; of which let me say to its praise, that there hath been no other book published in Oxford in the reading whereof thou mightest more easily go to sleep, and so be idle, and get plucked accordingly. Which last, wishing thee as many times over as thou desirest, I remain thy friend and fellow gownsman,

SCRIBLERUS REDIVIVUS.

Nov. 13, 1835.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

A Division of the Treatise.

Let the Art * of Pluck be that art which teacheth how most thoroughly to be plucked, the easiest way, in the shortest time, under a case the most difficult.† For truly, it is an easy task to be plucked, for one ignorant altogether of things; but the fine thing is, for one who cometh from school well laden with knowledge, so to demean himself as to come to be plucked in the end, and that in a short time, not for one ignorance only, as of Euclid, but for many, the which thing teacheth this art.

Now of "Plucks" there be in this age two kinds, firstly the Pluck in Little-go, secondly the Pluck in Great-go. But as Aristotle in his Poetics hath thought fit to discuss chiefly Tragedy, by reason that it embraceth within itself all questions pertaining to the other sorts of poesy, so let us also in this art of Pluck discuss the Great-go Pluck for the most part, bringing in at the end such dis-

* Vide Rhet. lib. i. cap. 2.

† Let it not be understood from this, that this art concerneth theory only, and not practice, for as Aristotle saith in his Poetics, *τὸ τέλος πρᾶξίς τίς ἐστιν*; and again in his Ethics, lib. ii. cap. 2. *οὐ γὰρ ἵν' εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ, σκεπτόμεθα· ἀλλ' ἵν' ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα.* Subject of the Essay, Mich. Term.

tinctions between the two as shall seem fit. For indeed doth not Great-go, besides what it hath of its own, include all the appurtenances of Little-go, such are Euclid, Logic, Horace, Virgil, and all else?

This thing then being settled, it remaineth to discuss the Great-go Pluck, which discussion divideth itself into two parts as followeth. For a man is plucked firstly, by the preparation of ignorance he maketh thereto before his Examination; secondly, by the way he carrieth himself at his Examination. Now these two things are different and beside them there is nothing else. Let then be discussed in the first place the preparation of ignorance before Examination.

CHAP. II.

A still further Division.

But this preparation likewise divideth itself into two kinds, whereof one is a preparation direct, the other a preparation indirect. The first meaneth such methods of Construing, of Parsing, of Logic, of Euclid, of Divinity, and the rest, as be most fit to gain a full Pluck; the second meaneth all kinds of Idleness, whereby the mind is put into the best channel of ignorance for the same.

CHAP. III.

Concerning Construing.

To begin then with the preparation direct, whereof first, cometh Construing. Now construing

is divided into two kinds, first, to construe Latin; second, to construe Greek, of which each taketh three subdivisions; first, to construe well; second, to construe right; third, to construe wrong. But of these three the last alone serveth to Pluck, being verily an easy thing to do simply, as for example sake, to construe *amo*, "thou lovest." Yet in a complexity of words where there be many ways of construing wrong, yea truly a difficult thing it is to construe the wrongest way, the which thing he who doth best hath best likelihood of gaining a full Pluck. Whereof let the following be examples for imitation.

As first, since *vices* meaneth shiftings and changings, to construe *mutat terra vices*, "the earth changeth her shift." So from the same author, *horridus aper*, "a horrid bore." And whereas Livy hath the following sentence, *Hannibal Alpes transivit summa diligentia*, which meaneth, "Hannibal passed over the Alps as fast as he could," so let him who desireth a Pluck, departing from this method construe it thus, "Hannibal passed over the Alps on the top of a dilligence." So much for Latin. Then for Greek as followeth, *πολλὴ αἰδὼς δωματοφθορεῖν*, Æsch. Aga. 921. "It is a great shame to squander ones goods." *ὤμοι πέπληγμαι*. id. 1314. "Oh dear! I'm blowed." *δαιμόνιος φόβος*. id. "A deuced fright." *αιτήσοντες γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ*. "To ask for gin and water." *ἔρχεται γυνὴ ἐκ τῆς Σαμαρειάς*. John cap. 4. "I

perceive that thou art a prophet." δηναιαὶ κόραι. Prom. 819. "Old maids." So also from Aristotle's Poetics, δεδίδαχε δὲ μάλιστα Ὅμηρος ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ. "Now Homer hath taught better than all others how to tell lies in the right style." From which examples is seen how first, simple words which cannot be construed wrong, so far as grammar concerneth, may yet be turned to a wrong meaning by fit attention; how secondly, a complex sentence so turned to a wrong meaning, may yet be further improved in wrongness by bad grammar: as happened with Mr. Thomas T*** of *****, who when he had construed *Hannibal Alpes transivit summa diligentia*, "Hannibal passed over the Alps on the top of a dilligence," was straightway reproved by the examiner as having construed wrong, whereon he yet improved the wrongness by bad grammar, construing thus; "the Alps passed over Hannibal on the top of a dilligence:" and again, "a dilligence passed over Hannibal on the top of the Alps." So much for good construing, which requireth further that in place of originals thou read translations, especially such as be of a free kind.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning Parsing.

As for Parsing, which cometh next in order, it requireth but little to say upon it. Only let each remember, where he can, for masculine to say

feminine; for singular plural; for nominative accusative; and so on through all the divers ramifications of nouns adjective and substantive. For verbs, let him not omit to put active for passive, present for past, and future for present, whereby he will gain a Pluck in good style. Yet to this end doth Greek offer more facility than Latin *, for that it hath a middle voice, which the Latin hath not, or but a little. Likewise it hath *paulo post futurums*, whereby boys at school do get floggings many, insomuch that at one time it was meditated by the learned to dismiss *paulo post futurums* altogether; yet still do they exist, for the sake of making an easy way to Plucks. Now to proceed.

CHAP. V.

Concerning Logic.

Logic is defined to be that instrumental art which helpeth a man to be plucked in his Little-go and Great-go by aid of his reason. For verily as the right use of Logic doth give an acuteness and readiness to the intellect, so doth the wrong use thereof mystify the mind and lead to Pluck.

Among good examples of Logic take the following. For definition, as of Oxford nominally, "a place where oxen do ford through;" accidently, "a learned society;" essentially, "a place where are

* Vide Edward's Eton Latin Grammar.

many Plucks." For division, as of "a plumb-cake into raisins and suet;" of "a kingdom into Tories and Whigs." For proposition, as when it was "proposed to admit Dissenters," which proposition, as was indeed affirmative at the first, but became negative afterward. For the mood of a proposition, as when that proposition being so negatived did put the Dissenters in an "ill mood." For conversion, "some wives love their husbands," converted to, "all husbands love their wives"— "Nothing is better than a good conscience," converted to, "a good conscience is better than nothing." "I saw two cats fighting on the leads," converted to, "I saw two dogs fighting in the street." Of conversion do all words admit, saving the word Jew, according to some. Then for opposition, Cain hated his brother Abel; therefore it is argued, he also "opposed him." As for syllogism which in cases of Pluck is called "silly-gism," it hath divers kinds whereof let suffice one instance, as

> All reading men are animals.
> Some animals (that is to say pigs) are learned
> Therefore is it not to be denied that some reading men may be learned.

CHAP. VI.

Concerning Euclid.

Of Euclid is but little to be said, save that for Pluck it is best to be learned by rote and not by understanding. Also to the same end, it is a

good thing to take for granted such problems as be difficult to learn. Wherefore let thy Euclid be bought second-hand, for so shall two advantages accrue to thee, inasmuch as firstly, thou shalt know by the thumbing which be the hard problems and so avoid them; secondly, of that same thumbing shalt thou have the glory when thou shewest the book to thy governor.

CHAP. VII.

Concerning History.

Of History useful to Pluck are there four divisions, for the most part, that is to say Herodotus, Thucydides, Livy, and Tacitus, whereof Herodotus produceth Plucks in proportion 40, Thucydides 39, Livy 53, and Tacitus 44; whence it appeareth that Thucydides produceth fewest Plucks, and Livy most. Now the reason of this is, that Thucydides being difficult is most studied, but Livy being easy, is studied but a little, being read for the most part, that is to say, the second decade, in an analysis. In the reading of History for Pluck, let each be mindful to consider of chronology, as of a separate thing not to be mixed up with history, for indeed history is of things, but chronology of times. Therefore let him be careful either first, not to read chronology at all; or secondly, to read it in such a way as for it to have no congruity with history. For example, let

him put Pericles after Cicero, and Virgil before Thucydides, this being the true way, which in geography also is to be observed. For as Sparta is commonly said to be in the Peloponnesus, and Ephesus in Asia Minor, so let him who aimeth at a good Pluck put Sparta boldly into the Baltic, and Ephesus among the "Silly" islands; also, let each consider this general rule, that in proportion, as a book is more difficult, so if it be the less studied it will produce more Plucks. Likewise this other, that if a person remember not one particular event of history, the first that he calleth to mind will do in its stead. The same for names also, as to put for Alcibiades, Heliogabalus; for Julius Cæsar, Og the King of Basan.

CHAP. VIII.

Concerning Divinity.

Next cometh a discussion of the kind of Divinity needful for Pluck, whereto let the rules following suffice.

First, Let a man make himself master of many and divers answers in Divinity from Watts' Scripture History;* which let be done in the morning before examination, so when his examination com-

* Of this kind also was the divinity of George H * * *, who passed indeed his Little go with ease, but being asked who Moses was and what happened unto him, said he remembered not, save that "he was nearly drowned when he was a baby."

eth, let him put in one of the answers that first riseth to his memory, not minding the question at all as happened with Mr. Hugh H****, who being asked "if he remembered what animal is recorded in the Bible to have spoken?" answered confidently, "the whale;" whereupon the examiner further interrogated him, "unto whom the whale spake?" on this did Mr. H**** think awhile, considering what answers he had still left, which being done, he replied that "the whale spake to Moses in the bull-rushes." Now this answer might have satisfied another examiner; yet was this examiner not content, but yet further asked, "what the whale said," to which was answer made boldly, that the whale said, "almost thou persuadest me to be a Christian." This is an example of an answer in divinity good for plucking.

Secondly, It is best not to read the Bible, yet if a man do, let him read forty chapters a day at the least.

Thirdly, Let a man be careful not to listen to what is read each day in chapel, for thereby he will escape much knowledge of divinity. For which reason let him read a novel instead of a Prayer Book.

Fourthly and lastly, Let a man consider of divinity that it is an easy thing and to be got up in half a day; so will he come to be plucked more surely, for he will ever put it off to the last, as in human life is the custom also.

CHAP. IX.

Concerning Sciences.

Sciences are useful to Pluck but seldom, for indeed few persons do take up sciences for a Pluck, save as did Mr. Andrew D*****, who being conscious of knowing nothing, nevertheless went up for a first class, hoping cunningly so to pass. However he succeeded not, but was plucked yet the more. Therefore of sciences I have but little to say,* save that it is best for Pluck to read no more than an analysis of them in English the night before; for which purpose, it seems, were such books writ at the first.

CHAP. X.

Concerning the composition of Latin and Greek.

For writing Latin and Greek, consider well the rules for construing and parsing, writ above † which will suffice for the most part. Yet must it not be omitted, that useful also are letters wrigged and tortuous, whereby the examiner is puzzled in

* It requireth a full and perfect ignorance of philosophy both ancient and modern, to understand the sciences in a way useful towards Pluck. Nevertheless many persons in Oxford do attain to this every year, for which they are highly to be praised.

† Likewise Crombie's Gymnasium, that is to say, so it be read superficially.

the reading, wherefore, further do I recommend a bad pen, that spurteth the ink.*

CHAP. XI.

Concerning Poesy.

As for Poesy, it compriseth many books useful to Pluck, whereof are most in use, Virgil, Horace, Juvenal, and Euripides. Now these poets, when they wrote, knew not the high use to which their books would be put. Yet nevertheless have they by intuition writ many things easy to be mistaken, and therefore useful to Pluck. Nay indeed, where they have writ in a clear manner, still it is possible to construe them wrong, as hath been before shewn. Therefore let every one in learning them, take care out of many bad meanings to choose the worst. Here also to conclude do I give this further rule for poesy and prose, which deserveth no small attention, that is to say, to construe prose as if it were poesy, and poesy as if it were prose.

* Among examples of Latin composition good for plucking take these following, *a man of a good constitution,* "homo bonæ reipublicæ;" *they came down at a quick rate,* "celeri rate descenderunt; *a woman of good carriage,* "mulier boni vehiculi; *Theodosius was the younger son of a decayed family,* "Theodosius erat junior filius corrosæ familiæ; *it is well to punish tyrants,* "bene est ad puniendum tyrannorum." Also in spelling, as to spell Horatius, *Horatious,* and the like.

These examples are enough for diligent learners; as for examples in Greek, they are not needful, for he that writeth bad Latin can also write bad Greek if it be necessary; albeit he that writeth good Latin, cannot for that reason write good Greek also.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Concerning Idleness.

Thus much for the preparation direct for plucking, to which followeth next in order, the preparation indirect, that is to say, Idleness. Whereof do both require much care and attention, but most of all the latter. For indeed it is a hard thing to be idle for a continuance; the which thing teacheth Virgil, when he saith *studiis otii*,* the which also is to be seen in the idle persons themselves, who for the most part do seem weary and way-begone; shewing how hard a thing it is, and what trouble it taketh to be well plucked.

CHAP. II.

The Idleness of Smoking.

Of Idlenesses there be many, among which first cometh the idleness of smoking.† Smoking is defined to be the sucking in of smoke at one part of the mouth, and the ejection thereof at another part. Yet is there a difference (as

* Likewise philosophers do teach the same when they discuss the *vis inertiæ*.

† Vide Arist. 31. Eth. lib. 3.

Aristotle saith of justice) between a smoker and him who smoketh, for the first hath the habit of smoking which the last hath not yet. Of smoking there be two grand kinds; first, with a cigar; second, with a pipe. Whereof the smoking with a cigar is divided into two kinds, first, with a cigar of paper as at school;* second, with a cigar of tobacco as at college; whence cometh a still further subdivision of the first into white paper or brown paper according to quality; thin or thick according to substance; long or short according to quantity. In like manner also is subdivided the cigar of tobacco according to its different kinds. As for the other grand division; the smoking with a pipe divideth itself into two kinds; first, with a common clay; second, with a German pipe. Whereof the first is subdivided into the straight pipe; the twisted pipe of modern fashion; the pipe with a plain bowl; the pipe with a flowery bowl; the pipe with red sealing wax at the end, the pipe with black sealing wax; the pipe with no sealing wax; the pipe with resin; the pipe full length; the pipe broken short, (as is the pipe of a coal-heaver,) and so on. For the German pipe it admitteth of no division save division of

* Likewise on the continent do they smoke cigars of paper with this difference, that there they put tobacco inside, but at school the cigar is of paper wholly, whence it is seen how wrong was Mr. H * * *, who said of this book that it was written by a man who knew not the noble science of smoking, for that he spoke of "*paper* cigars."

age, seeing that the best German pipe is that which hath been longest smoked; for which reason it is in use with a certain tobacconist of High-street to employ, on direction, two boys for smoking new pipes into old. Thus much for the instrument wherewith smoking is done. As for the manner of smoking, it is of divers kinds. Some do smoke sitting, some walking, and some standing. For sitting; a man may smoke first, in his own rooms; second, in another man's rooms; each of which admitteth the subdivision following. For it is possible to smoke at the fire, which may be done, first, with legs over the grate; second, with legs on the grate; third, with legs under the grate. And it is possible to smoke at table, which may be done, first, at breakfast; second, at luncheon; third, at tea; fourth, at supper; which last is most practised. Now all these instruments and manners of smoking are useful to Pluck; but as to which produceth most idleness, and therefore most Pluck, it is hard to say: for every one differeth in his adaptation to things external. Yet in the abstract is standing more idle than walking, and therefore to be preferred; as likewise is sitting more idle than standing. Also in the abstract, to smoke with a German pipe hath in it more of laziness than to smoke with a cigar; for why? He who smoketh with a cigar hath need to reach his hand for another when the first is smoked; but he that useth a German pipe may

sit a long while, for that it lasteth longer. Therefore is it found in the records of Oxford, that in the year 1833, of those that used German pipes were plucked 72, but of those that used cigars only 53. Whence for the most part do I recommend German pipes, as being the better way of prosecuting idleness with vigour.

CHAP. III.

The Idleness of Love.

Next cometh the idleness of Love which leadeth to no few Plucks. For he that is in love*, albeit his dictionary lie open before him, thinketh not of study. He walketh backward and forward in his rooms; he turneth his back to the fire lifting up his coat-tail; he looketh out of the window wishing to be a bird; he openeth the most secret part of his desk for a lock of hair and so passeth his time, thinking thereon till his Little-go or Great-go cometh unawares. Of love are there divers kinds according to the person loved, wherefore it followeth to consider, what sort of lady produceth the love most likely to cause Pluck.

Now ladies may be considered in three ways first, as to substance; second, as to quality; third, as to relation.

Under category of substance cometh the rich

* Vide Rhet. lib. i. cap. 5.

lady, the fat lady, the tall lady, the heavy lady, the plump lady, together with the contraries thereto, as the poor lady, the thin lady, the short lady, the light lady, the skinny lady.*

For quality; it is of two kinds, first, of person; second, of mind. Under the first cometh the round-faced lady, the long-faced lady, the wide-faced lady, the Roman-nosed lady, the red-haired lady, the gooseberry-eyed lady with their opposites. Under the second cometh the amiable lady, the romantic lady, the quick lady, the sensible lady, the flirting lady, all these with their opposites.

Lastly; under category of relation cometh first, the lady without relations, the widow, the ward in Chancery, the lady without brothers, the lady with first cousins, the lady with first cousins once removed, and so on. Secondly, relation to age; as the young lady, the middle-aged lady, the old maid, the lady with teeth, the lady without teeth, the lady that useth paint, the little girl, the big girl, the old lady, and so on.

Wherefore in considering the lady most likely to produce Pluck; there being three things concerned, first, substance; second, quality; third, relation; it followeth that the lady to be chosen, is she who hath the best in each. As in sub-

* Thus Aristotle hath, Rhet. lib. i. cap. 5. θηλειῶν ἀρετὴ σώματος μέγεθος, κ. τ. λ. see also, for what followeth, his doctrine concerning noses.

stance, the rich lady is best; in quality of person, the Roman-nosed lady; in quality of mind, the romantic lady; in relation, the lady without brothers, and the young lady. Yet is it after all a matter uncertain which lady produceth most love, and therefore most idleness in each particular person. For sometimes a young man falleth in love with an old lady having money, as happened with Mr. Andrew D****, who was plucked at Little-go in 1827; and sometimes a handsome man falleth in love with a gooseberry-eyed, fat, poor, red-haired lady, if she be amiable, of which last however hath been but one example in Oxford. Therefore as I said, is the matter of love an uncertain thing, yet from what hath been here writ concerning it, may one nevertheless learn something of it at the least, as regardeth Pluck in the abstract, and now to proceed to other idlenesses.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Idleness of Novels.

Next to the idleness of love cometh the idleness of reading novels, inasmuch as they concern love for the most part. Now novels are to be considered first, as to places where they are to be got; second, as to the most fitting time for reading them; third, in respect of their kinds; for place, there be four places in Oxford where novels are to be got; Mr. Weatherstone's, Mr. Dewe's, Mr.

Hawkins', and Mr. Richards'; whereof the first, which is the oldest is in St. Aldates'; the second, which hath many new books and various, is in Broad-street; the third, in High-street; and the fourth, in Magdalen-street. For time; the best time to read a novel is just before thy examination, for thereby the mind is diverted from study and so produceth Pluck; also let thy reading be at night for the most part, for in day time thou hast other idlenesses busying thee. As for the kinds of novels they be divers; as first, in respect of age; the novel well thumbed, the novel that is sticky, the old novel new bound, the novel whence the preface is torn, the novel whence the conclusion is torn; second, in respect of subject, as the novel that hath many love scenes, which is called by Mr. Bulwer in speaking of his own novels, the novel philosophical; the novel maritime which treateth of sailors' oaths; the novel fashionable which bringeth high life down stairs, and discusseth ladies' maids; the novel of real life which treateth of elopements; the novel religious wherein pretty Protestants do convert Roman Catholics; third, in respect of manner, as the novel which sendeth asleep, the novel which letteth go to sleep, the novel which keepeth awake. Now all these sorts are useful to Pluck; wherefore let them be read abundantly and without ceasing, so that the boy who carrieth the novels be even tired thereby; nor let it be forgot to scribble notes on the leaves with thy philoso-

phical opinion of things, as of the author that he is "a great ass;" of the book that it is "written confoundedly bad and very absurd throughout;" and of certain expressions that "there is no such word," for so shall succeeding readers gain wisdom by thy notices.

CHAP. V.

The Idleness of Riding and Driving.

Of riding there be two grand kinds, first, to ride on an animal; second, to ride on a vehicle; whereof the first is called specifically to ride, the second to drive.

The first differeth firstly according to the divers kinds of animals, for some do ride horses, some ponies, and some donkeys, whereof the two first only do subsist in Oxford. For horses; a man may ride a white horse, a black horse, and a bay horse, as also a mixture of these, as a grey horse, a horse skewbald, a horse piebald; each of which admitteth this further subdivision; a horse with a long tail, a horse with a short tail, a horse with one eye, a horse broken-kneed, a horse that plungeth, a horse that kicketh, a horse with white hoofs, a horse broken winded; of which last are many in Oxford. The same also of ponies. Then for the manner of riding, there is this further difference; for it is possible to walk, to amble, to trot, to canter, to gallop, to race, and to leap; which last may

be done first, with the rider on the horse; second, with the rider over the horse; third, with the rider under the horse, as in Oxford. To these let be added hunting which differeth in three ways; for it is possible to hunt a living animal, as a fox, a hare, a donkey; and it is possible to hunt a piece of flesh that is dragged on in front by a little boy; and it is possible to hunt a steeple, which is called a steeple-chase; each of which may be done, first, having a red coat or not having a red coat; second, having a dinner party afterward or not having a dinner party afterward. For driving, it differeth according to vehicles, for some do drive phaetons, some coaches, some gigs, and some tandems, which last differeth from the former in being forbidden by the Proctors. Furthermore some do drive their own vehicles, some the vehicles of their friends, and some vehicles which are let. Of these the first do avoid rough places, the second and third care not; also the third, which is he that driveth let vehicles, is of two kinds; first, he that payeth; second, he that payeth not; whereof the former admitteth a still further division into two; first, he that payeth much at the time; second, he that payeth more afterward.

Let so much have been said concerning the genus, species, and difference of riding. As for the property, it is of two kinds; for some do ride that have property and can afford, some likewise do ride that cannot afford. For the accidents,

they differ as follows: for some do break their wheels, some their noses, and some their fortunes; whereof the first is separable, but the second and third inseparable; for the wheel cometh off being broken, and so is replaced by a new wheel; but this happeneth not to the nose, nor to the fortune, whence many do leave Oxford with broken noses, but more with broken fortunes.

CHAP. VI.

The Idleness of Billiards.

The Idleness of Billiards, is an idleness good for Pluck and not to be dis-esteemed, albeit many that pass do also play at billiards. Of billiard rooms useful to Pluck there be eleven, whereof one by Mr. Tyrrel's hath of late been decorated with a new painted board at the outside. There is also another in New College-lane much to be recommended, which was among the first to have metallic tables whereby were Plucks increased not a little that year.

CHAP. VII.

The Idleness of Rowing.

Rowing, by which is understood the pushing of a boat with oars, hath not idleness in its own nature simply, for indeed sometimes he that ab-

staineth from rowing is idle, for the reason that he abstaineth, as with a London boatman. Yet when it be practised in the extreme, where it is not necessary, it is an idleness nevertheless; as to row every evening in an eight oar, when one hath skiffed beyond Iffley of a morning. King and Davis have good boats, also Franklin, and Mrs. Hall of ancient memory. The last mentioned hath a new sailing boat surnamed Pilot, which by reason of its goodness hath already brought in five Plucks, whereof were three in Great-go.

CHAP. VIII.

The Idleness of Music.

Albeit to have a good ear bringeth not a Pluck of necessity, yet the playing of many instruments leadeth to Pluck not a little, and therefore is a thing to be practised. Of instruments, the flute bringeth fewest Plucks, and the piano-forte most, for the first cannot be played for many hours in a day, but the last admitteth of this.

CHAP. IX.

The Idleness of Wine Drinking

Wine drinking produceth Pluck each year in the proportion following: Sherry 72, Claret 23, Madeira 27, Champagne 13, Port 90. The reason whereof is, that Port is most drunk, Champagne

A SYNOPSIS OF DRINKING,

FORMED ACCORDING TO THE CATEGORIES OF ARISTOTLE.

There hath been long wanting to philosophy a full and perfect Synopsis of drinking. The question hath indeed been touched upon by Xenophon in his Symposium; but to speak truth that author hath not treated his subject in a manner adapted to these times; and indeed how was this possible, when it is considered that the ancients though rich in learning, possessed not decanters of cut glass, nor knew how to make either Punch or Bishop! Therefore without meaning any derogation to Xenophon, or yet to Aristotle, I here set before the reader a Synopsis of modern Drinking, as practised at the Universities; wherein the categories are mixed together so far as appearance goeth, yet may be easily separated each to itself by such as are fond of more logical exactness. And this Synopsis is made partly for the sake of philosophy in general, but chiefly for the sake of this particular branch thereof, which teacheth how to be plucked, of which drinking formeth a constituent.

He that drinketh may be considered

1st. He that drinketh water, which is divided into

- 1st. He that drinketh pure water, which is done when there is nothing else to drink.
- 2nd. He that drinketh mixed water, which is divided into
  - 1st. He that drinketh muddy water, as the water of a ditch, when capsized out hunting.
  - 2nd. He that drinketh toast and water which is done, when beer is bad.
  - 3rd. He that drinketh water-gruel, which is done, when a man desireth to be thought eager.
  - 4th. He that drinketh lemonade, ginger beer, and the like, which is mostly done after being on the river.
  - 5th. He that drinketh 1st. Tea. 2nd. Coffee. 3rd. Chocolate. all which may be considered.
    - 1st. As to sugar, for a man may drink
      - 1st. Without sugar.
      - 2nd. With sugar, which may be
        - 1st. Brown sugar.
        - 2nd. White sugar.
        - 3rd. Whity brown sugar.
    - 2nd. As to sugar-tongs, for it is possible
      - 1st. To use sugar tongs, as do Fellows.
      - 2nd. Not to use sugar-tongs, as do Undergraduates.
    - 3rd. As to cups, which may be
      - 1st. With handles.
      - 2nd. Without handles, which may be
        - 1st. Essentially without handles, as being so made by the potter.
        - 2nd. Accidentally without handles, which may be done
          - 1st. By thy scout when tipsy.
          - 2nd. By thy friends when tipsy.
          - 3rd. By thyself when tipsy.

2nd. He that drinketh strong drink, which is divided into

- 1st. He that drinketh malt liquor, which is divided into 1st. Porter. 2nd. Beer, which may be divided into
  - 1st. Beer pure, which is divided into 1st. Double Stout. 2nd. Ale. 3rd. Swipes, whereof there is in Oxford not a little.
  - 2nd. Beer mixed, as Beer Flip, and the like.
- 2nd. He that drinketh spirits which are divided into
  - 1st. Spirits pure, as when a man drinketh brandy to exhibit his fortitude and strength of head.
  - 2nd. Spirits mixed which may be
    - 1st. Mixed before the time of drinking, as 1st. Noyeau. 2nd. Curaçoa. 3rd. Maraschino, and the like.
    - 2nd. Mixed at the time of drinking, as 1st. Cardinal. 2nd. Pope. 3rd. Bishop. 4th. Punch, which is divided into
      - 1st. [illegible]ford [illegible]h. 2nd. Cambridge Punch. 3rd. Spiced Punch. 4th. Tea Punch. 5th. Gin Punch. 6th. Red Punch. 7th. Punch Royal. 8th. Milk Punch. 9th. Egg Punch.
- 3rd. He that drinketh wine, which is divided into
  - 1st. He that drinketh pure wine, as abroad.
  - 2nd. He that drinketh impure wine, as in England, which may be considered
    - 1st. As to the wine drunk, which in Oxford is 1st. Bad Champagne. 2nd. Bad Port. 3rd. Bad Claret. 4th. Bad Sherry. 5th. Bad Madeira, and the like.
    - 2nd. As to the manner of drinking, which may be considered
      - 1st. As to the thing out of which one drinketh wine, which may be
        - 1st. A large glass, as used by the Undergraduate.
        - 2nd. A moderate glass, as used by the Bachelor.
        - 3rd. A small glass, as used by the Master of Arts.
        - 4th. A fox's head, as used by the Sporting man.
        - 5th. A tumbler, as used by the Fast man.
        - 6th. A tea cup, as used by the Slow man.
        - 7th. A bottle, as used by the Tipsy man.
      - 2nd. As to the state of mind and body in which one drinketh wine, which may be considered according to the four categories following.
        - 1st. Of Habit, as
          - To drink habitually.
          - To drink without having the habit.
          - To drink oneself into the habit.
          - To drink oneself out of the habit.
        - 2nd. Of Posture, as
          - To drink with ones legs on the grate.
          - To drink standing up.
          - To drink sitting in a chair.
          - To drink under the table, and the like.
        - 3rd. Of Action, as
          - To make action with ones hands, as in waving the glass.
          - To make action with ones legs.
          - To upset a glass.
          - To upset the table.
          - To upset thy friend.
          - To upset thyself, and the like.
        - 4th. Of Passion, as
          - To have a passion for drinking.
          - To drink without having a passion.
          - To drink oneself into a passion.
          - To drink oneself out of a passion.
          - To drink in a passion.
          - To drink coolly, and the like.
      - 3rd. As to the persons with whom one drinketh wine, which compriseth the category of relation, for it is possible.
        - 1st. To drink by thyself.
        - 2nd. To drink with thy friend.
        - 3rd. To drink with many friends.
        - 4th. To drink wine with a lady.
        - 5th. To drink with a relation, as
          - With thy father, when thou drinkest little.
          - With thine uncle, when thou drinkest much.
          - With thy cousin, when thou drinkest more.
      - 4th. As to the time one taketh in drinking wine, which compriseth the category of time, for it is possible.
        - 1st. To drink from breakfast to supper.
        - 2nd. To drink from dinner to tea.
        - 3rd. To drink till thou gettest funny.
        - 4th. To drink till thou gettest drunk.
        - 5th. To drink till thou gettest sober.
        - 6th. To drink on a Sunday.
      - 5th. As to the place in which one drinketh wine, which compriseth the category of place, for it is possible.
        - 1st. To drink in thy tutor's rooms, where thou drinkest sparingly, so as to appear of a sober disposition.
        - 2nd. To drink in thine own rooms, when thou drinkest little.
        - 3rd. To drink in thy friend's rooms, when thou drinkest much.
        - 4th. To drink in thy enemy's rooms, when thou drinkest more.

least, and the rest in proportion. Of late also hath Beer contributed not a little to produce Plucks, for indeed beer is a good thing for making the mind heavy and loaded. Nevertheless as yet beer hath not such consequence in Oxford as in Cambridge, being a new fashion in this place.

CHAP. X.

Concerning other Idlenesses

There be many other Idlenesses of the like sort with those mentioned, such are the kicking up of rows, the sleeping all day long in an easy chair, as does Mr. S****, the writing of poesy, the going to plays at Abingdon, the shying at lamps, the playing at whist with the oak sported, the shooting with a bow and arrow, and such like; all which, so they be taken in discretion, that is to say, as not to interrupt one another, do lead to Pluck. But it mattereth not to say more of them for the present, seeing that the principle of them may be drawn from what hath been aforesaid concerning the rest. Moreover in Oxford they do grow up naturally, and therefore are best to be learned by practice, and the close following of the many good examples thereto. Yet is there one other idleness that deserveth mention particular in this place, for that it is not known as an idleness, albeit it is one; that is to say, the idleness of thinking upon one's debts,

wherein is much time consumed. Therefore mind that thy debts be many, for so shalt thou come to be better plucked; moreover thou doest good to thy fellow creatures thereby, for what thing is more divine than confidence betwixt man and man? the which thou promotest exceedingly by living upon trust.

CHAP XI.

The things to be avoided so as to get Plucked.

Among things to be avoided for Pluck are these, for in this also consisteth an idleness, yet not particular but general. As for example, if thou really studiest to get plucked, thou must consider that economy of time, together with good counsel and discreet doings, are vain things not to be practised. Thou must shun a sober friend. Thou must despise honourable ambition, having opinion of thy superiors as persons of no respect. Beware also of having a Dictionary or Lexicon in thy room; and take heed that thou attend not lecture whether public or private. But instead of that, give thyself up to whatever thy fancy pleaseth best disregarding all else. So much for things to be avoided, which concludeth this part of the treatise.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

How to demean oneself at Examination.

As to the demeaning of oneself at Examination, which was the second grand division, it consisteth of five things. For in examination are three things to be considered; first, the person who examineth; second, the person examined; third, the subject whereon the examination fixeth; whereof to the examiner belongeth question; to the person examined answer. First then to consider him who examineth.

CHAP. II.

Concerning the Examiner.

Let an Examiner be defined to be one who plucketh, whence cometh it that examiners are of three kinds; first, the morose examiner who plucketh ill-naturedly; second, the good humoured examiner who plucketh with a smile on his face; third, the good natured examiner who plucketh with pity. Whereof there is this difference; that the first endeavoureth to pluck; the second careth not; the third avoideth. Whence cometh further, a distinction of manner; for the first questioneth oft and loud on a thing which he knoweth to be difficult, making an austere face and frightening;

the second, speaketh blandly and joketh not a little, playing his wit as occasion serveth; but the third, which is the best, desireth thee first to sit down; then speaking with sweetness indescribable, giveth such questions as may draw out not thy ignorance, but thy knowledge. So the first treateth thee as a naughty schoolboy; the second, as a gentleman; but the third, as a friend.

CHAP. III.

Concerning the person Examined.

As for the Persons Examined, they be each of them different according to their different idlenesses. For all are idle, inasmuch as they who sport now, do sport for present idleness; and they who read now, do read for the most part, that they may be idle afterward with better grace. Thus the one set are idle in practice, and the other in expectation. Now the different idlenesses are seen from what hath been before writ concerning them, therefore needless it is to mention them afresh. Yet let it not be omitted, that oftentimes the person examined changeth according to the examiner; for first, if the examiner be morose, the person examined becometh nervous and afraid, so that oftentimes he forgetteth himself and cometh to be plucked; yea, even though he may have taken much pains contrarywise. Second, if the examiner be good humoured yet not good natured,

and so playeth his wit with laughing and jesting; then doth the person examined grow flippant and saucy, fancying he shall pass to be sure with such a good sort of man. Third, if the examiner be a person kind, yet having respect for himself (as in truth be the Oxford examiners for the most), then the person examined settleth into his natural self and so is it easily discerned whether he have wisdom or not.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning the Subject.

As for the Subject, it consisteth of Logic, Euclid, and such other authors as have been mentioned in the first book; besides which, is nothing else to be observed.

CHAP. V.

The Doctrine of Questions.

For Questions, they differ in many ways and are to be considered; first, in respect of substance; that is to say, whether they be easy or difficult; second, in respect of quality; that is to say, whether they be put in a loud or soft voice; third, in respect of quantity; that is to say, whether they be many or few.

Now as to substance; the morose examiner putteth an easy question in a difficult way; the good humoured examiner putteth each in its own

way; the good natured examiner putteth a difficult question in an easy way.

As to quality; the morose examiner useth a loud surly voice; the good humoured examiner useth a quick voice; the good natured examiner useth a soft voice.

As to quantity; the morose examiner putteth many questions and difficult; the good humoured examiner putteth few questions and difficult; the good natured examiner putteth few questions and easy. So to proceed to the doctrine of answers.

CHAP. VI.

The Doctrine of Answers.

Of Answers, there be three kinds useful to Pluck; the answer indirect, the answer equivocal, the answer per accidens;* whereof the two first do agree as genus and species. To these three hath one other of late been added by Philosophers; that is to say, the answer impudent, which verily, if well managed, doth contribute not a little in the production of Pluck, yet by itself availeth not, wherefore it is practised but seldom.

Of the answer indirect take the example following; for in this last examination, a certain gentleman being asked in what year was the flood, an-

* Called also *taking a shy* which is here used in the second intention; for verily in the common use of language, shys are taken only at Proctors, the windows of tutors, lamps and the like.

swered that "the flood covered the highest mountains; but being asked again the same question, he replied thereto, that "the flood of Deucalion is not supposed to have prevailed except over Greece;" whereon the examiner asked yet a third time the same question, and received for answer, that "many shells are yet to be found in proof of the flood."

Of the answer equivocal take the following example: a person was asked of what substance were the walls of Platæa? whereto he answered that "one side was of the same substanee with the other side;" but being asked again, he said that "the substance at the top differed not from the substance at the bottom."

Of the answer per accidens, as followeth: to the question where is Sicily, cometh answer, "in the deserts of Siberia, near the Cape of Good Hope;" to the question who were the Pelasgi, cometh answer that "the Pelasgi were two crows, which settled one at Dodona, the other at Jerusalem;" to the question which party conquered at Philippi, cometh answer "Nebuchadnezzar.*"

* There is another answer in the records, which some philosophers do consider to be the answer impudent; but the learned W. **** in his last edition putteth it down as the answer per accidens, which is this. For a person being asked who Moses was, answered, that "he won the last Derby." This next also admitteth of discussion: for Mr. G**** being asked, "who were the major and minor Prophets," answered thereto that "he liked not to make invidious distinctions."

Of the answer impudent, there is but one example of note; for a person being asked in what way the pyramids were built, according to Herodotus, answered thereto, that "he was a gentleman and not a bricklayer."

Thus much for the examiner, the person examined, the subject, the question, and the answer; whence it is to be seen clearly, that, as respecteth demeanour at examination, it is best for Pluck that the examiner be morose; that the person examined be nervous and idle; that the subject be such as he comprehendeth not; that the questions be many and difficult; and that the answers be *per accidens.*

CHAP. VII.

Distinctions of Little-Go and Great-go.

Now all this, together with the two former books, hath been said of Great-go indeed particularly, yet also of Little-go, the appurtenances of which Great-go compriseth, as was before said. Yet since there be some things wherein these two do differ, it followeth to detail these things in order, that so the apprehension of the whole art may be full and perfect. Thus first, Little-go admitteth not of divinity, which Great-go admitteth of, nay requireth; second, Little-go cometh always before Great-go, but Great-go never cometh be-

fore Little-go; third, Little-go adhereth rather to strictness of rule, but Great-go to philosophy of things; fourth, Little-go requireth not examiners of a first class, which Great-go requireth; fifth, Little-go in comparison with Great-go admitteth but little of paper work; sixth, Little-go admitteth not sciences nor writing of Greek; seventh, Little-go hath no classes, which Great-go hath.

CHAP. VIII.

Examples of approved Plucks.

And now that these distinctions of Little-go and Great-go have been fully set forth, it remaineth firstly, to give some examples of approved Plucks for imitation, taken from the records of Oxford; secondly, to lay down certain topics, whereby to argue that a man will be plucked or not; and thirdly, to make a classification of Plucks according to the matter; whereof the second especially is much needed for helps to betting.

Examples of approved Plucks are the following.

The case of Geoffrey C*****, who verily at Eton was counted no small genius, being able to write forty good lines of Latin poesy in the hour; yet when he came to *****, taking much pains he forgot all at last, and so was plucked.

The case of Thomas T**** who went up for

Little-go, knowing his books well, yet returned not in triumph, for that out of spite to the examiner, as he declared, he answered every question wrongways.

The case of John D****, commonly called Jack o'Dandy, who because that his brothers had been plucked, arguing it unlikely that he also should come to be plucked, gave himself up to racing and hunting; yet was he cut short. For being asked in Little-go where Athens was, he answered "in the Hebrides;" nevertheless, after two Plucks, he passed through Little-go in triumph, and so in due time he came to Great-go, which also he passed in triumph after three Plucks; whereon he gave a supper yet remembered and to be remembered.

The case of John F****, who indeed had read not a little, and thereby being certain of a pass, nevertheless was plucked. For truly many friends offering to bet with him that he would pass, he took their bets with the cunning intent of demeaning himself ill; for his debts were many, especially to Mr. P***** for horses. Thereupon when his examination came, he did his best to be plucked and so succeeded, pocketing thereby many hundreds.

The case of Paul P****, who on the morning of his examination, did eat eleven sausages, one cold chicken, five slices of ham, three eggs, yea and toast with bread and butter besides, in quantity

not to be conceived; whereby he thought to make himself courageous, yet was mistaken, for he gained nought thereby save a Pluck and a head-ache. Nevertheless he passed next time, although he was fat exceedingly, whence had a wit said of him, that he was too fat to squeeze through. Yet are wits sometimes wrong, as in this case, the reason whereof is, that they do for the most part choose what is funny, rather than what is true.

The case of Joseph J******, who being in love, meditated thereon till his Great-go came, wherein being plucked he cleared twenty thousand pounds. For indeed, when he got home, he wisely told the lady that to be plucked was the greatest honour in Oxford: whereby gaining admiration, he came to be married next week. So he quitted College, yet first paid a visit to the examiner with many thanks.

The case of Andrew B***, who having put up his name, thinking himself ready for Little-go, was told by his tutor afterward, that he was sure to come to a Pluck; yet scorned he to take his name down, and therefore was plucked with no small glory.

The case of Henry ****, in this last examination who, when he was examined, answering each question with a pun was not understood; so when he came to be plucked, the examiner said of him to a friend in secret, (which was afterward told, as is common at Oxford, in public,) that he was

witty but not wise, thereby meaning that he would have passed but for his puns which he made,

The case of a gentleman, whose name shall not be mentioned in this place, who indeed laughed exceedingly at another for being plucked, yet in the end was plucked himself, for that he could not write Latin.

The case of Abel P***, who was plucked in Little-go, and afterward added thereto so many other honours, that none were left for those that followed.

So much for instances of approved Plucks, whereon it seemeth fit to notice, that sometimes one ignorance only, as of Euclid, leadeth to Pluck, as also one idleness only, as of smoking. Yet to him who aimeth at Pluck, it is best to make sure of it by many idlenesses and many ignorances, whereby his Pluck will be more certain before examination and more perfect afterward.

CHAP. IX.

Topics concerning Pluck.

For arguing that a man will be plucked take the Topics following, which are writ according to the manner indeed of Aristotle, but with allowance for modern times: now among men likely to be plucked are these for the most part.

He that hath no friends, he that hath many

friends ;* the first, because he hath none to put him in the way to escape Pluck; the second, because he hath many to draw him therefrom. He that liketh good eating. He that liketh good drinking. He that goeth to Ascot races. He that buyeth many cigars; for he that buyeth many smoketh many, and he that smoketh many wasteth much time in smoke, and he that wasteth much time in smoke is idle, and he that is idle is likely to be plucked. He that loungeth in Quad. He that is often proctorized. He that hath much money; he that hath no money; for the first hath too many pleasures, and the last too little time, since he must needs spend time in getting money. He that readeth many books. He that readeth few books. He that readeth no books. He that readeth novels, for verily pleasant things are novels and entice the mind away exceedingly. He that sporteth not his oak. He that taketh no exercise, as was the case with Mr. Benjamin B*****, who indeed did read sixteen hours a day for three years, yet did never pass for that he fainted thrice in the schools. He that sporteth many new whips. He that mixeth punch well; for truly is punch well mixed, sweet to the taste of all but most to the mixer. He that keepeth more than one large dog. He that drinketh out of a fox's head. He that hath a large bill at the pastry cooks', for such an one liketh good eating which

* Vide Aristot. Rhet. lib. ii. cap. 23.

was before shewn to produce Pluck. He that hath many large bills, for such an one hath doubtless one large bill at the pastry cooks'. He that hath many little bills, for such an one hath doubtless one large bill. He that is in love. He that hath been in love, for he is likely so to be again. He that knoweth many pretty girls. He that knoweth one pretty girl. He that roweth overmuch in eight-oared boats. He that hateth Greek. He that was often flogged at school. He that was never flogged at school. He that is his own master. He that writeth not his own essays but employeth a barber. He that thinketh himself clever. He that thinketh himself a fool. He that despiseth the tutor's lectures, for such an one thinketh himself clever. He that prideth himself on his coat. He that prideth himself on his waistcoat, for the same prideth himself also on his coat. He that prideth himself on his trowsers, for the same prideth himself on his waistcoat also. He that is careless in little things. He that is careless in great things. He that is over-careful in trifles. He that hath his common books finely bound, for such an one careth only for their outside, moreover he is fearful of soiling them with over use. He that hath in his rooms an easy chair, wherein he constantly sitteth. He that hath a private tutor from the first, for needs must such an one learn to depend not on himself. He that cometh from a large school, for needs must such an one have many friends. He that

cutteth chapel often. He that getteth up his Greek Testament in chapel. He that scribbleth in chapel. He that being poor sporteth Champagne. He that betteth and loseth many times. He that hath gone a second time to a dog fight. He that playeth oftentimes at billiards, yet playeth not well after all. He that is of a nervous nature. He that is a radical albeit his father is a tory, for such an one thinketh himself clever. He that useth a high-priced walking stick. He that weareth his hat cocked. He that weareth white kid gloves when shooting, for such an one is over careful in trifles, and therefore careth not for things important. He that belongeth not to the debating society, for such an one hath no interest for present history, how then for ancient, that is, for Latin and Greek? He that driveth tandems. He that writeth poesy. He that hunteth more than twice a week. He that doeth what his acquaintances please. He that hath more than seven pairs of top boots. He that always weareth a tattered cap and gown. He that getteth tipsy of a morning. He that breaketh lamps in the street. He that learneth more than two instruments of music. He that eateth much pudding. He that hath an over-pity for others that are plucked, for verily he pittieth others because he feareth for himself.* He that eateth much on the morning before examination. He that rideth often yet not

* Vide Aristotle's Analysis of Pity.

well. He that rideth steeple-chases often. He that hath many German pipes. He that hath a lock of hair in his desk. He that feareth shame overmuch. He that disregardeth shame. He that thinketh he will be plucked. He that thinketh he will not be plucked. Now if thou knowest a man to be in one of these predicaments thou mayest suppose him likely to be plucked; if thou knowest a man to be in two or three, thou mayest guess he will be plucked; but if thou knowest a man to be in sixteen or seventeen, thou mayest bet in safety, since he will be plucked for a certainty.

Thus much for Little-go and Great-go together; then for Great-go, they likely to be plucked in Great-go are these following. He that was plucked in Little-go, He that made a shave in Little-go. He that passed Little-go with ease, for he will take no pains towards his Great-go. He that gave a party after passing Little-go, for verily such an one esteemed his Little-go difficult, much more therefore his Great-go. He that gave a party after being plucked in Little-go, for such an one had no shame. He that was idle just before Little-go. He that took off his name at Little-go. He that was nervous in Little-go, for truly much more nervous will he be in Great-go. He that was flippant in Little-go. He that in Little-go wrote two pieces of Latin.

CHAP. X.

A Classification of Plucks according to the matter.

These be they likely to be plucked, whereby a man may judge almost for a certainty if he wish to bet on a friend. For the classification of Plucks according to the matter; they are to be put in the same gradations with Passes; for a first class in Pluck is got by him that hath the highest ignorance, as in Passes by him that hath the lowest knowledge. So also of seconds, thirds, and fourths, all which do follow in regular proportion, and therefore need not further account of them in this place. Let every man therefore try for a first for so shall he make sure at the least of his second or third; to which honours there is but this drawback only, that they are not registered in the books, nor advertised in newspapers. Yet it is to be hoped that in the gradual progression of ignorance, this also will be brought about by the worthy reformers of these times.

CHAP. XI.

Conclusion.

Such is a classification of Plucks according to the matter; and so to conclude, let me say that this Treatise is now finished, wherein I take to myself no small glory, as having been the inventor of a new art never before known. Yet am I not

ignorant that as it is new, so it must needs be imperfect in part, which imperfections let future editors mend as occasion shall call. For that this art being once begun, will progress no further is a thing not to be conceived; when is brought to mind its great use in helping men to be plucked on principle, which before was done at random. So that henceforth when a man is plucked, no person can say it was by accident or mistake of his, seeing that all the ways leading to Pluck have been here put down in strict order of philosophy. Wherefore from this time when a man hath gained a Pluck after much pains-taking to that end, let no person be so unjust as to take away from him the credit thereof, and give it to others; nay, rather let every one say, that he deserved what he got for his labour: and so I wish my reader farewell, hoping from what I have writ, he may understand fully the true way to get plucked and so act accordingly.

PLUCK

EXAMINATION PAPERS

FOR CANDIDATES

AT OXFORD AND CAMBRIDGE

IN 1836.

WHEREIN THE THEORY OF THE ART HOW TO BE PLUCKED IS EXHIBITED IN PRACTICE;

THUS COMPLETING THE END OF THE ENTIRE SCIENCE.

BY

SCRIBLERUS REDIVIVUS,

AUTHOR OF

THE ART OF BEING PLUCKED AND SYNOPSIS OF DRINKING.

OXFORD:

HENRY SLATTER, HERALD OFFICE,

HIGH STREET.

1836.

SCRIBLERUS REDIVIVUS

TO THE READER.

Learned reader, as the perfection of an art consisteth in the excellence of its theory, so the excellence of an artificer consisteth in the perfection of his practice. For it is a small thing to know how to get plucked, unless thou gettest plucked also, and that, both many times, and thoroughly, and with ease.

For this purpose I present thee in this book with some Pluck Examination Papers, whereby thou shalt be able to turn thy science in pluck to account; and procure for thyself at the least a second class in pluck, if not a first, which is to be preferred. As respecteth the plan of the book, it resembleth all other examination papers of Oxford and Cambridge, like to them pointing out the degree of ignorance that is required for the gaining of honours. It behoveth thee, however, to

bear in mind, that this book of papers containeth rather a collection of the most needful papers from many sets, than one entire set, which accounteth for the little quantity of Latin and Greek, as well as for certain other differences which thou wilt readily perceive; as, for example, the two pieces of English for translation, and the greater number of pages than be usual in one set of examination papers. Thou wilt also observe that sciences be introduced in these papers, somewhat beyond what is absolutely needful for being plucked, yet did it seem to me best, rather to run hazard of being too comprehensive than too meagre. Concerning the authors here quoted, I leave thee to discover respecting them, not choosing to lay open the secrets of examinations. Nevertheless if thou wilt come and be my pupil in the art, I promise not but I will explain to thee even these secrets; and thus get thee plucked much more easily than will even Mr. A****, or Mr. B***, or Mr. C***.

To conclude, I beg thee to understand these things in the way they be meant, not following

the evil practice of some persons, who are wont to understand of an author, that he meaneth to ridicule things sacred or grave, because his book toucheth thereon of necessity sometimes, and who do thus distort his meaning, looking not to the context. Such persons, it seemeth to me, do forget, that from the nature of things human, every book, like a glass, changeth its feature according to the feature of him that is looking therein; or rather indeed, that every book is likened to a certain young lady of Oxford, concerning whom, as she walketh along High-street, Mr. T. saith that she is horrible, Mr. L. that she is ugly, Mr. F. that she is bad looking, Mr. A. that she is passable, Mr. G. that she is good looking; another Mr. A. that she is pretty, Mr. P. that she is handsome, Mr. F. that she is beautiful, and Mr. N. that she is lovely, not according as the truth is, but according as he chooseth from his preconceived fancy to think of the different parts. Thus one praiseth her blue eye, but another condemneth the same. One thinketh a curl too long, but another desireth it to be cut. Of such an error touching this book I beg

thee to beware, except in the matter of praising, for thou hast free leave to praise it as much as thou wilt, in return for which I will not cease wishing thee to be rusticated a second time, or even to be expelled, if thou so desireth.

PLUCK

EXAMINATION PAPERS.

To be translated into your worst Attic Greek, in the style of Thucydides, where he is describing the character of Themistocles, Lib. i. cap. 138.

For Mr. Flashman was a person in whom most truly was manifested a natural strength of head, wherein he was worthy of admiration beyond any other man of his college. For by this strength of head alone, and without aid of instruction, he was enabled to drink all others tipsy, and not become drunk himself till he chose. Moreover he was the best discerner of Proctors at a distance, and in respect of things to come, could predict for certain whether a man would be rusticated or expelled for an action. Also no man better than he perceived

where he could run on tick; and he knew at once, by his natural sagacity, when it was time to leave his old tradesman, and begin a new bill elsewhere. Likewise there was no steeple-chase that he went not to, yet of him it could never be said that he was spilled. And to say all in a few words, this man, by the power of his understanding, did contrive to get numberless others rusticated and plucked, but never suffered himself either the one or the other, being considered a person of most discreet behaviour by his tutor, albeit in real truth he was the most noisy man of his time. Let so much have been said of his character. But having thus honourably passed his college career, he became a sincere clergyman, sporting a white tie, nor ever breaking a poor man's gate out hunting, but when it was difficult to get through otherwise.

From the Secret History of Oxford and Cambridge, as translated by Hobbes of Malmsbury.

Or else the following into your worst Ionic, in the style of Herodotus.

In the Atlantic Ocean, and nigh upon Cornwall, are some islands called anciently

Cassiterides, or the tin islands, but now surnamed Silly, which are much to be admired for their wonderful use and excellence. For therein does tin grow in such plenty that the inhabitants pass a most loveable life, being ever able to pay their debts, from having plenty of *tin*. These islands were first discovered, according to tradition, by a man of Cambridge, who being plucked on a time, and having likewise great debts, determined nobly to go in search of them upon the bare report. Therefore letting himself down at night time from his college window, while the porter slept, and being armed with an Ainsworth's dictionary for defence, he descended to the Cam, and taking a skiff went along with the stream, through much wild and barbarous country, as was to be expected in those times; till in the end, after ten days' travel, he reached the sea coast, with much danger from the savages, which nevertheless he escaped bravely, by wielding of his dictionary. From the coast he proceeded by land till he came opposite to a small island, which having reached by swimming, he found thereon much tin, lying in heaps of sovereigns along the shore. Like-

wise the trees had for leaves bank notes, whereof some were of five pound and others of ten pound, according to their age. Seeing which, he stuffed his pockets, not excepting even his fob, with the last mentioned, wisely neglecting the first. But perceiving the islanders to approach, he was forced to flee, and thus escaping to land by swimming reached Cambridge in thirteen days, where he paid all his own debts, besides those of his friends, albeit not a few of the notes had been destroyed by the salt water. Since his time many undergraduates in debt have gone on the same journey, but as yet no one hath succeeded, which is much to be lamented.

A True and Faithful Account of the Cassiterides, or Tin Islands, by Herodotus Britannicus, in his History of Undergraduates.

Historical Questions.

1. Give a particular account of the earliest town and gown rows recorded in history. Are there supposed to have been gown and town rows in Athens when it was the University of the world?

2. Does history say how many caps were broken in the last gown and town row, when Oxford was entertained by the Queen?

3. Livy says, that the "equites" of Rome were called "celeres" originally. How does Niebuhr prove this to be an historical fable, signifying that the Roman knights were generally *fast* men?

4. Give an account of the number of horses driven to death last term, and compare the cavalry of Alexander with that of Oxford and Cambridge.

5. What historical associations are connected with brandy and water? Give an account of the rise and progress of drinking in the Universities, and shew in what way our ancestors used to get drunk when at college. Give also a correct analysis of that philosophical work called Oxford Night Caps.

6. We read in the history of Greece, that it was first peopled by means of migrations. Shew how the same principle still works at Oxford and Cambridge. And explain the

terms "licet migrare," and "exeat," by an historical reference to the causes which in general produce these migrations from one college to another. What was the most famous migration of this sort last term?

7. Give a full account of the last steeple-chase, detailing minutely the different falls that occurred, and what parts were bruised. Draw also a map of the ground, and explain the geographical position of each rider and of his horse respectively at the close of the chase.

8. How long ago is it since the wild beasts were in the town? Give a clear narrative of the row which occurred with the authorities on that occasion. Who was the gentleman with a glazed hat, who told one of the authorities that he might go to a place that need not be mentioned? and what did he gain in return for this proper exhibition of spirit?

9. Give a succinct account of the origin of the Debating Society, explaining the alterations in its government since its commencement, and the influence of certain

laws lately passed, towards producing a democratic spirit.

10. Draw up a statistical account of the impositions set last term; distinguishing between those which were written by the man himself, and those which were paid for. Explain likewise in what parts of the town those persons live who gain an honest livelihood by writing impositions for the men; and conclude by drawing up a table of the fluctuation in prices paid for impositions during the last ten years. Compare likewise the Cambridge and Oxford system of impositions.

11. How many bulldogs receive bloody noses on an average every term, and at what period of history did the application of the term bulldog first begin?

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1. Under what class of revenue do you put the income derived from knocking in? Compare the revenue of Oxford, in this point of view, with that of Athens in the time of Aristides.

2. Describe faithfully the last match at pigeon shooting.

3. Who is the best tailor in the University? Account for the invention of swallow-tailed coats, and describe accurately the rise and progress of pea-jackets, and in what their flashness consists.

4. What Greek books burn best for lighting a cigar?

5. Give a clear account, with the chronology, of the painting red of all the doors of Christ Church, and compare this with the mutilation of the Mercuries at Athens, before the expedition to Sicily.

6. Shew what may be learnt of the history of the University from the philosophy of its flash language. State the metaphysical derivation of the Cambridge words *mumption* and *spitting a cantilene;* and explain the principle upon which it is that Cambridge men use more terms of this kind than Oxford men.

7. Niebuhr, from observing that caps have tassels, and that the streets of Oxford are not macadamized, comes to the conclusion that the University was originally inhabited by Pelasgi, which he further confirms by observing, that the inhabitants of it depart and return periodically, according to the vacations, in which we see the very migratory principle of the Pelasgi exemplified. State the force of the argument.

8. Explain the use of dumb-bells and pokers in storming citadels, comparing the late attack of the undergraduates upon the Theatre with the siege of Platæa. It is reported that one of the dumb-bells was covered with red leather; shew that this is contrary to fact, from your own observation.

Translate into your worst English the following account of an event at Cambridge, last term.

Jamque, duobus lampadibus fractis, contra eam quæ tertia stat in vico, progrediabantur, quum subito, laniariis canibus sti-

patus, Proctor supervenit. Is jam antea, dum in inferiore vici parte versatur, sonitus gliscentes audiverat; quibus excitus, collegâ relicto, ad tumultum cum majore copiarum parte, summa celeritate processit. Ejus adventu perculsi proximi duo fugam capessunt. Tres jamdudum vino gravati, et pugnare et fugere æque impotentes, manu statim capti sunt. Hos ad collegias suas Proctor ferri jubet. Ipse duobus canibus stipatus cæteros duo persequitur, quorum alter dux facinoris fuerat. Et ille quidem comitem arripiens "curramus" inquit; "Proctor adest. Cito pede opus est." His dictis, ambo per vicum quemdam devium versus rivum profugiunt. Proctor cum canibus insequitur. Jamque togati juvenes marginem prope rivi tetigerant, quum alter, pede lapso, in gramen humidum sternitur; alter (atque idem dux facinoris fuit) a cane arreptus, sanguineum nasum ei dat, deinde in rivum se projicit, ad ripam oppositam nando se laturus. Hîc Proctor paulisper se inhibuit, neque enim nare didicerat et Autumnus erat: duorum præterea ejus canium alter togatum juvenem qui prolapsus erat, vix tenebat; alter sanguineum suum nasum abstergens vix

cernere præ lachrymis potuit. Jamque dux facinoris ad alteram prope ripam accesserat, quum subito, Proctore scapham per marginem quærente, canis vulneratus pudore victus in rivum salit. Celeriter ad ripam oppositam pervenit. Illic dubius in noctis tenebris, ad quem locum hostis se abripuisset, per duas horas frustra se versat, omnes locos explorans. Re infecta ad Proctorem super pontem redit. Proxima die Proctor concilium collegæ et Proproctorum vocat. Rem cunctam, quo ordine gesta fuerat, exponit. Tribus togatis qui primi capti sunt quingenti versus imponuntur. Ille qui ad rivum prolapsus erat ad rusticandum terminum it. Dux facinoris non punitur, neque enim agnosci potest.

Livius Novus, lib. viii. cap. 7.

Moral Essay.

The evil tendency of reading slow in chapel considered with respect to breakfast parties and hunting appointments; shewing how far a man has a moral right to read slow; and what, according to Aristotle's the-

ory of the habits, are the proper requisites in a human being for getting fast through a chapter of the Old Testament.

Translate the following into the style of Horace's Epistles, as badly as you can, introducing the greatest number of false quantities that you can think of.

A tradesman's son, whom once I knew,
No matter when, or where, or who,
Bred at the desk to daily rounds
From pounds to pence, and pence to pounds,
Seiz'd with a sudden fit for knowledge,
Determin'd straight to go to College;
The thing was done as soon as said,
A cap with tassel decks his head;
He buys three teacups of his scout,
One with a saucer, two without,
And by kind Alma takes his stand,
With gown on back, and stick in hand.
Friends call and ask him out to dine,
To breakfast some, and some to wine;
Saving is what he takes delight in,
He goes whenever they invite him;
On others' wine gets wondrous merry,
And, drunk with port, still calls for sherry.
Meanwhile to pence and farthings true,
Though rich as Crœsus, or a Jew;

He quite forgets to ask his friends,
To taste his own, and make amends;
" The man is stingy," flew about,
" Stingy's the word," his friends cried out,
And straight devised, from animosity,
To trick him into generosity!
" I've heard," says one, " you've got some port,
" Of a most truly wondrous sort;
" Let's have a taste, I wish to try it,
" And if you choose would like to buy it!"
This said, he op'd the bin, and spied
Four dozen bottles side by side,
Demands two forks, the cork to draw,
And finds the wine without a flaw!
Just at this time, (as 'twas agreed,
In case the first friend should succeed,)
Another thirsty friend drops in,
" Oh, ho," says he, " you've op'd your bin!
" Give me a glass, we'll drink at ease,
" Or else a tumbler, which you please."
He takes a chair, (of which were plenty,)
No sooner sat, the bottle's empty!
Another bottle sees the light,
Another friend appears in sight,
Walks up the staircase, kicks the door,
Drinks up his glass and calls for more;
Our host reluctant, sees his cheer
Like smoke appear and disappear;
While drinkers fresh come every minute,
And seem to take a pleasure in it.
At last, when all his wine is gone,
Himself grown drunk *from looking on*,

Runs into Quad, kicks up a row,
And breaks four panes, he don't know how,
For which next morning he is fated
For two terms to be rusticated;
And learns at last, in his sobriety,
How to get drunk with due propriety;
Nor when to tippling he is prone,
To swill his friends', but spare his own.

A Fact of 1833, versified in the manner of Swift.

Historical Essay.

The origin of boat races in the University, with a detailed account of the principal victories gained in them since their commencement, tracing their influence upon the morals and studies of the place, and comparing the Athenian navy at the death of Pericles with the navy of Oxford and Cambridge.

To be translated into your worst Latin Prose, in the style of Cicero's Orations.

Mr. President, the honourable member is mistaken; for I beg leave to affirm, in the

most distinct and positive manner, that when I said of the honourable member that he spoke an untruth, I meant *nothing whatever* against his private character. But to return to the question before the house, if there be any gentleman here who has at heart the interests of this society, and therefore of the University, and therefore of the world; if there be any gentleman here who respects virtue and reveres antiquity; I beseech him again and again to consider most seriously the disastrous consequences that must inevitably result from the *admission of dogs,* however small, into the reading room. It is very easy for honourable members to say that *dogs are admitted* at the sister University; that it is a shame to *keep them out in the street,* while we ourselves are sitting snug over our newspapers; or that they will always be *barking at the door* so long as they are kept out. All this is very easy to say, Mr. President; but I appeal to facts; I appeal to the articles and ancient statutes of this society, in which it is expressly stated that dogs be not admitted. I am sure I have no enmity against dogs, Mr. President. They are very useful

and excellent animals in their place; but if once admitted into our reading room, be assured they will overturn the inkstands; they will tear the books to pieces; they will smear the carpet with mud from the streets; they will dirty the trousers of honourable members; and finally and eventually will not rest, till the ancient honours of this society are become the common property of the scum of creation.

Speech by a Tory in the Debating Society at Cambridge, against the admission of *dogs* into the *reading room*.

Or the following, in the style of Cicero's philosophical works.

The custom of sending in bills to young men at college, is a thing plainly contrary to the usages of morality and the principles of religion. But what is more than all this, it is opposed to my doctrine of expediency, as is to be seen in the following respects. It curtails generosity, that noblest principle of our nature, since men sometimes do not give champagne at parties because they cannot afford it, and are afraid of having to pay

for it afterwards. It condemns the human species to innumerable petty vexations, for the sight of bills is odious to all, especially when one has no money. It corrupts that serenity of mind which philosophy requires. It has a strong tendency to destroy all charitable feelings between a gentleman and his tradesman. It checks the circulation of capital, for it prevents tradesmen from failing. It gives shopkeepers a facility of cheating, enabling them as it does to send in the same bill twice with additions of what one never bought. It promotes the extinction of the gentry; for if a man pays he loses his money, if he does not pay, his honour. Such are some few of the evil consequences which result from the too prevalent custom of sending in bills; an impropriety on the part of tradesmen which deserves strong censure from the legislative powers. It is to be confessed, indeed, that if the custom were destroyed, it would occasion the misery of some few private shopkeepers, but what is this compared with the happiness of the whole human race, more especially the higher classes of it, which, to all appearance, have the opposite principle

of not paying implanted in their nature, (for here I am constrained to allow a moral sense,) as one of the first duties of morality.

From Paley's Moral Philosophy, in Lord Brougham's improved edition.

Critical Questions.

Explain the use of the word Brick in the following sentences:—As fast as a brick. As slow as a brick. As idle as a brick. To read like a brick. To run like a brick. To swear like a brick. To ride like a brick. To be as drunk as a brick. To be a brick. As hungry as a brick. An old brick. A young brick. Do you suppose this phrase to be borrowed from ancient authors? If so, what author is it who uses the corresponding Latin or Greek term in the same manner?

2. Explain the expressions "you're sold;" and "a fine sell;" and shew from the Antigone what Greek word is used in the same manner.

3. Soft fades the sun; the moon is sunk to sleep;
Through heaven's blue fringe the stars serenely
peep.
An azure calm floats o'er the breathing sky,
Like Memory brooding over days gone by;
And while the owls in tender notes complain,
Grim Silence holds her solitary reign.

From which of the Oxford or Cambridge Prize Poems are these lines taken? Explain their beauties, and give parallel passages.

4. Has any Prize Poem appeared for the last ten years at Oxford or Cambridge, without the sun, moon, or stars in it? Explain the use of these great auxiliaries to verse-making; and shew how inferior the ancients are to the moderns in the number of their suns, moons, and stars.

5. Are you acquainted with any other use of the sun and moon besides this use of helping writers of prize poems? Give reasons why these authors have not made an equal use of comets, especially when modern science has discovered there are so many to spare.

6. Trace analogically the application of the word coach, when it is said by a man, that he has "just taken such a coach to help him through his small."

7. Longinus says of swearing, *Ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ ὁπωσοῦν τινα ὀμόσαι μέγα, τὸ δὲ ποῦ, καὶ πῶς, καὶ ἐφ᾽ ὧν καιρῶν, καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα.* That is to say, "the excellence of swearing consists in the manner, the place, the occasion, and the object, being all fitting." Compare ancient and modern swearing in this respect, and give a philological history of swearing from the dark ages to the present times; explaining the true standard of correct swearing, from the metaphysical system of man.

8. Among old writers Plato and Xenophon are great swearers, being very frequent in their use of the term "by Jove." Compare these two great philosophers in this point of view.

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1. Tres fratres Cœli navigabant roundabout Ely.
   Omnes drownderunt qui swimmaway non potuerunt.

Shew the false quantities in these lines.

Who are the *tres fratres* supposed to have been? How many were drowned according to the last line? At what era of Cambridge did this important event occur? and what poet is supposed to have written the lines? Give Heyne's reading of the fourth word in the second line, and shew on what ground Porson objects to it.

2. Dr. Bentley argues that Phalaris was not plucked at college. Upon what grounds? State the argument.

3. When a man is trying to remember a thing it is common to say, that "he feels it at his fingers' ends." Shew how this expression took its rise from the custom of writing problems and chronological tables on one's nails, just before going in to be examined.

4. Explain philosophically the following terms: gip; scout; no end of clever; a tough chap; a splendid man; a shady man; and any flash terms that you can call to mind.

5. The words, mala ducis avi domum, have been construed, "thou bringest apples to the house of thy grandfather." What does Bos object to this mode of construing the words? A certain learned Oxford editor has construed, as follows, the following pieces of Latin and Greek: explain his arguments for such an interpretation of them.

Ἄμφι δ' ὀφθάλμοις φόβος. Persæ. *My eyes! if I'm not in a fright.* *Θαρσεῖτε παῖδες μητέρων τεθραμμένοι.* Sept. contra Theb. *Shew your pluck, every mother's son of you.* Ite capellæ. Virg. *Go it, you cripples.* Marinum equum. Plin. *A horse marine.* *Ἀπονυχιῶ σου τ' ἂν πρυτανείῳ σιτία.* *I will cut off thy battels in the buttery.* Nostri pugnabant rari. Cæsar. *Our men fought uncommon.*

6. Distinguish between a drag, a tandem, a buggy, a gig, a phaeton, and a coach.

7. When Cicero designates himself as Novus homo, does he not simply mean that he was a Fresh-man? Compare the two terms.

8. Translate every oath that you use into Latin and Greek, according to the learned Dammii Lexicon.

Translate the following into your worst English.

Oh fortunatos nimium sua si bona nôrint
Sleevatos bachelors ! neque enim sub sidere nightæ
Ad bookas sweatant ; nec dum Greattomia quartam
Lingua horam strikat, saveall sine candle tenentes,
Ad beddam creepunt semisleepi ; nec mane prima
Scoutus adest sævus tercentum knockibus instans
Infelix wakare caput. Sed munera mater
Ipsa dat Alma illis, keepuntque secantque chapellam
Quandocunque volunt. Si non velvete minaci
Ornati incedunt, non pisces ad table higham
Quâque die comedunt, ast illis cuttere semper
Quemque licet tutorem, illis lectura nec ulla,
At secura quies, et nescia pluckere vita.

1. Explain the uses of sleeves, comparing ancient and modern sleeves. What substitutes did the early Romans use for pocket handkerchiefs. Describe Cicero's pocket handkerchief, mentioning the most remarkable holes. Was it marked with his name? At which corner? In patent ink, or thread? And by which of the maids?

2. Prove to which of the Universities these verses apply from the third and sixth lines.

3. Shew from internal evidence at what period of history these lines were composed. Give the history of the most remarkable dog-latin poets; and analyse the most famous poem of this kind that has appeared in this century.

4. Porson reads shoutibus instead of knockibus. Heyne has proposed bawlibus *suo periculo*, and the very learned Oxford editor chooses for his reading kickibus. Shew why the present reading is preferable, from what historians tell us concerning the manner in which scouts used to wake the men in those times.

5. Does not the poet seem to exaggerate the privileges of bachelors, in what he says concerning their cutting chapel. May not this be accounted for, by supposing him to have been an undergraduate?

6. From what part of these verses does Virgil seem to have borrowed?

7. Translate the following into dog English:

Tum forte in turri, sic fama est, reading man alta
Invigilans studiis pensum carpebat, at illum
Startulat horrid uproar, evertitur inkstand—ibi omnis
Effusus labor, impurus nam labitur amnis
Ethica per Rhetoricque.——
Qualis ubi ingentes, coacha veniente, portmantos
Greatcoatosque bagosque humeros onerare ministri
Bendentis vidi, quem dura ad munia mittit
Angelus aut Mitre, vicinave stella Gazellæ.

By what poet of what era were these verses composed? Give a chronological history of the principal events in his life; mentioning whether he is noticed by any contemporary poet.—What reading has been proposed by Heyne instead of "portmantos," for the sake of removing the false quantity? Is this poet in general very particular about his quantities? May we not infer from the expression "quem mittit Mitre," that the author had in view a certain bishop?—What was the name of the person so poetically termed "reading man?" and to what fable is allusion made by the term "sic fama est?"—Shew how Mr. B*** cannot be the gentleman alluded to.

Logical and Rhetorical Questions.

1. Aristoteles novus, among other characters which he sketches in his Rhetoric, says of the freshman, as follows:

"Now the freshman differeth from the man of standing in these respects. He often weareth his cap and gown, sometimes bearing a walking-stick also. He calleth another, "Sir." He speaketh of the boys at his college. He determineth on a first class, scorning less. He attendeth lecture with reverence. He approveth not the manner of dining. He respecteth the grass-plat. He thinketh at chapel that all others be looking at him. He seemeth ashamed at his own wine party, making excuses many. He putteth on a grave countenance in passing the Proctor. He looketh this way and that way in walking. He appeareth proud of something. He despiseth schoolboys. He buyeth one cigar. He beggeth your pardon if you upset his skiff. He useth often the word Governor. He buyeth a large lexicon. He thinketh it time for him to fall in love. He goeth to bed at ten. He writeth home once a fortnight. He weareth a long

tassel to his cap. He payeth ready money, refusing discount as dishonourable. He telleth you concerning his uncle. He purchaseth a Calendar to see his own name therein. He toucheth the bottle with reverence. He buyeth false collars, changeth shoes for boots, sporteth straps, and of all great things considereth the University to be the greatest, whereof in his own mind himself formeth no small portion."

Explain this character by a reference to persons whom you know, and refer each point to the wrong head in the Rhetoric.

2. Illustrate Aristotle's sketch of youth, middle age, and old age, from the above character, and from the two following sketches of the same gentleman at two other stages of his college career.

The same person when he hath passed his Little-go.

He getteth tipsy twice a week. He cutteth chapel and lecture. He buyeth a pea, and taketh to him a swallow-tailed coat. He promoteth rows. He sporteth a blue and white shirt. He sweareth genteelly.

He talketh loud against bigotry. He buyeth cigars by the box. He borroweth a pink. He ridiculeth his former self. He considereth a quantity of bills to be gentlemanly. He boasteth of cutting the Proctor. He thinketh a first class a slow thing. He liketh to be seen with one who hath been rusticated. He acteth contumeliously at collections. He knocketh in late. He scorneth tea and bread and butter. He dineth seldom in hall. He preferreth shrewdness to learning. He writeth home once a term, and that for money. He buyeth translations. He considereth ladies to be a bore. He hath a good hand at whist, but chooseth rather to play with beginners. He cutteth his reading friend, as being slow. He shieth at the tutor's window, if there be others looking on. He encourageth whiskers. He killeth hacks. He selleth his large lexicon for ready money. He desireth to be in the army; considering of the University that it is a mean place, and becometh not a man that knows the world, and hath spirit.

The same when a Bachelor.

He consoleth himself by thinking that he

could have done better if he had pleased. He affirmeth that he hath never enjoyed himself. He keepeth a quiet pony. He considereth a fellowship to be a good thing. He payeth his pastrycook, but not his tailor. He giveth a quiet breakfast-party twice a term. He oftentimes adviseth others. He weareth continually his cap and gown. He disputeth in divinity. He angleth for pupils. He changeth whist and écarté for chess. He approveth of toast-and-water. He affirmeth of smoking that it is beastly. He buyeth the Waverley novels second-hand. He selleth certain of his old pictures. He writeth a pamphlet on the vices of the University. He studieth Russell's Modern Europe. He mindeth not to be seen in an old coat. He talketh of the time when he was an undergraduate. He goeth to bed at eleven. He beginneth German. He falleth in love. He getteth sweetmeats from home, and buyeth apples by bushel for dessert. He prideth himself on neatness. He buyeth a picture of his college. He respecteth himself as one that is experienced. He taketh upon him to order dinner. He considereth the University to be a decent

place, and himself to be a decent member thereof.

3. All members of the University wear caps and gowns,
Some ladies wear caps and gowns;
Therefore some ladies are members of the University.

Prove the correctness of this syllogism; also of the following:

A man in a skiff has got sculls in the water,
Sculls contain brains,
Therefore a man in a skiff has got water in the brains.

4. Is the following a correct Sorites?
All young ladies are agreeable; all agreeable things are pleasant; all pleasure is uncertain; all uncertain things are vain; all vanity is good for nothing; therefore all young ladies are good for nothing.

5. Put the following argument into a syllogistic form:
"I must say it was a great shame in the examiners to pluck such a fellow as me, especially when I have been plucked twice

before by accident. And I am sure no one can say I was idle; for I read all day through the last fortnight, except on hunting-days. However, I dare say the Governor wont find it out, for he is deuced slow."

6. The schoolmen define man to be "animal implume." Prove this definition to be false, from the fact that a man is capable of being plucked.

7. Are the speeches in the Debating Society to be considered as deliberative, judicial, or epideictic? Explain the singular circumstance that no mention of the Debating Society is to be found in Aristotle's Politics.

8. "We understand that Major D** of W*** near Yarmouth, has been convicted of receiving three kegs of smuggled brandy." May not this be called an "illicit process of the major?"

9. Explain the logical distribution of a term by reference to the meaning of the word term-trotter.

10. Distinguish metaphysically between Oxford milk and Oxford cream, shewing from Plato how much water is necessary to constitute the first, and how much milk the last.

11. Explain the following remarks of Aristoteles novus in his Rhetoric upon the character of the reading man :

"He supposeth that Henry the 8th must certainly have been a king of England, or something of the kind. He hath an indistinct idea that the Clyde is a trout stream in the West of England, or somewhere thereabouts. He expecteth to pass through Bristol on his road from Oxford to London, but not having a modern map is yet afraid to ask. He keepeth his brush and combs on the chimneypiece of his sitting room. He putteth off having his hair cut till after his degree. He hath a list of his books in his desk. He laugheth at another because he knew not the father of Zerubbabel. He taketh a pill on Saturday evenings. He grieveth severely for not getting a first class. He hath a pale face. He feareth that he will make a hash of his history. He taketh a constitutional of forty

minutes every day. He rideth out once a term galloping fast, and pinning in front the tails of his coat lest they get soiled. He despiseth amusements, considering man to be a reading animal. He loungeth in quad, that he may seem idle. He weareth gloves seldom, but oftentimes appeareth in dirty shoes.

Translate the following into your worst English.

Οἱ δὲ ἐπειδὴ παρεσκεύαστο αὐτοῖς, τηρήσαντες νύκτα χειμερινὸν ὕδατι, καὶ ἀνέμῳ, καὶ ἅμα ἀσέληνον, ἐξῄεσαν. Ἡγεῖτο δὲ Σμῖθος ὅσπερ καὶ τῆς πείρας αἴτιος ἦν. Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τρία βλάνκεττα συνδήσαντες ὕνγησαν αὐτὰ ἔξω. Τότε δὲ ὁ Σμῖθος παραινέσας Θομψῶνα καὶ Ἰονσῶνα καὶ Ἰακωβσῶνα δουνλέττει ἑαυτον πρὸς τὴν γῆν. Οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ἐφόλλουσαν αὐτόν. Καὶ δὴ ὁ Θομψῶν καὶ ὁ Ἰονσῶν; ἄνευ ψόφου ἐδουνγόττησαν· ὁ δὲ Ἰακωβσῶν, (ὑπέρφαττος γὰρ ἦν,) βλανκέττων τινος βρεακθέντος, φαλλδουνεῖ, καὶ τὸν πορτερὸν ἐξ ὕπνου ἀνεγείρει. Οἱ ἄλλοι μὲν ἐξέφυγον: ὁ δὲ πορτερὸς καὶ ὑποπορτερὸς προσελθόντες Ἰακωβσῶνα τὸν κακοδαίμονα συλλαμβάνουσι. Οἱ δὲ τρεῖς οἱ ἀποφυγόντες πολλὴν ὁδὸν ῥυννήσαντες ὡς τάχιστα, τέλος ἐστόππησαν: καὶ πολλῶν γνώμων λεχθείσων ἐνίκησεν ἡ τελευταία ἡ τοῦ Σμίθου, ὅτι δεῖ λάρκην ἔχειν, καὶ τότε λαρκήσαντες εἰς

κολληγίαν πρὸς τὸν πορτερὸν ῥετύρνειν. τὸ δὲ ὄνομα τοῦ πορτεροῦ ἦν Ἰωάννης, καὶ τοῦ ὑποπορτεροῦ Θῶμας. Ταῦτα οὖν δετερμινήσαντες καὶ ἔπραξαν οὕτως. Πρῶτον γὰρ λίθοις ἐβρεάκησαν πάνας εἴκοσι ἐν τῷ στρήτῳ, κ. τ. λ.

The Secret History of Oxford, by THUCYDIDES NOVUS.

Put the following into bad English verse.

Ὣς ἔφατ᾽· οἱ δὲ κλάπον Μάσιχοι μάλα γηθόσυνοι κῆρ,
Καὶ τῶν ἱσσόντων γένετο ἰαχή τε καὶ ὕπρωρ.
Καὶ τότε Σίνκλαιρος Σκιμμήριος ἇλτο χαμᾶζε·
Πολλὰς ἔχων παπέρας, καὶ σῶμ᾽ Αἴαντι ἐοικώς.
Τὸν Λοΐδην δὲ κάκ᾽ ὀσσόμενος προσέφη τε καὶ εἶπεν·
"Τίπτε μέλει ὑμῖν, Μάσιχοι, ὅτι Ῥάμβλερός εἰμι;
Καὶ τί πότ᾽ ἐστ᾽ ὑμίν αὐθώριτί με πρηφέντειν;
Ἀλλ᾽ ὅδ᾽ ἀνὴρ Μασίχης περὶ πάντων ἔμμεναι ἄλλων,
Πάντων δὲ ῥυλεῖν ἐθέλει, καὶ πάντας ἀβύζειν,
Πᾶσι δὲ κομμανδεῖν· ἅτιν᾽ οὐ πείσεσθαι οἴω.
Εἰ δέ μιν εὐσπάκοντ᾽ ἔθεσαν θεοὶ αἰὲν ἐόντες
Τούνεκά οἱ προθέουσιν ὀνείδεα πᾶσι λέγεσθαι;
Πάντας δὲ ἐξπέλλειν ἀγαθοὺς τρείουσι Μασεῖχοι,
Οἷς αἰεί τοι ἔρις τε φίλη πόλεμοί τε μάχαι τέ.
Μήδ᾽ οὕτως κλάσσμαν πὲρ ἐὼν, Μασίχη θέοειδες,
Κλέπτε νόῳ· ἐπεὶ οὐ ψήφῳ ἐξπέλλεαι ἡμᾶς."

UNIOMACHIA.

1. To what alteration in the constitution of the Union do these verses allude?

2. What is understood by the disputed

term Ῥάμβλερος? Do you agree with the learned editor in supposing it must have meant some opposition society, which has been gradually destroyed in the progress of college generations?

3. Who was the hero *Μασίχης*, and what do we know of his history? Discuss this.

4. Dunderheadius explains *Σίνκλαιρος*, by a reference to the Saxon language. Give any explanation of your own that you think better.

5. Explain the term *εὐσπηκοντ'*, mentioning who is the best speaker in the Union at present, and of what country he is. Also what the last motion was that he introduced, and whether it passed or not.

Questions in Moral Philosophy.

1. Prove the morality of swearing from the Bible and the nature of man.

2. Shew from Whately, whether Sunday

is most properly spent in reading Thucydides and Algebra, or in playing at écarté and drinking claret. Discuss this.

3. According to Locke's theory of ideas, we are to consider the human mind as a piece of blank paper. Does the philosopher here mean brown paper, whity brown paper, or white paper, according to the coarseness of men's minds? Or does he mean white paper only? And if the last, what sort of white paper? whether hot pressed or foolscap? Give reasons for preferring the latter, and discuss the subject.

4. Aristotle in his Ethics lays down the biting of one's nails to be the height of vice. Prove from this that he agreed with Paley in considering the seat of morals to be in one's fingers' ends.

5. Connect Plato's theory with New College puddings, and discuss the latter subject.

6. Defend upon philosophical principles the conduct of Paley, in having a large and

small hole cut in his door for his cat and kitten. What was the colour of this famous cat? and what of its remarkable actions in the philosopher's study are recorded?

7. Discuss the theory which justifies men in taking freshmen's caps and gowns, instead of their own old academicals, when at a party.

8. Make clear the correctness of the following reasons for cutting a man, according to Aristotle's doctrine of friendship in the Ethics:

"A man may be cut, because he has got on an old coat. Because he has got on a white hat in winter Because he has taken to reading. Because he has splashed you out hunting. Because he has taken a scholarship. Because he advised you. Because you have found a new acquaintance. Because he would not go with you to W*** in a tandem. Because he would not get tipsy at your request. Because he has taken to wearing his cap and gown. Because he would not carry into chapel for you the second volume of Jacob Faithful.

Because he refused to meet C*** at a wine party. Because his wine is bad. Because his rooms are up three pair of stairs, and therefore difficult to be got at. Because another man says he is an ass. Because he would not go with you on the river. Because his hat is narrow brimmed. Because you find it a bore to nod. Because his dog hurt yours. Because his skiff running against yours hurt your middle finger. Because he got a new novel before you, although your name was down first. Because he beat you at pigeon shooting. Because he would not let you break your own decanter. Because he was spilled. Because he is against Dr. Hampden. Because he shews the white of his stockings.

Questions in Divinity.

1. Who was the third cousin once removed of Tiglath Pelezer's great nephew ?

2. What sort of stone was that which David made use of, and were there any others in the brook like it ?

3. How often is that important word "and" repeated in the New Testament?

Mathematical Questions.

1. A bets B a certain sum that he will drive a tandem past the Proctor in daylight. B bets C the same sum, that he will ride through the College quadrangle. The Proctor imposes on B three times as many lines as he bet shillings, and the Vice on A fourteen and a half times as many lines as he bet pounds. What was the original sum bet?

2. A Freshman engages to eat a sponge cake while a Bachelor is drinking a bottle of port. The Bachelor begins half a second before the Freshman, and has reached his ninth glass by the time that the Freshman is swallowing the sixth mouthful. How long will it be before the Freshman is choked?

3. A and B had drunk two bottles and a quarter of Port at the proportionate rate of

three to five. A bets B, after this, that he shall be able to distinguish between port and sherry after sipping six times of each alternately. He is blindfolded accordingly, and ceases to distinguish when he has sipped half as many times as B had drunk more glasses than himself. How many glasses had A drunk before he began sipping?

4. Drink half a pint of negus, add to this a pint of beer, seven and a half glasses of Sherry, a bottle and a quarter of Port, three glasses of brandy, a tumbler of rum, and four drops of water. What will be the result?

5. At what angle with the horizon is a tipsy man most easily upset, according to Newton?

6. Reconcile this philosopher's theory of gravitation with the saying, that when such a man was going home from a party the ground rose up and hit him on the nose.

7. At what ratio of velocity will an empty bottle in concussion with a nose break the

nose in question? Explain this mathematical process of reduction to vulgar fractions.

8. Account for the phenomenon in acoustics, that the sound of your voice in calling the porter from your room up three pair of stairs travels at a ratio proportionate to your tips.

9. Explain Newton's theory concerning the antagonistic principles of undergraduates and chapel.

10. Allowing every man in the University to have six friends, each of whom has six friends, and so on; at what degree of acquaintanceship is every man connected with every man, supposing there to be 1200 men.

11. If one bottle is enough for eight reading and a half, how many bottles will be requisite for one man who does not read?

12. Of two Cambridge controversialists, one asserts that the apple which Newton saw

fall was a codlin, the other that it was a golden pippin. State the dispute of these learned philosophers, and shew its effect upon Newton's theory.

13. According to the theory of light, what light is best for escaping the eye of the Proctor?

14. If three men out of seven are plucked when the examiner is in a good humour, how many out of nine will be plucked when he is in a bad humour?

15. Let A be a hunter, B a freshman on the hunter's back, C a fence, and D a muddy ditch, on the other side of the fence. The hunter A suddenly draws up at the fence C. What connection will follow between the freshman B and the ditch D?

THE END.

COOKE, PRINTER, HIGH STREET.

A LETTER

TO

A STUDENT

ON

ENTERING THE UNIVERSITY.

CAMBRIDGE:

PRINTED BY

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1835.

The following Letter, which, in its original form, was addressed by a Fellow and Tutor of a College at Oxford to a student there, is now printed for circulation among the junior members of this University, in the hope that it may meet with their serious and attentive perusal.

It is extracted by permission from the "Domestic Portraiture," one of the volumes of the *Christian's Family Library*, published by Messrs. Seeley, London.

Cambridge,
November, 1835.

A LETTER,

&c.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

You request my advice on a subject which will probably give a direction to your whole life. I give it you with the more satisfaction, because I believe you are not one of those who ask counsel with a previous determination to follow their own judgment, and who set no value on experience for which they have not paid the price in their own mistakes; but are anxiously looking out for a guide, and ready to follow him. After twelve years' residence in one of our Universities, I may fairly be supposed to know something both of their dangers and advantages. I am aware of the temptations to which you will be exposed in your new situation; yet with respect to myself, I may assert, that they were by no means so great as others have represented them,—fewer and less dangerous than the after trials of manhood, or even those of my boyish days at school.

The opportunity you now have of acquiring solid learning, and of laying the foundation of all that will be useful to you in life, is incalculably valuable, and it should be your chief concern to embrace the golden moment with firm and steady grasp. Accept, then, with my best wishes and prayers for your welfare, the result of past observation at Alma Mater.

1. Wherever you are, in or out of the University, much will depend on the *regulation of yourself.* We are apt to lay the blame of our indiscretions and failures on our circumstances, and to suppose that we should act differently under other influences: but this is a great mistake; for circumstances, though I admit they have a powerful influence on our conduct, do not so much form, as discover our character. Be "lord of your own mind," and you will rise above outward trials. Try, then, to understand *yourself*—your *weak* points.

Begin and end the day with prayer; but content not yourself with an indolent or hurried exercise of devotion, without heart or meaning, and a cursory or irregular glancing at a passage of scripture, under an idea of satisfying conscience, or "doing your duty." Consider seriously the chief end of the appointment, as the prescribed channel of intercourse with God. Your strength, success, and preservation from evil, all depend on communion with him. Every thing will go well or ill with you, in proportion as you live in dependence on, and obedience to, the Spirit of God.

In reading the Bible, (I am now speaking of religion and its practical application to your heart and conscience, and not of theology as a science and profession,) take a few verses, and meditate and pray over them till you get not only the meaning, but the very spirit of them wrought into your own soul. If you do not understand a passage, you may apply to a commentator for explanation; otherwise be your own expositor,—preach to your own heart, and feed on the word of God amidst the aspirations of prayer and praise, and heavenly thoughts and affections. Examine yourself by it, to obtain conviction of sin, and to discover your defects and evil propensities,—to judge of your progress, and pray for uprightness and deep seriousness. Look forward to the probable events of the day, and seek grace and support to meet any trials that may occur, and improve your opportunities for good. Consider that you are entering society with a body of sin and death, ever liable to impart injury or to receive it; and while you carefully guard against the approaches of evil, you should aim, like your Master, to "go about doing good." Your first hour may be well employed in this holy exercise. At night, a shorter time may suffice; for the spirits will flag, and the body be wearied. The efficacy of prayer does not depend on the length of time employed in acts of devotion: God thinks of mercy, and not sacrifice; and so must you.

Such remarks are applicable to all persons and

situations, but are more especially important to one in your circumstances. You are now deprived of your father's conversation, and the devotional exercises of the family; and you have need to redouble your diligence in private devotion. Remember, then, that your first and greatest trial will be in your closet; and if you fail here, all will go wrong with you throughout the day. If you rob God, to turn to Euclid or Euripides, or hurry away to chapel without private prayer, because you have given way to sloth,—other motives may stimulate you to be diligent in business, but you will not long continue "fervent in spirit, serving the Lord;" and if his Holy Spirit forsake you,—and he *will* forsake you if you grieve him by neglect of the means of grace,—you will fall into many inconsistencies, and in the end lose all love for religion, and concern for your soul, and perhaps by your conduct discredit yourself even in the eyes of the world.

It is a good habit to keep some subject in mind for *occasional* employment,—a promise—a precept—an attribute of God, on which to meditate in every vacant moment. There are intervals in the course of your college duties, when you cannot sit down to serious studies. *An idle moment furnishes at all times a nidus for a temptation.*

2. Be very cautious in *the formation of friendships.* Your religious and general improvement will be closely connected with the character of your associates.

You will find me correct in dividing the young men into two classes; of which one affects to despise, and the other professes to honour religion. The former class comprises *three* sets or parties, all agreeing to live without God in the world, but differing in their manners and pursuits. The *first* of the three are the men of family and fortune, who spend their time in amusement, attending as little as possible to the studies of the place. For the most part they are men of profligate habits, though not all equally vicious. There is *another* set of young men who are not better disposed than the former, but who have not the same means of doing mischief to themselves or others: they are, however, quite as ignorant, idle, and thoughtless, with perhaps the addition of coarseness and vulgarity of manners. To neither of these classes must you approximate, but (to speak academically) you must *cut them* all. I am under no apprehension of your familiarizing yourself with low company; but a silk gown, or a gold tuft,—a wish to form a high connexion, may tempt you to tolerate what ought to be intolerable to you. At first you may feel disgust at profane and vicious language and manners. Insensibly they will excite less horror. After a time you will think it enough to be personally exempt from these offences—then you may begin to excuse and palliate; till at length you break bounds, and assume a conduct, and avow a creed, repugnant to your judgment, and which your heart secretly

condemns. You will have no difficulty in avoiding such associates; for, unless you seek an introduction, they will not notice you. There is a *third* party which pretends to no religion, but whose diligent application to study, and desire of distinction in the university, are worthy of your imitation; for you are sent to college, not merely to get a degree, and barely escape rejection at last, but to obtain a creditable testimony that you have profited by the studies of the place: yet, while I commend the industry of the characters alluded to, and their generally correct conduct, I do not hesitate to say, that their motives and objects are not such as I could enforce upon you.

It is possible that my advice to you may be different from that of some who nevertheless agree with me in principle. I remember it was said to you by ——"Don't look at every man not strictly religious as a wild bear, and a dangerous companion." Certainly it is not a duty to cherish morose feelings, but rather to cultivate a sweetness of temper and a courteous behaviour towards all: and an occasional interchange of visits, with those who will converse profitably on literary pursuits, cannot be objected to. Yet I wish to be more explicit as to the proper degree of intercourse with those who do not fear God, however creditable and desirable the acquaintance may be in other respects. If you were of long standing in religion, you might venture on

many things which you cannot now attempt with safety. They might even become a duty. The firemen must scale the burning roof, while the spectator of the flames had better keep at a distance. You must not try how much poison your constitution will bear, or risk your soul's health for the sake of any temporal advantage. *The world*—by which I mean those who are ignorant of religion, or whose hearts are not in it,—*must ever be to the true Christian either a cross or a snare; and when it ceases to be the one, it will invariably become the other.* I cannot approve of whole evenings passed in company where it is understood that God is never to be referred to, and where the least observation connected with eternity creates a silence, if it does not provoke a sneer, an opposition of sentiment, or a feeling of distaste. To be much in society of this kind, beyond the demands of duty or necessity, which you can seldom plead, is surely no better than constructive treason against our Lord and Saviour. If you make the experiment, mark the effect on your own mind. If the tone of religious feeling be impaired, if you grow dull and heartless in devotion, be assured that something is wrong in your motives, pursuits, and associations. So long as you agree to live and converse as if the world were every thing, and God nothing, you may be tolerated, though your professed attachment to religion be known ; or you may even be respected for qualities that are amiable and

estimable, and your society may afford satisfaction to literary young men, who would keep you at a distance if you acted consistently with your profession of a purer faith and stricter conversation. The old rule "noscitur a sociis" is a very wise and safe one. Compare the conversation of your new associates, if you form such, with the discussions you have heard under the paternal roof; where, though the subjects were not always strictly religious, yet the spirit in which they were treated had a tendency not only to improve the mind, but in some way or other to sanctify the heart. Perhaps I feel the more strongly on this subject, partly from having seen many a hopeful young person entirely ruined by a friendship formed on merely literary grounds, and partly because I perceive a gradual breaking down of old-fashioned distinctions, to the serious injury of true religion.

Your father has, I find, earnestly entreated you to cast in your lot with those who, by way of reproach, are termed *the saints*. But remember that, if you are not on the one hand to *despise* any man, neither are you, on the other, to *attach yourself* to any man on account of a *mere name*. You must judge every man, not by his professions, but by the measure in which he adorns his profession. Certainly piety is an indispensable requisite for a select and endeared companion; but you must look also for good sense and intelligence, for studious habits, for a con-

scientious discharge of all collegiate duties, and very particularly for a modest and amiable deportment. These are the things which recommend religion in the estimation of others, especially of those who are in authority in any college; and they will render the possessor of them a safe and valuable companion to yourself.

If there be any who, amidst their pretensions to piety, manifest an indifference to the studies of the university, and an open contempt for its honours, and who are forward in disputing on points of controversy, and arrogant in maintaining some peculiar views of their own, to the neglect of the plain and practical truths of religion, withdraw yourself from them. Those alone deserve your notice, who carry religion into all the duties and offices of life, and who unite diligence in their appointed studies, with fervour of spirit in the service of the Lord, (Rom. xii. 11.) At the same time, it will be well to join yourself to those, who are gentlemanly in their deportment, rather than to persons, who, by a vulgarity in their manner, give offence to those of more polished habits; but yet, on the whole, you will do well to prefer an honest man, with somewhat of a rough unmannered exterior, before one of more fashionable appearance, with a heart less upright, and a life less devoted to the Lord.

3. I particularly recommend you to decline *breakfast parties* as a custom; for even when the conver-

sation may be interesting and generally improving, there is a temptation to prolong it unreasonably, and thus to infringe upon the regular hours and habits of study.

4. When at college, I had a great dread of *loungers.* They are the bane of all study. Security from morning interruptions must be obtained at any expense. Idleness is very contagious, and gossiping of all kinds is a sad waste of time. The best way of avoiding the evil, is to resort to the common usage of shutting your outer door.

5. Remember, (for it is an invaluable maxim) that *method is the soul of business*, and that steady perseverance is necessary to your successful cultivation of knowledge. Let your time be duly portioned out, and every thing done in its season.—Let each hour have its allotted employment. Rise early. Keep good hours—your health and success both depend on it. Sitting up late is a very bad habit. Guard against inequality and irregularity: if you read hard for a week, and then idle away whole days in boating and riding, you will make less progress than persons inferior to yourself in ability, but who are steady and regular in their application. Nothing is done well that is done by fits and starts.

6. You ought not to think of degrading into the class called the *non-reading men,* under an idle pretence of gaining more general knowledge: you should aim at some academical distinction. I dare

not hold out to you, as a motive, the love of reputation or the gratification of pride ; but *study continually* to honour God and religion. *It is worth while to labour hard to have something valuable in the eyes of the world, to lay at the foot of the cross.* I have always admired Selden's reply, when asked how a man of his attainments could lower himself by superstition, (for such his piety was miscalled)—" You may despise religion, but whatever be my attainments in human learning, I do count them all but dung and dross in comparison of the excellency of the knowledge of Jesus Christ my Lord." Many men will value the truth in proportion to their respect for those who profess it. You may find persons who cloak their indolence or their dulness under a misapplication of some text of scripture ; but be assured the most spiritual and really useful men, if not always possessed of the greatest talent, are those who have made the most of their opportunities. No one's name slumbers in the Tripos : it follows him through life ; and what he has been at college, will help or injure his influence in many a country village. When a young clergyman excites attention by a serious application to his duties, it is a common inquiry amongst persons who might be supposed not to trouble themselves about such matters, What degree did he take ? Was he distinguished at college ? and he will rise or sink in their estimation accordingly. There may be prejudice and mistake in this ; but it

carries no small weight to be able to say, *Are they* philosophers, mathematicians, or linguists? *so am I.* Besides, the habit of application to subjects not immediately connected with religion, is a good discipline of the mind, and will accustom it to correct and deep thinking on religion itself. The studies of the university are not, as some suppose, a mere literary trial of skill, and of no further use than to fill up a space in human life, or fit a man for scientific pursuits alone. If you find the lectures dry, or your studies irksome, think of working for God's glory and Christ's honour, and it will infuse a vigour and a sweetness into them. I have heard some good young men complain of the loss of spirituality and taste for the Bible, and ascribe this mischief to the absorbing influence of their studies; but their studies are not to blame. If you enter into them with a desire to serve and honour the Lord, you will suffer no loss by means of them: if in your spirit you find less of the vivid motions of a flame, your love to God will on the whole burn with a purer and more steady fire. A man may hold communion with God through any medium, or in any occupation, if his heart and aim be right: and whilst he may become carnal in the midst of theological pursuits, he may preserve the utmost spirituality while wading through the less inviting labours of the schools. Remember that it is not your *work*, but your *motive*, which will injure or keep alive your piety.

You will be required to go to the college chapel a certain number of times every week. I would advise you, however, to be present as often as possible. The example even of the religious young men may fail you; many of whom regard this regular attendance as a waste of time. They complain of the way in which the service is sometimes performed, and that there is no devotion in chants and anthems. But you have nothing to do with the offences of others, or with *modes* of worship. It is God's house, God's service. Honour both, and you shall not have to bewail the unprofitableness of prayer under any circumstances or defects.

Go, also, to chapel in proper time; and *never think any time misspent which is employed in the service and presence of God.* Your attendance at St. Mary's, though expected, is not exacted. You will hear many admirable discourses for head and heart at that church. Sermons indeed are much improved in doctrine and application since my day; yet even then I seldom heard a discourse from which I could not gain something useful, either in the elucidation of the text, or by inference, and use of the preacher's material. But whatever be the defect of a sermon, recollect who has set you the example of honouring the appointment of lawful authority in church and state, and "fulfilling all righteousness." I would have you affiliate yourself to the habits, usages, studies, and worship of an university man, and cultivate a spirit

of modesty, regularity, order, humility, and submission, as the prime duty and greatest ornament of a young man in *statu pupillari*, whose province it is to learn and not to teach.

8. You wish me to sketch out *a plan of study*, and an orderly *arrangement of your time*. Much depends on college appointments; but leaving you to improve or alter in reference to them, I will comply with your request, at the same time observing that it is more easy for me to dictate, than for you to execute. You have need to pray for firmness and resolution; since any relaxation or breach on your part, except in cases of imperious necessity, will leave you resolving and re-resolving, but never attaining to any eminence. I suppose the chapel-service at seven in the morning and six in the evening, hall at four, lecture at nine, with some other college exercise which you must arrange as you can—the amount of time will be the same. Let your private devotions be always your first occupation in the morning. I need not repeat what I have already said on this subject, except it be again to urge you, on no account to proceed to business, till you have sought help from God. If you be not inflexibly steady and regular on this point, you will lose the spirit of religion, and retain only the dregs of form. Out of the remainder of the day, take after lectures six hours for your college exercises; and try to be steady, neat, accurate, and eminent in every thing.

You will now have spent seven or eight hours in close application; *never exceed them.* You may turn to music, which is a great refreshment of the spirits,—to conversation, or whatever requires no effort of mind. Never be out of your room after ten at night, and spend half an hour at the least in devotional exercises before you retire to bed. I shall not repeat what I have said on the subject of prayer, but let me add one caution. You will sometimes have to lament great failures; do not on such occasions take refuge in loose antinomian notions, nor yet give way to recklessness and despondency; if God knows you are honest, and striving in all things to glorify him, though you fall seven times a day, he will raise you up again. Never resolve to do *nothing* because you have not done *every thing;* but cast your troubles on Christ, and set to work again with more diligence, caution, and dependence.

I have said nothing of modern literature: you are already pretty well acquainted with it, and if you can find an hour for lighter reading, which does not fatigue you, it may be well to enlarge your present stock; but not to the neglect of other things; because in vacations you may profitably spend some time upon the historians and English poets. I would have you attend, in turn, the public lectures on anatomy, chemistry, &c.;—you will not be able to read in private on these subjects, but you may thus acquire a general knowledge of them, which will both

improve and amuse you. The divinity lectures I advise you to pay particular attention to. Make copious notes of what you hear there. You will find them abounding in important and well digested matter. With respect to theological reading, however, let me seriously caution you against a spirit of curious metaphysical inquiry into those parts of theology, which are more fit for age and experience, if indeed they are ever safe, or profitable, or intelligible. The arrogant dogmatism of some religionists is intolerable, their presumption full of danger, and their spirit and temper most unchristian. On many points it is best to say with Leighton, "Here I choose rather to stand on the shore, and in the survey of God's judgments exclaim, 'Oh the depths,' than venture out upon the fathomless abyss, from which I may never return." The present is a childish dispensation, in which we must be content to know little, and strive to do much.

There is one part of my sketch on which I have not been sufficiently explicit; I mean the exercise which is indispensably necessary to health. I have scarcely ever had a pupil to whom in this respect I did not seem to be another Cassandra, whose predictions no one would believe. I hope you will be an exception. To read yourself blind, deaf, stupid, and nervous, is really a great folly, and a kind of suicide. There have been many sad examples of complete failure amongst students, through neglect of exercise, rather than from over-mental exertion.

Always take exercise in the best part of the day, and for two hours consecutively at the very least.

9. *Avoid wine parties*, as much as possible: or if circumstances seem to make an occasional visit in this way necessary, firmly adhere to some rule as to quantity. This determination will save you much trouble and temptation. Acquaintances formed at these parties are transitory, and companions will soon be dispersed to be heard of no more. A few endeared intimacies are likely to be more durable and valuable.

10. The university, which brings together so great a variety of persons, is a good school for *the study of character:* avail yourself of it; by the defects of others learn to correct your own, and by their virtues improve yourself. You will seldom find a person who does not excel you in something: lead him to talk on his favourite subject, that you may profit by his superiority.

11. With respect to your *vacations*, I shall only now throw out one hint; which is, that these must be almost equally busy periods, if you aspire to academical honours. You will, indeed, be expected to relax occasionally in family parties; still you must unceasingly pursue your object, and attend to little else. Get up your college subjects for the next term; you cannot otherwise keep pace with the lectures.

12. Whatever you read, always keep in mind the

great truths of the Bible, Let the Bible and the Bible only, be the rule of your faith and practice.

13. Never converse about religion, but *in the spirit of religion;* be earnest, spiritual, and serious; jokes, and tales, and absurd associations, produce levity of mind, and even hypocrisy; be cheerful, but not light.

14. You may start at the amount of what I have stated, but I know from experience that I have proposed nothing which may not be achieved by steady perseverance. Throw your whole soul, my dear ——, into a preparation for a useful, honourable, and religious life; more especially as you are looking forward to the most glorious of all employments, the office and work of the ministry. That God may give you grace, and health, and strength, to become a workman that needeth not to be ashamed, is the earnest prayer of,

Your affectionate and faithful friend.

Article VIII 11 No. 18.

THE CHECK REIN;

A FEW COOL WORDS ON

HORSE RACING

AND ITS EFFECTS.

BY A LAYMAN.

READER! I would speak to you on the subject of Horse-races. Do you countenance them? I, among others, do not. We oppose them on *religious* principles. Now, if you are one of those that abound in these days of lukewarmness and misconceptions, who would set down for idle cant any allusion to religious principles in matters which they would flatter themselves religion has nothing to do with, I pray you put down this paper: I cannot convince you; the tongue of an angel could not convince you, that any thing is right which opposes the inclination of your will and heart. You have determined—if you have determined any thing—to serve the world first and God

next, if it be convenient, or there should be time occasionally. It is to the professing Christian that I address myself. To you I shall be intelligible when I speak of religious principles, and say that they can be never out of place; and from you I shall easily get an assent to that general rule which Scripture has established, and common experience supports,—that till by God's mercy there is implanted in the heart an anxious concern for the salvation of the soul, *nothing* is looked upon in a true view, or in its right place. Have I then no care for my soul, you ask, if I patronise the Race-course? Believe me, Reader, if you think yourself to be a true follower of Jesus Christ, and yet can see no harm in such things, you must be in fearful error one way or another. The true follower of Jesus is to look to the glory of God in all that he sets his hand to; is to have God always before his eyes; is to be seeking the good either of his own soul, or the souls of his fellow-creatures. Can God's glory, God's fear, or man's good be promoted by the agonising struggles of dumb animals? by the staking of men's substance—those talents committed to their charge to be laid out in glorifying

God—for no purpose at all? by indulging in the intoxicating cup? by listening to, and perhaps participating in, all manner of blasphemies and impurities? Tell me, Reader, does the boldly professing Christian frequent such places? he who professes to be led by the Spirit of God dwelling in his heart? Is it not notorious that those who originate, revive, and continue such scenes, are outwardly and even professedly, lovers of pleasure rather than lovers of God? persons who would stop their ears if you were to speak to them of Christ; who would turn their backs and blaspheme were a Minister of his Gospel to stand up before them, and reprove them out of God's word; who are in the habit of saying that people are in danger of becoming righteous overmuch, and that all the world are become saints? Is not this the language of the promoters of the Race, the theatre, the revel, and other various vanities with which Satan amuses his willing slaves in this world? And *can* this be the language of a Christian, of one that has vowed before God that he will by grace renounce, put far away from him, the world, the flesh, the devil? *Can* one on whom the vows of

God thus lie, countenance a place where the world—yea as its children call it, the fashionable world—reigns supreme—God and eternity shut out from their thoughts, that they may revel more freely in the reckless riot of blind and godless heathens; a place where the flesh in every shape is consulted, both in the lust of the eye, and the pride of life; where the flaunting crowds of the sons of Adam and daughters of Eve, clothed in all the glitter and glare their means can muster, parade their importance before their fellow-worms; a place where if God presides not, Satan must; and where it is plain that *he* does, from the fruits it produces, prodigality, profaneness, drunkenness, uncleanness, fighting, bloodshed. With what malignant complacency may we imagine the Prince of this World roams through the length and breadth of it, viewing the rich harvest he is about to reap in so many never-dying souls giving themselves up to him in preference, to be the subjects of his kingdom here, and the partakers of his torments hereafter.

Yet, notwithstanding all this, we are told that the Race-course is a necessary relaxation, and an innocent amusement.

Now we grant that there may be necessary relaxations; but until it can be shewn where God has said 'relax your energies which might otherwise sink through unremitted zeal in my service, by glutting your eyes with the writhings of dumb animals in their attempts to escape from the torture of the lash, and by gathering together around you the profane, the drunkard, the gamester, the unclean, and proclaiming to *them* a holiday which, by agreement, God and religion, the Bible and its truths shall have no power to mar,' till such a permission as this can be shewn, we can never allow the Horse-race to be a *necessary* relaxation. Is it an *innocent* one? Many maintain, perhaps, of those who desire to revive and continue this relic of a dark age, that they have never *felt* any harm from promoting a Horse-race; that they know many besides who have done as they have, and have likewise *felt* no harm. It may be so, and they should look to it; for one sign of God's having given up men to walk after their own imaginations is that they have no changes, no interruptions. But even allowing that they have as yet felt no harm to their souls arising from the practice, yet

let them look a little further than themselves, and see whether the ruin of the souls of thousands be not involved, if not their own. Do the great, the wealthy, the professional, alone participate in the scenes, and swell the crowd of the Race-course? It were well, perhaps, comparatively, if such were the case; but such is not. See the effects that it has among the poor. See the miserable results it leads to. See the labourer that has been tempted to leave his home, and take a part in the iniquities of the day, returning at night, reeling perhaps with the fumes of drunkenness, perhaps stained with the blood of himself or of his brother; to take his place, with stifled conscience and brutalized heart, before the little circle that clusters around him from day to day to gather from him an example and rule for their future lives; or, at any rate, returning to have those eyes, which amidst his labours should be dwelling on heavenly things, haunted for months to come by the empty shew of that day; and his ear, which might otherwise be noticing the care and love of a kind Providence in the glad sounds of creation, stunned with the oaths and blasphemies which that day fell

upon it. Or see the youth who has felt the strivings of the Spirit of God, and who has "escaped the corruptions of the world through lust;" (2 Pet. i. 4,) drawn away by the deceitfulness of sin into the same snare of the devil, and returning to *his* home, his affections cooled, his heart hardened, to relapse into a state more fearful than his first. O how many a soul has looked back with shame to the loss of its first love from the deadly influence of some such worldly vanity as the Race-course and the revel. And surely the fact that by such unholy excitements, the love of God, and the concern for the soul are diminished, deserves *some* consideration as to the *innocency* of the amusement we are considering. The nourishment of godliness in the heart is different from the nourishment of any thing else there; any thing else is a natural plant there, but godliness we all know is not: and the enemy that made it to be so, being still interested to keep the matter as bad as possible, makes a handle of every thing he can, to keep out, and to root out, every blade of righteousness.—And nothing yields him a better handle for so doing than these vanities, which he first put into

men's hearts to invent, such as the Race-course, the theatre, the revel, and so on; for these profess to have nothing to do with God or religion, and bring together multitudes without the fear of God before their eyes, who bring forth the evil treasures of their hearts, and encourage one another in every corruption.

Next the world holds that it is a *patriotic* amusement which we denounce, that it diffuses good among men. I think we have seen the species of good which it diffuses among others. Let us see of what kind is the good it produces to the originators and promoters themselves of such amusement. "He that loveth pleasure shall be a poor man." (Prov. xxi. 17.) The word of God has said it, and experience proves it two ways; first in the man's substance, next in his soul. With regard to his substance, how often has the Race-course reduced a man from affluence to beggary in the world; from a state in which he might have spread blessings around him, to a state in which he has neither power nor influence to effect good if he would. God has marked the place with his curse in making it the means of taking away from men those abused

talents which ought to have been laid out in promoting his glory, instead of increasing the groans of the creation. The Creator by no means permits his creature to do what *he pleases* with his own, but that which it has been commanded him to do, and woe be to the presumption that dares to squander that trust otherwise. But besides this poverty in substance, there is a far more to be dreaded poverty spiritually, which we may say always accompanies this devotion to the pleasures and sports of the world—when God sends leanness into the soul; when the light of his countenance is withdrawn, and every hope in the future fades, every joy in the present withers, and there remains only a fearful looking for of judgment, to the reality of which the mind must be kept blinded by such stir and excitement as the world and its gods best yield.

Next, say the world, there is a time for all things. Granted, for the Scripture saith it; but remember the Scripture speaks to those that hold the Scripture. Look at the Race-course both in itself and in its effects, and judge ye whether or not the Scripture saith there is a time for the countenancing that which is an especial

and exclusive field for the world, the flesh, and the devil to revel in. Till then it can be shewn that such an amusement is necessary, innocent, patriotic, and appointed, (in the sense which the world itself attaches to the terms) the baptized *Christian*, on whom are the vows of God, must in duty resist them. Even on the lowest ground, one would imagine, that men as mere rational creatures would do so; that minds capable of following the planets in their courses, would despise the contemptible pleasure which the sight of brute beasts frantic with torture could yield them. And, a further ground of resistance will be acknowledged by the *Christian*, in the stumbling-block which such sports are to the labours of the Ministers of God. He knows and considers that strict and solemn account which *they* will have one day to give for every soul under their charge, and trembles lest he should be found an impediment in their way by promoting that which Satan makes an especial means of entrapping those souls, and thus as it were nullifying their work, which is also God's work. Here is enough then for the true disciple of Christ, (who is commanded to prove all things, and to hold fast

that which is good,) to decide that the Race-course, involving as it does such awful consequences, must be given up by him, having been examined by the law and by the testimony, and found not good. And here would I call upon my neighbours, upon those of them who care for their souls, and have declared upon the Lord's side, to thank God for an opportunity that is about to be afforded them of shewing what they are, by separating themselves from the God-forgetting, God-despising crew, that will be found at their orgies on the high places of St. Stephens; for scarce more clearly and palpably was the golden image of Nebuchadnezzar worshipped, when was heard the sound of the cornet, flute, harp, sackbut, psaltery, and dulcimer, than will Satan himself, the god of this world, be worshipped by his deluded votaries, when the pant of the tortured steed, the shrill whistle of the whip, mingled with the shout of the gambler, the wild roar of the drunkard, the blasphemy of the profane, the ribaldry of the lascivious, the empty laugh of the frivolous, are heard—and heard they will be—on the Downs of St. Stephens. And blessed, thrice blessed, shall those Sha-

drachs, Mesechs, and Abednegos be, who dare for conscience sake, at the command of the God that bought them, set at nought the mandate of that prince of the unbelieving world who would fain set his foot upon *their* necks, even as he does upon the necks of his willing slaves.

And ye that have by grace been brought out from that bitter bondage, envy them not their revelry. The time fast cometh when such occupations will yield no satisfaction to those that engage in them. The evil day of peril, sickness, calamity, or death will make even the worldling, maddened though he hitherto has been with the intoxicating potion which Satan has held to his lips, come in a measure to his senses, and think—if it be only to despair—of his soul, and the eternity that he has trifled with! God give you grace to shew that you have chosen that *better part* which shall not be taken from you!

Price 3*s*. *per* 100.

Rev. H. A. Simcoe, (Penheale-Press) Cornwall.

Article IX

THE CASE

OF THE

Established Church in Ireland

AS STATED,

BY THE REV. MORTIMER O'SULLIVAN, M.A.,

BEFORE A MOST NUMEROUS AND HIGHLY RESPECTABLE

MEETING,

CALLED BY THE

BATH CHURCH OF ENGLAND LAY ASSOCIATION,

ON SATURDAY, DEC. 6, 1834,

AT THE ASSEMBLY ROOMS, BATH,

THE LORD BISHOP OF BATH AND WELLS

IN THE CHAIR.

TOGETHER WITH THE RESOLUTIONS AND ADDRESS TO THE KING THEN UNANIMOUSLY AGREED TO.

From the BATH CHRONICLE of Dec. 11, 1834.

BATH:

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WM. CURRY, JUN. AND R. M. TIMS, DUBLIN;
AND COLLINGS, BATH.

1834.

THE CHURCH IN IRELAND.

A most numerous and highly respectable Meeting of members and friends of the Established Church was held at the Assembly Rooms, Bath, on Saturday Dec. 6, 1834, for the purpose of receiving a Deputation from the Irish Protestant Conservative Society, which attended to submit a statement respecting "the present oppressed condition of the Protestant Church and "religion in Ireland," in order that, if the Meeting should see fit, an address on behalf of that religion and Church should be forwarded to his Majesty. The large room was very nearly filled, there being about a thousand persons present. The company were admitted by shilling tickets, according to the regulations of the Proprietors of the Rooms. Considering the very short time which intervened between the issuing of the notices and the day of meeting, the attendance was much greater than could have been expected. We may in this place remark, that the whole of the proceedings, particularly the eloquent speech of Mr. O'Sullivan, were listened to with the deepest attention, and were greeted with the most enthusiastic applause.

Capt. Muttlebury stated that the Meeting had been called by the Bath Church of England Lay Association, the object of which was to collect information necessary to place in a clear light before the public the condition of the Established Church. The Association thought that the present was a legitimate occasion for the exercise of the purposes which they had in view. The Lord Bishop of the Diocese had been requested to take the Chair, and his Lordship with his usual kindness had consented. (Cheers.)

The *Lord Bishop* said that it gave him much pleasure to preside over so numerous and respectable a meeting as the present. Many individuals more efficient there might have been selected for that honourable office; but he would assure the meeting that he would yield to no man in the fervour of his wishes to preserve the efficiency of our unrivalled Constitution in Church and State. (Cheers.) Though, however, this was his feeling he must readily acknowledge that he was a friend to effecting in the Church all real improvements. As to the discipline and temporalities of the Church he was most willing

to accede to all amendments which would promote the vital interests of the Establishment; but he must at the same time say, that with respect to the Articles of the Church—her doctrines—and her spiritualities, he would rather give up all that was dear to him on earth than concede one single iota of them, because he felt that the Church was built upon a rock, which rock was Jesus Christ. (Cheers.) He would not trespass longer on the time of the meeting, but call on the Deputation from Ireland to enter into the expected statement respecting the Irish Church, whose welfare was so intimately connected with that of the Establishment in this country. (Cheers.)

Mr. O'Sullivan then rose amid much applause and spoke nearly as follows :—My Lord, I have to express to your Lordship and to this great assembly, my deep regret that affairs of much importance have constrained the distinguished individual with whom I had been associated, to return suddenly to Ireland. I lament the loss which our cause must necessarily sustain by his absence, and the disappointment it must occasion here. I am painfully conscious that in such an absence, my efforts cannot do justice to the case of the Protestants of Ireland, or afford you satisfaction; but I will not allow this feeling to incapacitate me from endeavouring, however imperfectly, to discharge my duty; and I will encourage the hope that, as the difficulty of my position is encreased, you will regard my defects with more than ordinary indulgence. When it was determined by the Protestants in my country to send a deputation to England, the resolution was, it may be said, extorted from them by a sense of persecution and danger. They could not be blind to the repeated proofs that their interests and the public peace were not wisely consulted for by those who exercised legal rule over Ireland; and they saw, with increasing alarm, that in the same proportion as law became despised and legislation capricious, and the government seemed supine, purposes of alarming magnitude shewed themselves more openly in the avowals of those whose enterprises they had reason to dread, and crime was perpetrated with attendant circumstances which betrayed more clearly the system to which it ministered. They saw that, in obedience to the dictation of an individual, the pledged enemy to British connection, a grievous wrong was attempted against their Church, and they heard this prospering enemy declare that, had he succeeded to the extent of his demands this year, he would stand upon the present success, and demand next year a further concession. They learned, that the disorganised and distracted state of their country was such as to compel, from a reluctant Ministry, an Act having for its object to restrain disturbance, and prevent crime; and they saw that the irresponsible dictator was successful in mutilating the measure so as that faction should be free. They knew the inseparable connection between agitation and crime; and they felt that where an excitable people were denied protection against the influences of public meetings and passionate harangues, it was of no moment that, for a time, they were restrained from outward acts of violence. The Rev. Gentleman, in illustration of this part of his subject, here read the following extracts from the *Dublin University Magazine*:

" Talk of the protection of the laws, where if a Protestant farmer, together with his family, should escape the wholesale destruction of the midnight conflagration, he has still to sustain the houghing of his cattle, the turning up of his lea ground, the levelling of his fences, the firing of his turf-stack, the ferocious assaults upon himself or his children, when returning from the fair, or the market; or, if he should escape these, has yet to endure what the poor fellow himself calls " the more wearing and break down" annoyance arising from exclusive dealing, and the various other petty devices suggested by a mean and malignant bigotry. There could be no doubt (though attempts have been made to disguise the fact) as to the cause of all those horrifying atrocities."

* * * * * *

" It surely is not very difficult to prove this to those who have ears to hear. When the peasantry of a country are taught to believe that though not *de facto*, they are *de jure* the possessors of the soil—when they are told that some centuries ago their forefathers were robbed by a band of foreign invaders, who have ever since kept them in a state of unequalled slavery—that their pure and holy religion was denounced by those invaders, who planted their own execrable heresy in its stead."

* * * * * *

" He at once becomes an idler, a vagabond, a drunkard. He thinks no more of going home to the bosom of his family after his day of healthful and useful labour; he goes to the shebeen to hear the last new speech of the *Counsellor* read by the head schoolmaster; (a gentleman of whose multiplied accomplishments even Lord Brougham, with all his ' march-of intellect perfectability' has but little notion.—His earnings soon go in drinking potations pottle deep ' to the Liberator's health and the first gem of the sea.' Rent-day comes round: all the money has disappeared. It has gone either, as we have just said, in drinking to the *Counsellor's* health, or again, to pay his share of the *only* rent he has been taught to acknowledge, viz. the tribute necessary for keeping the ' *Counsellor*' in Parliament, while removed at such a cruel distance from the wife of his bosom and his ' callow nestlings of domestic bliss,' or again—for this modern minotaur quite distances the ancient in the variety of his swallow for the public tribute—it has gone to *fee* the ' *Counsellor*' for undertaking the defence of some brother whiteboy, who is entitled to the eternal gratitude of his country for freeing them from such monsters as Parson Whitty."

This (continued the Rev. Gentleman) is a clear and unexaggerated statement of the connection between what is called agitation and crime. How could the Protestants of Ireland behold such a state of things and not complain of the evils they suffered, and the dangers they apprehended? They saw, that, from the policy of the government and the purposes of a large portion of the people, the permanency of a religious ministration was severely shaken; security for life and property seriously diminished; and the bonds of British connection rendered more precarious and uncertain, and then, and not until then, when their existence was felt to have become a question, they determined that they would submit a statement of their wrongs to the people of England, and ask of you, shall these things be so? Better hopes have risen upon them since they resolved upon this appeal. (Cheers.) The King has rescued us and you from the domination of men whose measures would in the end have led to the separation of Ireland from this country. (Cheers.) But still the Irish Protestants feel that upon you, under God, it must depend whether their hopes shall be confirmed. They know that our gracious Sovereign is resolved, to the utmost of his power, to protect the right. (Cheers.) They believe that he will now have as his counsellors men who will not, in scorn of every thing that is honourable and just, advise injustice because they can uphold it, and it is clamorously demanded. They know, also. that with the people it must rest whether the ancient name of England is maintained and righte-

ousness done; and, therefore, they are not less careful now to take your judgment on their case, than they were earnest to obtain your support when their condition seemed more disastrous. And let it be premised, in justice to those who have sent me here, that they do not ask of you to connive at a single defect in the structure or the operation of any one of their institutions. (Cheers.) They ask no more than the severest justice; they feel that they have never failed in truth or affection to you; but they put forward no claim to warp you from equity. (Cheers.) They are satisfied to await your decision on the merits of their cause alone, and the only expectation they ground on their approved fidelity and attachment is this, that when you have seen, if you do see justice on their side, you will assert the impartial judgment you pronounce, with the resolution and energy which in upholding an injured friend, is characteristic of your name and nation. I do not know whether our statements have as yet come under your notice. With your permission I will endeavour to recapitulate briefly the substance of them, and have the more boldness in submitting them for your judgment inasmuch as they have extorted from our adversaries personal taunts, but have not provoked them to undertake the less agreeable task of endeavouring to prove that they were unfounded. But previously to laying a statement of our case before you, it is fitting that I should advert to a case which has been imagined for us in this city, otherwise I should be under the disadvantage of a witness, who, by his silence as to some questions lessens the value of his testimony in the instance of those he answers. The *Bath Herald* of Saturday last contains the following passage in reference to our deputation:—"We hope that, ' should the above named rev. gentlemen visit this city in their "progress of agitation, some individual will, for the public satis- "faction, just put this question to them,—'Do you, or do you not "mean to uphold that system of Church government in Ireland, "as it is proved to exist in the above exposé?' We should be "glad to have an explicit answer." I am willing, my Lord, to imagine the question proposed, and if the editor will allow me to change one word in its form, will give him an explicit answer. The word is "proved," let me substitute the word "alleged;" for no one part of this "exposé" has been proved (cheers), and I answer on behalf of the Protestants of Ireland, that "we do not mean to uphold that system of Church government as it is alleged to exist in the 'exposé,'" and further affirm, *that there is no such system for us to uphold.* (Loud cheers and laughter.) I beg your indulgence, my Lord, while I state in detail the grounds of my assertion. The charges advanced against the Church establishment in Ireland as alleged in the "exposé," to which I have requested your attention, are two-fold. It is said that the revenues of the Church are excessive, and their distribution unfair and injudicious. I shall beg leave to consider the justice of each of these accusations. First, for the amount of revenue. The first item in the charge against the Establishment is the amount of what is called Bishop's salaries, at six thousand pounds each, and in the total £132 000. The real amount, as stated by Lord Brougham in a debate on the Church Temporalities Act was then £128,000, from which the following deductions are to be made, as you may read in Earl Grey's speech on the same occasion. Immediate reduction on

Bishopric of Derry £4160, future reduction of the same Bishopric £2000; future reduction of Armagh, £4500; produce of ten Bishoprics suppressed, £50,780; tax on those which remain, £4600. Adding these sums together it appears that a deduction of £66,040 is to be made from the Episcopal revennes, and that the amount with which the Church is to be charged should be set down at £61,960, not as alleged in the *Bath Herald's* "exposé" £132,000. (Cheers and laughter) The second item is the amount of Tithe, which is stated to be at the lowest possible estimate £625,000. If the meaning be Ecclesiastical Tithe, Parliament has made a lower, and the Committee appointed to enquire into the tithe system, has set down the gross amount of Ecclesiastical Tithe as not exceeding £600,000. This also is Mr. Littleton's statement, and from it is to be deducted the per centage allowed by Mr. Stanley's Bill, and willingly conceded by the Clergy, amounting to fifteen per Cent , or on the entire tithe £90,000; so that, for this item, instead of £625,000, we may set down £510,000. (Loud cheers.) The third item is the revenue of Deans and Chapters, which is set down at £250,000. This should be erased. The property of Deans and Chapters in Ireland should be set down at less I am confident than £3000. (Cheers and laughter.) I mean of course, as distinguished from the funds of which they only have the management, not the benefit, and from the ecclesiastical income, which is included in the amount of their respective benefices. The members of Chapters are also beneficed clergymen, and as such are tithe owners or entitled to minister's money, in towns where such impost is recoverable. Their revenues, accordingly, are inclnded under these items, and onght not to be a second time set down. We court inquiry into the matter, and boldly affirm that the incomes of Deans and Chapters, as such, are not sufficient to keep their Cathedrals in repair. (Cheers.) At the present moment a most necessary alteration is being effected in the Cathedral of Armagh—I may say an indispensable alteration—and the expense is defrayed by subscription, the members of the Chapter, out of their private means, contributing largely, and the Primate, with his wonted munificence, heading the subscription list with a donation of £8000. (Cheers.) We may then lay aside the charge for Deans and Chapters altogether, the incomes of the dignitaries being set down under another head, and the very small deanery funds they have to manage being wholly inadequate to their objects, the maintaining Cathedrals and providing for public worship. The fourth charge is for fees, and is set down at £187,000. This enormous exaggeration may also be set aside. (Laughter.) Fees are received in Dublin, and in some town parishes, but, although I have some knowledge of various parts of Ireland, I do not know a single country parish in which they are paid or demanded. We may set them aside, and consider those in the next item, which is the amount of income received by Rectors of parishes in Dublin and other towns who are paid by ministers' money. There are computed forty-eight cases of this kind, and it is supposed that the average income of each amounts to £500. Half wonld be nearer the truth, but I am confident ample provision will be made for the amount of all the fees received by the Clergy throughout Ireland, if we were to set down the clerical income in Ireland arising out of fees and ministers' money, at the amount fixed in

the *Bath Herald's* "exposé," £24,000. This is a subject on which we court enquiry. I am acquainted with some of the parishes in Dublin in which fees were paid, and I know how very moderate was their amount. In one of these, wealthy and populous, having a much frequented burying-ground, the amount of fees did not average £20, and in another, where there were at least 2000 protestant parishioners, and which is, perhaps, the third or fourth in point of wealth in the city of Dublin, the fees, including those of burials, did not exceed fifty pounds. When such is the amount of fees in parishes where they are paid, and when you remember that throughout the rural districts there are none, you will judge whether I am not qualified in expunging them from the charge against us. I may add that neither in the towns would they be demanded, but because of the inadequate provision there for the maintenance of the clergy, the income arising out of ministers' money, not averaging in the gross more than £400 per annum, and the crowded population rendering it necessary for the rector to have in almost every instance one curate, and in the greater number of instances, a second. The concluding item in the "exposé" is one which I did not expect to see. It is a charge of £20,000, the property of the Dublin university. Of the eight individuals among whom the property here rated at £20,000, and which is, perhaps, not less than £14,000, is distributed, two are laymen, and all are individuals who have qualified themselves for their preferment, at first, by most laborious study and by success at an examination perhaps the severest to which the human faculties are submitted, and then, after, at an average, eighteen or twenty years of painful and unremitting attention to the duties of a college tutor, they are promoted to a share in the government of the college, and rewarded with an income far inferior to what they should naturally have expected had they for the same length of time devoted their talents to the acquirements of professional reputation and emolument in some other department of life. I cannot think it fair to charge this sum against the Church. All professions, all creeds, benefit by the University of Dublin. Students from various countries profit by it. The country gentleman, the barrister, the soldier, the physician, as well as the minister of religion, imbibe the advantages of its culture, and it is not correct to add the amount of property thus generally beneficial to those items by which a prejudice is sought to be created against the Church establishment. To sum up then the amount of Revenue—

For Bishoprics, according to the *Bath Herald's* "exposé," ...	£132,000	By Act of Parliament,	£61,960
Tithes	625,000	————————	510,000
Deans and Chapters.....	250,000	(Expunged altogether.)	
Fees...........................	187,000	(Included in next Item)	
Rectors in Dublin & elsewhere, paid by Ministers' money ...	24,000	Including all Fees ...	24,000
Property of Dublin University,	20,000	(Excluded as belonging to Education.)	
Total, *Bath Herald's* "exposé,"	1,238,000	Correct statement ...	595,960

From this statement it appears that the amount of Ecclesiastical Revenue in Ireland is less by more than one half than that for which the "exposé" would hold us accountable. (Loud and continued cheers and laughter.) I do not require of you to receive my state-

ment on my own showing. I must adduce corroborating testimony, and, as my subject is rather more extensive than the limits of time within which it would be right for me to detain you, I must rely less upon the abundance than the selection of evidence which I shall lay before you I call then as witness on behalf of the Church a noble individual who certainly never appeared her friend, the uncompromising reformer in all departments of Church and State—the Cabinet breaker—who was of late Lord Althorp. In the speech delivered by the noble lord, when bringing in the Church Temporalities Act, on Feb. 12, 1833, he states the amount of Church Revenue thus—

Revenues of Bishops	£130,000
Ditto of Deans and Prebends—the Deans and Chapters of the *Bath Herald's* "exposé"—(we have no Canonries in Ireland)	2,000
Ditto of other Benefices	600,000
Amounting to	732,000

And, allowing amply for any omission, the noble lord concludes that the whole Church in Ireland does not exceed £800,000. This exceeds by £68,000 the amount for which the noble lord assigned the specific items. Let it, however, stand. It was the statement of one who made its amount the ground of the reductions he had to propose. It was, accordingly, as plausible as conjecture could raise it. From this amount we are to deduct—

For the allowance on Tithe of 15 per Cent.	£90,000
Taxation on Clerical Income	41,800
Actual and prospective Reduction on Sees of Armagh and Derry	10,650
Revenues of suppressed Bishoprics	50,780
Taxation on those which remain	4,600
	197,830

This sum taken from the amount of Ecclesiastical income, magnified even as it was by Lord Althorp's conjecture, leaves it as affected by the Church Temporalities Act £602,170. Taking the noble Lord's statement of the amount to which he thought Ecclesiastical revenues would extend, not that which he was sure they would *not* exceed, we shall have on his Lordship's authority a remainder of £534,970, which is less than my return by £60,990. This, I am persuaded is correct. At least, the approximation between the noble Lord's return and that which I have laid before you is remarkable, as you will see when I have corrected an omission in my former statement. I had not deducted from the amount of the revenues of incumbents in Ireland, the taxation to which the Temporalities Act has rendered their benefices liable. This taxation Lord Grey rates at £41,800, and deducting it from the amount of income which I have stated, the remainder will be £554,160, leaving Church revenue, according to my calculation, *less* than that stated in the *Bath Herald's* "exposé" by £683,840. You are not to be surprised at this exaggeration, for in truth, until Lord Althorp, in his official capacity as Cabinet minister examined into the state of the Church, he had, himself, been under the most mistaken impressions as to its opulence. The terms in which he confesses his error are so remarkable, and I may add, so instructive, that with your permission I will read them:—

"The public mind had been totally led astray by the exaggerated statements as to the amount of that property (Hear, hear.) He candidly confessed that, previously to his looking more closely into the question, he himself had been deceived and led astray by the exaggerated statements

abroad relative to the amount of the church revenue in Ireland (Hear, hear.) He would first come to a matter which had been much talked about, the enormous amount of the revenue of the bishops. Now, after what the house had previously heard upon this subject, they would be surprised to learn from the returns that the whole amount of the bishops' revenues in all the counties was not more than £130,000 (Hear, hear). The gross amount was £150,000; but the net revenue did not exceed £130,000. It was quite true that large tracts of land belonged to the Protestant bishoprics; but the bishops had by no means an exclusive interest in those lands. (Hear, hear) On the contrary, it appeared that five-sixths of those interests were vested in the tenants by whom those lands were held.—The real amount of that property was about £600,000 a year; but of this sum the bishops did not receive more than £100,000. (Hear, hear) Some idea of the exaggerated statements which had gone forth might be formed from these returns. With respect to deans and chapters, and prebends, they were not so numerous, and were on a different footing from those of this country; their emoluments were derived in a different manner; and amounted in the whole to £23,600, but deducting from that sum the expenditure which took place before any portions of it could be divided amongst those parties, and which amounted to £21,500, it would be found that no more than £2200 remained to the whole (Hear, hear) — With respect to the other benefices he was not prepared to enter into the details. The returns had been called for from the different counties, and had been made by a great proportion of them, but not from all.—The only mode he had, therefore, of coming to anything like a conclusion on the subject was by taking the average of the returns made, and comparing them with the others. The whole amount of returns called for was 1401, of these 1149 had been brought in, making an amount of revenue of £478,346, and assuming the other 252 returns to be upon the same average the whole amount would be £58[illegible],000, or to speak in round numbers, £600,000, on a fair average of the whole (Hear, hear). Now, taking the amount of bishops' revenues at £130,000, those of the deans and prebends at £2000, and the other benefices at 600,000, it would be found that the whole church revenue of Ireland did not exceed £800,000 a year. (Loud cries of hear, hear.) He found it the more necessary to go into these details because of the greatly exaggerated statements which had gone abroad upon the subject, and because of the necessity of a clear understanding upon the subject previously to their coming to that calm and dispassionate consideration of the subject which its importance demanded."

It would be well for the interests of truth if the noble Lord's recommendation were attended to, and his representations of the real amount of Ecclesiastical income in Ireland respected; but the task of misleading and enflaming the public mind while the noble Lord was in ignorance, he felt a much easier task than to correct false impression and allay prejudice when he had himself taken the pains to become instructed. This happens according to the condition of our nature. The descent is easy—but to recall the step—to retrace the ways which led from the light of truth—here indeed is the toil which all feel most distasteful. Still I have hope that in time truth will prevail, and corroborated by the testimony of Lord Althorp, I suffer myself to believe that the statement of Revenue which I have laid before you will be accepted although it is, as I have said, less than one half than that with which the "exposé" in the *Bath Herald* charges us. (Cheers). I proceed to the other charge—that which concerns the distribution of this Revenue. The Church, it is said, offends in three particulars—Unions of Parishes are improperly large—Pluralities are too numerous, and Curates are neglected. With respect to the first of these accusations, it might, perhaps, be sufficient to say, that every union is now virtually dissolved on the death of the incumbent, and that a reunion can be effected only by the decision of the Privy Council. But it should not be lost sight of that the Bishops of the Church in Ireland were foremost in directing

attention to this evil—that they long laboured in their respective departments to correct it, and that, in the year 1819, they drew the attention of Government to it, and succeeded in placing the affairs of the Church on such a footing that the evil may be considered at an end. (Cheers). But how did it rise? Not surely from criminal indifference to the interests of religion. It arose out of the extreme poverty of the Church. When, at a time when there was scarcely any agriculture in Ireland, the tithe on pasturage, or agistment, was withheld, a maintenance could be procured only by very widely extending the boundaries of Ecclesiastical benefices. In consequence more than one or even two parishes were united, not for the purpose of rendering the incumbent opulent, but that he might have the means of existence. Times changed, the system of agriculture became more favourable to the temporal interests of the tithe owners. The unions which had once been necessary in order to provide a subsistence, became sources of wealth. It is not all at once that correctives can be applied. Vested interests must be regarded, and life will not at once cease in order to facilitate the march of improvement. But it is quite certain that improvements were rapidly effected, and none who take the trouble to enquire will hesitate to acknowledge that the heads of the Church were the most forward in their promotion. (Cheers). Let any man look to the recommendations of the Irish Bishops as to the unions which are to be divided according as they become vacant, and I defy him not to acknowledge that the Church has done its duty. I do not mean to say that they recommend the abolition of all: there are unions of more than two parishes in which the entire income is less than £60 per annum; but I, without any hesitation, affirm that the Bishops may publish their recommendations for the dissolution of unions, and defy the keenest and most malicious scrutiny, to withhold from them the praise of disinterested and prudent counsel. (Cheers). The next charge is against pluralities. They have ceased. In order to hold two livings, it is necessary to have a permission from the Primate, which is named a faculty. For five years he has not issued one. He had been gradually lessening the practice for some time before, and has from the time I mentioned, altogether discontinued it. (Cheers). With respect to the third charge, that the salaries of curates are inadequate it is one which I never yet heard advanced by a good curate in Ireland. Complaints may from time to time be made that promotion is not rapid, but scarcely ever that the salary is inadequate. The truth is there are many advantages in the distribution which does not hold out to an individual yet untried, the prospect of large emolument. No man enters the Church because of a curate's salary; but when he has given proof, that, entering from other motives, he is worthy to minister, it is right that he should be placed in a situation where he may assist others in learning to discharge their momentous duties. If there be any just ground for complaint that a deserving curate has been neglected, far be it from me to desire that the guilt of the diocesan who has been an unjust steward should be concealed; but I can have no hesitation in affirming, and if time permitted, it would be most easy to prove, that no curate who deserves promotion, can be found murmuring that his salary (the salary presented by law,) is not large, or expressing with respect to his

temporal prospects any other desire than that in due time he may obtain suitable preferment. The *Bath Herald's* "exposé" illustrates its abstract discussion by three cases, to which I beg to direct your attention. One is of a gentleman, son of the late Archbishop of Dublin, a prelate whose name is of the kind that endureth, who has a stall in Christ Church, an Archdeaconry, a living in the metropolis, and another in the county Wicklow. As to the living in the metropolis, which is, in truth, a curacy, from what I know of it and of the overflowing charities of the Archdeacon who holds it, I am much mistaken if it is not merely a source of expense. I know that the Archdeaconry is of but inconsiderable value, and that the living in the county Wicklow which involved a cure of souls has been for some time *resigned.* The next is the case of a son of the Bishop of Kildare, "who (says the *Bath Herald*,) in addition to the dignity of the Archdeaconry, and the possession of one of the richest Rectories in the city of Dublin, holds a benefice in the adjacent county consisting of five or six parishes united, and producing a revenue large enough to remunerate the services of four resident and really efficient ministers." As the "exposé" notices merely "the dignity" of the Archdeaconry, I shall not dwell upon the fact that it confers little more than dignity, except the solemn responsibility and the unavoidable necessity of incurring expense as well as enduring labour in discharging its onerous duties. Its dignity and its necessary expences should be provided for, and they can hardly be thought too amply provided by the parish in Dublin, which does not produce a clear income of more than five hundred pounds, not four hundred after deducting the various expences and charities which it involves, and the union of five or six country parishes which produce under the operation of Mr. Stanley's Bill the sum of £575, out of which are to be deducted the salaries of at the least, two curates, leaving for this richly endowed Archdeacon, an income of at the utmost nine hundred pounds per annum. Is this too much? I do not know what may be the judgment which the accuser would pass upon it, but little or much, the grievance is corrected, for after the preferment or demise of the present incumbent it must cease, unless cause can be shown to satisfy the Council that it ought to be continued. It may, in point of fact, be regarded as already corrected (Cheers). The third case is of the Rector of Granard, who holds a union of which the revenue is set down at £2469. The real net amount of revenue is £1347. The Editor of the *Bath Herald* and his informant considered, probably, the value of the Rectory, whereas the incumbent appears to have the Vicarage. And the union is set down as one of those which is to be dissolved (Cheers) I thank you for your indulgence to this tedious statement, and now may I not deliver my explicit answer on behalf of those who sent me here, that they do not desire to uphold a system like that which is complained of, and still better that the heads of the Irish Church have been forward to remove all just grounds of complaint. On the authority of Lord Althorp, we show that the Church does not possess half the revenues ascribed to her; and we refer to the Reports of the Church Commissioners to show that the evils of unions and pluralities are in rapid process of correction. (Cheers.) I thank you for the indulgence with which you have listened to

my long and tedious counter "exposé." However disagreeable, it was necessary—I trust it will not prove wholly ineffectual. The Church is accused of being too richly endowed. Her revenues are less than one half of the amount which is set down against her. (Cheers.) She is accused of having offended by allowing or making unions of parishes, and permitting individuals to hold more than one benefice. The truth is that such anomalies arose out of the extreme poverty to which the Church was reduced, and that in the same proportion as this poverty was relieved, the evils became corrected, until the allowing of pluralities wholly ceased and unions in every practicable instance were divided. As an indication of the improvement which is silently progressing I shall quote from the *Bath Herald's* "exposé," and from Parliamentary returns the number of benefices in Ireland in three different years. The *Bath Herald* states, but without naming the year, that the number of benefices in Ireland was 1252: in the year 1829 it was 1293; in 1830, 1302, indicating a progressive increase in the number of benefices in proportion to the opportunities afforded for the dissolution of unions. That the increase has been progressive since there can be no doubt, as the discussions in Parliament relative to the Deanery of Down, and the dissolution of unions in the Deanery of Raphoe abundantly prove, and I would merely say to any who desire information as to what the Church has been doing, to consult the returns of the Ecclesiastical Commission, and see whether every practicable dissolution has not been recommended. I will add but one remark. This Commission was appointed by the Duke of Wellington. In the administration of his successor, one of its leading recommendations was overruled, and a union of six parishes, containing five churches and yielding a gross revenue of £2877, continued in direct opposition to the decision of the Commissioners that it should be dissolved. It was given by Earl Grey to the nephew of the reforming Chancellor. (Hear, hear.) The extent to which my observations on the *Bath Herald's* "exposé" have led me, prevent me from entering so fully into the case of our Church in Ireland as I would have entered under other circumstances. I trust I have succeeded in satisfying you that the Protestant Church and people in Ireland are worthy of your countenance and succour, let me now endeavour to set before you the difficulties in which your aid is demanded. Here, too, I must briefly state what we have already proved, and what remains uncontradicted, namely, that there exists in Ireland a conspiracy of long standing and extensively organised, having for its object to extirpate Protestantism, and separate Ireland from Great Britain. This we have shown on the clear and positive evidence of adversaries, and all has been, since our statements were made public, still more strongly corroborated by the indirect testimony of their silence. We have shown that this conspiracy is at the present moment, in powerful operation, and that the oaths by which its members are bound together pledge them to endeavour the extirpation of protestants, and that the crimes by which they manifest the spirit which is in them, are not desultory and shameless atrocities, but are acts directed cautiously and skilfully by some unknown power to which obedience is yielded. We have shown that of late the southern parts of Ireland seem to have been almost surrendered to the agents of this

tremendous confederacy, that law has sunk into contempt, and peaceable men have been left defenceless, and that the late government, instead of exerting itself to protect the good, and to punish crime, were sacrificing all the interests of the country to propitiate partisans by whose aid their date of office could be prolonged. All this we stated, and when a sufficient interval had been allowed for its disproval if we had erred, the Protestants of Ireland resolved that they would submit a recital of their grievances to the British people, and call for, what we have to return thanks for having abundantly received, your equitable and paternal assistance. In the mean time our gracious Sovereign interposed, he rescued, (as I have already said) you and us from the domination of those whose policy was calculated to sever us from you for ever, and as it was in the discharge of a sacred duty to the Church, our King thus exercised his prerogative, we felt ourselves the more bound to appear before you, and show that the exercise was called for; that the Church was not undeserving of it, and that it was imperatively demanded by the imminent dangers which threatened the Protestant Church and people in Ireland, and our connection with Great Britain. There was a time when Protestant ascendancy was talked of in Ireland—it is talked of no longer; the question now is—shall the Protestant Church in Ireland be suffered to exist? If you meet any who deny that our case was, humanely speaking, almost desperate, ask them will they call for a parliamentary enquiry into the state of Ireland, and the conduct of the Irish Government during the late years, into the proofs of conspiracy against the Protestant Church, and the attention paid to the proofs of the efforts made to expose and defeat the conspiracy. I undertake to affirm, that our history does not contain the record of such a state of things as that enquiry would make manifest. Assizes adjourned because it suited not the purposes of a preponderating party to allow justice to have free course; jurors overawed in their verdict, and grievously persecuted for the verdicts they had returned; witnesses intimidated from giving evidence, and submitting to the rigors of the law which punished their contumely, rather than encounter the merciless vengeance of those who had enjoined that they should be silent; Protestants threatened and murdered, and seeking to escape from barbarous vengeance by assuming what at heart they abhorred, the guise of a superstitious religion; Protestant clergymen impoverished, persecuted, murdered, driven forth, homeless outcasts; and the Irish Government, while these things were so, sitting at ease in its possessions, and now by capricious exercises of unsustained power, now by criminal connivance, exasperating the evils it dared not attempt to correct, and rendering the afflictions of loyal men more hopeless. (Cheers.) What scenes would be brought to light of the sufferings of a persecuted Clergy; aged and charitable men compelled to swear, at the dictation of the nightly desperado, that they will forsake the home in which they hoped to end their days in peace, and turn away from the Church where they had long faithfully ministered, some noble spirits lingering at the post of duty; expending from their private stores to relieve the distresses of those who belonged to the party which, so far as it had the power, was bringing poverty upon them; relieving these distresses at a time when they were forced to meet the objects of

their bounty at some distance from their home, and at hours especially appointed, because they dared no longer allow an unrestricted entrance into their houses, or even encourage the approach to their doors; merciful men devoting the early parts of the day to the distribution of food or medicine, and medical advice, and, if it were indispensable that they should leave home, choosing the darkness of night as the time of their travel, and concealing the direction where they meant to proceed, that they might avoid the scoffs and taunts, and injuries, from which no worth or benevolence or services had the power to protect them. What a time, when men, whose going forth had been welcomed with smiles of affection and reverential greetings, for whom their large charity had secured respect in those who valued not their office; what a time when wherever they appeared shouting and mockery arose around them and frequent injuries assailed them even from those who had most reason to bless their well-proved benevolence. And what a time when a government looked on without affording protection and redress; nay, when a government could discourage the complaints of the afflicted, by violating a confidence which ought to have been sacred, and exposing a supplicant to the consequences of his indiscreet reliance. Let it not be imagined that I would lightly pronounce a censure upon any body of men, or that when their day of power had passed away, I would unnecessarily asperse the conduct of an unwise or corrupt government. The question is not yet decided. There is a party in England who would force again on the adoption of the Sovereign his late Ministers. There is a party in Ireland who strongly second them. Here in England I would persuade myself that, so far as our country is concerned, the rash restorers know not what they do in lifting up again the fallen government; but in Ireland, the consequences are fully understood, and will be vigorously prosecuted. Let it not then be regarded as an unnecessary labor to set forth the evils which followed from a most unhappy misrule, and which must be renewed in deeper horrors if the broken sway be reconstructed. Let it not be thought wantonly severe, that those who have mourned for the sufferings and crimes which such a fiction of government occasioned, shall not put their feelings to silence. What have I known of the sufferings of an upright Clergy under the cruel vial which their government poured out upon them; some languishing under wounds, which render the life with which they escaped the assassin's attempt a pain and sorrow; some persecuted from their homes; their families scattered; their children, who never retired to rest without a mother's blessing, eating the bread of dependance among strangers; some lingering within the precincts of their desolate homes, lamenting the loss or affliction of sons wounded in their defence, or because they were their offspring; some murdered; and all men upon whose good name the breath of calumny never dared to shed a tarnish. Shall we think of these things, and shall we be censured when we speak of the Government at whose door all are to be laid, if sorrow causes our speech to be unceremonious? Need I recall to the remembrance of any one here the case alluded to in Parliament by Mr. Stanley. The case of a venerable clergyman, 80 years of age, who was cruelly murdered in the face of day—and to whose wife, when she found his dead body bleeding on the ground, no one stretched out a help-

ing hand—and who, as she sat in her house at night by the corpse of her butchered husband, was insulted by brutal knockings at the door?—I will relate you a story such as, perhaps, you have never heard. Since I have been in England I have twice tried to relate it, but I have failed. I have not been able to summon up courage sufficient to enable me to go through the task. I will however try again. (The Rev. Gentleman here became so affected that he was for some time unable to proceed.) Irwine Whitty was a man, perhaps, more calculated than any human being you have known to make religion loved. He was tried with much bodily weakness and pain—he was gentle and indulgent to a degree which would induce you to think a bold effort or a severe expression impossible to him—but, whatever it was his duty to do, and his duty prescribed some arduous exertions, he was empowered to attempt and to accomplish. I can remember well how, when one among the proudest and most exalted in station of his countrymen had acted in a manner to deserve rebuke, this humble minister of the Gospel faithfully and eloquently discharged his severe duty: and I can almost fancy that I see him as when two of the most distinguished of his parishioners, who were known to be at variance, appeared at his communion service—he overcame the shrinkings of his modest nature, and descended on the mission, and with a face which was as the face of an angel, that, in the sight of his little congregation, the parties might be reconciled. And they were reconciled, for, were it not for the manner of his departing hence, I would say it was not in man's nature to withstand his gentle solicitation. I am the more sensible now of his worth because I have to confess that, during his Christian life, I did him one injustice. His house was ever open to me, and his wise counsel and his engaging and instructive conversation. I never entered his doors without a feeling as if I entered where no profane thought should come, nor returned from a visit to him without bearing with me an influence for good which did not readily evaporate For all this I am deeply responsible—but I was about to speak of the injustice. I saw that his habits of life were frugal as far as consisted with propriety; I saw that his broken health needed relief and recruiting, and I believed his income large enough to allow of the necessary relaxation, and I sometimes doubted whether it would not be well if he allowed himself the benefit he might derive by procuring the assistance of a curate. I was undeceived as to the means at the disposal of my revered friend when I learned that his dear family were left without any provision, but I had previously learned enough to instruct me that thus, in all human probability, it must have been. In a year of scarcity, almost amounting to famine, one of those visitations by which Ireland is not unfrequently scourged, my revered friend was left almost alone to succour the distressed within the bounds of his parish, and incurred in this charitable agency what for himself and his family he almost superstitiously avoided, a debt which he was discharging by instalments for many years. It is not improbable that this debt may have become, providentially, the occasion of his martyrdom. In process of time I became separated from my friend, but could not lose my anxiety for his welfare. When disturbances commenced in which Church property and the clergy were violently assailed, my anxiety was painfully encreased to learn that even the inestimable life of this good man was in peril.

I had an opportunity to speak freely with him, and urged the expediency of a temporary removal from the scene of danger. I said, as I thought, that it need be only temporary. I said no government could be so lost to all sense of justice or self-respect as to tolerate long the sanguinary excesses which were converting Ireland into something worse than had yet been found on earth, and that law must soon be vindicated. He was not to be moved. He had considered well the entire extent of his dangers, and he felt that his duty was plain and direct. He would remain at his post. He was not insensible to the perils of his situation, and would gladly, if he could, lessen or remove them. As to his income in tithe, to him, personally, it was of small moment that it should be reduced. If he could procure peace by allowing a reduction which should affect himself alone, he would sacrifice much to purchase it, but he would not violate a sacred trust by alienating Church property and defrauding a successor. He was in the Lord's hand, let him do what seemeth him good. He received my suggestions as a Christian would, but satisfied me that as to the point of residence he was immoveable. He even detailed to me the circumstances of the first threatening notice he had received. He was, as was his habit, after all the family had retired to rest, engaged in his sacred duties, when suddenly a report of fire-arms, so loud and near that it seemed to shake the house, stunned him. Generally when a notice was posted a discharge of fire-arms gave signal that it was done. "I arose," said he, "and having satisfied myself quickly that it came from without the house. I looked into the chambers where my family lay, dreading that it must have alarmed them. To my great content all were most peacefully sleeping, and I thanked God for the mercy from the bottom of my heart. Towards the last days of this good man's life his dangers seemed to have disappeared. I received assurances that his saintly life and charities had produced the natural effect—but all was hollow. He had been visiting an infirm parishioner at a distance of three miles from his home, he had walked, I believe he could not allow himself the indulgence of a horse or carriage, wearied with the exertion, he attempted to return by a shorter way than that of the public road. In the fields, a sense of weariness and cold overpowered him, and he approached the house of a Roman Catholic parishioner to rest for a little, and procure warmth in his chilled frame. He was so feeble that it was necessary to lift him over a stile which interposed between his path and the house. It appears that he was courteously invited to enter and take a seat, that he was, on leaving the house, accompanied on his way by its master; but after the lapse of many hours, late in the night, he was found upon the earth where he had been stoned, mangled, and bleeding, and speechless; but not yet quite liberated from the agony of death. Thus Irwine Whitty died, a man whose countenance only, by its subdued and saintly expression, might have disarmed the wildest hatred. Thus he died, returning from a charitable office, exhausted with toil, and languishing under bodily sickness, and in the fields of those who had experience of his kindness, and who knew his worth; in the sight of numbers who owed to his benevolence many a comfort in a season when but for him their sufferings would have been extreme; in their sight he lay for many a fearful hour in the death struggle, and none came

near to minister to him, and none summoned friends to his relief. He had been ready to give, glad to distribute. He had been at the bed of fever, and in the huts where penury sought a shelter, and there was a time when blessings followed him as he went upon his offices of mercy; but in that last awful day, he was looked upon and deserted in his parting agony. What fell poison must have been infused into human hearts to render them thus merciless! To him who departed, his going hence and the manner of it was of small account. He has had his crown; but it is an awful lesson to think that he whose life seemed so blameless should lie on the earth where neither tear, nor tender touch, nor prayer, nor blessing soothed him—a witness, an unambiguous witness, that the spirit which seeks the destruction of the Protestant Church, is of a kind which quenches the sympathies of human hearts, and is not to be charmed into peace or mercy by all the gentleness and all the virtue that is bestowed upon the most blameless of mortals. There was the show of a trial for this portentous crime. Two individuals were arraigned for the murder, and when the principal witness, as it would seem, was brought forward, he refused to give evidence. He was commanded, he said, to make oath that he would refuse, and when the sitting Judge explained to him that such an oath could not bind his conscience, and therefore that he must bear testimony to the truth, the poor man proposed the pertinent question "Must I be shot, my lord?" and finally showed which government he thought the strongest by declaring that he would go to prison rather than risk his life by becoming a witness. The culprits were acquitted, and the village from which "the merciful man had been taken away," celebrated, it is said, the acquittal by a general illumination. Is it wonderful that we should strongly complain when such things as these afflict and affright us? Is it wonderful that we should have distrusted a government which, while a conspiracy was raging against Protestantism in this most merciless spirit, instead of exerting every strong power to quell the evil, ministered to it, by proposing to number the protestant people, and exposing them to the hate and fury of monsters without conscience or pity; was this a time when men could be expected to declare themselves of a religion the profession of which rendered them liable to such atrocities as this? Was it possible for the government to find persons to go into Catholic districts to number the people unless those persons were Catholics; and if they were Catholics, how was it to be expected they could be otherwise than enemies to the Protestant Church, and that their returns would be biassed by their own feelings? In Kildare there was a Protestant gentleman who thought it necessary for his safety to keep in his house two Protestant servants. One night two graves were dug before his door, inscribed with the names of those two servants. Was it probable, that the gentleman to whom I allude, would avow that he had two Protestant servants in his house? Or would any similarly situated individuals do so? Is it reasonable to expect that they would thus place in jeopardy the lives of any Protestants who for safety's sake they might have near them? Is it easy to speak in moderate language of a government which ordered the people to be numbered, with reference to their different religions, at such a time as this? And now what is it we seek? Simply that we may not lose all the benefits of British connection;

that we may not be looked upon as outlaws. I have seen it repeatedly assigned, in petitions from my country imploring you to guard the bonds of connection, as the reason for the prayer, that Ireland must otherwise become the battle-field whereupon contending nations would decide their conflicts. This was the worst evil which was dreaded from separation; and I do not hesitate to affirm, that a far more fearful evil if found compatible with what is called a union. Look to the reports which recount imperfectly and partially some of the atrocities by which Ireland is now afflicted. Look to the representation ascribed to the late Chief Secretary for Ireland, declaring that the parts of the countiy where the Church of Rome prevails, should be traced in blood-red colours upon the map; and that, on an average, he received accounts of two murders every day Look to the reports fiom a late Privy Council in Dublin, at which the Lieutenant of Tipperary (a county to which the Irish Government long denied the benefit of the Coercion Act) gave in returns of crime, and showed that in that one county, in the space of only two years 560 murders had been perpetrated, and then say whether any state of things can be imagined more dreadful than that which at this moment prevails—war—a battle-field! I remember well when the brave and high-spirited gentry of the South of Ireland, a class of men than whom few nobler can be found; I remember well when they would hail with acclamation war, open, terrible war in their own fields, if it were a change from that gloomy fiendish spirit of assassination which came the blackest curse before which ever nation withered. War! If it have its terrors, it has also great compensations. It calls out noble bursts of human energy. It is relieved by lights of tenderness, and glorious in the loftiest qualities by which our unchanged nature can be adorned. The fields which it has signalized are separated to a peculiar honor—pilgrims visit them—and their names are spells to awaken those deep and proud emotions which are among the high mysteries of our being. But where murder steals out with coward stride and fell purpose—where he withdraws to his lair, and no indignation smites him—I am weak and wrong—where murder becomes the great animating and debasing principle—where it frowns the puny affectation of courts of justice into contempt,—where its baleful presence is attested by more victims than angry war demands or numbers—where the fall of every victim is a most fearful crime, and brings a curse and a cry of blood upon many criminals—there is a state of things having less to compensate its evil than comes in the train of battle. And this is the state of the southern provinces of Ireland. War would be better. Who would not rather go forth with the Emperor of France to his battles than abide amid the revolting butcheries of Robespierre or Marat, and who that reflected would not prefer to see Ireland the battle-field of civilized wai than the shambles which it has been made for murderers? We appeal to you shall it continue thus? Let it not be any longer the debateable ground on which contending parties in the state shall wage their political battles. Whether Tory or Whig or Radical exert himself to help it in so afflicting a condition, make him feel that you will not suffer men's lives to be thus slightly regarded—crimes of the blackest character to be perpetrated with impunity. Make him feel that the interests of Ireland must be

cared for, and are of more moment than the triumphs of party contention, and that you will not suffer Protestants to be rooted out, and their religion to perish, because they have maintained an unconquerable affection for this land of their fathers. (Cheers.) We beseech you to protect your Protestant fellow-subjects of Ireland, and see that the religion in which we pray in the same tongue as yourselves is not swept away from the face of our island. All your glory as a nation is simultaneous with and arising from your Church being the ark of the true religion. You cannot forget that when you emerged from the honourable war in which you were so long and so gloriously engaged, your efforts were immediately directed to the sending the knowledge of the truth into distant lands. When God said, " Whom shall I send and who will go for us?" England replied, " Here am I, send me!" A work at home now requires your earnest support. The Protestant religion is assailed at your own doors. Exert yourself in its behalf—correct it—clear it from its defects and protect it from its adversaries. (Enthusiastic and long-continued cheers.)

Col. Jervoise moved the 1st Resolution, (for which and those which followed it see page 26).

The *Ven. Archdeacon Moysey* seconded the resolution. After the powerful address of the Rev. Gentleman who had that day detailed to the meeting the present state of the Irish Church, and appealed to our sympathies on its behalf, he thought it was hardly possible to thank him too much. (Cheers.) A time was at hand when most of those who were now present would have it in their power to select for the making of the laws, such persons as would protect the protestant subjects and the protestant religion of Ireland. We were bound to choose such men as would do all in their power to repress bloodshed, and uphold in that land the tenets of the protestant faith. Every one present must be anxious to arrest the progress of the spoliation with which Ireland had been threatened. The Meeting would no doubt bear in mind the project which had been submitted to our sovereign by one of our late rulers—a project which would not only have led to the decay of the protestant religion in Ireland, and to the turning out upon the wide world of its faithful ministers; but to the razing of that Church, and to the extinction, in that island, of the reformed religion. All who were imbued with the genuine spirit of Christianity would have no objection to support that Church. The last clause of the resolution which had just been seconded, alluded to the prohibition of the bible in the Irish National Schools. He could not but denounce this prohibition as a most fatal evil. (Cheers.) It was once our pride and boast that the holy scriptures—not in parts and parcels, but in an unmutilated state—were rendered freely accessible to all classes of the people, in order that they might draw from them the waters of salvation, for the refreshment and health of their souls. If it were only to distribute the bible freely among the people of Ireland, we should lend our sincere efforts to keep down the overbearing Hierarchy, who so strenuously endeavoured to prevent the Catholic population of Ireland from possessing the word of God. (Cheers.)

Capt. Muttlebury, in moving the 2nd resolution said, that every

truly English heart must feel deeply grateful to our gracious sovereign for his noble declaration, that he would maintain inviolate the Protestant Church (cheers), and also for the manner in which he had evinced his determinatian on the subject by the late exercise of his prerogative. (Cheers.) He concluded by reading the resolution and the address, which were received with much applause.

Rev. Edward Tottenham rose to second the motion that the address which had been read, be presented to his most gracious Majesty. But, in doing so, he felt it would be a most unwarrantable outrage on propriety, if, after the arguments which had been so elaborately adduced, and the facts which had been so lucidly stated, he should be found weakening, by any lengthened harangue, the effect of the spirit-stirring eloquence to which he was persuaded, all present had listened with such delight. The intellectual powers of the meeting had already been called into, he might say, laborious activity, and it would not therefore be well for him to trespass long upon their attention. Nevertheless, he would ask his Lordship, could he, as a minister of the gospel, have a resolution put into his hand connected with the name of William the Fourth—could he remember that one of the titles which he bears is that of "Defender of the Faith,"—a title, the justice of whose application his Majesty had on a recent occasion so nobly proved—could he believe the closeness of the connection that existed between the monarchy and the church, and yet second the resolution committed to his charge, in almost perfect silence? He could not—and, therefore, although he should not be tedious, he solicited the indulgence of his Lordship and the meeting for a brief space of time. He regarded this meeting as one of peculiar moment, on account of the important *facts* which it had elicited, especially when he remembered the proneness to exaggeration and misapprehension which characterised the present day. They had had that morning a powerful exposé of the statements propagated respecting the Irish Church. (Cheers.) And it had been indisputably proved, that that Church, instead of being the over-paid Church she was represented to be; instead of being the gorgeous nuisance she was described, was a tried and a persecuted Church; and (he would add, though he believed no reference had been made to the point by those who had preceded him), persecuted simply because she had aroused herself to her duty. The facts of the case, and the circumstances of her history, fully established this position. So long as her locks were shorn, and she could be bound with a kind of moral ligature, so long did her enemies, like the Philistines of old, make merry. But when, like Sampson's, those locks began to grow, and the Church began to put forth her strength, and her clergy to remember their ordination vows, and to expose the fatal errors of a system which falsely claimed antiquity as her own—then was the outcry of opposition raised—then was the Church denounced as an incubus on the land. (Cheers.) She has therefore had to go, as had been already mentioned, through the fiery furnace of heavy persecution; but he believed there had been one with her "like unto the Son of God;" and however hot the furnace may have been, or may yet be, he trusted she would come out answering the description in the Book of Canticles, "fair as the moon, clear as the sun, and terrible as an

army with banners." (Cheers.) He was sure the sympathies of the meeting had been strongly enlisted on behalf of the Irish Church by the touching and eloquent delineations that had been used, as well as their judgments convinced by the arguments employed, and the facts adduced. Could he conceive such a thing as that, by the malice of designing men, the Church Establishment in Ireland, the adaptation of which to the spiritual necessities of the country had been so clearly proved, should fall—what monument should he erect—what epitaph should he write—over its manes? I may reply, (said the speaker) in the words so familiar to us all;—

> "I'd carve not a line—I'd raise not a stone—
> "But I'd leave it alone with its glory." (Cheers.)

The Reverend Gentleman proceeded to press upon the meeting the fact that the conflict in Ireland was in reality not about Church property. That was only an excuse—a plausible pretence—the conflict really was about Protestantism itself (cheers). It was very convenient for the Roman Catholic Priesthood to pretend to be engaged only with the outworks, when in truth it was the citadel itself, they were anxious to storm. If, said the speaker, the Church Establishment in Ireland were done away tomorrow, think you, my Lord, that the Church of Rome would be content? They know little of Popery, either as respects its principles or its history, who would say so Romanism is no idle—no indifferent—no easily satisfied system of Religion. It was well compared by a champion of the truth in former days, in his conference with the Jesuit Fisher, to a serpent which, when once it had got its head in, never rested till it wound in its entire body. (Cheers) No, my Lord, Rome is not to be lulled to sleep like Cerberus, with a honied cake—she is too wary—her appetite is of too craving a nature—and never, never, will she be content unless wielding the sceptre of universal supremacy! This is written, as "with a pen of iron and the point of a diamond," in the registers of her history. He spoke not this in any acrimonious spirit—he uttered not this language for the purpose of offence—but to raise a warning voice to the Protestants of the land. It had become the fashion to think that Romanism was changed—and if, for the sake of warning, a person ever referred to any persecuting fact of her bye-gone history, he was told that this was the very quintessence of uncharitableness and illiberality! How lamentable it is that men will expose their ignorance of the real state of things! To use a homely expression, he would say, the Roman Catholic laughs in his sleeve at the Protestant who would advocate his cause on such grounds as these (Cheers.) Did ever a Romanist tell you that his Church was changed? No—it is the boast of that Church that she is unchanged and unchangeable. He would ask, have the Canons of Lateran, which enjoined the persecution of heretics, ever been repealed? Have the decrees of Constance, that brought John Huss to the flames ever been abrogated? They never have and they never can—and what is more, they are at this moment professed by every genuine Roman Catholic. It may be done in ignorance by many, but yet it is so, for how does the case stand? A Roman Catholic declares, in one of the concluding articles of the creed of Pope Pius the 4th, "I likewise *unhesitatingly receive and profess all other things* delivered, defined, and declared by

the sacred canons and general councils, and particularly by the holy Council of Trent." Now the canons to which he had referred were part and parcel of the things delivered, defined, and declared by the Councils of Lateran and Constance, and therefore the conclusion is unavoidable from the premises, namely, that every consistent Romanist holds those canons as binding. He would not charge every individual in communion with the Romish Church with being a persecutor—this he did not believe to be a fact—but he only set forth what must be the belief, and the consequent practice of Roman Catholics, if only they be consistent with their principles. And here lay, he believed, one cause of the persecuted state of the Church in Ireland at present. But he must not be tedious. The importance of the case had been sufficiently established, and he hoped, therefore, that they would not suffer this meeting to pass away as a matter of course or as a thing of form, but that, according to the suggestion of the Venerable Archdeacon who had preceded him, they would make it the germ of some important actings. (Cheers.) They could advocate the cause of their persecuted and misrepresented sister church in their social circles—they could refute, so far as they possessed the information, those exaggerated statements which had been so industriously put forth—they could petition the King and the Houses of Parliament—and above all, they could petition the King of Kings, and send up their cause into the Court of Heaven. (Cheers.) Oh! that, while they were using every other lawful means, they might never forget the main-spring of them all, a spirit of prayer. Why did the early Christians triumph over the machinations of the enemies of the Cross, and why were they enabled to rejoice in being counted worthy to suffer shame for the name of Christ? Because they were men of prayer. Why was Luther so wondrously upheld in the most trying and difficult circumstances of the Reformation? Because he was a man of prayer. Why were the Reformers enabled to brave the scaffold and the stake in the maintenance of the principles of Christian truth? because they were men of prayer. (Cheers.) Prayer is the Christian's refuge—prayer is the essence of Protestantism—and if we neglect this it matters not what else we do, we cannot reasonably expect a blessing. But, supposing we are vigorously using all lawful means, and at the same time in the remembrance that it is "not by might, nor by power, but by the Spirit" of the living God, are found in the exercise of constant and believing prayer, shall we fear because the enemies of our excellent Church are many and are active? If we were not using means for "lengthening her cords and strengthening her stakes," we well might, for God works by means—but if we are, and that that Church is, in her principles based on the firm rock of God's word, then we need not fear, "though (as the Psalmist says in the boldness of figure) the earth be removed, and though the mountains be carried into the depths of the sea." (Cheers). You recollect the story of Julius Cæsar in a storm—the elements were raging—his pilot became alarmed—but the language of the great hero was, "Fear not, thou carriest Cæsar." Presumptuous, doubtless, the language was in this case, but, said the Rev. Speaker, in making application of the circumstance, I should say, we carry in the noble galley of our Establishment a mightier than Cæsar—we carry the Book of God and the

principles of the truth of the Gospel of Christ. Let us not then be daunted by difficulty, nor scared by opposition—let us go forward in the strength of omnipotence—let not the raging of the moral elements check us in our course, for the voice of our Lord seems, as it did of old to his affrighted disciples, to whisper to us, through the thunder of the tempest, "It is I, be not afraid." (Loud and continued cheering.)

The *Lord Bishop* "It is with pleasure and with pride I say that I myself heard the royal Declaration to which allusion has been made in the last resolution. (Loud cheers.) The words of his Majesty were, 'IF I EVER DESERT THE PROTESTANT CHURCH MAY GOD DESERT ME;' (tremendous cheering which lasted a considerable time,) and I am sure that a more honest or more heartfelt exclamation never fell from the lips of any monarch (Renewed cheers.) I can truly say that I never signed any document with greater pleasure than I shall feel in signing the address which you have adopted. (Cheers.)

Capt. Muttlebury here proposed the following addition to the resolution last moved, "and that the Lord Bishop of the Diocese be requested to present it (the address) to the King." This having been agreed to

The *Lord Bishop* said he should feel much gratification in acceding to the wishes of the meeting, and that he should describe to his Majesty how fervently the mention of his most gracious declaration had been received by this large and respectable meeting. (Cheers.)

W. Jeffs, esq; moved the third resolution.

Capt. Scott. R.N. seconded the resolution.

T. P. Clarke, esq; moved the 4th Resolution.

The *Rev. C. M. Mount*, "I rise to second the motion which has just been made by the hon. gentleman who has preceded me; and in saying that I do so with much pleasure, I beg to be understood as using no common-place-phrase employed on occasions like the present, when indeed, I declare that it is under the impulse of no ordinary feelings, I now stand before you. I am sure, I am but expressing a sentiment which will find a ready echo in the breast of every one by whom I am surrounded. It has been, in truth, a grateful sight to see the chair occupied by a right Rev. Prelate of the Church of England, (cheers) at a meeting, the avowed object of which is, to sympathize with the sufferings of a sister branch to which that Church is united—a Church, the members of which as they will never cease to rejoice with their brethren across the water when there is room for rejoicing, so will they never be backward to weep and to mingle tears of sympathy with theirs in the hour of tribulation. (The Rev. Gentleman's declaration was now loudly responded to by a general cheer) Upon various occasions we in this city are indebted to the Lord Bishop of the Diocese for the weight which his Lordship never fails to give to

the meeting, over which he is accustomed to preside, (cheers.) On no occasion whatsoever will that debt be more cordially acknowledged and more sincerely paid than by the present assembly. And yet although we should be wanting in courtesy in not offering our Right Rev. Chairman our hearty tribute of thanks, at the same time I will take upon myself to say that his Lordship will feel more than overpaid for the trouble which he has taken to come over and to direct the proceedings of this day, by the pleasure with which he has listened to the statement of the Rev. Deputy of the Irish Conservative Association—a statement so singularly luminous in its arrangement as to be distinctly comprehended in its several branches, and so pre-eminently fortunate in the selection of its topics as to leave behind it an impression which will not readily be effaced (cheers,)—a statement not less adorned by all those charms of eloquence and by that brilliant and impassioned style of oratory for which his countrymen are so famous, than calculated to carry conviction to his hearers by the irresistible force of the arguments by which it was strengthened; (cheers)—in a word, a statement so studded with those splendid figures of rhetoric which cannot fail to awaken the best feelings of which human nature is susceptible; but at the same time so replete with the plain figures of arithmetic and so charged with stubborn facts, as to force a complete surrender of the understanding in its favour, and to resolve itself into a direct, unequivocal, and most triumphant refutation of the calumnies by which the Irish Church has been, and still continues to be assailed. (Loud cheers). I repeat again, in having been a listener to a tale of Irish woe, which has been so told as to find a way into every English heart, (much cheering) the Right Rev. Prelate feels (I dare say,) amply compensated for the effect which his Lordship's presence has given to this day's proceedings. Nevertheless, we would fain hope that the current of his Lordship's feelings will be in no wise slackened by a cordial vote of thanks, which it is almost superfluous to put to the meeting, because I will venture to anticipate that it will be carried by one loud and simultaneous burst of acclamation. (The motion was passed amid loud, cordial and general cheering.)

The *Lord Bishop* returned thanks. He could truly say that his best services were always at the command of the citizens of Bath, more particularly on occasions like the present, when the object in view was the upholding of the protestant religion—the best legacy of our forefathers, and our hope of happiness hereafter. (Loud cheers.)

The meeting then separated, after having given three cheers for the cause of the Irish Church. The whole proceedings were characterised by the most enthusiastic spirit. It would be scarcely possible to imagine a more cordial display of attachment to the Established Church, than that by which this large assembly was throughout marked.—We have offered some general observations on the subject in another part of our paper.

RESOLUTIONS.

On the motion of Colonel JERVOIS, *seconded by the Ven. Archdeacon* MOYSEY,

RESOLVED,—I. That this Meeting, deeply sympathizing with their Irish Protestant Brethren in their sufferings, and feeling the safety of the whole United Church to be involved in the welfare of its Irish Branch, pledge themselves to use all lawful and Christian means for resisting the further progress of the oppression and spoliation so long and so patiently endured; for securing to them the quiet possession of their just rights and constitutional privileges; and for checking the encouragement now given to the growth of Popish principles by the prohibition of the use of the pure and unmutilated Word of God in the Irish National Schools.

On the motion of Captain MUTTLEBURY, *seconded by the Rev.* EDWARD TOTTENHAM,

RESOLVED,—II. That a Loyal and Dutiful Address be presented to his Majesty, reiterating our gratitude for his most timely and gracious declaration in behalf of the United Church, and praying that he will be further pleased to continue his vigilant and fostering care of that Sacred Establishment, which affords, under God, the most effectual means of Promoting Christian Knowledge and True Loyalty among all classes of his Majesty's subjects, and that the following Address be adopted, and signed by the Chairman on behalf of the Meeting, and be by his Lordship presented to his Majesty.

On the motion of WILLIAM JEFFS, *Esq; seconded by Captain* SCOTT, R.N.

RESOLVED,—III. That the best thanks of the Meeting are due to the Irish Protestant Conservative Society, and more especially to the Rev. Gentleman whom they have deputed, for the very valuable and important information, so eloquently afforded, on subjects vitally connected with the Church in Ireland, and, hitherto, too little known or understood in this country.

On the motion of T. PICKERING CLARKE, Esq; *seconded by the Rev.* C. M. MOUNT,

RESOLVED,—IV. That the most cordial thanks of this Meeting are due, and are now offered, to the Lord Bishop of Bath and Wells, for his great kindness in presiding this day, and

also for the readiness at all times shewn by his Lordship to assist by his presence, and support by his exertions, our efforts to maintain the rights, privileges, and efficiency of the united Church.

ADDRESS.

To the King's Most Excellent Majesty.

We, your Majesty's most loyal and dutiful subjects, Inhabitants of the City of Bath and its vicinity, in public meeting assembled, beg leave to assure your Majesty of our unshaken attachment to your Majesty's throne and person.

Encouraged by your Majesty's most gracious declaration, on a late occasion, in favour of the pure Protestant Faith, and of your determination to protect and uphold the United Church of England and Ireland, as by law established, in the enjoyment of all its just rights and constitutional privileges, (for which gracious declaration we beg to reiterate our most grateful thanks) we now venture

To draw your Majesty's attention to the state of oppression, spoliation, and distress under which the Irish Branch of the United Church has been so long and so patiently suffering;

To entreat your Majesty to stretch forth your protecting hand in its behalf;

And to countenance, by your favour, the righteous endeavours of its Prelates and Clergy for the dissemination of Apostolic truth.

And your Majesty may be assured of our most fervent prayers, that you may long be spared to be the "Defender of that Faith," which it is no less the bounden duty than, we are persuaded, it is the constant resolution of your Majesty to cherish and maintain.

Signed, on behalf of the Meeting, this 6th day of Dec. 1834,

GEO. H. BATH AND WELLS, *Chairman.*

H. E. CARRINGTON, PRINTER, BATH.

NIAGARA,

A

POEM.

NIAGARA, A POEM.

> ' Our outward sense
> Is but of gradual grasp—and as it is,
> That what we have of feeling most intense,
> Outstrips our faint expression.



" EVEN when present at the Falls, it is probable that the observer himself takes correct notice of a small part only, of the objects presented to his view. Those, however, which he does remark, straightway suggest, images to his mind, suitable to his own particular character; and of course, essentially modified by the peculiar circumstances of his past life. Now, if we suppose it possible, that he could describe with what is called perfect or graphic fidelity, both the facts themselves which strike his senses, and the ideas which arise in his mind from a contemplation of them, the chances are still infinitely against these recorded conceptions being found suitable to the minds of his different readers. At the best, the ideas suggested to others by his descriptions, must inevitably be feeble and incomplete, in comparison with his own. His impressions are not produced by the observation of a series of details, considered one after another,—the only method in which a reader can view them,—but are stamped upon his mind and feelings at the moment, by the whole in combination."

Travels in North America by Captain Basil Hall.

NIAGARA.

QUEENSTON, while on thy far-famed heights I rest,
What glowing thoughts, invade my thrilling breast!
And shall I pass thy scenes, and yon lone tomb,
Where all earth claims of Brock, receives its doom,
Nor strive, ere other themes, engross my lay,
A grateful tribute, to thy fame to pay?
Sweet is the view, thy lofty brow commands;
The spacious plain,—the shores of rival lands;—
Between whose bounds, the placid river flows,
Smiling serene, as conscious of repose:
Nor idly flows; for as its waters sweep,
Their devious course, towards the distant deep,
They on their bosom, bear the rich produce,
Of fertile fields around, for foreign use.
Wandering in joy, the chainless Zephyrs play,
And kiss its glassy cheek, as on they stray,
To where its waters, like a mirror spread,
Translucently above, Ontario's bed;
In which, Angelic Hosts, might stoop to view,
Heaven's arch reflected, of celestial blue!
Beneath yon mound—but wherefore should I tell,
Since History's page relates, what there befel?
Although our Meteor flag, in triumph waved,
The conqueror fell upon the soil he saved.
Yonder the column stands, by Briton's reared,
To thee immortal Brock! whom all revered!
" Bright names will hallow song," and verse like mine,
Illustrious Hero! stands in need of thine;
For of the brave, who fought to guard our land,
From the incursions of an hostile band;

Who can select, from the proud throng, a name ;
As bright as thine,—of such enduring fame?
Bravest, where all were brave ;—in zeal, untired ;—
A soul, with every patriot virtue fired ;
Ardent and generous,—prompt at glory's call ;
The victors wept,—the vanquished mourned thy fall !
I said by all *revered* : by one young land
Thou wert *adored* ; thy life's blood dyed her strand.
Whatever Titles others may confer,
She feels thou wert, a Martyr unto her !
Exultingly, she watch'd thy brief career,
And when fate stretched thee, on an early bier,
Upon her brow, dark clouds of sadness hung ;
And lamentations dwelt upon her tongue !
With deepest woe, her dauntless heart was rife ,
E'en victory cheered not, purchased with thy life !
Thy deathless name, her annals, shall adorn,
And be extoll'd through ages yet unborn ;
With deep-felt awe, her sons will view the grave,
Of him who died, their Father's hearths to save ;
And while her native pines, retain their hue,
With grateful hearts, will pay the tribute due !
Yes ! long as thy proud Monument remains,
Or the blood flows within a Briton's veins,
Thy hallow'd fame, shall be her boast and pride,
And the spot sacred, where in crimson tide,
Thy precious life, gushed from thy wounded side.

Queenston, adieu ! I quit thy heights to trace,
The chasm worn by the wild torrents race ;
To mark what form, its rugged shores pervade,
As they approach Niagara's Cascade.

Near where Brock led the brave in stern array,
And ever foremost, perished in the affray ;
The Cataract, 'tis said, first rushed sublime :
Was it coeval with the birth of time ?
Or did some dire convulsion shake this ball,
And raise the steppe, from whence its waters fall ?
Determine ye, whom Geologic lore,

Shall hither lead, the strata to explore ;
Enough, if I, in numbers can convey,
The scenes and thoughts, which strike me, as I stray
Along the shore, the ledge o'er hangs the stream,
And far beneath, the flashing billows gleam :
Like angry Titans, o'er a prostrate foe,
The frowning rocks, gaze on the waves below ;
Which undermine their strength, 'till each proud head
Falls crush'd, and broken, on a wave-worn bed !
Such is the scene, to where the raging flood,
Forms a vast whirlpool midst the shelt'ring wood.
Fierce daughter of the torrent ! thou dost sweep
In fearful eddies, round thy verdant steep ;
And many a Monarch of the forest, rides,
Barkless and branchless, on thy whirling tides !
Navell'd amid the woods, thy sudden bend,
Looks like the goal, where the huge torrents end ;
But pass the point, lo ! with impetuous gush,
The raging rapids, onward reckless rush !
Foam crested, bounding billows ! ye are pass'd,
And on the TABLE ROCK, I stand at last.
Sublimest wonder of Almighty might,
That ever charm'd with dread the human sight,
From humbler themes to thee ! with awe I turn
Thou matchless king of floods,—thou desert born !
Niagara Hail ! oh, how shall I impart
With words, the feelings, which invade my heart ?
I rest on rocks, which overhang the abyss,
Where thy dire " Hell of waters, howl and hiss !"
On that worn ledge, from whence with awful bound,
The foaming waters plunge with stunning sound !
I gaze, and turn away—then gaze again ;
Dread, fear, and joy, perplex my reeling brain :
Mixed undefinable sensations, rush
Across my mind ; wild as thy torrents gush !
Imagination, baffled ; strives in vain :
The wildest dreams that even poets feign,
Thou dost transcend ! There is no power in song,

To paint the wonders that around me throng!
The world abounds with sights and scenes sublime,
Seas—Rivers—Lakes—are found in every Clime;
Cities and Castles, Palaces and Fanes,
Abound, where roll the Tiber and the Thames,
The Seine—the Rhine—the Severn, and the Po,
Alike through realms of cultur'd beauty flow;
Scene like to scene, we meet in every zone,
But there is nought like thee!—Thou art alone!
  Mysterious spirit of this awful place;
Withdraw the veil of waters, from thy face!
Who shall attempt to sing thee, unless thou,
Unveil the hidden terrors of thy brow?
Fain would I grow familiar with the form,
That rules these wonders, and directs the storm,
Of winds and waters, which beneath me rage,
And with these rocks, a war eternal, wage!
Flood of the wild! through lands unknown to song,
And forests drear, thou roll'st thy course along;
Through wood clad verdant vales, and sunny glades;
Through dark and humid swamps, of deepest shades.
Each tributary stream, its homage shows,
And swells thy gathering power, as on it flows;
Till concentrated here, thy waters all,
Rush thundering down thy huge gigantic fall!
Here white as untrod snow,—there green as grass,
In its first verdure; falls the aqueous mass:
Conflicting-sweeping onward in its course,
With an Eternity's resistless force!
The firm earth shakes, as if with fear, around;
And the rocks tremble, with its dread rebound.
Beneath is thy abyss; Oh, what a scene!
The rising mists, float o'er, as if to screen,
The dreadful conflict! See the waters meet;
And how in hostile rage, they fierce compete!
Flood, wars with flood,—the kindred drops rebel,
And like the roused ocean of a Hell,
Thy turbid bosom heaves: the rising sound

Like moanings of the damned, my ears astound,
An awe inspiring roar ! such as would rise,
From hopeless millions, to unpitying skies !
Behold ! upshooting, from the Cauldron's breast,
The boiling torrent, tortured into yeast ;
Rising in billowy piles, as if to gain,
The heights which they can never more attain :
Like sheeted ghosts, striving from thy dread deep,
To gain a place of rest, they upward leap !
Whirling, like waltzing fiends, thy eddies play,
And sport and gambol, midst the dire affray ;
The heaving surges too, each other chase,
And burst in foam, against thy rocky base ;
Then on, like foaming steeds, with fearful force ;
The billows, gallop down, thy rapid's course.
Serenely floating o'er thy wild cascade ;
Spanning the ragged rent, its stream hath made;
An Iris glows in its celestial hues,
And with a magic charm, the scene imbues.
The wild sea-mews, careering in the spray,
Amidst its heaven-born dyes; delighted, play:
And Lo! as down the gulph my restless eyes,
Pursue thy course, to where the rocks arise,
Like an embattled wall, curtain'd with foam;
Another rainbow seeks, its stormy home!
How beautiful its tints! Divinely calm!
Over the mingling strife, it sheds a balm,
Like "hope on death beds," ere saints sink to rest;
Or "beauty sleeping," upon "horrors breast!"
A floating shroud, o'er all thy grandeur dwells,
Form'd by the spray, thy angry flood repels;
And the blue heavens, like a celestial pall,
Form one wide canopy, and cover all!
Great God! How wonderful thy works, when Thou,
Sports't with thy elements, as Thou dost now!
How mean,—how insignificant are all,
Man's mightiest works, that decorate this Ball;
They fade, and pass away; but Thine remain,

Emblems of Thy power,—eternal as Thy reign!
Prostrate before Thy mightiest display,
I worship Thee;—Thy temple is the day!
Niagara, Thy Altar! Its loud roar,
Sounds Thy Omnipotence, from shore to shore!
On Thee, great author, and first cause of all,
Eternal source of light and life I call!
Teach me, whene'er Thy awful steps I trace
'Mid scenes, which Thou hast made my dwelling place,
Or from Earth's surface, lift my wond'ring eyes,
To view thy glory, in the star-lit skies;
To feel that awe which erring man should feel,
When he attempts thy greatness to reveal.
Impetuous Cataract! sublimely grand!
Thou seem'st to have burst the fetters of His hand,
Who holds the Ocean in His hollow palm;
Who bids thee rage, and can, thy raging calm:
And a deep awe, o'erpowers the astonish'd mind,
As though His laws, eternal; did not bind
Thee to the Channel, which His finger's trace,
Mark'd as a passage, for thy billowy race!
Restrain'd by Him, thou sends't with steady flow,
Thy harmless torrents to the depths below;
Where thy proud billows all opposing sweep,
Each idle vestige from thy troubled deep.
Ye rushing Tides! ages, on ages, pass'd,
Ere aught, but your loud roar, disturb'd the blast;
Except the wild beast's howl, or warlike cry
Of Red men, broke the silence of the sky;
Or the loud crash, when with o'erwhelming force,
The frozen masses, falling, choked your course.
But where are they, whom scenes like thine, first taught,
That the Great Spirit reigned? Who on this spot,
In humble worship bowed and felt o'er-awed:
Who, " looked through nature, up to natures' God?"
Fierce as the beasts they sought,—to warfare bred,
Along thy shores, their vagrant tribes they led;
Wild as thy flood,—impetuous as its speed,

Their legends tell, of many, a bloody deed.
The new world was their own,—its boundless woods,
Its wide Savannas, and gigantic Floods:
Till thou Columbus, steer'd o'er unknown seas,
Where sail had never flutter'd in the breeze.
Thy daring keel, the first that ever press'd,
The azure billows, of their virgin breast!
Onward, like hope, thy streaming pennon played,
Until their shores, thy longing eyes surveyed.
Soon flew the tidings, and the white man came,
And dispossess'd, the hunter, and his game:
Long have the Redmen ceased to throng thy brink,
Their songs are hushed, their council fires extinct,
The warriors mound will soon alone be all,
That will remembrance, of their race, recall.
Ye children of the forest! It was not
In open war, that men from Europe, sought
Your fertile shores: they came with heartless wile
And you rejoiced; suspecting not their guile.
Missouri and La Plata! Rio Grand
And all ye floods that lave their outraged land!
Bear witness ye,—for often hath your wave
Dyed with his blood, afforded him a grave,—
Bear witness how, the Whiteman hath repaid,
The Indian's kindness! how he oft hath laid
His dwelling desolate; and made his name,
A by-word and a scoff: and Oh! eternal shame!
Oppress'd and plunder'd him! The murder'd hosts
If call'd to life, would throng your spacious coasts.
Niagara, the remnant of that race,
Which call'd thy verdant shores, their dwelling place,
Are now protected, and securely toil,
Where ever Britain sways the Indian soil.
But where the "Patriot's banner," long hath waved,
And sable millions still remain enslav'd;
The ill-fated Indian, on his own domain,
Asks but to live in peace, but asks in vain.
Is there no place on earth man calls his own,

Where guilt and outráge; hath remain'd unknown?
Is there no spot, his restless foot hath trod,
Where blood, hath never stain'd, the guilty sod?
Long,—long ago, as Indian legends tell,
On yonder Isle, victims to vengeance fell.
Wild on the blast, all sustenance denied,
Their shrieks arose, above thy roaring tide:
Tis said their spirits, doomed to know no rest,
Amidst the warring floods still dwell unbless'd,
And fancy's ear, can catch their mournful groans,
Now rising high,—now sunk to sullen moans;
'Twas but of late, invaders sought our land
And fought and fled, defeated, from thy strand,
Thou,too, hast heard, the White man's shouts arise,
The din of war—the death struck wretches cries!
Seen blood profusely flow, when hand to hand,
The crimson'd steel, clash'd, mids't the hostile band;
And mimic light'nings flash, the live-long night,
While the loud cheer, proclaim'd the lengthen'd fight;
And heard the thunders of the cannon's roar,
"Vex the dull ear of night," along thy shore.

Insulted Genius of the spot, expand
Each narrow mind—avert each daring hand,
That would denude thy shrine, and Oh! defeat,
Man's innovations, on thy dread retreat!
Could he not count his pence, and leave between
Thee, and his plodding deeds, a leafy screen?
Could not, a margin of the wild, be spared?
No, where thy shore is clothed 'twill soon be bared,
And Taverns, Mills, and Groceries will rear
Their shingled roofs, o'er thy sublime career!
Oh, had I power, how soon would I restore,
The forest he hath stripped from thy dread shore;
And force, the staring structures of his hand,
A proper distance from thy outrag'd strand.
Shall gain alone, the soul of man infest—
Lead "wrens" to prey, where 'eagles', dare not rest?
Rise in thy wrath, thou mighty flood, and sweep
The intruders works from thy colossal steep!

Man! stay thy band,—here let thy mind dilate,
And strive to grasp, what thou dost contemplate.
Nature is eloquent—the torrents flow,
Can teach a lesson it is well to know;
And thou Niagara, if rightly read,
Speaks't to the heart, like requiems o'er the dead.
Here all is change. Mark how the constant shock
Of falling torrents, frets the solid rock.
Time like thy flood, incessant onward rolls,
And with its billows agitates our souls.
Years, countless years, have heard thy solemn roar;
It will be heard, when all shall be no more,
Whose hearts now throb ! When not a trace is left,
And even our graves shall be of us bereft.
Thou art not wrinkled by the hand of time;
The lapse of ages, leaves thee in thy prime !
Alas ! how different, with the crowds that flock
From distant lands, to throng thy Table Rock !
A few short years, and Lo ! the spark expires,
Which gives them life—they moulder ,with their sires:
But when their tombs are tenantless, thy voice
Will make the hearts, of other crowds rejoice ;
They too shall pass away —yet still thy song
Will hoarsely rise, these wave-worn rocks among.
Alas ! my soul is dark,—dark as the abyss,
That yawns beneath ! Hope, whispers, future bliss :
But even her vivid eye, will oft grow dim :
Doubts, like thy mists, before its visions swim,
And fiend-like, whisper to the heart, and say,
Its hopes shall perish, like thy rising spray !
Oh ! Man, thou " pendulum" 'twixt "smile and tear,"
Now buoyed by hope, and now depress'd by fear,
Now doubting all things, then believing all,
That priestcraft hath invented, since thy fall !
What is thy lot? disease, and death and strife.
And what thy hope? bliss, in a future life.
Shalt thou, like yonder rainbow, pass away,
And with thy spirit, share a bed of clay ?

Shall all the elements of this dull earth,
Retain the power, God gave them at their birth;
And thou, and thy, all-grasping, restless mind
Become extinct ? a grave eternal find,—
In the dark earths embrace ? Oh! FAITH impart,
Thy confidence to every doubting heart;
As the cool water, from the fountain brought,
To the parched lips, thou art to the thought.
On every soul, oh! let thy full light stream,
And gild each wayward thought, with thy bright beam !
And should times, adverse storms still ruthless sweep
My shatter'd skiff, across lifes' dreary deep,
Soul soothing Angel Faith, do thou remain,
To still the tempest, or, my bark sustain!
And when the dreary voyage, of life, is o'er,
And its worn fragments, strew death's sable shore;
Let my freed soul, in thy embraces ride,
Into Eternity's, "unebbing tide":
Where sorrows blight comes not, nor thou despair,
And find a stormless, tranquil haven, there!
Yes! when Niagara, thy voice no more,
Shall in the ears, of awe-struck listners, roar;
When wasted are thy floods, and thy wild waves,
Have perish'd with the shores, thy torrent laves;
Then shall the immortal soul, on wings sublime,
Soar—daring soar, above the wrecks of time!
O'er this crush'd world, its song of triumph sing,
"Oh! grave where is thy victory! Oh! death, where is thy sting!"
On Queenston heights, I stray'd in lonely guise,
This morn, and saw, yon setting sun, arise.
Long, ere I stood, where now entranced I gaze,
Meridian skies, were glowing with his rays,
He will arise, to cheer the land, and main,
And scatter gladness, o'er those scenes again:
But thousands gaze, on his last lingering ray,
On whom, the "precincts of the cheerful day"
Shall dawn no more: Time's, ceaseless noiseless wing,
No change of night, or day, to them shall bring.

Thy floods are Ocean bound, but dark and drear,
Is the dread grave, we journey to in fear.
From the great deep, in vapours, *they* may rise,
And float in gorgeous forms ; 'mid other skies ;
But man must sleep, until that final day,
When earth, and seas, and skies, shall pass away ;
Till the last Trump, shall call him to his doom,
And wake the slumbering, Tenants of the tomb.
Niagara, Farewell ! a long adieu ;
The deep'ning twilight hides thee from my view.
Oft ere I left, my loved paternal home,
E'en long before, I ever thought to roam ;
I've read, and talked of thee, and longed to gaze,
And stand before thee thus, in deep amaze.
And I did promise, that if e'er I stood,
Upon thy rocky ledge, to view thy flood ;
That I would task my feeble powers, and dare
To sing the wonders, I should witness there.
I have essayed to sing, but where art thou
My aged sire, to whom I made that vow !
Huge Oceans roll between, and fate may doom,
In different hemispheres, to us a tomb.
Though dim thy eyes, they'll gleam with joy to see,
I've not forgot my home, and vow to thee.
Though dull the words I've woven into rhyme,
Yet to thy ears, they will like music chime ;
And thy fond heart, a blessing will implore,
On the lone wanderer, of a distant shore.
Ye skies, and hills, and voices, far away
By night of ye I dream, and muse by day :
Scenes of my youth ! when ye my thoughts employ,
I feel my pulse beat high, with hope and joy ;
My native land ! Oh ! soul inspiring sound,
How closely to my heart's core art thou bound !
Yes, I do love thee, Ah! how vain for they,
Who never left their native land, to say
"I love my country "! Home ! thou art a theme
Which makes the exile's life a fever'd dream.
But I have said farewell. Ye mighty Falls,

Your sights astonish, and your roar appals!
Night, from her ebon wings, the darkness throws,
And brooding o'er your scenes, demands repose;
The skies frown heavily ——, the stars are hid,
Or gleam, as pass, some cloudy pyramid.
Hush'd, are the zephyrs, which I sung of yore,
And hollow, moaning blasts, invade the shore!
Niagara ! thy darkling floods appear,
To rush with greater force, as if in fear.
Methinks I hear, strange voices join thy song,
And sounds unearthly float, thy shores along.
Huge shadowy forms, on falling torrents ride,
Sport over thy abyss, and down thy rapids glide.
Visions, from worlds beyond the grave intrude;
Awful,—appalling, as its solitude.
All gloomy things are met, with dread oppressed,
Wild trains of thought, invade my troubled breast--
Thoughts, of those youthful hopes, of earthly bliss,
Which long have vanish'd; lost in time's abyss:
Of Death—the Grave—Eternity--of all,
That can exalt, or can the soul enthrall!
My task is done! Here will I end my lays,
And of thy Great Creator, muse the praise.

FINIS.

Article XI

AN

ESSAY ON TIME;

AND

Sacred Poems.

BY THE AUTHOR OF THE

"ESSAY ON THE HAPPINESS OF THE LIFE TO COME."

ST. LEONARD, EXETER:

PRINTED BY AND SOLD FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE DEAF AND DUMB CHILDREN AT THE INSTITUTION.

1832.

ON TIME.

"How do you contrive to spend your time?" said a gentleman to one of his acquaintances. "I set this foot on one side of the fender," answered he, "and that foot on the other side, and let time spend itself."

Such was the manner in which a rational being, a being formed for immortality, wasted a talent which was given to be employed to the glory of God, the benefit of his fellow-creatures, and the advantage of his own soul;—such was the mis-use of that time which is the path to eternity. But are we not all, in a greater or less degree, liable to the same censure?

Various are the talents intrusted to mankind, and variously are they imparted to different individuals; but of disposable time some portion is allotted to each in every rank and situation of life.

Time may be considered with reference either to our *thoughts*, our *words*, or our *actions*. They whose constant occupation consists only in bodily labour, have still time for a profitable exercise of *thought*;—even those whose professions chiefly employ the mind, have intervals

in which *thought* may be free;—and both may find many opportunities when by *words* they may benefit those around them, without omitting any of their respective duties. But they whose circumstances afford leisure, not only for a choice of *thoughts* and *words*, but of *actions* also,—these have received, with regard to time, ten talents; and how awful is the charge with which those talents were committed to their trust,—"occupy till I come."

Time appears under a different aspect according to the passing hour of the day. When we awake in the morning, time *future* lies before us; we must then determine how we can employ it to the best advantage;—as we proceed from minute to minute, we must take a view of it as *present*, and consider what we are doing;—soon "the night cometh, when no man can work;" it is then that the *past* time passes in review before us;—and what religious mind can take such a retrospect without regret and repentance?

On the sacred rest of the sabbath, time is of double value. It is then that time may lay aside its burdens and cares, and obtain a share in the blessings of eternity. Alas! for those who retain the burdens, and reject the blessings!

"Time," as an old maxim expresses it, "Time is what we want most, but what we use worst; for which we must all account, when Time shall be no more."

POEMS.

ON THE NEW YEAR.

I.

Another course of varying seasons o'er,
With warning voice those midnight sounds proclaim--
The moments once our own, are ours no more;
Yet still 'tis given, with strong exalted aim,
To stamp the important future, ere they fly,
And swell the awful records of eternity.

When the last period of revolving Time
Like this arose, on swift but silent wing,
How many welcomed nature's opening prime,
And hailed with transport the returning spring;
But ah! whilst Hope her scenes delusive spread,
They fell—the vision fades—they rest among the dead.

Before *my* sight the same fair prospect lies,
And Fancy leads in smiles the circling hours;
Soft Health benignant looks from vernal skies,
And Peace and Pleasure strew my path with flowers;
Yet,' midst the Zephyr's breath, the rose's bloom,
Some sudden blast may rise, and bear me to the tomb.

Awful the view—Yet not with terror fraught,
Where Virtue's train on Hope's bright pinions soar;
'Tis wisdom's voice that wakes the solemn thought,
And bids the soul her native clime explore:
Immortal Truth her aid divine has given,
Drawn nature's veil aside, and taught the way to heaven.

There, to the footstool of the eternal throne,
The Seraph Mercy leads her favoured race,
Midst the bright forms on earth but faintly known,
Celestial Love, and Friendship's angel-face;
Peace smiles serene, with wreaths unfading crowned,
And Pleasure's sacred songs through heaven's wide realms
resound.

II.

How blest, O Lord! that heavenly soul,
Whose passions own divine controul,
What though the restless hopes and fears
That spring amidst this vale of tears,
May sometimes prompt a rising sigh,
And fill with grief the trembling eye—
They ne'er his steady faith can move
Whose heart securely rests above,
Where near the everlasting throne,
He boasts a treasure all his own;
Which, free from dire corruption's power,
Nor thieves shall waste, nor moth devour,
But, safe beneath the Saviour's eye,
Shall time's tremendous wreck defy.

When thy all-powerful hand, O God!
At length shall lift the chastening rod;
When health shall yield to torturing pain,
And sickness flow through every vein;
When all the springs of life decay,
And vital spirits sink away;—

Even through the darkening mists of death,
Whilst nature heaves her latest breath,
His eye shall view his Saviour's love,
Rejoiced that final stroke to prove,
That sets the ransomed spirit free
To dwell in endless bliss with Thee.

III.

The comforts of the world are false,
And all its transports vain;
Its smiles oft checked by rising tears,
Its pleasures mixed with pain.

If such the blessings it bestows,
Imperfect, insecure,
Alas ! how poignant are its woes !
How difficult to cure!

But if we turn our thoughts above,
To Him from whom they spring,
Reliance on eternal Love,
Eternal peace shall bring.

No comforts then shall e'er prove false,
No transports e'er be vain,
No smiles be checked by rising tears,
Nor pleasures end in pain.

No more the blessings we possess,
Imperfect, insecure,
No longer poignant be our woes,
Nor difficult to cure.—

When prosperous suns around us shine ?
Our day of life to cheer,
Reflection on its source divine,
Shall every *joy* endear;

And in *affliction's* trying hour,
To Him shall praise be given,
Whose mercy sends its chastening power,
To raise the soul to heaven.

IV.

To be inscribed in a volume of Cowper's Poems.

Woe to the bard of mis-spent powers,
Who turns to gloom the brightest hours;
Sees all events in evil end,
Man's purest joys to misery tend.—
Nor views the hand, that, fraught with love,
Links all below with all above.

'Tis *thine*, with nobler aim to rise,
To lift from earth to heaven our eyes,
Through the deep mists of time and sense,
To trace the beams of Providence;
And point the Christian's glorious way
To regions of eternal day.

Thus to the peasant's bounded sight
The stars appear but sparks of light;
Not so to him by science led,—
He bursts the veil o'er nature spread,
'Midst worlds, and suns, and systems soars,
And 'wrapt in silent awe, adores.

V.

"This is none other but the House of God and this is the Gate of Heaven."

Genesis XXVIII. 27.

"The House of God!" O'welcome sound!
"There streams of sweet salvation flow,
And *faith*, and *hope*, and *love* abound,
For weary pilgrims here below.

Love, the redeemed only feels—
Hope, that the pardoned only know—
And *faith*, that scenes of bliss reveals
To mourning pilgrims here below.—

And here unfolds "the Gate of Heaven,"
Where all who knock may entrance gain—
To them that ask, shall here be given,
And they who seek, shall here obtain.

Ye, whom the cares of life enthral!
Ye, by the woes of life oppressed!
Come at the Saviour's gracious call—
O come! and he will give you rest.

Here let the voice of praise resound,
Where streams of sweet salvation flow,
And *faith*, and *hope*, and *love* abound,
For Christian pilgrims here below.

VI.

Faith, Hope, and Charity.

When, wandering on life's mazy road,
We seek the path that leads to God—
When doubts perplex, when fears alarm,
And vain the aid of mortal arm—
What power shall steadier views impart,
And turn to truth the wavering heart?
'Tis thine, bright Faith! whose eagle-eye
Is fixed on immortality.

And in affliction's gloomiest day,
When foes assault or friends betray—
When want o'erwhelms or pains oppress,
And all the world seems loneliness—
What hand can chase the shades of night,

And bring returning life and light?
Then, heavenly Hope! thy power we hail,
Whose anchor rests within the veil.

When discord holds her baneful reign—
And all the evils in her train,
Hatred and malice, wrath and strife,
Poison the cup of human life—
What voice shall bid the tempest cease,
And calm the passions into peace?
'Tis thine, sweet Charity! for love
Is bliss below, and bliss above.

VII.

"*And he said unto the woman, thy faith hath saved thee: go in peace.*"

Luke vii. 50.

When, kneeling at her Saviour's feet,
A suppliant at the mercy-seat,
The sinner breathed a silent prayer,
And humbly sought salvation there—
She heard a voice, like sounds from heaven,

Proclaim her every sin forgiven,
And bid, with words of full release,
The penitent depart in peace.

Thus, on the confines of the grave,
When nought on Earth has power to save,
Be Thou, my God and Saviour! near,
Exalt my hope, and calm my fear;
Each self-applauding thought repress,
And clothe me with thy righteousness;
With strength divine my faith increase,
And bid my soul depart in peace.

VIII.

What is Life?

Say, what is life? a few short years,
A varying scene of smiles and tears,
Of fading hopes, and anxious fears?

A world to sin and death a prey,
Where pleasures lure but to betray,
And virtue's self may lead astray?

No—'tis a bliss to us unknown,
That springs from the Redeemer's throne,
The purchase of his blood alone.
There is no sin, nor death nor night;
All is immortal, clear, and bright;
For God's own glories are the light!
This, this is life!

IX.

"It is I—be not afraid."
Mark vi. 50.

"It is I"— in darkest night,
Lord! can thy disciples fear?
Darkness shines as noonday bright,
Saviour God! if thou art near,

Though the billows rage and swell,
At thy word the storm is laid;
Speak that word, and all is well;—
"It is I—be not be afraid."

In the hour of deep distress,
Shower thy influence on my soul;
Every murmuring thought repress,
Every anxious fear controul.

Mercy's hand inflicts the blow;
Be thy gracious will obeyed;
Comfort beams 'midst every woe;—
"It is I—be not be afraid."

When the pains of death assail,
Lord! be thou my strength and stay;
Guard me in the gloomy vale,
Guide me through the narrow way.

Saviour! bid my terrors cease;
Light of Heaven! dispel the shade;
Let my soul depart in peace;—
"It is I—be not afraid."—

X.

"Thanks be to God, which giveth us the victory, through our Lord Jesus Christ."

Corinthians XVI. 57.

Assailed by sorrow and by sin,
By foes without, and foes within—
When pain shall seize our mortal part,
And deeper anguish wound the heart—
And, rushing on with rapid wing,
When death shall point his fatal sting—
O whither shall the sufferer fly ?
What power can give the Victory ?

That power is Thine, Almighty Lord !
We read our truimph in thy word—
That word bids sin and sorrow cease,
Speaks to the soul, and all is peace.
The *pardoned* shall thy love proclaim—
The *comforted* shall bless thy name.
Our friend on earth, our God on high,
Thou givest us the Victory.

And, at the awful judgement day,
When thou shalt come in dread array—
The conqueror who died to save,
And on the cross subdued the grave—
Thy ransomed saints shall rise, to prove
The wonders of redeeming love ;—
And hosts shall shout, and hosts reply,
Christ giveth us the Victory

THE END.

PRINTED BY THE DEAF AND DUMB CHILDREN,
AT THE INSTITUTION, ST. LEONARD'S EXETER.

Christ's Spirit,

A

CHRISTIAN'S STRENGTH;

OR,

A PLAIN DISCOVERY

OF THE

Mighty and Invincible Power

THAT ALL

Believers receive through the Gift of the Spirit.

FIRST HELD FORTH

IN TWO SERMONS,

ON ACTS I. 8.

And after published for the Instruction and use of those that are spiritual. Anno 1645.

BY

WILLIAM DELL,

Minister of the Gospel of Jesus Christ.

"I will come unto you shortly, if the Lord will, and will know not the speech of them that are puffed up, but the power."—I COR. iv. 19.

"For the kingdom of God is not in word, but in power.—20.

"Having a form of godliness, but denying the power of it; from such turn away." 2 Tim. iii. 5.

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

To the Right Honourable the Lady Elizabeth Countess of Bolinbroke.

Right Honourable,

THE form *of godliness is very* common *in these days of ours, but the* power *of it is very rare. How* few *persons shall we find in the visible* church, *who live and act in the* strength *of* God? *But generally men do, what ever they do, in their* own *strength, and that not only in* human *things but in* divine. *How seldom do we see, either in* ministers *or* Christians, *in the discharge of their duties in their several places, more than the* power of men? *The greatest part by far, not only of those who are called* Christians, *but also of forward* professors, *being ignorant what it is,* to be strengthened with might in the inner man, according to the glorious power of the Great God. *How* little *is there (among all our plenty) of* that *preaching, which is not in the plausible words of man's wisdom, but in the demonstration of the* Spirit *and* Power? *How few* congregations *(among the many that are in the kingdom) are gathered together in the* Spirit *and* Power *of our* Lord Jesus Christ? *How few of those Christians are there, in whom is the* exceeding greatness of God's power, *together with the* effectual working of it? *But the* form of godliness, *is now become, almost the* covering of all flesh, *and in these days of light and knowledge, it is accounted by all (that are not down-right Atheists) a great shame, not to* seem *to be religious. And when men, and families, and congregations are gotten into this* form, *they think themselves both safe and happy, as being near the suburbs of the kingdom of God, and close neighbours to the saints. Aud this* form of godliness, *as it is of very easy compliance with flesh and blood, in this particular, in that according to this men only make their* actions new, *retaining still their* old natures; *so it* is also of great credit and esteem *with* carnal gospellers. *But the* spiritual man judgeth all things, and yet he himself is judged of no man. *And he being partaker of the power of God himself, can in some measure discern both the* presence *and* want *of it in others, both which he knows in his own experience.*

Now this form of godliness, *is when men are godly without God, and anointed without Christ, and regenerate not having the Spirit; that is, when they have a* semblance of holiness, *but not the* thing *itself; a semblance of* grace, *retaining their*

old natures. *And such Christians as these perform* spiritual *duties with* natural *strength,* heavenly *duties with* earthly *strength, the* works *of God with the* power *of men; In the* religion *of these men, there is the* outward *duty done, and it may be very speciously and* plausibly, *but there is none of* Christ, *nor the* Spirit *in the duties. There is* their own working *towards God, which is faint and faithless, and not* God's own working *in them towards himself, which is lively and mighty. And all the religious acts they do are only their own operations, and not the operations of* God in them.

This form of godliness, *how pleasing soever it be to a man's* self, *and of what reckoning soever with* others, *who are like himself, yet is indeed of very* evil *and* woful consequence, *whether we regard the* doings *or* sufferings *unto which this* form *necessarily engages.*

For first, when men by occasion of this form *are called forth to do the great* works *of God, and yet are destitute of the* power *of God, their* duties *are above their* strength, *and their* Strength *bears no proportion to their* duties. *And so sooner or later meeting with* difficulties, *they faint and languish as a snail, their* works *being too high for their* faculties. *For* nature *being strained above its power, and offering at that which is beyond its abilities, by degrees grows* weary, *and returns to its* old temper *again. And he that sought that* glory *which was* not *his own, at last lies down in his* own shame.

Again, the form of godliness *exposes a man to those* evils, *that are incident to the faithful because of* godliness. *Now when a man hath the* same evils *with the faithful, and not the* same power *to support him under those evils; when men have the same evils in the* flesh, *but not the same power in the* Spirit, *the same burthens on their shoulders, but not the same* everlasting arms *underneath them, they fall* sadly *and* desperately, *to the great* scandal *of the ways of God.*

However, if men be not called forth, to such eminent *doings and sufferings, and so scape such* manifest *discoveries and downfalls; yet the* form of godliness *hath this evil in it, that it brings a man only to the* troublesome *part of* religion, *but not to the* comfortable; *it engages a man in the same* duties *with the godly, but supplies him not with the same* strength; *it involves him in the same* bitterness of flesh, *but doth not furnish him with the same* joy of Spirit. *For as such a man's* religion *doth not reach above* flesh and blood, *no more doth his* strength and comforts. *And so he performs duties at a low rate; yea and his* bare *and* empty form *casts a black vail upon* religion, *and utterly obscures its* beauty and glory, *and*

makes the world judge meanly of it, and to think it a matter only of singularity *and* humour, *and not of* power. *Whereas when a* Christian *walks in the* strength *of the* Spirit, *doing and suffering the will of* God, beyond *all strength and abilities of* flesh *and* blood, *the world oftentimes* wonders *and* gazes *at him, and many are provoked to* glorify God, *who hath given such power to* men.

For this power of godliness, *among other things, hath these* three *advantages.*

1. *It makes a man do every duty* strongly *and* mightily. *And whatever might take a man off from duty, or distract and disturb him in it, all falls to nothing before this* power. *There is that* strength *in each duty, performed by the power of the* anointing, *which declares it to be the operation of* God himself *in man, and nothing else but the very* power of God, *that is, Jesus Christ himself, in action in us.*

2. *It makes a man* inflexible *in the ways of God, that he shall neither turn* to *the right hand nor to the left, but take* straight *steps towards the mark set before him. No fear nor favours, nor frowns, nor flatteries, nor temptations, nor insinuations, nor designs of others, nor ends of his own can turn him aside. He carries such* strength *in his Spirit, as he can never be* bended, *and so far forth as he partakes of the* power *of* God, *is as* unmovable *and* unchangable *as God himself.*

3. *It makes a man* invincible, *by all* evils and enemies. *Because all the power* against *him is but the power of the* creature, *but the power* in *him is the power of God. And the power of* God, *easily overcomes the mightiest power of the* creature, *but is never* overcome *by it. And if this power in a* Christian, *should be prevailed against,* God *himself, who is that power, should be conquered, which is impossible.*

To conclude, the power of godliness *is the doer of every duty, in God's kingdom, the subduer of every sin, the conqueror of each tribulation and temptation, the life of every performance, the glory of each grace, the beauty of a Christian's life, the life, the stability of his conversation, the lustre of his religion, his great honour and excellency both in doing and suffering, yea it is the very glory of God himself, in the church of God; for by* faith the Lord arises on us, *and by this* power of godliness, *his glory is seen upon us.*

These considerations, right honourable, moved me to discourse of the power of the Holy Spirit, *coming on all Christians, ministers, and people. And besides the* importunity *of some other friends, your earnest desires of these notes hath especiall*

prevailed with me to publish them. Not that I am worthy to publish anything, but that the truth of God *is worthy to be published, be the* instrument *never so mean and unworthy.*—*And although I well know, the* doubtful success *of such undertakings as these, yet in this matter I am not at all* careful, *being most willing to be bound up in one condition with the* truth *of God, and to have with it, the same common* friends *and* enemies. *Besides if Christ dwell in my heart by faith, I carry in my bosom already my reward, out of whom I neither regard praise or dispraise, good or evil.*

Now I was bold to prefix your name *to these notes, because your* desire *of them hath made them yours, and also your many noble favors are a strong and continual engagement, for me to serve you according to what God hath made me. Especially I remember your extraordinary* compassion, *and* bowels *towards me, in the day of my* deepest distress, *when my soul drew near to the pit, and the shadow of death sat upon my eye lids, and I had not the least drop of comfort either from earth or heaven; you then shewed me the* kindness of the Lord, *and encompassed me both with your pity and goodness, though then through bitterness of Spirit I tasted it not, Wherefore when I remember the* wonderful *goodness of God to me after so great* sorrow *and* darkness, *I cannot forget that* part *of his goodness, which he was pleased to administer to me by your hands; and the remembrance of this, causes me to pray that God would double the* same *goodness on you, and that he would pour forth upon my* lord, *your* honour, *your* noble offspring *and* family, *this power of the Holy Spirit here treated of: which shall render you a thousand times more precious and excellent, before God and his Saints, than all* worldly *honour and nobility whatsoever. And by this means shall religion shine in your family, in its native beauty and lustre, and the kingdom of God which stands not in* word, *but in* power, *shall appear in its* bright glory *among you, till the kingdom of the Son first fit you, and then after* deliver *you up to the kingdom of the Father, and God be all in all immediately;*

Which is the earnest prayer of your most humble and faithful Servant,

WILLIAM DELL.

CHRIST's SPIRIT,

A

CHRISTIAN's STRENGTH.

ACTS I. 8.

"But ye shall receive power, when the Holy Ghost is come upon you and ye shall be witnesses unto me," &c. Or,

"You shall receive the power of the Holy Ghost coming upon you."

THESE words are the more *remarkable*, because the very *last words* in the conference between the Son of God, and his beloved apostles, immediately before his ascension into heaven. Now, you know, when dear and intimate friends are to part, as their *love* then runs strongest, and their *affections* are most entire and vehement, so then also, they especially discourse of those things, wherein most of all they desire to be satisfied and resolved. Thus was it between Christ and his apostles: never was there such dear and intimate *friendship*, and such sincere and burning *love* between any, as between them. The apostles, all of them, loved Christ most truly and passionately; and Peter, who had three times denied him, three times professed his love to him, and being sorry that Christ should question his love the third time, he thus answered, *Lord, thou knowest all things, thou knowest that I love thee.* And Christ also loved them dearly; yea he loved *them first, and having loved his own, he loved them to the end:* and so he was not discontented with them, for their leaving and forsaking him, through human infirmity, when he was led away to judgment and to death; for though death quite puts out all *natural* love, yet *spiritual* love is not *extinguished*, but *enlarged* by death. Now when such loving friends as these, were even now ready to take their last leave of one another, in regard of bodily presence, who would not, most willingly have been

present, to have heard what discourse passed between Christ and his *disciples*, at this, their last parting.

Now Luke acquaints us with the whole sum and substance of Christ's discourse with his apostles, all the time he lived together with them, after his *resurrection*, till the day wherein he *ascended* into heaven: In the third verse of this chapter, he saith, He did discourse with them, *de Regno Dei, touching the kingdom of God.* That is, not only touching his *spiritual kingdom*, which he sets up in each particular Christian, and which begins at our *regeneration*, and is consummate in *glorification*: but also touching his *mediatory* and *monarchial kingdom*: which, in the time appointed of his Father he should set up in the world; *when he should have the heathen for his inheritance, and the utmost ends of the earth for his possession, and all people, and nations, and languages should serve him, and he should reign from sea to sea, and from the river to the world's end.* This was the *sum* of Christ's discourse with them. And the apostles were fully satisfied touching the thing, only they were unsatisfied touching the time. For besides, that the setting up of this kingdom of the Messias in the power, beauty, and glory of it, was at that time the common discourse and expectation of *all Israel;* the apostles themselves remembered many *prophesies* and *promises* of the Old Testament, for the restoring of the kingdom of David, and this they thought *Christ* would have done, in the days of his flesh: but presently all their hopes were blasted by his *death*. But when they saw him *risen* from the *dead*, then presently their hearts were revived into their former *hopes*; but yet again, seeing nothing done, all the time he conversed with them after the *resurrection*, when now he was ready to *ascend* into heaven, they desired him, *first* to resolve them of this question, Whether or no he would, at that time, restore the kingdom to Israel? *Lord*, (say they) *Wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom to Israel?* Now, Christ doth not deny the restoring of the kingdom to Israel, but denies to acquaint them with the time when it should be done: He tells them, *It was not for them to know the times*

and seasons, which the Father had put in his own power. ver. 7.

The like *answer* to the like *demand*, Daniel received in his time: for when the *angel* had represented to Daniel the total destruction of the image of *worldly monarchy*, together with the rise, and reign, and ruin of *antichrist*, and the setting up *Christ's kingdom* in the world, in the stead of the two former, Daniel said, chap. xii. 8. *and I heard, but I understood not; then said I, O my Lord! What shall be the end of these things?* and he said, *go thy way Daniel, for the words are closed up, and sealed till the time of the end.* So that the angel, who discovered the *things* themselves to Daniel, refused to discover to him plainly and expressly the time when they should be done: but that was to be closed and sealed up to the time of the *end.* And so here in like manner, Christ, who had discoursed largely and clearly to the disciples touching the *kingdom of God;* yet denies to disoover to them the *time*, when it should be set up in the *world.* And the reason why he denied this to them, to whom he had not denied himself, was not for want of love, but because the Father had kept the time and season, wherein all this should be done, in his *own power.*—Had this been placed in Christ's power, he had, no doubt, made it known to them, as well as he did those other things which he had heard from his Father; but the Father had not placed this in his Son's power, but had reserved it in his *own:* and the apostles were not to *pry* after that which was hidden with God, but were to content themselves with what he had *revealed.*

But though the Son did not reveal to them what the Father had kept in his *own* power; yet he tells them what the Father hath *promised* unto them, and what he had also put into his power, and what he would certainly perform ere long, and that was *the gift of the spirit of power*, saying, *but ye shall receive power when the Holy Ghost is come upon you, and you shall be witnesses to me, &c.* As if he should have said, do not you trouble yourselves about secret

things, which shall not be accomplished in the world, till many years after you are fallen asleep; but do you mind your present business, wherein you are to serve God in your generation; your present task is to be *witnesses* unto me, in Jerusalem and all Judea, and in Samaria, and to the utmost parts of the earth; to declare and make known what you have heard and seen with your eyes, and looked upon, and your hands have handled of the Word of Life: you are to testify to the world my *incarnation*, *doctrine*, *miracles*, *life*, *death*, *resurrection*, and my *kingdom* and *glory* that is to come: you are to make known to the world the high and deep, the great and glorious mystery of Christ and of the gospel; and that you may be fit for this great and weighty work, you shall receive the *power of the Holy Ghost: you shall receive power when the Holy Ghost is come upon you, &c.*

Which words also may be an answer to another question which disciples did, or might make after this manner.

2. Our dear Lord and Master, why wilt thou leave us, thy poor disciples, among so many evils and enemies in the world, which our *weaknesses* must of necessity sink under? we well remember how *fearful* and *foolish* we have been, whilst thou was yet with us; but how much more *timorous* and *trembling* shall we be when thou art gone from us? when thou wast apprehended by the armed power of the magistrates, thou knowest how we all forsook thee and fled; and I, said Peter, denied thee, and *forswore* thee, at the voice of a simple maid. And therefore if thou now quite leave us, what witnesses are we like to be unto thee, and what *preachers* of thy name among the obstinate Jews, among the angry and enraged *rulers* and *people*, who will be ready, for thy name's sake, every day to deliver us up to a new death? And how shall we be able to stand amidst so many difficulties, troubles, distresses, oppositions and persecutions, when thou hast left us? surely, we are such *weak* and *infirm* creatures, that we shall never be able to hold out, but shall lie down both in *shame* and *sorrow*.

Ans. To this Christ answers in these words, *accipietis virtutem, you shall receive the power of the Holy Ghost coming upon you.* As if he should have said, you have a *hard task* indeed, but you shall be furnished with *proportionable power.* The business you are to undertake, is not *human*, but *divine;* the things you are to teach are not *carnal*, but *spiritual;* the work that you are to set upon, is not man's work, but God's: you are to act among men for God; you are to act in the *world*, against the *world:* you are to act against the Devil, in the very midst of the Devil's kingdom. You are to convert *Infidels;* to make of *heathens, Christians;* to bring them near unto God, who are now without God *in the world;* to carry the *light of heaven* up and down this dark world, among the people that sit in *darkness*, and *shadow* of death, to shew them the way to life and salvation; you are to turn the world upside down; to change the manners and customs of the people; to bring them off from the *idolatry* of their fore-fathers, to worship the true God in spirit and truth; you are to reduce the earth into conformity with heaven, and set up God's kingdom here in this present world.— And all this you shall not do in ease and quietness, and prosperity and pleasure; but whilst you are thus employed and busied, you shall have the *whole world* rise up against you, and the devil prosecuting you with his utmost power through wicked men, and you shall not only be hated of all men, for my name's sake, but you shall be even *overwhelmed* with reproaches, obloquies, slanders, oppositions, persecutions, prisons, torments, deaths. And, therefore, that you may be able both *do* and to suffer all these things; *you shall receive the power of the Holy Ghost coming upon you.*

Now from these words, we shall note something *generally*, and something more *particularly.*

In *general* three things: the first is this,

1. That as Christ will not suffer his disciples to be *tempted* above their power, so neither to be *employed*

above their power; but he furnishes them with power *sufficient*, both for their *temptations* and for their *employments;* for their *sufferings*, and for their *doings*. And as *soldiers* that are under a wise and careful commander, when they are near an engagement, are not suffered to run rashly upon the enemy, nor permitted to go forth to battle till they are *armed* and *mounted;* so Christ would not suffer disciples to go forth in his warfare, to encounter so many evils, and oppositions, and persecutions, and the whole power of the *world*, and of the devil, till first he had armed them with the power of the *Holy Spirit; ye shall receive power when the Holy Ghost is come upon you*, &c.

Christ always gives unto all those whom he sends forth and employs, of his own *power* for his works; *heavenly* power for *heavenly* works, *spiritual* power for *spiritual* works, the power of God, to do the works of God. Indeed Christ gives unto some a greater measure of power, and to some a lesser, according as he intends to use some, in greater works and difficulties and some in lesser; but still they have of Christ's power, whether more or less, who are employed by Christ; and a little of that power that is communicated by Christ, will enable a man to do great things, far greater than the world suspects or imagines.

So that we may judge of our calling to any business, and of our employment in it, by the power we have received from Christ for it. If we have none of the power of Christ, we were never set on work by Christ; for Christ never sets any on his work, without communicating unto them of his power. And hereby we may certainly know and conclude, that those in the ministry, that are loose, and vicious, and idle, and negligent, and insufficient for that work, were never called to it, nor employed in it by Christ, but they run of their own heads, when they were not sent, and minister in the church for the *gain of money*, and *preach* only that they may *live*. Whereas, if Christ had employed them in that call-

ing, he would have furnished them with *abilities* for it: and they being destitute of such *abilities*, it is most evident, they were not sent by Christ.

Judge then what a kind of *reformation* this church were like to have, if some men might have their minds, who would have *ignorant* and *insufficient* men; yea, *loose* and *profane* men, tolerated in the ministry, under pretence of keeping up *ordinances*; when yet such men were never *employed* by Christ, nor *supplied* with any power from him: yea, and what *ordinances* (I pray) are those like to be, which are kept up by men that are *carnal*, not having the Spirit? but you see here that Christ's way and wisdom was different from this; for he *first* gives the apostles the power of the Spirit, and then sent them to preach, when he had first *enabled* them to preach.

2. You see here that Christ, being to leave his disciples, in regard of his *bodily* presence, yet leaves behind him the *promise* of the spirit of power; and this was some *establishment* to them; yea, this gave great *joy* and *comfort* to them, who before had their hearts filled with *sorrow*.

Christ, though sometime he leave his people in regard of *sense*, yet he never leaves them without a *promise*. The soul sometimes, in the hours of temptation and desertion, may want the sense and feeling of Christ, but it never wants a *promise* from Christ; and the *promise* makes Christ *presence* in his *absence*. For Christ himself is *spiritual* present in the promise, and not Christ only, but the Holy Spirit also; for Christ and the Spirit are never assunder, but as the Father and the Son are one, so is Christ and the Spirit one, and all are in the *promise*. And so the *promise* is able to uphold the soul in any condition, not because of its *own nature*, but because God, and Christ, and the Spirit are present in the *promise*, and they are infinitely able to support the soul through the *promise*, under the greatest *evils* either of *earth* or *hell*. Now this enjoyment of God in the promise, is the enjoyment of faith, and not of sense; and this en-

joyment of faith is the most excellent and intimate enjoyment of Christ. And thus may the soul enjoy Christ's presence in his absence; his presence according to faith, in his absence according to sense. And therefore Christ departing from his disciples, in regard of his bodily presence, leaves with them the promise of the Holy Spirit, and in that promise, his spiritual presence. And this is the worst condition that Christ ever leaves his true church in; he leaves them his presence in a promise, when, in regard of *sense* he forsakes them.

3. Note, that Luke being to speak in this book of the *Acts of the Apostles*, of the propagating and enlarging, and governing the Christian church; doth *first* make mention of the *pouring forth of the Spirit*, and that both upon the *apostles*, and afterwards upon the *disciples*. Signifying hereby, that there is nothing so necessary, for the increase and well-ordering of the true church of Christ, as *the pouring forth of the Spirit*. And therefore they are altogether deceived, and walk in the light of nature, and not of God, who think the increase, and propagation, and preservation, and establishment, and ordering of the church of God, depend especially upon the counsels, and degrees, and constitutions of men: and that without these, the church of God would soon come to woeful *disorder;* yea, to utter ruin and confusion; as if Christ and his Spirit sat idle in heaven, and had left the whole business of the church to men, and the *sacredpower* confirmed with the *secular*, were abundantly sufficient for the *increase* and *well-ordering* of the church. In the meantime not regarding the *promise* of the Father, or the *pouring* out of the Spirit by the Son. And this is the very *mystery of the mystery of iniquity* among us, and the very head of *antichrist*, which is yet to be broken. And, therefore, let us know, that as the Psalmist saith, *except the Lord build the house, they labour in vain that build it: and except the Lord keep the city, the watchman watcheth but in vain:* so also, except the Lord, through his word, pour forth his promise of the Spirit, and by

that Spirit of his, in and through the word, enlarge and govern the church, they *labour in vain*, that undertake these things of themselves For it is the Spirit alone that through the faithful ministry of the word, makes the increase of the church, and lays hold on all the elect, and brings them through faith into the unity of the Son and of the Father, and teaches them, and orders them, and governs them, and preserves them. And therefore you see here that the *promise of the Spirit* is first performed, before the church of God hath any *enlargement* or *government.*

And now from these *general* things we proceed to the words more *particularly. Ye shall receive power when the Holy Ghost is come upon you.*

And here you may note two things.

1. What he *promises* them, and that is *power*; *you shall receive power.*

2. How they should be made partakers of that power, and that was *by the Holy Spirit coming upon them.*

The *point* we will insist on from both; is this,

That *the receiving of the Spirit, is the receiving of power:* till we receive the Spirit we are altogether without power; and when we receive the Spirit, then first of all do we receive power; power from on *high.*

By *nature* we are all without *strength*, weak, impotent creatures, utterly unable to do any thing that is *truly* and *spiritually*, *righteous* and *good.* For by nature we are nothing but flesh; *for that which is born of the flesh is flesh, and all flesh is as grass:* a fading, and withering of it; that is, the perfections and excellencies of it. So that by nature we are all without power, because we are nothing but flesh, of which weakness is an inseparable adjunct.

But when we receive the Spirit, we receive power: for power is an inseparable adjunct of the Spirit, as *weakness* is of flesh: yea, the *Spirit itself* which is given us, is *power*, and that both *essentially* and *operatively*, in itself, and in us,

1. The Spirit is power *essentially* in itself: for it is one God with the Father and the Son, co-essential;

co-equal, co-eternal; and so as Christ is the power of God, so also is the Spirit the power of God; yea, the Spirit is the God of power, as well as the *power* of God. So that the Spirit is power in himself *essentially*, and he that partakes of the power of the Spirit, partakes of that power, which is God and no *creature*.

2. The Spirit is power *operatively* in us, by being in us,

1. A *spirit of knowledge*; for the Holy Spirit teaches us to know *the things that are freely given to us of God:* yea, he teaches us to know, what *sin is*, and what *righteousness;* what *death* is, and what *life;* what *heaven* is, and what *hell;* what *ourselves* are, and what God is, and these things he teaches us to know otherwise than other men know them. In a word the Spirit teaches a Christian to know all things, that is to know God, and the kingdom of God, and all the *things* of both, all *other* things being *nothing* in comparison of these. Thus the Holy Spirit is a *Spirit of knowledge* in us, and so of *power;* for *knowledge is the strength of a man; whereas* an *ignorant* man is a *weak* man, you may carry him whither you will; but *knowledge* renders a man strong and immoveable. And in all things, wherein the Holy Spirit is a Spirit of *knowledge* in us, he is also a Spirit of strength.

The Holy Spirit is a Spirit of *power* in us, by being in us a *Spirit of truth.* And so the Spirit is, because it doth not only lead us *unto the truth* (that is unto the word which is the only truth, as it is written, *sanctify them through the truth, thy word is truth*) but also, the Spirit leads *us into the truth;* it leads *us* into the *truth*, and the *truth* into *us*, till we and it become *one* by an inseparable union. The Holy Spirit takes a believer, and leads him into *one* truth after *another*, till at last it leads him into all *truth.* Now wherein the Spirit, is a *Spirit of truth* to us, it is a *Spirit of power;* for through the *truth*, we learn from the *Spirit of truth*, we are altogether stedfast and immoveable, among variety of *different* and *contrary* winds of doctrine — And this is the very cause, that among so many di-

visions, and factions, and errors, and heresies, which woefully prevail in these present times of ours, the people of God are not *seduced* and *overcome*, to wit, because they *are all taught of God;* of God, and not of men, and have the Spirit of truth to lead them into the truth; the Spirit I say, and not men: and so it is *impossible* that they should fully and finally be deceived. For wherein we are taught by the Spirit of God, it is impossible we should be perverted by men. Whereas on the contrary, the true ground, why so many are seduced and overcome by the errors and heresies of this age, is because they have taken up their *religion* only from *man's teaching*, and have received their opinions, or doctrine from men: and so what one man hath taught us, another man can unteach; yea, if we be led to the truth itself only by man, man can again lead us from it. For all the world cannot lead any man into the truth, till the Spirit lead him into it; and when the Spirit doth lead us into the *truth*, all the men in the world cannot lead us out of it; but we are so sure of those things, wherein the Spirit hath been a teacher to us, that if all the *councils* and *churches* in the world; yea, all the angels of heaven should teach us contrary, we would hold them *accursed*. But a man that hath not been taught of the Spirit, every day you may win him into new opinions, by the power and authority of men, together with the strength of other advantages: but he that hath been led into the truth, by the *Spirit of truth*, is *immoveable* and *invincible* among all doctrines. And thus, also, the Holy Spirit, by being a *Spirit* of *truth*, is also a spirit of *power* in us.

3. The Holy Spirit is a Spirit of *power* in us, by being in us a Spirit of *wisdom:* and so it is, because it makes us wise with the *wisdom* of God, wise upon *earth* after the rate of *heaven*, *wise to salvation*.—There is no man *wise* without the Spirit of God; for the wisdom of *carnal man* is but *foolishness* before God; yea, before angels and saints: but the wisdom

of the Spirit is most gracious and heavenly wisdom. And this wisdom of the Spirit, is the strength of a Christian: the more he hath of it, the more *mighty* he is, both in all his *doings* and *endurings.* It is said Eccles. ix. 15. *that there was a poor wise man delivered a small city from the power of a mighty king:* and, therefore, Solomon concludes, that *wisdom is better than strength*; for it can do greater things than strength can. When David carried himself *wisely*, Saul a great king was afraid of him; he thought himself too weak to deal with David, and David too mighty to deal with him, because of his wisdom; and Solomon asked *wisdom* of God above all things, for the strength of his *government*; all *government, without* this, being but *weak* and *brittle.* Thus wisdom contributes *strength* to us, whereas we say of a man that wants *wisdom*, he is a *weak* man: and so the Holy Spirit, being a Spirit of wisdom in us, is also a Spirit of power.

4. The *Holy Spirit* is a Spirit of *power* in us, by being in us a Spirit of *faith:* For *faith* is a work of the *Spirit of power*; and no less power will work *faith in us*, than *that which raised up Christ from the dead*, when he lay under all the *sin of man*, and all the *wrath of God*, and all the *sorrows of death*, and all the *pains of hell*; it must be a *mighty power* indeed that must raise Christ then, and that *power* was the power of the Spirit; and no less power will work faith. So that whoever truly believes by this faith, of the operation of God, is sensible in his own soul of the *self-same* power that raised Christ up from the dead. And thus the Holy Spirit is a Spirit of *faith* in us, and so of *power.* For unbelief keeps a man in himself; but faith carries a man out to Christ; now there is no man *weaker* than he that rests on *himself*; and there is no man *stronger* than he that forsakes himself, and rests on Christ. And so a *man*, through the power of faith, is able both to do and endure the self-same things which *Christ* himself *did and endured.*

1. He is able to do the same *things that Christ himself did*; and therefore, saith Christ, *All things are*

possible to him that believeth; so that a *believer hath a kind of omnipotency*, and all things are possible to him because by faith he lays hold upon the power of God, and all things are possible to the power of God, and so all things are possible to a believer, who is partaker of that power of God. And hence Paul saith, I *can do all things through Christ that strengtheneth me*: This Christ that strengthened him, was the power of of God; and this power of God is not a *finite* power, but an *infinite*; nor a *particular* power, but an *universal*: and so can do, not some things only, but all things; and so also can all they who are truly partakers of it, by FAITH: Yea, Christ himself hath a greater expression than this; yea, such an one that I never durst have spoken, if Christ himself had not first spoken it; and that is this, John xiv. 12. *He that believeth in me, the works that I do, shall he do, and greater works than these, because I go to the Father.* Where Christ saith, a believer shall not only do the same works with himself, (which also had been a great thing) but also *greater works* than himself; and this indeed is altogether *admirable* and *wonderful*, That a *believer* shall do greater works than Christ: But how is this made good? Why thus, Christ he overcame the *law*, and *sin*, and *death*, and *hell*, and the whole power of the *devil*, in a body and soul free from sin; (his human nature being the immediate formation of the Holy Spirit in the womb of the Virgin Mary, and so had not the least spot of sin in it.) But now *believers* overcome the same evils, even the *law*, *sin*, *death*, *hell*, and the whole power of the devil, in *corrupted* and *polluted* nature, in bodies and souls, at the first, *full* of sin, and afterwards defiled through many corruptions. The *devil* came to Christ, and found nothing in him, and so he overcame: but he comes to a believer and finds much in him, and yet he overcomes. And this truly is a greater work than Christ did: and these works we do, but not through our own power, but through Christ's, of which we truly partake through *faith*.

2. A Christian, through the power of faith, is able,

not only to do, but also *to suffer the same things that* Christ *himself suffered.* Now the *sufferings* of Christ were the most grievous and intolerable to nature that ever were. For how did Christ, for the present, as it were, lay aside his divine nature, that he might suffer in his human; and how did he suffer in this, the whole *weight* and *condemnation* of sin to the very *utmost*, and the whole *wrath* of God to the utmost, and all the *sorrows* of *death*, and the pains of hell to the very utmost: and among all the sufferings had not the least drop of comfort, either from *heaven* or *earth*; and yet through the power of the Spirit, he endured and overcame all. And so each Christian, is able to endure and overcome the same evils by the same power: and therefore Paul desired to know Christ truly, and not only the power of his *resurrection*, which any one would desire to know, but also the fellowship of his sufferings, which flesh and blood trembles at; yea, and to be made *conformable to his very death:* yea, I add yet further, that if a Christian should chance to fall down into hell (as we believe Christ descended into hell, and so also many of his saints have done, as David and Hezekiah, &c.) yet a Christian, through the power of the Spirit, were able to overcome both the sins and the pains of hell; and therefore, saith Solomon, *love* (which is the power of the Spirit) *is too strong for death, and too hard, or too cruel for hell:* As is evident in that *godly woman* (for I will name but one instance instead of many) who thinking of the torments of hell, and of the *hatred* and *blasphemy* of God, which reigned in the *damned*, did earnestly entreat God, *ut etiamsi damnaretur, tamen Deum diligeret;* that though she were *damned*, yet still she might love God. Here love was too hard for hell indeed.

And thus a *believer*, through faith, is enabled both to do and endure the self-same things which Christ himself did and endured; and the Holy Spirit, by being a Spirit of faith, is a Spirit of power in us.

5. The Holy Spirit is a Spirit of power in us, by being in us, a Spirit of *righteousness*: and so he is two ways.

1. In regard of *mortifying* sin: for the Spirit of God dwelling in us, is not *idle* in us, but continually *active;* and so from day to day *mortfies sin.* And this is the proper work of the Spirit in our flesh, to destroy out of us whatsoever is contrary to itself; and that is, every *sin, lust,* and *corruption.* Now *our sins are our weakness;* a man's pride, and passion, and envy, and covetousness, and lust, and intemperance, and every sin is his *weakness.* Now the Holy Spirit, by being in us a Spirit of righteousness, mortifies and destroys all our sins, and so takes away our *weakness.*

2. Again, as the Holy Spirit is a Spirit of righteousness in us in regard of *mortifying sin;* so also in regard of *imparting grace* to us. For all *grace* is the fruit and operation of the Spirit in our flesh; and as all light is from the sun, so is all grace from the Spirit. Now *every grace is so much strength in the soul: faith* so much strength; *hope,* so much strength: *love,* so much strength; and so *humility,* and *patience,* and *temperance,* and *godliness,* and *brotherly kindness;* and all other graces are so much strength: and according to each man's *measure* of grace, so is his *measure* of *strength;* and according to each man's measure of the Spirit, so is his measure of grace. And thus the Holy Spirit by being a Spirit of righteousness, is also in us a Spirit of power.

6. The Holy Spirit is a Spirit of power in us, by being in us a Spirit of the *fear of the Lord:* and so he is, by representing God to us in his *glory* and *majesty,* according as he hath revealed himself to us in his *word;* from which knowledge of God springs his fear. For what is the reason that the men of the world *fear* not God, but sin securely against the great and glorious God every day? Why, the reason is, because they know not the Lord. Now the Spirit comes and reveals the Father in the Son, and presents God to the soul, through his word, in his infinite and eternal power, and justice, and wisdom, and truth, and faithfulness, and love, and mercy, and goodness, &c. and shines to the soul, in each *attribute* of God; and now when a man sees *God* by his own light, and knows him

by his own teaching, then first doth he begin truly to fear God; and the fear of God is his strength. For he that fears God, is free from all other fear: he fears not men of *high degree*, nor men of *low degree*, nor the united power of all the *creatures;* he fears not the fear of other men in their *evils*, but in the midst of all *fearful things*, he is without fear; because he *sanctifies the Lord of Hosts in himself, in his heart, and makes him his fear and his dread.* And by this means, amidst all evils, he hath admirable *confidence* and *assurance;* because he knows that no evil can befal him from any man, or from any creature, till first it be the will of God: and also, that whatsoever evil befalls him, according to the will of God, it shall work for good unto him in the end. Thus the fear of the Lord is a Christian's confidence, and a believer's strength:—whereas he that fears not God, fears every thing: yea, not only *real*, but imaginary evils; and as evils multiply his fears, so his fears again multiply his evils, till at last he be swallowed up of both. But the Holy Spirit being in us a Spirit of the fear of the Lord, is also in us a Spirit of strength.

7. The Holy Spirit is a Spirit of power in us, by being in us a Spirit of *love* and *unity*. The Holy Spirit is a Spirit of *love* and *unity* in the Godhead; for the Father loves the Son with the Spirit; and the Son loves the Father with the Spirit; and the Father is one with the Son in the Spirit; and the Son is one with the Father in the Spirit; and the Spirit is both the bond of *love* and *unity* between the Father and the Son, and God being most *love* and most *one*, is also most *strong*. Now what the Spirit is in the Godhead, he is the same in the *church* of God, which is the true temple and habitation of the Godhead; and that is a Spirit of *love* and *unity:* for why is there such constant *love* and *unity* between the members of the same *body*, but because one Spirit runs through them all; and so there is such constant *love* and *unity* between all believers, because one Holy Spirit runs through them all. And hence we may take notice of a remarkable difference between nature and grace; for

nature of one makes many; for we all, who are many among ourselves, even a whole world of men, were but one in Adam, *omnes eramus ille unus homo;* but grace of many makes one, for the Holy Spirit which is as fire, melts all the faithful into one mass or lump, and makes of many one body, one thing; yea, it makes them one in the unity of God, according to that of Christ, John xvii. 21. *That they all may be one, as thou Father art in me and I in thee, that they also may be one in us*: Mark the words, for they are *wonderful that they all may be one;* that is, that all believers, who are many among themselves, may be all made one; *one*, How *one? As thou Father art in me, and I in thee*, that is, as thou and I, being two persons, are yet but one God: after this highest example of unity, let them be made one in us; as long as they remain in themselves, they are many: and how much they remain in themselves they are many, for their unity is not in *themselves*, but they are *one in us*, who are *one*, that is, how much the saints, by the Spirit, are carried into the Father and the Son, who are *one*, so much also are they made *one*, not only with the Father and the Son, but also with *one another*. You may see in the Acts, how the multitude of believers, after they had received the Spirit, so far forth as they had received the Spirit, *Were of one heart and of one mind* And this unity of believers is their strength. And when God shall take away all those prejudices and suspicions, and jealousies, and particular ends and interests, and divisions, and separations, and schisms that are among his own people, and the people of God shall be reduced into his *blessed unity* among themselves, and the Lord be *one*, and his name *one* among them all; then shall the church also be of admirable and invincible power. *So that all they that strive with it shall perish; and all they that war against it shall be as nothing: yea, then shall the Lord make the church as a new sharp threshing instrument, having teeth, and it shall thresh the mountains* that is the kingdom of the world, *and shall beat them small, and shall make the hills*, (that is, the lesser commonwealths) *as chaff*. But

till the church of God attain to this unity, it shall not do any *excellent* thing; it shall not work any notable deliverance in the earth, neither shall the inhabitants of the world fall. When the Spirit of God shall be a Spirit of unity in the faithful, and shall heal all the sad differences and dissensions that are now between them, then also shall it be a Spirit of admirable power in them.

And thus much for the *explication* of the point.

The *use* is two-fold.

1. The *first* is, to exhort all men, every where, to endeavour to *partake* of this supernatural, spiritual, and divine power of the Holy Spirit, which is *certainly* communicated to all the *faithful* and *elect*, in Christ Jesus And let no man think it is a thing *indifferent*, whether he have this *power* or no, but know that the having of this *power* of the *Spirit*, is of *absolute* necessity, and that both for *ministers* and for all other Christians.

1. There is a *necessity* of this power of the Holy Spirit for *ministers*, and to them this present place doth chiefly relate.

1. For *first*, if they have not this power of the Holy Spirit, *they have no power at all.* For Christ sent *them* only as his Father sent *him;* and so Christ never gave unto them any *earthly* or *human*, or *secular* power, no power of *swords*, or *prisons*, no power of outward *constraint* and *violence.* Christ gave them no such *outward* and *worldly* power, for the enlargement of his *kingdom*, as not being at all *suitable* to it. For *his* kingdom is *spiritual;* and what can *carnal power* do in a *spiritual kingdom?* his kingdom is *heavenly* and what can *earthly power* do in a *heavenly kingdom?* his *kingdom* is not of *this world;* and what can *worldly power* do, in a kingdom that *is not of the world?* and though *antichrist* and his *ministers* have arrogated and usurped such a *carnal* and *earthly* and *worldly* power to themselves, in their *pretended* managing the *kingdom of Christ*, yet the *faithful ministers* of Christ *cannot.*

And therefore seein g the *ministers* of the gospel

have no power from *beneath*, they must needs have power from *on high;* seeing they have no *fleshly* power, they must needs have *spiritual* power; seeing they have no power from *earth* and from *men*, they must needs have power from *heaven* and from God; that is, the power of the Holy Spirit coming on them, or else they have no *power* at all.

2. The *ministers* of the gospel, must needs *have this* power of the Holy Spirit, because *otherwise they are not sufficient for the ministry.* For no man is *sufficient* for the work of the *ministry,* by any *natural* parts and abilities of his own, nor yet by any *acquired* parts of human learning and knowledge, but only by this *power* of the Holy Spirit, and till he be endowed with *this,* notwithstanding all his *other* accomplishments, he is altogether *insufficient.* And therefore, the *very apostles* were to keep silence till they were endued with *this* power: they were to wait at Jerusalem, till they had received the *promise of the Spirit,* and not to preach till *then.* Yet Christ himself, did not betake himself to the work of *ministry,* till *first,* the Spirit of God came upon him, and anointed him to *preach.* And, therefore, for thirty years together he did not preach publicly and ordinarily till at John's baptism, he received this *power* of the Spirit coming on him. Now if Christ himself and his *apostles,* were not sufficient for the ministry, till they had received this power from on high, no more are any other ministers whatsoever. For, as I said, it is not *natural* parts and abilities, and gifts, and learning, and eloquence, and accomplishments, that make any man sufficient for the ministry, but only the power of the Holy Spirit coming upon him. So that whoever is destitute of the Spirit of power, is *insufficient* for the work of the *ministry;* and that in these regards,

1. Without this power of the Spirit, ministers are utterly unable to *preach the word;* that is the true, spiritual, and living word of God. For to preach

this word of God, requires the *power of God.* One may speak the word of *man* by the power of man: but he cannot speak the word of God, but by the *power* of God. And Christ himself, in all his ministry spake nothing of himself in the strength of his *human nature:* but he spake, all he did speak, by the power of God: and without this *power of God* he could not have spoken one word of God. And so in like manner, no man is able to preach Christ; but by the Holy Spirit, which is the power of God. For Christ is the power of God; and can never be represented but by the Holy Spirit, which is the *power of God.* For as we see *light* in his *light:* that is, the Father who is *light,* in the Son, who is *light:* or else, the Son who is *light,* in the Holy Spirit who is *light:* so we know *power* in his *power,* that is, the Son, who is *power,* in the Holy Spirit, who is *power.* And Christ, who is the *power* of God, can never be made known to the church, but by the ministration of the Spirit, which is the *power* of God. So that it is not an easy thing to preach Christ the power of God; yea, none can do it aright, but by the *power* of the Holy Spirit coming upon him.

2. Without this power of the Spirit ministers are unable to preach the *word powerfully.* They may, it may be, happen upon the *outward* word, yet there is no *power* in their ministry, till they have received this *power* of the Spirit coming upon them. Otherwise their ministry is *cold,* and there is no *heat* in it: it is weak, and there is no strength in it.

1. It is *cold,* and there is no *heat* in it. Without men have received the *power* of the Spirit, there is no *fire* in their preaching. Their ministry is unlike the ministry of Elias, whose ministry was as *fire;* and unlike John the Baptist's, who in his ministry was a *burning* and *shining* light; and unlike Christ's, whose ministry made the disciples hearts *burn* within them; and unlike the *apostles,* who, having received this Spirit, were as men made all of *fire,* running through the world and burning it up. Without this Spi-

rit a man's ministry is *cold*, it warms the hearts of none, it inflames the Spirit of none, but leaves men still *frozen* in their sins.

2. It is *weak* and hath no *might* in it. There is no strength in a ministry where there is no Spirit.—Whereas, when men have received the Spirit, then their ministry is a *powerful ministry*, as Paul saith, 1 Thess. i. 5. *the gospel came unto you, not in word only, but in power, and in the Holy Ghost:* and therefore in power, because in the Holy Spirit. And again, 1 Cor. ii. 4. *my speech and preaching was not with the enticing words of man's wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and power.* Where you see the Spirit and power in the *work* of the ministry are always *conjoined*, as the *sun* and *light* are. And that ministry that is in the Spirit is always in power; and being in power, it is always *effectual*, either to *convert* men, or to *enrage* them: and the *enraging of men* is as evident a sign of the Spirit of power in a man's ministry, as the conversation of men. Whereas, a *cold* and *dead* ministry, that is destitute of this power, doth (as we use to say) neither *good* nor *harm*, neither *converts* nor *enrages*. neither brings in *righteousness*, nor destroys *sin*, neither *kills* nor *quickens* any, but leaves men in their *old* temper for many years together, and never stirs them. But the ministration of the Spirit and power is *operative* and *mighty* and carries all before it. And though evil and carnal men will ever be murmuring, and wrangling, and opposing, and contending against such a ministry, yet they are never able to resist the *wisdom* and *Spirit* of it; as the *libertines*, *Cyrenians*, and *Alexandrians* were not able to resist the wisdom and Spirit by which Stephen spake. And therefore, let them that will needs be striving against such a ministry know, that they strive against more than a mere *man*, they strive against *power from on high*, against the greatest power that ever God put forth; against the power of Christ himself, and his Eternal Spirit, and so they shall never be able to prevail against this power, but

shall surely sink under it. But to return from whence we have a little digressed.

3. Without this power of the Spirit, as ministers are not able to preach the word, nor to preach it *powerfully*, so neither are they *able to hold out in their ministry*, and to carry it on strongly against all opposition and contradiction. Peter and John preached the *gospel*, but presently the *rulers* and *elders*, and *scribes* convented them; and straitly *threatened* them, and commanded them not to speak at all, nor to teach in the name of Jesus. And now if the apostles had wanted this power of the Spirit, they would presently have been *snibbed* and *awed*, and would have sneaked away, and you should have heard no more of them. But they having received this power, all the *threatenings* and *scornings* of the rulers and magistrates could not *deter* them from the discharge of their office, and that ministry they had received from Christ. But though before they were *fearful* and *trembling*, and daunted at the apprehension of the least *danger*; yet now having received this power, they are altogether *undaunted*, and said to the *rulers* and *elders*, *whether it be right in the sight of God, to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye*, Acts iv. 19. As if they should have said, O ye *rulers* and *elders* of the people, our case is a plain case, wherein ye are most willing that even your ownselves should be *judges:* for we have received a command from God to preach the gospel of his Son Jesus Christ; and you forbid us to do that which God hath commanded us. Now do you yourselves be *judges*, Who is fittest to be obeyed, God or *you?* the *great* and *glorious* God of heaven and earth, or *poor wretched* men, such as yourselves? nay, what God hath commanded us, we must, and will obey, against all your *threatenings* and *punishments*, and whatever you can *say* or *do*.—We cannot conceal, but must publish what we have seen and known of our Lord Jesus Christ, of his incarnation, life, death, resurrection, ascension, kingdom, glory, and of that great redemption and salva-

tion which he hath wrought and purchased for all the elect of God.

Now, I would to God, that the *unjust commands* of all magistrates, and secular powers whatsoever, might be no otherwise obeyed than this unjust command of the rulers was by Peter and John; and that no man would dare to yield more obedience to the creature, than to the Lord *of all.*

For no *princes* or *magistrates* in the world have any power to forbid the preaching of the *everlasting gospel*, which God hath commanded *should be published to all nations, for the obedience of faith.* I say, they have no power at all to forbid the preaching of this gospel, or of any *one truth* of it, though never so cross to their designs. And if they should, yet herein ought we to know no more obedience than Peter and John did here. We ought to obey God and not them, and to make known the whole *mind* of God, though it be never so *contrary* to their mind, after the example of Peter and John; who, having received this power of the Holy Spirit, held on their *ministry* against all the *countermands* and *threatenings*, and *punishments* of the magistrates: whereas, without this power, they had soon *fainted* and *failed*, and had never been able to have gone through with it

4. Without this power of the Holy Spirit, ministers are not able to *reprove the world.* For every man, by nature, seeks the *amity* of the world, and no man by his *good will*, would provoke the *enmity* of it against himself. And therefore, *flesh and blood* will never *reprove the world of sin*, but allows it, and countenances it in sin. But now the *Spirit when he is come, he will reprove the world of sin.* When a man hath this power of the Spirit in him, then presently he *reproves* and *argues* the world of sin, and so, by his ministry, bids *defiance* to the whole world, and *provokes* the whole world against himself. And this no man either can do, or dares do, except he be first endued with this *power of the Spirit* coming on him. And therefore saith Micah, chap. iii. 8. *I am full of power*

by the Spirit of the Lord, and of judgment, and of might, to declare unto Jacob *his transgression, and to* Israel *his sin.*

The world, of all other things, cannot endure the *reproof of sin*, and the *declaration* of its evil ways.—And therefore it is exceedingly *offended;* yea, and extremely *rages* against the *faithful* teachers of the word, with all sorts of *punishments* and *persecutions*, as the examples of all the prophets, apostles, and faithful teachers of the word of God in all ages do declare: yea, and Christ himself testifies, touching himself, *therefore the world hates me, because I testify of it, that the works thereof are evil.* But now, they that will connive at sin, and flatter the world in its own ways, these are the only men of *reckoning*, and live in all worldly honour and prosperity. And all ages can witness that all teachers are not of that *strength* and *resolution* to contemn the hatred and fury of the world: nay, the most are quite overcome with the *prosperity* of this present life, and with the desire of *friends* and *riches*, and *preferment*, and so wink at the sins of the world, and are ministers in whose mouths are *no reproofs*, though the whole world lie in *wickedness.* For thus they escape the *rage* and *violence*, and obtain the *favour* and *love* of the men of this world. And thus weak and unworthy are those men, who are only endued with their own Spirits—But now (saith Micah) *I am full of power by the Spirit of the Lord, and of judgment, and of might, to declare unto* Jacob *his transgression, and to* Israel *his sin.*

As if he should have said, the power of the Spirit of the Lord dwelling in me, puts forth itself two ways; in *judgment* and in *fortitude.*

First, in *judgment*, and this signifies the reproving and the condemning sin and wickedness, as the prophet himself explicates, saying, that *I might declare unto* Jacob *his transgression, and to* Israel *his sins.*—But seeing their being full of *judgment*, doth not want *danger*, but exposes a man to a thousand evils, inasmuch as the world can endure nothing less than

the *reproof of sin;* therefore I am, by the power of the Spirit, not only full of *judgment:* but also,

Secondly, full of *might;* and as the *Spirit of judgment,* exposes me to danger, so the *Spirit of might* enables me to contemn those dangers. So that though the world, *because of the Spirit of judgment,* threatens never so many evils; yet the prophet is not frighted from his office, but through the Spirit of *might* discharges it faithfully, in despight of all those threatenings.

And whatever *ministers* want this Spirit of *might,* though out of danger, they may be confident, yet at the very first encounter of evil, they will bend, and yield, and speak, and do all things for the favour of the world; rather than for the *truth's* sake they will expose themselves to the hatred and opposition of the world.

5. Without this power of the Spirit, they are unable to *wrestle with, and overcome the devil;* whose subtilty, and wrath, and malice, and power, they must needs encounter with in the work of the *ministry.* Christ, as soon as he was endued with this power and anointed by the Spirit to preach, was *immediately* led into the wilderness, to be *tempted of the devil,* who would feign have taken him off from the work of the *ministry,* if it had been *possible:* but Christ being endued with this *power,* overcame the devil. And Christ, before he sent his apostles to preach the kingdom of God, as you may see, Luke ix. 1. called them together, *and gave them power and authority over all devils;* and when they returned, they told him, that the *devils themselves* were subject to them. But now the seven sons of *Sceva,* who were destitute of this power, when they took upon them to call over one who had an evil *spirit,* the name of the Lord Jesus, and to say, *we adjure you by Jesus, whom Paul preached;* the evil Spirit answered and said, Jesus *I know, and Paul I know, but who are ye?* and so the man in whom the evil Spirit was, leaped upon them, and *overcame* them, and *prevailed* against them, and they fled away *naked* and *wounded,* Acts xix. So that they, being destitute of this *power from on high,* the

devil was presently too hard for them, and they were overcome by the devil. But now they that are invested with this power of the Holy Spirit, are able to wrestle with the *principalities and powers, and the rulers of the darkness of this world*, and to *out wrestle* them, and to tread Satan *himself* under their feet.

Sixthly, without this power of the Holy Spirit, they are unable *to suffer persecution for the word;* but the least *touch* of evil causes them to pull in their horns; and each *reproach*, and *opposition*, and *persecution* shakes them down. Whereas *this* power makes them confident, courageous, comfortable and invincible in the midst of all evils: see this in some examples, our Lord Jesus Christ being anointed with the Holy Spirit and with power, did not only preach the truth in his life, but also witnessed a good confession before Pontus Pilate, and sealed to the *truth with his death*. Paul, who was endued with the same power, when Agabus foretold him by the Holy Spirit his bonds at Jerusalem, and the brethren hearing it, came weeping to Paul, and besought him to keep himself out of bonds, by not going up thither; Paul reproved them, and told them, that he *was ready, not only to be bound but to die at Jerusalem for the Lord Jesus*. Chrysostom was endued with the *same power*, and so resolved to preach the truth, and not to depart from the truth, though the whole world should wage war against him *alone:* and professed, that he desired nothing more than to *suffer* for the cause of Christ; and that if it were *offered to him of God, whether he would immediately go to heaven, or stay on earth and suffer for Christ; he would a thousand times rather choose this latter than the former*. Because in going immediately to heaven he should seek himself, but in staying on earth to suffer for Christ, he should wholly deny himself, and seek his honor alone. Luther was endued with the *same Spirit of power*, and so when he was called to Wormes before the Emperor Charles the Fifth, and before all the estates of the empire, to render a reason of his doctrine, and some of his friends (perceiving undue dealing among his adversaries) persuaded

him not to expose himself to danger; but he answered with a mighty spirit, *I have decreed, and am resolved, because I am called, to go into the city in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, though I knew there were so many devils to oppose me, as there are tiles in all the houses of the city.* And when he was called to return to Wittenberge by the people, which he could not do without most evident and apparent *danger,* he being already condemned by the edicts and authority both of the Pope and Emperor; and so in regard of them, could expect no less than a *violent death* every day; yet, for all this he was resolved to return to his charge; and upon this occasion hath this passage to the duke of Saxony. *But what shall I do? unavoidable causes urge me, God himself calls and compels me, and here I will turn my back to no creature. Go to them! let me do it in the name of Jesus Christ, who is Lord both of life and death.*— Again in his answer to the dialogue of Sylvester Prierias, who had threatened him, he saith, *I have nothing that I can lose, I am the Lord's, and if I am lost, I am lost to the Lord; that is, I am found. And therefore seek somebody else to fright, for me you cannot.* Again, in his answer to Ambrosius Catharinus, he saith of the Pope, and his instruments, *they seek not to overcome me with scriptures, but to destroy me out of the earth, but I know, and am sure that Christ our Lord lives and reigns. And being even filled with this knowledge and confidence, I will not fear many thousands of popes. For greater is he that is in us, than he that is in the world* And again, in his epistle to his Father, he hath this remarkable passage, *what if the pope should kill me, or condemn me below hell? he cannot raise me up again when I am slain, and kill me a second and third time. And having once condemned me, I would never have him absolve me. For I am confident, that the day is at hand, wherein that kingdom of abomination and destruction shall be itself destroyed: but would I might first be counted worthy either to be burned or slain by him, that so my blood might cry the louder, and urge his judgment to be the more hastened. But*

if I am not worthy to testify with my blood, let me at least entreat and implore this mercy, that I may testify by my life and doctrine that Jesus Christ alone is our Lord, and God blessed for ever and ever.

Calm Melancthon was endued with the same Spirit of power, and so when his enemies threatened him not to leave him a place in all Germany whereon to set his foot, he said, *avido et tranquillo animo expecto exilium.* I expect *banishment with a desirous and peaceable mind.*

Many more *examples* might be produced to shew that when *ministers* are endued with the *power* of the Spirit coming on them, then they are *stronger* than all *opposition* and *persecution* whatsoever: otherwise, when those evils encounter them, they with Demas leave the *work* and embrace the *world.*

And thus you see, what *necessity* all the faithful *ministers* of the gospel have of the *power* of the Holy Spirit coming upon them; and without this power, though they be *called* ministers, yet they are *none.*— For without this power, they are *unable* to preach the word, to preach it *powerfully*, and to *persevere* and *hold out* in the course of the ministry; they are unable to *reprove* the *world*, to wrestle with and overcome the *devil;* and to suffer that *persecution*, which necessarily attends that calling. And so without this power, they may minister to *themselves*, but cannot minister to *others*, the manifold graces of God: they may do their *own* work, but they cannot do God's work; they may feed *themselves*, but not the *flock of Christ:* they may *domineer* over the sheep, but cannot *drive* away the wolf: they may build up their *own houses*, but cannot build up God's house.

Secondly, as the Holy Spirit and the *power* of it is necessary for *ministers*, so also, for all other Christians whatsoever.

But some here will be ready to say, yea, but do *all believers* receive the Spirit of God, and the *power* of the Spirit as *ministers* do?

Yes, *equally* and *alike* with them, without any difference. This is evident, Acts. xi. 15. where Peter

tells the Jews, who contended with him for conversing and eating with the Gentiles, that when *he began to speak the word to them, the Holy Spirit fell on them (saith he) as on us at the beginning*. And again ver. 17. *forasmuch then as God gave unto them the like gift as he did unto us, who believed on the Lord Jesus Christ, what was I, that I could withstand God.* So that God gave the Holy Spirit to as many Gentiles as *believed*, in like manner as he did unto the apostles themselves: and they received the *same power* of the Holy Spirit coming on *them*, as the apostles did. Whereby you may perceive that not *ministers* only are *spiritual* men, and all others *temporal*, as the papists have taught, and many ignorant people among ourselves, are still persuaded, but *all true believers* are *spiritual* as well as they, being *born* of the Spirit, and *baptized* with the Spirit, equally as *they* are.

And so all *true believers*, as well as *ministers* being endued with the Spirit; are also endued with the *power* of the Spirit, and so have more than an *earthly* power in them: they have *all* of them, power of another *nature* than the power of the world; they partake of *spiritually*, *heavenly* and *divine* power, even of the very power of Christ himself, which infinitely transcends all the power of the *creature.*

You see then clearly, that all *faithful Christians* have the Spirit of power, and the *power* of the Spirit coming on *them*, as well as *ministers:* and they stand in *need* of both these, for these causes,

1. They stand in need of the Spirit of *power*, first to *difference and distinguish them from reprobates and devils:* for, without the gift of the Spirit, there is no *difference* between *us* and *them.* For Michael doth not differ from the devil, nor Gabriel from Belzebub, but only by the Spirit: and Moses differs not from Pharaoh, nor Abel from Cain, nor Jacob from Esau, nor Peter from Judas, in regard of their *substance*, but in regard of the Spirit, which the one received, and the other were counted unworthy of.

2. To *advance* them above the *condition of flesh*

and blood, and above all those, in whom is none of God's Spirit. The *excellency* of each creature is according to its Spirit; for the more excellent the Spirit of the creature is, the more excellent is the creature *itself*; and each *creature* is valued and rated according to the Spirit of it. How *excellent* then must they be above all the *world*, who have received the *Spirit that is of God?* surely these are people of the most *excellent* Spirit: and hence, it is, that *the righteous is more excellent than his neighbour*, because his Spirit is more excellent than his *neighbours*.

3. To *unite them unto Christ*. The Spirit is the *bond of union* between the Father and the Son, in the Godhead; and the Father, and the Son are *one* in the Spirit (as we spake before) and now, the same Spirit, is our *bond of union* with Christ, and makes us *one* with Christ, as Christ is *one* with God, and unites us unto Christ, in the unity of God; for as Christ is one with the Father in the Spirit, so are we one with Christ in the Spirit: for *he that is joined to the Lord is one Spirit*; and he that is not *one* Spirit with the Lord, is not joined to him.

4. All faithful Christians stand in need of the power of the Spirit, as well as of the Spirit of power.

1. To change their nature which is impossible to all power, but the power of the Spirit. It would be a great power to change clay into gold, and a pebble into a diamond; but it is a greater change that is wrought in a Christian, and requires a greater power. For the power of the Spirit, when it comes into our flesh, changes the nature of it: for it finds a man *carnal*, it makes him *spiritual*; it finds him *earthly*, it makes him *heavenly*; it finds him a *drunkard*, it makes him *sober*; an *adulterer*, it makes him *chaste*; a *swearer*, it makes him *fear an oath*; *proud*, it makes him *humble*; it finds him *darkness*, makes him *light* in the Lord; in a word, it finds him nothing but a *lump of sin*, and makes him the *righteousness* of God in Christ. Thus the power of the Spirit, changes our whole corrupt nature, and makes it conformable to the divine nature; as fire makes the iron, in which

it prevails like unto itself, communicating its own nature to it. After this sort, the power of the Spirit changes our nature, and our nature cannot be changed without it. But without this power of Spirit, we shall always remain the same we were born, without any change at all: yea, our corruption will, by daily use and exercise, increase in us, till at last it quite eat out that common natural good, which God hath given to every one of us, for the common benefit of mankind.

2ndly. All Christians have need of the power of the Spirit to work grace in them. For our natures are wholly carnal and corrupt; and nothing can implant grace in them but the mighty power of God's Spirit. And it is as great a miracle, to see the grace of God dwelling in the corrupt nature of man, as to see the stars grow upon the earth. And yet the power of the Spirit doth this, as it is written, *truth shall spring out of the earth*; and again, *great and precious promises are made to us, that we should be partakers of the divine nature:* and again, *he hath predestinated us that we should be conformable to the image of his Son.* That is, as in other things, so also in all his virtues. So that the power of the Spirit implants grace in our nature; and each grace is so much of the power of the Spirit, in our flesh, as was said before. Wherefore we must needs learn to know *whose power* the power of grace is. For though grace be a power in our flesh, it is not the power of our flesh: for Paul saith, *in me, that is, in my flesh, dwells no good thing*, but, and if any good be in my flesh, it dwells not in my flesh, but in God's Spirit which dwells in me As light is in the air, but dwells in the sun, so when men are regenerate, good is in the flesh, but dwells in the Spirit: for grace in the soul, is nothing but so much of the power of the Spirit, immediately dwelling and working in us; and when the Sp.rit is gone, all grace goes along with him, as all light with the sun; but it dwells in him, and is inseparable from him.

3rdly. All Christians stand in need of the power

of the Spirit, to enable them to mortify and destroy sin. There is no power in our flesh against sin; but all the power of our flesh is for it; and therefore it must be another power, than the power of our flesh, that must destroy sin, and that can be no other, than the power of God's Spirit; and the power of the Spirit, destroys the whole body of sin, and each particular strong corruption.

1. The whole body of sin in all the parts and members, and branches of it, each several influence and operation of the Spirit, being a several destruction of some sin or other. For as the Spirit that is in us, lusts after envy, or pride, or vain-glory, or covetousness, or uncleanness, or the like; so the Spirit we have of God, according to its mighty power, destroys all those sinful works of our corrupt Spirit, and mortifies all the deeds of our flesh, according to that of Paul, *if ye mortify the deeds of the flesh by the spirit, ye shall live.* The flesh will never mortify its own deeds, but the Spirit must mortify the deeds of the flesh; and this will mortify them, according to the whole latitude of them.

2. Again, as the power of the Spirit subdues the whole body of sin, so also it over-powers each particular strong corruption, and keeps a Christian straight and upright in the ways of God. Every man hath some one corruption, to which by nature he is more inclined than to another, and this is the bias of a man; but the strength of the Spirit will overpower this: a bowl, if it be thrown with strength, knows not its bias but is carried on straight, as if it had no bias at all: so the godly have still some flesh in them which is their bias, and carries them from God to themselves and the world, but the strength of the Spirit takes away this bias, and make us take straight steps to God.

4 All Christians stand in need of the power of the Spirit, to enable them to perform duties, to perform them aright; that is, spiritually. For spiritual duties may be performed for the outward work carnally; and in such duties there is no strength but weakness, because there is none of the Spirit in them. For there is no power in any duty, except there be some-

thing of the Spirit in the duty. There is no more power in praying, nor in preaching, nor in hearing, nor in meditation, nor in reading, nor in resisting evil, nor in doing good, nor in any duty of sanctification, or of mortification, then there is the Spirit in them.

And according to the measure of the Spirit, in each duty, is the measure of *power* in the duty. If there be none of the Spirit in a man's duties, there is no *power* at all in them, but only weakness and deadness, and coldness, and unprofitableness. If a *little* of the Spirit, there is a little *power*, if *abundance* of the Spirit, *there* is a *great* power; and that duty that is most *spiritual* is the most *powerful*. And therefore saith Paul, *I will pray with the Spirit*, and I *will sing with the Spirit;* and all the worship of the faithful is in the Spirit. Phil iii. 3. *we are the circumcision which worship God in the Spirit, and have no confidence in the flesh:* so that there is no more *power* in any duty than there is of the Spirit in it, and there is no more *acceptance* of any duty with God, than there is of *power* in it.

Fifthly, all Christians stand in need of the power of the Spirit, to *enable* them to the *use of the word,* and that both in *private*, and in *public*, as occasion serves.

1. *In private;* for no man can say, *that Jesus is the Christ, but by the Holy Spirit.* No man can speak of Christ *spiritually*, but by the Spirit; and without this Spirit, which searches the deep things of God, and reveals them to us, Christians are *unable* to give the *sense* of the word of God in their *families* and among their *friends*, and acquaintance, and are also *ashamed* to do it: whereas the Spirit of God gives both *ability* and *boldness;* as Aquila and Prescilla his wife, did not only speak the word in their family, but also took Apollos a minister home, when they perceived him somewhat ignorant in the mystery of Christ, *and instructed him in the way of God more perfectly.*

2. They have need of the *power* of the Spirit, to enable them to speak the word of God in *public*, as every Christian may do, if he come where people are *igno-*

rant of God's word, and there be no *minister* to do it. This I say in such a case he may do, by virtue of his *anointing* with the Spirit; and for this you may see the practice of Stephen and Philip, who were but *deacons*, and not *elders* or *ministers*, and yet published the word where the people were *ignorant*; yea, you may see, Acts viii. how all the disciples except the apostles, were, by reason of a great persecution, scattered throughout the regions of Judea and Samaria; and they, that *were so scattered, went every where preaching the word*, because the people among which they were, were ignorant, and there was nobody else to do it: and God having made known Christ unto them, they could not, but *declare* him unto others: the love both of Christ, and of their *brethren* constraining them both. But this is in case of *necessity*, and *where other faithful Christians* are absent; otherwise when Christians are present, *no man can take that to himself, without the consent of all, which belongs to all.*

Sixthly, all Christians stand in need of this power of the Spirit, to enable them to confess the word before kings, and rulers, and magistrates, when they are called thereunto: whereas, without this power they would tremble, and bite in the truth. In the tenth chapter of Matthew, Christ tells his disciples, *that they should be brought before governors and kings for his name's sake.* But saith he, ver. 10. *when they shall deliver you up, take no thought how, or what ye shall speak, for it shall be given you, in that same hour, what ye shall speak. For it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh in you.* Here Christ tells his disciples, that they should be brought before great men; yea, before the greatest in the world, to give testimony to his truth: and surely, it is a very hard thing, for a man not to be daunted then, but to be immoveable before all worldly power and glory, and all the terrible frowns and threats of mighty men. Now, saith Christ, at such a time, when you are to speak before the armed power of the world, be not troubled beforehand, how, or what to say. For if you have Christ and his Spirit in your

hearts, you cannot want words in your mouths. And the truth which you profess is most glorious, when it it most naked, and destitute of the garnishings of human eloquence and wisdom. And therefore be not fearful beforehand, no nor yet careful, touching what you shall say, *for it shall be given you in that same hour;* in that same moment you shall have most present help. How so? *for it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that dwells in you.* The Spirit of truth, that dwells in you, shall enable you to speak the words of truth, when you are called to it. And though you, it may be, are plain and mean men, and your lips would tremble, and be quite closed up before such an assembly of power, and majesty: yet God's Spirit shall give you a mouth to speak, even then. And because, if you were only supplied with a mouth to speak at such a time, you would be ready to speak rashly, and foolishly, to the great prejudice and disadvantage of the truth, therefore he will give you not only a mouth, but wisdom too; and he himself will manage his own cause with your mouths. And you shall so speak, as all your adversaries shall not be able to resist the truth that you speak, but shall be so convinced in their consciences, that their tongues shall not know what to say. You shall have a mouth and wisdom, and they shall want both.

And thus, have many poor, mean, simple Christians, when brought before *rulers* and *magistrates*, been able to carry out the truth in that strength, that all their adversaries have been put to silence and shame, as you may see in a multitude of examples in the Book of Martyrs. And all this they did, by the power of the Spirit coming upon them.

Seventhly, and lastly. All Christians stand in need of the power of the Spirit, to overcome *affliction* and *persecutions*, from which it is impossible they should be free in this world, they being contrary to the world, and the whole world to them. A natural man who hath no strength in himself, but in his own strength, faints and fails under *affliction* and *persecution:* but the faithful have in them strength above their natural strength, strength above the strength of

men, even the strength of the Spirit coming on them, and so they endure and overcome. Our Spirits are weak Spirits, and are conquered by every evil; but when they are strengthened by the power of God's Spirit, they are over all evils, more than conquerors. And this is one thing observable, between natural and spiritual strength, in the overcoming of evil.— Natural strength seeks always to throw off the evil, and so it prevails: but spiritual strength never seeks the removing of evil, but let the evil be what it will it stands to it, and overcomes it. For the strength of the Spirit is easily able to overcome all evils that can happen to flesh and blood, whether they arise from earth or hell. And thus those blessed martyrs, mentioned Heb. xi. and thousands and ten thousands of their consorts since have overcome cruel mockings and scourgings, and bonds, and imprisonment, and stoning, and sawing in sunder, and slaying with the sword, and all the woes of poverty and want, and banishment, and of all living in wildernesses and caves and dens of the earth; these and all other evils they have mightily overcome, by this only power of the Spirit coming upon them. Thus we stand in need of the power of the Spirit, to overcome affliction and persecution; and how much power we have in affliction and persecution to endure them and overcome them, just so much of the power of the Spirit we have and no more.

And, thus also I have declared unto you what necessity all Christians have of the power of the Spirit coming on them as well as ministers: and this was to strengthen the use of exhortation.

The second use, is for information and instruction, after this manner. If the receiving of the Spirit be the receiving of power, then it clearly informs us, that the way to partake of this power, is to obtain this Spirit: and the way to increase this power is to increase this Spirit. I shall endeavour to speak to both these things, and so shall conclude.

1. The way to obtain this power, is to obtain the Spirit.

And that we may better obtain the Spirit, we must first prepare ourselves to receive the Spirit.

Now this preparation doth not stand (as Papists teach, and many ignorant persons among ourselves think) in sweeping the soul from sin, and then strewing it with graces, so that we may be fit to receive the Spirit.

For first, the sweeping of the soul from sin, is not a work of our own, before the coming of the Spirit but a work of the Spirit itself, after it is come: for no flesh can clear the soul of one sin, it is the Spirit must do that.

And secondly, for the strewing of the soul with grace, neither is this a work of our own, but a work of the Spirit itself, after it is come. For the Spirit itself brings all grace with it, and before the coming of the Spirit, there is no grace at all.

So that we cannot, by any acts of our own, prepare ourselves to receive the Spirit; but only by the Spirit we prepare ourselves to receive the Spirit. For it is not any work of our own, upon ourselves, but the immediate work of the Holy Spirit upon us, that can make us fit to receive himself: it lies wholly in his own power and goodness, first to prepare in us a place for himself, and then after to receive and entertain himself in that place he hath so prepared. Now the works of the Spirit, whereby he first prepares us for himself, and then entertains himself in us, are these two especially:

1. He empties us; and 2. he fills us with himself, whom he hath made empty.

1. He empties us: and this emptying, is the first, and chief work of the Spirit upon the elect, whereby he prepares them to receive himself. For the more empty a man is of other things, the more capable he is of the Spirit. If you would fill a vessel with any other liquor than it holds, you must first empty it of all that is in it before; if you would fill it with wine, you must empty it of beer, or water, if any such liquor be in it: for two material things cannot possibly subsist in the same place, at the same time, the substances of each being safe and sound. And so if the Holy Spirit, who is God, must come into us, all mor-

tal and unstable creatures, together with sin and ourselves, and whatever else is in us, must go forth: human reason, human wisdom, and righteousness, and power, and knowledge, cannot receive the Holy Spirit: but we must be emptied of these, if ever we would receive him.

We must thus suffer ourselves to be prepared by the Spirit, to receive the Spirit: but with this caution. That when the Spirit of God hath wrought this in us, we do not attribute it to ourselves, as our own work, nor think any thing of ourselves, but descend into our own mere nothing. Otherwise we shall be a hindrance to the Spirit, that he cannot work in us after a more excellent manner.

And when a man is thus empty of himself, and of other things, then he becomes poor in Spirit, and such the Spirit always fills, and descends into with a wonderful and irresistible power, and fills the outer and inner man, and all the superior and inferior faculties of the soul, with himself, and all the things of God.

And this is the second work of the Spirit, to fill those whom he hath emptied. Now the usual and ordinary means, through which the Spirit doth this, are these three.

1. The hearing of the word preached. But here we must distinguish of the word. For the law is the word of God, St. Paul, saith *that by that word the Spirit is not given, but by the word of the gospel.* And therefore how beautiful are the feet of them that bring the gospel of peace! for nothing is so sweet and precious as the word of the gospel, which brings with it the Holy Spirit. This you may see, Acts x. 44. where it is said, *that whilst Peter yet spake, the Holy Ghost fell on all them that heard the Word.* And therefore also the *gospel* is called the ministration of the Spirit; because as it proceeds from the Spirit, and the Holy Spirit gives utterance, so it also conveys the Spirit to the faithful. Now the gift of tongues and miracles, and such like gifts are at the present ceased in the church; but the gift of the Spirit is not ceased; and this the Lord still joins with the ministry of the gospel, that he may keep up in our hearts the due respects of

this ordinance, and may preserve us, from the ways of those men, *who seek for the Spirit without the word.*

2. Means, is faith in the word heard. For it is not every one that hears the word, that receives the Spirit: but only they that hear with the hearing of faith. For if thou hear the word of the gospel a thousand times, and wantest faith, thou shalt not receive the Spirit; for unbelief shuts up the heart against the Spirit, and ever opposes and resists the Spirit, and never receives it. But faith opens the heart to receive the Spirit.

By faith, we lay hold on Christ in the word: and, through our union with Christ, we obtain the Spirit: for we have not the Spirit immediately in itself, but in the flesh of Christ. And when we by faith, are made the flesh of Christ, then we partake of that Spirit that dwells in the flesh of Christ.

Now, through these two things, the word and faith, the Spirit communicates to us a new-birth; it begets us unto God: and so we, partaking of the nature of God, partake also of the Spirit of God. They that are born of men have nothing in them but the Spirit of men: but they that are born of God, have the Spirit of God.* *That which is born of the flesh is flesh*, and that hath no Spirit in it; *but that which is born of the Spirit is Spirit*, and hath Spirit in it. So that there is no means to partake of the Spirit of God but by being born of God; and the means by which we are born of God, are the word and faith.

3. Means is *prayer*. For Christ hath said, *the Spirit is given to them that ask.* And the disciples when they were to receive the promise of the Spirit, *continued with* one accord in *prayer and supplication.* Acts i. 14. For God who hath promised to give us his Spirit, hath commanded us to ask it: and when God hath a mind to give us the Spirit, he puts us in mind to ask it: yea, God gives us the Spirit, that by it we may ask the Spirit, seeing no man can ask the Spirit, but by the Spirit. Now in asking the Spirit, there is no difference, whether we ask it of the Father, or of the Son, seeing the Spirit proceeds from both, and is the Spirit of both. And therefore Christ promiseth the sending of the Spirit from both. From the Father

John xiv. *the Spirit which the Father will send in my name.* From himself, John xvi. *except I go, the Comforter will not come: but if I go, I will send him to you.* So that both the Father and the Son give the Spirit, and it is no matter whether we ask him, either of the Father in the Son, or of the Son in the Father.

And thus you see the way, to obtain this power, is to obtain the Spirit, and also by what means this is done.

2. The way to increase this power, is to increase the Spirit: and therefore it is as needful for us to know the means to increase the Spirit, as to receive it. And they among others are these:

1. *To continue in the use of the word.* As the Spirit is first given by the word, so by the same word it is increased; and the more any Christian is in the use of the word, the stronger and more vigorous and mighty is the Spirit in him: but the *neglect* of the word is the *quenching of the Spirit.* Let a Christian that is *strong* in the Spirit neglect the *word*, and he will soon become weak, and as a man without strength. For the Spirit is not *bestowed* on us, but through the *word*, neither doth it dwell in us but by the word; and the more the *word* dwells in our hearts by *faith*, the more the Spirit dwells in our hearts by the *word*. And according to the *measure* of the word in us, is the measure of the Spirit.

2. *To increase faith.* For the more we *believe*, the more we receive of Christ; and the more we receive of Christ, the more we receive of the Spirit in Christ. For *faith* doth not apprehend *bare* Christ, but Christ with his Spirit, because these are *inseparable.* Now always according to the measure of Christ in us is the measure of the Spirit; and according to the measure of faith is the measure of Christ in us. 3. *To be much in prayer.* For the *prayer* of the Spirit *increases* the Spirit. The more we have the Spirit, the more we *pray:* and the *more* we *pray*, the more we receive the Spirit. So that when we have the Spirit in truth, we shall have daily a greater and greater *increase* of it, till we be *filled with the Spirit.* For the Spirit comes from Christ, in whom is the *fullness* of the Spirit, and carries us back again to Christ, that we may receive still more of the Spirit. And so by the Spirit that is

in our hearts, we lay hold on the Spirit that is in Christ, and receive more and more of it.

4. *To turn ourselves daily from the creature to God.* For the more we *enlarge* our hearts towards the *creature* the less capable are we of the *Spirit of God.* For to live much upon the *creature*, is to live much according to the *flesh;* and this quenches and straitens the Spirit in us. And therefore, we must live *abstractedly* from the creatures; and so *use* them, as if we did not *use* them; and so *mind* them, as if we did not mind them; and *abandon* the contents and satisfactions of flesh and blood, and *wean* ourselves from all things but the *necessities of nature.* And the more *free* and *loose* we are from the *creature*, the more *capable* are we of God's Spirit, and the *operations* of it: he that lives at greatest *distance* from the *world*, and hath least communion [illegible] the *things* of it, hath always [illegible] God's Spirit. For as [illegible] saith, *if any man love the world, the love of* [illegible] (that is, the Holy Spirit) *is not in him:* so if any man love the Father, the love of the *world* is not in him: now the more any man loves the Father, the less he loves the *world:* and the *less* he loves the world, the *more* the Spirit dwells in him.

5. *To cease daily from our own works.* The more we act *ourselves*, the less doth the Spirit act in us.— And therefore we must, from day to day, *cease* from our own *works,* from the *operations* of our own minds, and understandings, and wills, and affections, and must not be the authors of our own *actions.* For we being flesh ourselves, whatever we do is fleshly, seeing the effect cannot be better than the cause. And if we mingle the works of our *flesh* with the works of God's Spirit, he will *cease* from working in us. But the *less* we act in ourselves, according to the principles of our *corrupt nature*, the more will the Spirit act in us, according to the principles of the *divine nature.* But our *own works*, are always a mighty *impediment*, to the *operations* of the Spirit.

6. To *increase* the Spirit in us, *we must give up ourselves to the Spirit, that he only may work in us, without the least opposition and resistance from us.* That as the soul acts all in the body, and the body doth

nothing of *itself*, but is subject to the *soul* in all things: so the Spirit may do all in us, and we may do nothing of ourselves without the Spirit, but be subject to the Spirit in all its operations. For the Spirit of God, cannot work *excellently* in us, except it work *all in all* in us. And in such a man, in whom the Spirit hath *full* power, the Spirit works many *wonderful* things, that he according to human sense is *ignorant* of. For the soul doth secretly nourish, and cherish, and refresh the body, and disperses *life* and Spirit through it, even when the body is asleep, and neither *feels* it, nor *knows* it, so the Holy Spirit dwelling in the soul, by a *secret* kind of operation, *works* many a thing in it, for the quickening and renewing it, whilst it oftentimes, for the present, is not so much as *sensible* of it.

7. The seventh means to *increase* the Spirit, *is to attribute the wo*[illegible] *Spirit to the Spirit*, and not to *ourselves.* F[illegible] of the Spirit: and take [illegible] his *own* works, he will work no longer in us. Wherefore we must *ascribe* unto the Spirit the *whole glory* of his own works, and acknowledge that we *ourselves* are nothing, and can do nothing; and that it is *he* only, that is all in all, and *works* all in all: and we ourselves, among all the excellent works of the Spirit in us, must so remain, as if we *were*, and *wrought* nothing at all; that so, all that is of flesh and blood, may be laid low in us, and the Spirit alone may be exalted; first, to do all in us: and then, to have all the glory of all that is done.

And thus you see the means to increase the Spirit, and so consequently strength, as well as to get it. And by the daily use and improvement of these means, we attain to a great degree of spiritual strength, that we may *walk and not be weary:* and may *run and not faint*, and may mount up as eagles, and may walk as angels among men, and as the powers of heaven upon earth to his praise and honor, who first communicates to us his own strength, and then by that strength of his own, works all our works in us: and thus is he *glorified in his saints, and admired in all them that believe.*

W. D.